A Postmaterial Crisis?
Did the 2008 economic crisis led to a decline in postmaterial values hold by
citizens of advanced industrial countries?
Masterthesis
Willem van Sermondt
(s3043681)
Date: 8 October 2014
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. M. Verloo
Management Faculty
Department of Political Science
1
Abstract
Modernization theory holds that economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent,
predictable changes in culture and social and political life. Inglehart is a prominent scientist standing
in this modernization tradition, whereby he focuses on (postmaterial) values hold by citizens. He
argues that starting from the 1960s citizens more dominantly hold postmaterial values. This is linked
to modernization in the sense that he claims that prolonged periods of prosperity tend to encourage
the spread of postmaterial values, economic decline tends to have the opposite effect. This thesis
focuses on the second effect and test whether the 2008 economic crisis has led to a decline in
postmaterial values. This is descriptively tested on a macro level (advanced industrial countries) and
causally tested on a micro level (citizens of advanced industrial countries). The causal model holds
that citizens are more insecure about their income due to the economic crisis and therefore have less
postmaterial values. The hypotheses are tested using the World Values Survey and the European
Social Survey. After examining the different analyses, with varying results, I conclude that it seems to
be the case that the expected mechanism is going on. The effects are however that small that I
conclude that the change in material vs postmaterial values is not one of the important elements
describing the effects of the 2008 economic crisis. Furthermore the dichotomy between material and
postmaterial values is criticized.
Key words:
Modernity – Inglehart – (post)material values – 2008 economic crisis – World Values Survey –
European Social Survey
2
Content
Chapter
1. Introduction
2. Theory
3. Methods
4. Results
5. Critical Reflection
6. Conclusion
Literature
Appendix
Section
modernity, postmodern values and the 2008 economic crisis
different conceptions of modernity
2.1 Modernity among three domains
2.2 How Inglehart conceives of modernity
2.3 Post-modernity: a new direction
2.4 Beyond post-modernity
Varieties of modernity
Path dependency
Waves: a silent counter revolution
2.5 Inglehart and culture: generalization and particularization
2.6 Postmodern vs post-material: two distinct concepts?
2.7 Post-materialism according to Inglehart
2.8 Value change according to Inglehart
Life cycle effects
Generation effects
Period effects
2.9 Critiques on Inglehart’s claims
2.10 Moving forward or backward? The current economic crisis
Hypotheses and causal models
measurement issues and the specification of hypotheses
3.1 Case selection and population-level causality
World Values Survey and European Social Survey
3.2 Dependent variable: measuring postmaterial values
3.3 Alternative index measuring postmaterial values
(European Social Survey)
3.4 Macro level hypotheses
3.5 The need of a multilevel model
3.6 Micro level hypotheses
macro and micro level
4.1 Lower scores of post-materialism?
4.2 Lower scores of post-materialism among youngsters?
4.3 Macro level correlation?
Correlation: economic growth with postmaterial change
Correlation: change in unemployment level with postmaterial
change
4.4 Micro level effects
4.5 The wealthy threshold
what could the results mean?
5.1 Difference between World Values Survey and European Social
Survey
5.2 Measuring post-materialism
no postmaterial crisis
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1) Introduction: modernity, postmodern values and the 2008 economic crisis
In May 2014 the elections for the European Parliament were held across 28 European Union member
states. For the first time in history no less than seven animal welfare parties competed in these
elections (Animal Welfare Party, 2014). Two of them, the Dutch and the German animal parties, were
even elected in the Parliament. Characteristic for animal welfare parties is their strong appeal to
post-modernism. The following phrases from the Dutch Party for the Animals’ program are typical for
this appeal to postmodern values.
“the earth has enough to meet everyone’s needs, but not enough to meet everyone’s greed.
monetary issues are dictating the economy. money rules, while everything of real value is
subordinated to money. Animals and nature have been turned into products with price tags. Even
people’s desires and cares are expressed in terms of money. This one-sided approach stands in the
way of the change we so dearly need.” Source: Party for the Animals (2012).
The aversion against the financial system and the appeal to a change towards a less economycentered society are typical for the postmodern ideal. Although only a small part of the population
voted for animal welfare parties, the popularity of those parties indicates a societal shift towards
postmodern ideals. The Dutch member of parliament (MP) for the Socialist Party Emile Roemer also
points to a similar shift. Roemer sees this shift especially among young people. “Younger generations
have a different mindset, they do not care so much about money but have different longings. They
put more value on friendship and spare time and do not feel the need for excessive salaries”. (E.G.M.
Roemer, personal communication, 11 June 2014).
These two examples correspond with Inglehart’s (1977) view about modern society. Inglehart claims
that since the 1960s a shift towards post-modernism has been taking place. In essence postmodernism 1 is the idea that economic production becomes less important while interaction,
communication and processing information becomes increasingly important (Bell, 1976). The
changing societal economic relations led to changing gender roles, changing attitudes towards
authority, changing sexual norms and the longing for more political participation (Inglehart, 1997).
Inglehart’s modernization theory holds that the postmodern shift is intergenerational. Younger
generations are more postmaterial than older generations. The intergenerational shift is based upon
two hypotheses; the scarcity hypothesis and the socialization hypothesis. The scarcity hypotheses
1
The concepts post-modernism and post-materialism are often confused with each other. In the theoretical
chapter the overlap and distinction of the two concepts is explained. This thesis mainly focuses on the
postmaterial concept.
4
states that “under conditions of prosperity people become more likely to emphasize post-materialist
goals” (Inglehart, 1977). People, however, do not immediately adjust their priorities. Hereby
socialization places a key role. According to Inglehart (1977) one’s basic values reflect to a large
extend the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years. Younger generations are raised
under more secure conditions and therefore are more likely to hold postmaterial values. In this sense
the fact that a party for animal welfare gets elected is only half of the story. The other half is partly
explained by Emile Roemers’ statement that it is especially the younger generations that most often
hold postmaterial values.
Inglehart’s theory fits perfectly within the larger modernization tradition. “The central claim
of modernization theory holds that economic development is linked with coherent and, to some
extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life” (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Some
tend to focus more on general patterns whereas others focus on specific, or cultural, developments.
Although Inglehart is usually put within the generalization strand, he does not neglect cultural
differences (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). He argues that a lot of cross-cultural variation is explained by
whether or not a society experienced two important shifts . The first shift is associated with the
industrial revolution, through which life changed from a ‘game against nature’ towards a ‘game
against fabricated nature’ (Bell, 1976). The second shift is the postmodern shift. Apart from these
patterns with space for particularities Inglehart also draws bold statements about a general pattern.
He translates the central claim of the modernization theory into a statement in which it applies to his
own theory of post-materialism. Inglehart (1999, p. 211) states that; “Prolonged periods of
prosperity tend to encourage the spread of postmaterial values, economic decline tends to have the
opposite effect”.
Inglehart’s research has focused mainly on the first part, showing that modern societies have
become more postmodern. Inglehart does not pay much attention to declining levels of postmaterialism. This thesis, however, will focus extensively on this second effect that is to a great extend
neglected by Inglehart. In this thesis the 2008 economic crisis2 is used as test case.
