NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND L A B O U R MIGRATION THEORY: A
CANADIAN P E R S P E C T I V E
by
ANDREAS MATTHIAS O L L I G S C H L A E G E R
B . A . , Concordia U n i v e r s i t y ,
1984
A THESIS S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F
THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES
D e p a r t m e n t of Geography, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a
W e accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
T H E UNIVERSITY
O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A
JULY
1986
(c) A n d r e a s M a t t h i a s Olligschlaeger,
1986
DE-6
In p r e s e n t i n g
requirements
of
British
it
freely
agree
for
this
thesis
f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t
Columbia,
available
that
permission
that
that
for reference
d e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s
for
I agree
(3/81)
Columbia
the
make
further
this
thesis
h e a d o f my
It
this
s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t
of
^ x f x ^
I
or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h
1956 Main Mall
V a n c o u v e r , Canada
V6T 1Y3
Date
shall
and s t u d y .
may be g r a n t e d by t h e
permission.
of
University
Library
copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of
f i n a n c i a l gain
Department
the
the
for extensive copying of
s c h o l a r l y purposes
understood
in partial fulfilment
is
thesis
my w r i t t e n
ABSTRACT
T h i s thesis examines the theoretical and empirical base of neoclassical migration
analysis
in economic geography. It is shown that the key assumptions
of neoclassical
migration analysis stem from the broader m a r g i n a l equilibrium analysis and theory of
resource allocation that defines
the neoclassical
school. Spefically, the hypothesis
that
neoclassical economics makes with respect to labour migration is that labour flows
from
low wage, high u n e m p l o y m e n t regions to regions with high wages and low unemployment,
thus a r r i v i n g at a state of equilibrium. T h i s hypothesis is tested using C a n a d i a n labour
migration data for 1976-1981. It is found that the hypothesis is unable to explain labour
migration patterns i n C a n a d a because: first, the assumptions about h u m a n behaviour that
the neoclassical model makes are both too simplistic and unrealistic, as are those about the
nature of the economy, and second, migration seems to promote cumulative
rather t h a n move the system towards equilibrium.
ii
causation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
ii
List of Tables
v
List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgement
x
1. Introduction
1
2. Neoclassical Economics and Economic Geography
3
2.1 The Advent of Neoclassicism
3
2.2 Major Characteristics of Neoclassical Economic Theory
7
2.3 Criticisms of Neoclassical Economic Theory
12
2.4 Geographical Applications of Neoclassical Economics
14
3. Neoclassical Economics and Labour Migration
20
3.1 The Foundations of Neoclassical Labour Migration Theory
20
3.2 Empirical Application of Neoclassical Labour Migration Theory
22
3.2.1 Assumptions of Labour Migration
23
3.2.2 Geographical Models of Labour Migration
24
3.2.3 Empirical Applications
27
3.2.3.1 Micro-Adjustment Models
27
3.2.3.2 Macro-Adjustment Models
28
4. Data and Methodology
32
4.1 Data
32
4.2 Methodology
35
4.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
35
4.2.2 Methodology
38
5. Data Analysis
43
iii
5.1 Gross M i g r a t i o n F l o w s
43
5.2 L a b o u r F o r c e Adjusted M i g r a t i o n Rates
45
5.3
Migration
Rates
Adjusted
for
Labour
Force,
Distance
and
Intervening
Opportunities
57
5.4 Wages, U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates and Adjusted M i g r a t i o n Rates
69
5.5 N e t M i g r a t i o n and Changes in W a g e and U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates
73
5.6 S u m m a r y of Findings
76
6. A c c o u n t i n g for F a i l u r e s of the Neoclassical M i g r a t i o n Model
77
6.1 M a x i m i z a t i o n
77
6.2 T e m p o r a l Considerations
84
6.3 Social Constraints to L a b o u r M i g r a t i o n
86
6.4 L a b o u r M a r k e t s
87
6.5 G o v e r n m e n t Intervention
88
6.6 Spatial E q u i l i b r i u m
93
7. S u m m a r y and Conclusion
96
8. Bibliography
.•
iv
98
LIST OF TABLES
4.1.1 A m a l g a m a t i o n of Occupational G r o u p s
34
5.1.1 Gross M i g r a t i o n , 1976-1981, A l l Occupations
44
5.1.2 N e t E x c h a n g e M a t r i x , 1976-1981, A l l Occupations
44
5.2.1 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted
for Size of the L a b o u r Force,
1976-1981,
Managerial,
Administrative
46
5.2.2 Migration Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, N a t u r a l Sciences
.'
46
5.2.3 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Social Sciences47
5.2.4 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Teachers
5.2.5
M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force,
47
1976-1981, Medicine &
Health
5.2.6
48
Migration
Rates
Adjusted
for
Size
of the
Labour
Force,
1976-1981,
Fine
Commercial Artists
&
48
5.2.7 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Clerical W o r k e r s
49
5.2.8
Migration
Rates
Adjusted
for
Size
of
the
Labour
Force,
1976-1981,
Sales
Occupations
5.2.9
Migration
49
Rates
Adjusted
for
Size
of the
Labour
Force,
1976-1981,
Service
Occupations
50
5.2.10 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
5.2.11 M i g r a t i o n
Rates Adjusted
for Size of the L a b o u r Force,
Agriculture...50
1976-1981,
Primary
Occupations
5.2.12 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Processing
51
5.2.13 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, M a n u f a c t u r i n g
52
5.2.14 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Construction.52
5.2.15 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r F o r c e , 1976-1981, Transportation
53
5.2.16
Migration
Rates
Adjusted
for
Size
of the
Labour
Force,
1976-1981,
Occupations
Other
53
5.2.17 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, A l l Occupations
54
5.3.1 Regression of L a b o u r Force Adjusted M i g r a t i o n Rates with Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, b y Province of O r i g i n
56
5.3.2 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities,
1976-1981, M a n a g e r i a l , Administrative
5.3.3 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted
Opportunities,
59
for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
1976-1981, N a t u r a l Sciences
59
5.3.4 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities,
1976-1981, Social Sciences
60
5.3.5 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities,
1976-1981, Teachers
60
5.3.6 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Medicine & H e a l t h
61
5.3.7 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities,
1976-1981, F i n e & C o m m e r c i a l A r t i s t s
5.3.8 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted
Opportunities,
61
for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
1976-1981, Clerical W o r k e r s
;
vi
62
5.3.9 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Sales Occupations
62
5.3.10 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Service Occupations
63
5.3.11 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Agriculture
'.
63
5.3.12 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, P r i m a r y Occupations
64
5.3.13 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Processing
64
5.3.14 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, M a n u f a c t u r i n g
65
5.3.15 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, Construction T r a d e s
65
5.3.16 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1976-1981, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n
66
5.3.17 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities, 1876-1981, Other Occupations
5.4.1
Significance of Interregional Differences
66
in W a g e
Residual M i g r a t i o n , b y Province of O r i g i n
5.4.2
and U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates on
70
Significance of Interregional Differences
Reisdual M i g r a t i o n , by Occupation
in W a g e
and U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates on
72
5.5.1 Significance of N e t M i g r a t i o n on Changes in W a g e a n d U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates, 19761981, by Province
74
vii
5.5.2 Significance of N e t M i g r a t i o n on Changes i n W a g e and U n e m p l o y m e n t Rates, 19761981, by Occupation
75
6.5.1 C M M P Generated M i g r a t i o n as C o m p a r e d to the Total Internal M i g r a t i o n in C a n a d a ,
1966-1976
6.5.2
CMMP
90
Generated M i g r a t i o n as C o m p a r e d to the Total Internal
Migration, by
Province, 1976-77 a n d 1977-78
90
6.5.3 T h e Effects of Selected Changes in F i s c a l Structure on O u t - M i g r a t i o n Rates
From
the Atlantic Provinces Including Intra-Atlantic M o v e s , L o w e r Income C l a s s , 1968-1977..92
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.2.1 Feasible Resource Allocation as a n Intersection of Resource Constraints
10
2.4.1 Bid-Rent Functions a n d Locational E q u i l i b r i u m
15
2.4.2 Concentric Zone M o d e l of L a n d U s e
15
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
T h e two past two years at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a have been most
enjoyable. In particular I would like to thank m y supervisor, D r . T r e v o r B a r n e s , for his
support a n d patience during all phases of m y studies. T h a n k s also go to m y second- reader,
D r . K e n Denike, for providing help with the methodology. I a m particularly indebted to D r .
J a m e s W . Y o u n g , m y undergraduate supervisor at Concordia U n i v e r s i t y , for awakening
my
interest in economic
geography
a n d - apart from giving me
the
occasional
well-
deserved kicks in the r e a r end - for being such a n outstanding teacher. A b o v e all, however,
I would like to thank m y parents, Rudolf and Hildegard Olligschlaeger, who have sacrificed
so
much
in
providing
for
their
childrens'
education,
for
their
affection,
love
and
understanding. It is to them that I dedicate this thesis. F i n a l l y , m y graduation from this
university m a r k s the end of a six year stay in C a n a d a . D u r i n g those six years C a n a d i a n s
have at all times made me feel welcome and at home. So, like thanks a lot, eh?
x
1. INTRODUCTION.
E v e r since the departure from the descriptive type of economic geography (for some
examples see D i c k e n , 1955
and Alexandersson & N o r s t r o e m , 1963) in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, neoclassical economics has played a major role in the field. T h i s is recognized by
K i n g (1979, p.34), who characterizes most of current economic geography as: "positivistic,
decidedly
neoclassical
in
its
economic
foundations,
and
only
weakly
spatial".
Whereas
neoclassical economics has been heavily criticized for quite some time by economists (Robinson,
1962;
Dobb,
1973;
Rowthorn, 1974), it is only within the
last
15
y e a r s that
economic
geographers have begun to question the neoclassical theoretical foundations of their own
discipline (Massey, 1973; S a y e r , 1976; C l a r k , 1982,
1983; C l a r k & Gertler, 1983). T o this
date two alternative theories have been proposed: the M a r x i s t school of economic geography
( H a r v e y , 1982,
1985) a n d more recently the neo-Ricardian one (Barnes, 1984,
1985; B a r n e s
& S h e p p a r d , 1984).
L a b o u r migration has been the focus of m u c h attention in economic geography and
regional science. T h i s is largely due to the fact that it has traditionally played a n important
role in regional development and in the spatial economy as a whole. While there are m a n y
approaches to labour migration modelling, m u c h of contemporary migration analysis is based
upon neoclassical economic theory. Specifically, the notions of utility a n d resource allocation
which are crucial to the neoclassical scheme, are often k e y assumptions i n the analysis of
labour migration. These assumptions, however, have come under h e a v y criticism in recent
years (Greenwood, 1975; C l a r k & B a l l a r d ,
1979,
1980; C l a r k ,
1982,
1983; C u r r y ,
1985).
T h u s m a n y empirical studies have shown that such assumptions do not hold in the "real"
world.
H o w e v e r , in spite
of the
emergence
of the M a r x i s t
and neo-Ricardian schools
of
economic geography, to date no rigorous alternative theory to neoclassical labour migration
analysis has been proposed.
T h i s thesis will focus on the neoclassical theory of labour migration and test it using
C a n a d i a n interprovincial labour migration d a t a for the period 1976-1981. T h e second chapter
1
of the thesis will provide an overview of the development of the neoclassical school of thought
and show how its principles have been applied in economic geography. T h e third chapter will
establish the link between neoclassical economics and labour migration, a n d also outline two
empirically testable hypotheses that stem from the neoclassical analysis. T h e fourth chapter
will discuss the d a t a a n d methodology employed i n testing the two hypotheses. C h a p t e r five
analyses the data, and concludes that the neoclassical hypotheses concerning labour migration
are invalid at least for C a n a d a during this period. F i n a l l y , chapter six will critically examine
the neoclassical contentions about labour migration and suggest w h y the theory does not hold.
2
2. N E O C L A S S I C A L E C O N O M I C S A N D E C O N O M I C G E O G R A P H Y .
To understand neoclassical migration analysis, it is first necessary to be familiar with
the roots of neoclassicism itself. T h i s introductory chapter consists of four sections. F i r s t , a
brief history of neoclassical economics is presented. It will concentrate on those features of
neoclassicism that particularly have been employed in economic geography. T h e second section
will outline the major characteristics of neoclassical economic theory. T h e third section will
critically
examine
these
characteristics.
Finally,
the
fourth
section
will
present
some
geographical applications of neoclassical economics.
2.1 T h e A d v e n t o f N e o c l a s s i c i s m .
Neoclassical theory arose during the 1870's (Walsh & G r a m , 1980). A l t h o u g h the t e r m
"neoclassicism" itself was not coined until the e a r l y twentieth century. T h r e e authors and
their works are commonly associated with its origin: W i l l i a m Stanley Jevons
Political
Economy",
1871), C a r l M e n g e r ("Grundsaetze
L e o n W a l r a s ("Elements of Pure Economics",
essentially
1874)
der Volkswirtschaftslehre",
{"Theory of
1871)
and
(Dobb, 1973). These three works were
a reaction to the classical school of economic thought, as postulated by S m i t h ,
Ricardo and M a l t h u s (Walsh & G r a m , 1980).
F o r classical economists the p r i m a r y concern was the reproduction of the economy and
the m a x i m i z a t i o n of surplus, where surplus is defined as total output m i n u s those commodities
that are used up i n the production of that output.
In turn the surplus is divided a m o n g three
social classes: workers, landlords and capitalists. T h e problem of classical economics was then
to locate the mechanisms which determine what proportion of the surplus each class receives.
A n o t h e r feature of the school was its emphasis on the conditions of production. D e m a n d does
not p l a y a role because there are constant returns to scale, i.e., changes in output do not affect
per unit costs.
Neoclassical
economics,
on
the
other
hand,
emphasizes
exchange
rather
than
production. O n l y two sets of actors exist in the neoclassical world: producers and consumers.
Prices are
set
through the d e m a n d a n d supply. While consumers
3
are motivated to buy
(demand) goods i n order to acquire utility, producers are motivated to sell (supply) goods i n
order to acquire profits. T h r o u g h the action of supply and d e m a n d - the m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m resources are then allocated to the best possible uses. A s will be illustrated below, Jevons,
W a l r a s and M e n g e r each made a unique contribution to this new line of thought, which has
been more generally termed the "marginal revolution".
W i l l i a m Stanley Jevons' (1835-1882) major work, the "Theory of Political Economy"
published in 1871, was essentially
devoted to the determination of the mechanics of self-
interest and utility. T h e major novelty of Jevons' theory l a y in the singling out of the "final
degree of utility" and the subsequent equating of this with the exchange value of commodity.
In other words, the value (price) of a good depended on how m u c h pleasure ("utility") it would
give to a n individual. G i v e n that the "utility" of a n individual a n d the value of a commodity
are quantifiable factors, Jevons argued that a n y theory dealing with those variables should
necessarily be mathematical (Dobb, 1973). These ideas were directly opposed to the beliefs of
the classical economists who postulated that value was uniquely determined b y the costs of
production, a n d those of M a r x , who implied that it was determined b y the value of labour
(labour theory of value). T h i s was most likely one of the major reasons w h y economists at the
time were so reluctant to accept Jevons' principles (Howey, 1973). In fact, Jevons w a s better
known to his contemporaries as a n applied economist, rather t h a n as a theorist (Deane, 1978).
In constructing a theory that deals
with the exchange
of commodities
in light of
consumers' wants and needs, Jevons used a partial equilibrium approach. T h e t e r m "partial
equilibrium",
as
opposed
to
"general
equilibrium",
implies
that
onty
a
few
selected
relationships are examined i n detail, while other relationships are assumed to be constant
(Hoover, 1978). F o r example, if we w a n t to identify the effect of substituting between various
resources i n a production process, then the supply price of those resources is fixed at a
constant level. G e n e r a l equilibrium theories,
on the other h a n d , simultaneously
take
into
consideration a l l interdependent variables such as cost schedules, demand functions a n d prices.
4
Carl
M e n g e r (1840-1921) was
economic
thought.
lifetime.
Menger's
U n l i k e , Jevons,
theory,
put
the founder of the
he was
forward
Austrian
school of
widely recognized for his
in
his
"Grundsaetze
published in the same y e a r as Jevon's "Theory of Political
der
Economy",
neoclassical
writings during
his
Volkswirtschaftslehre",
was v e r y similar to that
of Jevons, except in that it was not mathematical .
The
objective
of
Menger's
1973).
"Grundsaetze"
development
(Streissler,
The
main
development
is brought about b y increases
was
to
of
his
thrust
sketch
a
argument
in h u m a n welfare,
theory
was
which is
of
economic
that
economic
defined
as
the
"constant widening of the range of goods and the improvement of their quality, i.e. changes in
the productive output" (Streissler, 1973, pp. 164-165). In the process of constructing his theory
of development, M e n g e r also constructed a theory of value which was v e r y close to that of
J e v o n s . T h e value of a "first order" (consumer) good was derived from its power of satisfying
h u m a n wants, whereas the value of a "higher order" (producer) good was determined by its
contribution to the production of goods that cater directly to h u m a n wants (Dobb, 1973). In
both cases the method used to derive the value was the so-called "loss principle", where the
value of a good is defined as the loss of satisfaction a person experiences i f he or she has to do
without it. In effect this is identical to the m a r g i n a l utility of a good: if a person is deprived of
a good then the decrease in the overall utility of that person is equal to the m a r g i n a l utility
times the quantity of the good that is lost.
U n l i k e Jevons, M e n g e r ' s concern was
always
out
of
equilibrium.
Menger
believed
the detailed study of a n economy which is
that
because
of
information
uncertainty,
disequilibrium is the n o r m within a n economy. T h i s belief also accounts for Menger's rejection
of the standard simplifying assumption of a single equilibrium price in a m a r k e t . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
it has also been judged to be the reason w h y he did not use mathematics.
L e o n W a l r a s (1834-1910) was the third, a n d perhaps most influential, of the three
founders of neoclassical economic theory. W a l r a s began work on his theory i n 1859, but did
5
not complete it until 1872 (Jaffe, 1973). H i s major work, "Elements of Pure Economics",
finally
was published in 1874.
W a l r a s ' s theory was expressed in mathematics . One of his m a i n achievements,
in
fact, was the "synthesis of various aspects of the new approach into a m a t h e m a t i c a l system of
m u t u a l dependence" (Dobb, 1973). T h e establishment of a "system of m u t u a l dependence"
refers to a situation of general equilibrium, where all the central variables are considered
simultaneously. T h i s is in direct contrast to Jevons and M e n g e r , with the former adopting a
partial equilibrium approach and the latter a s s u m i n g that the system is constantly out of
equilibrium.
In
his
"Elements
of Pure
Economics"
Walras
assumed
that
given
first,
certain
predetermined quantities of productive services a n d , second, free competition, there will be
three
so-called
"natural
effects"
(Jaffe,
1973):
(1)
certain definite
quantities
of various
products; (2) a definite price of each product at each moment in time; and, (3) a definite price
of each productive service at each moment in time. T h e goal of his theory was
thus to
determine how these quantities and prices are arrived at. H i s answer to this was to solve a
system of linear equations where the three "natural effects" appear as unknowns
(Jaffe,
1973). U n d e r these assumptions W a l r a s then proceeded to outline the two key concepts of his
work: the theory of exchange and the theory of m a r g i n a l utility. B o t h theories were brought
together at the m a r k e t place. E x c h a n g e will continue to occur until both sides can no longer
gain any more utility from further trade, at which point the equilibrium is reached. In more
general terms, the value of commodities is predetermined by their scarcity. T h e scarcer a
good, the greater is its m a r g i n a l utility and hence the higher its price. E q u i l i b r i u m prices are
then equal to the ratios of "raretes" (scarcities), where raretes are defined as the
"intensities
of the last wants satisfied for the holders of the commodities" (Dobb, 1973, p.204).
A s mentioned above, W a l r a s is considered b y m a n y authors to be the most influential
of the three founders of neoclassicism. I n fact, contemporary neoclassicism is often referred to
as "post-Walrasian" (Walsh & G r a m , 1980). T h e reason for this is that W a l r a s was far more
6
successful
t h a n Jevons or M e n g e r in establishing a clearly defined analytical link between
m a r g i n a l utility and the m a r k e t price of a commodity (Jaffe, 1973).
2.2 M A J O R CHARACTERISTICS OF N E O C L A S S I C A L E C O N O M I C T H E O R Y
Perhaps
the
importance follows
psychological
central feature
of
neoclassicism,
is
its
reliance
on
utility.
Utility's
from its role within the neoclassical theory of value. F o r utility is
entity
that
provides
a
good
with
value.
It
represents
the
the
fundamental
psychological satisfaction that is the motive behind any purchase. T w o features stem from the
nation of utility: first, following Jevons et a l . , there is a systematic relationship between price
(exchange value) and utility (use value). Second, because utility is what everyone wants, it
follows that producers and consumers employ their resources in the most efficient w a y , that is,
to realize as m u c h utility as possible given the available means. T h i s is termed "resource
allocation".
Given
these
preliminary
remarks,
the
intention
of
this
section
is
first
to
summarize the general characteristics of neoclassicism, and second, to discuss the concepts of
utility and resource allocation in detail. N o t only do the latter concepts play a pivotal role in
neoclassical economics, but, by extension, in neoclassical economic geography as well.
T h e r e are six major characteristics of neoclassical economic theory, all of which
been applied i n economic geography and regional science
(King,
have
1979). F i r s t , the principal
focus of neoclassical economics is on equilibrium analysis, both general and partial. W i t h i n this
context, the m a i n goal is to determine the conditions which m u s t exist if equilibrium is to be
stable.
T h u s the tasks of neoclassical economics are twofold: first, to show that equilibrium
exists, and second, to prove that if at any point in time the s y s t e m is out of equilibrium,
"forces exist that drive the system back to equilibrium" (King, 1979, p.37).
Second,
it
is
consumers.
Each
consumers
display
assumed
of these
the
that
only
groups act
same
two
in a
behaviour
groups
of individuals exist:
unified m a n n e r , in that both
and
make
identical
decisions
producers
and
producers and
under
the
same
circumstances. T h e a i m of both consumers and producers is to seek a state where they are as
7
well off as possible. T h i s leads to the third major characteristic: consumers seek to maximize
utility, while producers seek to maximize p r o f i t .
T h e fourth characteristic identifies the optimal state of a n economy once it has reached
equilibrium. Such a state is defined b y the so-called "Pareto-optimality" criterion (King, 1979).
A n equilibrium is considered to be Pareto optimal i f and only if there is no other point where at
least one consumer would be better off and no other consumers worse off ( M y r d a l , 1953). T h u s
in
Pareto-optimality
consumers'
utilities
are
maximized
thereby
allowing
the
"greatest
happiness for the greatest number".
F i f t h , it is generally assumed that there are constant returns to scale in production.
Production functions
are consequently
returns to scale, increases
all linear-homogeneous.
Because
there
are
constant
or decreases in the d e m a n d for a product will not lead to any
increases or decreases in its price. Prices are therefore supply inelastic.
Finally,
it is
assumed
that both
the
producers
and the
consumers
have
perfect
knowledge of all prices.
L e t us now first t u r n to the concept of "utilitj'". F r o m the previous discussion we have
seen that utility is a key to the theories of all three founders of neoclassicism. F o r Jevons it
was
the
amount of pleasure
a good provided;
for M e n g e r it represented
the amount of
displeasure an individual experienced i f he or she was deprived of that good (loss principle);
and for W a l r a s the utility of a good was linked to its scarcity: the scarcer a good, the more
satisfaction it provided to an individual. In general, however, all three were all referring to the
same thing: the use-value of a good.
T h e value of a good is directly derived from the utility it provides. J u s t as value can be
expressed i n terms of prices (a physical quantity), the basis of a good's value, utility, can then
be expressed in satisfaction (a psychological quantity). A l l individuals act to maximize their
utility, i.e., they strive to obtain the m a x i m u m satisfaction. T h e neoclassical argument goes
that in p u r s u i n g their own utility m a x i m i z a t i o n (see third characteristic above), individuals are
also
collectively
maximizing
society's
utility.
When
8
all
individuals' utilities
have
been
maximized
the
point of equilibrium is reached,
i.e.
it is
not possible
to change
without
decreasing the collective utility. T h u s the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Paretooptimality) is achieved. Therefore, neoclassicists argue, because all individuals have the same
goal, n a m e l y to m a x i m i z e their utilities, there is a n a t u r a l tendency towards a state of equilibrium. Consequently, it is in most cases not necessary to interfere with the economic process
in order to maximize h u m a n welfare.
Therefore the argument is that political economists
should adopt a "laissez faire" type of attitude.
Connected to the notion of utility is the concept of "marginal utility". T h e term was not
coined until the e a r l y 1900's, when it was introduced as a n alternative t e r m for Jevons' "final
utility" (Howey,
1973). T h e m a r g i n a l utility of a commodity is the change
in utility
an
individual receives f r o m consuming a n additional unit of a service or a good. T h u s the value of
a good is directly derived from its m a r g i n a l utility.
U n d e r the assumption of utility m a x i m i z a t i o n neoclassicists explain h u m a n behaviour.
If it is possible for a person to gain additional utility b y obtaining a good or service, then,
provided he or she has the funds to do so, it will be purchased. O n the other h a n d , if a n action
will lead to disutility, i.e., a reduction in utility, a person will refrain from undertaking it.
L e t us now t u r n to the issue of resource allocation. Resource allocation refers to the
distribution of two or more given quantities of goods or services between two or more uses.
Because consumers are utility m a x i m i z e r s a n d , b y extension, producers are profit maximizers,
it is argued that these goods or services will be efficiently
distributed such that
Pareto
optimality is achieved.
L e t us illustrate this principle by using a typical "post-Walrasian" example (see F i g u r e
2.2.1), where we have two input factors, land (T) a n d labour (L), and two commodities, wheat
(W) and rice (R). T h e two
input factors
are constrained in that only a fixed amount
is
available. T h e a m o u n t of wheat and rice produced is shown on the y and z axes, respectively.
A t point L y ^ all of the labour supply is used up for the production of wheat, so that
the
m a x i m u m a m o u n t of wheat possible is produced given the fixed supply of labour. S i m i l a r l y ,
9
1
F i g u r e 2.2.1: Feasible Resource A l l o c a t i o n as a n Intersection of Resource Constraints.
