ENDI Research Packet
Definitions
Resolved: In East Africa, the United States federal government should prioritize its counterterrorism
efforts over its humanitarian assistance
“East Africa”
United Nations Statistics Division, xx-xx-xxxx, "UNSD — Methodology," No
Publication, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ Accessed 5-7-17. // LH
The assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical convenience and does not
imply any assumption regarding political or other affiliation of countries or territories by the United
Nations.
Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia,
Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles, Réunion and MayotteMozambique and Madagascar,
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Egypt, Sudan
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa definition of “East Africa”
United Nations, 4-1-2017, "Office for Eastern Africa of the Economic Commission for Africa," No
Publication, http://www.uneca.org/sro-ea // DY
The Sub-Regional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA) is based in Kigali, Rwanda and covers Burundi,
Comoros, D.R Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Britannica Definition of “East Africa”
Brittanica, 2-12-2015, "eastern Africa," Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/place/eastern-Africa // DY
Eastern Africa, part of sub-Saharan Africa comprising two traditionally recognized regions: East Africa,
made up of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; and the Horn of Africa, made up of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea,
and Ethiopia.
East Africa Community Definition
East African Community, 11-30-1999, "Overview of EAC," No Publication, http://www.eac.int/about/overview //
LH
The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organisation of 6 Partner States : the
Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda,
with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania.
“Prioritize”
Definitions
Merriam Webster definition of prioritize
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prioritize
1. to organize (things) so that the most important thing is done or dealt with first
2. to make (something) the most important thing in a group
Mutually Exclusive
Counterterrorism efforts trade off with aid
IRIN News, 25 July 2013, “Counter-terrorism laws can stifle humanitarian action, study shows”, The
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jul/25/counter-terrorismhumanitarian-aid-study /// MP
The growing body of counter-terrorism
legislation is having a direct impact on humanitarian action, restricting
funding, stalling project implementation and resulting in an increased climate of self-censorship by aid
workers, according to an independent study. Commissioned by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the
Norwegian Refugee Council on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the report, published last week in Geneva, assessed the
consequences of counter-terrorism policies epitomised by the Patriot Act introduced after September 11. The UN assistant secretary general
for humanitarian affairs, Kyung-wha Kang, said: "The
impact of counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action
has been the source of growing concern within the humanitarian community. A particular fear has been
that people in areas controlled by non-state armed groups designated as terrorists may have no or
diminished access to humanitarian assistance and protection."
Counterterrorism measures in Somali decreased aid by 88%
IRIN News, 25 July 2013, “Counter-terrorism laws can stifle humanitarian action, study shows”, The
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jul/25/counter-terrorismhumanitarian-aid-study /// MP
Kate Mackintosh, who co-wrote the study with Patrick Duplat, said: "We did find negative impacts on humanitarian activities, as restriction of
funding, blocking of projects and self-censorship by IOs [international organisations] and NGOs. "After
2008, for example, when
the US listed al-Shabaab [Somali insurgents] as a terrorist group, we saw an 88% decrease in aid to
Somalia, between 2008 and 2010. In the OPT, beneficiaries can be excluded from humanitarian aid especially in Gaza, under
Hamas control [also proscribed by the US]." The report (pdf) points out that the wariness of aid agencies over falling foul of counter-terrorism
legislation had a significant impact on humanitarian programming. "The research uncovered a high level of self-limitation and self-censorship.
This was particularly acute in organisations which perceived their reputation to be highly vulnerable,
most notably faith-based Islamic NGOs. The risk of criminal prosecution, as well as of significant
reputational damage, appears to be leading in some cases to overcompliance," itnotes.
Affirmative
Sample Case
We affirm Resolved: In East Africa, the United States federal government should
prioritize its counterterrorism efforts over its humanitarian assistance.
1. Keeping it Local
Jane Ferguson finds on june 1st that
Jane Ferguson, 6-1-2017, "20 million starving to death: inside the worst famine since World War II," Vox,
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/6/1/15653970/south-sudan-hunger-crisis-famine //DY
When war came to 15-year-old Rebecca Riak Chol’s small town in rural South Sudan in early April, she and 27 other villagers fled into nearby
marshlands to hide. They spent two grueling weeks slowly making their way to the relative safety of a region controlled by rebels from her
same tribe. They were constantly hungry, constantly thirsty, and constantly in danger of being killed by the troops trying to hunt them down.
Chol’s sister died along the way, but it wasn’t because she was found and shot. Instead, she — like growing numbers of South Sudanese — died
from starvation. “We didn’t have anything to dig with to bury her, so we just put grass on the body and left it there,” Chol told me during a
conversation in the schoolyard of her new home in the small town of Thoahnom Payam. Two school buildings with mud walls and tin roofs
flanked the dry dirt yard. In the center was an unused volleyball net. One of Chol’s classmates, 16-year-old Marco Nuer, arrived here in
February from a different violence-ravaged part of the country. Like Chol, he paid an enormous price: His father, brother, and sister starved to
death along the way. He and his mother were the only ones to survive. The two stories are tragically common in South
Sudan, which is
facing mass hunger on a scale unimaginable in almost every other part of the world. In February, the United Nations
estimated that 100,000 South Sudanese were starving, and that 5 million more — 42 percent of the country’s
population — have such limited access to proper food that they don’t know where their next meal is coming from. More recent
figures are not available yet, but aid agencies fear the situation could be much worse now. There are two things you need to understand about
the famine decimating South Sudan, the world’s newest country and one that came into existence largely because of enormous assistance from
the US. First, South Sudan isn’t the only country in the region facing mass starvation. [and]
A potentially historic famine is also
threatening Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Far from Western eyes and far from the headlines, an estimated 20 million people in those
four countries are at risk of dying due to a lack of food. A makeshift grave by the side of the road in Juba, South Sudan. A makeshift grave in
Juba, South Sudan. The UN has already officially declared a full-fledged famine in parts of South Sudan and warned that the other three
countries will suffer mass death from food and water shortages if “prompt and sustained humanitarian intervention” doesn’t happen soon.
Second, these
famines weren’t caused by natural disasters like crop failures or droughts. They were
man-made — the direct result of the bloody wars and insurgencies raging in all four countries. The upshot is that
[meaning] the current famines, unlike others in recent history, could have potentially been prevented. Washington,
which has been slow to act, seems to finally be taking steps to help fight the famine. The Trump administration proposed massive funding cuts
to America’s humanitarian food aid, but Congress rejected those cuts and instead allocated close to $1 billion in new funding. In a recent
interview with Vox, Michael Bowers, the vice president of humanitarian leadership and response for the aid group Mercy Corps, said the
current famine was “entirely avoidable.” “It’s entirely a man-made construct right now, and that means we have it within our power to stop
that,” he said. “Wars are hard to stop; famines are not.” On the ground here in South Sudan, the civil war that has left millions on the brink of
starvation shows no signs of ending anytime soon. And that means the numbers of men, women, and children dying from lack of food will
continue to increase into the indefinite future. In the intensive care unit of an International Medical Corps hospital in the capital city of Juba,
the beds are occupied by the tiny, skeletal frames of malnourished children. The building is a simple temporary structure made of cinderblocks
and plywood. Although children under 5 years old are the most vulnerable to malnutrition and the infections it can cause in small bodies, they
are also incredibly resilient and almost always bounce back if fed high-calorie foods and given proper medicine. The problem is that huge
numbers of South Sudanese children aren’t getting that type of food. Many, in fact, aren’t getting food of any kind. Most famines are caused by
nature. These are caused by war. Many American adults first learned about the very idea of an African famine in 1985, when Lionel Richie and
Michael Jackson brought together some of the biggest stars in rock and pop music to record a song called “We Are the World.” It was part of an
effort to raise money to fight a famine that killed a million people in Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985. The song — which also included stars like
Stevie Wonder, Paul Simon, Tina Turner, Bruce Springsteen, and Willie Nelson — eventually sold an astounding 20 million copies and raised
more than $10 million for relief caused largely by a devastating drought in the impoverished country. The crisis in the 1980s pales in
comparison to the famine happening today. Because it isn’t just happening in one country; it’s happening in four. Take Nigeria, where a bloody
insurgency by the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram has created a growing humanitarian disaster. Since the group declared war on the
country’s central government in 2009, millions of civilians — including huge numbers of farmers — have been forced from their homes to
escape the group’s campaign of suicide bombings and kidnappings. With the agricultural systems of hard-hit areas in near collapse because of
the fighting, the UN estimates that at least 4.8 million people are in need of urgent food assistance. Map including Nigeria, South Sudan,
Somalia, and Yemen. Javier Zarracina/Vox Somalia, long synonymous with civil war and hunger, risks suffering its second famine of the past five
years alone. The
UN says that more than 6 million Somalis — fully half the country’s population — need
food aid. The problem is that [but] the government of Somalia doesn’t control huge swaths of the country.
Much of it is still run by the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. The ongoing conflict between the
government in Mogadishu and the al-Qaeda-aligned group has devastated the economy and made
[making] it far harder to bring aid into the country
In fact, Alexa Liautaud finds on june 2nd that
Alexa Liautaud, 6-2-2017, "Al-Shabaab replaces Boko Haram as Africa’s deadliest terror group," No
Publication, https://news.vice.com/story/al-shabaab-replaces-boko-haram-as-africas-deadliest-terrorgroup //DY
Somalia’s al-Shabaab was the deadliest terrorist organization in Africa in 2016, ending Boko Haram’s four-year
reign. The Somali terror group killed 4,281 people in 2016, with a high concentration of attacks taking place in the capital Mogadishu, according
to new data compiled by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and first reported by
Quartz. Boko Haram killed 3,499. Since forming in 2006, al-Shabaab has carried out more than 360 attacks in Somalia. The terror group’s
resiliency has proved an obstacle for the country’s new president and worsened its numerous humanitarian issues. Recently, the U.S. military
signaled a push toward greater counterterrorism action against al-Shabaab in Somalia, including authorizing unilateral action for ground
operations and the use of airstrikes. In April, the U.S. deployed dozens of troops to assist the Somali government’s national army in its fight
against the Islamist extremist group. The rise of al-Shabaab parallels the declining capacity of Boko Haram to maintain territorial control, which
has been further exacerbated by mounting military pressure from the Nigerian government and an internal split into two factions. “We have
seen Boko Haram in a declining capability to gain such ‘control’ and relying on, for example, more suicide bombers,” said Jasmine Opperman,
the director of Southern Africa Operations at Terrorism, Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). Boko Haram remains a major terror threat
throughout Africa’s Lake Chad region, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In the past six years, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram
accumulated a combined body count far higher than that of ISIS and al-Qaida combined, according to ACLED and the African Center for
Strategic Studies. Between 2010 and 2016, the two terror groups racked up more than 47,000 fatalities while ISIS, al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb, and other al-Qaida linked groups totaled 9,236. [and
that] The total number of terror attacks on the African
continent has increased by 1,000 percent in the past 10 years, according to a report by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
The foundation found that the uptick is largely fueled by declining economic prospects for African youth, as well as unemployment and social
isolation. Between 2006 and 2015, terror attacks rose from about 100 per year to nearly 2,000, according to data from the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. And in documents obtained by VICE News, Donald Bolduc,
the U.S. Army general running special operations command in Africa, warned that “Africa’s
challenges could create a threat
that surpasses the threat that the U.S. currently faces from conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.”
However, The Obama White house reported in 2014 that
whitehouse.gov, August 6th 2014, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,"
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-supportpeacekeeping-africa //DY
To help combat terrorism in Somalia and support the Somali Federal Government’s efforts to build security and stability, the
United States has committed to provide more than $512 million to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to build capacity to counter al-Shabaab in Somalia and provide space for political progress. This includes
pre-deployment training, provision of military equipment, and advisors on the ground. Additionally, the
United States has provided more than $455 million in U.S contributions for the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), thereby bolstering
support to African Union forces.
Kevin Knodell writes in September of 2016 that
Kevin Knodell, 9-12-2016, "The African Union Still Needs the West’s Help in Somalia," Medium,
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-african-union-still-needs-the-wests-help-in-somalia9c6c5936be26 //DY
AMISOM has been hailed as an African solution to an African problem. The force has indeed made strides in recent
years. Violence is down in Somalia. But AMISOM is far from self-sustaining. Yes, African troops do the fighting. But
the force couldn’t function without financial and logistical support from Western countries including the
United States. AMISOM’s dependence on Western powers became plainly evident in 2016 when the
European Union slashed funding for the mission. Political violence in Burundi — one of AMISOM’s troop-contributing
countries — prompted the European Union to withhold support. The union hoped the move would force Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza
to talk to his opponents. The main result for AMISOM — missing paychecks. The African Union extended AMISOM’s mandate, but both Kenya
and Uganda threatened to withdraw their soldiers from the force. The long-running mission has seen troops from several African countries
chase down Al Shabab terrorists while also training Somali security forces, all in an effort to prop up Somalia’s fledgling government. Any
softening of Western support for AMISOM could have a knock-on effect on Somalia’s newfound stability. Burundian troops patrol the town of
Biyo Adde on March 7, 2016. AMISOM photo Despite being a “peacekeeping” mission, AMISOM has fought bloody gun battles with militants
and endured frequent bombings and ambushes. Ugandan soldiers have been involved in some of the most intensive fighting. Uganda was the
first country to send troops — in 2007. They took over from Ethiopian troops who had seized part of Mogadishu in an invasion aimed at ousting
the ruling Islamic Courts Union. The ICU’s collapse gave rise to Al Shabaab. Ugandan forces focused their efforts on securing main roads and
port facilities in order to allow aid and commerce to resume. Al Shabaab fought them at every turn. Eventually AMISOM drove out the
militants, lending Mogadishu a degree of security and prosperity the city had not seen in decades. But Somalia’s often austere conditions and
the lack roads in the countryside — as well as the winding roads of crowded Mogadishu — mean logistics are a challenge for AMISOM. And even
as troops drive Al Shabaab out of cities, the militants, now based in rural areas, continue to pose a threat to the Somali government as well as
to neighboring countries. British troops arrived in Somalia under a U.N. banner in the spring of 2016 with the mission of providing AMISOM
with engineering, medical, logistical and counter-IED support. Sustained
U.S. and British assistance could go a long way
toward making up for the European Union’s cutbacks — and could have the effect of stabilizing
AMISOM. On Sept. 20, 2016, Britain’s new prime minister Theresa May pledged to deploy more British troops, some of whom are likely to
advise Somali and A.U. forces outside Mogadishu. “Since 2010, with huge support from across the region, and critically the commitment of
Somalis themselves, Al Shabaab has been driven from all the major cities it used to control,” May told the U.N. General Assembly. “It is vital
that as an international community we continue to support countries in the region that are contributing thousands of troops, and that we
continue to build the capacity of Somali security forces.” The British troops are set to be advisers and aren’t expected to engage in direct
combat. But Western troops have seen combat against Al Shabaab. American commandos, sometimes working with AMISOM, have tracked
down militant leaders and launched raids against insurgents’ rural strongholds. American special operations forces and the CIA have also been
quietly training the Somali government’s new counterterror units. Still, Al Shabaab endures. At the end of August, suicide bombing by militants
killed 20 people in Mogadishu. The group has also urged followers to kill members of the new parliament taking part in next month’s elections.
Somalia is getting better. But it still needs AMISOM. And AMISOM still needs its supporters in the West.
Which is key for 2 reasons
First is new elections.
the UN security council finds on may 17th that
UN security Council, may 17th 2017, "Somalia’s Election Outcome Hailed as Unique Chance to Overcome
Insecurity, Humanitarian Crisis, as Security Council Considers Latest Developments," No Publication,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12826.doc.htm //DY
Somalia’s peaceful election of a new President had opened a unique opportunity to surmount
entrenched insecurity, political and humanitarian challenges and create a functional State in the
coming four years, a senior United Nations official told the Security Council today. Urging international support to help the Somali
authorities realize that vision, Raisedon Zenenga, the Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, said that country’s Federal
Government and the leaders of its federal member states had concluded a political agreement on the national security architecture. That
framework defined the size, structure, composition, command-and-control structure and financing for Somalia’s security forces. “The
significance of that agreement is enormous,” he said by video link from Mogadishu, offering a model for other political agreements on
management of natural resources, sharing of revenue, and definition of the Federal Government’s powers, as well as those of the federal
member states. Reached two months into the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, the accord should be coupled with an
agreement defining a federal model for the justice and corrections sector, he added. Describing
insecurity caused by AlShabaab as the biggest challenge, he said fighting the group require[s]d offensive operations by the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army, alongside partners in a position to undertake special counter-terrorism
operations. Efforts must also be made to extend State authority, address deficits in governance and resolve local conflicts, he emphasized.
Second is shifting mandates. Guy Martin finds on june 6th that
Guy Martin, 6-6-2017, "ISS: AMISOM needs a mandate for peace and development," No Publication,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48036:iss-
amisom-needs-a-mandate-for-peace-and-development&catid=56:diplomacy-apeace&Itemid=111 //DY
The mandate of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia ( AMISOM) officially expires today, 31 May. Although the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)
extended the mission’s role until 30 November, its future, lies in the hands of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A joint AU-UN strategic review of the 10year mission – which has been both praised for its good work done under challenging circumstances and criticised for not having done enough – will influence the
UNSC’s decision. UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted both in March, and again this month at the London Conference on Somalia, that AMISOM ‘is underequipped in relation to the needs … but it has been doing remarkable work in very precarious conditions’, and it has been ‘fighting to protect our global security …
under a Security Council mandate, without enough support and with unpredictable funding’. Despite these challenges, the mission – the biggest-ever AU-led peace
operation to be authorised by the UNSC – has
laid the foundation for improved governance, security and peace in
Somalia by ejecting al-Shabaab from major urban centres and continuing to limit its violent activities.
And in its last push to defeat the extremist group before the mission’s planned total withdrawal from Somalia
by 2020, AMISOM continues to seek financial and logistical support. The mission is unique in that it is
entirely dependent on unreliable funding from partners and donors; its main troop contributors are Somalia’s neighbours –
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – who all have security interests in the country; and it is engaged in an all-out war with al-Shabaab. Based on these challenges,
AMISOM has seen both major success and outright failure over the past decade, compounded by severe losses in manpower. Some speculate that AMISOM’s
sacrifices total more than the UN’s losses over 70 years of peacekeeping operations. While the mission has been praised, it has also received criticism for not having
done enough in terms of building the capacity of Somalia’s institutions, especially regarding governance, security and justice. The challenge to secure areas
recovered from al-Shabaab and hand over primary responsibilities to Somali security actors continues to vex the mission because of the gap in institution-building.
But to be fair, has AMISOM been given the proper mandate and capability to do so? According to UNSC Resolution 2297 of 7 July 2016, AMISOM has been
authorised, with 22 126 uniformed personnel, to take all necessary measures to reduce security threats posed by al-Shabaab, provide security to enable political
processes, stabilisation, reconciliation and peacebuilding, and engage with communities in areas recovered from al-Shabaab, within its capabilities. In this sense,
[however], it could be argued that AMISOM doesn’t have the proper mandate or capacity to support the
establishment and enhancement of Somalia’s institutions, which are vital for state rebuilding.
