Syria and the Force Continuum
The ongoing unrest, violence, and security crackdowns in Syria have been a major
international issue for many months. Our current assessment is that the [Link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111208-continued-stalemate-syria ]
government and opposition forces have reached a stalemate in which the
government can’t quell the unrest and the opposition cannot bring down the regime.
We also believe that the dynamic is not likely to shift in the opposition’s favor
without outside intervention.
In last week’s security weekly we discussed the [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111207-covert-intelligence-war-against-iran ]
covert intelligence war being waged by the United States, Israel and other U.S.
allies against Iran. These efforts are not only directed against Iran’s nuclear
program but also seek to curb Iran’s regional power by [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111121-syria-iran-and-balance-powermiddle-east ] preventing Iran from establishing an arc of influence that
stretches from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Not only are the United
States and its allies working to limit Iran’s influence in Iraq and constrain Hezbollah
in Lebanon, but they also appear to be exploring ways to overthrow the Assad
regime in Syria, which has been a long time Iranian ally, and which at this time is
vulnerable due to the unrest in the country.
Because of this possibility, we would like to take a deeper look at what external
efforts to topple the Syrian might look like. To do this we will examine the types of
tools that are available to external forces seeking to overthrow governments and
where those tools fit into the force continuum. We will also discuss some of the
indicators that can be used by outside observers seeking to understand any efforts
taken against the Syrian regime.
Intervention
First, it must be recognized that while there are some similarities between Libya
and Syria, the situation in Syria is quite different from what it was prior to the [link
http://www.stratfor.com/theme/protests-libya-full-coverage ] beginning of
outside intervention in Libya last March. Certainly the Assad regime is every bit
as brutal as that of Gadhafi, and also came to power as a result of a military coup
during the same era. Syria is also a country that is quite divided, and is being
governed by a small minority of the population. However, the fault lines in Syrian
society are not as clear cut regionally as the
[link http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110824-libya-after-gadhafitransitioning-rebellion-rule ] are in Libya. This means that there is no clear
Benghazi-like zone in Syria where the opposition can dominate and control territory
that can be used as a base to project power. As the map below indicates, the
protests in Syria have occurred in many diffuse areas and the Free Syrian Army
likewise claims to have a presence in many parts of the country.
(Insert graphic from this piece : http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111201military-options-undermine-syrias-regime )
It is also quite significant to note that while some Syrian military members (mostly
low-level Sunnis) have defected to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110928-syrian-opposition-perception-andreality ] Syria has not seen the large scale-military defections (sometimes entire
units) that occurred in Benghazi and eastern Libya at the beginning of that conflict
that immediately provided the opposition with a substantial conventional military
force. The Alawite-controlled Syrian military has remained far more unified and
intact than the Libyan military.
Secondly, Syria simply does not have the oil resources that Libya does. Up to this
point we have not seen the Europeans pushing for military intervention in the same
way they were for action in Libya. Even France, which has been the most vocal of
the European countries regarding Syria, has recently backed away from seeking
direct military intervention. Due to the strength of Syria’s military, and specifically
its air defense system, which is far more advanced and robust than Libya’s, any
intervention there would be far more costly than the intervention in Libya both in
terms of blood and treasure. Syria spent some $264 million on air defense weapons
in 2009 and 2010 following the embarrassing [link
http://www.stratfor.com/israels_ammunition_drop_syria ] Sept. 2007 Israeli
airstrike on a Syrian nuclear reactor.
With Libya still being unsettled, it is not at all clear that the U.S. and Europe have the
stomach to deal with another major military inervention at this time either
politically, or economically – the operations in Libya were very costly. We also do
not believe that interested regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Turkey
have the ability to take military action against Syria without U.S. and NATO support.
However, regardless of the foreign intentions regarding the Assad regime, there is a
whole array of options that can be applied against governments that do not rise to
the level of an outright invasion or even an air campaign supported with special
operations forces.
The Force Continuum
Let’s examine some of the actions available along that force continuum. But as we do
we must keep in mind that the steps are not at all static, and there can be quite a
degree of latitude of action within each step. For example, training provided by the
mercenaries or the CIA’s Special Activities Staff is far more low-key, and therefore
easier to deny, than training by Special Operations Forces.
Once a nation decides to intervene in another nation, the lowest risk, least obvious
option is to ramp up intelligence activities in the target country. Such activities can
involve hidden, clandestine activities such as developing contact with opposition
figures, encouraging generals to conduct a coup or defect to the opposition.
Clandestine efforts can also include measures such as working with opposition
groups and NGOs to improve their information warfare activities. They may also
progress to more obvious, covert actions such assassinations or sabotage. Most of
the actions in the covert intelligence war against Iran we discussed last week fit into
this level. The difference between clandestine activities such as meeting with the
opposition and assassinations are quite stark.
Often such clandestine and covert activities are accompanied by overt diplomatic
pressure such as press statements denouncing the leadership of the target country,
the initiation of resolutions in regional international organizations (such as the Arab
league) or the United Nations, and even international economic sanctions. These
overt measures can also include formally meeting with representatives of the
opposition in a third country, like U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s meeting
with Syrian opposition members in Geneva, Switzerland on Dec. 6.
The next step up on the force continuum is to solidify relationship with the
opposition and to begin to provide them with intelligence, training and advice. In
the intervention in Libya, this happened fairly early on as foreign intelligence
officers and special operations forces traveled to places like Benghazi, then later the
Nafusa Mountains to provide the Libyan opposition with intelligence about the
disposition of Gadhafi’s forces, and to begin to train the rag tag forces to fight. In
Syria there is still a very real issue of lack of unity among the Syrian opposition,
which appears to be even more fragmented than its Libyan counterpart. Often times
the opposition fighters will be taken to a third country for training due to the
difficulty of training in the host country controlled by a hostile government that
rightfully views the opposition as a threat. This already appears to be happening
with the training of FSA members in Turkey.
