Experimental Economics – CONS 901 University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Professor Anya Samak Email: [email protected] Office: Nancy Nicholas 4204 Office hours: By appointment Overview: This is a research course intended for graduate students in consumer science, economics, applied economics, business/management, accounting and other related fields (advanced undergraduates can apply by emailing me). In this course, I will introduce experimental economics as a methodology for conducting research in individual preferences and behavior/decision-­‐making, and provide a guided reading of selected seminal and recent research papers in the field. There are three primary objectives to this course: 1. Lecture: Through lecture, students learn experimental methodology, laboratory and field, as well as overview of topical lectures in key areas of interest 2. Discussion: Through student discussant presentations and class discussion, students become familiar with seminal papers in the field across many domains 3. Research Project: Students develop an idea and experiment design in an area of their interest, pilot the idea, give a conference-­‐style presentation and write a draft research proposal Class meetings will consist of a mixture of lecture and discussion. In the first part of the class, I will lecture on methodology (or on a topical lecture). In the second part of the class, we will have a discussion of 2-­‐3 selected research papers. Each student will be required to lead discussions 2 times throughout the semester. Students are expected to read the assigned material before class, and informed contributions to the class discussion count towards students’ grades. The main graded course requirement is a research project that consists of a complete design of an experiment, detailed experiment instructions, a pilot experiment with classmates, short conference-­‐style presentation and draft of grant proposal. Students should note the due dates of several components of this project toward the end of the semester. Pre-­‐requisites: Advanced Economics, Applied Economics or Consumer Science course Suggested Class Readings: • Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. Bardsley, Cubitt, Loomes, Moffatt, Starmer, Sugden. Princeton University Press, 2010. ISBN 978-­‐0-­‐691-­‐12479-­‐7 • Research articles as indicated in the syllabus Page 1 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Class Assignments: Item Discussion 1* Discussion 2* Class Project Initial meeting to approve idea Motivation/Literature Review Design of Experiment Instructions Pilot Experiment Class presentation Final Research Proposal Paper All sections, plus pilot results Budget and Funding plan Turned in with final paper Portion of grade 10% 10% 60%** 0% 10% 10% 5% 5% 10% 15% Due date As Scheduled As Scheduled Weeks 2-­‐3 Week 5 Week 7 Week 9 Weeks 12-­‐14 Weeks 14-­‐15 Finals Week 5% *Discussants responsible for: Signing up for your time in advance, discussing with others in your group which papers each of you will present (choose from list), making arrangements with others to switch if needed, posting the paper the week before on the Dropbox. You can only present once per class period. ** Half credit if any component is late. Due either in class or dropped off at my door. The remaining 20% counts for class participation. If all students come prepared to class and provide informed comments, everyone will do well on this component. If students start not showing up to class or not reading the material, students may be required to complete reaction papers for selected readings. Students are required to attend all class presentation sessions and experiment sessions to provide feedback to classmates. We may schedule an additional date the last week of the semester to accommodate all presentations, depending on the size of the class/groups. There may be opportunities for extra credit this semester, each can contribute up to 1% to your overall grade. Over the course of the semester, you will receive information about visiting experimental faculty. To get extra credit, you should attend each talk and present to me a two-­‐paragraph summary of what the talk was about (P1) and what you found interesting/your extension ideas (P2). Keep this fairly short. Lecture Topics (may not follow this order) 1. What is Experimental Economics? 