Recognising this gap, the AU has requested more support and recommended that the UN enhance the
role of AMISOM’s substantive civilian component. Given the failed state of Somalia, AMISOM should have been given a comprehensive
mandate that goes beyond just providing security. It should include helping to build state institutions, strengthening rule of law and justice, supporting
peacebuilding, facilitating reconciliation of conflicts among the divided clans and sub-clans, monitoring human rights, and coordinating humanitarian support. The
mission is heavily military-focused because its mandated task is just to provide security and fight al-Shabaab. Other UN-led missions – such as those in Darfur and
South Sudan – are often given more comprehensive mandates with more appropriate financial and logistical capacity. These missions also have a mandate to
coordinate donors, development partners and humanitarian agencies in the host countries. The questions over AMISOM’s mandate also tie in to recent
developments at
the London Conference on Somalia earlier this month, where two important road maps were
endorsed: a Security Pact (SP) and a New Partnership for Somalia (NPS). The former [to] focuses on rebuilding Somalia-led security
institutions, while the latter outlines how the international community and Somalia’s government will work together to meet the country’s most pressing
needs. These road maps will help move Somalia back from the abyss if they are well managed and implemented in a unified way. The SP acknowledges the
interdependence of security, politics and development. This means comprehensive and coordinated efforts with a unified management and leadership are needed.
However, both road maps want to establish separate implementing bodies, and their relationship with AMISOM is not clear. For the NPS, a high-level forum of
international partners together with the Somali government’s Development and Reconstruction Facility are intended to provide overall direction and delivery. In the
SP’s case, the aim is to establish an international security advisory team to work with Somalia’s national security council. The road maps also talk about a conditionsbased transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somalia’s security institutions, but they don’t say how these conditions can be met. It would seem that
the conditions are the defeat of al-Shabaab and other extremist groups, and the ability of Somalia’s security institutions to do the job. This means that working
closely with AMISOM is key to implementing the road maps. A strong single entity that brings together all stakeholders and partners is essential for implementing
the London road maps. AMISOM is best placed to take on this role and help build peace and development in Somalia. It has vast experience and is essential to
Somalia’s security. What it needs is a mandate from the UNSC to go beyond security and fighting al-Shabaab, along with reliable funding, just like other UN-led
peace operations in Africa.
2. Aiding and Abetting
Veronique De Rugy finds in January of 2015 that, frequently,
De Rugy, Veronique. "Foreign Aid is a Failure.” Reason. January 2015. Web. 3 May 2017.
<http://reason.com/archives//foreign-aid-is-a-failure>. //DY
Aid providers also have trouble figuring out which investments are most appropriate for a particular developing economy, so money ends up
being poured into bad projects. These white elephants not only fail to encourage economic growth but frequently divert scarce resources to
destructive ends. Aid
money becomes a tool of oppression rather than empowerment. As Moyo put it in a 2009
"A constant stream of 'free' money is a perfect way to keep an inefficient or
simply bad government in power." New York University's Bill Easterly does an excellent job describing international organizations'
Wall Street Journal essay, [since]
tendency to double down on their failures in his 2008 book The White Man's Burden. Like governments, multilateral aid institutions can suffer
from central-planning paralysis, which makes it difficult to isolate mistakes and find ways to better serve their "clients."
[creating a
situation where] Foreign aid suffers from a principal-agent problem, in which organizations prioritize
donors' political and commercial interests over recipients' needs. In 2012, for example, Egypt received $1.3 billion in
U.S. military aid. Most of those funds flowed through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a program that provides foreign governments with
grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment and services. One of the program's objectives, according to the State Department, is to
"support the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services."
For example, Tonny Onyulo finds on april 17th that
Tonny Onyulo, 4-17-2017, "Somalis walk for days searching for food and water while al-Shabab blocks
aid," Public Radio International, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-14/drought-ravaged-somalis-walkdays-searching-food-and-water-while-al-shabab-blocks
Somalia’s drought may be devastating, but much of the suffering is man-made. While Somali forces have curtailed the
reach of the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group Al-Shabab, the militants continue to carry out attacks in Mogadishu and still control
swaths of the Somali countryside. And that means they control food and access. “I have not been receiving
food aid from anybody,” Ahmed said of the conditions back home. “Accessing food aid is a problem because al-Shabab
always block roads used by vehicles transporting the aid. They steal food and kill occupants.” Al-Shabab claims to be
distributing aid to Somalis living under its control. Meanwhile, aid agencies say militants are denying them access to those areas. [in fact]
Earlier this month, al-Shabab kidnapped four aid workers employed by the World Health Organization.
Earlier this month, Mohamed gave al-Shabab militants 60 days to surrender in exchange for amnesty, education, training and employment. On
April 9, the group carried out a suicide attack at a government building in the Mogadishu that killed seven people. The following day, another
bombing killed a municipal worker in the city. "Terror attacks have become frequent and all Somali forces were on the state of alertness to
combat insecurity and terror," said Mohamed in response to the April 9 incident.
Which is why Daniel Fiott indicates in 2013 that
Daniel Fiott, Web. 3 Dec. 2013. <http://www.ies.be/files/2013- 02_Sahel.pdf>.
“Before any longer-term focus on economic development, political inclusion and government accountability can be achieved in the region
the immediate concern is restoring security. Without
security, there can be no sustainable political and economic
development – but security will depend on a legitimate political process. While the French prevented a bad situation from getting much
worse through Operation Serval, the immediate military phase is about ensuring security while the French withdraw militarily from the country.
French military withdrawal from Mali raises many questions about whether AFISMA is able to fill the security vacuum that will be left. One must
also question the Malian army’s abilities to regain full control of the North of the country, and whether they will be prepared to engage rebel
groups if they resort to asymmetric tactics.”
As a result, prioritizing humanitarian aid in the status quo has two distinct impacts.
First, killing the local economy. Ibrahim Anoba finds on may 24 th that
Ibrahim B. Anoba, 5-24-2017, "How Foreign Aid Hurts Famine Relief in Somalia," No Publication,
https://fee.org/articles/how-foreign-aid-hurts-famine-relief-in-somalia/
Unfortunately, what
starts off as well-intentioned giving often results in job losses for the local shopkeepers and
an even weaker economy overall. Continuously giving away free stuff causes local businesses to confront
a much tougher market, as they must compete with international donations to provide Somalis with goods and
services. In Somalia, these conditions have increased unemployment and forced many to venture into
agriculture, which often suffers during periods of drought. Likewise, terrorism is another hindrance to aid for Somalia.
The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabab has perpetrated over 360 attacks, targeting government officials and aid workers. Not only did these threats
prompt monitoring agencies to withdraw from the country, but insurgents also seized relief materials to use as weapons and to deny them
from reaching their intended recipients. Corrupt politicians get involved too, and worsen the situation by allocating donated goods to insurgent
groups. For instance in 2014, the SEMG reported that presidential advisor Musa Mohamed Ganjab unofficially diverted frozen government
assets and weapons to Al-Shabab. Ganjab denied the allegation.
Second is stolen aid, as Nancy qian quantifies in 2014 that
Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian 2014.. "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict." American Economic Review 104.6
(2014): 1630-666. Web. 2 May 2017.
<https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf>. //DY
“They highlight the ease with which armed factions and opposition groups appropriate humanitarian aid, which is often physically
transported
over long distances through territories only weakly controlled by the recipient government. Reports indicate that up
to 80
percent of aid can be stolen en route (Polman 2010, p. 121). [and] Even if aid reaches its intended recipients,
it can still be confiscated by armed groups, against whom the recipients are typically powerless. In addition, it is difficult to
exclude members of local militia groups from being direct recipients if they are also malnourished and qualify to receive aid. In all these cases,
aid ultimately perpetuates conflict”
Inherency
Current Threat
Kenya currently receives significant counterterrorism support from the US
Peter Kirechu, 8-4-2016, "Kenya's Counterterrorism Approach is Floundering," National Interest,
›http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kenyas-counterterrorism-approach-floundering-17247 // DY
Kenya is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Through both State
and Defense Department accounts, the Kenyan government has received over $141 million in security assistance
funds since 2010­—an amount that rose to $100 million in 2015 alone. Most of this financing is directed
towards counterterrorism support, but despite substantial increases in training and equipment,
concerns abound with woeful professionalism in Kenya’s military and security forces. Both security institutions
are hampered by persistent allegations of human rights violations and entrenched corruption—both to the detriment of Kenya’s national
security, and the general well-being of Kenya’s Somali population. In the past decade, the United States has helped bolster Kenya’s domestic
security and military capacity, assisting in the development of the National Intelligence Service­—Kenya’s domestic and foreign intelligence
service—the General Service Unit, a paramilitary reserve unit primarily deployed to respond to civil disorders, and the Anti-Terror Police Unit
(ATPU)—a specialized police unit tasked with counterterror responses. These domestic security and military services serve at the forefront of
Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts against a capable enemy in Al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab’s action inside Kenya spills into Somalia – change needed to counter
terror.
Peter Kirechu, 8-4-2016, "Kenya's Counterterrorism Approach is Floundering," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kenyas-counterterrorism-approach-floundering-17247 // LH
Ultimately, Al
Shabaab’s ability to wage a costly terrorism campaign inside Kenya aids its ambitions inside
Somalia. And as long as professionalism within Kenya’s security establishment lags and the propensity to
criminalize Kenya’s Somali population remains, Al Shabaab will benefit from a reservoir of disaffected
and aggrieved Somalis, vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization. Above all, unless the United States is
willing to condition its assistance to improvements in human-rights conduct, Kenya’s ability to defend
and deter Al Shabaab’s attacks within its borders will remain inadequate.
Inherency: terror up in the squo
Salem Solomon, 1-19-2017, "Counterterrorism Efforts Dominated Africa Policy During Obama Years,"
VOA, http://www.voanews.com/a/counterterrorism-efforts-dominated-africa-policy-during-obamayears/3676860.html // DY
By most measures, Africa is safer today than it has been in the modern era: Diseases are less deadly and
wars are less frequent. But recent years have also been marked by a rise in radical extremism on the
continent, and the terror threat could derail some of the world's fastest-growing economies. Dealing with the spread of radicalization has been a central focus
of U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy during his time in office. Few areas have been spared over the past eight years,
with much of the continent living in the shadow of a violent extremist group: [including] al-Shabab in
Somalia and East Africa, Islamic State (IS) in Libya, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa, and
Boko Haram in Nigeria.
Al-Shabaab is biggest terrorist threat, with attacks up by 1000%
Alexa Liautaud, 6-2-2017, "Al-Shabaab replaces Boko Haram as Africa’s deadliest terror group," No
Publication, https://news.vice.com/story/al-shabaab-replaces-boko-haram-as-africas-deadliest-terrorgroup //DY
Somalia’s al-Shabaab was the deadliest terrorist organization in Africa in 2016, ending Boko Haram’s four-year
reign. The Somali terror group killed 4,281 people in 2016, with a high concentration of attacks taking place in the capital Mogadishu, according
to new data compiled by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and first reported by
Quartz. Boko Haram killed 3,499. Since forming in 2006, al-Shabaab has carried out more than 360 attacks in Somalia. The terror group’s
resiliency has proved an obstacle for the country’s new president and worsened its numerous humanitarian issues. Recently, the U.S. military
signaled a push toward greater counterterrorism action against al-Shabaab in Somalia, including authorizing unilateral action for ground
operations and the use of airstrikes. In April, the U.S. deployed dozens of troops to assist the Somali government’s national army in its fight
against the Islamist extremist group. The rise of al-Shabaab parallels the declining capacity of Boko Haram to maintain territorial control, which
has been further exacerbated by mounting military pressure from the Nigerian government and an internal split into two factions. “We have
seen Boko Haram in a declining capability to gain such ‘control’ and relying on, for example, more suicide bombers,” said Jasmine Opperman,
the director of Southern Africa Operations at Terrorism, Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). Boko Haram remains a major terror threat
throughout Africa’s Lake Chad region, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In the past six years, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram
accumulated a combined body count far higher than that of ISIS and al-Qaida combined, according to ACLED and the African Center for
Strategic Studies. Between 2010 and 2016, the two terror groups racked up more than 47,000 fatalities while ISIS, al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb, and other al-Qaida linked groups totaled 9,236. [and
that] The total number of terror attacks on the African
continent has increased by 1,000 percent in the past 10 years, according to a report by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
The foundation found that the uptick is largely fueled by declining economic prospects for African youth, as well as unemployment and social
isolation. Between 2006 and 2015, terror attacks rose from about 100 per year to nearly 2,000, according to data from the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. And in documents obtained by VICE News, Donald Bolduc,
the U.S. Army general running special operations command in Africa, warned that “Africa’s
challenges could create a threat
that surpasses the threat that the U.S. currently faces from conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.”
War is Root Cause
The current humanitarian crises could have been prevented if not for war
Jane Ferguson, 6-1-2017, "20 million starving to death: inside the worst famine since World War II," Vox,
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/6/1/15653970/south-sudan-hunger-crisis-famine //DY
When war came to 15-year-old Rebecca Riak Chol’s small town in rural South Sudan in early April, she and 27 other villagers fled into nearby
marshlands to hide. They spent two grueling weeks slowly making their way to the relative safety of a region controlled by rebels from her
same tribe. They were constantly hungry, constantly thirsty, and constantly in danger of being killed by the troops trying to hunt them down.
Chol’s sister died along the way, but it wasn’t because she was found and shot. Instead, she — like growing numbers of South Sudanese — died
from starvation. “We didn’t have anything to dig with to bury her, so we just put grass on the body and left it there,” Chol told me during a
conversation in the schoolyard of her new home in the small town of Thoahnom Payam. Two school buildings with mud walls and tin roofs
flanked the dry dirt yard. In the center was an unused volleyball net. One of Chol’s classmates, 16-year-old Marco Nuer, arrived here in
February from a different violence-ravaged part of the country. Like Chol, he paid an enormous price: His father, brother, and sister starved to
death along the way. He and his mother were the only ones to survive. The two stories are tragically common in South
Sudan, which is
facing mass hunger on a scale unimaginable in almost every other part of the world. In February, the United Nations
estimated that 100,000 South Sudanese were starving, and that 5 million more — 42 percent of the country’s
population — have such limited access to proper food that they don’t know where their next meal is coming from. More recent
figures are not available yet, but aid agencies fear the situation could be much worse now. There are two things you need to understand about
the famine decimating South Sudan, the world’s newest country and one that came into existence largely because of enormous assistance from
the US. First, South Sudan isn’t the only country in the region facing mass starvation. [and]
A potentially historic famine is also
threatening Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Far from Western eyes and far from the headlines, an estimated 20 million people in those
four countries are at risk of dying due to a lack of food. A makeshift grave by the side of the road in Juba, South Sudan. A makeshift grave in
Juba, South Sudan. The UN has already officially declared a full-fledged famine in parts of South Sudan and warned that the other three
countries will suffer mass death from food and water shortages if “prompt and sustained humanitarian intervention” doesn’t happen soon.
Second, these
famines weren’t caused by natural disasters like crop failures or droughts. They were
man-made — the direct result of the bloody wars and insurgencies raging in all four countries. The upshot is that
[meaning] the current famines, unlike others in recent history, could have potentially been prevented. Washington,
which has been slow to act, seems to finally be taking steps to help fight the famine. The Trump administration proposed massive funding cuts
to America’s humanitarian food aid, but Congress rejected those cuts and instead allocated close to $1 billion in new funding. In a recent
interview with Vox, Michael Bowers, the vice president of humanitarian leadership and response for the aid group Mercy Corps, said the
current famine was “entirely avoidable.” “It’s entirely a man-made construct right now, and that means we have it within our power to stop
that,” he said. “Wars are hard to stop; famines are not.” On the ground here in South Sudan, the civil war that has left millions on the brink of
starvation shows no signs of ending anytime soon. And that means the numbers of men, women, and children dying from lack of food will
continue to increase into the indefinite future. In the intensive care unit of an International Medical Corps hospital in the capital city of Juba,
the beds are occupied by the tiny, skeletal frames of malnourished children. The building is a simple temporary structure made of cinderblocks
and plywood. Although children under 5 years old are the most vulnerable to malnutrition and the infections it can cause in small bodies, they
are also incredibly resilient and almost always bounce back if fed high-calorie foods and given proper medicine. The problem is that huge
numbers of South Sudanese children aren’t getting that type of food. Many, in fact, aren’t getting food of any kind. Most famines are caused by
nature. These are caused by war. Many American adults first learned about the very idea of an African famine in 1985, when Lionel Richie and
Michael Jackson brought together some of the biggest stars in rock and pop music to record a song called “We Are the World.” It was part of an
effort to raise money to fight a famine that killed a million people in Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985. The song — which also included stars like
Stevie Wonder, Paul Simon, Tina Turner, Bruce Springsteen, and Willie Nelson — eventually sold an astounding 20 million copies and raised
more than $10 million for relief caused largely by a devastating drought in the impoverished country. The crisis in the 1980s pales in
comparison to the famine happening today. Because it isn’t just happening in one country; it’s happening in four. Take Nigeria, where a bloody
insurgency by the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram has created a growing humanitarian disaster. Since the group declared war on the
country’s central government in 2009, millions of civilians — including huge numbers of farmers — have been forced from their homes to
escape the group’s campaign of suicide bombings and kidnappings. With the agricultural systems of hard-hit areas in near collapse because of
the fighting, the UN estimates that at least 4.8 million people are in need of urgent food assistance. Map including Nigeria, South Sudan,
Somalia, and Yemen. Javier Zarracina/Vox Somalia, long synonymous with civil war and hunger, risks suffering its second famine of the past five
years alone. The
UN says that more than 6 million Somalis — fully half the country’s population — need
food aid. The problem is that [but] the government of Somalia doesn’t control huge swaths of the country.
Much of it is still run by te Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. The ongoing conflict between the
government in Mogadishu and the al-Qaeda-aligned group has devastated the economy and made
[making] it far harder to bring aid into the country
AMISOM Good
Definition
AMISOM is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union
with the approval of the United Nations.
African Union Mission In Somalia Peacekeeping Mission, 2017, “AMISOM Background”, http://amisomau.org/amisom-background/ // MP
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by
the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security
Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006.IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations
Security Council.
The goal includes, but is not limited to: reducing AL Shabaab’s threat, providing
security, passing authority to Somalia, and ensuring a free elctioral process in Somalia.
African Union Mission In Somalia Peacekeeping Mission, 2017, “AMISOM Mandate”, http://amisomau.org/amisom-background/ // MP
AMISOM, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, is mandated to: Reduce the threat posed by
Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. Provide security in order to enable the political process
at all levels as well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia. Enable the
gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent
on abilities of the Somali security forces. To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab
and other armed opposition groups. To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM
Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across
Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces. To assist with the free movement, safe passage
and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the
security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement.