I
Wheat-
Rice
Source: W a l s h & G r a m (1980)
10
point L j ^ shows the m a x i m u m amount of rice that can be produced if all of the labour supply is
used for rice production. T h u s any point on the line connecting L
w
and L - ^ (referred to as the
"production possibility frontier") represents a feasible allocation of labour between wheat and
rice production, considering the
amount of land available. In the
same m a n n e r the
line
between T y ^ and T j ^ represents the production possibility frontier of land.
Superimposed on the d i a g r a m are a number of points ( Y Q to Y g ) . A l l points, with the
exception of Y g , Y y a n d Y g , are feasible locations. Point Y g exceeds both the land and the
labour constraint, whereas at Y g the land constraint is exceeded and at Y y there is not enough
labour available. T h e ideal location would be at Y g . H e r e both input factors are fully utilized
and efficiency is at a m a x i m u m , i.e., all available resources are put to use. A l l other points are
at levels of production where at least one of the resources is underutilized. It should be noted
that although a simple case, the above example c a n be extended to any number of commodities
and input factors, or resources.
T h e difference between W a l r a s i a n and post-Walrasian neoclassical economics is that
for the
former point Y g would be considered
the
only feasible
combination of
resource
allocation. T h i s is because it is assumed that all resources m u s t be fully utilized. Therefore
any other point would constitute a "waste" of available resources. In post-Walrasian economics
all feasible locations would be considered. F o r example, consumers in the model m a y all be
wheat eaters, i n which case point Y-^ would be the ideal allocation. W a l r a s ' s assumption of
fully utilized resources was the subject of considerable debate during the
1930's (Walsh &
G r a m , 1980). T h e most frequent a r g u m e n t was that it is not always possible to fully employ
all resources, since, in a two factor - two commodity case, for example, the two production
possibility frontiers m a y not intersect at a point where both outputs are non-negative.
B o t h sides, however, agree that at point Y Q production would never occur. A t least one
of the resources
must
always be fully utilized. T h i s happens because individuals wish
maximize their utility, i.e., get the most use (satisfaction)
their wants and desires.
11
to
out of what is available in light of
T h e m a r g i n a l revolution h a d significant implications for orthodox economic theory. It
provided theorists with a convenient set of analytical tools that could easily and effectively be
applied to a wide range of uses. In particular, m a r g i n a l analysis provided a technique to
identify the most efficient
allocation of a given set of competing resources. T h e o p t i m u m
allocation was at that point where m a r g i n a l values were equalized.
T h i s allocation principle
could also be applied to a number of different problems, be it the allocation of a fixed a m o u n t
of income a m o n g a range of consumer goods or a set of production factors.
In s u m m a r y , with techniques enabling the theorists to identify optimal allocations of
resources neoclassicists
were able to derive a seemingly logically sound explanation of how
commodity and factor prices are determined in a m a r k e t system,
while at the same
time
m a x i m i z i n g consumers' satisfactions. T o economists at that time this new method represented
substantial analytical power. T h u s it is no surprise that m a n y students of economics
were
attracted b y neoclassicism, and that neoclassical economics soon became the leading school of
thought.
2.3 C R I T I C I S M S O F N E O C L A S S I C A L E C O N O M I C T H E O R Y .
T h e r e are numerous criticisms of the above characteristics that have been voiced b y
economists,
regional
scientists and geographers
alike
(King,
1979;
Hollis & N e l l ,
1975;
Robinson, 1962; M y r d a l , 1953; B a r n e s , 1984, 1985; B l a u g , 1973; H o l l a n d , 1976; C l a r k ,
1982,
1983; C l a r k & Gertler, 1983). In particular, critics have tended to focus on utility (and utility
maximizing
"economic
equilibrium)
and
hypotheses.
man"),
problems
of
resource
dynamics
allocation
in
the
(and
the
inevitable
formulation and
testing
pareto
of
optimal
neoclassical
T h i s section will engage in a p r e l i m i n a r y discussion of some of these criticisms.
F u r t h e r criticisms, where appropriate, will be put f o r w a r d in later chapters.
T h e concept of utility is one of the most heavily criticized aspects of neoclassical theory
( M y r d a l , 1953; Robinson, 1962,
1973; Dobb, 1973). O n e of the strongest arguments
utility has been that it is a circular concept (Robinson, 1962, p.48):
12
against
"Utility is a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity;
utility is the quality in commodities that makes individuals want
to buy them, and the fact that individuals want to buy
commodities shows that they have utility."
U t i l i t y and the m a x i m i z a t i o n assumption have been expressed in a concept that has
come to dominate both the disciplines of economics a n d economic geography: "economic m a n " .
Economic m a n , sometimes also referred to as "rational economic m a n " , is a person who
essentially possesses no flaws. In s u m m a r y , economic m a n has the following characteristics
(Hollis & N e l l ,
1975): (1)
he has
perfect knowledge of all factors involved in whatever
situation; (2) the principle applies to all organizations, including producers, consumers a n d
landlords; (3) economic actors are m a x i m i z e r s , which implies that producers maximize profits,
consumers maximize their utility, and landlords m a x i m i z e the amount of rent they can obtain
under given circumstances; (4) rational economic m a n will always make a "rational" decision,
i.e., he never makes a mistake.
T h e r e are a n u m b e r of problems w i t h economic m a n . F i r s t , in using h i m it is a s s u m e d
that everybody behaves i n the same w a y . T h u s a n y model based on economic m a n ignore
diversity or cultural differences. Second, it has been argued that economic m a n is too simplistic
an assumption (Pred, 1967, 1969; Hollis & N e l l , 1975). F o r example, A l l a n P r e d (1967), i n
outlining his behavioural m a t r i x argues that economic m a n in possessing the ideal combination
of perfect information a n d perfect computational skills is a special case that rarely, i f ever,
occurs. F i n a l l y , it has been argued that economic m a n can never be tested (Kaldor, 1972). T h e
a r g u m e n t here is that rational economic m a n is insulated against empirical falsification b y
means of a ceteris paribus
clause. T h e problem is that i f in testing economic m a n we find that
he is disconfirmed, one never knows whether such disconfirmation is a result of h i m actually
being falsified or whether things are not in fact equal.
A final criticism of neoclassical theory is that its nature largely prohibits the use of
d y n a m i c models. T h e economic s y s t e m is always considered to be at or near a state of
equilibrium. If at any point i n time the s y s t e m falls out of equilibrium, then the perfectly
13
competitive system will ensure that m a r k e t forces will bring the system back to equilibrium.
T h i s occurs because disequilibrium implies that w h e n some people experience disutility, utilitym a x i m i z i n g individuals will strive to m a k e themselves better off. In so doing they eventually
b r i n g the
system
back in to equilibrium.
H o w e v e r , all other factors
are assumed
to be
exogenous to the s y s t e m and stable over time. T h u s the dynamics of exogenous factors are
ignored. T h e emphasis on equilibrium analysis and the consequent neglect of dynamics, so the
critics contend, is one of the major setbacks of neoclassicism (King, 1979).
2.4
GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATIONS OFNEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS.
Neoclassical economics have been applied i n numerous areas of economic geography,
notably in theories of location analysis a n d the analysis of interregional flows, such as trade
and migration, for example. In the process both partial and general equilibrium approaches to
resource allocation have been adopted. T h e following discussion will outline some of the major
theories within the partial and general equilibrium approaches.
L e t us begin with partial equilibrium applications a n d some examples from the oldest
b r a n c h of regional science and economic geography: location analysis (as we shall see later,
however, location analysis is not restricted to the partial equilibrium approach).
A v e r y well k n o w n location model u s i n g neoclassical resource allocation techniques is
that developed b y Alonso (1964), which analyses the location of a firm within a city using the
concept of a bid-rent function.
T h e purpose of the bid-rent function is to show how a firm's
willingness to p a y rent varies with increasing distance from the C B D while keeping profits
constant regardless of location. Since it is assumed that the firm is a profit m a x i m i z e r , the
objective is to find the location with the highest possible profit level and the lowest possible bidrent. T h i s is the case where the bid-rent function (the slope of which is given b y the size of the
site, revenue and operating costs) is tangential to the rent gradient (Alonso, 1970). F i g u r e
2.4.1 illustrates this, where R is the actual rent charged with increasing distance from the city
(assuming
that the
slope of the curve is negative),
14
and X-^ to X g are bid-rent functions
Figure 2.4.1 Bid-Rent Functions and Locational Equilibrium.
K
distance
Source: Richardson (1978)
Figure 2.4.2 Concentric Zone Model of Land Use.
distance
Source: Richardson (1978)
15
representing the amount of rent the firm is willing to p a y with increasing distance f r o m the
C B D given a particular level of profits. T h e firm will then locate at the point of locational
equilibrium, L , where the curve is tangential to the rent gradient. T h e amount of rent will be P
at K distance from the C B D .
T h i s example
can be extended
to a n y n u m b e r a n d type
of
firms
(Alonso,
1964),
resulting in a land use pattern centered around the C B D . Different firms producing different
products (i.e. competing land uses) will have v a r y i n g bid-rent functions. T h u s , if competing
land
uses
are
ranked
according to
the
steepness
of their
bid-rent functions,
each
will
monopolize a concentric a r e a around the C B D . In other words, each type of economic activity
is "allocated" a particular zone of land. A n example
is shown in
figure
2.4.2, where four
competing land uses (a,b,c,d) are allocated to four zones of activity, resulting in a n "exclusive
zoning" pattern (Richardson, 1978).
T h e above model has been extended to a large variety of land uses, notably residential
and commercial. H o w e v e r , there are two major weaknesses associated with its
first,
only one rent is determined exogenously,
necessarily reflect reality.
assumptions:
so that the resulting land use patterns do not
T h e second problem lies with the explicit assumption that the slope
of the rent gradient is negative.
T h e advantage of this is, of course, that it enables a neat
solution to be derived. H o w e v e r , empirical studies have shown that the bid-rent functions for
some industries have a different shape (Richardson, 1978). F o r example, some manufacturing
industries,
although
initially attracted
to the
suburbs because of lower
land rents,
may
actually be willing to bid higher rents in peripheral locations t h a n at locations closer to the
C B D due to other advantages, such as agglomeration economies a n d terminal locations. T h i s
could i n t u r n i m p l y a positively sloped bid-rent function.
A n o t h e r partial equilibrium approach is that of Weber's (1909) industrial location
theory. T h e assumptions in his model are typical of neoclassical economic theory: producers
are profit maximizers; they have perfect knowledge of all input factors and transportation
costs (they are all rational); and, in the simple transport oriented model, all variables other
16
than distance are held constant. The argument is that under these assumptions the optimal
location is uniquely determined at the site where total transport costs are minimized. In the
case of m input factors (raw materials) and c markets, the optimum location will be
determined by minimizing the sum of all transport costs (Richardson, 1978):
•
mm
„
TC =
m
m
1
i=l
1
t.r.q.
l l l
+
c
T
..
]=1
t.r.q.
i i i
(2.4.1)
where: t is the transport rate per unit distance; r^ is the distance between the source of the
raw material and the production site; and qj is the amount of material moved from the raw
material source to the production site.
The equation also implies that if there is more than one market, then the location of
the optimal site will be sensitive to variations in demand among the different markets because
it influences economies of scale (Richardson, 1978). The pull will be towards that market
which shows the highest demand for a product because the per unit cost declines with
increasing demand.
For many years the major problem to be solved in location analysis was to find the
minimum transport cost location under the assumption of profit maximization. Subsequent
modifications to Weber's theory by Loesch shifted the attention to variations in demand under
the
assumption
of uniform costs. However, this
still implies both revenue
and profit
maximization (Richardson, 1978). Alternative studies have focused on sales maximizing, as
opposed to profit maximizing, which implies a different choice of an ideal location if costs
change over space.
As previously mentioned, most location models adopt the partial equilibrium approach,
defined as an economic system is closed off to the rest of the world with all exogenous
variables held constant.
A general equilibrium theory of location analysis, in contrast,
simultaneously considers all variables. Such general equilibrium models are extremely difficult
17
to develop, and although there have been numerous attempts at doing so (Henderson,
1958;
Lefeber, 1958; K u e n n e , 1963), all have thus far been unsuccessful (Richardson, 1978). One of
the major obstacles is that even if a n initial equilibrium exists, it is almost impossible
to
determine the implications of a disturbance of that equilibrium as each disturbance would
bring about a chain reaction of locational adjustments throughout the space economy. O n the
other h a n d , for a variety of reasons, such as immobilities and spatial frictions, it is necessary
to distinguish between those disturbances that create locational adjustments and those that do
not. F u r t h e r m o r e , the prediction of the impact of a disturbance is complicated b y the fact that
it takes time for certain factors, such as information, for example, to be transmitted over
space.
One of the earliest attempts at establishing a general equilibrium theory of location
was that of Loesch (1954). T h e basic assumptions of the model are that producers m a x i m i z e
profits and consumers maximize their utility b y b u y i n g the cheapest products. T h e competitive
struggle
between producers results
in the elimination of excess profits
and thus
locational equilibrium. Specifically, the conditions for the existence of a general
equilibrium are (Isard, 1956,
also i n
locational
1960): (1) all space is taken up by m a r k e t areas served b y
producers; (2) because prices are equal to average costs, all producers e a r n n o r m a l profits; (3)
m a r k e t areas are of a m i n i m u m size; (4) all producers are located at the optimum site; and, (5)
the m a r k e t a r e a boundaries are stable because all consumers are indifferent as to their choice
between equidistant suppliers.
T h e result of these conditions and assumptions is that regardless of their location all
firms
producing a specific good have identical costs, m a r k e t areas, freight rates and f.o.b.
m a r k e t prices. A p a r t from the problems associated
assumptions,
the
Loeschian model is unrealistic in the sense that it neglects locational interdependencies
and
intraindustry
agglomeration
economies.
A
country
with its neoclassical
could thus
never
have
an
industrial
heartland in which, for example, most of the nation's automobile production takes place, as it
is the case in C a n a d a . A l t h o u g h the model c a n deal with interindustry agglomerations,
18
the
resulting concentrations of population would negate the conditions for a locational equilibrium
(Richardson, 1978).
Other attempts at formulating a general equilibrium theory of location have been made
b y G r e e n h u t (1956), Henderson (1958), Lefeber (1958)
few
examples.
and Isard & Ostroff (1960, to name a
A l t h o u g h m a n y of these models have been more successful
in that
they
eliminate some of the problems associated with Loesch's model, none of them have been able
to account for all aspects of the space economy. T h u s a working general equilibrium theory of
location has yet to be established.
A l t h o u g h the above discussion has not covered all aspects of neoclassicism and its
impact on economic geography, it has nevertheless become clear that contemporary economic
geography is indeed strongly rooted in neoclassical economics in that it v e r y m u c h reflects
neoclassical
thought.
J u s t as
economists
were
attracted b y the
relative p a r s i m o n y a n d
analytical power of neoclassicism, so were geographers d r a w n towards the approach due to the
apparent ease and efficiency with which it could be applied to a spatial context. T h e resulting
theories and models proved to be extremely popular, illustrated b y the fact that, for the most
part, they are still in use today, albeit in modified form. Consequently one m u s t ask the
question whether neoclassical economics are really applicable to the "real" world, or whether
they are j u s t a vision of an idealized "hypothetical" world.
19
3. N E O C L A S S I C A L E C O N O M I C S
In
and
A N D L A B O U R
MIGRATION.
the previous chapter the central features of neoclassical economics were outlined
criticized.
It
was
demonstrated
how
traditional
economic
geography
is
rooted
in
neoclassicism. In the first p a r t of this chapter it will be shown how neoclassical migration
theory is derived f r o m the broader neoclassical assumptions. T h i s is followed b y a discussion of
several hypotheses
about the causes and effects of labour migration that stem
from
neoclassical f r a m e w o r k . T h e second part, of the chapter will show how these hypotheses
the
have
dominated the theoretical and modeling literature of labour migration. In particular the two
d o m i n a n t schools of thought within the neoclassical approach will be discussed: the "microadjustment approach" and the "macro-adjustment" approach. It will be argued that although
the original models of these two
schools of thought
(Sjaastad (1962) developed the micro-
adjustment model a n d L o w r e y (1966) the macro-adjustment one), have been modified since
their initial presentation, both the current literature on labour migration, and perhaps more
significantly public policy, has, and continues to be, dominated by a neoclassical vision of the
economy.
3.1 T H E F O U N D A T I O N S OF N E O C L A S S I C A L L A B O U R M I G R A T I O N T H E O R Y .
Not
s u r p r i s i n g l y , the key elements of neoclassical labour migration theory are the
same as those discussed in the previous chapter: utility, resource allocation determined b y the
laws of d e m a n d and supply and equilibrium. In addition, like all neoclassical theory, it is also
highly abstract m a k i n g a few simple assumptions about h u m a n behaviour and the nature of
the economy.
P e r h a p s the key assumption i n the neoclassical model which is transferred to labour
m i g r a t i o n is
that
of utility m a x i m i z a t i o n . F r o m
neoclassical school of thought postulates
the
previous chapter we
know that
the
t h a t all individuals wish to m a x i m i z e their utility
(degree of satisfaction). It was also suggested that utility cannot be m e a s u r e d directly because
it consists of a v a r i e t y of factors in t e r m s of which a n individuals determine their level of
satisfaction. Consequently some surrogate for utility m u s t be found i n order to model labour
20
migration. W a g e a n d unemployment rates offer themselves intuitively because they are the
only variables that v a r y with changes in the supply of labour. Clearly, however, there are
other variables that individuals might want to m a x i m i z e , for example, climate or the quality of
life. B u t climate is unresponsive to changes in economic variables, and therefore difficult to
measure, and in the case of quality of life it is indirectly affected b y changes in wage and
unemployment rates and thereby
already partly accounted for. T h u s although wage and
unemployment rates are not the only explanatory variables considered in neoclassical models,
they nevertheless represent the key determinants of labour migration. T h i s is so because they
are a n indicator of changes in utility at a given place.
Perhaps the best w a y to exemplify how the broader principles of neoclassical economics
are employed in neoclassical labour migration theory is to use the example of a hypothetical
nation composed of two regions. In both regions we have perfectly competitive markets: there
is no government intervention; there are no barriers to movement or entry to a n y market,
thereby allowing each individual at a n y point in time to move freely from one region to the
other; and, finally, information is homogeneous, u n i v e r s a l and complete, thus ensuring that all
individuals
possess
perfect
knowledge
about
all
economic
indicators
(wages,
employment, etc.). A l s o , assume that initially the two regions are in perfectly
prices,
competitive
equilibrium, that is, there are no regional differences in a n y of the economic variables.
N o w let us assume that for some reason, say, a shortage in the supply of labour, wage
rates in one
of the
regions,
call it A , increase.
A s a result the
s y s t e m is no longer in
equilibrium. Because information is assumed to flow freely across space, workers in the other
region, call it B , will learn of this wage increase and, because of their desire to maximize their
utility, respond b y m o v i n g to region A . In t u r n , the migration from region B to region A will
cause a n increase in the supply of labour in region A , while at there same time decreasing it in
region B . T h e increase i n the supply of labour will, ceteris paribus,
through the law of demand
and supply, reduce wage rates in region A while the reduction in the pool of workers in B will
21
cause wage rates to rise in that region. W o r k e r s will migrate from region B to region A , and
this process will continue until the s y s t e m is eventually brought back in to equilibrium.
The
same argument can be made for unemployment rates: if unemployment is lower in
region A than in region B , the unemployed will move to A because of the greater probability of
finding a job.
In broader terms, labour migration can be viewed as a n "adjustment process" where
labour is reallocated according to regional variations in the demand and supply of labour:
workers respond to regional differences
in labour m a r k e t conditions b y m i g r a t i n g between
regions until the s y s t e m is back in equilibrium. T h u s , just as resources in the wider economy
are efficiently
allocated between uses through the price system,
labour efficiently
"allocated" a m o n g regions
so too, ceteris paribus,
through the p u s h and pull of m a r k e t
is
forces,
namely changes in wage and unemployment rates.
In
general then, two hypotheses c a n be derived from this simple model. T h e
first
concerns the causes of labour migration: all other things being equal, labour flow from regions
of low wage and high unemployment rates to regions of high wage a n d low
unemployment
rates. T h e second hypotheses is that the effect of labour migration i n regions experiencing net
outmigration will be for wage rates to rise and unemployment rates to fall, while in those
areas experiencing net inmigration wage rates will fall and unemployment will rise. T h e net
result is that the spatial economic s y s t e m will be driven back towards equilibrium, i.e., wage
and
unemployment rates will be equal across the country.
3.2 E m p i r i c a l A p p l i c a t i o n s of N e o c l a s s i c a l L a b o u r M i g r a t i o n
Theory
The
neoclassical labour migration theory presented in the previous section is only a
simple version; it derives from H i c k s ' (1932) early work on wages and labour allocation. Since
H i c k s ' pioneering study a number of modifications to the theory have been made. In part, such
changes are a result of the realization that the assumptions of neoclassicism r a r e l y , if ever,
apply.
Nevertheless,
despite
those
modifications
22
labour
migration
theory
remains
fundamentally neoclassical. T h i s part of the chapter will first present the m a i n assumptions of
current labour migration literature, and then show some examples
of geographical
models
employing neoclassical labour migration theory.
3.2.1 Assumptions of Labour Migration.
M c K a y & Whitelaw's (1977) work identifies
the six most common assumptions
in
current literature on labour migration. T h e first assumption is that the decision of when and
where to migrate is made b y individuals who are free to do as they please. S u c h decisions,
however, are influenced by prevailing economic conditions, spatially biased information flows
and
existing
social
ties.
This
first
assumption
is
essentially
a modification of the
pure
neoclassical model a n d reflects the realization that the real world is more complicated t h a n the
simplifying assumptions of neoclassicism.
T h e second assumption is that individual decision m a k i n g takes place within a "free
market" framework in which there is a wide range of alternatives.
between as m a n y destinations
A person c a n choose
as there are regions within the spatial system. A l s o , once a
person has reached a destination, then he or she is free to compete with the local labour force
for any job openings.
T h i r d , an individual always has the alternative to r e m a i n in the same location. N o
pressures exist that could force a person to move. T h e dislocation of workers due to plant
closures, for example, could b y assumption never happen.
Fourth,
although it is a n accepted
fact that mobility rates differ b y
socioeconomic
groups, it is assumed that all individuals are subject to a single migration process, albeit with
different
variables
intensities.
influencing
T h i s implies
labour
that
each
migration.
It
person responds
is
recognized,
in the
however,
same w a y
that
the
to
those
intensity
(probability) with which people respond does v a r y .
T h i s leads us directly to the fifth most common assumption, which is that since a
single
process is assumed,
highly aggregated
data is sufficient to test a migration model
23
because
everybody
behaves
(reacts)
to the
economic
environment
i n the
same
way.
If
everybody did not act in the same w a y the hypothesis on the causes of labour migration would
not hold.
F i n a l l y , and perhaps most importantly, migration is assumed to operate as a n efficient
equilibrating m e c h a n i s m , reducing differences between regions: wage and unemployment rates
will, through changes in the supply of labour resulting from migration, be equalized among
regions.
3.2.2 Geographical Models of L a b o u r Migration.
W i t h i n the r e a l m of neoclassical labour migration theory two distinct approaches have
been adopted: the "micro-adjustment" approach (commonly also referred to as the "human
investment" approach) and the more widely used "macro-adjustment" approach. W h e r e a s the
former
approach reflects
the
highly
individualistic nature
of neoclassical
theory
and
is
theoretically more "pure" t h a n the other, the latter is more practical in that it can actually be
applied empirically.
In
our discussion
of the
two
approaches
let
us
begin with
the
micro-adjustment
approach and its ties to h u m a n capital or h u m a n investment theory. T h e origins of h u m a n
capital theory go back to A d a m S m i t h (Carline et al, 1985). T h e theory is closely linked to the
concepts of m a r g i n a l utility and m a r g i n a l product. N o t only has it been used in migration
analysis, but also in a wide range of other areas. H u m a n capital theory is used to determine
whether an individual will make a decision to "invest" in a n undertaking or not. F o r example,
a s s u m i n g a wealth m a x i m i z i n g individual, if the m a r g i n a l increase i n future wages (discounted
in terms of the r e m a i n i n g lifetime working horizon) is greater than the cost of such training
that enables a person to earn those higher wages, then that person will decide to go ahead
with the training. G e n e r a l l y speaking, if the m a r g i n a l increase i n utility or the m a r g i n a l
product is greater t h a n the cost of a n undertaking, then, ceteris paribus,
always choose such an undertaking.
24
a n individual will
This highly individualistic approach to decision making was first applied in migration
analysis by Sjaastad (1962). His argument is that when an individual is considering moving
from region A to region B, he or she computes the present value (PV ) of the move with
t
respect to the following variables (Clark & Ballard, 1979): Potential earnings (Yg) in region B
at time t; current earnings (Y^) in region A at time t; the individual's lifetime working horizon
(T); the cost of moving from A to B (C); and a discount rate (r) which individuals apply to their
earnings stream. Migration will only occur if the anticipated returns are greater than the cost
of moving. In formal terms, define the present value of migrating as:
T
PV(t)
a
=
I
t=0
YB
- YA
(1 + r )
- C
Z
(3.2.1)
T
1
where
= t+1. A present value can also be calculated for the decision not to migrate, call it
PV(t) . Therefore, migration will occur if and only if PV(t) is greater than PV(t) . In the case
of multiple regions the individual will migrate to that region which promises the highest
anticipated returns.
The micro-adjustment model has a number of distinct advantages (Schwartz, 1976)
which are linked to the significance it attaches to the attributes of individuals. Demographic
characteristics such as age, occupation, and education are easily incorporated. Furthermore,
contrary to the neoclassical assumption that migrants flow from low wage to high wage
regions, it can account for the fact that there are also reverse flows: some people might be able
to maximize their future earnings by migrating to a depressed region.
However, there are two major problems with this model (Clark & Ballard, 1979). The
most important one is that it is essentially untestable. Individual case histories would be
necessary to test the propositions. Even if such data did exist, one would need a sufficiently
large number of regionally stratified observations in order to make any general conclusions as
to its validity. The second problem is the assumption that the individual will always go to that
25
region which promises the highest future gain. In real life the decision of when and where to
migrate might well not be decided by a n individual. A person might be forced to move (because
of a plant closure, for example; for a discussion of this see Gordus et a l . , 1981) even though
the move will result in a net loss. O n the other h a n d , a move could be the result of a company
transfer, in which case the decision is made by a higher authority, not the individual
(see
M c K a y & Whitelaw, 1977).