The 2008 economic crisis forms a typical case for testing the second part of Inglehart’s thesis. The
economic crisis that started in 2008 can be seen as such a prolonged period of economic decline that
Inglehart mentions in his theory on post-materialism. During the 2008 economic crisis a lot of citizens
lost
their
jobs
which
led
to
rapidly
increasing
unemployment
rates
across
many
2
The economic crisis started in 2007/2008 with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007/2008. Dating an endpoint
of the crisis is more difficult. Growth numbers have already turned positive, whereas unemployment rates are
still on a high level. Therefore the term ‘2008 economic crisis’ is used in this thesis, referring to the starting
point of the crisis.
5
countries(International Labour Organization, 2012). Additionally the 2008 economic crisis has been
lasting longer than economic crises in previous decades (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013).
Thirdly, the 2008 economic crisis is a global one due to the interconnectedness of the financial
system. Lastly the crisis is omnipresent due to the extensive media coverage. Even if you do not have
relatives who are hit by the crisis, you are affected by stories about the crisis. If economic decline
leads to less support for postmaterial values it is likely that this is the case for the 2008 economic
crisis. This expectation is at odds with the view of the Emile Roemer. He sees the crisis as a signal for
(young) people to make radical different choices, postmaterial choices. In this thesis it is tested what
happened with the dominant material and postmaterial values in society after the start of the 2008
economic crisis.
This research question of this thesis is relevant for at least four reasons. The first reason is the
economic crisis being an important subject of study . An economic crisis is known to have a serious
impact on a society (Kentikelenis et al, 2011; Gunnlaugsson, 2012; Chang et al, 2009). It is a
disruptive event which has the potential of changing dominant patterns is society. This thesis
contributes to the existing literature because it provides descriptive information on the extent to
which dominant values have been changed, or not. Secondly it provides explanatory knowledge on
the fact whether the expected change for the support of certain values is correlated with recent
economic developments.
The second reason why this research is theoretically relevant is the importance of studying
the dominant values in society. The theory of planned behavior assumes that in general attitudes
lead to intentions which lead to certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Although individual human behavior
does not always follow this implied linear rational pattern, the relationship is supported by a vast
amount of empirical evidence (see for example; Sniehotta, 2009; French et al, 2011). It is therefore
likely that a change in dominant values has behavioral consequences. Although this thesis does not
investigate these behavioral effects, it offers a building block for future researchers to do so.
In line with the second argument, research on postmodern values has led to research on
several ‘postmodern’ subjects. These subjects, for example, consist of postmodern political parties or
postmodern campaigning (Gibson & Römmele, 2001). Researchers making claims about postmodern
or postindustrial politics (Axford & Huggins, 2001; Chandler & Siaroff, 1986) draw the assumption
that dominant values in society changed. These changes consequently led to a different political
reality. In order to draw conclusions about these political patterns it is important to first examine
dominant value patterns among different societies. This is especially the case during or after a
notable event such as the 2008 economic crisis.
6
These three reasons have both theoretical and real world importance. The fourth and last
reason why the research question of this thesis is important is chiefly theoretical. Inglehart’s
research and predictions have been influential. Apart from the fact that his predications have been
criticized and tested many times, different scholars have continued to work with Inglehart’s
concepts. Notably Giddens (1991), Beck (1992, 2002), Bauman (2000), Huntington (1998) and
Eisenstadt (2000) have developed ‘new’ concepts of modernity. Hereby they all make use of
Inglehart’s work as an important scientific building block. Besides these newer concepts, the work of
Inglehart remains important considering the number of recent citations3 of his work. For these
reasons it will be a contribution to the scientific debate on modernization to test Inglehart’s thesis
against new conditions, namely the 2008 economic crisis.
The main questions this thesis tries to answer is;
Did the 2008 economic crisis led to a decline in postmaterial values hold by citizens of advanced
industrial countries?
In this thesis descriptive as well as explanatory hypotheses are tested. The descriptive hypotheses
test macro level results. They test to what extend postmaterial values have declined in advanced
industrial counties. They test whether this is the case for all citizens or only among youngsters. To
test these hypotheses Inglehart’s own operationalization (12-item battery) of postmaterial values is
used in the World Values Survey. This survey includes worldwide data measuring post-materialism
before and during the 2008 economic crisis. After a critical discussion of Inglehart’s measurements a
second operationalization is developed, using European Social Survey data. This is done in order to
see whether these results corroborate the findings from the World Values Survey.
Based on only macro level results one cannot draw conclusions about causal relationships.
Therefore causal relationships are tested using hypothesis testing micro level results. To this aim one
possible causal mechanism is tested. This causal model is explained in the theoretical chapter and
further elaborated on in the method chapter. Central to the causal model is the idea that an
economic crisis affects the level of economic security of citizens. This feeling of security then
influences citizens’ postmaterial values. This effect is not expected to be equally strong for all
citizens. It is expected to be mainly applicable for those who are less well off in society.
This thesis consists of six chapters. The next chapter describes the most important notions
concerning modernity. Thereafter several aspects of Inglehart’s theory are discussed. The theoretical
3
Inglehart’s most famous work: 'The Silent Revolution’ (1977) is according to Google Scholar cited in more than
200 works in 2014.
7
chapter ends with Inglehart’s thoughts about change in the dominance of postmaterial values hold
by citizens. Here the scarcity and socialization hypotheses are explained. Thereafter it is argued why
the 2008 economic crisis could affect postmaterial values. The chapter ends with the explanation of
the micro level causal model. In the method chapter this model is simplified in order to be able to
test the causal links. The possibilities of the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey data
are described. Furthermore the operationalization of the different variables is explained. Most
important here is the measurement of postmaterial values among citizens. In the result chapter the
outcomes for the different hypotheses, phrased in the method chapter, are given. These results are
thereafter elaborated on in a separate chapter named; critical discussion. In this chapter the possible
meanings of the results are discussed. In the final chapter from a more distant perspective more
general conclusions and suggestions for future research concerning modernity and post-modernity
are given.
8
2) Theory: different conceptions of modernity
The theoretical chapter consists of three main parts. In the first part I take a broad departure, while
discussing different conceptions and dimensions of modernity. It is shown that the modernity
concept is highly contested. An important divide consists between those who think of modernity
from an economic point of view and those who think of it from a justice point of view. Also within
these strands there are considerable empirical and normative debates about what modernity is or
ought to be. From this range of views the chapter zooms into the way Inglehart conceives of
modernity. Inglehart notes two important shifts that form important markers in the modernization
process. The first shift is associated with the industrial revolution, the second with post-modernity.
Inglehart explains that due to economic changes the dominant values in modern societies have
changed. Traditional values were first most dominant. After the first shift secular/rational values
became most dominant. After the second shift self expression values became most dominant in
advanced industrial countries. After the description of Inglehart’s view other ‘newer’ concepts on
modernity are described. These concepts state that globalization processes have changed and
continue to change societies. The ‘varieties of modernity’ concept, in which culture has a dominant
place, is extensively elaborated on. In the final part of the first part of the theoretical chapter
Inglehart’s view on culture is discussed.