Current Response
Obama Administration used AMISOM to counter terrorist threat
whitehouse.gov, August 6th 2014, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,"
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-supportpeacekeeping-africa //DY
To help combat terrorism in Somalia and support the Somali Federal Government’s efforts to build security and stability, the
United States has committed to provide more than $512 million to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to build capacity to counter al-Shabaab in Somalia and provide space for political progress. This includes
pre-deployment training, provision of military equipment, and advisors on the ground. Additionally, the
United States has provided more than $455 million in U.S contributions for the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), thereby bolstering
support to African Union forces.
AMISOM is effective, but needs US support
Kevin Knodell, 9-12-2016, "The African Union Still Needs the West’s Help in Somalia," Medium,
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-african-union-still-needs-the-wests-help-in-somalia9c6c5936be26 //DY
AMISOM has been hailed as an African solution to an African problem. The force has indeed made strides in recent
years. Violence is down in Somalia. But AMISOM is far from self-sustaining. Yes, African troops do the fighting. But
the force couldn’t function without financial and logistical support from Western countries including the
United States. AMISOM’s dependence on Western powers became plainly evident in 2016 when the
European Union slashed funding for the mission. Political violence in Burundi — one of AMISOM’s troop-contributing
countries — prompted the European Union to withhold support. The union hoped the move would force Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza
to talk to his opponents. The main result for AMISOM — missing paychecks. The African Union extended AMISOM’s mandate, but both Kenya
and Uganda threatened to withdraw their soldiers from the force. The long-running mission has seen troops from several African countries
chase down Al Shabab terrorists while also training Somali security forces, all in an effort to prop up Somalia’s fledgling government. Any
softening of Western support for AMISOM could have a knock-on effect on Somalia’s newfound stability. Burundian troops patrol the town of
Biyo Adde on March 7, 2016. AMISOM photo Despite being a “peacekeeping” mission, AMISOM has fought bloody gun battles with militants
and endured frequent bombings and ambushes. Ugandan soldiers have been involved in some of the most intensive fighting. Uganda was the
first country to send troops — in 2007. They took over from Ethiopian troops who had seized part of Mogadishu in an invasion aimed at ousting
the ruling Islamic Courts Union. The ICU’s collapse gave rise to Al Shabaab. Ugandan forces focused their efforts on securing main roads and
port facilities in order to allow aid and commerce to resume. Al Shabaab fought them at every turn. Eventually AMISOM drove out the
militants, lending Mogadishu a degree of security and prosperity the city had not seen in decades. But Somalia’s often austere conditions and
the lack roads in the countryside — as well as the winding roads of crowded Mogadishu — mean logistics are a challenge for AMISOM. And even
as troops drive Al Shabaab out of cities, the militants, now based in rural areas, continue to pose a threat to the Somali government as well as
to neighboring countries. British troops arrived in Somalia under a U.N. banner in the spring of 2016 with the mission of providing AMISOM
with engineering, medical, logistical and counter-IED support. Sustained
U.S. and British assistance could go a long way
toward making up for the European Union’s cutbacks — and could have the effect of stabilizing
AMISOM. On Sept. 20, 2016, Britain’s new prime minister Theresa May pledged to deploy more British troops, some of whom are likely to
advise Somali and A.U. forces outside Mogadishu. “Since 2010, with huge support from across the region, and critically the commitment of
Somalis themselves, Al Shabaab has been driven from all the major cities it used to control,” May told the U.N. General Assembly. “It is vital
that as an international community we continue to support countries in the region that are contributing thousands of troops, and that we
continue to build the capacity of Somali security forces.” The British troops are set to be advisers and aren’t expected to engage in direct
combat. But Western troops have seen combat against Al Shabaab. American commandos, sometimes working with AMISOM, have tracked
down militant leaders and launched raids against insurgents’ rural strongholds. American special operations forces and the CIA have also been
quietly training the Somali government’s new counterterror units. Still, Al Shabaab endures. At the end of August, suicide bombing by militants
killed 20 people in Mogadishu. The group has also urged followers to kill members of the new parliament taking part in next month’s elections.
Somalia is getting better. But it still needs AMISOM. And AMISOM still needs its supporters in the West.
Elections Could Solve
The new president will only be good if AMISOM is there to help
UN security Council, may 17th 2017, "Somalia’s Election Outcome Hailed as Unique Chance to Overcome
Insecurity, Humanitarian Crisis, as Security Council Considers Latest Developments," No Publication,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12826.doc.htm //DY
Somalia’s peaceful election of a new President had opened a unique opportunity to surmount
entrenched insecurity, political and humanitarian challenges and create a functional State in the
coming four years, a senior United Nations official told the Security Council today. Urging international support to help the Somali
authorities realize that vision, Raisedon Zenenga, the Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, said that country’s Federal
Government and the leaders of its federal member states had concluded a political agreement on the national security architecture. That
framework defined the size, structure, composition, command-and-control structure and financing for Somalia’s security forces. “The
significance of that agreement is enormous,” he said by video link from Mogadishu, offering a model for other political agreements on
management of natural resources, sharing of revenue, and definition of the Federal Government’s powers, as well as those of the federal
member states. Reached two months into the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, the accord should be coupled with an
agreement defining a federal model for the justice and corrections sector, he added. Describing
insecurity caused by AlShabaab as the biggest challenge, he said fighting the group require[s]d offensive operations by the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army, alongside partners in a position to undertake special counter-terrorism
operations. Efforts must also be made to extend State authority, address deficits in governance and resolve local conflicts, he emphasized.
Nation Building
AMISOM is laying foundation for progress but doesn’t have mandate without US
Guy Martin, 6-6-2017, "ISS: AMISOM needs a mandate for peace and development," No Publication,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=48036:issamisom-needs-a-mandate-for-peace-and-development&amp;catid=56:diplomacy-apeace&amp;Itemid=111 //DY
The mandate of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) officially expires today, 31 May. Although the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)
extended the mission’s role until 30 November, its future, lies in the hands of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A joint AU-UN strategic review of the 10year mission – which has been both praised for its good work done under challenging circumstances and criticised for not having done enough – will influence the
UNSC’s decision. UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted both in March, and again this month at the London Conference on Somalia, that AMISOM ‘is underequipped in relation to the needs … but it has been doing remarkable work in very precarious conditions’, and it has been ‘fighting to protect our global security …
under a Security Council mandate, without enough support and with unpredictable funding’. Despite these challenges, the mission – the biggest-ever AU-led peace
operation to be authorised by the UNSC – has
laid the foundation for improved governance, security and peace in
Somalia by ejecting al-Shabaab from major urban centres and continuing to limit its violent activities.
And in its last push to defeat the extremist group before the mission’s planned total withdrawal from Somalia
by 2020, AMISOM continues to seek financial and logistical support. The mission is unique in that it is
entirely dependent on unreliable funding from partners and donors; its main troop contributors are Somalia’s neighbours –
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – who all have security interests in the country; and it is engaged in an all-out war with al-Shabaab. Based on these challenges,
AMISOM has seen both major success and outright failure over the past decade, compounded by severe losses in manpower. Some speculate that AMISOM’s
sacrifices total more than the UN’s losses over 70 years of peacekeeping operations. While the mission has been praised, it has also received criticism for not having
done enough in terms of building the capacity of Somalia’s institutions, especially regarding governance, security and justice. The challenge to secure areas
recovered from al-Shabaab and hand over primary responsibilities to Somali security actors continues to vex the mission because of the gap in institution-building.
But to be fair, has AMISOM been given the proper mandate and capability to do so? According to UNSC Resolution 2297 of 7 July 2016, AMISOM has been
authorised, with 22 126 uniformed personnel, to take all necessary measures to reduce security threats posed by al-Shabaab, provide security to enable political
processes, stabilisation, reconciliation and peacebuilding, and engage with communities in areas recovered from al-Shabaab, within its capabilities. In this sense,
[however], it could be argued that AMISOM doesn’t have the proper mandate or capacity to support the
establishment and enhancement of Somalia’s institutions, which are vital for state rebuilding.
Recognising this gap, the AU has requested more support and recommended that the UN enhance the
role of AMISOM’s substantive civilian component. Given the failed state of Somalia, AMISOM should have been given a comprehensive
mandate that goes beyond just providing security. It should include helping to build state institutions, strengthening rule of law and justice, supporting
peacebuilding, facilitating reconciliation of conflicts among the divided clans and sub-clans, monitoring human rights, and coordinating humanitarian support. The
mission is heavily military-focused because its mandated task is just to provide security and fight al-Shabaab. Other UN-led missions – such as those in Darfur and
South Sudan – are often given more comprehensive mandates with more appropriate financial and logistical capacity. These missions also have a mandate to
coordinate donors, development partners and humanitarian agencies in the host countries. The questions over AMISOM’s mandate also tie in to recent
developments at
the London Conference on Somalia earlier this month, where two important road maps were
endorsed: a Security Pact (SP) and a New Partnership for Somalia (NPS). The former [to] focuses on rebuilding Somalia-led security
institutions, while the latter outlines how the international community and Somalia’s government will work together to meet the country’s most pressing
needs. These road maps will help move Somalia back from the abyss if they are well managed and implemented in a unified way. The SP acknowledges the
interdependence of security, politics and development. This means comprehensive and coordinated efforts with a unified management and leadership are needed.
However, both road maps want to establish separate implementing bodies, and their relationship with AMISOM is not clear. For the NPS, a high-level forum of
international partners together with the Somali government’s Development and Reconstruction Facility are intended to provide overall direction and delivery. In the
SP’s case, the aim is to establish an international security advisory team to work with Somalia’s national security council. The road maps also talk about a conditionsbased transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somalia’s security institutions, but they don’t say how these conditions can be met. It would seem that
the conditions are the defeat of al-Shabaab and other extremist groups, and the ability of Somalia’s security institutions to do the job. This means that working
closely with AMISOM is key to implementing the road maps. A strong single entity that brings together all stakeholders and partners is essential for implementing
the London road maps. AMISOM is best placed to take on this role and help build peace and development in Somalia. It has vast experience and is essential to
Somalia’s security. What it needs is a mandate from the UNSC to go beyond security and fighting al-Shabaab, along with reliable funding, just like other UN-led
peace operations in Africa.
Aid Bad
Aid keeps inefficient and corrupt governments in power
De Rugy, Veronique. "Foreign Aid is a Failure.” Reason. January 2015. Web. 3 May 2017.
<http://reason.com/archives//foreign-aid-is-a-failure>. //DY
Aid providers also have trouble figuring out which investments are most appropriate for a particular developing economy, so money ends up
being poured into bad projects. These white elephants not only fail to encourage economic growth but frequently divert scarce resources to
destructive ends. Aid
money becomes a tool of oppression rather than empowerment. As Moyo put it in a 2009
"A constant stream of 'free' money is a perfect way to keep an inefficient or
simply bad government in power." New York University's Bill Easterly does an excellent job describing international organizations'
Wall Street Journal essay, [since]
tendency to double down on their failures in his 2008 book The White Man's Burden. Like governments, multilateral aid institutions can suffer
from central-planning paralysis, which makes it difficult to isolate mistakes and find ways to better serve their "clients."
[Foreign aid
suffers from a principal-agent problem, in which organizations prioritize donors' political and
commercial interests over recipients' needs. In 2012, for example, Egypt received $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid. Most of
those funds flowed through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a program that provides foreign governments with grants for the acquisition of
U.S. defense equipment and services. One of the program's objectives, according to the State Department, is to "support the U.S. industrial
base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services."
Aid is controlled by Al-Shabaab, so civilians do not benefit from it
Tonny Onyulo, 4-17-2017, "Somalis walk for days searching for food and water while al-Shabab blocks
aid," Public Radio International, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-14/drought-ravaged-somalis-walkdays-searching-food-and-water-while-al-shabab-blocks
Somalia’s drought may be devastating, but much of the suffering is man-made. While Somali forces have curtailed the
reach of the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group Al-Shabab, the militants continue to carry out attacks in Mogadishu and still control
swaths of the Somali countryside. And that means they control food and access. “I have not been receiving
food aid from anybody,” Ahmed said of the conditions back home. “Accessing food aid is a problem because al-Shabab
always block roads used by vehicles transporting the aid. They steal food and kill occupants.” Al-Shabab claims to be
distributing aid to Somalis living under its control. Meanwhile, aid agencies say militants are denying them access to those areas. [in fact]
Earlier this month, al-Shabab kidnapped four aid workers employed by the World Health Organization.
Earlier this month, Mohamed gave al-Shabab militants 60 days to surrender in exchange for amnesty, education, training and employment. On
April 9, the group carried out a suicide attack at a government building in the Mogadishu that killed seven people. The following day, another
bombing killed a municipal worker in the city. "Terror attacks have become frequent and all Somali forces were on the state of alertness to
combat insecurity and terror," said Mohamed in response to the April 9 incident.
Security is a pre-requisite to aid
Daniel Fiott, Web. 3 Dec. 2013. <http://www.ies.be/files/2013- 02_Sahel.pdf>.
“Before any longer-term focus on economic development, political inclusion and government accountability can be achieved in the region
the immediate concern is restoring security. Without
security, there can be no sustainable political and economic
development – but security will depend on a legitimate political process. While the French prevented a bad situation from getting much
worse through Operation Serval, the immediate military phase is about ensuring security while the French withdraw militarily from the country.
French military withdrawal from Mali raises many questions about whether AFISMA is able to fill the security vacuum that will be left. One must
also question the Malian army’s abilities to regain full control of the North of the country, and whether they will be prepared to engage rebel
groups if they resort to asymmetric tactics.”
Impact: Hurts Economy
Aid means that people are less likely to buy goods from buisnesses
Ibrahim B. Anoba, 5-24-2017, "How Foreign Aid Hurts Famine Relief in Somalia," No Publication,
https://fee.org/articles/how-foreign-aid-hurts-famine-relief-in-somalia/
Unfortunately, what
starts off as well-intentioned giving often results in job losses for the local shopkeepers and
an even weaker economy overall. Continuously giving away free stuff causes local businesses to confront
a much tougher market, as they must compete with international donations to provide Somalis with goods and
services. In Somalia, these conditions have increased unemployment and forced many to venture into
agriculture, which often suffers during periods of drought. Likewise, terrorism is another hindrance to aid for Somalia.
The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabab has perpetrated over 360 attacks, targeting government officials and aid workers. Not only did these threats
prompt monitoring agencies to withdraw from the country, but insurgents also seized relief materials to use as weapons and to deny them
from reaching their intended recipients. Corrupt politicians get involved too, and worsen the situation by allocating donated goods to insurgent
groups. For instance in 2014, the SEMG reported that presidential advisor Musa Mohamed Ganjab unofficially diverted frozen government
assets and weapons to Al-Shabab. Ganjab denied the allegation.
Impact: Goes to Rebel Groups
80% of aid is stolen
Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian 2014.. "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict." American Economic Review 104.6
(2014): 1630-666. Web. 2 May 2017.
<https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf>. //DY
“They highlight the ease with which armed factions and opposition groups appropriate humanitarian aid, which is often physically
transported
over long distances through territories only weakly controlled by the recipient government. Reports indicate that up
to 80
percent of aid can be stolen en route (Polman 2010, p. 121). [and] Even if aid reaches its intended recipients,
it can still be confiscated by armed groups, against whom the recipients are typically powerless. In addition, it is difficult to
exclude members of local militia groups from being direct recipients if they are also malnourished and qualify to receive aid. In all these cases,
aid ultimately perpetuates conflict”
Porous Borders
Facilitate weapons trade
Porous borders facilitate transport of weapons/terrorists in Kenya/Somalia
Patrick Kimunguyi, 2011," No Publication,
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/radicalisation/files/2013/03/conference-2010-terrorism-counterterrorism-eafrica-pk.pdf // DY
Porous borders represent a major challenge to ensuring security and stability for national
governments in EA. The presence of the state security apparatus is marginal in many border areas,
which reflects a general inability of the governments to enforce order within each country‟s territorial
boundary (Rosand, Millar and Ipe, 2009; Rabasa, 2009). This allows for free movement of people and illicit trade across borders. This is
particularly true in the case of the Kenya – Somalia border, which has not only allowed the movement of refugees
fleeing the conflict in Somalia but also allows movement of terrorist and easy flow of illegal weapons.
Kenya Inherency
Kenya needs international support to stop increasing illegal border traffic
Nima Elbagir, Cnn, 7-24-2015, "Kenya's 'back door': Security threat from porous border," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/24/africa/kenya-back-door-porous-border-security-threat/// DY
Dirt tracks criss-cross the bush, leading through the dusty, rust-colored soil and scrub-dotted no-man's land of northern Kenya and across the
border into Somalia. They're known as "Panya," or "Rat Routes," and they are the paths used by smugglers -- and, we've been told, by AlShabaab militants. This is the "back door" to Kenya. Away from the official border crossings, here there are no government
officials, no checkpoints, no patrols, no security searches: you can bring whoever and whatever you want in and out. One man who spoke to
CNN told us he uses the back-roads regularly, ferrying people back and forth to the Southern Somali port town of Kismayo: No passports, no
questions. That's despite the fact that some of the tracks run just 20 kilometers from a major military base and the Dadaab airstrip. In
the
aftermath of the Al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in September 2013, the Kenyan government
said the militants involved had crossed through from Somalia using the Panya. Kenya struggles with growing terror
threats Kenya struggles with growing terror threats 03:51 Two years on, though, the routes are even busier than
before, in spite of an increased security drive by the government. "We are not denying that there are problems and
there are smugglers in those areas," says Mwenda Njoka, spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, who notes that ensuring proper controls
along the entire length of the 800km border is a "serious challenge." The
government says it plans to build a wall along
the border, put up security cameras, and expand its new border patrol units -- but that it is an
international problem, and needs international support. "There is a boundary that is being constructed around the Kenya
Somali border," says Njoka. "It has been porous for a long time because the previous government have not taken serious action. [But] in the
recent past we have established a border patrol police, a specialist police." But Al-Shabaab's attacks and ambitions have been spilling over into
Kenya with deadly frequency.
Trans-border terrorism problem in East Africa
Henry Isoke, December 2015, THE DILEMMA OF POROUS BORDERS: UGANDA’S EXPERIENCE IN
COMBATING TERRORISM, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790451 // DY
Trans-border terrorism can only be contained through bilateral and regional cooperation.197 In the last
decade, African states and regional bodies have embraced the strategy of regional and international cooperation to combat transnational
terrorist activities. The
threat of terrorism in East Africa is directly related to and influenced by the activities
of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda operating across borders in the Horn of Africa. This chapter examines the regional
framework of counterterrorism in East Africa.198
Drone Strikes
Drones are able to track electronic devices and target leaders during communication –
this decreases the ability of terrorists to communicate
Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice" The Brookings
Institute. 17 June. 2013. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-forwashingtons- weapon-of-choice/ // MP
Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid
attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among
jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders,
however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly
impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al
Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and
risking dead leaders.