2. History of Experimental Economics 3. Market Experiments 4. Social Preference Experiments – Dictator, Ultimatum, Public Goods Games 5. Experimenter Demand Effect 6. Lab Experiments: Design Considerations, How to run 7. Coordination Games 8. Contests 9. Risk and Time Preference Elicitation 10. Field Experiments: Design Considerations, Power Tests 11. Programming in ZTree (Short tutorial) 12. Giving a Good Presentation / Applying for Grants Page 2 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Discussant Topics Schedule Dates Discussant Instruction Topic Areas Week 1 N/A Introduction Week 2 Choose Paper from I Market Experiments: Auctions, Pricing Week 3 Choose Paper from II Choose Paper from II Choose Paper from II Pro-­‐social Behaviors & Public Good Provision A. Preferences: Fairness, Inequality Aversion, Altruism, Warm-­‐Glow B. Dictator/Ultimatum Games C. Public Goods Provision D. Field/Charitable Giving Week 6 Choose Paper from III Choose Paper from III Coordination/ Competition Topics A. Trust Games & Reciprocity B. Sanctions/Punishment C. Coordination D. Contests and Tournaments Week 8 Choose Paper from IV Choose Paper from IV Time and Risk A. Risk Preference/Loss Aversion B. Time Preferences C. Field Applications: Credit Markets and Savings Labor Economics A. Incentive Schemes B. Gift Exchange, Reciprocity C. Teams D. Gender Differences in Competitiveness Week 4 Week 5 Week 7 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11 Spring Break Choose Paper from V Choose Paper from V Week 12 Week 13 Choose Paper from VI Choose Paper from VII or VIII Field Applications, Neuroeconomics, Deception A. Education B. Discrimination C. Health Week 14 Week 15 N/A N/A Pilots/Class Presentations Page 3 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus SUGGESTED READING LIST (ACCEPTABLE DISCUSSANT TOPICS) Methodology Bardsley et al., Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. All Chapters. Brandts, Jordi and Gary Charness (2011), “The Strategy versus the Direct-­‐Response Method: A First Survey of Experimental Comparisons,” Experimental Economics, pp. 375-­‐398. Calisi, R. and Bentley, G. (2009). Lab and Field experiments: Are they the same animal? Hormones and Behavior, 56:1-­‐10. Falk, A. and Heckman, J. (2009). Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences, Science, 326: 535-­‐538 Harrison, G. and List, J.A. (2004). Field Experiments, Journal of Economic Literature, 42: 1009-­‐ 1055. Heckman, J. and Urza, S. (2010). Comparing IV with Structural Models: What Simple IV Can and Cannot Identify, Journal of Econometrics, 156: 27-­‐37 Hertwig, R. and Ortmann, A. (2004) Economists and Psychologists Experimental Practices: How They Differ, Why They Differ, And How They Could Converge. In Brocas, I. and Carillo J.D. (eds.) Economics and Psychology. Oxford University Press: 253-­‐72. Levitt, S.D. and List, J.A. (2009). Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, The Present, and The Future, European Economic Review, 53: 1-­‐18. List, J.A., S. Sadoff, M. Wagner. (2008) “So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some Simple Rules of Thumb for Optimal Experimental Design,” NBER working paper 15701. List, John A., (2008) Homo experimentalist evolves, Science, 321(5886), pp. 207-­‐208. List, John A. (2011) Why Economists Should Run Field Experiments and 14 Tips for Pulling One Off, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 25:3, Pages 3–16. Roth, Alvin E. (1988); "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview", Economic Journal, Vol. 98, 974-­‐1031. Schram, A. (2005). Artificiality: The Tension between Internal and External Validity in Economic Experiments, Journal of Economic Methodology, 12: 225-­‐237. Smith, V.L. (1989). Theory, Experiment and Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3(1): 151-­‐169. Smith, V.L. (1994). Economics in the Laboratory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8: 113-­‐
131. Samuelson, L. (2005). Economic Theory and Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Smith, Vernon (1982), “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,” American Economic Review, pp. 923-­‐955. Smith, Vernon (1989), “Theory, Experiment and Economics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 151-­‐169. Page 4 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus I. Market Experiments: Auctions, Pricing Fehr, E. et al. (1993). Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108: 437-­‐59. Cason Timothy N. “An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction,” American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 4. (Sep., 1995), pp. 905-­‐922. Cason, Timothy and Daniel Friedman (1997), “Price Formation in Single Call Markets,” Econometrica, pp. 311-­‐345. Kagel, John H. and Dan Levin, "Common Value Auctions with Insider Information." Econometrica, 1999, 1219-­‐1238. Lei, Vivian, Charles Noussair and Charles Plott (2001), “Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality,” Econometrica, pp. 831-­‐859. Fehr, Ernst, and J.R. Tyran. “Does Money Illusion Matter?” American Economic Review 91 (2001), 1239-­‐1262. Lei, V. and C. Noussair, and Charles Plott, “Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality,” Econometrica Vol. 69(4), July 2001, pp. 813-­‐59. Goeree, Jacob, Emiel Maasland, Sander Onderstal, and John Turner (2005) “How (Not) to Raise Money,” Journal of Political Economy, 113(4): 897-­‐926. Morgan, John, Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton (2006), “A Laboratory Study of Advertising and Price Competition,” European Economic Review, pp. 323-­‐347. Morgan, John, Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton (2006), “A