L e t us now turn to the macro-adjustment approach. T h e assumptions it makes are
typical
of
neoclassical
theory:
workers
have
perfect
knowledge
of
all factors
involved;
information is homogeneous, u n i v e r s a l and complete; there are no differences between regions
other t h a n in terms of wage a n d unemployment rates; and there is no significant social or
economic cost associated
Lowrey
(1966).
In his
with the migration process. W o r k in this a r e a was
model wage
and unemployment
pioneered by
characteristics at the origin and
destination points are assumed to be the determinants of migration. In its basic version, the
model can be specified as:
u.
w.
L. L .
i :
u.
w.
D. .
, 1*
1 *
where: Mjj is the gross migration from i to j ; U j and U j are the unemployment rates in i and j ;
W j and Wj are the wage rates in i a n d j ; and L j , L j and Djj are the population and distance
components of the gravity model.
T h e major criticism of this model is that its assumptions conflict with reality: perfect
information does not exist and there are numerous social and economic costs associated with
the migration process. F u r t h e r m o r e , there has been v e r y little empirical evidence to support
the L o w r e y model. C l a r k (1983) maintains that although it has been quite successful
for
prediction purposes, probably due to its gravity component, it is inadequate in explaining the
labour migration process.
26
In s u m , both the micro- and the macro-adjustment models are representative of the
first neoclassical hypothesis, n a m e l y that labour will migrate in accordance with the spatial
pattern
of
demand
and
supply
as
reflected
in
interregional
differences
in
wage
and
unemployment rates. It is assumed that in the long r u n migration will tend to decline as the
s y s t e m approaches equilibrium.
3.2.3 Empirical Applications.
T h e r e are numerous examples of applications of neoclassical theory in labour migration
modelling ( L a n s i n g and Mueller,
1967;
Renshaw,
1970;
Fields, 1976,
1978;
Milne,
1981;
S i m m o n s , 1982; Y o u n g , 1984). T h e first p a r t of this section will discuss applications of the
micro-adjustment model, while the second will deal with examples of applications of the macroadjustment model.
3.2.3.1 Micro-Adjustment Models.
E m p i r i c a l applications of the micro-adjustment approach to migration analysis are few
and far between. T h i s is not surprising, considering the data requirements of the model. O f the
few examples that do exist, most adopt the micro-adjustment (human investment) approach in
their theoretical sections, but revert to a n aggregated
version when empirically testing
the
model. One example of this is V a n d e r k a m p ' s (1968) study of interregional mobility in C a n a d a .
He
hypothesizes
that individuals are more likely to migrate
depending on the net advantage
they
differentials,
unemployment
aggregate
V a n d e r k a m p uses
variables).
He
found
that
from region A to region B
derive from migrating. A p a r t f r o m regional income
the
flow
and
of
return
migration
migration
unemployment (as is predicted b y the neoclassical hypothesis)
is
as
variables
negatively
related
(all
to
and that r e t u r n migration is
positively related to the unemployment variables. T h e positive relationship is explained by the
push of the sending region's employment being stronger t h a n the pull of the region to which
they return.
27
Other
examples
are
those
of B r e n n a n (1965),
Diehl
(1966),
Bodenhofer
(1967),
R a b i a n s k i (1970) and K o t t i s (1972). T y p i c a l l y , these studies relate the benefits of migration to
factors such as variations in basic wage rates, opportunities for job t r a i n i n g and education, and
economic rewards in alternative regions for attained skills (Shaw, 1975).
3.2.3.2 Macro-Adjustment Models.
Far
more
popular t h a n
the
micro-adjustment
approach is
the
macro-adjustment
approach. T h e majority of past and current literature on labour migration has adopted it in
one form or another. A s mentioned earlier it is essentially a n aggregated version of the microadjustment approach a n d reflects the neoclassical notion that labour flows from areas of low
wages a n d high unemployment to high wage and low unemployment regions.
G r a n t & V a n d e r k a m p (1976) examine the causes and effects of labour migration in
C a n a d a d u r i n g different time periods. In a model almost identical to that of L o w r e y ' s , the
significance
of wage
rates,
unemployment
rates
and job information were
examined
in
determining migration flows. T h e significance of all the variables was tested. T o allow for the
fact that information about other provinces declines with increasing distance, a gravity type
variables was also included. A l t h o u g h it was found that the standard linear equation did not
satisfactorily explain the variation in mobility rates (both income and unemployment were
insignificant as explanatory variables), a general observation was that income was a strong
pull factor, but only a weak push factor. A s expected, distance played a major inhibiting role.
U n e m p l o y m e n t had a strong push and a negative pull effect. T h e r e was, however, considerable
variation in the significance of variables between time periods, suggesting that the migration
pattern m a y be subject to cyclical fluctuations.
A n o t h e r neoclassical study of labour migration is that b y R o s e m a n (1977) of changing
migration patterns in the U n i t e d States. A g a i n the approach was identical to that of L o w r e y ,
w i t h one
major modification: the decision to move
and the decision where
to move
were
considered as two separate models (equations). T h e results were essentially commensurate to
28
those of G r a n t & V a n d e r k a m p ' s (1976), with the additional observation that there was also a
considerable variation in mobility rates between age groups.
Greenwood (1981) proposes a typical neoclassical model of metropolitan growth a n d
migration. A r g u i n g along traditional lines, Greenwood maintains that outmigration of labour
will put u p w a r d pressure on wage levels whereas inmigration will apply downward pressure.
T h e magnitude of change in wages, however, depends on the relative magnitude of the change
in the demand and suppty of labour. T h e same argument holds for unemployment rates. A l s o ,
the impact of migration on both variables is contingent upon a variety of other factors, such as
the occupational composition of the inmigrating labour force visa-vis the occupational structure
of the existing labour force. T h i s represents a departure from the n o r m a l assumption where
the labour force is taken to be homogeneous, that is any labour can do a n y job.
Y o u n g (1985) analysed changes in the significance of selected origin and destination
characteristics on migration flows to W e s t e r n C a n a d a and on return migration f r o m W e s t e r n
Canada
between
1971-1976 and
1976-1981 using
a model
along the
lines
of G r a n t
&
V a n d e r k a m p (1976) a n d Courchene (1970). These characteristics included a g r a v i t y t e r m ,
a n n u a l average employment in 1971 dollars (income), percentage growth in employment over
the five y e a r census period, and a cultural variable (percentage
of the population of F r e n c h
mother tongue). It was found that the significance of origin and destination variables declined
significantly between the two time periods under analysis. While for 1971-1976 almost all of
the variables were statistically
significant at the
1% level, for 1976-1981 only two of the
variables were significant at 5%. A l t h o u g h the results of the analysis have to be interpreted
with caution due to the five year census interval, they do suggest that there could be cyclical
fluctuations in the sensitivity of migrants to interregional differences in economic variables.
One of the most extensive reviews of migration literature is that conducted b y S h a w
(1975).
H i s work m a r k s
the
beginning
of a
growing criticism of neoclassical
migration
analysis. H i s criticism, however, is limited to methodological rather than theoretical problems.
T h u s he argues that aggregate migration measures do not permit the identification of non-
29
economic motives for migrants. F u r t h e r m o r e , r e t u r n migration a n d multiple moves are not
accounted for in the neoclassical approach. In addition, even if crude economic measures
(such
as wages and unemployment) do seem significant in explaining migration patterns, the results
are only rough indicators of the real forces at work in migration.
Apart
from
the
methodological
criticisms
of
Shaw,
theoretical
failings
of
the
neoclassical approach have recently been identified. M o s t critiques have either focused on the
assumptions of h u m a n capital theory (Greenwood, 1981; Peek & Standing, 1982) or on the
effects of migration (Clark & B a l l a r d , 1979, 1980; C l a r k , 1982, 1983; C l a r k & Gertler, 1983).
T h e r e is, however, a general consensus that migrants are not as sensitive to economic factors
as neoclassical theory suggests. In addition, empirical evidence has shown that the broader
framework that accounts for migration is one of cumulative causation ( C u r r y , 1985)
t h a n a Pareto-optimal state of equilibrium (for a more detailed discussion see
rather
chapter
6).
Despite such criticisms, a complete alternative labour migration theory has yet to be proposed.
These
methodological
and
modelling (for further examples
theoretical
criticisms
see K r i e s b e r g & V i n i n g ,
of
neoclassical
1978;
Stone,
labour
1978,
migration
1979;
Plane,
1981; Stock, 1981; Foot & M i l n e , 1982; Plane et a l . , 1984), are being increasingly recognized
by neoclassicists themselves. T h e result is that a growing number of studies have
adopted
increasingly sophisticated methods, thereby recognizing, for example, that information is not
homogeneous and universally available, people are not always free to move or to stay, and
that the labour m a r k e t is not perfectly competitive. However, despite evidence to the contrary,
most contemporary migration analysts hold on to the belief that interregional migration will
eventually lead to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
One of the
recent examples
of this
persistence
is a study b y C e b u l a (1979).
He
proposes two models of labour migration, one along the lines of the micro-adjustment approach
and the other a n aggregate macro-adjustment model. S u r p r i s i n g l y , only v e r y few modifications
are made to the s t a n d a r d L o w r e y a n d Sjaastad models. T h e point is, however, that a s s u m i n g
perfectly competitive markets (!) and m a x i m i z i n g behaviour he argues that while a perfect
30
spatial equilibrium m a y never be reached, this is only because the m a r g i n a l interregional
differences in economic benefits (marginal utility) do not outweigh the costs of moving. T h i s
imperfect spatial equilibrium is thus only a reflection of rational decision m a k i n g b y utilitym a x i m i z i n g economic m a n : people will not make themselves better off b y m o v i n g because the
costs are greater t h a n the benefits.
Therefore, while
wage equalization will never occur,
labour migration will nevertheless eventually result i n a Pareto-optimal equilbirium (nobodj
r
c a n make h i m or herself better off by moving).
In s u m m a r y , neoclassical economic theory as embodied in the micro-adjustment and
the macro-adjustment approach to modelling labour migration is, despite a growing body of
literature
critical of
its
assumptions
and
hypotheses,
still
very
much
alive.
Although
neoclassicists do recognize and allow for the inadequacies of the standard assumptions,
continue
to argue
that labour migration will lead to a spatial equilibrium. T h e next
they
two
chapters will examine the validity of the neoclassical h^potheses outlined in section 3.1 in a
C a n a d i a n context.
31
4. D A T A
A N D
M E T H O D O L O G Y .
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the data and methodology used in testing the
two neoclassical hypotheses presented i n chapter 3. Specifically, these are that (1) differences
in unemployment a n d wage rates are directly related to migration rates, and (2) that
net
migration figures influence changes in u n e m p l o y m e n t and wage rates within a region. T h i s
chapter is divided into two parts. T h e first discusses problems of data, while the
second
addresses methodological issues.
4.1
DATA.
D a t a availability and reliability have posed a problem to researchers in m a n y areas of
migration
study.
While
the
micro-adjustment
model
probably
represents
the
purest
transformation of neoclassical theory, it requires unobtainable data. A s a result researchers
have turned to aggregate data models, in particular the macro-adjustment approach.
Despite the d a t a availability for aggregate modelling there are disadvantages to using
gross flows. F o r example, return migration (individuals who return to their place of origin
after h a v i n g moved to another place in search of a job) are almost impossible to
estimate.
However, studies have shown that this return migration can account for up to 40% of total
migration flows ( V a n d e r k a m p , 1968).
In
the
U n i t e d States a new
source of migration data has
recently become
more
available (Clark, 1983). It is the Continuuous W o r k H i s t o r y Sample ( C W H S ) compiled b y the
Social Security A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d the
B u r e a u of Economic A n a l y s i s . T h i s data
source
provides micro-level migration estimates based on individual work histories (Clark & Gertler,
1983). T h e C W H S is recompiled each y e a r , m a k i n g it possible to conduct in-depth temporal
analyses.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y the data source does not extend to C a n a d a and thus the first p a r t of this
analysis is forced to use gross
migration flows,
and hence a macro-adjustment model. In
particular, the analysis takes data from the 1981 C a n a d i a n Census (although estimates of net
migration at the provincial level are available a n n u a l l y , complete figures are only available
32
every five years from the census). D a t a listed in the census volume dealing with population
mobility are based on a 20% sample of private households. G r o s s migration flows are given for
each province of origin a n d destination, broken down b y occupation. A s migration is defined in
terms of the difference i n place of residence
(province) between 1976
and 1981,
multiple
moves during the five y e a r period are not accounted for. Multiple moves would also include
return migration as well as "hypermobile" individuals who move more t h a n once every
five
years (particularly important in the white collar occupational groups; see Stone, 1978).
A p a r t from this problem with the census figures, another difficulty is finding wage and
unemployment data on which to regress the gross migration figures. A s the migration data
refers to a five y e a r period, the decision to migrate could have been based on information
obtained in a n y one of the five y e a r s , depending upon when that decision was made. . O n the
other h a n d , information about wages and unemployment takes time to diffuse
over space
(Clark, 1986). F u r t h e r m o r e , there will be a time lag between the decision to migrate and the
actual migration. Ideally, then, one would use annual migration flows and regress these on
wage and unemployment rates of the previous year (if one assumed that the time lag was one
year). Since this was
assumed)
the
not possible,
error associated
1976
was
with the use
selected as the base year. E v e n if (as it is
of 1976
data is constant,
the results of the
following analysis m u s t nontheless be interpreted with caution.
W a g e and unemployment figures were compiled from original tapes of the 1976 and
1981 censi (the latter being used for the second part of the analysis). A s with the migration
data, the tapes are based on a 20% sample.
A problem encountered
definitions of the occupational groups h a d changed between 1976
here was
that
and 1981. In 1876
the
there
were fewer groups t h a n i n 1981. T h u s the 1981 data (including the migration figures) h a d to
be a m a l g a m a t e d in order to facilitate a direct comparison between the two years (see
table
4.1.1).
A further problem is the availability of data. W h e r e a s in 1981 data were available for
all provinces and territories, the 1976 tapes did not include Prince E d w a r d Island, the Y u k o n
33
Table 4.1.1 Amalgamations of Occupational Groups.
Group #
Description (Census Occupational G r o u p #)
1
M a n a g e r i a l , A d m i n i s t r a t i v e and Related Occupations (11)
2
N a t u r a l Sciences, E n g i n e e r i n g and M a t h e m a t i c s
3
Social Sciences a n d Related Fields (23)
4
Teaching and Related Occupations (27)
5
Occupations i n Medicine and H e a l t h (31)
6
F i n e and C o m m e r c i a l A r t i s t s (33)
7
Clerical and Related Fields (41)
8
Sales Occupations (51)
9
Service Occupations (61)
10
F a r m i n g , H o r t i c u l t u r a l and A n i m a l H u s b a n d r y Occupations (71)
11
P r i m a r y Occupations:
(21)
- F i s h i n g , H u n t i n g and T r a p p i n g (73)
- F o r e s t r y and L o g g i n g (75)
- M i n i n g and Q u a r r y i n g (77)
12
Processing Occupations (81)
13
M a n u f a c t u r i n g Occupations (85)
14
Construction T r a d e s (87)
15
Transportation E q u i p m e n t Operators (91)
16
Other Occupations:
- M a c h i n i n g a n d Related Occupations (85)
- Materials H a n d l i n g Occupations (93)
- Other Crafts a n d E q u i p m e n t O p e r a t i n g Occupations (95)
- Occupations N o t Elsewhere Classified (99)
34
and the Northwest Territories. These regions were thus omitted from the analysis. In the case
of the two territoties this omission is probably just as well, as the migration figures there are
extremely high in some occupations. Inclusion of the Northwest Territories and the Yukon
therefore would have distorted the results of the analysis.
For the second part of the analysis (the test of the second neoclassical hypothesis) net
mobility rates were used (calculated from the gross migration matrix). The 1976 and 1981
data were used to calculate changes in unemployment and wage rates.
4.2 Methodology.
4.2.1 Theoretical Considerations.
In the previous discussion it was shown that most studies testing the first neoclassical
hypothesis either use first, a gravity type model or, second, a model that directly relates
migration rates (in the form of gross or net migration or mobility rates) to wages and
unemployment. In particular, both models generally employ multiple regression techniques,
where the independent variables include differences in unemployment and wage rates. In
gravity type models population figures are often weighted by wage and/or unemployment
o
rates. The r
and the partial regression coefficients are then deemed to be an indication of the
explanatory power of the hypothesis.
This approach has been quite popular not only in migration analysis, but also in other
studies of interregional flows, for example, the analysis of trade patterns. For quite some time
now it has been realized that there are a number of problems associated with this approach
(Olsson,
1965,
1970; Lycan,
1969; Curry,
1972; Johnston, 1973). While some
studies
recognize these problems and accordingly adjust their methodology, a surprisingly large
number of studies
do not.
Significantly, these include the testing
of the
neoclassical
hypotheses.
The first problem with the traditional approach concerns the use of unconstrained
gravity models, especially those that incorporate wage and unemployment rates. Regressions
35
of gross migration rates with this
type
of model characteristically show extremely
high
correlations, usually greater than .8. W h i l e possessing a large degree of predictive power,
gravity type models do not explain a n y of the variation. T h e resulting correlation coefficient is
only a measure
of the
"goodness-of-fit"
of the model. E q u a l l y high r squares
could most
probably be achieved by simply using population or labour force figures. T h u s it is not possible
to either reject or accept a hypothesis on the basis of a gravity model, because it is
not known
whether the high correlation is a result of wage and unemployment differentials or simply the
friction of distance.
T h e second problem is related to the regression of r a w gross migration figures on
differences
in unemployment and wage rates and, in most cases, a distance variable. T h e
obvious implication here is that the n u m b e r of migrants depends on the size of the population
(or the labour force if the concern is with labour migration). T h u s , the greater the population
size of the region of origin, the greater
the number of migrants. In order to facilitate
a
comparison of migration rates between regions of v a r y i n g sizes, gross migration rates are
usually transformed to mobility rates, i.e., the number of migrants per thousand population.
However, this eliminates just one p a r t of the problem. Mobility rates to regions with large
populations will still be greater t h a n to those with smaller populations. O n e of the reasons for
this is that the larger a region's population base, the
larger the number of
employment
opportunities and, b y extension, the greater its attraction.
N e l s o n (1959) has shown that a large part of total gross migration is a result of a
"random" allocation process. In other words, migrants are randomly allocated according to the
size of the regions of origin and destination. F o r example, if region j has 10% of the total
population of a country, then, ceteris paribus, the number of migrants m o v i n g from i to j should
be one tenth of all outmigrants from i. Conversely, if region i has a 5% share of the country's
population, then, all other things being equal, the number of migrants from i to j should equal
5% of all inmigrants to j . W a g e rates, unemployment rates, or distance have nothing to do
with this aspect of migration. In order to test the influence of these variables gross migration
36
rates thus have to be adjusted to allow for this factor b y removing the r a n d o m component of
gross migration.
Once the effects of the sizes of origins and destinations have been removed, the effects
of spatial factors
have
to be
considered and also
removed before
the
influence
of
any
socioeconomic variables can be tested. Distance and intervening opportunities have been judged
to be the most influential inhibitors to migration (Stouffer,
1960,
influence of distance is in itself a compound of two influences
1962; L y c a n ,
1969). T h e
(Johnston, 1973). F i r s t ,
the
friction of distance varies b y origin. In terms of migration this would m e a n that some regions
experience outmigration to more distant destinations, whereas in others, m i g r a n t s tend to go
to a more restricted portion of the system, concentrating on their "nearest neighbour". T h e
second influence is that of the m a p pattern. S i m p l y because of the location of the region of
origin in relation to the destination regions, the average distance m i g r a n t s have to travel
varies. F o r example, O n t a r i a n s , being located in the middle of C a n a d a , do not have to travel
as far on average as B r i t i s h Columbians to reach their desired destination. Therefore the
influence of distance (degree of inhibition) will, all other things being equal, not be as high for
migrants from Ontario as it will be for migrants from B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . T h e implication is
that aggregate estimates of the influence of distance (based on regressions that are not broken
down b y origin) will be inaccurate for a n y kind of detailed analysis. A systemwide
regression
would result in a n overestimation of the influence of distance on migration from
regions
located i n the centre of a country, whereas it would be underestimated for peripheral regions.
Therefore migration rates adjusted on the basis of a singular regression (not broken down b y
origin) would include this error.
The
other
major
spatial
factor
Intervening opportunity, like distance,
variables,
such as
influencing
migration is
is in itself the
intervening opportunity.
result of a combination a
several
employment opportunities, and social and cultural considerations.
The
assumption is that intervening opportunities will have a n impeding effect on migration over
space. While intervening opportunities are closely related to distance, they do tend to "de-
37
emphasize spatial separation across sparsely populated areas and to stimulate the absorptive
effect of densely populated intervening areas" ( L y c a n , 1969, p.242). In other words, if, for
example, a potential m i g r a n t has a choice between two alternate destinations, then the higher
probability of m o v i n g to the closest one could be negated
b y the number of
employment
opportunities l y i n g in between (if that number is less for the further destination). A s with
distance, the influence of intervening opportunities will v a r y by province of origin for m u c h the
same reasons, i.e., the range of intervening opportunities will differ.
W h a t this discussion suggests is that in order to test the neoclassical migration model
we m u s t first remove both the spatial and population size-related influences from observed
migration patterns. If we did not, we could not conclude m u c h from our analysis. F o r it would
be not clear whether it was the spatial and population factors that were deterring migration,
or the wage and unemployment rates that are the focus of the neoclassical model. So w h a t this
chapter will do is to first account for observed migration patterns only in terms of spatial and
population
size-related
factors.
Once this
has
been
done,
we
can test the
residuals
for
differences in the effect of wage and unemployment rates.
4.2.2 Methodology.
T h e methodology used i n the first part of the statistical analysis closely follows that of
N e l s o n (1959) and L y c a n (1969), albeit with some modifications. G r o s s occupational migration
rates will be
adjusted
for the
size of the labour force
intervening opportunities. Interprovincial differences
in each occupation, distance
and
in wage and unemployment rates will
then be tested for their significance in exaplining the residual migration.
F i r s t , census estimates of gross interprovincial migration are adjusted according to the
size of the labour force in each occupation in each province. T h e rationale for this change is
that the n u m b e r of m i g r a n t s in occupation k m o v i n g between two provinces should be directly
proportional to the product of the provincial shares of the labour force in occupation k. T h e
resulting adjusted migration rates (which are essentially ratios of expected to actual migration)
38
are defined as equal to 1.00 if the share of migrants m o v i n g from a given province of origin to
a given province of destination is exactly proportional to the product of each of the provinces'
share of the C a n a d i a n labour force in occupation k, less t h a n 1.00 if it is less, a n d greater than
1.00 if it is greater ( L y c a n , 1969).
T h e formula used to arrive at the labour force adjusted migration rates is:
„ k
k
£• * —
I
• = - ^ - r /
. . i l
ij
J
where my
k
h l
i,j
= 1
9
(4.2.1)
.i
j
u
i
J
is the labour force adjusted migration rates; M ^ is the gross number of migrants
between i and j in occupation k; a n d
and
is the size of the labour force in provinces i
and j in occupation k.
Second, the influence of distance and intervening opportunities is estimated b y means
of multiple regression. M i g r a t i o n rates are then adjusted a second time to account for this
influence.
Distance
is measured
in the
n u m b e r of road kilometers
separating the
major
population centres of the provinces. Intervening opportunity is defined as the percentage of the
total C a n a d i a n labour force in a particular occupation lying between the
two
provinces.
A l t h o u g h intervening opportunities are most likely related to wage and unemployment rates
(the
higher
the
difference
opportunities), it is
in
assumed
wage
that
rates,
for
example,
the
greater
this relationship is equal across
the
the
intervening
country.
Because
C a n a d i a n migration is unique in the sense that almost all (with exception of the M a r i t i m e
provinces)
of the
migration occurs in an easterly
N o r t h w e s t Territories are not included in the
or westerly
direction (the
analysis), it is possible
Yukon
and
to s i m p l y add the
percentage shares of the labour forces of the provinces lying between i and j .
A
multiple
regression
will
be
performed on
assumption that:
ln(
k
m i j
)
= f(ln(D ); I C ^ )
k
ij
(4.2.2)
39
each
province of
origin under
the
where:
v
j
k
10..
k
1
n=i +l
I
if
j
g.t.
i,
if
j
1. t .
i ;
or
L.
1=1
J
A
n=j +l
L
i o .
1
k
v
D
*
i , j ,n = 1 , . . . , 9
(4.2.3)
j=l
10y
is the percentage of the C a n a d i a n labour force in occupation k l y i n g between i a n d j ; L j
and L j k is the size of the labour force in occupation k i n i and j , respectively; and D j j is the
distance between i and j . L a b o u r force adjusted migration rates and distance were logged in
order to normalize the distribution.
B y conducting a separate regression for each province of origin, differential influences
of
distance
and
intervening
opportunities
due
to
map
location
can
be
accounted
for.
F u r t h e r m o r e , intervening opportunities can also be broken down by occupation, thus reducing
the problem of aggregation.
F o r both variables it is expected
that the p a r t i a l regression
coefficients will be negative.
In formal terms,
to adjust migration rates in a m a n n e r
such that
distance
and
intervening opportunities are considered, one simply subtracts the migration due to distance
and intervening opportunities from the adjusted total migration, to arrive at the residual
migration (rm-). T h u s (following the example of L y c a n (1973)):
40
rm^
= lnCm^) - ((a + b (ln(D )) + b aOy ))
1
i
i
1
ij
k
2
(4.2.4)
where r m ^ is the residual migration; a* is the constant for province i; and b-^ and b2* are the
regression parameters for province i. If the residual is less than zero, migration was less than
expected based on labour force, distance and intervening opportunities. Conversely, if the
residual is greater than zero, then migration was greater than expected.
Spatial and labour force size related factors have now been removed as far as possible
given the available data. However, some spatial biases still remain due to factors other than
distance and intervening opportunities. For example, migration from the Maritime provinces
will tend to be between Maritime provinces (in some occupations) due to the social welfare
system in those provinces. Fishermen, for example, will tend to stay in the Maritimes, because
it is easier for them to obtain unemployment benefits there than in other, non-Maritime
provinces. This and other factors will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
The final task (and a major objective of this part of the thesis) is to test the significance
of differences in wage and unemployment rates in explaining the residual migration. This will
again involve the use of multiple regression. The formula used is that:
u -u
k
k
r m
ii
=
f { - J
nr *
u
3
w -w
k
k
1 0 0 ;
K
1
k
- ~ir *
J
w
K
1 0 0
>
(4.2.5)
1
where U j and U j are unemployment rates in provinces, j and i in occupation k, respectively;
k
and Wjk and W j
k
k
are wage rates in occupation k in provinces j and i, respectively. According
to the neoclassical hypothesis stated in chapter 3, the expected sign of the partial regression
coefficients would be positive for wage rates and negative for unemployment rates. This
section of the analysis will consist of two parts. In the first a separate regresion will be run on
each province of origin to test interregional differences, while in the second it will be broken
down by occupational group.