Drones decrease American deaths
Jordan, Henry "Drones save U.S. soldiers’ lives" The Washington Post. 09 May 2016..
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/drones-save-us- soldiers-lives/2016/05/09/911b5eec-155611e6-971a-dadf9ab18869_story.html // MP
The pertinent difference is not the means but the reduced risk to U.S. fighters.
It is, of course, politically much easier to “sell”
Americans on drone strikes because, successful or not, they don’t cost American lives. If the author’s objection
is to the loose controls over the use of drone strikes, would that concern not also apply to manned airstrikes and other military actions? Having
spent more than 20 years in the military, I am all in favor of drones. The best definition I ever read of what a soldier does was written by
cartoonist Bill Mauldin : “The
business of a soldier is to kill, wound, or otherwise disable his enemy, as quickly
and effectively as he can, with as little risk as possible to himself.” Drones are great for this purpose.
Alternatives to drones are infeasible and unnecessarily risky
Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice" The Brookings
Institute. 17 June. 2013. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-forwashingtons- weapon-of-choice // MP
Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic. To be
sure, in an ideal world, militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful
information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations. That is why
they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government. But in
war zones or unstable countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, arresting militants is highly dangerous and,
even if successful, often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control
over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there. Worse
yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants. If the United States regularly sent in special operations
forces to hunt down terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists, likely leading to firefights, U.S. casualties, and
possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians.
Econ
Link
Peace is a pre-requisite to economic growth, and counterterrorism creates peace.
Jones, Garrett. "U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth" GMU. Feb. 2011,
https://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/USTroopsGrowthJonesKane // MP
Security Umbrella. Any
military force will tend to provide a foundation of societal peace and stability in most
circumstances, though clearly not all. Such peace is a necessary condition for economic activity to flourish –
especially market forces which depend on the incentives of private property, in law and practice. At its
heart, this is a simple articulation of the enforcement power underlying any effective rule of law. The armed force in this story need not be
American military, or even military. It would, of course, be useful to examine the influence of other military forces (French, British, Soviet) in
contrast to U.S. deployed forces, but that larger question requires data far beyond the capacity of this paper to address.
US presence leads to both an increased demand for goods and a spread of
technologies that contribute to growth.
Kane, Tim. "U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth" Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Feb. 2011,
https://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/USTroopsGrowthJonesKane // MP
Diffusion. A second hypothesis we propose is that the
long-term presence of American troops contribute positively to
the diffusion of cutting-edge technologies and economic institutions. Discipline, lawful authority, respect for human
and economic rights, construction standards – these are just a few of the most likely norms that are on display for any society with an
accessible U.S. military base in its presence. Aggregate Demand. A
third hypothesis we propose is that a large deployment
of U.S. troops involves a major demand stimulus to the local economy. This arguably contributes to the enhancement
of market forces locally, but especially acts as a Keynesian boost to aggregate demand. Especially in a war-torn country recovering from all-out
warfare (Japan, Germany, Korea), this story makes intuitive sense during the immediate post-war recovery period.
Impact: Increase in Growth
A study from 1950-2000 finds that a tenfold increase in US troops leads to a .33%
increase in annual host country growth
Jones, Garrett. "U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth" GMU. Feb. 2011,
https://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/USTroopsGrowthJonesKane // MP
Do American troops help or hinder economic growth in other countries? We
use a newly constructed dataset of the
deployment of U.S. troops over the years 1950- 2000, and discover a positive relationship between deployed troops
and host country economic growth, robust to multiple control variables. Each tenfold increase in U.S. troops is associated
with a one-third percentage point increase in average host country annual growth. We explore three possible
causal explanations: a Keynesian aggregate demand boost, the diffusion of institutions, and security. Extensive econometric testing, including
the use of panel data, confirms the core relationship. The relationship is strongest in the poorest countries.
The spread of terrorism is helped by poverty and despair
Lindsay, James "To Fight Terror, Increase Foreign Aid." Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Feb. 2002,
http://www.cfr.org/foreign-aid/fight-terror- increase-foreign-aid/p6363 // MP
George W. Bush's administration has said from the beginning that the war on terrorism must be fought on many fronts. It is not simply a
military problem. We also need to tackle the tough economic and social problems that enable terrorism to thrive. Secretary of State Colin
Powell told the World Economic Forum in New York: "Terrorism
really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair and
hopelessness, where people see no future. We have to show people who might move in the direction of
terrorism that there is a better way." That is why, as National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice recently told a gathering of
conservative activists, "President Bush and the United States of America are committed to channeling our noble energies into an effort to
encourage development and education and opportunity throughout the world, including the Muslim world."
Corruption
Misuse Aid
Governments in poor nations benefit from keeping aid flows for themselves to
strengthen their power
Williamson, Claudia R. "Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information." The
Review of Austrian Economics, 2009, http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf //
MP
“This supports previous arguments from Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958). They argue that politicians
will not distribute aid in
an effective manner as to achieve the stated goals of the aid programs. The political elite understand that they
will benefit from aid flows by having access to more resources (aid), thus strengthening their relative
positions and keeping them in power.6 As public choice theory would predict, governments of the poor have an incentive to
misappropriate foreign aid in a manner that serves their own self-interest. Fearful that development might bring about their downfall, officials
in these governments have the incentive to use or misuse aid in a manner that promotes their regime maintaining power.”
Governments can use aid to bolster themselves, thus decreasing the need for public
support
Easterly, William. "Was Development Assistance a Mistake?" The American Economic Review. May
2007, http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5524/easterly2007b.pdf // MP
““Aid agencies also have paid surprisingly insufficient attention to the political incentives facing recipient governments, as Todd Moss, Gunilla
Pettersson, and van de Walle (2007) suggest: "Large aid
flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability
because governing elites no longer need to ensure the support of their publics and the assent of their legislatures
when they do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, as long as they keep the donors happy and willing to provide alternative
sources of funding."”
An increase in aid empirically hurts democracy – long term harm.
Djankov, Simeon et al. "The curse of aid." World Bank, Apr. 2005,
https://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/990/870.pdf?sequence=1 // MP
Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the
“curse of natural resources” literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries
in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, if
the foreign aid over GDP
that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the
effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse
than oil.
No Punishment for Corruption
Historical precedent suggest that corrupt governments will continue to get aid
Williamson, Claudia R. "Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information." The
Review of Austrian Economics, 2009. http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf //
MP
"Bauer (2000, p. 43, 48) provides examples of governments engaging in such corrupt behavior but continuing to receive foreign aid flows
despite adopting damaging policies. Examples
of such policies chosen by governments receiving aid include
persecution of productive ethnic minorities, suppression of trade, restriction of foreign capital,
expropriation of property, restrictions on external contracts and domestic mobility, and extensive
economic controls. More specifically are the examples of Ethiopia and the Sudan in the 1980s. The
destructive polices these governments adopted over this time period created massive poverty. This created an environment effective for
eliciting large sums of foreign aid (Bauer 2000).”
Impact: Entrenches Poverty
The impact of corruption disproportionally falls on the poorest people withing a
country, and hurts economic growth
Probe International. "World Bank finds corruption is costing billions in lost development power." Probe
International, Sep. 29, 2004, https://journal.probeinternational.org/2004/09/29/world-bank-findscorruption- is-costing-billions-in-lost-development-power/ // MP
““Mr. Kaufman said that World Bank research had revealed a 400 per cent governance dividend where there was good governance and
corruption was under control. Countries that improve on corruption and the rule of law could expect in the long run a four- fold average
increase in incomes per capita. Thus a country with income per capita of US$2,000 could expect to attain $8,000 in the long run by making
strides in controlling corruption. Similarly, such a country could expect on average a 75 percent reduction in child mortality. “We have also
found” he said, “that the
business sector grows significantly faster where corruption is lower, and property
rights and the rule of law are safeguarded. On average, it can make a difference of about 3 per cent per
year in annual growth for the enterprises.” Another way of looking at the problem is that corruption and bribery is a
regressive tax. Not only do smaller enterprises pay a higher share of their revenue in bribes than their
larger counterparts, but poorer households bear a disproportionate share of the burden, often paying for
public services they expected to be provided free of charge.
Blocks
A2: Aid Good
Aid is bad for five distinct reasons. First, aid could be wasted. Second, it can help keep
bad governments in power. Third, countries may have limited absorptive capacity to
use aid flows effectively if they have relatively few skilled workers, weak infrastructure or constrained delivery systems. Fourth, aid flows can reduce domestic
savings. Fifth, aid flows could undermine private sector incentives for investment or to
improve productivity.
Steven Radelet, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development, A PRIMER ON FOR- EIGN AID, July 2006,
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/Research.html
Aid has no affect on growth, and may actually undermine growth. Peter Bauer was per- haps the most outspoken proponent of this view (e.g.,
Bauer, 1972), although he never provided systematic empirical evidence to support his argument. Many later empirical studies did reach the
conclusion of no relationship between aid and growth,8 which is represented by the middle panel of Figure 3. These researchers have
suggested a variety of reasons why aid might not support growth: First,
aid simply could be wasted, such as on limousines or
presidential palaces, or it could encourage corruption, not just in aid programs but more broadly. Second, it can help keep bad
governments in power, thus helping to perpetuate poor economic policies and postpone reform. Some argue that aid provided to
countries in the midst of war might inadvertently help finance and perpet- uate the conflict, and add to instability. Third, countries may
have limited absorptive capacity to use aid flows effectively if they have relatively few skilled workers,
weak in- frastructure or constrained delivery systems. (Aid could help redress these weaknesses, but it may not be aimed to
do so). Fourth, aid flows can reduce domestic saving, both private saving (through its impact on interest rates) and
government saving (though its impact on government revenue). Fifth, aid flows could undermine private sector
incentives for investment or to improve productivity. Aid can cause the currency to ap- preciate, undermining the
profitability of the production of all tradable goods (known as the Dutch disease). Food aid, if not managed appropriately, can reduce farm
prices and hurt farmer income.
Even if aid isn’t inherently bad, USAID is very poorly managed.
Clifton Wharton, USAID AND FOREIGN AID REFORM, July 26, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
This is not to say that all of USAID’S problems are externally generated or need legis- lation to be corrected. Even with appropriate statutory
goals, USAID
will not succeed if it is poorly managed - and the agency currently has serious internal
problems. For example, USAID’s fiscal and personnel resources are spread too thin. USAID currently maintains a field
presence - at least one permanent employee - in 99 different countries, of which 52 represent either a fully staffed mission or a regional office,
normally with a staff of 12 or more Americans. USAID also operates programs with no permanent staff in an additional 26 countries, not
including countries receiving disaster relief or PL 480 food aid. In addition, USAID currently has a portfolio of 2,226 active projects, a substantial
majority of which are designed and implemented - because of limited per- manent staff -through a complex and cumbersome system of grants
and contracts, each subject to the full panoply of federal procurement regulations and financial oversight. In regard to management of its
headquarters operations, the task force noted two prin- cipal conclusions of the Commission on Foreign Assistance Management, established
under the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1991: USAID has too many lay- ers of management between the Administrator and field
programs, and USAID has suffered from a lack of strong and consistent leadership. The commission’s report also documented an observation,
concurred in by the task force, that the process of designing and implementing policy within USAID is diffuse and uncoordinated. Central
direction and monitoring and compliance of clearly understood agency-wide assistance policies is lacking.
Security threats preclude effective aid because the aid is difficult to deliver.
“Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.” European Union External Action Service. N.p.,
2010. Web. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en. pdf.
In few areas is the interdependence of security and development more clear. The
fragility of governments impacts on the
stability of the region and the ability to combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise.
Poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security threat from terrorist activity
by Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found a sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focussed on Western targets and has evolved
from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region. AQIM resources and operational capacities are significant and growing.
Deteriorating security conditions pose[s] a chal- lenge to development cooperation and restrict the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which in turn exacerbates the vulnerability of the region and its
population.
A2: Soft Power
Soft power has limitations, and is only effective when combined with hard power.
Liaropoulos 10, “Being Hard on Soft Power,” no date given but must be written in 2010 or 2011 because
he cites references published in 2010, http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlanticstudies/1519-being-hard-on-soft-power-.html)
Soft power has been highly criticized as being a rather ineffective and vague concept. Neorealist scholars place
emphasis on hard power, meaning economic and military power and downgrade the role of culture and values in shaping events. Critics argue
that soft power is just a reflection of hard power. States
are able to exercise soft power, only through their hard
power. Only states with a capable military, economic power and industrial strength can claim to exercise soft power effectively. Another
point of criticism is that it is difficult to measure power in general and soft power in particular. By its very nature, soft power is a relative and
intangible concept, that is inherently difficult to quantify. Quantitative metrics can be used to measure elements of hard power like population,
defence expenditure, military assets, gross domestic products and the effects of economic sanctions, but it is tricky to meaure influence,
reputation and cultural power. The lack of a clear conceptual framework on soft power is evident when the latter is translated into public
diplomacy and strategic communication. The way soft power campaigns are conducted depends on the nature of the state that exercises soft
power, the type of message that is transmitted and the nature of the target. Recent cases of soft power operations highlight the fact that
successful application of soft power is rather limited. In Iraq, the United States were unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. The vast
majority of the polulation was against the U.S military occupation and this had a profound effect in the duration and intensity of the
counterinsurgency campaign. The Coalition Forces failed to communicate their message successfully. The reasons for this failure lay in the
nature of both the messenger (U.S / Coalition Forces) and the target (Iraqis). The U.S in general lacked credibility in the Arab World and the
Iraqis were very skeptical of Washington’s intention. The U.S lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi populace and in certain cases
even lost the trust of some of their allies. After years of totalitarianism Iraqis were ill-equipped to value the credibility of information and it was
difficult for the Coalition Forces to counter misinformation in a society that is not culturally receptive to such messages. In addition, the U.S
information campaign had to compete with a rather sophisticated information campaign that took place both inside and outside Iraq. The
insurgents were able to mobilize part of the population and provide a credible anti-American rhetoric. Furthermore, the Iraqi populace was for
the first time exposed to alternative sources of information. In the post-invasion era, the Iraqis had access to satellite television and foreign
news services and as a result, part of the population was alienated and hostile to U.S forces. The occupation clashed the interest of the Iraqi
population that wanted to regain control of their country and viewed the U.S forces as an imperial power that invaded in order to exploit their
natural resources. The
case of Iraq, vividly demonstrates the limitations of soft power. A serious constraint is
that no state, no matter how powerful, can control the information sphere. The U.S did not have the
monopoly on communication and therefore was unable to shape the battlefield of perception in a close
society like Iraq. Responding to misinformation, refuting conspiracy theories, filling information vacuums
and building credibility is not an easy task, even for a hegemon.
This is nonunique, as President Trump’s recent budget cuts have slashed federal
spending on soft power tactics.
Sarah Westwood, 27 March 2017, “Trump's 'soft power' budget cuts draw hard opposition”,
Washington Examiner, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trumps-soft-power-budget-cuts-drawhard-opposition/article/2618259 // MP
Mick Mulvaney, Trump's
budget director, said the administration had shuffled funding around the federal
government to prioritize "hard power" over soft. The $54 billion in spending increases directed mostly
toward the Pentagon would boost military might, the White House has said, and accompanying cuts to
the U.S. Agency for International Development and State Department would dilute the role of "soft
power" tactics such as diplomacy and aid. "Foreign assistance is not charity; it is a pillar of U.S. engagement around the world," Sen. Chris
Coons, D-Del., told the Washington Examiner. "President Trump's budget proposal fails to recognize the effectiveness of these investments and
the importance of diplomacy and development."
A2: Droughts/Famine
Many countries in East Africa have programs that allow them to get money from
sources other than the US government.
Oxford Analytica, “East Africa: Disasters overwhelm regional governments.” 1/10/08
<http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/east-africa-disasters-overwhelm-regional- governments-10-jan2008>.
“Early planning efforts. All of these factors suggested that the region's countries were in urgent need of new, national disaster strategies: Tanzania. The first country in the region to be targeted in this 'new wave' of disaster preparedness funding was Tanzania, which in 2001
received substantial US funds to rejuvenate its moribund Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee. One of the first tasks of the resulting structure -the Strengthening Tanzania Disaster Response Capacity Programme -- was to carry out a comprehensive Disaster Vulnerability Analysis, aimed
at identifying all possible natural disaster risks nationwide. - Kenya. In
2002, the Kenyan government similarly created a
new -- multi-ministry -- National Disaster Policy (NDP), which was initially underwritten by the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) at 350,000 dollars per year. - DRC. Also in 2002, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) set up its own Disaster Preparedness Fund (DPF), initially also funded by the
UN. - Uganda. In 2003, Uganda revised its existing National Disaster Preparedness Policy to create a
distinct Ministry for Disaster Preparedness (within the Office of the Prime Minister).”
Countries can get aid and guidance from the African Union.
Addis Ababa “REPORT OF THE SECOND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION”
African Union 7/19/10 <www.preventionweb.net/files/18570_17947excl589xviireportdisasterriskr.doc>.
“Disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and institutional mechanisms do exist at various degrees of completeness in African countries. However,
their effectiveness is limited. Hence a strategic approach to improving and enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency by emphasizing disaster
risk reduction is needed. To address the issue of disasters comprehensively, the African Union Commission (AUC) /New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), currently NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), African Development Bank (AfDB) and the
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) Africa have
been working together since the beginning
of 2003 to seek ways to provide strategic guidance and direction to mainstream disaster risk reduction
in sustainable development planning and process.”
Solving for conflict can help reduce the negative impact that natural disasters have.
USAID “EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA – DISASTER RISK REDUCTION” 9/30/13
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/eca_drr_fs01_09-30- 2013.pdf>.
East and Central Africa (ECA)—comprising Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda—faces a range of natural disasters and complex
emergencies. Environmental hazards, including disease outbreaks, drought, and floods, negatively impact health, livelihoods, and food security.
In addition,
factors such as conflict, climate variability, slow economic development, political instability, and limited government
capacity can further increase communities’ vulnerability to disasters.
A2: Band Aid Solutions
Humanitarian aid is worse in this regard. In fact, many of the nations who have
received humanitarian aid in the past are now stuck in a cycle of dependency. 66% of
nations receiving aid are long term recepients
“Chapter 7: WHEN AND FOR HOW LONG?” Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. 2015. Web.
<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/06/Chapter-7.pdf>.