Laboratory Study of Advertising and Price Competition,” European Economic Review, pp. 323-­‐347. Harrison, Glenn, and J. List (2008) “Naturally Occurring Markets and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of the Winner’s Curse,” The Economic Journal, 118(528): pp. 822 – 843. List, John A. “The Economics of Open Air Markets,” U. Chicago working paper, 2008. Davis, Douglas, Oleg Korenok and Robert Reilly (2010), “Cooperation without Coordination: Signaling, Types and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Oligopolies,” Experimental Economics, pp. 45-­‐65. Kogan, Shimon, Anthony Kwasnica and Roberto Weber (2011), “Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets,” American Economic Review, pp. 927-­‐947. Page 5 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus II. Prosocial Behavior & Public Goods Provision A. Preferences: Fairness, Inequality Aversion, Altruism, Warm-­‐Glow Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 817-­‐69. Engelmann, D. and Strobel M. (2004). Inequality aversion, efficiency and maximim preferences in simple distribution experiments. American Economic Review 94: 857-­‐69. Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing Theories of Fairness -­‐ Intentions Matter. Games and Economic Behavior 62: 287-­‐303. Crumpler, H. & Grossman, P.J. (2008). An experimental test of warm glow giving. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5–6), 1011-­‐1021. B. Dictator/Ultimatum Games Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (1996). Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 16: 181-­‐191. Andreoni, James and Rao, Justin. (2010). The Power of Asking: How Communication Affects Selfishness, Empathy and Altruism. NBER Working Paper. Guth, W., Huck, S., and Mäuller, W. (2001). The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games. Games and Economic Behavior, 37:161-­‐169. Kagel, J.H. and Wolfe, K.W. (2001). Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a three-­‐person ultimatum game. Experimental Economics 4: 203-­‐
219. List, J. (2007). On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games. Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 115: 482-­‐493 Andreoni J. & Bernheim, D. (2009). Social image and the 50-­‐50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica, 77, 1607-­‐1636.
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review, 99, 544-­‐555.
Eckel, C.C., & Petrie, R. (2011). Face Value. American Economic Review, 101, 1497-1513.
C. Public Goods Provision Isaac, R. Mark and James Walker, "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism." QJE, 1988, 179-­‐99. Isaac, R. Mark and James Walker, and Arlington Williams, "Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experiments Utilizing Very Large Groups." Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54, 1-­‐36. Andreoni, James, (1995) "Warm-­‐glow versus Cold Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing in Public Goods Experiments." QJE, 110(1): pp. 1-­‐21. Andreoni, J., (1995). Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? American Economic Review, 85: 891-­‐904. Houser, Daniel and Robert Kurzban (2002), “Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments,” American Economic Review, pp. 1062-­‐1069. Page 6 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Falkinger, J., E. Fehr, S. Gaechter, and J. Winter-­‐Ebmer, “A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,” American Economic Review 90, (2000), 247-­‐264. Jacob Goeree, and Charles A. Holt and Susan Laury, (2002) “Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior,” Journal of Public Economics, 83(2): pp. 255-­‐276. Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a
glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1605-1623.
Potters, J., M. Sefton, and L. Vesterlund (2005) “After you – endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games,” Journal of Public Economics, 89(8): pp. 1399-­‐1419. D. Field/Charitable Giving Eckel, C. and P. Grossman (2003) “Rebates Versus Matching: Does how We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?” Journal of Public Economics, 87(3): pp. 681-­‐701. List John A. and David Lucking-­‐Reiley “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign,” Journal of Political Economy (2002), 110(1), pp. 215-­‐233. Landry, C., A. Lange, J.A. List, M.K. Price, and Nicholas Rupp (2006), "Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 747-­‐782. Karlan, Dean and John A. List (2007) “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-­‐Scale Natural Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 97(5): 1774-­‐1793. Falk, A. (2007). Gift exchange in the field. Econometrica, 5: 1501-­‐1511 DellaVigna, Stefano; List, John and Malmendier, Ulrike. (2009). Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving. NBER Working Paper. Chen, Y., Harper, F.M., Konstan, J., & Li, S.X. (2010). Social Comparisons and
Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens.
American Economic Review, 100, 1358–98.