41
T h e second neoclassical hypothesis concerning the effects of labour migration suggests
that
positive
net
migration will
lower
wage
rates,
while
at
the
same
time
increasing
u n e m p l o y m e n t rates. T h u s :
Wj
k
= f(NETMOBj )
(4.2.6)
= f(NETMOBj )
(4.2.7)
k
and
Uj
k
k
where W j and U j are percent changes in wage and unemployment rates in province i
k
k
between 1976 a n d 1981 in occupation k; a n d N E T M O B j
k
is the net loss (gain) per thousand of
the 1976 labour force in occupation k i n province i between 1976 and 1981. In keeping with
the neoclassical hypothesis the expected sign of the correlation coefficient should be positive for
u n e m p l o y m e n t rates and N E T M O B and negative for wage rates and N E T M O B .
42
5. DATA ANALYSIS.
T h i s chapter will discuss the results of the data analysis as outlined in the previous
chapter. T h e first section will provide a description of overall labour migration patterns in
C a n a d a between 1976 and 1981, while the second section will concentrate on the labour force
adjusted migration rates.
T h e third section
will examine
the residual migration rates not
accounted for by the size of the labour force, distance a n d intervening opportunities. In the
fourth section the results of the test of the first hypothesis will be presented, while in the fifth
those of the second hypothesis
will be discussed. F i n a l l y , this chapter will conclude with a
s u m m a r y of the findings. W h e r e appropriate, comparisons will be made to a similar study
conducted b y L y c a n (1969) on C a n a d i a n migration patterns between 1955 and 1961.
5.1 Gross Migration Flows.
Table 5.1.1
1976 and 1981.
sufficient
shows gross migration figures within C a n a d a for all occupations between
Prince E d w a r d Island, the Y u k o n and Northwest Territories are included, as
data were available for this stage of the analysis. A l s o included are flows from
outside C a n a d a .
By
far the most popular destination for migrants from outside C a n a d a was
Ontario,
followed b y B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , A l b e r t a and Quebec. Considering the population size of Quebec,
the inflow of foreigners
is somewhat
lower t h a n expected.
However, this relative lack of
attractivity could i n part well be attributed to the fact that the official language of Quebec is
F r e n c h , creating a cultural barrier for overseas or A m e r i c a n immigrants. F u r t h e r m o r e , the
Quebec
Department
of Immigration
(a separate
entity
from the
federal
Department
of
Immigration with veto rights) tends to favour i m m i g r a n t s from F r e n c h speaking countries
such as F r a n c e , H a i t i a n d some A f r i c a n nations. I m m i g r a n t s from these countries constitute a
minority i n the total immigration to C a n a d a .
In order to interpret migration patterns within C a n a d a , the gross migration matrix
was converted into a net exchange matrix for all occupations (see table 5.1.2; the table does
43
Table 5.1.1 Gross Migration, 1976-1981, A l l Occupations.
From/to
FOREIGN
NFLD
1225
P.E.I.
N.S.
N.B.
610
4195
3595
QUEBEC
ONT.
44715 136570
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA.
B.C.
YUKON N.• W.T.
14260
6365
45310
50880
265
380
27565
320
3905
1350
750
8810
895
490
6100
1940
90
365
PEI
165
5770
1485
795
105
1535
135
145
1935
455
25
35
NS
1820
1135
43790
4915
1660
12425
1260
940
10920
5205
105
350
NB
725
965
5435
33855
3950
8630
905
625
8455
2580
65
175
524 5 592165
73250
2715
1485
22025
13935
235
415
1015
1820
NFLD
Quebec
Ontar io
Man i t .
760
500
3475
4960
1705
11865
7230
385
50
1015
485
Sask.
70
115
Alta.
425
375
B.C.
345
Yukon
N.W.T.
24015 753955
13615
8135
92 45 49810
8170
49510
8005
22930
14880
225
560
180
450
1105
290
525
3855
4275
69135
23840
9510
2280
1050
1895
15105
4650
11195 168775
41785
680
1155
310
2175
915
2890
16750
3900
5755
43310 267275
1645
800
15
20
65
30
45
345
70
180
1220
2225
820
95
105
20
115
40
285
725
285
410
2960
1245
340
1925
4 60
Note: Exchange between same province is internal migration
Source: Statistics C a n a d a (1981)
Table 5.1.2 Net E x c h a n g e Matrix, 1976-1981, A l l Occupations.
From/to
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
Quebec
NFLD
******
P.E.I.
155
-155 ******
-2085
N.S.
2085
-10
ONT.
3850
MAN.
510
SASK.
ALTA.
420
5675
B.C.
YUKON
N.W.T.
1595
75
260
5
15
-170
-395
-170
85
30
1560
145
-350 ******
-520
-1815
560
245
480
8640
3030
40
235
135
-625
170
10
395
520 ******
1815
Ontario
-3850
170
-560
-510
-85
-245
Sask.
-420
-30
-480
Alta.
-5675
-1560
-8640
Yukon
625
QUEBEC
350
Manit.
B.C.
N.B.
-1595
-145
-75
-5
N.W.T.
-260
-15
NET IN
-15240
-1300
-3030
335
7405
1665
35
1610
960
20130
11045
190
130
5445
-5445 ******
4280
77140
33060
670
1095
3730
18280
10980
155
275
12645
3755
0
40
-7405 -20130 -77140 -18280 -12645 ******
-1525
-540
-1805
1525 ******
-580
-445
580 ******
-245
-1295
1400
420
1295 ******
49235
-1400 -49235 * * * * * *
-420
-335
r960
-4280
-3730 ******
-1665 -110 4 5-33060 -10980
-40'
-235
-1610
-35
-135
-190
-130
-670
-1095
-155
-275
-8460 -10165 -86815 -66815 -25105
Source: Statistics C a n a d a (1981)
44
-3755
0
5*0
1805
445
-6205 155345
64745
-40
245 ******
295
-310
not include inmigrants from outside
Canada). H e r e the migration pattern is more readily
apparent t h a n in the previous table. In terms of total net inmigration f r o m all provinces,
A l b e r t a was able to attract 155,345 more migrants t h a n it lost to other provinces. T h e only
other
province
tremendous
that
experienced
positive
net
migration
was
B . C . , with
64,775.
This
gain for A l b e r t a is no doubt related to the boom of the oil i n d u s t r y and the
resulting economic spinoffs.
The
m a s s exodus from Quebec is again not surprising, considering that the Partie
Quebecois came to power i n 1976. T h e subsequent introduction of B i l l 101, the controversial
language law requiring all business transactions to be conducted i n F r e n c h and prohibiting
advertising in E n g l i s h , is most likely to be one of the major determinants of the net loss. W i t h
the exception of Newfoundland, Quebec was the only province to lose m i g r a n t s to very other
province. P e r h a p s a bit surprising is the relatively large loss for O n t a r i o (66,815). F o r the
Maritimes
the
loss was
to be
expected.
Newfoundland, Prince E d w a r d
Island and
New
B r u n s w i c k have traditionally been areas of low employment opportunities. O f the opportunities
that do exist, m a n y are seasonal jobs, particularly in fisheries and related occupations.
O v e r a l l , there was a pronounced east to west movement between 1976 a n d 1981
(see
table 5.1.2). T h i s is indicated b y the fact that, again with the exception of Quebec, almost all
of the values above the diagonal in the m a t r i x are positive, whereas below they are negative.
From
Ontario westwards,
provinces.
Clearly
the
provinces
pole
gained
of attraction
from eastern
was
Alberta,
provinces
obtaining a
a n d lost to
net
gain
western
even
from
neighbouring B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a which, like A l b e r t a , gained from all other provinces.
5.2 L a b o u r Force Adjusted M i g r a t i o n Rates.
L a b o u r force adjusted migration rates according to formula (4.2.1) display a more
detailed pattern. Tables 5.2.1
to 5.2.16 show migration rates broken down by occupation.
Tables 5.2.17 shows migration rates for all occupations. F o r reasons discussed above Prince
E d w a r d Island, the Y u k o n and the N o r t h w e s t Territories are not included in the tables. T h e
45
Table 5.2.1 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Managerial, Administrative.
s.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 0
16 36
NOVA SCOTIA
12 70
NEW BRUNSWICK
N
N B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B C.
6 24
O 31
1 06
1 01
O 94
2 86
0 49
0 0
22 97
0 39
1 82
1 04
2 26
5 45
1 76
4, 52
20 75
0 O
0 90
1 09
0 77
1 40
4 32
1 08
QUEBEC
0 28
0 86
1 21
0 0
1 50
0 27
0 18
1 56
0 75
ONTARIO
0 79
1 59
1 03
0 38
0 0
1 00
0 96
3 75
1 58
MANITOBA
0 51
0 90
0 28
0 15
1 12
0 0
12 13
10 24
4 55
SASKATCHEWAN
0 16
0 97
0 43
O 07
0 58
5 76
0 0
14
3 94
ALBERTA
0 43
1 05
0 84
0 10
0 83
2 01
8 41
0 0
7 62
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0 25
1 08
0 30
0 15
0 72
1 22
3 22
8 22
0 0
1 1
Table 5.2.2 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, N a t u r a l
Sciences.
N
s.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N B.
ONT..
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 o
15 66
3 48
0 84
1 34
1 63
0 95
8 89
1 08
NOVA SCOTIA
12 05
0 0
10 44
0 49
2 06
0 94
0 82
1 1 96
3 90
NEW BRUNSWICK
4 17
8 63
0 0
0 54
0 88
0 63
2 69
4 32
0 72
QUEBEC
0 63
1 12
0 63
0 0
1 40
0 45
0 58
2 23
0 94
ONTARIO
0 79
1 65
0 49
0 38
0 0
0 96
0 96
4 78
1 49
MANITOBA
1 36
0 94
0 81
0 26
1 01
0 0
1 1 25
9 78
3 63
SASKATCHEWAN
0 48
1 10
0 32
0 12
0 46
4 95
0 0
16 29
3 02
ALBERTA
0 73
1 43
O 29
0 20
0 61
0 91
5 19
0 0
5 10
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0 0
0 90
0 28
0 22
0 47
0 69
1 70
7 01
0 0
QUEBEC
46
Table 5.2.3 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, S o c i a l
Sciences.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0. .0
10 . 38
19 .. 28
NOVA SCOTIA
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
2.91
0. . 12
1 . 75
0. .0
8 .. 73
0. . 73
N., S .
N,,B.
SASK .
ALTA .
B ,C.
3 .7 1
1 .80
2 . 65
0 . 30
2 . 10
1 . 18
1 . 43
9 . 13
2 . 73
NEW BRUNSWICK
8 .. 73
9 .. 75
0. .0
0. .64
0 . 98
0 .51
0 . 93
3 . 98
1 . 16
QUEBEC
0. .46
0. . 73
0. .96
0. 0
1 .07
.
0. .55
0 .4 1
1 .. 15
0. .83
ONTARIO
0. .99
2 ..02
0. .69
0. .44
0. .0
1. . 4 1
1, . 25
4 ..85
2 . 19
MANITOBA
O. 74
1 .57
0. 51
0. 12
1 .. 55
0. .0
7 . 63
10. . 19
5 ..07
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
1 .91
.
0. 62
0. 04
0. 51
4 . 05
0. O
9 . 10
2 ..83
ALBERTA
0. 88
1 .64
0. 46
0. 13
0. 82
2 ..93
5 .. 26
0. .0
6 .. 38
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 30
1 .45'
0. 1 1
0. 1.3
0. .77
1 .69
3 . 32
4 .84
0. .0
Table 5.2.4 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for S i z e of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Teachers
FROM/TO
NFLD
N. S .
N.B .
QUEBEC
NEWFOUNDLAND
O..0
6 . 75
1 . 87
NOVA SCOTIA
10. . 29
0 .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
0. 70
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK .
ALTA .
B.C .
0 . 34
0 .84
1 . 67
0 .47
2 . 37
1 . 59
8 .63
0 . 50
1 . 54
1 . 44
2 .02
6 . 72
2 .56
9 .00
0, ,0
0 .83
0 .60
0 . 67
1 .07
2 .96
0. . 57
0. 47
0 .98
1 .02
0. .0
1.2 1
0 . 48
0 .31
1 .07
0. .91
ONTARIO
1 .00
1. 7 1
0. 61
0. 62
0. .0
1 .. 22
1 .. 35
2 .97
2 ..13
MANITOBA
0. 84
1 .31
.
0. 29
0. 33
0. .94
0. O
5 .. 35
4 . 37
3 ..88
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 23
0. 37
0. 0
0. 08
0. 63
3 . 54
0. 0
9. 53
3 . 91
ALBERTA
1 . 13
2 . 03
0. 77
0. 18
0. 86
1 .47
5. 92
0. 0
6 . 65
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 59
1 .94
0. 06
0. 28
0. 89
1 .09
2 . 49
5 . 34
0. 0
47
Table 5.2.5 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted f o r Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Medicine & Health.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
23 . 54
2 . 16
13 . 70
O .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
3 .40
14 . 27
QUEBEC
0. , 28
ONTARIO
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C.
0. . 24
1 .64
3 .02
0 ,65
4 .62
4 . 27
16 .. 74
0. 47
2 . 10
2 . 10
1 ,. 2 1
6 . 26
5 .02
0. .0
0. 68
1 . 16
0 .63
0. ,48
3 . 39
0 .99
0. . 92
1 . 14
0. .0
0 . 86
0. . 38
0. , 24
0 . 93
0 . 77
1 .. 10
2 .. 23
0. 72
0. 35
0 .0
1 .. 12
0. 94
2 .84
2 ,. 32
MANITOBA
0. ,40
2. . 72
0. 63
0. 13
1 .03
0. .0
6 . 44
7 .. 58
6 ,01
SASKATCHEWAN
0. . 22
1 .48
0. 10
0. 05
0. . 53
2 ..97
0. 0
10. . 1 1
5 ., 24
ALBERTA
0. 35
1 .78
0. 4 1
O. 16
0. . 70
1 .. 74
3 .,73
0. .0
6 .,90
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 68
1 .97
0. 56
0. 13
0. . 56
1 .29
1 .83
4 ..34
0. ,0
NOVA SCOTIA
N.. S .
N..B.
QUEBEC
'
Table 5.2.6 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, F i n e &
C o m m e r c i a l Artists.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0, .0
NOVA SCOTIA
1 ,, 68
NEW BRUNSWICK
O,,0
QUEBEC
0, . 26
ONTARIO
N.S .
N.,B .
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B ., C .
1 1 .76
,
1 ,59
.
0. ,52
2 . 23
2 .. 52
3 ..56
2 , 70.
0. , 79
0, .0
9 . 28
0. 65
1 .99
,
2 ,. 94
2 ,.77
3 , 15
2 ..44
10 . 52
0. ,0
1 ,00
.
1 ., 17
0. .46
1 .31
,
2 .. 39
1 ,, 30
1 .01
0. 90
0. ,0
1 . 10
0. . 57
0 . 32
0 .99
0. . 73
0, , 74
1 .92
0. 96
0. .60
0 .0
1. . 74
1 .76
3 .52
2 .,06
MANITOBA
3 ., 78
0 .98
0. 46
0. , 4 1
1 .66
,
0 ,0
16 ,.08
13 .. 23
3 ,.89
SASKATCHEWAN
0, ,0
0. .0
0. 0
0. 43
0 .84
10 .90
0, .0
16. .01
3 ,.88
ALBERTA
O., 54
3 . 15
0, 80
0. , 27
1 .06
2 . 21
10, .01
0 .O
7 .90
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0, . 39
2 .90
0. . 29
0, , 25
0 .95
1 . 37
3 .07
6 . 53
0 .0
48
Table 5.2.7 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for S i z e of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, C l e r i c a l
Workers.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
NOVA SCOT IA
N .S.
N,.B.
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C .
15 . 74
4 . 95
1 . 54
1 . 84
9 . 84
1 .67
6 . 12
0 .0
1 .76
1 .88
1 .40
9 .31
2 .94
NEW BRUNSWICK
2 . 42
0. . 78
1 .07
0 . 94
0 . 99
5 . 84
1 . 44
QUEBEC
0. .81
0. 0
1 . 18
0. . 34
0. . 16
1 .85
.
0 .85
1 .. 27
0. .69
0. . 35
0 •0
0 .86
0 . 75
4.41
1 .61
0. .58
1 ,48
.
0. 29
0. . 10
0. .67
0. ,0
7 .. 13
9, , 22
4 . 26
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 32
0. .73
0. 35
0. .09
0. . 39
4 ..69
0. .0
ALBERTA
0. 50
1 .61
0. 79
0. 14
0. .64
1 .81
.
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 24
0. 82
0. 42
0. 14
0. 56
1 .00
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
O.. 24
2 .07
8 .92
0 . 43
1 1. 29
0. .0
0. , 32
0. .69
ONTARIO
0, ,95
MANITOBA
17 ..38
4 ,.91
7 . 27
0. .0
7 .,93
2 . 35
9 . 58
0. .0
Table 5.2.8 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for S i z e of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Sales
Occupations.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
NOVA SCOT IA
4 .51
NEW BRUNSWICK
N.
s.
N.B .
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C .
10 .59
2 . 75
0 . 23
0 .98
0 . 58
0 . 12
5 .63
0 . 50
0 .0
8 .38
0 .33
1 .37
1 .08
0, .80
5 .63
1 . 88
1 ., 13
10. . 43
0. .0
0 . 72
0. . 73
0 .42
0. 49
3 .48
0. .80
QUEBEC
0. , 12
0. 8 1
0. 85
0 .0
1 .. 28
0 . 28
0. 10
1 .41
.
0, ,68
ONTARIO
0. . 94
1 .61
.
0. 72
0 . 34
0. 0
1 .06
0. 61
3 .93
1 .. 5 1
MANITOBA
0. .69
1 .02
0. 31
0. . 16
0. 79
0. ,0
7 . 30
10. . 74
4 .,44
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 36
0. 20
0. 22
0. .06
0. 26
3 . 01
0. 0
10. .05
2 . 64
ALBERTA
0. 26
0. 90
0. 57
0. .08
0. 66
1 ,83
.
4 . 60
0. 0
7 . 54
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 32
0. 58
0. 23
0. 14
0. 55
1 .00
1 .46
7 . 34
0. 0
49
T a b l e 5.2.9 M i g r a t i o n R a t e s A d j u s t e d f o r S i z e o f t h e L a b o u r F o r c e , 1976-1981, S e r v i c e
Occupations.
SASK.
ALTA .
B ,C.
1 .. 73
1 .69
.
5 ..88
2 ..09
o 38
2 .24
2 . 05
7 • 3.1
3 ., 18
0. .69
0. .92
1 .01
0. .62
2 .92
0. ,83
0 .98
0. 0
0. .93
0. .42
0. , 40
1 .. 48
0. .80
2 . 49
o
. 90
0. . 33
O. ,0
1 . 33
0. . 82
3 . 48
1 .58
.
0, .72
1 .60
,
0. . 68
0. . 10
0. .86
0 .0
3. . 72
5 .88
3 . 29
SASKATCHEWAN
0. . 29
1 .. 30
0. . 55
0. . 14
0. . 40
2 .80
o:.0
7 . 77
2 . 91
ALBERTA
0. .55
2 .. 33
0 .63
0. , 22
0. ,75
1 .87
4 .01
0 .0
5 .82
B R I T I S H COLUMBIA
0, .29
1 .96
.
0. .49
0. . 20
0. ,59
1 .36
1 .88
5 .81
0. .0
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
4 . 91
0. .21
2 . 46
0. .0
6 . 12
0. .47
1 .64
.
6. .98
0, .0
QUEBEC
0. . 25
1 ,. 39
ONTARIO
1 .09
.
MANITOBA
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0. .0
NOVA SCOTIA
7 . 18
NEW BRUNSWICK
N.. S .
25 .
18
N. B.
T a b l e 5.2.10 M i g r a t i o n R a t e s A d j u s t e d f o r S i z e o f t h e L a b o u r F o r c e , 1976-1981,
Agriculture.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
NOVA SCOTIA
8 . 25
NEW BRUNSWICK
N.S .
N .B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
8 . 17
2 .51
2 .53
7 .08
9 . 19
0. .0
0 .28
4 .43
7 .20
B .C.
49 .52
28 .95
0. .0
0 .0
21 . 59
0 . 76
0 .0
28 ..06
0. .0
2 ,.67
2 . 47
0. .66
0 .33
4 .07
4 .21
QUEBEC
0 .0
0 . .95
1 .. 78
0. .0
1 .81
0. . 14
0 .07
0 .82
2 . 23
ONTARIO
1 ., 72
3 . 08
1 ,. 24
0. 44
0 •0
0 . 83
0. ,21
2 , 49
3, .94
MANITOBA
0, ,0
O. 28
0. 0
0 . 03
0, . 44
0. 0
1 ,37
.
1 ,. 59
4 ,,06
SASKATCHEWAN
0 . .0
O. 42
0 . 17
O. 0
O, . 1 1
o . 58
0. 0
2 . OO
1 ,93
.
ALBERTA
0. 0
1 .1 1
0 . 37
0 . 05
0 . 44
0 . 87
1 .84
0. 0
7 ., 19
B R I T I S H COLUMBIA
0. O
5 . 14
2 . 40
0 . 58
1 .26
1. 87
2 . 56
7 . 36
O. O
50
• 2 .02
Table 5.2.11 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
P r i m a r y Occupations.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N..
s.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0..0
1 .82
0.. 29
NOVA SCOTIA
0 .87
0 .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
0.. 18
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
0..09
0..64
5 .15
0. 90
5.. 10
0.. 30
0.. 48
0..03
0..42
1 .27
1 .05
5 .94
0.. 78
0.. 82
0..0
0..31
0. 35
0. 95
0. 15
2 .91
0..50
0..07
0 . 15
0.. 74
0.0
0. 98
0. 54
0. 34
2 .04
0..67
ONTARIO
1 ,45
,
1 . 37
0.. 7 1
0. 38
0..0
2 .65
1 .93
.
8 .. 73
1 ,73
.
MANITOBA
1 .09
.
1..09
0.. 32
0.. 12
1 .96
.
0..0
10,.51
22 . 39
3 .67
.
SASKATCHEWAN
0..0
0..0
0.. 15
0.0
0. 39
5 . 66
0..0
30 . 15
2,
. 30
ALBERTA
0,, 5G
1.. 1 1
0..40
0.03
0. 53
2 .15
10..94
0 .0
5 , 55
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0.. 12 . 0.. 32
0.,05
0.02
0. 26
0. 53
0..96
6 . 57
0.,0
N.,B.
QUEBEC
ALTA .
B.
,C.
Table 5.2.12 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted f o r Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Processing.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N .S.
N .B .
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
8 . 14
1 .44
NOVA SCOTIA
1 . 68
0 .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
0 . 29
QUEBEC
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK.
0 .21
2 .67
3 . 48
3 . 55
•O. 20
1 . 56
5 .68
0 .0
0 . 78
0 . 17
0..31
1 .. 47
ONTARIO
1 .84
,
1 .99
.
MANITOBA
0..87
SASKATCHEWAN
ALTA .
B .C .
4 .77
10 . 58
1 . 70
1. 9 1
0 .0
6 .96
2 .42
1 . 28
3 .42
0..0
7 . 73
1 .30
0..0
0.. 73
0 . 29
0,. 24
1 .72
.
0..68
1 .. 16
0..31
0..0
1 .30
1 .08
,
7 .. 13
1 ,86
.
0..48
0. 49
0.06
1.. 17
0.,0
10. 53
17 .98
5..65
0. 0
0. 0
0. 40
0. 14
0. 52
5 .67
.
0. 0
32 .52
7 .89
ALBERTA
0. 24
2 .32
0. 79
0. 17
1. 03
4,
. 20
9 .53
0. 0
1 1 56
.
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0.08
0. 38
o. 52
0.05
0. 39
1 .05
1 .62
9 .16
0.0
51
Table 5.2.13 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Manufacturing.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N.S .
N.B .
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK .
ALTA .
B .C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
29 ., 64
8 . 27
0. .61
6 .. 37
4 .66
2 . 34
27 . 75
6 . 33
NOVA
6 . 59
0 .0
14 . 64
0. . 38
2 . 52
2 . 23
4 . 44
19 . 56
4 . 44
i.
. 76
16 ..04
0. .0
0. .81
1 .30
1 .66
1 . 73
13 . 6 0
2 . 13
QUEBEC
0. . 14
0. . 56
1 .09
.
0. .0
0. . 63
0. . 35
0. . 33
2 .46
0 , 75
ONTARIO
1 .48
.
1 .76
0. 89
0. 24
0. 0
1 .02
.
1 .. 22
6 . 26
1 .97
.
MANITOBA
0. . 74
1 .. 24
0. 62
0. . 17
0. 57
0. .0
12 . 16
15 .96
7 . 30
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
0 . 89
1 .73
.
0. 13
0. 4 1
6 ..87
0. .0
30 .99
7 .45
.
ALBERTA
1 . 19
2 . 51
1 .43
0 . 17
0 . 98
3 . 36
15 ..92
0. .0
15 . 27
0 . 26
0 . 98
0 . 49
0 . 22
0 . 63
1 .46
.
4 .59
.
15 .32
0. .0
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
Table 5.2.14 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Construction.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N. S .
N . B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK .
ALTA .
B .C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
1 . 50
0 .89
0 . 14
0 .98
0 .66
1 . 68
7 .69
0 .68
NOVA
1 . 15
0. .0
1 . 69
0 . 1 1
0. . 72
0 . 59
1 . 34
9 .93
1 .65
.
0 . 53
2 . 19
0 .0
0 . 23
0. . 46
0 . 27
0 . 39
6 .80
0 .70
QUEBEC
0. .05
0 . 21
0. . 43
0. .0
0. 40
0. .07
0. . 22
2.71
0. .53
ONTARIO
0 . 60
0 . 73
0. 5 1
0. . 17
0. 0
0. . 37
0. .68
6 . 36
1. 51
MANITOBA
0 . 37
0 . 29
0. 14
0. 03
0 . 38
0. O
6 .. 5 1
10.. 82
3 . 61
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
0 . 17
0 . 06
0 . 05
0 . 15
1. 33
0. 0
15..04
2. 97
ALBERTA
0 . 12
1 .38
0 . 20
0 . 09
0 . 35
1. 07
5 . 82
0. 0
6 . 42
0 . 06
0 . 27
0 . 23
0 . 06
O. 28
o . 46
2 . 20
7 . 68
0. 0
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
52
Table 5.2.15 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981,
Transportation.