The second part of this chapter zooms into the postmaterial concept. Post-materialism is part
of the postmodern concept but is more specifically in dichotomy with material values. Inglehart is a
prominent researcher in the field of post-material values. His work and its critiques is discussed in
these sections of the theoretical chapter. The main claim of Inglehart holds that as societies develop
in an economic sense, they transform in a postmaterial direction.
The third part of the theoretical chapter explains how the research question of this thesis is
extrapolated from Inglehart’s work. Though the main claim of Inglehart is about the effect of
economic growth on postmaterial values, he has also made claims about the effect of prolonged
periods of economic decline. It is expected that such periods will lead to a decline in the dominance
of postmaterial values. To test this latter effect, the 2008 economic crisis is selected as a typical case.
It is expected that due to the 2008 crisis and its great impact on society, postmaterial values have
declined. Finally five hypotheses that are central to this thesis are formulated.
2.1 Modernity among three domains
Modernity is all about progress. But what is progress? About this question there is and has been a lot
of contestation (Walby, 2009). Walby provides with her book ‘globalization and inequalities’ a
9
comprehensive overview of different conceptions of modernity. Walby’s book is used as an
important source in the below discussion on modernity. In order to place Inglehart’s work within the
broader debate on modernity Inglehart’s theory is related to Walby’s concepts. One of the important
divides in the modernization debate is between those who think of progress from an economic point
of view and those who think of progress from a justice point of view.
From an economic point of view, progress is seen as an improvement in living conditions and
welfare (Ibid). Economic development is seen as neutral, since people can decide for themselves
what to do with their money to improve their own life. Economic growth is thus not seen as an end in
itself, but as the best means for improving one’s standard of living. The standard of living is often
measured using life expectancy or subjective well being. Others measure the standard of living by
computing different welfare elements. Most known is the Human Development Index of Anand and
Sen (1994) whereby years of education, life expectancy and income are combined into an index. The
positive relationship of income on life expectancy and subjective well being is highly corroborated
(Inglehart, 1999; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). This relationship is however curvilinear (Inglehart,
1999). To a certain degree one’s life expectancy and subjective well being shows a steep rise as one’s
income rises. Beyond a certain threshold more economic growth does, however, not lead to a further
improvement in life expectancy or a better subjective well being. Some lay this threshold at a Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per person of 10.000 dollar (Inglehart, 1999, p. 218) others around 5.000
dollar (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Because advanced industrial countries are beyond these
thresholds economic growth, as the engine for the improvement of the quality of life, has done its
job in these countries (Ibid).
Beside the economic point of view, progress can also be seen from a justice stance.
According to those who see modernity from a justice stance, modernity is not about material
improvement of living conditions but about what kind of progress is just. Walby (2009, p. 6) list i.a.
the following authors as making claims about what kind of improvement is just for a society; justice
(Sandel, 1998; Rawls, 1999), equality (Phillips, 1995; Holli, 1997; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010), rights
(Paine, 1984; Kymlicka 1995), human rights (Peters and Wolper, 1995), citizenship (Marshall, 1950),
equal opportunities and equity (Acker, 1989; Shaw & Perrons, 1995), freedom and capabilities (Sen,
1999; Nussbaum, 2000), democracy, political rights and civil liberties (Gastil, 1982) and recognition
(Taylor, 1994; Fraser, 1997). These authors mainly make philosophical arguments but also use
empirical research to underpin their positions. According to Walby (2009) three of these approaches
are dominant. These are 1) equality, 2) human rights and 3) human development, well-being and
capabilities.
The economic and justice approach show that modernity can have different meanings and is
highly contested. A clear ‘one size fits all’ definition for modernity is therefore hard to formulate.
10
Walby (2009) does not formulate such a definition but pinpoints to different meanings modernity has
across different domains. These domains of social organization are; the economy, the polity,
violence4 and civil society. Some authors mark, sometimes implicit, a starting point of modernity.
They refer, for example, to the start of regional/global trade or to the industrial revolution. Walby
argues that it is impossible to give to a starting point of modernization. Trade and human interaction
have always been present. It is better not to see modernization as a certain event but as a process. In
this process some markers or game-changers of modernity can however be named. This is something
Walby also does. Below some of these key-events within the different domains are discussed.
In the economic domain free wage labour is a key aspect of modernity. The installment of free wage
labour replaced forced and non-marketised unfree labour, such as slavery. It also opened doors for
women to enter the labour market. The commodification of labour changed societies dramatically.
This transition is seen as the shift from feudal modes of production to capitalist modes of production.
More recent important processes in the economic domain are industrialization and globalization.
In the polity modernization often refers to the transition towards a modern state. An
important marker in this process is the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. With modernity power shifted
from feuding barons to state actors. A key element of the modernization process in the polity is the
concentration of legitimate state power. According to Weber (1947) a modern state is a body that
has a monopoly over legitimate violence within a given territory. Some argue that the process of
state modernization is over. Foucault (1997), for example, argues that modern societies are in next
stage in which state violence is replaced by disciplining. Walby (2009) states that contemporary
modern states do not have full control over legitimate violence, for example in the case of genderand ethnic-based violence. For this reason the process of modernization in the polity is not yet over.
The third domain, civil society, is especially interesting because the subject of this thesis is
closely linked with it. This thesis focuses on values hold by citizens, and citizens are the key actor
within civil society. Rationalization is a key concept of modernity within civil society (Weber,
1922/1968). The process of rationalization refers to a shift from traditional and charismatic forms of
authority towards rational, legal and bureaucratic forms of authority. Traditional and religious
believes are in this process replaced by secular and rational modes of reasoning. The scientific
method becomes the valid method for gaining knowledge. Secularization is seen as a consequence of
this modernization process. Inglehart & Baker (2000) see this secularization in declining church
attendance in most advanced industrialized countries. They do however not see secularization in the
sense that religiosity is in decline. They rather see a redirection of spiritual concerns (Inglehart,
4
Since violence as discussed by Walby (2009) does not link strongly to the modernization process in the way
Inglehart conceives it, the violence domain is not further elaborated on this thesis.
11
1999). Apart from rationalization and secularization also other concepts are ascribed to the
modernization process in civil society. Simmel (1995), for example, sees increased individuation as a
key element of modernity. In primitive thinking about social connections, family and kin affiliations
were important. In modern thinking about social relations, affiliations are based on rationality rather
than simple external characteristics. In these modern relations people can decide for themselves
with whom they want to affiliate.
Other key aspects of the modernization process crosscut through different domains.
Democratization and the focus of human rights are examples of modernization processes which can
be placed within different domains (Walby, 2009). According to modernization theory citizens in
modern societies usually think that democratic and human rights ought to be respected. These
values are seen as a product of modernity, although both concepts are highly contested. A key
marker of modernity concerning human rights is the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Walby, 2009). Empirical research shows that democratic practices and beliefs are nowadays
widespread. In almost all societies the majority of the population has a positive view on democracy
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003).