Humanitarian assistance may be required to respond quickly but it is rarely a short- term intervention. The
majority goes to the
same countries year after year, due to recurrent or chronic crises, often continuing to provide basic
goods and services where other international or national investments are absent. In 2013, two-thirds
(66%) of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors went to long-term recipients, that is those that had
been in receipt of an above-average share of their ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance for eight years or more. A further 23% went to
medium-term recipients – those meeting the same criteria for between three and seven years. Long- term recipients are also often the largest
recipients – of the 30 longterm and 28 medium-term recipient countries, 19 were among the 20 largest recipients of international humanitarian
assistance in 2013. The three largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2013 – Syria, oPt, and Sudan – are all long- term
recipients. Of the 19 medium- and long-term recipients that featured among the 20 largest humanitarian recipients in 2013, 8 had over a third
of their population living in extreme poverty. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) this was as high as 84%. Average government expenditure
per person to these 19 countries stood at PPP$997 in 2013, significantly lower than the average government expenditure per person to all
other developing countries of PPP$2,444 in the same year.14 However, as Chapters 1 and 8 note, in many of these contexts, national (let alone
sub-national) poverty and expenditure data is missing or pre-dates crises – Syria and Somalia being prime examples.
Negative
Sample Case
We negate Resolved: In East Africa, the United States federal government should prioritize its
counterterrorism efforts over its humanitarian assistance.
Contention one is stopping the bleeding
Anne barker in March of this year reports that
Anne Barker, 3-4-2017, "Millions in urgent need of food across eastern Africa, aid agency says," ABC
News, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-04/somalia-on-brink-of-famine-tipped-to-follow-southsudan/8323286
More than 5 million Somalians are already on the brink of famine, according to aid agency Plan
International, and it expects an official declaration by April. "It's pretty staggering," Plan Australia's
Program Director Dave Husy said. "We're looking at [with] 40–50 per cent of the population facing acute
food shortages, and a good proportion would be reaching a desperate state. "My expectation is there
will be a declaration [of famine] within four to six weeks." Last week South Sudan declared a famine in
areas of the country's south, where civil war has displaced thousands of people, disrupted crop planting
and led to economic collapse. A woman carries a bucket outside her home in Kudo village, South Sudan.
PHOTO: There are little opportunities for employment in South Sudan. (Supplied: Plan
International/James Perryman) It is the first country in the world to be in famine in six years, since
Somalia emerged from famine in 2011. Nearly 5 million people are in urgent need of food. Now Somalia
faces renewed threats to its food supply. Like South Sudan, it is riven by conflict and fighting. As a socalled failed state it has no centralised or functioning government, meaning there is next to no state
support to assist people at risk. Australia urged to raise aid Charities are calling for an urgent increase in
aid spending to avoid a "catastrophe" across the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, a protracted
drought has led to water shortages, livestock loss and the failure of food production. A sizeable
proportion of the population faces immediate risk of starvation, Mr Husy said. "The extended conflict
that exists in areas of the country makes any functioning service provision extremely difficult," he said
Kevin Sieff elaborates on march first that
Kevin Sieff, March 1 2017, "Trump’s plan to slash foreign aid comes as famine threat is surging,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/trumps-plan-to-slash-foreign-aid-comes-as-faminethreat-is-surging/2017/03/01/509029ac-fdbd-11e6-9b78824ccab94435_story.html?utm_term=.c600ccab18df
It is the first time in recent memory that so many large-scale hunger crises have occurred
simultaneously, and ­humanitarian groups say they do not have the resources to respond effectively.
The United Nations has requested $4.4 billion by March to “avert a ­catastrophe,” Secretary General
António Guterres said last week. It [but] has so far received only a tiny fraction of that request. The
details of Trump’s ­budget proposal have not been released, and large cuts to ­foreign assistance will
face stiff opposition from Congress. So far, U.S. funding for the hunger crises has come out of a budget
approved last year under President Barack Obama. But the ­famines or near-famines in parts of
­Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Yemen underscore the reliance on continued U.S. assistance to save
some of the world’s most desperate people.
However, Joe Temin finds on may 25th that rather than comply with the request,
Jon Temin, 5-25-2017, "Opinion," International New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/opinion/somalia-al-shabaab-us-airstrikes.html
The Trump administration has made it clear that the United States will take a more aggressive approach
to battling al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia. In March, President Trump granted the military expanded
authorities to operate in Somalia, paving the way for an accelerated military campaign. By declaring
parts of Somalia an “area of active hostilities,” Mr. Trump gave the Department of Defense authority to
approve strikes without going through an Obama-era vetting process, which potentially lowers the bar
for tolerance of civilian casualties. And the head of American forces in Africa, who advocated the
change, said this would “allow us to prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion.” The United States also
recently sent several dozen additional troops to Somalia and reportedly requested information on the
locations of aid groups there, possibly to ensure they are out of the way of airstrikes. One American
soldier was killed in Somalia this month, the first combat death there since 1993. Continue reading the
main story RELATED COVERAGE In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War OCT. 16, 2016 ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story [however] There is little to be gained by making intensified military
engagement the dominant policy approach to Somalia. The absence of an effective state is the
fundamental problem there. When and where there is some semblance of governance, it is often
profoundly corrupt and subservient to a deeply ingrained clan system. Al-Shabaab capitalizes on
resentment of government ineptitude, corruption and lack of economic opportunity to recruit,
especially among Somalia’s youth. Airstrikes do nothing to address these failures. Instead, they may
create more problems by allowing African Union forces to retreat, further militarize American policy,
sideline diplomatic engagement and undercut the newly elected Somali president. After making
notable progress for several years, troops from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti and Burundi fighting
al-Shabaab under an African Union banner have slowed the pace of their offensives.
Because it prevents effective humanitarian aid in two ways. First, by threatening legal action. Jason
Burke explains in 2017 that
Jason Burke, 4-1-2017, "Anti-terrorism laws have ‘chilling effect’ on vital aid deliveries to Somalia,"
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/apr/26/anti-terrorism-laws-havechilling-effect-on-vital-aid-deliveries-to-somalia
Strict British and US counter-terrorism laws are discouraging humanitarian organisations from
delivering vital emergency assistance to millions of people facing starvation and fatal diseases in
drought-hit Somalia. Senior humanitarian officials say the laws, which target any individual or
organisation found to have materially assisted a terrorist group, exert a “chilling effect” on vital
assistance in areas of Somalia controlled by Islamic militants from al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida affiliate.
Drought took their animals and land – now hunger is taking Somalia's children Read more The worst
drought for 40 years in the unstable east African country threatens 6 million people with famine. Most
of the worst hit – around 2 million people – live in areas run by al-Shabaab. Humanitarian officials say it
is almost impossible to guarantee that no aid will reach the extremists if they work there, and fear this
means they will fall foul of the laws, exposing them to potential prosecution. “US and UK terrorism
financing laws are a significant discouragement to operating in al-Shabaab areas. At the very least, you
could end up wasting a huge amount of time explaining yourself; at worst, if substantial amounts of aid
were appropriated by al-Shabaab – as has happened to people in the past – you could end up in court
with your organisation shut down,” said the country director of one major international NGO working in
Somalia. Moving any aid by land in Somalia involves paying “taxes” at road blocks run by different armed
groups, including al-Shabaab. UN experts estimated that at the height of its power in 2010 al-Shabaab
imposed fees and taxes that totalled on average $90,000 (£70,200) per aid agency every six months.
Second, by making humanitarian aid “non-neutral”. Sunil Suri indicates in 2016 that
Sunil Suri,January, 2016,“Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and
statebuilding in Somalia
One of the broader impacts of militarised approaches is that humanitarian efforts are no longer
viewed as ‘neutral’, with one NGO representative arguing that “it’s too late to point to a distinction
between humanitarianism and stabilisation” because the same international actors who are providing
aid for humanitarian response are also financing the stabilisation and statebuilding agendas in Somalia:
“they’re no longer talking about apolitical humanitarian aid”. These concerns have become more acute
ever since the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established in May 2013,
integrating hitherto separate humanitarian structures into the UN’s political and military components.
According to one NGO this blurring of lines between humanitarian, military and political objectives has
impacted on the ability of humanitarian actors to negotiate access to areas controlled by alShabaab.254 With three million Somalis estimated to be in areas controlled by al-Shabaab and having
no access to aid, this has almost certainly had a negative impact. The broader use of humanitarian
assistance as a political tool has had devastating consequences for Somalis. 258,000 Somali people –
including 133,000 children – died during the 2011 famine.255 Writing on the famine, Maxwell et al.
noted that while al-Shabaab behaviour played a role in exacerbating the famine, “counter-terrorism
restrictions introduced by major Western donors limited the pool of humanitarian funds available during
the crisis and discouraged organizations from operating in the area” adding that “both the inadequate
funding and counter-terror policies were strategic manoeuvres to ‘undermine’ Al-Shabaab.”256 A 2015
report went on to argue that the inadequacy of preventive measures ahead of the famine was “at least
in part because a proscribed group controlled much of the affected area, and counter-terrorism legal
restrictions outweighed humanitarian concerns in external policy consideration.”257 Sunil Suri,January,
2016,“Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia
Furthermore, Suri also finds that
Sunil Suri,January, 2016,“Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and
statebuilding in Somalia
Another significant impact of the counter-terror agenda of international actors in Somalia is that over
time regional actors, in particular Kenya, have adopted this agenda in counterproductive ways. While
regional counter-terror efforts have to some extent emerged organically in response to attacks by alShabaab (and other armed groups), international actors have encouraged these efforts, and had a role
in shaping their nature. As explored in the previous section, this has been a result of the fact that
“almost every government and polity in the eastern Horn of Africa has benefited from counterterrorism-driven institution building” financed by international actors.245 The counter-terror agenda is
now increasingly tied to domestic politics, with pressure on regional leaders to protect their citizens
against further attacks. In the wake of al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University in April 2015, for
example, the Kenyan Deputy President, William Ruto, said “the way America changed after 9/11 is the
way Kenya will change after Garissa” and declared that “we must secure this country at whatever
cost”.246 This pressure to ‘secure’ Kenya has repeatedly manifested itself in heavy-handed militarised
responses such as Operation Usalama Watch. Launched on 2 April 2014, Operation Usalama Watch saw
the deployment of 6,000 Kenyan security personnel to the predominantly Somali Nairobi
neighbourhood of Eastleigh, where 650 residents were arrested. In the aftermath, there were
accusations that the Kenyan police carried out acts of looting and received bribes.247 These are not
one-off incidents. In September 2015, in a report entitled “The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror”,
Kenya’s National Commission on Human Rights detailed how Kenyan security agencies have continued
“to conduct abusive operations against individuals and groups suspected to be associated with terror
attacks in various parts of the country”, documenting “over one hundred and twenty cases of
egregious human rights violations that include twenty-five extrajudicial killings and eighty-one
enforced disappearances”.248 Such actions have been described as a ‘decisive’ factor in pushing
Kenyans to join organisations like (or linked to) al-Shabaab, and in turn al-Shabaab is increasingly able
to pursue an agenda that transcends the Somali conflict.249 According to Anderson and McKnight, alShabaab has been successfully “reinventing itself to exploit the wider sense of economic and social
grievance among Kenya’s disadvantaged Muslim populations.”250 This is reflected in a recent survey of
recruits into extremist groups in Kenya where 65 per cent of those surveyed claimed that they joined
radical Islamist groups as a result of experiencing injustice at the hands of Kenyan security forces.251
More generally, there are also widely shared concerns about the increasing militarisation of the police
forces, with one Kenyan civil society representative observing that “everything is getting militarized all in
the name of fighting terrorism”.252
Eyder Peralta reminds us on April 2nd that
Eyder Peralta, 4-2-2017, "'Hard To Comprehend' The Effect Of U.S. Humanitarian Aid Cuts ," NPR.org,
http://www.npr.org/2017/04/02/522357490/hard-to-comprehend-the-effect-of-u-s-humanitarian-aidcuts
Yet looming over all of this is President Trump's proposal to slash United Nations' money and U.S.
foreign aid by more than a quarter. McDonough says [and] it is quote, "hard to comprehend" the kind
of effect those cuts would have because the United States doesn't just provide about 40 percent of
the World Food Programme's money, it also pushes other countries into giving more. Right now, she
says, U.S. money is going into dropping food out of planes in South Sudan. It's saving lives. But by all
accounts, the situation is getting worse. And McDonough is blunt about what will happen [put simply] if
the humanitarian effort stalls. MCDONOUGH: People will die. If the world does not do more, people
will die. PERALTA: In a press briefing last month, White House budget director Mick Mulvaney shrugged
off the crises. (SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING) MICK MULVANEY: The president said specifically,
hundreds of times - you covered him - I'm going to spend less money on people overseas and more
money on people back home. PERALTA: Johnnie Carson, who was in charge of African Affairs at the
State Department in 2011, says that America-first philosophy is shortsighted. JOHNNIE CARSON: If we
don't address these humanitarian situations, they contribute to the civil conflicts that are there, and
they nurture long-standing grievances and resentment. PERALTA: He says the Obama administration
was also talking about cutting foreign aid in 2011. But when they saw people dying in Somalia, they
dropped it.
Contention two is fifteen years of failure
Margo Berends finds in 2016 that the
Margo Berends, 2016, "Defeating Terrorism Requires Prioritizing Development," HuffPost,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/defeating-terrorismrequi_b_9817838.html // LH
Yet the United
States’ piecemeal counterterrorism strategy is failing because it prioritizes surveillance and
killing individual terrorists over addressing the fundamental social and economic issues that empower and
sustain terrorist groups. The United States must reevaluate its counterterrorism approach in order to fulfill the promise of
defeating global terrorism. A greater emphasis on investment in development - political, economic, and social is the only means of alleviating the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorist groups and allow them
to successfully recruit members.
Which is why David Sedney finds in 2015 that US counterterror policy in East Africa is
David Sedney, 1-21-2015, "America's Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing," http://time.com/3676321/americas-counter-terrorism-policy-is-failing/
These methods have, for limited periods, degraded extremists’ capabilities. But, today it is clear they are
fundamentally flawed and
severely counter-productive. Rather than reducing threats, our tactics produce more dangerous, more
committed extremists. The crucible of the pressures we have created has not destroyed the extremists, instead it has evolved them
into more virulent forms. Our singular focus on killing, without any serious attempt to ameliorate basic societal
problems — and the absence of a moral core for our actions — have led huge swathes of the world to
see us as the evil doers. Extremists today seek revenge for those we have killed, to punish us for abuses they suffer, and to end our
support for abusive, corrupt rulers.
And, Daniel Davis finds in 2016 that since
Daniel L. Davis, Contributor, 7-29-2016, "After 15 years, the US's counter-terror strategy has 'unequivocally failed'," Business Insider, <span
class="skimlinks-unlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/us-counter-terror-strategy-unequivocally-failed-2016-7</span>
The anti-terror strategy the U.S. has implemented over the past 15 years has unequivocally failed to
accomplish national objectives. Applying it more energetically will most likely deepen the failure. What Washington ought
to do is first step back and conduct an honest, sober, and thorough analysis of the outcomes its strategy has produced. The key is to identify
which major components of the strategy have backfired and worsened security. Those tactics must then be immediately jettisoned in favor of
new ideas that have a chance to increase the security of the nation.
For three reasons. First,
Sunil Suri finds in 2016 that Militarized responses lock out other options. He writes
that counterterrorism
Sunil Suri,January, 2016 Safer World, “Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia” http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/barbedwire-on-our-heads.pdf // DY
Such an objective has proved to be unhelpful, as it has locked international actors into a militarised
approach to resolving the various drivers of the Somali conflict – which according to one INGO representative has
prevented the development of “a more comprehensive peacebuilding strategy”,175 leaving no avenues
through which Somali and international actors can engage with al-Shabaab in an effort to de-escalate
the conflict. Another problem with reducing the Somali conflict to one where al-Shabaab simply needs to be defeated is that it ignores the fact that: “AlShabaab is a symptom rather than a cause of fragility, and while it may be the most immediate and
obvious challenge to peace and security in Somalia, it is by no means the most important one.” Dominik
Balthasar in ’Thinking Beyond Roadmaps in Somalia: Expanding Policy Options for State Building’176 The wider consequence of this confusion about what
international actors are seeking to accomplish through the use of militarised approaches in Somalia and the overwhelming focus on defeating al-Shabaab is that
strategy has often been formulated 2.1 The failures of militarised approaches saferworld 23 177 Op cit Ploch L (2010), p 3. 178 These actions have been copied by
regional actors such as Kenya, which has banned at least 86 entities and individuals it accuses of financing and supporting terror activities in the country. This has
negatively impacted on the local economy of Somalis in Kenya, with an estimated $70–100 million transferred a month between Somalis in Kenya. For more details,
see Bosh A M (2015), ‘Kenya is stopping remittances of $70 million a month from reaching its Somali community’, Quartz, 8 April. 179 Migiro K (2015), ‘Somalis
panic as cash flow dries up after U.S. remittance lifeline cut’, Reuters, 19 February. 180 Congress of the United States (2015), ‘Ellison Remittances Letter’, 6
February, (www.hiiraan.com/PDF/2015/Feb/Ellison%20 Remittances%20Letter_2.06.15.pdf). 181 Ibid. 182 Monbiot G (2015), ‘Unremitting Pain’, 10 February,
(www.monbiot.com/2015/02/10/unremitting-pain/). 183 Op cit International Crisis Group (2002), p 8. 184 For example, the US State Department Press Release
after killing of Godane described it as “a major symbolic and operational loss” to al-Shabaab. See The White House (2014), ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on the
Death of Ahmed Godane’, 5 September (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/statement-press-secretary-death-ahmed-godane). See also U.S.
Department of Defense (2014), ‘Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby on Ahmed Godane’, 5 September
(www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605172). without proper consideration of the actual long-term security needs of the Somali
people. For
example, the prioritisation of Western security needs over those of Somalis is clearly reflected
in testimony offered in 2010 by the then Chairman of the Senate’s Subcommittee on African Affairs,
who voiced concern that, “we [the US] still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties our
programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be grasping at straws to ‘do something’ while
our national security increasingly hangs in the balance [emphasis added]”.17
Second is ineffective strategies. Sunil Suri also finds that
Sunil Suri,January, 2016 Safer World, “Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia” http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/barbedwire-on-our-heads.pdf // DY
As detailed in section one, the
US, as well as Kenya and Ethiopia, have repeatedly carried out operations, some
involving airstrikes and drone strikes, to target individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist
organisation. While any attempt to assess the efficacy of such operations is complicated by the general lack of transparency and
accountability surrounding them, it is possible to observe that military action focused on achieving short-term counterterrorism objectives has frequently had negative longer-term impacts on the Somali conflict. This can be
elaborated by examining al-Shabaab in the aftermath of notable counterterrorism operations. The high-profile killings of alShabaab leaders Aden Hashi Ayro and Ahmed Abdi Godane, for example, were celebrated as decisive
blows against al-Shabaab.184 However, despite predictions that their deaths heralded al-Shabaab’s decline, in both
instances, the group has retained its abilities to conduct high-profile attacks both in Somalia and
beyond.185 Indeed, [but] according to Jenna Jordan – who has analysed 298 instances of leadership
targeting – “decapitation is not ineffective merely against religious, old, or large groups, it is actually counterproductive…
In many cases, targeting a group’s leadership actually lowers its rate of decline”.186
Third is revenge killings. Gabriella Blum finds in 2010 that
Gabriella Blum and Phillip Heymann, 2010, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing.” Harvard Law School
The aggression of
targeted killings also runs the risk of spiraling hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the
Each attack invites revenge, each revenge invites
further retaliation. Innocent civilians suffer whether they are the intended target of attack or its
unintentional collateral con- sequences. Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. As in the case of
effects of killing and thus continuing the cycle of violence. [since]
extraordinary detention or interrogation methods, there is a danger of over- using targeted killings, both within and outside of the war on
terrorism. A particular danger in this context arises as the killing of a terrorist often proves a simpler operation than protracted legal battles
over detention, trial, extradition, and release.