Huck, Steffen; Rasul, Imran. (2011). Matched Fundraising: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 95(5-­‐6), pp. 351-­‐362. Ekstrom, Mathias. (2012) Do Watching Eyes Affect Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Field Experiment. Experimental Economics, 15:3, pp. 530-­‐546 Gneezy, Ayelet; Gneezy, Uri, Nelson, Leif and Brown, Amber. (2010). Shared Social Responsibility: A Field Experiment in Pay-­‐What-­‐You-­‐Want Pricing and Charitable Giving. Science, 329:5989 pp. 325-­‐327. Andreoni, James, Rao, Justin and Trachtman, Hannah. (2012). Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy and Charitable Giving. Working Paper. III. Coordination/Competition Topics A. Trust Games & Reciprocity Berg, J., Dickaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior 10: 122-­‐42. Glaeser, E., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J., and Soutter, C. (2000). Measuring Trust. Quarterly Page 7 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Journal of Economics, 115: 811-­‐846. McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., and Trouard, T. (2001). A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-­‐Person Reciprocal Exchange. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98: 11832-­‐11835. Karlan, Dean. “Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions,” AER, 2005, 95(5): 1688-­‐1699. Charness, G. and Dufwenberg, M., (2006). Promises and Partnership. Econometrica 74: 1579-­‐ 1601. Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., Zeckhauser, R. (2008). Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. American Economic Review 98: 294-­‐310. Leider, Stephen, Möbius, Markus M., Rosenblat, Tanya and Do, Quoc-­‐Anh, (2009), Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124: 1815-­‐1851 B. Sanctions/Punishment Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992), “Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-­‐Governance is Possible,” American Political Science Review, pp. 404-­‐
417. Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher,U. (2005). Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 73: 2017-­‐30. Anderson, C. and Putterman, L. (2006). Do non-­‐strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior 54: 1-­‐24. Hopfensitz, A. and Reuben, E. (2009). The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment. Economic Journal, 119: 1534-­‐1559 Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., and Riedl, A. (2009). Institution Formation in Public Goods Games. American Economic Review, 99: 1335-­‐1355. Quervain, D., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., and Fehr, E. (2004). The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment. Science 305: 1254-­‐8. Sutter,M. Haigner,S., and Kocher,M. (2010). Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations, Review of Economic Studies, 77:1540-­‐ 1566. Cason, Timothy and Lata Gangadharan (2012), “Complexity and Robustness of Peer Punishment for Promoting Efficient Cooperation” Purdue and Monash Universities working paper. C. Coordination Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., & Beil, R.O. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80, 234-­‐248. Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., & Beil, R.O. (1991). Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 885-­‐910. Page 8 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Blume, A., & Ortmann, A. (2007). The effects of costless pre-­‐play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-­‐ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274-­‐ 290. Cason, Timothy and Vai-­‐Lam Mui (2011), “Coordinating Resistance through Communication and Repeated Interaction,” Purdue and Monash Universities working paper. Cason, Timothy; Savikhin, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman. (2012) “Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games,” European Economic Review, pp. 233-­‐245. D. Contests and Tournaments Orrison, Alannah, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt. “On the Design of Optimal Organizations Using Tournaments: An Experimental Examination.” 1998, Management Science. Orrison, A., Schotter, A., and Weigelt, K. (2004). Multi-­‐person tournaments: An Experimental Examination, Management Science, 50: 268-­‐279. Sutter, Matthias and Christine Strassmair (2009), “Communication, Cooperation and Collusion in Team Tournaments,” Games and Economic Behavior, pp. 506-­‐525. Abbink, Klaus, Jordi Brandts, Benedikt Herrmann and Henrik Orzen (2010), “Intergroup Conflict and Intra-­‐group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game,” American Economic Review, pp. 420-­‐447. Sheremeta, Roman. (2011). Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry. 49:2, pp. 573-­‐590. IV. Time and Risk Preferences A. Risk Preference/Loss Aversion Haigh, Michael and List, John A. “Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Finance, (2005), 60 (1): 523-­‐