SASK.
ALTA .
B.C.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N., s.
N . B . QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0..0
5 .31
.
1 .95
.
0., 20
0..97
0 . 65
0.0
4 .73
0 .89
NOVA SCOTIA
4 .85
.
0..0
4 .05
.
0., 20
1 .14
1 .. 17
0. 49
6 . 84
2 . 28
NEW BRUNSWICK
o"..97
5..07
0..0
0. 23
0. 59
0..51
0. 23
4 . 15
0 . 44
QUEBEC
0..45
0..40
0..58
0..0
0. 76
0 .34
0\ 16
2 .08
0..51
ONTARIO
1 .. 32
1 .49
.
0,.66
0,, 27
0..0
1 .. 53
0. 95
6 . 43
1 .. 37
MANITOBA
0. 65
1 .31
.
0..41
0.. 23
0..68
0 .0
5. 77
1 1.86
3 .82
SASKATCHEWAN
0..0
0..49
0.. 1 1
0..10
0..23
3 .81
.
0.0
14 .42
2 . 89
ALBERTA
0..21
1 ,50
.
0.,40
0. 19
0. 86
2,
. 78
4 .76
0 .0
9 ,.1 1
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0.. 13
0..80
0,. 28
0.. 12
0..46
1 .05
1 .7 1
10 .69
0 .0
Table 5.2.16 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, Other
Occupations.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N . s.
N .B .
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
9 .4 1
5 .97
NOVA SCOTIA
3 . 76
0 .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
1 .66
QUEBEC
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C .
0 .04
4 .82
2 .87
1 .03
8 .89
2 . 56
9 . 46
0.. 39
1 . 77
1 .28
1 . 38
7 .93
2 . 26
1 1.04
0..0
0 . 59
1 .41
1 . 20
0 .65
8 .71
1 . 50
O . 25
O .67
0. 75
0 .0
0 .71
0 . 23
0,. 25
1 .67
.
0 . 58
ONTARIO
1 ,, 64
1 .. 56
1 .00
0. 25
0 .0
1 ., 12
0,.87
4 . 58
1 . 70
MANITOBA
1 ., 9 1
1 .00
0. 75
0. 15
0 . 88
0, 0
7 ,72
1 1.. 75
5 .05
SASKATCHEWAN
O.0 •
0. 77
0. 49
0.09
0.,6 1
6 .20
0. 0
13 .17
3 .63
.
ALBERTA
0. 52
1 .56
0. 66
0.06
0. 84
2,
. 55
5 .69
0.0
8 .. 57
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 44
1 .10
0. 39
0.08
0. 49
1 .76
2 .55
7 .96
0..0
53
Table 5.2.17 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, 1976-1981, A l l
Occupations.
Newfoundland
* * * * * 15. 08
4.91
.29
2. 44
2. 32
1. 58
7. 33
2. 15
7. 17 * * ** *
9.73
.42
1. 70
1. 46
1. 48
7. 91
2. 97
2. 07 10. 66 * * * * *
. 78
1. 04
• 91
• 84
5. 10
1. 23
1. 03
• 37
• 27
1. 64
• 84
1. 22
1. 02
4. 78
1. 91
8. 23 10. 85
4 .51
4. 55 * * * * * 15. 54
3. 93
7. 84
New
Scotia
Brunswick
Quebec
NS
QUEB. ONT
.96 * * * * *
SASK. ALTA.
BC
NFLD
Nova
NB
MAN •
From/to
• 26
• 74
1. 15
1. 78
.81
. 37 * * * * *
Manitoba
• 95
1. 15
.43
.16
• 98
Saskatchewan
• 13
.
68
. 36
. 10
• 43
Alberta
• 51
1. 74
.61
.14
75
2. 11
6. 81 *****
26
1. 48
.44
.17
61
1. 22
2. 34
Ontar i o
British
Columbia
54
* * ** *
7. 73 ** * * *
following section will first describe the overall C a n a d i a n pattern of migration and then look at
the pattern for individual occupations.
A number of generalizations c a n be made from the tables. F i r s t , with one
exception
(agriculture) Quebec experienced far less inmigration t h a n expected. T h e adjusted migration
rates are in most cases well below
Quebec was
1.00.
A t the same time, however,
also g e n e r a l ^ less than expected.
T h i s reasons
outmigration from
for this are the cultural and
political explained above. T h u s F r e n c h speaking Quebecers are likely to have a m u c h lower
tendency to migrate, whereas of those that do migrate to another province the majority will in
all probability be E n g l i s h speaking. T h e destination of most of the migrants from Quebec is
either N e w B r u n s w i c k (also bilingual), Ontario or A l b e r t a , although inmigration from Quebec
to A l b e r t a was not as high as for the other provinces.
Second, there was a great deal of interaction within the M a r i t i m e provinces. A l t h o u g h
the propensity to migrate was the highest i n the M a r i t i m e s , migrants from those provinces do
tend to stay within the M a r i t i m e s , i.e., move to another M a r i t i m e province. T h e major nonm a r i t i m e destination for the Atlantic provinces was A l b e r t a . N o v a Scotia seemed to be the
M a r i t i m e pole of attraction. In m a n y cases inmigration was greater t h a n expected. M o s t of the
migrants likely moved to H a l i f a x , the major growth centre in the M a r i t i m e s between 1976 and
1981.
T h i r d , the attractivity of A l b e r t a was more readily apparent in the adjusted migration
rates. In only three cases was inmigration less t h a n expected on the basis of Alberta's share of
the C a n a d i a n labour force. F i n a l l y , migration rates tend to be greater than 1.00
between
neighbouring provinces and A l b e r t a , and less t h a n 1.00 for other provinces.
T h e above
findings are similar in two instances with those of L y c a n (1969). T h e
Quebec pattern a n d the greater propensity to migrate within the M a r i t i m e provinces also
existed between
1956
a n d 1961.
H o w e v e r , A l b e r t a was
not as popular a destination.
In
addition, the variation in migration rates was also not as great as it was between 1976 a n d
1981. Increased mobility leading to higher migration rates appears to be a national trend.
55
Table 5.3.1 Regression of Labour Force Adjusted Migration Rates with Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, by Province of Origin.
ln(D)
IO
Province
R
R
Newfoundland
.578"
.334
-.577*
.553*
Nova Scotia
.313"
.098
-.306*
.304*
New Brunswick
.460 '
.211
-.444*
.350*
Quebec
.317"
.101
-.317*
.252^
Ontario
.695 *
.483
.693*
-.048
Manitoba
.591
.349
-.221*
-.163*
Saskatchewan
.746 '
.557
-.432*
-.009
Alberta
.734 '
.539
-.485*
.155
British Columbia
.787*
.619
-.559*
.211
Canada*
.333"
.111
-.234*
.043
:
:
:
z
: significant at 10%
**
: significant at 5%
***
: significant at 1%
x
: does not include Prince Edward Island, Yukon and Northwest Territories
56
:l
Although Alberta was the major region of attraction for every occupation, this
attractivity was more pronounced in the blue collar and resource-related occupations such as
primary occupations, processing and manufacturing. In general, however, blue collar workers
do not seem to have as high a propensity to migrate as white collar workers. The reason for
this is likely to be found in the social and cultural characteristics of blue collar workers. One of
these is that they are more conservative and thus more deeply rooted to their region of origin.
Nova Scotia tends to attract migrants from white collar occupational groups. Again,
this is most likely related to the development of Halifax as the gateway to eastern Canada.
Halifax's fastest growing industry, the port, requires a large number of service industries.
These service industries have in turn been able to attract many other, non port-related
activities.
Apart from the above observations, labour force adjusted migration rates do not show
any notable variation between occupational groups.
5.3 Migration Rates Adjusted for Labour Force, Distance and Intervening
Opportunities.
The next step in the analysis is to determine the influence of spatial factors (distance
and intervening opportunities) on the adjusted migration rates, and in turn adjust the rates
according to equation (4.2.4).
Table 5.3.1
shows the results
of the multiple regression.
Overall distance
and
intervening opportunities explained 11.1% of the variation in migration rates, significant at
1%. This is very much lower than the result of Lycan's (1969) study, where the multiple r
showed that 49.8% of the variation was explained by spatial factors. As was to be'expected,
however,
the explanatory powers of the two spatial factors vary considerably between
provinces of origin, and are, in most cases (Nova Scotia and Quebec excepted), higher than the
coefficient based on all provinces. Generally the multiple R tends to increase in an east to west
direction. In all cases the sign of distance was negative, except for Ontario where there was a
highly significant positive relationship (62.7% of migrating Ontarians moved to Alberta or
57
B r i t i s h Columbia). H o w e v e r , intervening opportunities h a d a positive sign in all provinces save
Ontario, M a n i t o b a and Saskatchewan.
For
the
eastern
provinces
the
relationship
between
distance
and
intervening
opportunities is one of a m i r r o r image. In addition, the partial regression coefficients
almost
equal
to
the
multiple
regression
coefficient.
The
major reason
that
are
intervening
opportunities show a positive correlation is that, as mentioned earlier, migrants from the
M a r i t i m e provinces tend to go to A l b e r t a and B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a i f they do not stay within the
M a r i t i m e s . A s the majority of the n o n - M a r i t i m e moves are therefore destined to provinces
west of Ontario, it is not surprising that the
sign is positive.
T h e largest
proportion of
C a n a d a ' s labour force is in the industrial heartland of Ontario and Quebec, which tends to be
"skipped" b y migrants f r o m the M a r i t i m e s , thus explaining the positive partial correlation
coefficient.
O v e r a l l the amount of variation explained by spatial factors for migration to the
M a r i t i m e s was relatively low, compared to the rest of C a n a d a . A g a i n , this is accounted for by
the fact that there are only two major destinations: neighbouring provinces or A l b e r t a .
F o r Quebec the coefficients were comparatively low. T h i s c a n be explained by the same
reasons as above: the small amount of migration that does occur is either to N e w B r u n s w i c k ,
Ontario or A l b e r t a .
F o r Ontario the
partial correlation of intervening opportunities
was
negative, but totally insignificant. T h i s was to be expected as Ontario itself is the industrial
heartland of C a n a d a (along with Quebec). T h e strong positive relationship with distance c a n be
explained b y the fact that a good proportion of the moves are over long distances.
T h e multiple r
for the western provinces is relatively high compared to the rest of
C a n a d a , r a n g i n g from a low of .349 (Manitoba) to a high of .619 (British Columbia). While
distance is highly significant in all cases (greater t h a n 1%), intervening opportunities do not
account for as m u c h of the variation a n d are generally not as significant.
The
equation
results
would
of the
lead
to
multiple regression
errors.
The
confirm that
explanatory
power
the
of
considerably, as do the signs of the partial correlation coefficients.
58
use
spatial
of a n
factors
economy-wide
vary
quite
Table 5.3.2 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted f o r Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Managerial, Administrative.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N .s.
N .8 .
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK .
ALTA .
B .C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
1 .01
0. . 68
- 0 . 29
- 0 .31
- 1 .46
- 1 . 32
0 . 24
- 1 .21
NOVA
2 . 29
0 .0
1 .60
.
- 1 .40
- 0 . 15
- 1 .04
- 0 . 23
0 . 75
- 0 . 34
1 .91
.
1 . 53
0 . .0
- 0 . .47
-0,, 4 1
- 0 .84
- 0 , . 14
1 ., 16
-0.. 1 1
0 . 34
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
-o,,
19
0, .50
0 . 67
0. ,0
0. ,49
- 0 .95
- 1.26
,
1 .00
,
ONTARIO
-o.,
75
0 . .43
0 . 17
0. .02
0 . ,0
- 0 , .20
- 0 , .44
0, .70
0 . 26
0 . 55
- 0 . 74
-2 .,02
- 0 . 68
0, .0
- 0 . 13
1. 24
0 . 29
- 1 98
.
- 0 . 14
0 . 07
0 . 55
0 . 23
- 1 96
.
- 0 . 07
0 . 95
- 0 . 43
- 1 .15
MANITOBA
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH
NOTE:
BASED
COLUMBIA
- 0 , ,42
0. .62
1 .. 20
1 ,02
.
- 0 , 38
0. 0
0. 97
1 .27
0 . 51
- 0 . 29
0. 14
0. 0
0 . 89
0 . 95
0 . 03
0 . 40
0 . 22
0. 0
P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN
ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
EXPECTED
Table 5.3.3 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, N a t u r a l Sciences
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
0.61
O. . 27
- 0 .98
-1 ,.29
1 .42
-0,. 4 1
0. .81
- 1 .20
0. .07
- 1• .
^
- 1. ,24
1 . 55
0, ,45
0. . 66
0. .0
-0.97
- 1.00
.
0, . 55
1 .21
O, .60
0 . . 74
0. 02
- 0 . 76
O. 46
MANITOBA
1 .24
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
FROM/TO
NFLD
N .S.
N..B .
NEWFOUNDLAND
0, .0
0 .97
0. . 10
NOVA
2 ,. 24
0. .0
1 ., 83
QUEBEC
ONTARIO
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
BRITISH
NOTE:
BASED
COLUMBIA
QUEBEC
- 0 . . 48
1
B .C.
- 0 . ,48
0.0
0. . 4 1
- 0 , ,49
- 0 . . 17 .
1 . 30
0. , 50
- 0 . 59
0.02
0. 0
- 0 . . 23
- 0 . , 44
0 . 94
- 0 . , 47
0 . 59
0 . 32
-1.41
- 0 . 79
0. 0
0. ,55
1 . 15
0. 80
0.. 99.
1 .37
- 0 . 02
- 1 . 49
- 0 . 37
- 0 . 54
0. 0
1 ., 12
1 ,01
.
o. 6 1
O. 87
- 0 . 81
- 1 . 35
0 . 20
- 1 07
.
- 0 . 34
0. .0
0 . , 49
0. 0
0 . 77
- 0 . 49
-0.82
0 . 51
- 0 . 54
- 0 . 24
0, .06
0. 0
P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN
ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
59
EXPECTED
Table 5.3.4 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Social Sciences.
FROM/TO
NEWFOUNDLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
NEW BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
ONTARIO
MANITOBA
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH COLUMBIA
NFLD
N,,S.
0..0
0.. 55
2,
. 7 1 0..0
2.., 57 O., 78
0.. 29 0,, 32
-0., 52 O,,67
1 ,09
.
0.,63
1 ,92
.
0..0
1 ,01
.
0.,80
0., 15 1 .25
N,,B.
QUEBEC
- 1..38
-o,, 78
-0,,81
0.,0
-0. 24
0,, 17
. 24
-0.. 15 -2 ,
.
0. 66 -2 ,67
,
-0. 35 - 1.73
-1.^46 - 1,31
.
-o,,09
0.,63
O.,0
0..44
ONT .
MAN.
SASK .
-0,.09 -0..59
-0..90 -o. 66
- 1,,18 -0. 48
-0., 20 -0. 42
0.. 15 -0. 18
0.,0
0,,0
0. 16
-0. 35
-0., 26 -0.. 74 0. 0
0.,08 -0. 33
0. 49
1.
01
0,. 35 0. 44
0,. 13
-0,,03
-0..51
0., 14
ALTA .
0..20
1 ,, 28
1 ,, 12
0., 7 1
,C .
B.
- 1.62
.
0.. 12
0 .01
0 . 46
0,,96 -0..09
1 ,.20 1 .. 13
0,. 54 0 .94
0.,0
0.. 72
-0.. 30 0.,0
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
Table 5.3.5 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Teachers
FROM/TO
NEWFOUNDLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
NEW BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
ONTARIO
MANITOBA
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH COLUMBIA
NFLD
N.. S .
0 .0
2,.08
0,,03
0..29
-0.. 5 1
0.. 7 1
0,. 27
1 .06
.
0..83
0.. 12
0..0
O,, 70
0.. 59
0,.51
0..86
0.. 27
1.
25
1 .56
.
N.
,B .
QUEBEC
-0., 59 -0.43
0.,62 -1.18
-0.55
0..0
0,, 50 0.0
-0.. 34 0.52
-0. 80 -1.31
- 1 . 94
0. 0
0. 21 - 1 . 36
-2 .05 -0. 48
ONT .
MAN .
SASK.
ALTA .
-0.. 78
-0.. 37
- 1.01
.
0.. 27
0..0
-0. 85
-0,.06
0. 52
1. 1 1
-0..61
-0..60
-0.. 79
-0. 24'
- 1 77
.
-0. 25
-0. 25
-0. 63
-0. 10
-0. 20
0. 0
-0. 21
0. 13
0.. 20 0..05
1 ,02
,
0 .08
0..90 -0..66
0.. 70 0.. 59
0.. 47 -0.. 1 1
0.. 36 0..89
0.. 58 1 .. 27
0'..0
0.. 76
-0..21
0. 0
0. 00
0. O
-0. 87
-0. 61
-0. 1 1
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
60
B ,C .
T a b l e 5.3.6 M i g r a t i o n R a t e s A d j u s t e d f o r S i z e o f t h e L a b o u r F o r c e , D i s t a n c e a n d
I n t e r v e n i n g O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 1976-1981, M e d i c i n e a n d
Health.
N .B . QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK .
ALTA .
B ,c.
- 0 , . 67
0 . 20
0 .04
- 1. 33
0..92
1 .06
1 , 28
- 1. 23
0..02
- 0 . . 22
- 0 . . 74
0..96
0 . 74
1. .16
0 ,.0
- o . 75
- 0 . . 28
- 0 . . 87
- 1.04
.
1.02
.
- 0 . . 13
FROM/TO
NFLD
N .S.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .. 0
1 . 37
NOVA SCOTIA
2 . 37
0 .0
NEW BRUNSWICK
1 ,62
.
- 0 , .40
QUEBEC
- 0 . .21
0 ,. 54
0 .,61
0 .,0
- 0 . ,07
- 0 . . 52
- 0 . .93
0 . 51
0 .. 37
ONTARIO
- 0 , ,42
0.. 77
- 0 , . 19
- 0 . .06
0 ., 0
- 0 . .08
- 0 . .46
0 ..43
- 0 . ,02
MANITOBA
- 0 . .03
1..59
- 0 , ,01
- 2 ., 22
- 0 . . 77
0 ..0
- 0 . .01
0 . 92
1. .34
0 . , 20
1..66
-1 ,. 20
- 2 .. 37
- 0 . , 23
- 1 . 05
0 ..0
0 . 64
1 .56
.
-0. 1 1
1. 12
- 0 . 43
- 1 50
.
0 . 31
- 0 . 45
- 0 . 67
0. 0
0 . 80
0 . 97
1.,57
0 , ,23
- 1.30
,
0 . .64
0 . .04
- 0 . 19
- 0 . 42
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0. 0
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
T a b l e 5.3.7 M i g r a t i o n R a t e s A d j u s t e d f o r S i z e o f t h e L a b o u r F o r c e , D i s t a n c e a n d
I n t e r v e n i n g O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 1976-1981, F i n e a n d C o m m e r c i a l
Artists.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N.s.
N .B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN .
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
0 .68
- o .71
0 . 17
0 . 18
- 0 . 72
- 0 .05
0 . 17
- 0 .73
NOVA SCOTIA
0 . 27
0 .0
0 . 69
- 0 . . 88
- 0 . 13
- 0 .05
- 0 .04
0 . 20
- 0 .00
NEW BRUNSWICK
0 .0
0 .85
0 .0
- 0 . 36
-0 . 4 1
- 1. 38
- 0 .21
0 . 58
0 .09
QUEBEC
- 0 . . 28
0 .64
0 . 38
0 ..0
0 .. 18
- o . . 18
- 0 . .66
0 . 59
o .. 36
ONTARIO
- 0 . .80
0 . 63
0. 1 1
0 . 49
0 . .0
0 . 36
0 . 16
0 ..63
- 0 . ,15-
MANITOBA
2 . 30
0 . 66
- 0 . 20
- 1 01
.
- 0 . 29
0. 0
0 . 90
1. .44
0 . 86
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
- 0 . 23
0 . 23
0 . 25
0. 0
1 .10
1 26
.
ALBERTA
O. 30
1. 66
0 . 18
- 0 . 94
0 . 78
- 0 . 18
0 . 32
0. 0
0 . 93
BRITISH COLUMBIA
0 . 40
1. 94
- 0 . 47
-0. 6 1
1. 26
0 . 17
0 . 36
- 0 . 01
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
61
0. 0
Table 5.3.8 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1876-1981, C l e r i c a l Workers.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N S.
N B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
NEWFOUNDLAND
O 0
0 97
O 43
-0 62
0 49
NOVA SCOTIA
1 5G
0 0
0 65
- 1 32
1 28
O 93
0 O
QUEBEC
-0 08
0 26
ONTARIO
-0 56
MANITOBA
MAN.
SASK .
ALTA .
B C.
-0 98
-0 6 1
1 52
0 07
-0 14
-o
43
-0 69
1 30
0 20
-0 61
-0 36
-0 59
-0 44
1 50
0 22
0 27
0 0
0 25
-0 72
- 1 40
1 16
0 45
0 20
-0 24
-0 04
0 0
-0 34
-0 69
0 86
-0 39
0 38
1 03
-0 71
-2 42
- 1 19
0 0
0 09
1 09
0 96
SASKATCHEWAN
0 60
0 96
0 07
- 1 77
-0 55
-0 59
0 0
1 18
1 49
ALBERTA
0 23
0 99
0 19
- 1 64
0 25
-o
0 0
0 93
-0 07
0 69
-0 09
- 1 26
0 70
-0 17
0 38
0 0
NEW BRUNSWICK
BRITISH COLUMBIA
1
39
-o
00
0 09
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION. DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
Table 5.3.9 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Sales Occupations.
i
FROM/TO
NFLD
N
s.
N B.
QUEBEC
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 0
0 58
-0 20
-0 76
-0 23
- 1 55
NOVA SCOTIA
1 26
0 0
0 59
- 1 59
-0 37
NEW BRUNSWICK
0 51
0 85
0 0
-0 69
0 42
0 31
0 0
ONT .
MAN.
ALTA .
B c.
-2 93
1 23
-0 95
-0 85
- 1 12
0 89
-0 19
-0 70
- 1 23
-0 98
1 10
-0 28
0 32
-0 82
- 1 79
0 93
0 26
-0 90
0 75
-0 45
0 1 1
1 27
1 03
0 0
0 63
0 88
-0 46
0 0
0 88
-0 41
0 1 1
0 0
| QUEBEC
-1
I
ONTARIO
-0 58
0 44
-0 19
-0 09
0 0
-0 13
MANITOBA
0 50
0 59
-0 7 1
-2 02
-1 03
0 0
SASKATCHEWAN
0 70
-0 35
-0 39
-2 16
-0 96
-1 03
-o
09
-2 18
o
-0 64
- 1 22
0 63
ALBERTA
BRITISH COLUMBIA
1 1
-0 37
0 23
o
46
0 38
SASK .
25
-o
40
-0 2 1
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
62
Table 5.3.10 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Service Occupations.
s.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 0
1 44
0
38
-0
NOVA
1 72
0 0
0
27
- 1 27
0
0 0
74
SCOTIA
N B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
95
0 61
-0
42
0
16
-0
-0
46
0 00
MAN .
SASK.
ALTA .
B C.
-0
29
1 29
0 54
1 1
-0
18
1 16
0
35
-0
31
-0
71
0 97
-0
19
-0
42
-0
39
1 00
0 09
-0
60
0 63
-0
40
0 0
-0
56
0 66
0
72
I
NEW
BRUNSWICK
O 87
44
-0
QUEBEC
-0
35
0 93
0 46
ONTARIO
-0
42
0 88
O 02
-0
1 1
MANITOBA
0
52
1 03
0 04
-2
46
-0
95
SASKATCHEWAN
0
50
1 53
0
- 1 34
-0
52
- 1
•1 1
ALBERTA
0
37
1 41
0 04
- 1
14
0
38
-0
38
-0
60
0
16
1 61
0
17
-0
85
0
70
0
1 1
-0
15
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
52
0 0
0 0
0 0
38
0
0 0
-0
12
0 44
0 97
0 62
0 0
N O T E : P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
Table 6.3.11 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, A g r i c u l t u r e .
FROM/TO
NFLD
N S.
N B.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 0
2
2 26
NOVA
1 86
0 0
1 53
0 0
1 84
0 0
0 62
0 76
-0
0 0
o 61
1 06
0 O
1 05
0
0
-3
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
ONTARIO
-0
01
12
32
QUEBEC
1 50
1 58
1 32
- 1 79
0 66
0 94
27
-1
01
1 2 1
1 08
0 67
- 1 34
-2
04
0
21
1 12
17
0 0
-0
38
-1
93
0
36
0 60
84
- 1 62
- 1 56
-0
44
1 27
0 0
-0
98
0 57
70
-0
98
SASKATCHEWAN
O 0
0
40
-0
69
ALBERTA
0 0
o 67
-0
54
-2
82
0 0
2 42
1 54
-0
1 1
COLUMBIA
1 74
B C.
0 0
BRITISH
2 90
ALTA .
MANITOBA
O 0
MAN.
SASK.
0 0
-0
ONT .
0 0
0
28
- 1 80
0 0
0 O
-2
68
42
- 1 34
38
0 97
0 02
0 00
-0
N O T E : P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
63
0 0
0
1 1
0 84
0 0
Table 5.3.12 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, P r i m a r y Occupations.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
N.S.
N..B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
0 .0
- 1. 19
-2 .
.80
-2 .47
- 1. 27
NOVA SCOTIA
-0 . 38
0..0
-2 . 28
-4 . 26
NEW BRUNSWICK
- i ..47
- 1.70
.
0..0
QUEBEC
- 1 ,81
.
- 1 .,33
0., 18
ONTARIO
-0. 12
0.. 28
MANITOBA
0..83
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH COLUMBIA
MAN.
SASK .
1 . 38
-0..05
2. 1 1
-0,.31
- 1.62
-0.. 37
-0..49
1 . 34
-0,.62
- 1.52
- 1.40
0..08
- 1.62
.
1 .49
-0,. 1 1
0 .0
0..06
0.,07
-0.. 28
1 .61
0..59
-0. 21
0..03
0,,0
0.. 78
0. 25
1 . 54
0. 48
-0. 95
-2 .