As the above shows there are a lot of debates which concern modernity. Different concepts which
have been developed form even research fields by themselves. Normative and empirical debates
about democracy, measurement of human development and debates about equality are some
examples of these research topics. One can easily get entangled in the web of all these different
debates concerning modernity. I want to avoid this by bringing focus in this thesis. For that reason
the following paragraphs zoom in on the way Inglehart conceives of modernity.
2.2 How Inglehart conceives of modernity
Inglehart is an important researcher within several debates concerning modernity. Inglehart most
famous work is ‘The Silent Revolution’ published in 1977. Most of his later writings continue to work
with the concepts developed in this book. Inglehart dominantly focuses on general patterns across
countries while taking notice of specific developments within nations. Culture plays an important
role in these specific developments. Inglehart, inspired by Bell (1976), sees two major socioeconomic
shifts which form the markers of modernization processes. The first shift is associated with the
industrial revolution, the second shift with post-modernism. According to Inglehart both shifts had
important cultural and sociopolitical implications.
A first important societal shift that took place, according to Bell (1976), was the industrial
revolution. Inglehart and Baker (2000) share this analysis and haveinvestigated what this shift meant
for the dominant values hold by citizens. They found that before the industrial revolution, in
12
preindustrial times, people dominantly needed to deal with their natural surroundings. These were
for example the seasons, storms and the depth of the mine seams. These surroundings had a major
impact on individual lives. Bell (1976, p. 147) calls this the “game against nature”. Due to
industrialization people became less dependent on nature. Nature became something which could
be controlled. Furthermore the process of industrialization is associated with occupational
specialization, rising educational levels and rising income levels (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The
industrial revolution created the rise of the working class and laid emphasis on economic growth. The
world became dominantly technical, mechanical, rationalized and bureaucratic (Bell, 1973).
According to Bell (1973, p. 147) life became a “game against fabricated nature”. As discussed in the
previous paragraphs, Walby also sees free wage labour, industrialization, rationalization,
bureaucratization and rising educational levels as key components of modernity.
The developments of and after the industrial revolution also influenced cultural, social and
political life on a more fundamental level. The dominant mode of reasoning and dominant values in
society changed due to the changing mode of production. This is a key component of modernization
theory; “economic developments are linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes
in cultural, social and political life” (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Before the industrial revolution
traditional values were dominantly by citizens, after the industrial revolution secular and rational
values became dominant. Traditional norms comprise i.a. religious norms and faith in (a nation’s)
authority. Inglehart (1999) argues that in times of physical and economic uncertainty these norms
and believes were important. The rigid religious norms and the trust in the nations gave guidance in
the ‘game against nature’. The industrial revolution brought, to some extent, peace, prosperity and a
stronger welfare state. These developments gave a sense of security that diminished the need of
traditional norms and believes. According to Inglehart (1999), although taking notice of
the
complexity of societal change, the above causal mechanism is key to the societal change caused by
the industrial revolution. Central to this mechanism is the role of sense of security. In table 1 the
distinction between traditional and secular-rational values is shown.
Table 1
Traditional
Traditional values versus secular-rational values
1) God is very important in respondent’s life.
2) Respondent believes it is more important for a child to learn obedience and
religious faith than independence and determination.
3) Respondent believes abortion is never justifiable.
4) Respondent has a strong sense of national pride.
5) Respondent favors more respect for authority.
Secular-rational
Values which emphasize the opposite.
Source: Inglehart & Baker (2000, p. 18).
13
Inglehart examines modernity as a process. Industrialization has however an important place in this
process. He uses the industrial revolution as a marker of the beginning of modernity. He does not
name any notable shift that took place before the industrial revolution. According to Inglehart, as
well as for other authors, modernization did not end after the first shift. Inglehart (1977) argues that
after the second world war a second important shift started to take place. This shift is associated
with the concept of post-modernity.
2.3 Post-modernity: a new direction
Post-modernity holds the idea that after the first shift of modernity a second, ‘new’, process of
modernization started to take place. Lyotard (1979/1984) argues that with this move societies
entered the postindustrial age. With this shift societies not only became more modern, they also
moved into a new direction (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Especially during the 1990s the idea of a
postindustrial or postmodern era triumphed scientific debates (Kumar, 2005). Soon the term postmodernity, and concepts alike, were used in many different (scientific) fields. It seems that almost all
‘new’ societal changes at that time were associated with post-modernity. The meaning of these
concepts are however different. In philosophy of science postmodern perspectives see the end of
grand narratives and emphasize the uncertainty of all knowledge. In International Relations
postmodern views attack realism and emphasize local knowledge, relativism and social
constructedness. Post-modernism is also a distinctive movement within arts and literature.
In comparative politics there are also a lot of different concepts which hold the idea of postmodernity. Some examples of these concepts are; postmodern campaigning (Gibson & Römmele,
2001), postindustrial politics (Chandler & Siaroff, 1986), postmodern politics (Axford & Huggins,
2001), postmodern populism (Axford & Huggins, 2000) and postmodern political parties. These
different concepts can be confusing. This is above all caused due to the linguists of the word ‘postmodern’. ‘Post’ can mean after or can mean opposed to (Gibbins & Reimer, 1999). For that reason
the question becomes after what? Or opposed to what? In this case ‘post’ contrasts with ‘modern’.
This means that in order to know the meaning of post-modernity one needs to know what the user
of the word means with modernity.
In the case of Inglehart (1997) it is clear what he means with modernity. According to
Inglehart a modern society is a society in which secular-rational values are dominant, see table 1.
This is created in a first shift that is linked to industrialization. The second shift seems to be a further
evolution of prevailing worldviews, but is fact again a shift in direction (Ingehart & Baker, 2000).
Inglehart and Baker, still inspired by Bell (1976), associate this shift with the emergence of
postindustrial society. In industrial times life was a “game against fabricated nature” (Bell, 1976, p.
147). Due to increased prosperity dependence on both nature and production of material objects
14
becomes less important. Instead interaction with others, communication and processing information
becomes most important. Life becomes a
“game between persons” (Bell, 1976, p.148).
The economic developments have again an impact on cultural, social and political life.
Postmodern values, instead of modern values, are dominantly held by citizens in postmodern
societies. Postmodern values encompass a range of different values. They concern for example
gender roles, attitudes towards authority, sexual norms and longing for political participation.
Modern values Inglehart (1997) calls survival values, postmodern values he calls self expression
values. This distinction is shown in table 2.
Table 2
Survival
Survival values versus self expression values
1) Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over selfexpression and quality of life.
2) Respondent describes self as not very happy.
3) Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition.
4) Respondent believes homosexuality is never justifiable.
5) Respondent believes you have to be very careful about trusting people.
Self expression
Values which emphasize the opposite.
Source: Inglehart & Baker (2000, p. 18).
The diversity of values shown in table 2 opens the debate for a further specification of the
postmodern concept. This chapter and the next chapter does extensively so. Before I turn to this
elaboration wider perspective on post-modernity is discussed. The following paragraphs discuss
several concepts linked with, or in response to, the concept of post-modernity.
