Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting

Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting
Palash Dey , Neeldhara Misra , and Y. Narahari
?{palash|hari}@csa.iisc.ernet.in † [email protected]
?
†
?
?Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India † Indian Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar, India
WM, ` = 1 WM OM, ` = 1 OM SM, ` = 1
Plurality
Veto
P
P
k-Approval
Figure 1: Application of voting in AI
Voting in AI
• Recommender
systems, search engine aggregation, multiagent planning, Clarke tax etc.
• However, voting is susceptible to manipulation- a strategic agent may misreport her preference to
achieve better outcome.
• In this work, we study the complexity of manipulation problem when manipulators’ have partial
information about the votes of others.
k-Veto
NP-complete
Bucklin
Fallback
Copeland
P
coNP-hard
P
Borda
maximin
SM
NP-complete
coNP-hard
P
NP-hard
coNP-hard
α
Table 1: Summary of Results (` denotes the number of manipulators). The results in white follow immediately from the literature
Significance of Results
• Studied
Figure 2: Strategic Manipulation and Bribery
Problem Definitions
• r-W EAK
M ANIPULATION (WM): Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C, a
positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number of manipulators, and a candidate c, do there exist
|P|
votes 1, . . . , ` ∈ L(C) such that there exists an extension ∈ L(C) of P with
r(, 1, . . . , `) = c?
• r-O PPORTUNISTIC
M ANIPULATION (OM): Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates
C, a positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number of manipulators, and a candidate c, does there
exist an (r, c)-opportunistic `-vote profile?
• r-S TRONG
M ANIPULATION (SM): Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C, a
positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number of manipulators, and a candidate c, do there exist
|P|
votes (i)i∈` ∈ L(C) such that for every extension ∈ L(C) of P, we have r(, (i)i∈[`]) = c?
the computational complexity of manipulation under more realistic partial information
setting.
• Our results show that, for many common voting rules except plurality and veto voting rules,
manipulation becomes intractable even when manipulators know the other votes almost
entirely.
Acknowledgements
Palash Dey wishes to gratefully acknowledge support from Google India for providing him with a special fellowship
for carrying out his doctoral work. Neeldhara Misra acknowledges support by the INSPIRE Faculty Scheme, DST India
(project IFA12-ENG-31).