.51
0. 0
0. 48
1 .98
0,.79
0. 0
0. 0
-0. 77
0..0
-0..55
-0. 40
0. 0
1 . 73
0. 74
0. 54
0. 88
-0. 16
-2 .
.91
0. 07
-0. 22
0. 41
0..0
0. 58
-0. 48
0.08
-1 . 77
-2 ..86
-0. 02
-0. 78
-0. 79
0,,00
0. 0
-0.. 12
ALTA .
B .C.
-0,, 33
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION, DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
Table 5.3.13 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Processing.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N.S.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0..0
NOVA SCOTIA
0.. 27
N .B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
0 .31
-0 .92
-0 .96
0 . 14
0.,0
-0 . 27
-2 . 1 1
-0..40
-o..31
NEW BRUNSWICK
-0..89
0.. 24
0,.0
-0..61
QUEBEC
-0. 73
-0., 55
0,.87
0..0
-0.. 17
MAN .
-o .
13
SASK .
ALTA .
B ,C.
0 .47
1 . 76
O .51
0..0
1 . 10
0.. 15
0.. 77
0..0
1 .90
Oi.31
-0.. 75
1 .23
0..42
1 . 34
-0,. 27
-o.. 37
0.0
0..07
-0..86
-0.. 32
-3. 05
-0. 63
0. O
0..48
1 . 75
1.. 19
0. 22
- 1 .32
.
-0. 25
-0. 40
0. 0
1 .81
.
1. 97
ONTARIO
0. 12
0. 67
0..30
MANITOBA
0. 79
-0. 12
-0. 23
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
0. 0
-0.. 24
ALBERTA
-0. 49
1 .40
0. 25
- 1 38
.
0. 74
0. 46
0. 27
0 .0
1. 31
BRITISH COLUMBIA
- 1 .13
0.03
0. 25
-1 .99
0. 4 1
-0. 06
-0. 24
0..33
0. 0
NOTE: POSITIVE VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON POPULATION. DISTANCE AND INTERVENING OPPORTUNITY
64
Table 5.3.14 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted f o r Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Manufacturing.
FROM/TO
NFLD
N. S .
N .B.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
1.60
0 . 98
NOVA
1 . 64
0 .0
1 . 15
1 .42
1 . 28
0 .0
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK .
ALTA .
0 . 38
1 . 37
- 0 . 37
- 0 .83
2 . 18
1 .21
- 1.42
.
0. . 13
-0.. 4 1
0. .32
1 .93
0 . 54
- 0 . . 57
- 0 . . 27
- 0 . .21
- 0 . .06
2 . 19
0 . . 52
B .c.
QUEBEC
- 0 . .87
0 .06
0 . 56
0 , ,0
- 0 . . 38
- 0 . .75
- 0 . . 73
1 .41
0 . . 33
ONTARIO
-0.. 1 1
0 . . 54
0. .03
- 0 . .44
0. 0
- 0 . 17
- 0 . .21
1 .21
.
- 0 . . 20
MANITOBA
0 . . 70
0 . .94
0. . 14
- 1 84
.
- 1 36
. .
0. 0
0 . 62
1 .63
.
1 .45
.
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
1. 16
1..69
- 1 38
.
- 0 . 50
- 0 . 21
0. 0
1 ,, 76
1 .91
ALBERTA
1 .04
1. 37
0. 7 1
- 1 50
.
O. 69
0 . 24
0 . 78
0 . .0
1 .59
- 0 . 05
0 . 82
0 . 02
- 0 . 80
0 . 87
0 . 27
0 . 79
0 . .85
0. 0
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
N O T E : P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
Table 5.3.15 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted f o r Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance a n d
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, C o n s t r u c t i o n Trades.
N.. s .
N ,B.
O .0
- 1.38
.
- 1 . 38
- 0 . . 10
0. O
- 0 . , 27
QUEBEC
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
- 1 . 37
- 0 . 20
- 1 . 23
- 0 , . 16
1 . 75
- 0 . , 52
- 1.01
.
- 2 . 68
- 1 .00
- 1 . 40
- 0 . .55
1 .53
- 0 . 27
- o . . 72
0 . .0
- 1 . 84
-1. 1 1
- 1 . 57
- 1. ,14
' 1 . 88
- 0 . 33
- 1.91
.
- o . 94
- 0 . . 36
0 .0
- 0 , .84
- 2 . 17
- 1.00
,
1 .62
0 . 02
ONTARIO
- 1 03
.
- o . 35
- 0 . .54
- 0 . . 79
0 .0
- 1. ,18
- 0 . . 78
1 . 23
- 0 . 45
MANITOBA
- 0 . 16
- 0 . 70
-1. 6 1
- 3 ..80
- 1 . , 75
0 .0
- 0 . ,00
1 . 26
0 . 83
0. 0
- o . 52
- 1 . 62
-2 . 35
- 1 . .49
- 1.85
.
0 . ,0
1 .04 '
0 . 99
- 1 09
.
0 . 92
- 1 . 07
- 2 ..09
- 0 . , 37
- 0 . , 93
- 0 . 23
0, .0
0 . 72
- 1 38
.
- 0 . 34
- 0 . 59
- 2 ,,03
- 0 . 05
- 0 . 99
- 0 . 01
0 , . 16
0. 0
NOVA
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
SASKATCHEWAN
ALBERTA
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
QUEBEC
N O T E : P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
BASED ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
65
ALTA .
B ., C .
Table 5.3.16 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Transportation.
. s.
FROM/TO
NFLD
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
NOVA
1 .. 33
0. .0
o!', 34
0 . 12
0 . . 23
- 0 . 31
- 0 . 23
MANITOBA
SASKATCHEWAN
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
ONTARIO
ALBERTA
BRITISH
NOTE:
BASED
COLUMBIA
N.
N.. B .
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
- 0 .58
- 1 .04
- 0 .59
- 1 .52
0 .0
1 .02
- 0 . 30
-o .
-2 . 1 1
- 0 . .•65
- 0 . . 79
- 1.62
.
1 .08
0 .03
0. .0
- 1 .84
- 0 . .98
- 1.02
.
- 1. .72
1 .30
- 0 .81
- 0 .06
0. .0
- 0 . 20
- 0 . .60
- 1 28
.
1 . 38
0 .06
0 . 37
- 0 . . 28
- 0 . . 32
0. .0
0. 23
- 0 . 45
1 . 24
- 0 . . 56
0 . 45
0 . 85
- 0 . .46
- 1.67
.
- 1 .18
0 . .0
- 0 . 12
1 . 36
0. .86
0. 0
0 . 55
- 1 04
.
- 1.69
.
- 1 05
.
- 0 . 80
0. 0
1 .00
0. .96
- 0 . 60
0 . 97
- 0 . 44
- 1 26
.
0 . 53
0 . 02
-o. 43
0.0
1. .07
- 0 . 66
0 . 72
- 0 . 39
- 1.30
.
0 . 48
- 0 . 14
- 0 . 22
0 . 49
0. 0
- 0 . 12
14
P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN
ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C .
EXPECTED
Table 5.3.17 M i g r a t i o n Rates Adjusted for Size of the L a b o u r Force, Distance and
Intervening Opportunities, 1976-1981, Other Occupations
FROM/TO
NFLD
N.S .
N .B.
QUEBEC
ONT .
MAN.
SASK.
ALTA .
B .C.
NEWFOUNDLAND
0 .0
0 .46
0 .56
-2 . 57
1 .. 24
- 0 . . 30
-1 ..07
1 . 47
O .58
NOVA
1 .08
.
0 0
0 .7 1
- 1.41
- 0 . . 15
- 0 . .78
- 0 . .65
1 . 18
- 0 . .03
0. . 88
0 .90
0 .0
- 0 .88
- 0 . . 10
-0.. 3 1
- 0 . .81
1 .93
0. 30
NEW
SCOTIA
BRUNSWICK
QUEBEC
-0.. 3 1
0 . 23
0 . 20
0. .0
- 0 . . 26
- 1.08
.
- 0 . 92
1 .08
0. 10
ONTARIO
- 0 . 02
0. . 4 1
0. . 14
- 0 . ,40
0. 0
- 0 . .08
- 0 . 54
0 .90
- 0 . 34
MANITOBA
1. 57
0. .62
0. . 22
-2 ..04
- 0 . .93
0 . .0
SASKATCHEWAN
0. 0
1 .00
.
0. .4 1
- 1,80
.
- 0 . 10
ALBERTA
0 . 29
0 . 98
0 . 02
-2 . 44
0 . 54
1 .01
- 0 . 13
- 1 78
.
BRITISH
NOTE:
BASED
COLUMBIA
0. 17
1 . 34
1 . 13
- 0 . 31
0. 0
0 .90
1 . 19
0 . 51
- o . 06
- 0 . 25
0. .0
1 .01
0 . 57
0 . 39
0 . 17
0. . 19
0. 0
P O S I T I V E VALUES INDICATE THAT MIGRATION IS GREATER THAN
ON P O P U L A T I O N , DISTANCE AND INTERVENING
OPPORTUNITY
66
EXPECTED
Tables 5.3.2
to 5.3.17 show migration rates b y occupation adjusted for labour force
size, distance and intervening opportunities, which are simply the residuals of the multiple
regression as given in equation (4.2.2). T h e question is whether the explanations for the above
patterns still hold, or whether the patterns were removed and accounted for b y distance and
intervening opportunities. T h e tables show that the removal of the influence of distance and
intervening
opportunities
has
resulted
in both the
emergence
of new
patterns
and
the
enhancement and/or r e m o v a l of old ones.
A l b e r t a still shows the highest inmigration rates.
N o v a Scotia now has the
second
highest rates, followed b y British C o l u m b i a , which has lost m u c h of its original attractivity. In
the M a r i t i m e s m u c h of the increased interaction between other M a r i t i m e provinces has been
removed (although one can still see
a pattern), whereas in some occupations it has
been
reversed, that is migration is less t h a n expected. Some examples of these negative residuals
are p r i m a r y , processing and construction occupations. F o r Newfoundland a n d N e w B r u n s w i c k
the residuals are also in most cases positive, i.e., inmigration is greater than expected, for
most most occupations, but not quite as pronounced as N o v a Scotia. In general the M a r i t i m e s
do not do as badly as one would have otherwise
expected.
In fact inmigration rates are
generally higher than those of Ontario. O u t m i g r a t i o n rates, on the other h a n d , tend to average
out to zero. T h e fact that the M a r i t i m e s performed comparably well can be explained by three
factors: (1) m u c h of this inmigration is most likely to be r e t u r n migration; (2) social security
benefits are in some cases probably easier to obtain than in other provinces; and (3),
explanation already mentioned
an
in the discussion of labour force adjusted migration rates,
H a l i f a x ' s role as a growth pole.
T h e tendency found above to migrate to a neighbouring province has now largely been
removed. Instead, a new pattern has emerged where migration rates to the eastern neighbours
are generally negative, whereas to western neighbours they are usually positive, indicating a
"pull" to the west. Quebec, Ontario, M a n i t o b a and Saskatchewan all p e r f o r m quite poorly in
67
attracting migrants due to other t h a n spatial or labour force related factors compared to the
rest of C a n a d a .
The
above
results
are again quite different
to those of L y c a n
(1969). F i r s t ,
the
variation in the size of the residual was m u c h lower (the correlation was also greater). Second,
no significant east to west movement was found. Quebec and Saskatchewan, however, were
also poor attractors of migrants between 1956 and 1961.
F r o m a n occupational point of view three distinct groups appear when observing the
signs of the residuals: (1) occupations that are relatively reluctant to migrate (mostly negative
residuals),
(2) occupations
that show a tendency
towards
"hypermobility" (mostly
positive
residuals), and (3) occupations which do not show a tendency in either direction. T h e first
group of occupations is comprised of sales (58% of the residuals are negative),
construction
(81%) and transportation (60%). Salespeople, although they do travel quite frequently, are not
required to move in order to gain access to jobs. T h e c o m p a n y a salesperson works for can be
located anywhere in C a n a d a (or the U n i t e d States). Companies prefer to assign regions to
people that are on their "home turf". Construction- and transport-related occupations
are
highly unionized, as mentioned earlier, which would p a r t l y explain the reluctance to move.
Hypermobile occupations are fine and commercial artists (63% of the residuals are
positive), service occupations (60%), agriculture (67%)
and m a n u f a c t u r i n g (65%). F o r artists
m a n y jobs are short t e r m contracts, thus often requiring a move w h e n a new contract is won.
In the agricultural sector of the economy (this concerns not so m u c h the f a r m e r s , but more the
agricultural
consequently
workers)
not
as
there
stable
are constant
as
in
other
up- and downswings,
occupations.
Thus
and job opportunities
agricultural workers
are
have
traditionally been nomadic people. In the service related occupations we find the hypermobile
"Yuppies". F o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g it is difficult to find a n explanation for the relatively high
tendency
to
migrate,
especially
considering the
heavy
unionization in those
occupations.
P e r h a p s increased automation and the resulting relative instability of jobs could provide a
partial explanation.
68
5 . 4 Wages, Unemployment and Adjusted M i g r a t i o n Rates.
The
purpose of this
section of the chapter
is to test the
influence
of wage and
unemployment rates on the residual migration not explained b y the size of the labour force and
spatial factors. According to the neoclassical hypothesis we should thus find that if the wage
rate
is
higher in the
province of destination
than
it is
in the
province of origin,
and
unemployment rates are lower, then the residual should be positive. Consequently, as stated
earlier,
the
partial
coefficient
should then
be
positive
for wage rates
and negative
for
unemployment rates.
Table 5.4.1
shows the results of the multiple regression broken down by province of
origin. In general the
correlation coefficients
insignificant. Differences
are not v e r y high and in most cases quite
in wage and unemployment rates explained between 0.7%' (New
B r u n s w i c k and Ontario) and 8.1% (British Columbia) of the variation. O v e r a l l (Canada) the r
was 0.5%. T h e partial regression coefficients were in most cases not of the expected sign: for
unemployment rates only in three out of nine cases was the sign negative, whereas for wage
rates
only
four
out
of
nine
were
positive.
Intuitively
this
suggests
that
wage
and
unemployment rates do not influence migration rates in the m a n n e r they are expected
to
according to the neoclassical hypothesis. H o w e v e r , before such a judgement can be made, data
problems and individual cases (provinces and occupations) have to be considered.
The
negative partial correlation coefficients for wage rates in the M a r i t i m e s indicate
that individuals from those provinces tend to go to low wage regions, in this case other
M a r i t i m e provinces (although a large portion of the i n t r a - M a r i t i m e migration pattern was
removed
after
migration
rates
were
adjusted
for
spatial
factors).
For
Ontario
and
Saskatchewan the multiple correlation coefficients (.082 and .100, respectively) were also v e r y
low. T o explain this phenomenon it is necessary to go back to the labour force and spatiallyadjusted migration rates tables. F o r Saskatchewan the residuals (in terms of outmigration) are
generally positive
for the
M a r i t i m e s and A l b e r t a , a n d negative
69
for the remainder of the
Table 5.4.1 Significance of Interregional Differences i n Wage and Unemployment
Rates on Residual Migration, by P r o v i n c e of O r i g i n .
Unempl.
Wages
Province
R
R
Newfoundland
.137
.019
-.083
-.126
N o v a Scotia
.122
.015
.079
-.079
New Brunswick
.081
.007
-.024
-.081
Quebec
.214*
.046
.089
.213**
Ontario
.082
.007
.077
.054
Manitoba
.247
.061
.053
.245
Saskatchewan
.100
.010
-.100
-.039
Alberta
.102
.010
.055
.100
British Columbia
.285
.081
.145
Canada
.068*
.005
.066
x
**
***
2
**
* *
* *
: significant at 10%
*
: significant at 5%
**
: significant at 1%
: does not include Prince E d w a r d Island, Y u k o n and N o r t h w e s t Territories.
70
**
-.188 .
.036
country. T h u s it is possible to make the same kind of arguments above with respect to the low
r squares i n the M a r i t i m e s (note that the partial correlation coefficient for wage rates is also
negative). F o r migrants from Ontario the residuals seem to be r a n d o m l y distributed. W i t h the
exception of A l b e r t a , O n t a r i a n s do not seem to favour a n y particular destination.
B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a was
the only province of origin where
residual migration
rates
showed a significant correlation with wage and unemployment rates, although in both cases
the partials were of the wrong sign. A g a i n , it is necessary to refer to the residual migration
tables to provide a partial explanation for this finding. T h e residuals tended to be positive for
Ontario, N o v a Scotia, and to certain extent also for N e w B r u n s w i c k (all r a n k i n g lower t h a n
British
Columbia
on
the
wage
and
unemployment
rates
scale),
and r a n d o m for
other
destinations (including Alberta). Return migration could again partially account for the positive
residuals for M a r i t i m e destinations and Ontario.
Manitoba
had
the
second
highest
correlation
(.247, significant
at
the
5%
level).
Residuals tended to be positive for western destinations and negative for eastern destinations.
In the provinces to the west of M a n i t o b a wage rates are relatively low (positive partial). F o r
Quebecers the two variables explained the third highest proportion of the variation. While
unemployment
rates
were
insignificant,
wage rates
showed
a positive
relationship
with
shows the results of the regression of wage and unemployment
rates
residual migration (significant at the 5% level).
Table 5.4.2
broken down by occupation. O v e r a l l the multiple correlation coefficients were slightly higher
t h a n obtained i n the previous regression, but still insignificant. White collar occupational
groups tended to have a slightly higher r squared t h a n the blue collar groups, although the
lowest was in m a n a g e r i a l and administrative occupations (0.4%). In only one case (teachers)
the partial correlation coefficients of unemployment rates was of the expected sign. F o r wage
rates the signs tended to be negative for the white collar groups a n d positive for the blue collar
occupations. A s with the previous regression, the results show that the residual migration
pattern does not seem to fit the neoclassical hypothesis.
71
Table 5.4.2 Significance of Interregional Differences in Wage and Unemployment
Rates on Residual Migration, by Occupation.
Unempl.
Wages
Occupation
R
R
Managerial
.063
.004
.062
N a t u r a l Sciences
.250
.063
.213*
Social Sciences
.202
.041
.024
-.202*
Teachers
.252
.064
-.076
-.229*
Medicine & H e a l t h
.272*
.074
.211*
-.070
Artists
.227
.052
.165
-.204
Clerical W o r k e r s
.159
.025
.063
-.126
Sales
.282*
.080
.234
-.000
Service
.163
.027
.162
.009
Agriculture
.146
.021
.024
.136
Primary
.143
.021
.103
.129
Processing
.214
.046
.170
.212*
Manufacturing
.172
.030
.042
.172
Construction
.219
.048
.088
.197*
Transportation
.162
.026
.160
.043
O t h e r Occupations
.188
.035
.186
.051
A l l Occupations
.068
.005
.066
*
: significant at 10%
: significant at 5%
72
2
-.014
.131
*
**
**
.036
5.5 Net M i g r a t i o n and Changes i n Wage and Unemployment Rates.
This final part of the analysis will examine the effects of migration on wage and
unemployment rates between 1976 and 1981. The neoclassical hypothesis here is that net
inmigration will increase unemployment rates while reducing
wage rates, whereas net
outmigration will reduce unemployment rates and increase wage rates. It is assumed that
these changes will bring the system back to a state of equilibrium.
Table
5.5.1
shows
the relationship between
net migration
and
wage
and
unemployment rates broken down by province. While net migration did have an effect on
changes in wage and unemployment rates between 1976 and 1981 (although significant only
in a few cases), in most cases the direction of the sign was not as expected. The relationships
were strongest in Quebec, Alberta and New Brunswick. The reversed signs suggest a process
of cumulative causation rather than an equilibrating process, particularly in Alberta, where,
as we know, net inmigration was the highest in Canada.
Broken down by occupation the relationship becomes clearer (see table 5.5.2). The
correlation coefficients are generally higher for wage rates and lower for unemployment rates.
In all but one case the signs are reversed. For unemployment rates we find that net migration
had a stronger and more significant effect in the upper occupational groups, while for wage
rates there was little variation. Only in two cases (fine and commercial artists and other
occupations) there was a significantly strong relationship.
This latter regression suggests more strongly that net inmigration promotes a. process
of cumulative causation. This implies that, rather than increasing unemployment and reducing
wage rates, net inmigration causes the opposite effects. Thus the neoclassical hypothesis on
the effects of labour migration can not be substantiated.
73
Table 5.5.1 Significance of Net Migration on Changes in Wage and Unemployment
Rates, 1976-1981, by Province.
Unemployment
Wages
R
R
.006
.414
.171
.028
.239
.057
.286
.314
.098
Province
R
R
Newfoundland
.076
N o v a Scotia
.168
New Brunswick
**
-.535
**
2
2
Quebec
.524
.274
.465*
.216
Ontario
-.153
.023
-.463*
.215
Manitoba
-.083
.007
.321
.103
.108
.021
.489*
.239
Saskatchewan
**
Alberta
-.498
.248
.408
.167
British Columbia
-.012
.000
-.277
.077
Canada
-.529
.280
.140
x
***
a
*
: significant at 10%
: significant at 5%
***
: significant at 1%
x
: does not include Prince E d w a r d s Island, Y u k o n a n d Northwest Territories
74
.019
Table 5.5.2 Significance of Net M i g r a t i o n on Changes i n Wage and Unemployment
Rates, 1976-1981, by Occupation.
Wages
Unemployment
Occupation
R
R
*
2
R
R
2
Managerial
-.666
.443
.046
.002
N a t u r a l Sciences
-.572
.328
.273
.074
Social Sciences
-.661*
.437
.205
.042
Teachers
-.574
.666
.000
.000
Medicine & H e a l t h
-.816
.666
.008
.000
Artists
-.635
.403
.672
.451
Clerical W o r k e r s
-.565
.319
.250
.063
Sales
-.697
.486
.370
.137
Service
-.489
.239
.117
.014
Agriculture
-.457
.209
-.071
.005
Primary
-.546
.298
.144
.021
Processing
-.560
.314
.297
.088
Manufacturing
-.328
.108
.312
.098
Construction
-.538
.290
.013
.000
Transportation
-.539
.291
.123
.015
O t h e r Occupations
-.513
.263
.599*
.358
A l l Occupations
-.529
.280
.140
**
***
**
**
***
: significant at 10%
*
: significant at 5%
: significant at 1%
75
**
*
.019
5.6 Summary of Findings.
Once the effects of the size of the labour force and spatial factors have been removed
from the gross migration data, we find that A l b e r t a and N o v a Scotia seem to attract the
largest proportion of the residual migration. While wage and unemployment rates in general
perform poorly in explaining migration rates,
it is not possible
to conclusively
reject
the
neoclassical hypothesis. T h e argument might be made that the factors affecting an individual's
decision to migrate consist of more than just wage and unemployment rates. T h e y might
include climate, political factors, and other such considerations. If this is the case a n individual
m a y still maximize their utility even though the destination province has lower wage rates and
higher unemployment rates than the province of origin. Nonetheless it still can be argued that
the
standard notion that
wage a n d unemployment rates
are the
major determinants
of
migration patterns is highly questionable, at least in the case of C a n a d a .
A stronger case can be made against the neoclassical assumption about the effects of
migration. H e r e we
do not have
the d a t a problems encountered i n the
first
p a r t of the
analysis. F u r t h e r m o r e , in almost every single case the outcome was the exact opposite of the
predicted
result.
Instead
of
reducing
regional
disparities
u n e m p l o y m e n t rates), migration seems to have increased them.
76
(by
equalizing
wage
and
6. ACCOUNTING FOR FAILURES OF T H E NEOCLASSICAL MIGRATION MODEL.
The previous discussion has thus far raised three different kinds of doubts about the
neoclassical approach to migration analysis: (1) there is considerable concern about the validity
of some of the basic assumptions of neoclassical migration theory; (2) the methodologies
employed in neoclassical migration models are questionable; and, (3) the above data analysis,
while not disproving the neoclassical hypotheses, has at least raised some serious questions
about their validity.
This final chapter will try to account for some of the ostensible problems with the
neoclassical scheme. Specifically, it will be argued that the major reason why the neoclassical
model fails is that the neoclassical assumptions are often too simplistic and do not reflect
reality. In doing so we will discuss the maximization principle, temporal considerations, social
constraints, labour markets, government intervention and the notion of spatial equilibrium.
6.1 Maximization.
This section of the chapter will deal with the maximization principle, more specifically
with the associated concepts of utility, the ceteris paribus principle and the assumption of
perfect information flows.
In chapter 2 we saw that the concept of utility is a key pivot around which much of
neoclassical theory revolves. In chapter 3 it was further shown that neoclassical theory
contends that individuals' utilities are the reason why people move from one place to another:
if for any reason it is possible to increase one's utility by migrating, then such a move will
always occur.
Having already discussed the theoretical aspects of utility above we now turn to the
practical issue of empirically testing the utility-maximization thesis. We have seen that in
neoclassical labour migration theory peoples' utilities are frequently measured in terms of
wage and unemployment rates. What we have not been able to prove, however, is that these
socioeconomic variables are the only significant measures of utility. Such a proof, though, is
77
necessary to demonstrate that the neoclassical model is invalid. F o r i f it cannot be proved that
wage a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t rates are the only variables affecting utility, then it could be argued
by a neoclassicist that people are still m a x i m i z i n g utility, but they are m a x i m i z i n g variables
other t h a n wage a n d unemployment rates, for example, climate, cost of living or quality of life.
T h e problem with this counterargument is that if each person measures his or her utility i n
terms
of different
variables,
then,
in order
to test the hypothesis,
psychological profiles of each m i g r a n t would be needed.
case
histories a n d
T h u s , in light of the absence of
sufficient data (i.e. individual case histories) a n d the fact that the notion of utility is a crucial
ingredient i n the neoclassical
theory on labour migration, the entire hypothesis
would be
untestable. T h u s the crux of the problem is that if neoclassical economic geographers reject the
claim that utility c a n be measured b y wages a n d unemployment, then they are left with a
theory that cannot be empirically tested.
A further fundamental aspect of neoclassical labour migration theory a n d the utility
maximization principle that underlies it is the so-called
"ceteris paribus" principle, or the
premise of "all other things being equal". N o t only is its existence crucial i n that without this
condition the neoclassical theory would not hold, but it is also used to show that a neoclassical
world is in fact a desirable one. F o r only i f all things are equal in all regions is it possible for
all individuals to m a x i m i z e their utilities. If, for example, there were barriers to movement i n
one
region,
then individuals living in that region
would not be able
to maximize
their
satisfaction b y m i g r a t i n g . Therefore, the argument goes, it is desirable to move the real world
closer to the neoclassical one so that all individuals are able to maximize. T h u s we encounter
the t e r m i n m a n y neoclassical arguments. W i t h i n the context of labour migration, we learn
that i f i n a n y region wage rates are higher and unemployment rates are lower t h a n i n other
regions, then, ceteris paribus, it will experience inmigration which in t u r n through the law of
supply a n d demand will bring wage and unemployment
rates back to equilibrium levels.