2.4 Beyond post-modernity
In the debate about progress different schools of thought have been developed. The idea of a
postmodern era triumphed the debate during the 1990s. Several other ideas about progress have
however also been developed. Some of the most prominent ideas are; late modernity (Giddens,
1991), reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992, 2002), liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) and multiple
modernities (Huntington, 1998; Eisenstadt, 2000). These concepts all hold the notion that
globalization processes have changed and continue to change societies.
According to Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) the world is dominated by ‘risk societies’. In
pre-modern societies natural risks played an important role. Modernization brought a decline in
these natural risks. Modernity did however create new risks. These new risks are social and can be
caused by human decision making. The element of choice rather than fixed traditional patterns
becomes important. Beck (1992) says; “There is an unprecedented possibility of destruction through
15
human decision making”. Humans can for example decide about the use of weapons, major
industries and economic mechanisms. These bring, respectively, risks of mass destruction, destroyed
vital ecological system and collapse of the global economy. In ‘risk societies’ reflexivity in social
relations plays a key role. With reflexivity the individual (Beck, 2002) and self-identity (Giddens,
1991) become important. Although Walby (2009) prefers using concepts and language that originates
in gender theory, she agrees with Beck and Giddens that social relations in small groups, like the
family, are areas of significant social change.
Bauman (2000) goes a step further and argues that we live in an era of liquid modernity. The
modernization process is according to Bauman about changing space and time relations. In this
process the natural limit of accelerating the speed of movement has been reached. This led to a
situation in which mutual engagement between supervisors and the supervised and between capital
and labour, has ended. In Bauman’s view, which holds a pessimistic connotation, human interactions
have become liquid, fluid and transitory.
Varieties of modernity
A lot of modernization theorists see some sort of linear or gradual pattern of modernity. Beck,
Giddens and Bauman all see a singular path to modernity. With this they neglect that there can be
different paths of modernity (Walby, 2009). These different paths can lead to important differences
between countries. This idea of ‘multiple modernities’ (Huntington, 1998; Eisenstadt, 2000) or
‘varieties of modernity’ (Schmidt, 2006) is taken up by several scholars. These scholars are part of the
particularization strand which argues against the generalization strand. Authors like Marx
(1848/1967) and Bell (1976), part of the generalization strand, argue that socioeconomic
developments are the driving force behind cultural development. They try to identify underlying
factors that explain common social changes taking place around the globe (Shirokanova, 2012).
Authors like Weber (1904/2002) and Huntington (1993), part of the particularization strand, point to
cultural components of different paths of development.
Huntington and Eisenstadt focus on the idea of multiple modernities. They reject the notion
that the modernization process is a western product. For Huntington (1993) the world is divided by
different civilizations. These civilizations form the most important cleavage through which societal
conflicts are and will be formed. Similarly, Eisenstadt (2000) points to differences between cultures.
He argues that different cultures have value systems which are incompatible with each other. Both
Huntington and Eisenstadt argue that cultural factors are dominant in the process of individual- and
group-identification.
Schmidt (2006) warns for too much focus on differences and incompatibilities in culture. If
one does so, similarities in development get snowed under, he argues. Schmidt (2006) developed the
16
concept of ‘varieties of modernity’. In this concept differences and similarities between societies are
taken into account. The differences between societies are, according to Schmidt, not simply culturally
rooted. Differences can better be seen as differences within one family. The mode of (economic)
organization is similar across societies, namely modern capitalism. Within this mode of modern
capitalism there are differences which form ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
This mode of reasoning can also be found in the globalization literature (see for example:
Featherstone, Lash & Robertson, 1995). Globalization makes that economies and cultures get
increasingly intertwined which each other. This does however not mean that the world becomes a
simple melting pot of cultures. Local events have different effects in the global world and global
events have different impacts in the local sphere (Robertson, 1995). For Schmidt (2006) differences
between societies are dominantly institutional, not cultural. Institutions are embedded in a cultural
and political context, but these do not make societies incompatible with each other. Hereby the
‘varieties of modernity’ concept acknowledges the role of culture but leaves room for similarities
across cultural lines.
Path dependency
Within the varieties of modernity literature authors emphasize different elements. They point to
different factors which form, according to them, the most important division in the modernization
process. The concept of path dependency (Walby, 2009) is often used while theorizing about these
different factors (see for example; Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Anderson, 1990).
The idea of path dependency holds that political institutions shape different paths of development.
Authors have focused on different factors of political organization and state institutions. Moore
(1966) focuses on differences in class formations. Differences in class formations during the industrial
revolution let, according to Moore, to dictatorship or democracy. Skocpol (1979) focuses on class
relations and social structures in the state. With these structures she explains social revolutions.
Korpi (1983) and Esping-Anderson (1990) both focus on class alliances. They argue that at critical
moments these alliances created different types of welfare state regimes. Esping-Anderson (1990)
defines three types of welfare states regimes; A social democratic, a liberal and a conservative
welfare state regime. According to Walby (2009) neo-liberalism and social democracy are the main
varieties of modernity. Central to these varieties are their depth of democracy and their degree of
inequality. In the social democratic form there is more welfare provision, employment is regulated.
The neoliberal form has less welfare provision and employment is not regulated by the state. In the
neoliberal view the democratic state may interfere only as little as necessary in order to keep the
economy running. This leads to a situation in which there is more inequality (in the polity, the
economy and civil society) in a liberal state in comparison to a social democratic state. The
17
importance of inequality is also argued by Wilkinson & Pickett (2010). They argue that economic
inequality has a negative effect on the level of trust, mental illness, life expectancy, infant mortality,
obesity, children’s educational performance, teenage births, homicides, imprisonment rates and
social mobility (Ibid, p.19). Their general statement is that differences in life expectancy and
perceived happiness in advanced industrial countries can be explained by looking at economic
inequality. In these countries inequality has more effect on society than economic growth, Wilkinson
and Pickett argue.
Scholars like Giddens, Beck, Bauman, Hall and Soskice focus mainly on economic factors.
Authors using the concept of path dependency primarily focus on political, or institutional, factors.
They see the domain of the polity as the most important explanatory factor for societal change. In
section 2.5 the place of Inglehart within the generalization/particularization debate is discussed. The
following paragraphs discuss another school of thought that uses the concept of waves.
Waves: a silent counter revolution.
Apart from the concept of ‘varieties of modernity’ there is another critique on the linearity assumed
by modernization theory. This is the idea that there can be counter developments. Most
modernization theorists expect a somewhat linear development of modernity. They argue that more
societies will pass a certain threshold from which subjective well-being is perceived as more
important than economic growth. Inglehart (1988) also predicts a somewhat steady increase of postmaterialism. Authors like Ignazi (1992) criticize such views and point to counter developments.