The next step beyond training and intelligence sharing is to provide the opposition
with funding and other support, which can include food, uniforms, communication
equipment, medical assistance and even weapons. Obviously again, providing
funding is not as aggressive as providing weapons to the opposition, so there is a
great deal of latitude within this step.
Usually, the weapons provided will be of a type used by the host country in an effort
to hide that fact that the opposition is receiving outside assistance. Certainly in the
early days of the international support for the mujahidin fighting the Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan, efforts were made to provide them with weapons consistent with
what the Soviets and the Afghan communists were using. However, when those
weapons proved insufficient to counter the threat posed by Soviet air superiority,
the decision was made to provide [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100129_manpads_persistent_and_potent_thre
at ] U.S. FIM-92 Stinger man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to the
Afghan fighters. The presence of the Stingers made a huge tactical difference on
the battlefield, but since it was an advanced, exogenous weapons system, furnishing
it to the Afghan fighters stripped away any sense of plausible deniability the U.S.
might have maintained up to that point regarding its operations to arm the Afghans.
We saw a similar situation in Libya in May when large quantities of FN-FAL battle
rifles began to appear in rebel hands. While the rebels had looted many Gadhafi
arms depots filled with Soviet-era Kalashnikovs, the appearance of the FAL rifles
clearly demonstrated that the rebels were receiving weapons from outside patrons.
The appearance of Iranian-manufactured bomb components in Iraq in 2006-2007
was another classic case of a weapon that indicated foreign government
involvement in an armed struggle. Since furnishing non-typical weapons has this
effect of stripping away plausible deniability, we are listing it as a separate step on
the force continuum. Unveiling the foreign hand can also have a psychological effect
on members of the regime by signaling that the opposition is being supported by a
powerful foreign power.
The next level begins to bring direct foreign involvement into play. This usually
entails foreign special operations forces working with local ground forces and
foreign airpower being brought to bear. We saw this model used in the 2001
invasion of Afghanistan where U.S. Intelligence personnel, Special Operations Forces
and airpower augmented the Afghan Northern Alliance ground troops and allowed
them to quickly defeat the Taliban. This model was also used successfully against
the Gadhafi regime in Libya.
Of course the highest and least exercised step on the force continuum is foreign
invasion, like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Signposts
With this range of actions in mind then, outside observers can look for telltale signs
that signal where foreign efforts to support a particular struggle fit along the
continuum.
For example, signs of a clandestine intelligence campaign can include the defection
of critical officers, coup attempts or even major splits within the military. When
figures such as former Libyan Chief of Intelligence, and serving foreign Minister
Moussa Koussa [link http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20110330-whatkoussas-defection-means-gadhafi-libya-and-west ] defected from the Gadhafi
regime, they were clearly doing so in response to clandestine intelligence efforts.
Covert activities could include sabotage and assassinations, like some of those
recently reported inside Iran.
Signs of training and support will manifest themselves in increased effectiveness by
the Free Syrian Army or if they suddenly begin to employ new tactics, strike new
targets, or show the ability to better coordinate actions over a wide geographic area.
An example of a new tactic would be if the FSA began to execute asymmetrical
warfare operations such as coordinated ambushes or hit and run strikes directed
against high value targets. Foreign trainers will also help the FSA learn how to
develop networks within the local population that provide intelligence and early
warning, supplies, communication and shelter.
Another indicator of outside training and intelligence support will be an increase in
the effectiveness of the opposition attacks. The opposition has claimed to have
conducted several strikes against targets like the Syrian [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111118-syrian-intelligence-facility-attackexamined ] Directorate of Air Force Intelligence, in suburban Damascus, but
such attacks do not appear to have been very effective. To date these attacks have
served more of a propaganda function rather than achieving cleat military
objectives. We are currently carefully monitoring alleged FSA efforts to hit oil and
gas pipelines to see if they become more directed and tactically effective. We have
heard rumors of American, Turkish, French and Jordanian Special Operations Forces
training FSA personnel in Turkey, and if these rumors are true, we should begin to
see results of this training in the near future.
As we watch videos and photos coming out of Syria we constantly looking for
evidence of the FSA having either an increased weapons supply or even signs of
external weapons supply. This not only includes a greater quantity of weapons, but
different types of weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, mines,
MANPADS and IEDs. So far we have not noticed signs of either, or signs of external
weapons flowing into the country. The FSA appears to be using the weapons they
defected with.
If outside powers are going to even consider launching any sort of air campaign, or
even establishing a no-fly zone, there will be stepped up surveillance efforts to
confirm the location and status of Syria’s air defense systems. This will result in an
increase of surveillance assets and sorties in the area immediately around Syria.
Aircraft used in the suppression of air defenses would also be flown into the theater
before launching any air operation, and an increase in aircraft such as US F-16CJ and
the British Tornado GR4s in Cyprus, Turkey or Greece is a key indicator to watch as
are EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, both carrierbased aircraft that regularly transit the region aboard American Carrier Strike
Groups. Aircraft carrier battle groups, and cruise missile platforms, and possibly a
Marine Expeditionary Unit would also be moved into the region prior to any air
campaign.
Like the 2003 invasion of Iraq, any invasion of Syria would be a massive
undertaking and there would be lots of indicators to watch for in the buildup to such
an invasion, but the likelihood of actions against Syria happening at the top of the
force continuum are very remote. Instead we will need to keep focused on the more
subtle signs of foreign involvement that will signal what is happening at the lower
levels of the scale.