534. Gneezy, Uri, John A. List, George Wu, “The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect is Valued Less than its Worst Possible Outcome,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2006), November 121(4): 1283-­‐1309. Harrison, Glenn W., John A. List, and Charles Towe (2007) “Naturally Occurring Preferences and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of Risk Aversion,” Econometrica, 75(2): 433-­‐458. Andreoni, J. and Harbaugh, William. (2009) Unexpected Utility: Experimental Tests of Five Key Questions about Preferences over Risk. B. Time Preferences Andreoni, James and Sprenger, Charles. (2012). Risk Preferences are Not Time Preferences. American Economic Review. Ifcher, John and Zarghamee, Homa. Happiness and Time Preference: The Effect of Positive Affect in a Random-­‐Assignment Experiment. American Economic Review, 101:7, pp. 3109-­‐3129. Page 9 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus C. Field Applications: Credit Markets and Savings Bertrand, Marianne; Karlin, Dean; Mullainathan, Sendhil; Shafir, Eldar; Zinman, Jonathan. (2005) What’s Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market. Burger, N., Charness,G., and Lynham, J.(2011). Field and online experiments on self-­‐
control. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 77:393-­‐404. Madrian B.C. and D.F. Shea, The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001) (4), pp. 1149–1187. Meier, Stephan and Sprenger, Charles. (2010) Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences and Participation in Financial Education Programs. American Economic Journal, 2:1. Pp. 193-­‐210. Beshears, John; Choi, James; Laibson, David and Madrian, Brigitte. (2012). Simplification and Saving. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Bauer, Michal, Julie Chytilová, and Jonathan Morduch. 2012. "Behavioral
Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural
India." American Economic Review, 102(2): 1118-39.
V. Labor Economics A. Incentive Schemes Bull, C., Schotter, A., and Weigelt, K. (1987). Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study. Journal of political Economy, 1-­‐33. Carpenter, Jeffrey and Erika Seki (2006) “Competitive Work Environments and Social Preferences: Field Experimental Evidence from a Japanese Fishing Community,” B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2006, 5(2): Contributions Article 2.http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss2/ art2 Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., and Rasul, I. (2007). Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: Evidence from a firm level experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 729-­‐773 Fehr, E., Goette, L. (2007). Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Economic Review, 1: 298-­‐317 Al-­‐Ubaydli, Omar, Andersen, Steffen, Uri Gneezy, and John List, 2008, “For Love or Money: Testing Pecuniary and Non-­‐pecuniary Incentive Schemes in a Workplace,” Working paper. Ariely, D., Gneezy, U., Lowenstein, G., and Mazar, M. (2009), Large Stakes and Big Mistakes. Bellemare, C, Lepage, P., and Shearer, B. (2009), Peer pressure, incentives, and gender; an experimental analysis of motivation in the workplace. Hossain, Tanjim and John List, 2009, “The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing Manipulations,” working paper. Güth, W., Levínský, R., Pull, K., and Weisel, O.(2010), Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited: A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Premium Incentives, No 2010-­‐
039, Jena Economic Research Papers, Max-­‐Planck-­‐Institute of Economics. Page 10 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Leuven, E., Oosterbeek, H., Sonnemans, J., van der Klaauw,B. (2011). Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment, Journal of Labor Economics, 29: 637-­‐ 658 B. Gift Exchange, Reciprocity Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., and Gächter, S. (1998). When social norms overpower competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets. Journal of Labor Economics, 16:324-­‐ 351. Charness, G. (2004). Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market. Journal of Labor Economics, 22: 665-­‐688. 4 Bellemare, C. and Shearer, B. (2007). Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-­‐ level experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 67: 233–244 Gneezy, U. and List, J. (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica, 74: 1365-­‐1384. Kube, S., Marechal, M., and Puppe, C. (2010). Do wage cuts damage work morale? Evidence from a natural field experiment. IEW working paper. C. Teams Hamilton, Barton, J. Nickerson, and H. Owan, 2003, “Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation,” Journal of Political Economy 111, 465-­‐497. Nalbantian, H., and Schottter, A. (1997). Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. American Economic Review, vol. 87, no. 3, pp 314-­‐341 D. Gender Differences in Competitiveness Ayres, I., and Siegelman, P. (1995). Gender and Race Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, American Economic Review, 85: 304-­‐321.
