Desiderata in a Moral Theory
Or, what, if anything, have we
learned from all this?
Drawing a moral from the story of morals…
 In Chapter 13, Rachels poses the question “what would
a satisfactory moral theory be like?” and proposes as an
answer “the possibility that seems most plausible” to
him.
 That “possibility” turns out to be an amalgam of various
considerations drawn from Kantian ethics, virtue ethics,
and the ethics of care integrated into a modified U
framework (“Multiple Strategies Utilitarianism”)…
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…there’s nothing especially magical about Rachels’
synthesis. In fact, there is much about it that could be
criticized. [I’ll suggest some things along the way]
His overall point, however, I’d suggest is a reasonable
one:
A variety of considerations are relevant to morality. While
we may not be perfectly free to mix and match as we see
fit, we do, each of us, face the real-life task of doing the
best we can to integrate these considerations into a
(more or less) coherent plan for how we will live our
lives.
Some Considerations
 We human beings are rational beings. In contrast to the
rest of nature, we can consciously guide and direct our
behavior in response to reasons. (Cf. Aristotle, Kant)
Possibly this makes us unique in nature; surely it’s at
least relevant somehow.
 Given that we are rational, we should not (cannot?)
accept rules, constraints, virtues that don’t stand up to
rational scrutiny.
To do so would be to fail to respect ourselves as
autonomous—i.e., as rational beings.
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The most basic demand of rationality is (logical)
consistency.
Kant: This implies we ought to treat others as rational
beings would want/demand to be treated—as we would
want to be treated.
Rachels: “Reason requires impartiality.” We ought not to
make an exception of ourselves, we ought to treat
everyone alike—unless there is a good reason not to…
[But notice what does and does not turn out to be a good
reason…]
Desert
 …and there may be such reasons. Most generally,
because we ought to treat people as they deserve to
be treated
If and when an individual treats others badly, she
deserves to be treated differently—e.g., to be punished.
If and when an individual treats others especially well,
perhaps she deserves to praised or rewarded.
 To do otherwise, would be to fail to respect people as
fully rational—as responsible for their actions…
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Justice and Fairness
 But, says Rachels, we ought to treat people differently
only in respect of actions for which they are
responsible—voluntary actions under their control.
According to Rachels, we ought not to treat people
differently on account of properties they acquired
through “the natural lottery” (Rawls) – e.g., their
beauty or intelligence.
 Really? Would you select, say, your dentist via lottery?
[Rachels makes a grotesque hash of Rawls’s point here]
Other Motives
 But, besides punishment and reward, there are other
grounds for treating different people differently.
For instance: Because we love them, because they are
our friends, because they are our children…
[What’s become of the ‘reason requires impartiality’
principle by this point?]
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 Moreover, to respect ourselves as rational, autonomous
beings involves respecting how our motives, our life
projects, may differ from others’.
I choose to devote my life to art (which means I have
less time for charity); you choose the opposite.
A university professor may cultivate in her moral
development certain virtues that are not required of a
corporate lawyer or politician—and conversely.
Multiple Strategies U (MSU)
 Following Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900)
on ‘motive’ U, Rachels argues that all of
the forgoing considerations could be
accommodated into MSU.
Sidgwick: Universal Happiness is indeed the ultimate
standard, but that does not imply that Universal
Benevolence is always the best motive for action.
Often we will maximize overall utility by aiming, in the
first instance, at something else…
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The “Best Plan”
 MSU, for Rachels, entails trying to maximize overall
utility by formulating and following a list of motives and
virtues optimized for our individual lives—our
circumstances, personality and talents.
[A kind of extremely broad, but personalized, RU]
My ‘best plan’ list will specify…
 Virtues needed to make my life go well
 Motives on which I’ll act
 Commitments and personal relationships that are
important to me
 Social roles that I occupy, and the responsibilities that go
with them
 Duties and concerns associated with my projects (e.g.,
becoming a good artist; being a good parent)
 Habitual rules that most people follow most of the time
 Strategies and grounds for making exceptions to rules
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 Rachels assumes [hopes?] that the ‘best plans’ for each
of us will overlap to a significant extent.
 Yet the point of MSU is that our ‘best plans’ will not
necessarily be identical. Different personalities, different
circumstances, will generate different plans.
[All of this is supposed to promote both overall utility and
our individual utility, while at the same time respecting
persons and leaving us individual freedom. The overlap
is going to have a lot of work to do…]
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