"Ceteris paribus" c a n in this sense be interpreted as presupposing that all of the neoclassical
assumptions
(perfectly
competitive
market,
perfect
78
information, maximization
of utility,
freedom of movement, etc.) apply. If a n y one of these conditions does not exist, then the theory
does not hold.
Neoclassicists
thus argue that i f the results of a n empirical test of a
neoclassical
hypothesis prove to be inconclusive, then initial (real life) conditions m a y not be the same as
the
initial
assumptions.
equilibrium
-
which
Therefore, because
would occur only
it is
if the
desirable to bring
initial
conditions
are
the
system
equal
to
back
the
to
initial
assumptions - something is wrong with the system. O n e should design policies that bring the
real world closer to a neoclassical one.
A n o t h e r element of the m a x i m i z a t i o n thesis upon which the neoclassical theory of
labour migration is based is the assumption that information flows freely across space. T h e r e
are no n a t u r a l or artificial barriers to the flow of information. Inherent in this assumption is
that all individuals have equal access and ability to process that information. If they did not,
then all individuals would not be able to m a x i m i z e their utilities.
T h u s at a n y given point in time each and every person has perfect knowledge. T h i s
has v e r y important implications not only for the efficiency of the labour adjustment process,
but also for the resulting tendency for the spatial economic system to move back towards a
state of equilibrium. A s soon as a n individual receives information that he or she can make
h i m or herself better off by moving to another region (taking into consideration the cost a n d
the friction of distance), then they will do so. T h i s move will then be destined to a region where
the net gain i n satisfaction will be m a x i m i z e d . If, however, a n y one of the assumptions about
information (flow, access and ability to process) does not hold, then the neoclassical theory will
not work because people make wrong decisions.
T h e subject of information has been the subject of m u c h research, notably within the
general field of job search theory (for some examples see Pissarides, 1975; A z a r i a d i s ,
Clark
&
W h i t e m a n , 1983).
Like
many
other
areas
of regional analysis
and
1981;
economic
geography, research in job search theory has also been dominated by neoclassical economic
conceptions of individual behaviour and macro-equilibrium-oriented adjustment (Clark, 1986).
79
T h i s dominant school of thought recognizes the existence of imperfect information and uses it
to explain inefficiencies in the allocation of labour (Holt, 1970; Phelps, 1970). Phelps' (1970)
"island parable" is a typical example of a neoclassical explanation of this problem. In it the
author likens the spatial economic entity to a s y s t e m of islands between which information
flows are costly, i.e., workers m u s t forgo wages b y travelling to other islands to learn of the
wages there. A s s u m i n g a constant labour supply, homogeneous labour with respect to the
techniques of production and perfect inter-island competition, then, if for some reason relative
wages fall on the local island, the worker will be induced to search for a better wage offer,
either locally or on some other island. Because searching costs money (in terms of lost wages),
there is a constraint on the number of searches and the geographical pattern of search (Clark,
1986). N o worker could afford to visit all islands, which results in few workers reaching
peripheral islands. H o w e v e r , as the existence of a n inter-island equilibrium depends on the
efficiency of workers' searches (which in turn depends on the flow of a n d efficiency with which
workers process the information), a limited number of searches and a n inefficient information
transfer
will
lead
to
an
inefficient
labour
market
adjustment
and
thus
a
persistent
disequilibrium.
T h e neoclassical argument concludes that workers' search efficiency should therefore
be improved by training and education, while the flow of information should be improved b y
some government sponsored information gathering and dissemination agency. Holt (1970), for
example,
argues
that
a
national computer
m a t c h i n g network
could greatly
improve
the
efficiency of the labour adjustment process. C l a r k (1986) maintains that this is in fact the logic
behind the C a n a d i a n federal labour m a r k e t information system and the U n i t e d States job
search p r o g r a m .
T h e r e are m a n y examples within the geographic literature of alternative views on the
subject
of job search theory
a n d the
spatial inefficiency
of labour markets. W h i l e m a n y
economists believe that information is distinctly aspatial (for some examples see
Pissarides,
1985 a n d E v e r s & V a n der V e e n , 1985), geographers have argued that information on job and
80
wage offers
is in fact systematically
differentiation of the economy
(Clark,
dispersed
among regions
as
a result of the
1986). Greenwood (1981), for example,
spatial
argues
that
empirical evidence suggests that not only are workers' searches subject to a friction factor of
distance, as the Phelps island parable suggests, but also that migrants tend to have specific
search paths which are directly linked with their origin. T h i s is in accordance with the findings
of this thesis. It was
shown that there is a wide range among provinces of origin in the
sensitivity of m i g r a n t s to the influence of distance a n d intervening opportunities. E v e n after
these influences
are removed, distinct interaction patterns can still be observed. Recall, for
example, the tendency for migrants from a M a r i t i m e province to stay within the M a r i t i m e s .
One of the reasons for this observation could be that M a r i t i m e r s limit their area of job search
to other M a r i t i m e provinces.
T h e importance of imperfect information and its impact on the spatial economic s y s t e m
is
shown
by M a i e r
(1985). H e recognizes
that the
standard neoclassical
job search
and
migration models based on the assumption of perfect information are too restrictive to permit
insights into the migration decision process. M a n y hypotheses derived from these assumptions
in fact
contradict empirical observations.
Once the
assumption
of perfect
information is
dropped the task of modelling job search behaviour becomes more complex. H e goes on to
argue that under the assumption of imperfect information, strategies which seem absurd or
suboptimal under conditions of perfect information c a n actually be preferable. H e constructs a
model
which
distribution.
analyses job
search
T h e information is
strategies based
imperfect
and
on information about
accumulated
through the
the
wage
search
rate
process.
Individuals "buy" information about wage offers in other regions. T h e decision to migrate thus
depends on four key variables: each person's knowledge about the wage offer distribution; the
cost of searching for the information; the actual cost of the information; and the cost of
m i g r a t i n g to another region. Although the model is essentially
neoclassical
with modified
assumptions, M a i e r argues that it can explain m a n y phenomena used in polarization theory,
81
most
notably
effects
of
cumulative
causation
caused
by
past
migration.
This
directly
contradicts the neoclassical hypothesis on the effects of migration.
While at first glance M a i e r ' s model seems to offer a relatively elegant solution to the
problem of imperfect information, it still does not get around some of the other fundamental
problems
of
neoclassical
migration
models.
In
chapter
3
it
was
mentioned
that
most
contemporary migration models do not consider time as a variable, yet it has been shown that
time can be a vital factor (Clark & B a l l a r d , 1980;
a more detailed discussion of temporal
considerations will follow in a subsequent section of this chapter). A further drawback of his
model is that wage offers constitute the sole source of information on the basis of which a
potential m i g r a n t will base his or her decision to move. F i n a l l y , M a i e r offers no empirical
evidence to support his contentions.
C u r r y (1985) suggests a different (non-neoclassical)
approach to handling the problem
of information flows in determining migration. H e strongly questions the standard neoclassical
notions on how the spatial economy is supposed to work. F u r t h e r m o r e , he argues that past
attempts at ameliorating spatial inefficiencies in the operation of labour m a r k e t s have more
often t h a n not produced the opposite of the desired results. T h e reason for this, he argues, is
that workers do not exploit opportunities in a n o p t i m u m m a n n e r because they are in m a n y
cases ignorant of them. T h i s ignorance can drastically affect the economic landscape. Because
information is acquired locally, and there are large regional differences i n the quantity and
quality of information available (which in t u r n is a result of the spatial differentiation of the
economy),
each
region
and
occupation
has
unique
expectations
and
specific
degrees
of
sensitivity and selectivity with regards to jobs and wage offers. Therefore, because each region
will react differently to changes in wages or other variables, central policies cannot work and
in fact often produce adverse results.
Decentralized policy instruments,
specifically
geared
towards individual regions, would on the other h a n d serve to decrease inefficiencies
in the
labour m a r k e t .
82
A further alternative approach to dealing with information is that of "indeterminate
information"
(Clark,
1986),
as
opposed
to
imperfect
information.
It
is
argued
information is indeed indeterminate, i.e., it is heterogeneous, incomplete, and/or
upon other
postulates,
factors,
lead
then
the
likelihood that information will,
to a n efficient
as
the
reallocation of labour would appear
that
contingent
neoclassical
to be
if
theory
remote.
Clark
maintains that in the extreme case indeterminate information might mead to a total collapse
of the spatial labour m a r k e t .
Clark
recognizes,
however,
that
not
all circumstances
need
be
characterized
by
indeterminate information. In some cases well defined, albeit spatially contingent information
channels do exist. O n e example is the rather well developed and very reliable information
network between the upper midwest of the U n i t e d States and California, which is based on
previous migrants' experiences and growth trends in the two areas. In most cases, however,
reliable information channels do not exist. F o r example, empirical evidence suggests that as a
result of their inability to develop reliable information channels about employment prospects in
other parts of the country, m a n y midwest auto workers preferred to r e m a i n unemployed
d u r i n g the recession rather than risking their r e m a i n i n g assets (Clark, 1986). T h i s i n t u r n
suggests that the influence of information is far more complex than Phelps made it out to be.
C l a r k argues that it is not possible to circumvent the existence of uncertainty by simply
putting a price tag on information.
Neoclassicists
frequently
contend
that
while
indeterminacy
of information is
well
within the realm of possibilities, its source is government policy (intervention), rather than
problems with the
internal logic of the
neoclassical
model (Clark,
1986). Note
that
the
implication of this, as has previously been argued and will be argued i n subsequent sections, is
for policy m a k e r s to change reality to suit the neoclassical model, as opposed to respecifying
the model to accomodate reality. A typical example of this philosophy is the notion of rational
expectations based
on available
information (Lucas,
1981). L u c a s argues
that
while
all
individuals essentially m a k e correct (rational) decisions, spatial disequilibrium persists because
83
of misinformation about other regions originating from government policy. In addition, local
policies such as unemployment benefits
and m i n i m u m wages prevent the labour allocation
process from working efficiently.
A final alternative approach to job search theory that is closely linked to the notion of
indeterminate information are contract models (Clark, 1986). W i t h i n these models information
is believed to be inherently indeterminate for two reasons: first, m a n y events can not be
anticipated, and second, it is impossible to completely rely on a n unanticipated event, no
matter how high the likelihood of its occurrence. Consequently there will always be a degree of
uncertainty. In order to reduce the level of uncertainty and to protect the worker (and the
firm)
from
unanticipated events, contracts
are d r a w n between employers
and
employees
(Clark, 1986). These can be of a n explicit nature (union - labour) or implicit (company policies).
A l t h o u g h obviously not every worker has a contract (such as the self-employed), contracts will
in
the
aggregate
because
hinder short t e r m adjustments
of labour to changing m a r k e t conditions
of their long t e r m rigidity. B o t h workers and management
will not
immediately
renegotiate contracts in response to fluctuations in the space economy, rather they will gather
as m u c h information as possible
about both inter a n d intra-regional differences
until
the
contract expires.
In
s u m m a r y , utility maximization, the ceteris paribus principle and the neoclassical
assumption labour information flows are all conditions that have been highly criticized, for the
most p a r t because they are never met in reality. If this is the case (in fact if only one of the
conditions does not hold), then the neoclassical hypotheses on labour migration will not hold.
6.2 Temporal Considerations.
It
temporal
has
been
aspects
argued repeatedly
of the
that
migration process.
neoclassical
Adjustments
migration models
are
usually
largely
assumed
to
ignore
occur
instantaneously. C l a r k (1982) has argued that the structure of the neoclassical model itself
cannot deal with the dynamics of migration, despite the fact that migration is perceived as a
84
flow - a t e r m that in itself implies change over time. Because
temporal
factors,
neoclassical
models
thus
essentially
of the failure to consider
analyze
migration
in
terms
of
comparative statics, rather than dynamics. B u t s i m p l y c o m p a r i n g the economy between one
point i n time to another could lead to the failure to recognize migration cycles and to the overor underestimation of the sensitivity
because
of migrants to origin and destination
of the neglect of time lags in the decision-making process. C l a r k
characteristics
(1982), C l a r k &
B a l l a r d (1979) and Greenwood (1970, 1981) have proposed models that do incorporate time as
a variable. In order to illustrate the significance of time we will review some literature that
does account for the temporal dimension.
Greenwood (1970) analyzed lagged responses in the decision to migrate. H e
argues
that migration from one place to another increases geometrically. T h e reason for this is that
the more people migrate from i to j , the more information is available: friends and family who
have m o v e d to j will send back information about the success of their move. T h u s the flow of
migrants f r o m
i to j during
a particular time period is not only
a function of current
socioeconomic indicators, but also related to the cumulative number of migrants that have
moved
from
i to j in the
previous
periods.
Consequently parameter estimates of
most
socioeconomic variables tend to obscure the true relationship with migration because they also
indirectly influence migration through their effect on past migrants. B u t these past migrants
will in t u r n affect future migration by relating their experiences, for example. T h i s hypothesis
was
tested on inter-state
migration in the
U n i t e d States between
1955
and
1960
and
compared to a s t a n d a r d model not considering past migration as a n independent variable. T h e
results of the analysis showed that the explanatory power of the model was greatly increased
when incorporating time (the average r
increased from .77 to .93), while at the same time
individual (socioeconomic) variables showed a decline in significance.
Greenwood
atemporal
(1981)
approaches
to
puts
forth a
further
migration modelling,
argument
concerning the
p a r t i c u l a r l y with
respect
problems
to
with
employment
opportunities. T h e d i l e m m a is that migration m u s t be m e a s u r e d over some finite time interval.
85
D u r i n g this time interval, however, migration is itself influencing the observed growth of
employment opportunities. T h i s could lead to a bias in the parameter estimates of single
equation, multiple regression models of migration over one extended time period.
C l a r k (1982) maintains that neoclassical economists present labour migration as a
static process. T h e question for neoclassicists is how to allocate labour between regions given
the current labour supply so that spatial equilibrium m a y be reached. T h u s the issue is
allocative efficiency from one point in time to the next. T h e two points in time are analyzed in
terms of comparative statics, not by modelling the process of adjustment from one time period
to the other (this is one of the reasons that net migration flows are generally preferred to
gross flows in neoclassical models; while net migration fits the comparative statics framework,
the adjustment properties of gross migration do not (Clark,
1982)). H o w e v e r , while it is
possible to evaluate the effects of migration on m a r g i n a l changes in independent variables,
typical neoclassical models employing a comparative statics framework (such as the popular
L o w r e y model) cannot analyse the temporal sequence of adjustment.
C l a r k & B a l l a r d (1979) have shown that gross flows of both in- and outmigration are
indeed quite
sensitive
unemployment
rates).
to
short-run fluctuations
They
conclude
that
in economic
factors
labour' migration,
like
(including wage a n d
many
other
regional
processes, is a cyclical phenomenon. T h e implication of this is that as the economy moves
through a sequence of fluctuations, migration patterns will also v a r y in a similar fashion.
G i v e n that these temporal fluctuations can be quite significant, macro-adjustment models
using census data compiled at five year intervals will miss the true pattern of migration.
6.3 Social Constraints to Labour Migration.
One of the assumptions of the basic neoclassical hypothesis is that people are free to
move anywhere a n d anytime. It has been shown, however, that i n reality there are m a n y
barriers to migration. In the data analysis section, for example, it was argued that only few
people migrated to a n d from Quebec because of social and cultural (language) barriers. O t h e r
86
impediments are family ties and, although more of a short run hindrance, job contracts (see
Clark, 1986). Housing is considered to be a further important barrier to labour mobility
(Cullingworth, 1969; Johnson et al, 1975). Although there is a general agreement on the
connection between housing and labour mobility, the nature of the relationship has been highly
debated. Housing is in itself a complex phenomenon when regional differences, preferences of
various social classes and their accessibility to housing finance are considered (Johnson et al,
1975). The white collar occupational groups, for example, will, because of higher wages, have
easier access to owned housing
and
mortgages than the blue collar groups. Thus the
availability and type of housing is in turn related to other socioeconomic variables. The most
popular view, however, is that workers owning houses show the highest mobility rates and
tend to migrate further. Publicly owned and rented housing is generally associated with much
lower levels of mobility and shorter moves (Cullingworth, 1969).
6.4 Labour Markets.
A further argument for barriers to labour migration is provided by the dual labour
market theory (Sloane, 1985). The basic version of the dual labour market theory suggests
that there are two distinct sectors: a primary market where "good" jobs and majority workers
predominate, and a secondary market where "bad" jobs and minority workers are dominant.
While Sloane argues that the existence of these two markets hinders inter-market mobility, it
can also be argued that it hinders interregional mobility. In contrast to the primary labour
market, wages are generally low, unemployment high, and the often hazardous jobs in the
secondary labour market are mostly occupied by minority groups (blacks, hispanics, etc.). If,
for example, a country has two regions that traditionally offer most employment opportunities
in the secondary labour market (such as the southern United States), then a move to a region
other than those two would thus often also involve moving up the occupational hierarchy, i.e.,
a promotion into the primary labour market. Empirical studies have shown, however, that,
because of racial discrimination, lack of education and training and other factors this is
87
extremely difficult (Sloane, 1985). Therefore m i n o r i t y groups and workers in the secondary
labour m a r k e t in general are faced with fewer choices of destinations when deciding to move.
McKay
& Whitelaw's
(1977) study
of the
role of large
private and
government
organizations in generating interregional migration is one example of the dual labour m a r k e t
approach to constrained choices of destinations w i t h i n the spatial labour m a r k e t . T h e y point
out that there are a multitude of formal and unwritten rules of entry into m a n y occupations
imposed b y both employers and trade unions. It is argued that occupations in the p r i m a r y
labour m a r k e t are more mobile due to the fact that
an increasingly large proportion of
interregional moves are a result of company policy, i.e., a transfer from b r a n c h to another
(this in m a n y cases also applies to government employees, in particular teachers and health
workers). Individuals in the secondary labour m a r k e t , on the other h a n d , were found to be
considerably less mobile, in part because local trade unions make entry into the job m a r k e t
extremely difficult for newly arrived migrants.
6.5 Government Intervention.
A s was shown in chapter 2, neoclassicists generally argue for a "laissez faire" type of
approach to public policy. T h i s implies that, because n a t u r a l forces exist that drive the spatial
economic system back to equilibrium, governments should desist from enacting policies that
serve to reduce regional disparities. T h e neoclassical hypothesis on labour migration assumes
that a perfectly competitive
m a r k e t exists: there
are no outside
influences
on migration
patterns. A number of recent studies have shown, however, that government action such as
fiscal policy does in fact have a pronounced effect on m i g r a t i o n patterns (Riew, 1975; K o s i n s k i ,
1981; Peek & Standing, 1982; W i n e r & G a u t h i e r , 1982; C l a r k , 1983). T h u s migration is no
longer just a function of individuals' choices and motivations, as it is assumed i n neoclassical
or " h u m a n capital" type of models, rather a highly significant proportion of interregional
migration is directly and indirectly caused by government policies.
88
One
of the best examples of a federal p r o g r a m directly affecting migration is to be
found in C a n a d a (Kosinski, 1981). T h e D e p a r t m e n t of E m p l o y m e n t and Immigration (DEI)
administers a number of programs, the most important of which is the C a n a d a M a n p o w e r
Mobility P r o g r a m ( C M M P ) .
T h e following grants
are made
available under this p r o g r a m
(Kosinski, 1981):
- exploratory grants to search for jobs elsewhere;
- relocation grants for workers and their families;
- special travel grants to obtain manpower services not offered locally;
- travel grants for temporary employment;
- travel grants to temporary employment; and
- travel grants to attend training courses offered under the C a n a d a training p r o g r a m .
Although
boundaries,
their
only
some
of
the
grants
provide
impact is nevertheless quite
funds
significant.
for
moves
T a b l e 6.4.1
across
provincial
shows the
size of
migration flows generated b y C M M P grants between 1966 and 1979 and their share of total
interprovincial migration in C a n a d a . W h e r e a s overall the impact is not v e r y significant
(the
range is from 1.6% to 15.3% of total interprovincial migration), its importance does differ quite
considerably between provinces of origin (see table 6.4.2). Between 1976 and 1978 34.7% of
all outmigration f r o m Newfoundland was generated
(20%)
by C M M P grants, followed b y Quebec
a n d Ontario (19.4%). T h e lowest share was in A l b e r t a (1.2%) and in Prince E d w a r d
Island (1.6%). D a t a for the destinations of C M M P
migrants
were not available. A l t h o u g h
C M M P is the most important p r o g r a m affecting labour mobility, it is not the only one. O t h e r s
include the C a n a d a M a n p o w e r Consultive Service, the L o c a l E m p l o y m e n t Assistance P r o g r a m ,
the C a n a d a W o r k s P r o g r a m and the Opportunities for Y o u t h P r o g r a m (Kosinski, 1981).
W i n e r & G a u t h i e r (1982) analyzed the indirect impact of the C a n a d i a n fiscal structure
on interprovincial migration (in terms of both in- and outmigration) between 1968 a n d 1977).
The
independent
variables
were
provincial changes
in
the
total
sum
of
unemployment
insurance benefits paid (Ul), unconditional grants ( G U : comprised of the s u m of equalization
89
Table 6.5.1
Table 3. CMMP generated migration as compared to the total internal migration in Canada, 1966-1976.
Financial
year
1
Number of
relocation grants
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
2,138
5,757
6,591
7,460
6,382
9,026
10,653
11,019
11,361
12,786
20,338
10,206
12,302
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
i Notes:
;
'
a
.
2
3
Estimate of the total
Total interprovincial
flow supported by CMMP^ migration in Canada
6,400
17,300
19,800
22,400
19,100
• 27,100
32,000
33,000
34,100
38,400
61,000
30,600
36,900
406,000
382,000
365,000
414,000
404,000
399,000
390,000
436,000
417,000
375,000
398,000
405,000
n.a.
4
Proportion of
CMMP migration
1.6
4.5
5.4
5.4
4.7
6.8
8.2
7.6
8.2
10.2
15.3
7.6
-
a Including 1 287 grants and 851 loans;
b Based on an assumption that one worker supports two dependents (see CMCS program). Assumption that
one-third are singles and two-thirds support three dependents would yield similar results;
c Based on assumption that all CMMP supported moves are interprovincial.
Table 6.5.2
Table 4. CMMP generated migrations as compared to the total internal migration by provinces, 1976-77 and 1977-78.
—
-- • •
Estimate of
total flows
by provinces
Newfoundland
• 2,821
42
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
1,162
New Brunswick
1,378
Quebec
8,425
Ontario
12,790
Manitoba
490
Saskatchewan
354
Alberta
485
British Columbia
2,497
Yukon & the N.W. Territories
100
8,500
120
3,500
4,100
25,300
38,400
1,500
1,100
1,500
7,500
300
24,500
7,700
46,400
36,800
126,700
197,600
64,600
49,500 '
122,300
112,300
13,300
34.7.
1.6
7.5
11.1
20.0
19.4
2.3
2.2
1.2
6.7
2.3
Total
91,600
802,800
11.4
Provinces
Notes
30,544
a
b
2
4
Percentage of CMMP
generated migration
as compared
to the total flow
3
Total interprovincial
outmigration by provinces 1976-77 and
1977-78
1
Relocation grants
authorized in
1976-77 & 1977-78
by provinces
Based on an assumption that one worker supports two dependents;
Based on an assumption that all CMMP supported moves are interprovincial
Source: Kosinski (1981)
90
payments, subsidies, adjustment grants, and revenue guaranteed by the federal government to
the provinces) a n d n a t u r a l resource revenues (NRR). A l l dependent variables were measured
in terms of changes from 1971 to 1977. T h e model was tested on high, middle a n d low income
groups of individuals. It was found that the fiscal structure indeed did have a significant
impact on both in- and outmigration, although it varied systematically with the geographical
composition of the migration flow and was generally more significant (as is intuitively to be
expected) in the lower income class. T h e fiscal variables performed considerably better on
outmigration from the A t l a n t i c provinces and on inmigration to A l b e r t a and B r i t i s h Columbia.
Recall that in the d a t a analysis (chapter 5) it was found that M a r i t i m e r s tended to
either
migrate
to
another
Atlantic province
or
move
to
Alberta
or B r i t i s h
Columbia.
F u r t h e r m o r e , A l b e r t a was b y far the greatest pole of attraction for migrants from all C a n a d a .
C o m p a r e these findings to table 6.4.3, which shows W i n e r & Gauthier's (1982) results for
outmigration from the Atlantic provinces in the lower income class. Changes i n the total s u m
of unemployment insurenace benefits
paid out h a d a positive influence
on i n t r a - M a r i t i m e
moves, whereas they tended to be negative for other destinations (with only few
exceptions).
F o r example, outmigration from Newfoundland to N e w B r u n s w i c k was 52.9% higher t h a n it
would have been in the absence
of any changes
to the unemployment insurence
system.
Unconditional grants, on the other hand, tended to have a negative impact on outmigration,
i.e., induce potential movers to stay, although the impact was generally not as pronounced as
for unemployment insurance benefits. Changes in n a t u r a l resource revenues h a d virtually no
impact on outmigration save
for the
destinations
of A l b e r t a ,
Saskatchewan
and
British
C o l u m b i a . F o r all three A t l a n t i c provinces migration to A l b e r t a was about 63% higher than it
would have been h a d A l b e r t a n n a t u r a l resource revenues remained at the 1971 level. T h i s
variables
also
h a d the
most
important impact on inmigration from
other, n o n - M a r i t i m e
provinces, for both A l b e r t a a n d B r i t i s h Columbia. These results v e r y concur with our findings
in chapter 5 in that they in m a n y w a y s fit the description of the residual migration patterns
shown in tables 5.3.2 to 5.3.17.
91
Table 6.5.3 T h e Effects of Selected Changes i n F i s c a l Structure o n Out-Migration
Rates F r o m the Atlantic P r o v i n c e s Including Intra-Atlantic M o v e s , L o w e r Income
C l a s s , 1968-1977.