Ignazi (1992) sees that apart from Ingleharts’ ‘silent revolution’ there is a ‘silent counter
revolution’. The rise of post-materialism values he sees as a phenomenon of the political left. The
counter revolution is a phenomenon of the right side of the political spectrum. The silent counter
revolution consists of the rise of extreme right parties, the ‘new right’. The new right is the nonmaterialistic answer to the question of the new politics (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987). The
postmodern movements decreased the salience of economic issues and provoked the emergence of
the new right. New right issues are especially moral and religious issues like patriotism, law and
order, anti-minority rights and xenophobia (Ibid, 1987). This is what different authors nowadays
label as populist radical right issues (Mudde, 2010). The silent counter revolution is a reaction on
some consequences of the crisis of modernity like globalization, postindustrial society and the postfordist economy (e.g. Swank & Betz, 2003; Loch & Heitmeyer, 2001; Beck, 1992). Rapid changes in
the postindustrial society let to winners, who are open for postmodern ideas, and losers, who have a
higher change for voting for the populist radical right (e.g. Mudde, 2010; Betz, 1994; Minkenberg,
1998). Inglehart & Flanagan (1987) argue that left and right are not proper ways to describe new
politics, since left and right refers predominantly to economic issues. For that reason they argue for
18
an extra political axis of libertarianism and authoritarianism. Voters on the libertarian side of this
second value cleavage support for example “liberalizing of abortion, women's lib, gay rights, and
other new morality issues; protecting the environment, antinuclear weapons, and other quality-oflife issues; and support for protest activities, more direct forms of participation and minority rights”
(Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987, p.1306). Voters on the authoritarian side of this cleavage support issues
like the “right-to-life, anti-women's lib, creationism, anti-pornography, and support for traditional
moral and religious values; a strong defense, patriotism, law and order, opposition to immigration
and minority rights, and respect for the traditional symbols of offices of authority”.
The above discussion raises attention for the fact that 1) there can be countertrends and 2)
that there can be different trends in different societal groups. Instead of describing the postmodern
changes as a linear process of society the concept of waves is better to use. A wave sees events not
as deterministic but as passing through networks and social institutions. “The extend of the spread of
the wave depends on external circumstances, the connectedness of its networks, resources available
to participants and the energy generated by endogenous processes” (Walby, 2009). Speaking in
waves gives the possibility to speak of global developments while in the same time distinguishing in
time, space (nations, regions) and different societal groups.
2.5 Inglehart and culture: generalization and particularization
Inglehart’s research is mainly placed within the generalization strand, but he is also aware of the
different trajectories societies can follow (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The work of Inglehart developed
over time. In his early work he saw a single pathway of modernity. As societies become more
prosperous the postindustrial and the postmodern shift will occur, Inglehart (1977) expected. In his
later work Inglehart (1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003) does make some refinements of this singular
path. In his work with Baker (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) he attempted to link his work with the work of
Huntington (1993). By doing he found a middle ground between generalization and particularization.
Inglehart and Baker (2000) argue that dominance of either traditional, secular-rational or self
expression values correspond with global cultures. These cultures are similar to the categories of
Huntington’s (1993) civilizations. This classification is shown in figure 1.
19
Figure 1
Global cultures
Source: Inglehart & Baker (2000, p. 19).
The value dimensions as shown in figure 1 do not reflect the cultures itself. The traditional,
material and post-material dimensions are rather predictors for a society’s culture. According to
Inglehart and Baker (2000) they are even strong predictors. Scores on these values can for example
predict the value to freedom, the tolerance towards out-groups and the level of interpersonal trust.
These scores all correlated strongly with the level of economic modernization in a country. Countries
with a higher GDP per capita have a Protestant, ex-Communist, Confucian, Catholic or English
speaking culture. Although economic developments do play an important role, these cultures are not
simply economic determined. They also reflect historical and cultural differences. Inglehart and Baker
(2000) point for example to the impact of religion, communism and interpersonal trust. These
cultural factors also affect the dominant values or even the polity and the economy. Here they point
to work of Fukuyama and Putnam. Fukuyama (1995) argues that societies with low levels of trust are
less able to create social institutions. Thereby these societies are disadvantaged in the global market.
20
Putnam (1993) points to historical cultural traits in civil society that affect the level of interpersonal
and institutional trust.
In conclusion one can see that Inglehart’s work dominantly focuses on the way
modernization processes influence the dominant values held by citizens. He does however not
neglect the role of historical traits, religion and culture. After the above, more broad, discussion of
different conceptions of modernity, the following paragraphs zooms in the distinction between postmodernism and post-materialism.
2.6 Postmodern vs postmaterial: two distinct concepts?
As the above discussion showed; post-modernism encompasses a broad range of issues. A lot of
these issues are linked with each other. When citizens are more postmodern they usually not only
care for freedom of speech but also are more tolerant towards out-groups, care about gender
equality, care about the environment and have more interpersonal trust. The causal logic of
Inglehart’s argument differs however for the different postmodern subjects. Therefore it is important
to make a clear distinction between different postmodern subjects and to discuss the causal logics
separately.
An important distinction which has to be made is between postmodern and postmaterial values.
Most of the times these concepts are used interchangeably, even by Inglehart (1977, 1999). They do
have a different meaning, though. Postmaterial values form “only one aspect of a much broader shift
from modern to postmodern values” (Inglehart, 1999). Postmaterial values are humanistic and
downplay economic values. Postmodern values include a broader set of values which also include for
example tolerance for outer groups and the wish for self-expression. For this reason post material
values are postmodern, but not all postmodern values are postmaterial. The criteria for a value to be
postmaterial is that it must oppose a material or economic value (Brooks & Manza, 1994). The
examples showed in table 3 show that the distinction between postmodern values that are
postmaterial and postmodern values that are not is not always easy.
Table 3 Examples of postmodern and post-material values
Postmodern and directly postmaterial
Prioritizing the environment above the economy.
Stating that ideas are more important than money.
Postmodern and indirectly postmaterial
Tolerance for foreigners
(link: those who feel more economic save feel less threatened by foreigners ‘steeling’ their jobs)
Postmodern but not postmaterial
Tolerance for homosexuals
21
Some values, for example prioritizing the environment above economic issues, are directly postmaterial. They clearly downplay economic values. Other values, like, tolerance towards foreigners
can indirectly be linked with post-materialism. These values have however their bases in noneconomic conditions. Some other values, for example tolerance for homosexuals, that are seen as
postmodern do not have a clear link with post-materialism. They do not downplay economic values.
The examples show that postmodern issues do not need to be postmaterial. They may
however not favor materialism, because this does not fit with the postmodern argument. The
postmodern concept has basically two main categories; the wish for self expression and the
prioritization of subjective well-being and quality of life issues. When a lot of values, issues, parties
and movements are labeled as being ‘postmodern’, it is more likely definition problems occur. This is
especially likely in for the second category, the quality of life issues. For some of these themes it can
be doubtful whether they are really postmodern. Below an example concerning women’s groups
shows these tensions. The example makes clear that postmodern issues do not need to be postmaterial but they may not favor materialism.
Women’s groups, lobbying for women’s rights ,are often labeled as postmodern. On the one hand
this is correct. Lobbying for equal rights, dignity and respect is clearly in line with the postmodern
spirit. On the other hand women’s group also lobby frequently for equal payment. It is hard to see
equal payment not as a material subject. Therefore it is doubtful to place all women’s groups in the
postmodern category.