Which is why Eric Neumayer finds in 2010 that
Eric Neumayer, 2010, “Foreign Terror on Americans.” Journal of Peace Research
An analysis of substantive effects based on model 4 allows one to gauge the relative importance of the three measures of military support
when entered together in the esti- mations. A
one standard deviation increase in US military aid raises the expected
count of anti-American terrorism most by 114%, followed by arms exports and military per- sonnel, of
which a one standard deviation increase leads to an increase of 45 and 30%, respectively. It would thus appear that
US military aid matters most for foreign terror on Americans.
Fortunately, Mona Yacoubian finds on march 10th that
Mona Yacoubian, 3-10-2017, “Trump’s Cuts to USAID Would Imperil the United States”, Foreign Policy,
“http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/trumps-cuts-to-usaid-would-imperil-the-united-states // LH.
Accessed 6-3-17.
This is where USAID and its partners come in. Beyond
providing critically needed humanitarian assistance and
insuring access to essential services such as water, electricity, and health care, U.S. assistance helps
strengthen local governance and ideally will facilitate[s] the sustainable return of those who have been
displaced from their homes. Successful stabilization of these areas will help prevent[ing] the emergence
of dangerous power vacuums that can lead to renewed conflict, vastly diminishing the prospects that the United States
will need to return to battle the Islamic State 2.0.
Drought/Famine
Climate Change Worsens
The Horn of Africa has little rain – very dry and hot
Henze, Paul B. The Horn of Africa: from war to peace. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994.
eBook. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1349214566 // LH
While the Ethiopian highlands and southern Sudan normally experience heavy rains during the late spring and summer monsoon season,
much of the rest of the Horn, whether the terrain is high or low, is rain-poor. Northern
Sudan and northern Eritrea are so are the coastal lowlands along the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden. Most of the Somali-inhabited areas are semi-desert. In ancient times many of the peoples
of the Horn learned to adapt to [exist]ence in extremely dry and hot climates. The Afar who can be found
from Djibouti northward to Tigre and Eritrea are the most extreme example. Throughout the Hom climates are
characterized by sharp contrasts in precipitation and temperature within the year and
from one year to another. ln ancient times parts of the Ethiopian highlands were thickly forested. Deforestation
occurred over millennia, not in the past half-century. as is sometimes claimed. Virgin highland forests remain only in a few mountain areas. The
Australian blue gum eucalyptus, introduced in the late nineteenth century, has changed the appearance of the landscape over the past hundred
years. It is now planted everywhere in the highlands and serves as a valuable source of wood for fuel and building. Portions of lowland Sudan
. [of] Acacia forests are the natural vegetation in most semi-arid lowland
areas. Degradation of these has been particularly severe in Somalia during recent vears.
and Ethiopia still possess modest stands of tropical forest
Horn of Africa gets drier alongside climate change; 4.5 million need food
Maria Gallucci @Mariagallucci, 10-9-2015, "The Horn Of Africa Is Rapidly Drying Out Due
To Climate Change: Study," International Business Times,
http://www.ibtimes.com/pulse/horn-africa-rapidly-drying-out-due-climate-changestudy-2131253
“What we see in the paleoclimate record from the last 2,000 years is evidence that the Horn of Africa is drier when
there are warm conditions on Earth, and wetter when it is colder,” Jessica Tierney, lead
author of the study and associate professor at the University of Arizona, said in the statement. The regionspecific study [This] contradicted the conclusions of more optimistic global models, which predicted heavier rainfall during the African region’s
“short rains” season from September to November. The new study suggested those gains in rainfall will be offset by declining rainfall and
severe dryness during the “long rains” season from March to May -- the period on which most of the region’s crops rely for moisture.
Drier
climate conditions and a surge in extreme weather events are already taking a
devastating toll in the Horn of Africa and other parts of the continent, international aid organization Oxfam said in an
Oct. 1 report. In Ethiopia, below-average rainfall is decimating crops and livestock, leaving
4.5 million people in need of food relief. To the south, in Zimbabwe, many people eat only one meal a day -- typically
maize flour and a vegetable -- as drought decimates the country’s corn and wheat production and pushes up food prices. Malawi and northwest
Mozambique, meanwhile, are facing food crises after extensive flooding earlier this year washed away food stockpiles and drowned fertile land.
Climate change makes droughts more frequent and food prices higher
Daniel Wesangula, 4-27-2017, "Climate change deepening Horn of Africa's hunger crisis,
Oxfam says," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eastafrica-climatechangeidUSKBN17T00D
Climate change is making drought and humanitarian disasters worse in the Horn of
Africa, Oxfam said on Thursday, ahead of a major climate march in Washington to coincide with the first 100 days of the Trump
About 12 million people in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are at risk of hunger
due to recurring droughts, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) says, with Somalia at risk of slipping
into famine for the second time in six years. "Climate change is a real and current
problem in East Africa. What were previously once in a life time droughts now come
around more often," Nigel Tricks, Oxfam's regional director told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. "For the first time, scores of
administration.
camels and donkeys which are typically hardy animals are dying off and the lives of pastoralists, which revolve around their animals have been
greatly disrupted." Thousands are expected to attend the People's Climate March in Washington on Saturday, which hopes to match the
success of a 300,000-strong rally in New York in 2014, the largest single protest ever held on the topic of climate change. President Donald
Trump last month signed an order to undo Obama-era climate change regulations, keeping a campaign promise to support the coal industry
and calling into question U.S. support for an international deal to fight global warming. A small group of activists in the Kenyan coastal town of
East Africa is
experiencing its third year of very low rainfall, coupled with above average
temperatures, which are part of a trend that began in the 1980s, Oxfam said. Seven of the
last ten years have seen chronic droughts in East Africa due to poor or failed rains, it said
Kilifi will take part in a sister march, along with others in Australia, Brazil, Greece, Ivory Coast, Uganda and Zambia.
"The march is to fight for our environment by creating more awareness on conservation," Noel Baraka, director of Kilifi-based Kenya Action
Network, which campaigns on climate change, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation by phone. ALSO IN INTEL Grab, Uber's Southeast Asian
rival, likely to seek funds, eyes financial services UPDATE 3-Egyptian wheat imports thrown back into uncertainty as ergot ban looms People are
hungry and cattle are dying in Kilifi due to drought, he said, which started to bite last year. Eastern and southern Africa were hard hit in 2016 by
drought exacerbated by El Nino - a warming of sea-surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean
economic growth and drove food prices higher.
- that wilted crops, slowed
Inherency
Somalia facing drought, impending famine
Faith Karimi, CNN, 3-12-2017, "UN: World facing largest humanitarian crisis since 1945," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/11/africa/un-famine-starvation-aid/ Accessed 5-7-17. // LH
In Somalia, more than 6 million people are in need of food assistance -- more than half the population.
Drought, impending famine and the presence of terrorist group Al-Shabaab have left the country and its people in a desperate situation. "The
situation is critical in Somalia. People are dying of hunger and there is no water," said Mogadishu resident Noor Ibrahim, who fled his home to
seek help at a camp. "Al-Shabaab blocks the roads, there is no access for food aid, the Shabaab steal food as well." South
Sudan, where
a famine was recently declared, has more than 7.5 million people in need of assistance -- more than half
of whom have been displaced, according to the UN.
Up to 50% of the population is suffering from food shortages
Anne Barker, 3-4-2017, "Millions in urgent need of food across eastern Africa, aid agency says," ABC
News, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-04/somalia-on-brink-of-famine-tipped-to-follow-southsudan/8323286
More than 5 million Somalians are already on the brink of famine, according to aid agency Plan International, and it
expects an official declaration by April. "It's pretty staggering," Plan Australia's Program Director Dave Husy said. "We're looking at [with]
40–50 per cent of the population facing acute food shortages, and a good proportion would be reaching a desperate
state. "My expectation is there will be a declaration [of famine] within four to six weeks." Last week South Sudan declared a famine in areas of
the country's south, where civil war has displaced thousands of people, disrupted crop planting and led to economic collapse. A woman carries
a bucket outside her home in Kudo village, South Sudan. PHOTO: There are little opportunities for employment in South Sudan. (Supplied: Plan
International/James Perryman) It is the first country in the world to be in famine in six years, since Somalia emerged from famine in 2011.
Nearly 5 million people are in urgent need of food. Now Somalia faces renewed threats to its food supply. Like South Sudan, it is riven by
conflict and fighting. As a so-called failed state it has no centralised or functioning government, meaning there is next to no state support to
assist people at risk. Australia urged to raise aid Charities are calling for an urgent increase in aid spending to avoid a "catastrophe" across the
Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, a protracted drought has led to water shortages, livestock loss and the failure of food production. A
sizeable proportion of the population faces immediate risk of starvation, Mr Husy said. "The extended conflict that exists in areas of the country
makes any functioning service provision extremely difficult," he said
Children starving to death. Largest crisis since UN founded.
Mark Hanrahan, 3-11-2017, "A kid's choice as famine stalks Africa: To feed his siblings or to eat," NBC
News, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/famine-east-africa-multiple-crises-strain-efforts-respondn731766 // DY
A drought has left close to 3 million people severely food deprived across the country. The
World Food Program estimates that
363,000 children aged under 5 are acutely malnourished, including 71,000 who are severely
malnourished and face a high risk of disease and death. Last week, Somali authorities announced the first tally of fatalities
from the crisis, saying that 110 people had died from hunger in a 48-hour period in a single region. On Friday, the
United Nations said the world faced the largest humanitarian crisis since the organization was founded
with starvation and famine threatening more than 20 million people in four countries — Somalia, as well as Yemen, South Sudan and northeast
Nigeria. In
South Sudan, a civil war has prevented crops from being harvested and brought about
economic collapse, prompting the United Nations to officially declare parts of the country as suffering
from famine — the first time anywhere in the world since Somalia in 2011.
Closing refugee camps
Sulaiman Momadu reports in 2017 that
Sulaiman Momadu, march 2017, "Africa most affected by refugee crisis," No Publication,
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/africa-most-affected-refugeecrisis
But the
distress over refugees landing in Europe has overshadowed the efforts of African countries also
grappling with refugee emergencies. While European nations seek to limit the “economic” refugees as opposed to asylum
seekers, Ethiopia, for example, is taking in thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries. According to the
United Nations, developing countries, mostly in Africa, are taking in a disproportionate number of refugees
— currently 80% of the world’s refugee population. Refugees hosted in developing countries put enormous pressure on
water and health care systems in host communities. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says the world
is currently facing the highest levels of displacement ever in history, with an unprecedented 65.3 million people forced from their homes by
war, internal conflicts, drought or poor economies. Among these are 21.3 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18; the rest
are economic migrants and internally displaced persons. People are forcibly displaced at a rate of 34,000 per day due to conflict or persecution.
Currently there are also 10 million stateless people worldwide who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education,
health care, employment and freedom of movement.
He continues that
Ethiopia hosts nearly 740,000 refugees, mostly from Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan, the
largest refugee population in a single African country. The country maintains an open-door policy that welcomes refugees
and allows humanitarian access and protection. In the Central African Republic, clashes among rival groups have forced thousands to flee their
homes. In Nigeria, more than 2 million people have been forcibly displaced, including the 1.87 million who have fled from the militant group
Boko Haram’s violence since 2014. Some 195,350 people have sought refuge in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
Mohammed Yusuf, 3-21-2017, "East Africa Summit to Focus on Refugees, Food Concerns," VOA,
http://www.voanews.com/a/east-africa-summit-focus-refugees-food-concerns/3773993.html
NARIOBI — East African leaders attending the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Kenya this week are expected to talk about Somali refugees
and regional security. However, there are doubts that IGAD has what it takes to ease the crisis in the region. The Kenya State House spokesperson, Manoah Esipisu,
said the repatriation of Somali refugees will be the main agenda item at the summit. "It will focus largely on the questions of Somali refugees and creating a
conducive environment in their own country so that they can feel safe to go back and to contribute to their country's development as well as their country's
growth," he said. Kenya
plans to shut the Dadaab refugee camp by the end of May. Dadaab is home to more
than 300,000 refugees, most of them Somalis. Tens of thousands have already returned to Somalia. Humanitarian agencies
are currently struggling to save lives in Somalia, where more than 6 million people need assistance
because of drought and insurgent attacks. The aid agencies warn if nothing is done, the crisis in Somalia
may become worse than the 2011 famine. The United Nations estimates more than 17 million people
need humanitarian assistance in East Africa.
Security Prioritization Link
Lack of humanitarian aid has allowed famine to grow
Martin Michaels, 5-3-2013, "Both Terrorists And US Counter-Terrorism Efforts Reportedly Worsened
Somalia Famine," MintPress News, https://www.mintpressnews.com/both-terrorists-and-us-counterterrorism-efforts-reportedly-worsened-somalia-famine/156100/ //DY
International aid analysts are blaming the slow delivery of U.S. aid and attacks by Al-Shabaab terrorists for the
2010-2012 Somalia food crisis, a two-year famine that resulted in the deaths of 258,000 and thousands of
others in East Africa. The study released Thursday was produced by the U.S.-based Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) and the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found that 10 percent of children and 4.6 percent of the overall population in southern
Somalia perished. Overall half of all deaths were children under the age of five, the report finds. “With the expertise of two renowned
institutions, we now have a picture of the true enormity of this human tragedy,’’ said Mark Smulders, Senior Economist for the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN. “Lessons drawn from this experience will help the international community, together with the
people of the region, build a stronger and more resilient future.” FEWS NET began issuing dire warnings of impending famine in the Horn of
Africa as early as August 2010. An acute drought, the worst in 60 years, triggered widespread livestock deaths and the smallest cereal harvest
since the 1991-94 civil war. Despite
issuing several warnings, most aid agencies did not respond until famine
was declared in parts of Somalia in July 2011. The delivery of aid was further delayed by Al-Shabaab and affiliated terrorist
organizations seeking to overthrow the central government and impose a conservative form of Sharia law. These groups, which controlled large
swaths of territory, prevented critical aid from passing to southern Somalia, one of the areas hardest-hit by the famine in East Africa. AlShabaab, an organization designated as a terrorist group by the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and Canada among others, made large territorial gains
during the Somali Civil War of 2006-2009. A union with Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups help the group make significant gains “Everyone
wanted to get aid in,” said Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College in North Carolina. “But local aid diversion was endemic. One aid
agency worker called southern Somalia ‘an accountability-free zone.’ You could not count on getting aid to the people who needed it most.”
Geno Teofilo, spokesman for Oxfam, said his agency. believed that the
international community put too much emphasis
on security issues in the developing world and not enough on humanitarian crises “Oxfam believes that when
there’s a conflict, it doesn’t matter what side of the control line people are on,” Teofilo said in a telephone interview. “When they need food
and people are dying of hunger, politics should not play a part. People should be able to receive humanitarian aid, wherever they are.”
Humanitarian groups are short on funds as of 2017
Kevin Sieff, March 1 2017, "Trump’s plan to slash foreign aid comes as famine threat is surging,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/trumps-plan-to-slash-foreign-aid-comes-as-faminethreat-is-surging/2017/03/01/509029ac-fdbd-11e6-9b78824ccab94435_story.html?utm_term=.c600ccab18df
It is the first time in recent memory that so many large-scale hunger crises have occurred simultaneously, and ­humanitarian
groups
say they do not have the resources to respond effectively. The United Nations has requested $4.4 billion
by March to “avert a ­catastrophe,” Secretary General António Guterres said last week. It [but] has so far received only
a tiny fraction of that request. The details of Trump’s ­budget proposal have not been released, and large cuts to ­foreign assistance
will face stiff opposition from Congress. So far, U.S. funding for the hunger crises has come out of a budget approved last year under President
Barack Obama. But the ­famines or near-famines in parts of ­Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Yemen underscore the reliance on continued
U.S. assistance to save some of the world’s most desperate people.
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya are being ravaged by famine
Lucy Lamble, 3-14-2017, "‘Countless lives at stake’ warn NGOs as hunger in east Africa prompts major
appeal," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/15/countless-lives-atstake-warn-ngos-as-east-africa-hunger-prompts-major-dec-appeal-16-million
Drought has been especially acute across Somalia, southern and south eastern Ethiopia, and northern
and coastal Kenya. Central and southern Somalia has recorded only a third of the rainfall expected. Famine has already been
declared in parts of South Sudan. War and a collapsing economy have left 100,000 people facing starvation, while 4.9 million
people, more than
40% of the population, are considered severely food insecure by the UN. The UN has
warned that Somalia is also on the brink of famine, with 6.2 million people, more than half the country’s
population, in urgent need of help. Somalia’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed, has declared the drought a
national disaster and called for urgent assistance. On Tuesday Somalis gathered in the capital, Mogadishu, to pray for rain. Around 110 people
died as a result of hunger in the country at the start of this month, and urgent action is needed to stop a repeat of the famine six years ago,
which the UN estimates claimed close to 260,000 lives. In Ethiopia, the current drought hit the country before it could recover from the
devastating effect of El Niño in 2015 and 2016, and more than 5.6 million people are in urgent need. Some $18.5m (£15m) has been released
(pdf) from the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund to provide support to those suffering from hunger, malnutrition and severe water
shortages in the worst-hit region. Advertisement Stephen O’Brien, the UN’s emergency relief coordinator and under-secretary general for
humanitarian affairs, said: “I was recently in Ethiopia’s Somali region, where I saw the devastating impact this drought is having on people’s
lives, livestock and livelihoods. We must act. Time lost means lives lost.” Kenya declared a national drought emergency last month, affecting 23
of its 47 counties. The government has projected that the number of people facing food insecurity will rise from the current 2.7 million to 4
million by April this year. The UK government has said it will match-fund the first £5m donated by the public to the DEC appeal. DEC member
charities are already working to deliver food, treatment for malnutrition and clean drinking water. Save the Children said its health and
nutrition clinics are reporting “all the early warnings signs” of an avoidable catastrophe, with deaths from cholera and acute watery diarrhoea
rising sharply. DEC’s chief executive, Saleh Saeed, said: “Hunger on a massive scale is looming. More than 800,
Robyn Dixon, 5-2-2013, "U.S. policy seen as factor in Somalia famine deaths," latimes,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/02/world/la-fg-somalia-famine-20130503
But American policy also played a considerable role, according to analysts, with the Shabab designated a
terrorist organization by the U.S. in 2008. U.S. counter-terrorism law imposes sanctions on any group
found to be offering even indirect assistance to a terrorist group. Some U.S. and international agencies
halted aid deliveries to Shabab-controlled areas, fearing they could be charged with helping a
designated terrorist group. In January 2010, the World Food Program suspended aid to southern
Somalia, after reports that the Shabab was diverting supplies.