Gneezy, U.; Niederle, M., and Rustchini, A. (2003). Performance in competitive environments. Gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 1049-­‐
1074
Gneezy, U, and Rustchini, A. (2004). Gender and competition at a young age. American Economic Review, Papers and proceedings, 94: 377-­‐381
Niederle, M. and Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122: 1067-­‐1101
Paarsch, H. and Shearer, B. (2007). Do women react differently to incentives? Evidence from experimental data and payroll records. European Economic Review, 51: 1682-­‐
1707
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K., and List, J.A. (2009). Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society, Econometrica (2009)
Flory, J., Leibbrandt, A, and List, A. (2010). Do competitive work places deter female workers? a large-­‐scale natural field experiment on gender differences in job-­‐entry decisions,” NBER Working Paper w16546
Page 11 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus Andersen, S., Ertac, S. , Gneezy, E., List, J.A., and Maximiano, S. (2010). Gender, Competitiveness and Socialization at a Young Age: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society, Working paper. Lavy, V. (2012). Gender Differences in Market Competitiveness in a Real Workplace: Evidence from Performance-­‐based Pay Tournaments among Teachers. The Economic Journal, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-­‐0297.2012.02542.x VI. Applications to the Field A. Education Banerjee, A.V., S. Cole, E. Duflo and L. Linden “Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003): pp. 1235-­‐1264. Angrist, J. and V. Lavy “The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from Randomized Trials,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 114 (2004). Banerjee, Abhijit, Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, and Leigh Linden “Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3):1235-­‐1264, August 2007 (see also NBER Working Paper No. 11904, 2005; BREAD Working Paper No. 109. Kremer, Michael, Edward Miguel, and Rebecca Thornton, (2008). Incentives to Learn, working paper. Angrist, J., D. Lang and P. Oreopoulos “Incentives and Services for College Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized Trial,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (2009) 1(1): pp. 1-­‐xx. Bettinger, E.P. “Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary School Test Scores” Working Paper (2008). Levitt, Steven; List, John; Neckermann, Susanne; Sadoff, Sally. The Impact of Short-­‐term Incentives on Student Performance. Working Paper. Fryer, Roland Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials, working paper, (2010). B. Discrimination Ayres, Ian, and Peter Siegelman, “Gender and Race Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,” American Economic Review, 1995, 85(3): 304-­‐321. Goldin, Claudia, and Cecilia Rouse, “Orchestrating Impartiality: the Impact of ‘Blind’ Auditions on Female Musicians,” American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4): 715-­‐741. Bertrand Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” AER, 2004, 94(4): 991-­‐1013. List, John A. "The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the Field," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119(1): 49-­‐89. Page 12 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus C. Health Charness, G. and Gneezy, U. (2009). Incentives to Exercise. Econometrica. 77: 909-­‐931 C Wisdom, J., Downs, J. and Loewenstein, G. (2009). Promoting Healthy Choices: Information vs. Convenience. American Economic Journal: Applied, 99(2), 159-­‐64. Rao, G., Krall, J. and Loewenstein, G. (2011). An Internet-­‐based Pediatric Weight Management Program with and without Financial Incentives: A Randomized Trial. Childhood Obesity, 7(2), 122-­‐128. Jue, J.J., Press, M.J, McDonald, D., Volpp, K. Asch, D.A., Mitra, N., Stanowski, A.C. & Loewenstein, G. (2012). The impact of price discounts and calorie messaging on beverage consumption: a multi-­‐site field study. Preventive Medicine, 55, 629-­‐533. VII. Neuroeconomics Camerer, Colin; George Loewenstein; and Drazen Prelec. (2005) Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics. Journal of Economic Literature , XLIII, 9-­‐64. Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher and Michael Kosfeld (2005) Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences, American Economic Review. Harbaugh, William, Ulrich Mayr, Burghart, Dan, (2007) Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations. Science. VIII. Deception Gneezy, Uri (2005). Deception: The Role of Consequences, American Economic Review. Sutter, Matthias. (2009).Deception through telling the truth? Experimental evidence from individuals and teams, Economic Journal, 119: 47-­‐60. Wang, Joseph Tao-­‐yi, Spezio, M. and Camerer, C. (2010). Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-­‐Telling and Deception in Sender-­‐Receiver Games, American Economic Review, 100(3). Erat, S. and Gneezy, U. (2010). White lies. Forthcoming in Management Science Gino, Francesca, Shahar Ayal, and Dan Ariely. (2012). "Self-­‐Serving Altruism? When Unethical Actions That Benefit Others Do Not Trigger Guilt." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13-­‐028. Page 13 of 13 | SAMAK | CONS 901 – Experimental Economics -­‐ Syllabus