It is hard to mark the borders of what is postmodern and what is not. For post-materialism this is
also the case but less so. Postmaterial values all downplay economic values, this makes it possible to
set these values apart. Post-materialism also fits more directly with Ingleharts’ theory. The causal
effects predicted by Inglehart refer more directly to postmaterial values than to the broad range of
postmodern values. For this reasons this thesis focuses on post-materialism. Even though I use the
postmaterial concept, some conceptual difficulties will however remain. This is mainly because in
Inglehart’s operationalization not all issues are strictly post-material. Inglehart for example names
the issue ‘free speech’ as being postmaterial. Following the above argument it would make more
sense to call this postmodern and not postmaterial. In the following paragraphs the causal logic
behind Inglehart’s operationalization is explained. Following Inglehart, the word post-materialism is
used in this description. The precise operationalization of Inglehart and an alternative
operationalization is described in the method chapter.
22
2.7 Post-materialism according to Inglehart
From the two societal shifts described by Bell (1976) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) it becomes clear
that according to Inglehart post-materialism is in dichotomy with materialism. This materialism is
formed in a modern world in which life is a “game against fabricated nature” (Bell, 1976, p. 147). In
the modern world people have the psychological need to control their surroundings (Inglehart,
1977). These psychological needs can be divided between sustenance and safety needs. Sustenance
needs are the needs to have enough means in order to fulfill your livelihood. Safety needs are the
need to have a save and ordered country free from external powers and criminals.
Sustenance needs are directly linked to material needs; i.e. citizens wanting material
resources. Safety needs do not have this direct link with materialism. They are indirectly linked with
materialism. Namely; safety as a condition for gaining material property. This logic holds that citizens
would not strive that much to enhance their material belonging in case it is likely that it will be taken
away from you. This relationship is however more complex than it seems at first sight. Safety is not
only a condition for materialism, materialism can also be a condition for the need of safety. What is
for example the need for safety against thieves when there is nothing worth protecting? At the same
time physical safety, for example protection from being raped, is equally important no matter how
much material belonging one has. Safety and sustenance needs can also get mixed up. The Ebola
outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone is a perfect example of this. Obviously the virus decease
affects the physical security of citizens. It does however also have a major impact on the economy of
the three countries (International Monetary Fund, 2014a). For Inglehart (1977) the safety and
sustenance needs are so close to each other that they are both called materialistic. Here his
grounding in Maslowian (1943) thinking can be seen. In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, safety needs
encompass both security of body, morality, the family, health and the security of employment,
resources and property. So Maslow places safety needs at the same level as sustenance needs. In
figure 2 the total hierarchy of needs according to Maslow is shown.
23
Figure 2
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
Source: en.wikepedia.org
Social and self-actualization needs, once again Maslowian language, are according to Inglehart (1977)
postmaterial and vice versa. The postmaterial needs can according to Inglehart be divided in two
categories. These two categories follow a distinctive mode of reasoning. The need for self expression
originates in people being better educated and having a better potential to make autonomous
decisions (Bell, 1976). In industrial societies hierarchical organizations had little need for autonomous
judgments. In the service economy people deal with concepts and people. Because of this innovation
and freedom to exercise individual judgments become important (Inglehart, 1997). When people get
used to self expression at the workplace, people also want to express themselves in the political
sphere. In that way the need for self-expression becomes important across different domains such as
the economy (workplace), civil society (education) and the polity (politics).
The second category of postmodern values emphasizes subjective well-being and quality of
life (Inglehart, 1997). Whereas the need for self-expression arose from a higher educated society, the
importance of quality of life arose from a more secure environment. The causal logic is, once again,
Maslowian (1943); when one’s basic needs are fulfilled other need become dominant. The economic
and physical security in many advanced industrialized countries is such, that other subjects become
important. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) show that beyond a certain threshold economic growth does
not lead to a further improvement in life expectancy or a higher subjective well being. According to
Inglehart (1997) people are aware of this and therefore place more value on non-material subjects.
Interpersonal trust, tolerance of out groups, support for gender equality and attention for the
environment are subjects are typical quality of life issues.
24
In other works of Inglehart he uses a different categorization of postmaterial values. Hereby Inglehart
(1977) classifies three categories of postmaterial values; belonging and esteem, intellectual needs
and aesthetic needs. The three categories partly overlap with the above mentioned two categories.
In this thesis the three categories are used. This is done because Inglehart attaches the items
measuring postmaterial to these three categories.
In the belonging and esteem category items can be placed which focus on appreciation of
people. Maslow (1943) names for example confidence, achievement, and mutual respect in his
esteem category. The second category Inglehart (1973) names intellectual needs. This category
focuses on items like morality, freedom, creativity and the acceptance of facts. The third category
includes aesthetic needs, which includes the importance of the environment. In table 4 the material
and postmaterial categories and the corresponding items that Inglehart uses to measure postmaterialism are shown.
Table 4
Material and Postmaterial needs/values
Needs
Aesthetic
Social and self actualization
Intellectual
needs (Post-materialist)
Belonging & esteem
Physiological needs
(materialist)
Sustenance
Safety
Items
1. Beautiful cities/nature
2. Ideas count
3. Free speech
4. Less impersonal society
5. More say on job, community
6. More say in Government
1. Stable economy
2. Economic growth
3. Fight rising prices
4. Strong defense forces
5. Fight crime
6. Maintain order
Source: Inglehart (1977, p.42).
Inglehart uses three items to measure belonging and esteem, namely; belonging for a less
impersonal society, the wish to have more say in your job and community and the wish to have more
say in government. It is however remarkable that Inglehart does not include other Maslowian esteem
categories. He does for example not include confidence or achievement items, whereas he does
include two items that are about ‘more say’. The intellectual category is measured using two items;
the importance of ideas and the importance of free speech. Also here Inglehart could have chosen to
include more items. These could for example be items on morality, creativity and the acceptance of
facts. In some of his work Inglehart does name some items that are strongly connected to this needs
category. These issues, concerning subjective well-being and quality of life, are for example gender
25
equality and interpersonal trust (Inglehart, 1973).Although I think it is wise to include a variety of
items I think it is good not to include all of these items while measuring postmaterial values. If one
includes a bunch of different items the operationalization of postmaterialism becomes a melting pot
of items. These items are often connected but are also distinctive.
The third category of needs includes aesthetic needs. This is about care for the environment.
In the categorization discussed before this item is included as a subjective well being item. Because
of the complexity of the item, as is elaborated on in the following paragraphs, it is not surprising that
the item does not load enough on Inglehart’s postmaterial scale (Inglehart, 1973, p.45). Although the
item does not lead enough he still includes it in his operationalization. He does however calls it an
aesthetic need. This leads to his three categories; belonging and esteem, intellectual needs and
aesthetic needs.