Lower Quality Aid
Legal restrictions because of counterterrorism make it difficult for NGOs to help
Jason Burke, 4-1-2017, "Anti-terrorism laws have ‘chilling effect’ on vital aid deliveries to Somalia,"
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/apr/26/anti-terrorism-laws-havechilling-effect-on-vital-aid-deliveries-to-somalia
Strict British and US counter-terrorism laws are discouraging humanitarian organisations from delivering
vital emergency assistance to millions of people facing starvation and fatal diseases in drought-hit Somalia.
Senior humanitarian officials say the laws, which target any individual or organisation found to have materially
assisted a terrorist group, exert a “chilling effect” on vital assistance in areas of Somalia controlled by Islamic militants
from al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida affiliate. Drought took their animals and land – now hunger is taking Somalia's children Read more The worst
drought for 40 years in the unstable east African country threatens 6 million people with famine. Most
of the worst hit – around 2 million people – live in areas run by al-Shabaab. Humanitarian officials say it is almost impossible to guarantee that
no aid will reach the extremists if they work there, and fear this means they will fall foul of the laws, exposing them to potential prosecution.
“US and UK terrorism financing laws are a significant discouragement to operating in al-Shabaab areas. At the very least, you could end up
wasting a huge amount of time explaining yourself; at worst, if substantial amounts of aid were appropriated by al-Shabaab – as has happened
to people in the past – you could end up in court with your organisation shut down,” said the country director of one major international NGO
working in Somalia. Moving any aid by land in Somalia involves paying “taxes” at road blocks run by different armed groups, including alShabaab. UN experts estimated that at the height of its power in 2010 al-Shabaab imposed fees and taxes that totalled on average $90,000
(£70,200) per aid agency every six months.
Aid isn’t neutral because of counterterrorism; harder to help regions controlled by alShabaab
Sunil Suri,January, 2016,“Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and
statebuilding in Somalia
One of the broader impacts of militarised approaches is that humanitarian efforts are no longer
viewed as ‘neutral’, with one NGO representative arguing that “it’s too late to point to a distinction between humanitarianism and
stabilisation” because the same international actors who are providing aid for humanitarian response are
also financing the stabilisation and statebuilding agendas in Somalia: “they’re no longer talking about apolitical
humanitarian aid”. These concerns have become more acute ever since the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was
established in May 2013, integrating hitherto separate humanitarian structures into the UN’s political and military components. According to
one NGO this
blurring of lines between humanitarian, military and political objectives has impacted on the
ability of humanitarian actors to negotiate access to areas controlled by al-Shabaab.254 With three
million Somalis estimated to be in areas controlled by al-Shabaab and having no access to aid, this has
almost certainly had a negative impact. The broader use of humanitarian assistance as a political tool has had devastating
consequences for Somalis. 258,000 Somali people – including 133,000 children – died during the 2011
famine.255 Writing on the famine, Maxwell et al. noted that while al-Shabaab behaviour played a role in exacerbating the famine,
“counter-terrorism restrictions introduced by major Western donors limited the pool of humanitarian
funds available during the crisis and discouraged organizations from operating in the area” adding that
“both the inadequate funding and counter-terror policies were strategic manoeuvres to ‘undermine’ AlShabaab.”256 A 2015 report went on to argue that the inadequacy of preventive measures ahead of the famine was “at least in part
because a proscribed group controlled much of the affected area, and counter-terrorism legal restrictions outweighed humanitarian concerns
in external policy
This lack of neutrality increases the strength of al-Shabaab and other similar groups
Sunil Suri,January, 2016,“Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and
statebuilding in Somalia
Another significant impact of the counter-terror agenda of international actors in Somalia is that over time
regional actors, in particular Kenya, have adopted this agenda in counterproductive ways. While regional
counter-terror efforts have to some extent emerged organically in response to attacks by al-Shabaab (and other armed groups), international
actors have encouraged these efforts, and had a role in shaping their nature. As explored in the previous section, this has been a result of the
fact that “almost every government and polity in the eastern Horn of Africa has benefited from counter-terrorism-driven institution building”
financed by international actors.245 The counter-terror agenda is now increasingly tied to domestic politics, with
pressure on regional leaders to protect their citizens against further attacks. In the wake of al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University in April
2015, for example, the Kenyan Deputy President, William Ruto, said “the way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after
Garissa” and declared that “we must secure this country at whatever cost”.246 This
pressure to ‘secure’ Kenya has
repeatedly manifested itself in heavy-handed militarised responses such as Operation Usalama Watch. Launched on
2 April 2014, Operation Usalama Watch saw the deployment of 6,000 Kenyan security personnel to the predominantly Somali Nairobi
neighbourhood of Eastleigh, where 650 residents were arrested. In the aftermath, there were accusations that the Kenyan police carried out
acts of looting and received bribes.247 These
are not one-off incidents. In September 2015, in a report entitled “The Error of
security agencies have
continued “to conduct abusive operations against individuals and groups suspected to be associated
with terror attacks in various parts of the country”, documenting “over one hundred and twenty cases
of egregious human rights violations that include twenty-five extrajudicial killings and eighty-one
enforced disappearances”.248 Such actions have been described as a ‘decisive’ factor in pushing
Kenyans to join organisations like (or linked to) al-Shabaab, and in turn al-Shabaab is increasingly able
to pursue an agenda that transcends the Somali conflict.249 According to Anderson and McKnight, al-Shabaab has been
Fighting Terror with Terror”, Kenya’s National Commission on Human Rights detailed how Kenyan
successfully “reinventing itself to exploit the wider sense of economic and social grievance among Kenya’s disadvantaged Muslim
populations.”250 This is reflected in a recent survey of recruits into extremist groups in Kenya where 65 per cent of those surveyed claimed that
they joined radical Islamist groups as a result of experiencing injustice at the hands of Kenyan security forces.251 More generally, there are also
widely shared concerns about the increasing militarisation of the police forces, with one Kenyan civil society representative observing that
“everything is getting militarized all in the name of fighting terrorism”.252
Band Aid Solutions
Inherency
Counterterrorism fails because it doesn’t address root issues
Margo Berends, 2016, "Defeating Terrorism Requires Prioritizing Development," HuffPost,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/defeating-terrorismrequi_b_9817838.html // LH
Yet the United
States’ piecemeal counterterrorism strategy is failing because it prioritizes surveillance and
killing individual terrorists over addressing the fundamental social and economic issues that empower and
sustain terrorist groups. The United States must reevaluate its counterterrorism approach in order to fulfill the promise of
defeating global terrorism. A greater emphasis on investment in development - political, economic, and social is the only means of alleviating the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorist groups and allow them
to successfully recruit members.
Counterrorism in squo is military, surveillance – doesn’t address causes for
recruitment
Margo Berends, 2016, "Defeating Terrorism Requires Prioritizing Development," HuffPost,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/defeating-terrorismrequi_b_9817838.html // LH
Despite the important role that “social conditions” and the larger socio-economic context play in driving domestic
individuals to join terrorist organizations, most counterterrorism efforts focus on military campaigns,
surveillance and intelligence, security, winning hearts and minds, and blocking funding sources, rather than
addressing and alleviating domestic drivers of recruitment through comprehensive development. Using foreign
aid and development programs to mitigate these conditions is not without its challenges and drawbacks. Some places, such as Syria, are
too dangerous to effectively run development programs beyond providing basic humanitarian assistance. A development-based
approach does little to combat those who are already actively engaged in terrorist organizations. Some underlying conditions (such as
corruption, kleptocratic governance, and lack of rule of law), which give rise to grievances used as recruitment tools, are extremely
difficult to influence externally through aid programs. The current military-heavy counterterrorism strategy, however,
exerts little influence on the political environment in a country and can further harm an already struggling
economy.
Aid Solvency
USAID strengthens local government, stabilizes, prevents power vacuum
Mona Yacoubian, 3-10-2017, “Trump’s Cuts to USAID Would Imperil the United States”, Foreign Policy,
“http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/trumps-cuts-to-usaid-would-imperil-the-united-states // LH.
Accessed 6-3-17.
This is where USAID and its partners come in. Beyond
providing critically needed humanitarian assistance and
insuring access to essential services such as water, electricity, and health care, U.S. assistance helps
strengthen local governance and ideally will facilitate[s] the sustainable return of those who have been
displaced from their homes. Successful stabilization of these areas will help prevent the emergence of
dangerous power vacuums that can lead to renewed conflict, vastly diminishing the prospects that the United States will
need to return to battle the Islamic State 2.0.
Aid is needed to keep children in schools
“Failure to deliver aid to East Africa could result in ‘lost generation’ of children”, 27 Mar 2017, Disasters
Emergency Center, http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/failure-deliver-aid-east-africa-could-result-lostgeneration-children // MP
Figures released by the
UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs showed that in Somalia and Ethiopia, nearly
340,000 school children are being forced out of education due to schools temporarily closing and in
Kenya, 175,000 pre-primary and primary school children in ten counties are out of school due to the
impact of drought. In South Sudan, statistics released by UNICEF in 2016 showed 51% of children who are primary and lower secondary
school age are out of education; the highest proportion of children not attending school in the world. In Kilifi county, south of Kenya, a lack of
rainfall has led to crop failure and livestock deaths. Food is scarce and there isn’t enough to go around. At one local school, 14 per cent of pupils
have dropped out due to lack of food at home and only 15 pupils sat their national exams this year.
Impact: Reducing Conflict
Aid can help to reduce violence
Pierre Perin [ICRC] “The impact of humanitarian aid on conflict development.” Inter- national Committee
of the Red Cross, 1997.
But humanitarian aid can also help reduce violence. We have seen how it both relieves and prevents suffering — by providing
treatment for the wounded, food supplies, san- itation, etc. — and thus helps alleviate the silent forms of violence that are part of armed
conflict: hunger, thirst and disease.
Aid also helps to reduce violations of in- ternational humanitarian law, which
are very direct forms of violence. In all armed conflicts, the ICRC reminds the warring parties of their obligations, in particular
where non-combatants are concerned. For example, “the ICRC calls on all the parties involved to abide by the rules of international
humanitarian law, and in particular to make a clear distinction between civilians and combatants and to respect persons who are not or are no
longer taking part in the hostilities.” [10 ] An appeal such as this is the first stage in the ICRC’s work, aimed at actually preventing violations of
international humanitarian law (so-called primary prevention). Prevention
work will be all the more effective if the ICRC is
present on an ongoing basis, as is the case with aid operations. This pres- ence constitutes a mode of
protection for the victims, and thus helps lessen violence in conflicts.
Use of Funds
Current Spending Patterns
US counterterrorism spending already nearly 3x amount budgeted for foreign
assistance
Margo Berends, 2016, "Defeating Terrorism Requires Prioritizing Development," HuffPost,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/defeating-terrorismrequi_b_9817838.html // LH
Yet the
United States’ counterterrorism strategy remains military-centric. This is underscored by the fact that the
United States spends far more on military initiatives than development programs. Gordon Adams, a national
security budget expert, estimates that the United States spends at least $100 billion on counterterrorism efforts
each year. The 2016 U.S. Department of Defense budget is $585 billion while the budget for U.S. foreign assistance is $38
billion.
U.S. Spends More in dollars on aid, but not proportionally.
Jeremy Konyndyk, 5-31-2017, "'Trump's aid budget is breathtakingly cruel – cuts like these will kill
people'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2017/may/31/trumps-aid-budget-is-breathtakingly-cruel-cuts-like-these-will-kill-people // LH
The White House justifies cuts of roughly $13.5bn with claims that global aid spending is imbalanced,
and the US should roll back its spending to encourage others to do more. Global aid spending is
imbalanced – but if anyone is falling short, it’s the US. The United States is the most generous global aid
donor in absolute terms, but relative to the size of the American economy it’s less a case of “America First” than
“America Twenty-Second”. As my colleagues at the Center for Global Development have pointed out, US aid spending already falls
far short of the proportional contributions of most other rich countries in the world.
Trump’s budget cuts to humanitarian aid are catastrophic.
Jeremy Konyndyk, 5-31-2017, "'Trump's aid budget is breathtakingly cruel – cuts like these will kill
people'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2017/may/31/trumps-aid-budget-is-breathtakingly-cruel-cuts-like-these-will-kill-people // LH.
Accessed 6-3-17.
Humanitarian aid is one of the crown jewels of American foreign policy – US
funding provides the backbone of global
humanitarian response and saves millions of lives each year. The Trump administration proposes to
drive it over a cliff – cutting nearly half the funding that Congress appropriated in 2017 and fully
eliminating the principal food aid account. The budget documents attempt to wrap these cuts in a veneer of efficiency, claiming
the US will purchase food aid more efficiently through a different budget line. Don’t be fooled. The proposal does not shift those resources; it
eliminates the money completely. And it simultaneously cuts the budget line that it claims will cover food aid needs. This is not about stretching
dollars further – it’s simply about getting rid of them. The
human impact here is extraordinary. Food aid funding would
drop from $3.5bn in 2017 – enough to feed 67 million people – to $1.5bn in 2018, enough to feed only
29 million. Beyond the food side, refugee assistance would be cut by nearly 20%. International disaster
assistance, which covers the non-food needs of the world’s conflict and disaster victims, takes a massive hit as well – [drops] dropping
from $2.5bn in the 2017 budget to $1bn in 2018.Let’s not sugarcoat this: humanitarian aid is lifesaving
assistance, so cuts like these will kill people. As the head of foreign disaster response for the Obama administration, I had to
weigh up budget trade-offs every year, knowing that saving lives in one region meant we would save fewer elsewhere. But I never faced tradeoffs this extreme. Laying waste to US relief aid would be hard to defend even if the world were in decent shape. But proposing this amidst the
worst slate of humanitarian crises in recent decades is breathtakingly cruel. This [Trump’s]
budget would cut[s] nearly 30 million
people from food aid rolls even as aid groups struggle to hold off four potential famines. It would
undermine[s] refugee aid even as global refugee numbers hit peaks not seen since the second world war and new South
Sudanese refugees flee their country by the tens of thousands. And it would obliterate[s] funding for the
health, clean water, nutrition, and shelter programmes that keep victims of conflicts and natural disasters
alive.
Trump cuts aid to peacekeepers in South Sudan refugee camps
Jeremy Konyndyk, 5-31-2017, "'Trump's aid budget is breathtakingly cruel – cuts like these will kill
people'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2017/may/31/trumps-aid-budget-is-breathtakingly-cruel-cuts-like-these-will-kill-people // LH.
Accessed 6-3-17.
UN peacekeepers protect the lives of some of the world’s most vulnerable people [in] – something I have witnessed
firsthand during visits to UN Protection of Civilian camps in South Sudan. The POC sites provide protection to
hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities who would risk death if they stepped beyond the camps’
gates. While peacekeepers in South Sudan and elsewhere occasionally come in for criticism – some justified – there is ample evidence that
peacekeeping deployments shorten conflicts, reduce harm to civilians, and help prevent conflicts from
recurring. The Trump administration wants to cut US support for peacekeeping efforts by 40%.
Even with Trump’s proposed cuts, U.S. still donating more than other nations/US not
the only factor in humanitarian aid
Kevin Sieff, 6-3-2017, "U.N. asks for billions to avert four hunger crises, but the money doesn’t arrive,"
Spokesman, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jun/03/un-asks-for-billions-to-avert-fourhunger-crises-b/ // LH. Accessed 6-3-17.
Raising funds for hunger crises, particularly in Africa, is never easy. In 2011, the United Nations struggled to
galvanize donors during a famine in East Africa. In Somalia alone, 260,000 people died during that crisis, though a lack
of funding wasn’t the only reason for that massive loss of life. The international community’s response had been slow even
before the fundraising appeal began, and aid delivery had been complicated by al-Shabab militants. Many in the
aid community worried that the Trump administration’s budget, which proposed massive cuts to foreign aid, would be
disastrous for the international humanitarian response. But so far, the United States is still donating more than
other nations in many cases.
Prioritizing Aid Better
Foreign aid boosts soft power, more effective and cost-efficient than military action
Mona Yacoubian, 3-10-2017, “Trump’s Cuts to USAID Would Imperil the United States”, Foreign Policy,
“http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/trumps-cuts-to-usaid-would-imperil-the-united-states // LH.
Accessed 6-3-17.
While the soft power aspect of U.S. development assistance is important, increasingly the work
performed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others must be recognized as
a strategic asset that is no less powerful than the military in confronting multifaceted challenges, and for
a fraction of the cost — less than one percent of the total federal budget. Indeed, in a letter to Congress last month,
more than 120 retired military leaders underscored their “strong conviction that elevating and strengthening diplomacy and development are
critical to keeping America safe.” Recognizing the
complexity of crises in the 21st century world, they noted that these
problems “do not have military solutions alone.” Nowhere is this more apparent than the Arab world, which suffers from the
Islamic State’s barbaric extremism; wrenching conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and massive refugee flows to Lebanon, Jordan, and
beyond. Youth unemployment, poverty, corruption, and unaccountable governance add to the region’s volatility.
US is moving towards military response, but there is little benefit – makes the
problem worse.
Jon Temin, 5-25-2017, "Opinion," International New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/opinion/somalia-al-shabaab-us-airstrikes.html
The Trump administration has made it clear that the United States will take a more aggressive approach
to battling al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia. In March, President Trump granted the military expanded
authorities to operate in Somalia, paving the way for an accelerated military campaign. By declaring parts of
Somalia an “area of active hostilities,” Mr. Trump gave the Department of Defense authority to approve strikes
without going through an Obama-era vetting process, which potentially lowers the bar for tolerance of civilian casualties.
And the head of American forces in Africa, who advocated the change, said this would “allow us to prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion.”
The United States also recently sent several dozen additional troops to Somalia and reportedly requested information on the locations of aid
groups there, possibly to ensure they are out of the way of airstrikes. One American soldier was killed in Somalia this month, the first combat
death there since 1993. Continue reading the main story RELATED COVERAGE In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War OCT. 16, 2016
ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story [however]
There is little to be gained by making intensified
military engagement the dominant policy approach to Somalia. The absence of an effective state is
the fundamental problem there. When and where there is some semblance of governance, it is often profoundly corrupt and
subservient to a deeply ingrained clan system. Al-Shabaab capitalizes on resentment of government ineptitude,
corruption and lack of economic opportunity to recruit, especially among Somalia’s youth. Airstrikes do
nothing to address these failures. Instead, they may create more problems by allowing African Union
forces to retreat, further militarize American policy, sideline diplomatic engagement and undercut the
newly elected Somali president. After making notable progress for several years, troops from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti
and Burundi fighting al-Shabaab under an African Union banner have slowed the pace of their offensives.