Origin
Destination
Ul
GU
NRR
0.095
0.041
0.000
0.000
-0.045
0.109
-0.045
-0.045
0.000
0.000
0.632
British Columbia
0.385
0.529
0.021
-0.091
-0.131
0.116
Newfoundland
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
0.438
0.555
0.459
0.038
-0.076
-0.189
-0.116
0.134
-0.083
-0.044
-0.063
-0.125
0.017
-0.228
-0.125
-0.125
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.592
0.631
0.106
Newfoundland
N o v a Scotia
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
0.325
0.297
0.344
-0.043
-0.149
-0.253
-0.186
0.045
-0.037
0.054
-0.017
-0.081
0.068
-0.189
-0.081
-0.081
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.591
0.630
0.105
Newfoundland
N o v a Scotia
New Brunswick
Ontario
Manitoba
Alberta
0.106
N o v a Scotia
New Brunswick
Source: W i n e r & G a u t h i e r (1982)
92
The
above
empirical evidence
directly contradicts the
contention that interregional migration patterns
"conservative"
(neoclassical)
are dominated b y long r u n trends which
cannot be directly manipulated b y government policy (Clark, 1983). G o v e r n m e n t action, by
providing for the existence of the neoclassical
assumptions,
can only indirectly
influence
migration. A s we have seen, however, government policy indeed can have quite a profound
direct influence on migration, not only in the long r u n , but also in the short r u n . In the long
run
changes
to the
social welfare
system,
such as regional increases
or decreases in the
amount of u n e m p l o y m e n t insurance benefits paid out, will induce or inhibit migration. O n the
other h a n d , manpower travel grants c a n induce a worker to search for a job i n another region
in the short r u n , which he or she could not afford to do in the absence of such policy.
6.6 Spatial E q u i l i b r i u m .
The
neoclassical notion that the p r i m a r y effect of labour migration is to lead the spatial
economic s y s t e m back to a state of equilibrium has been strongly questioned, even b y some
neoclassical theorists (for an example see M a i e r , 1985). T h e consensus seems to be that rather
than leading to equilibrium, labour migration has a cumulative causatory effect. H o w e v e r ,
there are also m a n y other aspects of the consequences of migration not normalty considered by
neoclassicists.
This
section
of the
chapter
will
concentrate
first
on
alternative
theories
advocating cumulative causation, and then proceed to look at other alternative notions about
the effects of migration.
The
hypothesis
causation, was
that
interregional migration promotes
put forward as e a r l y as
1957
by Myrdal.
polarization, or cumulative
H i s argument was
that
since
migration is a selective phenomenon, it is usually the most productive and educated people
that are attracted a w a y from declining regions. T h u s , because the inflow of skilled workers
increases the attractivity of growth regions a n d the outflow of skilled workers from the poorer
regions decreases their attractivity, cumulative causation will result. A similar argument is
made b y Webber (1972), when he suggests that where agglomeration economies are strong,
93
skilled labour is more likely to be attracted to growth centres because of the wider range in
wage differentials
that are likely to exist there. K a l d o r (1970) maintained that while
the
neoclassical model predicts equilibrium i n the long r u n , in reality regional economic disparities
are
generally
reinforced and
argument was later extended
that
divergence
rather
than
convergence
is
the
rule.
His
and interpreted as the "Verdoorn effect" (Clark, 1983). T h e
Verdoorn effect basically implies that regions are able to m a i n t a i n their dominant positions
through increasing returns to scale. G i v e n that there are increasing returns to scale in high
wage regions, inmigration from low wage areas reinforces the dominance of those regions.
Clark
& Ballard
(1981) tested the
neoclassical
assumptions
about
the
effects
of
migration on U n i t e d States data in a short t e r m time-series model, taking into consideration
both the demand a n d the supply of labour. It was found that the effect of migration on wages
was mixed: while in some cases it increased them, in others it caused them to decline or h a d
no effect at all.
While it is commonly thought that migration in one w a y or another affect wage rates,
it is frequently not realized that migration also results in redistributions of income, both in the
region of origin a n d the region of destination (Greenwood, 1981). T h i s implies that in both
areas some individuals are made better off, while others find themselves in a worse situation.
F o r example, in a depressed region outmigration in the short r u n will result in less competition
for the few job opportunities that do exist, so that people who would otherwise be unemployed
now e a r n those wages that the migrants formerly earned. O n the other h a n d , older workers in
the receiving region will find it more difficult to gain employment as y o u n g immigrants enter
the local job m a r k e t . A l s o , if outmigration leads to a significant decline in the population base
of a depressed region, then the average tax burden of the r e m a i n i n g population could increase
or, because of the smaller tax base and the declining economy of scale, the government might
have to practice constraint and cut back on existing programs, thereby reducing overall social
welfare.
94
F r o m the above discussion it can be seen that m a n y authors believe, and furthermore
back up such beliefs with empirical evidence, that the standard neoclassical assumptions and
determinants of labour migration do not hold. H o w e v e r , it cannot be said that migrants,
particularly those from depressed regions, do not react to economic opportunities. Rather, the
w a y i n which they react to those variables is different: there is little evidence that migrants
maximize their utilities in terms of economic variables, they rarely, if ever, have equal and
perfect information about t h e m , and they do not always have the freedom to move to the
destination of their choice.
95
7.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The
task of this thesis was
to empirically test the neoclassical
theory of labour
migration in light of C a n a d a ' s experience d u r i n g the period 1976-1981. I n c a r r y i n g out this
task, it was argued in chapter 2
that m u c h of contemporary economic geography stems from
neoclassical economic theory, and, specifically the concepts of utility and resource allocation.
The six major characteristics of neoclassical theory were then outlined and their applications
illustrated using some examples of geographic models.
C h a p t e r 3 linked the broader neoclassical theory to labour migration. It was
how neoclassical principles and assumptions
shown
are applied in formulating the two standard
neoclassical migration models: the micro- a n d macro-adjustment approaches. F u r t h e r m o r e , it
was argued that two central hypotheses stem from these two neoclassical approaches: first,
that labour will flow from regions of low wages and high unemployment to areas of high
wages and low unemployment; and second, that the effect of this migration will be to reduce
interregional differences in wage and u n e m p l o y m e n t rates. F i n a l l y , it was argued that despite
a growing body of literature critical of the two approaches and neoclassical assumptions and
hypotheses, neoclassical migration modelling is still v e r y m u c h alive.
Chapter
neoclassical
4
presented
hypotheses.
the
Chapter
data
and
methodology
5 interpreted the
results
employed
of the
in
testing
analysis
the
two
arguing that
C a n a d i a n patterns of labour migration between 1976 a n d 1981, as well as provincial changes
in
wage
and u n e m p l o y m e n t rates,
do not fit either one
of the
neoclassical
hypotheses.
Specifically, there is no uniformity in the direction of the flow of migrants in relation to
interprovincial
differences
in wage
and unemployment
rates.
Furthermore,
rather than
reducing regional differences in those variables, labour migration seems to have increased
them. While the findings of this thesis do not entirely justify a rejection of the hypotheses (in
p a r t because of d a t a problems), they do raise doubts as to their validity.
F i n a l l y , chapter 6 attempted to account for the failures of the neoclassical model. It
was
argued that the m a i n reason for its failure are the overly simplistic and unrealistic
96
assumptions of neoclassicism. The real world is far more complex than the neoclassical one.
All other things are not always equal. A n additional oversimplifying assumption is that of the
utility-maximizing individual and, by extension, the argument that all individuals behave and
act in the same way. It is usually recognized by neoclassicists themselves that wage and
unemployment rates are not the only variables that people maximize. Even so, it must be
strongly questioned whether it is at all possible to measure utility. If this is not the case, then,
because they are based on the assumption of the utility-maximizing individual, it is also
impossible to empirically test the neoclassical hypotheses about labour migration.
It is perhaps time to rethink migration theory. Although much work has been done on
individual aspects of the migration process, a comprehensive model - one that is flexible, less
rigid, more realistic in its assumptions and that encompasses the entire migration process has yet to be formulated. Thus, future research should focus more closely on the causes and
effects of migration. While it has been established that migrants are sensitive to regional
variations in socioeconomic variables and that migration does have an effect on the spatial
economy, it is still unclear how the actual process works. Before a comprehensive alternative
theory of labour migration can be put forward, it is thus necessary to learn more about
individual decision-making behaviour and the dynamics of the adjustment of socioeconomic
variables to migration (and vice versa).
Clearly,
my
thesis
has
not
provided
that
comprehensive
alternative
theory.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that it has made some contribution by raising questions about the
orthodox approach to labour migration. For in order to get the right new theory, one must first
know what is wrong with the old one.
97
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Alexandersson,
G . & N o r s t r o e m , G . (1963): "World Shipping), J o h n W i l e y & Sons,
New York
Alonso, W . (1964): "Location and L a n d U s e " , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge
(1970): "Equilibrium of the Household", in D e a n , R . D . , L e a h y ,
W . H . & M c K e e , D . L . (eds): Spatial Economic T h e o r y , T h e F r e e Press, N e w Y o r k
A z a r i a d i s , C . (1981): "Implicit Contracts and Related Topics: A Survey", i n Hornstein,
Z . , G r i c e , J . & Webb, A . (eds): T h e Economics of L a b o u r M a r k e t s , H M S O , L o n d o n
B a l l a r d , K . P . & C l a r k , G . L . (1981): "The S h o r t g u n D y n a m i c s of Inter-State
Migration: A Space-Time Economic Adjustment Model of In-Migration to F a s t G r o w i n g
States", Regional Studies, 15:213-228
B a r n e s , T . J . (1984): "Theories of A g r i c u l t u r a l Rent within the Surplus A p p r o a c h " ,
International Regional Science Review,
9:125-140
(1985): "Theories
V a l u e " , E n v i r o n m e n t & P l a n n i n g A , 17:729-746
of Interregional
T r a d e a n d Theories of
& Sheppard, E . (1984): "Technical Choice a n d Reswitching in
Space Economies", Regional Science a n d U r b a n Economics, 14:345-362
B l a u g , M . (1973): "Was There a M a r g i n a l Revolution?", in B l a c k , R . D . , Coats, A . W . &
Goodwin, C . D . W . (eds): T h e M a r g i n a l Revolution in Economics, D u k e U n i v e r s i t y Press,
Durham
Bodenhofer, H . J . (1967): "The Mobility of L a b o u r and the T h e o r y of H u m a n Capital",
J o u r n a l of H u m a n Resources,
2:431-439
B r e n n a n , M . J . (1965): " A M o r e G e n e r a l T h e o r y of Resource M i g r a t i o n " , in B r e n n a n ,
M . J . (ed): Patterns of Resource Behaviour, B r o w n U n i v e r s i t y Press, Providence
C a r l i n e , D . , Pissarides, C . A . , Siebert, W . S . & Sloane, P . J . (eds) (1985): "Surveys in
Economics: L a b o u r Economics", L o n g m a n , L o n d o n
C e b u l a , R . J . (1979): "The Determinants of H u m a n Migration", Lexington, M A
98
& V e d d e r , R . K . (1969): " A Note on M i g r a t i o n , Economic
Opportunity, and t h e , Q u a l i t y of Life", J o u r n a l of Regional Science, 13:205-211
C l a r k , G . L . (1982): "Dynamics of Interstate
A m e r i c a n Association of Geographers, 72:297-313
L a b o u r Migration", A n n a l s
of the
(1983): "Interregional M i g r a t i o n , National Policy, and Social
Justice", R o w m a n & A l l a n h e l d , Totowa
& B a l l a r d , K . P . (1979): "Modelling O u t - M i g r a t i o n f r o m
Depressed Regions: T h e Significance of O r i g i n and Destination Characteristics", Discussion
P a p e r D 7 9 - 1 7 , Dept. of C i t y & Regional P l a n n i n g , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , Cambridge
& B a l l a r d , K . P . (1980): "The D e m a n d and S u p p l y of
L a b o u r and Interstate Relative Wages: A n E m p i r i c a l A n a l y s i s " , Economic G e o g r a p h y , 56:95112
C l a r k , G . L . & Gertler, M . (1983): "Migration and Capital", A n n a l s of the A m e r i c a n
Association of Geographers, 73:18-34
C l a r k , G . L . & W h i t e m a n , J . (1983): " W h y Poor People Don't M o v e : Job Search
B e h a v i o u r and Disequilibrium A m o n g s t L o c a l L a b o u r M a r k e t s " , E n v i r o n m e n t & P l a n n i n g A ,
15:85-104
Courchene, T . J . (1970): "Interprovincial
C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l of Economics, 3:550-576
Migration
and
Economic
Adjustment",
Cullingworth, J . B . (1969): "Housing and L a b o u r Mobility", O E C D , P a r i s
C u r r y , L . (1972): " A Spatial A n a l y s i s of G r a v i t y Flows", Regional Studies, 6:131-147
(1985): "Inefficiencies
M a r k e t s " , Regional Studies, 19:203-215
in the Geographical Operation of L a b o u r
D e a n e , P . (1978): "The Evolution of Economic Ideas", M o d e r n Canbridge Economics
Series, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e
Dicken, S . N . (1955): "Economic Geography", P r e n t i c e - H a l l , N e w J e r s e y
D i e h l , W . D . (1966): " F a r m - N o n - F a r m M i g r a t i o n in the South-East: A Cost-Returns
A n a l y s i s " , J o u r n a l of F a r m Economics, 48:1-11
99
Dobb, M . (1973): "Theories of V a l u e and Distribution Since A d a m Smith", Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e
E v e r s , G . H . M . & V a n der V e e n , A . (1985): " A Simultaneous N o n - L i n e a r Model for
L a b o u r M i g r a t i o n a n d C o m m u t i n g " , Regional
Fields,
Studies, 19:217-229
G . S . (1976): "Labour Force M i g r a t i o n , U n e m p l o y m e n t
and Job Turnover",
Review of Economics and Statistics, 58:407-415
(1978):
"Place-to-Place M i g r a t i o n : Some
New
Evidence",
Review of Economics a n d Statistics, 60:21-32
Foot, D . & M i l n e , J . (1982): "Net M i g r a t i o n E s t i m a t i o n in a n Extended, Multiregional
G r a v i t y Model", Institute for Policy A n a l y s i s , Toronto
Gordus, P . G . , J a r l e y , P . and F e r m a n , L . A . (1981): "Plant Closings
and Economic
Dislocation", W . E . U p j o h n Institute for E m p l o y m e n t Research, K a l a m a z o o
G r a n t , K . E . & V a n d e r k a m p , J . (1976): "The Economic Causes
Migration: C a n a d a , 1965-1971", Economic Coucil of C a n a d a , O t t a w a
and Effects
of
Greenhut, M . L . (1956): "Plant Location in T h e o r y and Practice", U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h
C a r o l i n a Press, C h a p e l H i l l
Greenwood, M . J . (1970): "Lagged Response in the Decision
to Migrate", J o u r n a l of
Regional Science, 10:375-384
(1975): "Research on Internal M i g r a t i o n in the U n i t e d
States: A Survey", J o u r n a l of Economic Literature, 8:397-433
H a r v e y , D . W . (1982): "Limits to Capital", Chicago U n i v e r s i t y Press, Chicago
(1985):
"The
Urbanization
of
Capital",
John
Hopkins
U n i v e r s i t y Press, Baltimore
Henderson, J . M . (1958): "The Efficiency of the C o a l Industry: A n Application of L i n e a r
P r o g r a m m i n g " , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, Canbridge
H i c k s , J . R . (1932): "The T h e o r y of Wages", M a c M i l l a n , L o n d o n
100
H o l l a n d , S. (1976): "Capital vs. the Regions", M a c M i l l a n Press L t d . , N e w Y o r k
Hollis, M . & N e l l , E . J . (1975): "Rational Economic M a n " , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press,
Cambridge
Holt, C . C . (1979): "How C a n the Phillips C u r v e be M o v e d to Reduce B o t h Inflation and
Unemployment?", i n Phelps, E . (ed): Microeconomic Foundations of E m p l o y m e n t and Inflation
Theory, W . W . Norton, N e w York
Hoover, E . M . (1978): "The P a r t i a l E q u i l i b r i u m A p p r o a c h " , in Deane, R . D . , L e a h y ,
W . H . & M c K e e , D . L . (eds): Spatial Economic T h e o r y , T h e Free Press, N e w Y o r k
H o w e y , R . S . (1973): "The Origins of M a r g i n a l i s m " , i n Black, R . D . , Coats, A . W . &
Goodwin, C . D . W . (eds): T h e M a r g i n a l Revolution i n Economics, D u k e U n i v e r s i t y Press,
Durham
Isard, W . (1956): "Location a n d Space Economy", J o h n W i l e y & Sons, N e w Y o r k
(1960): "Methods of Regional A n a l y s i s : A n Introduction to Regional
Science", M I T Press, Cambridge
&
Ostroff,
D . J . (1960):
"General
Interregional
Equilibrium",
J o u r n a l of Regional Science, 2:67-74
Jevons, W . S . (1871): "The T h e o r y of Political Economy", M a c M i l l a n , L o n d o n
J o h n s o n , J . H . , Salt, J . & Wood, P . A . (1975): "Housing and M i g r a t i o n of L a b o u r in
E n g l a n d and Wales", Saxon House, F a r n b o r o u g h
Johnston, R . J . (1973): " O n Friction of Distance and Regression Coefficients",
Area,
5:187-191
Kaldor,
N . (1970):
"The Case
for Regional
Policies",
Scottish J o u r n a l of Political
Economy
K i n g , L . J . (1979): " O n Neoclassicism in Economic Geography", in H a m e l i n , L . - E . &
Beauregard,
L . (eds):
Retrospective
1951-1976,
Montreal
101
Canadian
Association
of
Geographers,
K o s i n s k i , L . A . (1981): "Federal P r o g r a m s Directly Affecting M i g r a t i o n in C a n a d a " , in
W e b b , J . A . , N a u k k a r i n n e n , A . & Kosinski, L . A . (eds): Policies of Population Redistribution,
Geographical Society of N o r t h e r n F i n l a n d , Oulou
Kottis, A . (1972): "Mobility and H u m a n C a p i t a l Theory: T h e Education, A g e , Race a n d
Income Characteristics of M i g r a n t s " , A n n a l s of Regional Science, 6:41-61
Kriesberg, E . M . & V i n i n g , D . R . (1978): "The Contribution of O u t - M i g r a t i o n to Changes
in N e t Migration: A Time-Series Confirmation of Beale's Cross-Sectional Results", A n n a l s of
Regional Science, 12:1-11
L a n s i n g , J . B . & Mueller, W . (1967): "The Geographic Mobility of L a b o u r " , Institute
for Social Research, A n n A r b o r
Lefeber, L . (1958): "Allocation in Space:
Location", N o r t h - H o l l a n d , A m s t e r d a m
Production, Transportation and Industrial
Loesch, A . (1954): "The Economics of Location", Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w H a v e n
L o w r e y , I.S. (1966): "Migration and Metropolitan G r o w t h : T w o A n a l y t i c a l M O d e l s " ,
Chandler, S a n Francisco
L u c a s , R . (1981): "Studies in Business-Cycle T h e o r y " , M I T Press, Cambridge
L y c a n , R. (1969): "Interprovincial M i g r a t i o n in C a n a d a : T h e Role of Spatial a n d
Economic Factors", C a n a d i a n Geographer, 13:237-254
M c K a y , J . & Whitelaw, J . S . (1977): "The Role of L a r g e Private a n d Government
Organizations in G e n e r a t i n g Flows of Interregional M i g r a n t s : T h e Case of A u s t r a l i a " ,
Economic Geography, 53:28-44
M a i e r , G . (1985): "Cumulative C a u s a t i o n a n d Selectivity in L a b o u r M a r k e t Oriented
M i g r a t i o n Caused b y Imperfect Information", Regional Stidies, 19:231-241
M a s s e y , D . B . (1973): "Towards a Critique of Industrial Location T h e o r y " , Antipode, 5,
#3:33-39
M e n g e r , C . (1871): "Grundsaetze der Volkswirtschaftslehre",
Braumueller, Wien
102
E r s t e r allgemeiner T e i l ,
Milne, W . J . (1981): M i g r a t i o n in a n Interregional Macroeconometric M o d e l of the
U n i t e d States: W i l l N e t Outmigration from the N o r t h e a s t Continue?", International Regional
Science Review, 6:71-83
Moses, L . N . (1978): "The G e n e r a l E q u i l i b r i u m A p p r o a c h " , in Deane, R . D . , L e a h y ,
W . H . & M c K e e , D . L . (eds): Spatial Economic T h e o r y , T h e F r e e Press, N e w Y o r k
M y r d a l , G . (1953): "The Political E l e m e n t in the Development of Economic Theory",
Routledge & K e g a n P a u l , London
Nelson, P . (1965): "Migration, Real Income, and Information",
Science, 2:43-74
J o u r n a l of Regional
Olsson, P. (1965): "Distance a n d H u m a n Interaction: A Review a n d a Bibliography",
Philadelphia
(1970):
"Explanation,
Prediction,
and Meaning
Variance: A n
A s s e s s m e n t of Distance Interaction Models", Economic G e o g r a p h y , 46:223-231
Peek, P . & Standing, G . (1982): "State Policies and Migration", C r o o m H e l m , L o n d o n
P r e d , A . R . (1967): "Behaviour and Location: Foundations for a Geographic and
D y n a m i c Location T h e o r y " , L u n d Studies in Geography, Series b: H u m a n Geography, #27,
Lund
Pissarides, C . (1975): "Job S e a r c h and the Functioning of L a b o u r M a r k e t s " , i n C a r l i n e ,
D . , Pissarides, C , Siebert, W . S . & Sloane, P . J . (eds): S u r v e y s in Economics: L a b o u r
Economics, L o n g m a n G r o u p , L o n d o n
Plane, D . A . (1981): "Estimation of Place-to-Place M i g r a t i o n F l o w s from N e t M i g r a t i o n
Totals: A M i n i m u m Information A p p r o a c h " , International Regional Science Review, 6:33-51
, Rogerson, P . & Rosen, A . (1984): "The Cross-Regional
V a r i a t i o n of In-Migration and O u t - M i g r a t i o n " , Geographical A n a l y s i s , 16:162-175
R a b i a n s k i , J . S . (1970): "Real E a r n i n g s and the Present V a l u e of F u t u r e E a r n i n g s in a
T h e o r y of H u m a n Migration", unpublished
P h . D . Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Illinois at U r b a n a -
Champaign
Renshaw,
V . (1970): "The Role of M i g r a t i o n in L a b o u r M a r k e t Adjustment", P h . d .
dissertation, M I T , C a m b r i d g e
103
Richardson, H . W . (1978):"Regional a n d U r b a n Economics", Penguin Books, N e w Y o r k
Riew, J . (1973): "Migration and Public Policy", J o u r n a l of Regional Science, 13:65-76
Robinson, J . (1962): "Economic Philosophy", Penguin Books, L o n d o n
(1973):
"Collected
Economic
Papers",
Vol.
IV,
Basil
B l a c k w e l l , Oxford
Roseman, C . C . (1977): "Changing M i g r a t i o n Patterns W i t h i n the U n i t e d States",
Resource Paper #77-2, Association of A m e r i c a n Geographers, Washington
Rowthorn, B . (1974): "Neo-Classicism,
Review, 86:63-87
N e o - R i c a r d i a n i s m , and M a r x i s m " , N e w Left
S a y e r , A . (1976): " A Critique of U r b a n Modelling: F r o m Regional Science to U r b a n
and Regional Political Economy", Progress i n P l a n n i n g , 6:187-254
Schwartz,
701-719
A . (1976): "Migration, A g e and Education", J o u r n a l of Political E c o n o m y ,
S h a w , R . P . (1975): "Migration T h e o r y and Fact", Bibliography Series #5,
Science Research Institute, Philadelphia
Regional
S i m m o n s , J . W . (1982): "The Stability of M i g r a t i o n Patterns: C a n a d a , 1966-1971 and
1971-1976", U r b a n Geography, 3:166-178
Sjaastad, L . (1962): "The Costs and Returns of H u m a n Migration", J o u r n a l of Political
E c o n o m y , 70:80-93
Sloane, P . J . (19850: "Discrimination in the L a b o u r M a r k e t " , in C a r l i n e , D . , Pissarides,
C . A . , Siebert, W . S . & Sloane, P . J . (eds): L a b o u r Economics, L o n g m a n , N e w Y o r k
Stock, R. (1981): "Monitoring M i g r a t i o n in the P r a i r i e Provinces",
Report #5, C a n a d i a n Plains Research Centre, U n i v e r s i t y of Regina, Regina
Stone,
L . O . (1978):
"The F r e q u e n c y
o f Geographic
C a n a d a " , Statistics C a n a d a , O t t a w a
104
C a n a d i a n Plains
Mobility in the Population of
(1979):
"Occupational
Composition
of C a n a d i a n
Migration",
Statistics C a n a d a , O t t a w a
Stouffer, S . A . (1960): "Intervening Opportunity and Competing Migrants", J o u r n a l of
Regional Science, 1:1-26
(1962): "Social Research to Test N e w Ideas", N e w Y o r k
Streissler, E . (1973): "To W h a t E x t e n t W a s the A u s t r i a n School Marginalist?", in
Black, R . D . , Coats, A . W . & Goodwin, C . D . W . (eds): T h e M a r g i n a l Revolution in Economics,
D u k e U n i v e r s i t y Press, D u r h a m
Vanderkamp,
J . (1968): "Interregional Mobility in C a n a d a : A S t u d y
Pattern of Migration", C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l of Economics,
(1976):
Studies", C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l of Economics,
of the
Time
1:595-608
"The Role
of Population
Size
in
Migration
9:508-516
W a l r a s , L . E . M . (1874): "Elements d'economie politique pure", Corbaz, L a u s a n n e
Walsh, W . & Gram,
E q u i l i b r i u m " , Oxford
H . (1980):
"Classical
and Neoclassical Theories
of G e n e r a l
Webber, M . J . (1972): "Impact of Uncertainty of Location", M I T Press, Cambridge
Weber, A . (1909): "Ueber den Standort
der Industrien",
Tuebingen;
English
T r a n s l a t i o n b y C a r l J . F r i e d r i c h (1929): "Alfred Weber's T h e o r y of the Location of Industries",
Chicago
Winer,
S . L . & Gauthier,
D.
(1982):
"Internal
Migration
and F i s c a l
Structure",
Economic Council of C a n a d a , O t t a w a
Y o u n g , J . W . (1984): "Recent Changes in Interprovincial M i g r a t i o n W i t h i n C a n a d a " ,
unpublished paper, Concordia U n i v e r s i t y , M o n t r e a l
(1985):
Differentials
in
Mobility
of
Canadian
"Labour
Male
Market
Workers",
University, Montreal
105
Structures
unpublished
and
Occupational
paper,
Concordia