Aff Increases Violence
Counterterror Backfires
A one standard deviation increase in US military aid increases terrorism by 114%
Eric Neumayer, 2010, “Foreign Terror on Americans.” Journal of Peace Research
An analysis of substantive effects based on model 4 allows one to gauge the relative importance of the three measures of military support
when entered together in the esti- mations. A
one standard deviation increase in US military aid raises the expected
count of anti-American terrorism most by 114%, followed by arms exports and military per- sonnel, of
which a one standard deviation increase leads to an increase of 45 and 30%, respectively. It would thus appear that
US military aid matters most for foreign terror on Americans.
Targeted killings increase the desire for revenge, which leads to civilian death and a
cycle of violence
Gabriella Blum and Phillip Heymann, 2010, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing.” Harvard Law School
The aggression of
targeted killings also runs the risk of spiraling hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the
effects of killing and thus continuing the cycle of violence. Each attack invites revenge, each revenge invites further retaliation. Innocent
civilians suffer whether they are the intended target of attack or its unintentional collateral consequences. Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. As in the case of extraordinary detention or interrogation
methods, there is a danger of over- using targeted killings, both within and outside of the war on terrorism. A particular danger in this context
arises as the killing of a terrorist often proves a simpler operation than protracted legal battles over detention, trial, extradition, and release.
Kenya’s counterterror has been counterproductive
Vanda Felbab-Brown, 2016, “Why are efforts to counter al-Shabab falling so flat?” The Brookings
Institute
April 2 marked one year since the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab attacked the Garissa University in Kenya and killed 148 people, galvanizing
Kenya to intensify its countert- errorism efforts. Yet al-Shabab’s operational capacities and intimidation power have grown in the past year.
Many of Kenya’s
counterterrorism policies have been coun- terproductive, and counterinsurgency efforts
by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have at best stagnated.
Impact: Decreases Government Legitimacy
Counterterrorism erodes support for law enforcement – long term harm.
Eric Rosand, 2008, “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa.” Center on
Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
In general, lack of
respect for human rights and the rule of law has undermined public support for
counterterrorism efforts in East Africa and further undermined confidence in the law enforcement and
security services of some countries in the subregion. To exacerbate matters, the lack of information currently being
provided to the public has helped galvanize human rights advocates against governments in the subregion.
Military options fail
Militarized responses lock out other options
Sunil Suri,January, 2016 Safer World, “Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia” http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/barbedwire-on-our-heads.pdf // DY
Such an objective has proved to be unhelpful, as it has locked international actors into a militarised
approach to resolving the various drivers of the Somali conflict – which according to one INGO representative has
prevented the development of “a more comprehensive peacebuilding strategy”,175 leaving no avenues
through which Somali and international actors can engage with al-Shabaab in an effort to de-escalate
the conflict. Another problem with reducing the Somali conflict to one where al-Shabaab simply needs to be defeated is that it ignores the fact that: “AlShabaab is a symptom rather than a cause of fragility, and while it may be the most immediate and
obvious challenge to peace and security in Somalia, it is by no means the most important one.” Dominik
Balthasar in ’Thinking Beyond Roadmaps in Somalia: Expanding Policy Options for State Building’176 The wider consequence of this confusion about what
international actors are seeking to accomplish through the use of militarised approaches in Somalia and the overwhelming focus on defeating al-Shabaab is that
strategy has often been formulated 2.1 The failures of militarised approaches saferworld 23 177 Op cit Ploch L (2010), p 3. 178 These actions have been copied by
regional actors such as Kenya, which has banned at least 86 entities and individuals it accuses of financing and supporting terror activities in the country. This has
negatively impacted on the local economy of Somalis in Kenya, with an estimated $70–100 million transferred a month between Somalis in Kenya. For more details,
see Bosh A M (2015), ‘Kenya is stopping remittances of $70 million a month from reaching its Somali community’, Quartz, 8 April. 179 Migiro K (2015), ‘Somalis
panic as cash flow dries up after U.S. remittance lifeline cut’, Reuters, 19 February. 180 Congress of the United States (2015), ‘Ellison Remittances Letter’, 6
February, (www.hiiraan.com/PDF/2015/Feb/Ellison%20 Remittances%20Letter_2.06.15.pdf). 181 Ibid. 182 Monbiot G (2015), ‘Unremitting Pain’, 10 February,
(www.monbiot.com/2015/02/10/unremitting-pain/). 183 Op cit International Crisis Group (2002), p 8. 184 For example, the US State Department Press Release
after killing of Godane described it as “a major symbolic and operational loss” to al-Shabaab. See The White House (2014), ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on the
Death of Ahmed Godane’, 5 September (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/statement-press-secretary-death-ahmed-godane). See also U.S.
Department of Defense (2014), ‘Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby on Ahmed Godane’, 5 September
(www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605172). without proper consideration of the actual long-term security needs of the Somali
people. For
example, the prioritisation of Western security needs over those of Somalis is clearly reflected
in testimony offered in 2010 by the then Chairman of the Senate’s Subcommittee on African Affairs,
who voiced concern that, “we [the US] still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties our
programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be grasping at straws to ‘do something’ while
our national security increasingly hangs in the balance [emphasis added]”.17
Decapitation strategies are counterproductive - lower the rate of decline for alShabaab
Sunil Suri,January, 2016 Safer World, “Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia” http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/barbedwire-on-our-heads.pdf // DY
As detailed in section one, the
US, as well as Kenya and Ethiopia, have repeatedly carried out operations, some
involving airstrikes and drone strikes, to target individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist
organisation. While any attempt to assess the efficacy of such operations is complicated by the general lack of transparency and
accountability surrounding them, it is possible to observe that military action focused on achieving short-term counterterrorism objectives has frequently had negative longer-term impacts on the Somali conflict. This can be
elaborated by examining al-Shabaab in the aftermath of notable counterterrorism operations. The high-profile killings of alShabaab leaders Aden Hashi Ayro and Ahmed Abdi Godane, for example, were celebrated as decisive
blows against al-Shabaab.184 However, despite predictions that their deaths heralded al-Shabaab’s decline, in both
instances, the group has retained its abilities to conduct high-profile attacks both in Somalia and
beyond.185 Indeed, according to Jenna Jordan – who has analysed 298 instances of leadership targeting –
“decapitation is not ineffective merely against religious, old, or large groups, it is actually counterproductive… In many
cases, targeting a group’s leadership actually lowers its rate of decline”.186
Local leadership is unprepared to manage liberated areas, leading to reclaiming by
terrorists
Sunil Suri,January, 2016 Safer World, “Barbed wire on our heads” Lessons from counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia” http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/barbedwire-on-our-heads.pdf // DY
Typically following the ‘liberation’ of an area, a temporary administration has been dispatched from
Mogadishu, often bypassing any discussion of its lack of legitimacy among the local populace. The
sustainability of these temporary administrations has been further undermined by their total dependence on AMISOM for security. Newly
recovered areas are extremely vulnerable to being retaken by al-Shabaab if AMISOM withdraws, as
occurred in the town of Buqda, which al-Shabaab retook in early September 2015. Local elder Nur
Ibrahim remarked that “the problem is that the government cannot keep control of the town and it does not
want al-Shabaab to rule it”.210
Soft Power
Counterterrorism Decreases Soft Power
Aid decreases incentive to cooperate
Patricia Sullivan, 2011, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooper- ation.” Foreign Policy Analysis
We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing
levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign
policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recip- ient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrotand-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US
military assistance.
Countries shun US to seem independent
Patricia Sullivan, 2011, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooper- ation.” Foreign Policy Analysis
The Lonely Superpower model predicts that increasing
dependence on US military aid will create incentives for
leaders to be less overtly cooperative with the United States in an effort to counter any perception that
their foreign policy is dictated by a foreign power. The Reverse Leverage model anticipates that military aid recipients will
exploit the fact that the United States relies on them to provide some specific good—and the availability of alter- native arms suppliers—to
defy the broader interests of the United States with impunity.
Aid is empirically proven to decrease cooperation
Patricia Sullivan [University of Georgia] “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooper- ation.” Foreign
Policy Analysis, 2011.
States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are
held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less
cooperative—scoring an average of) 11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An
increase in US military aid to one standard
deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of
the recipient state.
Humanitarian diplomacy
Mark Wild, Spring 2015, "," No Publication, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/06_Wild.pdf
However, a
new form of the reciprocal nature of humanitarian aid has been becoming more prominent and
utilized by non-traditional donor states like China, who, in recent years has been on the forefront of economic growth and
stability. It is predicated to become the world’s largest economy in the next decade, a feat it has met according to some sources, and its
growing influence in the developing world has been scaring the traditional economic powerhouses.9 Parallel to the growth of China, has been
the rise in the importance both politically and economically of Africa. After massive colonization and then a period of rapid decolonization,
Africa has just recently again begun to see a larger portion of the world’s attention, especially due to its abundance of untapped natural
resources and industrial potential. Western nations traditionally view most of Africa as a continent full of failing states needing social reform.
China, on the other hand, is outperforming the success of western nations when it comes to aid, gaining
both political allies as well as economic partners due to its ability to understand and deliver what
Africa needs most. China has begun the process of transitioning the idea of ‘aid’ from the western norm
of non-reciprocal charity donations to the now increasingly more evident and more mutualistic process
of reciprocal aid giving and thereby China has become a much larger player in the realm of humanitarian
diplomacy. China gave aid to the Philippines because it was what was required of the second largest economy in the world, not as a way of
gaining favor from the Philippines. Yet old ways are fading. The new model will show that what dictates China’s and
increasingly other nations’ aid giving, is the idea of what they, can gain- not from giving the gift, but
rather from engaging in humanitarian diplomacy, in other words, using aid to increase relations and
ties between the countries.
Mark Wild, Spring 2015, "," No Publication, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/06_Wild.pdf
that the persistence of African states “made possible” the recognition of the P.R.C. by the United Nations, and therefore the opportunity to
become a member of the P-5 on the Security Council.19 In return for this acceptance, China has given a large amount of aid in a variety of
forms to Africans states.20 While
China’s involvement in humanitarian aid has grown in both scale and
investment, the reason for which has not been one of altruism but rather realism. Li writes, “China’s main
objective in Africa is to develop and nurture its geopolitical influence on the basis of a practical
instrumental imperative that underpins its future growth through globalization”.21 This approach, while
common in most forms of diplomatic arrangements, is uncommon in the environment of humanitarianism. Little, outside of human rights, has
been asked for in return for aid or intervention, but China has decided to capitalize on this opportunity. While potentially seen as morally
wrong, states have no use for morality and therefore can proceed to leverage their support for African intervention issues in return for positive
relations and therefore growth.
Blocks
A2: Drones
Drones lead to unacceptably high levels of civilian casualties, because the drone policy
is based on the assumption that all military aged males are combatants.
Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice" The Brookings
Institute. 17 June. 2013. Web. 06 May. 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-workthe-case-for-washingtons- weapon-of-choice/>.
Despite the obvious benefits of using drones and the problems associated with the alternatives, numerous critics argue that drones still have
too many disadvantages. First among them is an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties. Admittedly, drones have
killed innocents. But the real debate is over how many and whether alternative approaches are any better. The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism reports that in
2011, drone strikes killed as many as 146 noncombatants, including as many as 9
children. Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Clinic also cites high numbers of civilian deaths, as does the Pakistani organization Pakistan
Body Count. Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation oversees a database of drone casualties culled from U.S. sources and international
media reports. He estimates that between
150 and 500 civilians have been killed by drones during Obama’s
administration. U.S. officials, meanwhile, maintain that drone strikes have killed almost no civilians. In June 2011, John
Brennan, then Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, even contended that U.S. drone strikes had killed
no civilians in the previous year. But these claims are based on the fact that the U.S. government
assumes that all military-age males in the blast area of a drone strike are combatants— unless it can
determine after the fact that they were innocent (and such intelligence gathering is not a priority).
The US using drones sets a dangerous precedent that could lead to other countries
using harmful strikes against nations. If the US doesn’t reform, they essentially justify
this practice.
Ingersoll, Geoffrey. "America Is Setting A Dangerous Precedent For The Drone Age" Business insider, 09
Jan. 2013. Web. 5 May. 2016. < <http://www.businessinsider.com/america-is-setting-a-dangerousprecedent-for- the-drone-age-2013-1>.
So the U.S. has the benefit of the doubt, even when it carries out "signature strikes" in which the identities of those killed on the
ground is unknown and the decision to strike hinges upon recognition of certain undisclosed behaviors and tendencies. That's a powerful
precedent. Imagine
China conducting strikes inside Japan, or its own borders (e.g. Tibet) while using the
current administration's same opaque, one-size fits all statement that each strike only happens after
"rigorous standards and process of review" — essentially, "nevermind the evidence, trust us. That wouldn't
fly, but right now America is not in a very strong position to criticize such a situation. That's why, as Zenko argues, the U.S. must reform
its policies or risk losing its moral and strategic advantage. A few months ago, the election spurred Obama to codify its
rules and regulations regarding drone strikes because "there was concern that the levers might no longer be in our hands," one anonymous
official told Scott Shane of the New York Times. Well that time is approaching, and it won't be a Mitt Romney or Marco Rubio in control. It'll be
North Korea's Kim Jung Un, China's Hu Jintao, or Iran's Ahmed Ahmadinejad. Which means that it may be time to show the drone "playbook" so
extrajudicial killings don't become a blindly accepted aspect of international foreign policy.
Because drones are so easy to use, they may incentivize the US to intervene
unnecessarily.
Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice" The Brookings
Institute. 17 June. 2013. Web. 06 May. 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-workthe-case-for-washingtons- weapon-of-choice/>.
The U.S. government also needs to guard against another kind of danger: that the
relative ease of using drones will make U.S.
intervention abroad too common. The scholars Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun have argued that drones provide “a way to
avoid deploying troops or conducting an intensive bombing campaign” and that this “may encourage countries to act on just cause with an ease
that is potentially worrisome.”
Although al Qaeda remains a threat, it has been substantially defanged since
9/11, thanks to the destruction of its haven in Afghanistan and effective global police, intelligence, and
drone campaigns against its cells. In addition, the U.S. government needs to remember that many of the
world’s jihadist organizations are focused first and foremost on local regimes and that although the
United States has an interest in helping its allies fight extremists, Washington cannot and should not
directly involve itself in every fight. The Obama administration should spell out those cases in which the AUMF does not apply and
recognize the risks of carrying out so-called goodwill kills on behalf of foreign governments. Helping French and Malian forces defeat jihadists in
Mali by providing logistical support, for example, is smart policy, but sending U.S. drones there is not.
A2: Econ
Troops aren’t necessarily the cause of the economic growth; they’re just one part of
the broader US commitment that spurs growth.
Jones, Garrett. "U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth" GMU. Feb. 2011. Web. 06 May. 2017.
<https://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/USTroopsGrowthJonesKane>.
The presence of U.S. military troops is surely related to a wider American commitment, one that involves
foreign aid, diplomacy, trade, investment, and a host of other factors. The fact that U.S. troops are much simpler to quantify, and that other
factors such as diplomatic and technology diffusion are quite impossible to quantify, means that troop
variables are likely serving
as a useful proxy for this wider commitment. But if the underlying, unmeasured relationship between U.S.
troops and U.S. political commitment remains robust, then our results likewise remain robust. However, we
did confirm that troops are better predictors of future growth than economic or military aid.
Humanitarian aid is the first step to creating an economy that can thrive in the long
term. Without it, any growth from troops will be ineffective.
Moran, Kate. "The Economics of Humanitarian Assistance: What We’re Doing and How We Can Do
Better" Huffington Post. 2017. Web. 06 May. 2017. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/youngprofessionals-in-foreign-policy/the- economics-of-humanita_b_10231486.html>.
Economic development is the hub around which the many spokes of development revolve; expanding opportunities in formal markets must be
a foundational component of development. While humanitarian assistance can and should continue to provide for emergency relief, it must
also deepen its engagement with economic development efforts by working to reform the legal and regulatory frameworks that enable
informality to thrive, and promoting economic growth that expands formal markets. Ultimately, it
will only be these two
strategies—short-term assistance and long- term economic development interventions—working in
tandem that will reduce exploitative labor, improve global value chains, achieve growth, and provide for
communities in a sustainable, comprehensive way. Humanitarian aid to displaced Syrians, should it focus more heavily on
tackling informality, would prove more sustainable and provide a replicable model for other humanitarian assistance efforts.
A2: Corruption
Donors provide outside expertise and impose conditions that lead to a reduction of
government corruption.
Mohamed, Masoud Rashid et al. "Effect of foreign aid on corruption: evidence from Sub- Saharan
African countries." International Journal of Social Economics, 42:1 (2015). Web. 5 May 2017.
<http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/IJSE-04-2013-0089>.
“Another strand of literature argues that aid does improve the quality of governance and institutions and thus, eventually reduces corruption
(e.g. Ear, 2007; Dunning, 2004; Tavares, 2003). This view argues that multilateral donors
impose conditionality that requires
recipient countries to reform their democratic systems and institutions. This enhances accountability and good
governance, which in turn leads to increase in efficiency and reduction in corruption. As multilateral donors’ oversees, the government
practices of aid-recipient countries and the implementation of the conditions attached with previous aid fund, the countries will be much
concerned about their reputation. Thus, they will undertake reforms in order to qualify for the aid in the future. On the other hand, bilateral
donors may bring expertise that would otherwise not be available in the developing countries. This may
increase know how in developing countries to undertake the critical reforms of their institutions and
improve the quality of governance which will eventually reduce corruption. Knack (2001) argues that the flow of
ODA can also help to fill the resource gap and pay salaries of the government employees in some developing countries. This would reduce the
incentive for “petty corruption” practices.”
An increase in aid inflows of 1% of GDP leads to a decrease in corruption of ~0.2 points
out of a possible range of 10Tavares, José. “Does foreign aid corrupt?” Economic Letters, 28 Aug.
2002. Web. 5 May 2017. <http://www.dochas.ie/Shared/Files/4/DoesForeignAidCorruptFinal.pdf>.
“In Table 1 we estimate the impact of aid on corruption, using both actual aid data (inflows of foreign aid as a share of GDP) and instrumented
aid. We use the logarithm of GDP as a control and successively add time, region, legal origin and religion controls. As can be verified, both aid
and “instrumented aid are negatively related to the level of corruption, significantly so except in the case where only time dummies are used.
The main difference is that the coefficient on instrumented aid is, without exception, higher in absolute value than the coefficient on actual aid.
An increase in aid inflows of 1% of GDP leads to a decrease in corruption of ~0.2 points out of a possible
range of 10. Alesina and Weder (2002) suggest that more corrupt countries may actually receive larger aid inflows. If they are right, our
results are exactly the pattern one would expect: the coefficient on actual aid flows is biased down by reverse causation. In other words, even if
aid leads to less corruption, the fact that less corrupt countries tend to receive less aid biases the size of the coefficient. Instrumenting
for aid inflows uncovers the real relationship: aid decreases corruption.”