The environmental issue
As the above shows, Inglehart struggles with the environmental issue. On the one hand he tries to
exclude the subject from his battery. In his scoring the score of the environmental item is not
counted postmaterial. Inglehart does however still include the issue in the questionnaires of the
World Values Survey. On the other hand the environment is often seen as a postmaterial subject.
Environmental movements are for example labeled as being postmodern or Green parties are seen
as a product of the post-industrial era (Chandler & Siaroff, 1986). Because of the struggle of Inglehart
and its prominent place in the postmodern debate the following paragraphs will critically elaborate
the complexity of the environmental issue. Although the beneath is critical about Ingleharts
measurement it is not so much meant as a critique on Inglehart. It is chiefly meant to show the
complexity of the environmental issue.
Inglehart (1977) names his environmental item aesthetic, whereby focus is laid upon the
beauty of nature. If seen from this perspective the environmental subject comes close to the
intellectual and esteem category. One would, because of this reason, expect the item to load on
Inglehart’s postmaterial scale. The fact that it does not could be due to the type of question. The
question focuses partly on the beauty of cities. Perhaps this is wrong if you are interested in one’s
environmental concerns. Apart from this I think that there is another factor which complicates the
environmental issue. That factor is the broadness of the environmental issue. While estimating an
opinion on this question respondents might think of other elements of the environmentalism.
Someone might think of environmental groups demonstrating against a new road crossing a
forest. In such matters the environmental subject is postmaterial; nature versus economic interests.
Still demonstrators could have however different reasons to demonstrate. One might demonstrate
to preserve the beauty of nature (aesthetic). One also might demonstrate because she/he always
26
walks with her/his dog in this forest. Cutting the forest leads to a situation in which she/he needs to
travel extra miles in order to be able to walk with her/his dog. In the second case the reason is
maybe partly aesthetic.
Another issue someone might think of while examining the environmental item are concerns
about the global environment. These issues may include concerns about air pollution, the hole in the
ozone layer or CO2 emissions. Suppose someone is really concerned about these issues as a threat to
her/his life. For example because smog is threatening a clean breathe. In that case the environment
is not just a aesthetic issue but is conceived as a threat to a basic need. In Maslowian terms these
basic needs are lower on the hierarchy of needs than the material needs named by Inglehart.
As these examples make clear, the environmental item encompasses different issues and is
complex. Sometimes it is postmaterial and sometimes it is not. When it is postmaterial it is not
always in line with the causal logic of the intellectual and belonging/esteem needs. Inglehart names
the environment an aesthetic need while the examples show that the environment might also be a
basic need. For that reason the environment is not directly postmaterial. In the World Values Survey
some questions try to overcome the above difficulty by framing the environment in a dichotomy
towards material needs. Table 5 shows two of such questions.
Table 5
Environmental question from World Values Survey.
Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic
growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?
1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic
growth and some loss of jobs.
2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment
suffers to some extent.
Source: World Values Survey (2014, p.6).
Although with this question the environment becomes anti-material in economic sense. It is still
possible that respondents see the environment pollution as a threat to their basic needs. For that
reason the environment cannot, in my opinion, be perceived as a postmaterial item in the same way
as self-expression and subjective well-being are perceived.
2.8 Value change according to Inglehart.
The preceding makes clear what Inglehart sees as postmaterial items. The goal of Inglehart’s research
is however not mainly to make a categorization societies based on the dominant values held by
citizens. The most important claim Inglehart makes concerns value change. He argues that countries
following the path of modernity have become more postmodern (Inglehart, 2008). In modern
societies more citizens hold postmaterial values.
27
Change in attitudes or behavior over time can be divided into three categories (Glenn, 1977). The
first category are lifecycle effects, which concerns one’s age. The second category are generation (or
cohort) effects, which concerns all events that a specific generation has experienced. The third
category are period effects, which affect all generations about equally at the same point in time. The
mode of reasoning of Inglehart is two-folded. For this he uses two hypotheses; the first is the scarcity
hypothesis, the second is the socialization hypothesis.
The scarcity thesis holds that individual priorities reflect their socioeconomic environment.
The greatest subjective value is placed on the those things that are relatively short (Inglehart, 1999,
p. 220). In the past basic economic supplies were short, which meant economic growth was the
engine for improvement of quality of life. In the wealthy and secure societies of advanced industrial
countries the most subjective value is placed on postmodern issues. The mode of reasoning in the
scarcity hypotheses is economic and implies that ‘recent’ economic developments have significant
consequences. “Prolonged periods of prosperity tend to encourage the spread of post material
values, economic decline tends to have the opposite effect” (Inglehart, 1999, p. 221).
The socialization thesis is not contradictory but additional to the scarcity hypothesis.
Inglehart (1999) argues that the relation between the economy and prevalence of postmodern
values is not one-to-one. Postmodern values reflect one’s subjective sense of security, which not per
se reflects one’s economic level. Someone’s subjective sense of security is also formed by cultural
factors and social welfare institutions. Values do not change overnight but are dominantly formed
during the time an individual reaches adulthood. Thereafter one’s values change relatively little.
Both hypotheses generate a set of predictions concerning value change. “The scarcity
hypothesis implies that prosperity is conductive to the spread of postmaterial values. The
socialization hypothesis implies that neither values of an individual nor those of a society as a whole
will change overnight” (Inglehart, 1999, p. 221).
Life cycle effects
De Graaf, Hagenaars and Luijkx (1989) found that individual levels of post-materialism are relatively
stable. Therefore lifecycle effects are unlikely to have a large impact on values, (De Graaf & Evans,
1996). Inglehart (2008) measured in 1970 differences between older and younger generations. From
this single measurement it does not follow whether these effects are lifecycle effects or period
effects. By taking longitudinal data from 6 west-European countries, cohort analysis shows that there
is no evidence what so ever for lifecycle effects (Ibid). As people age they do not become more
material nor postmaterial. The time series evidence, covering 35 years, shows that the age-related
differences found in 1970 reflect lasting cohort effects.
28
Generation effects
De Graaf and Evans (1996) also find generation effects. They see that generations with more highly
educated people have more postmaterial values. Furthermore more they find that generations that
suffered war have more people with dominantly material values. Inglehart (2008) shows that in the
six Western countries, cohorts slowly replaced each other. In the period 1970-2006 three cohorts
disappeared. First those who were born in 1886-1905 died off, thereafter those born between 190615 died and finally those born in the 1916-25 cohort died. In these cohorts the materialists
outnumbered the post-materialists. At the same time citizens of three new cohorts became mature.
First those who were born in 1956-65, thereafter those born between 1966-75 and thereafter those
born between 1976-85. According to Inglehart (2008) those born in 1956-65 had their formative
years in more security than those who were born immediate after the second world war (1946-55).
For that reason the 1956-65 cohort is significantly more postmaterial than previous cohorts. Those
who were born between 1966 and 1985 were not more postmaterial than citizens born in previous
cohorts. Inglehart (2008) explains this using a post hoc argument saying that there was only little
economic growth in the period these cohorts became mature. Rising incoming equality, cutbacks in
the welfare state and high levels of unemployment, particularly among the youth, let to slightly less
post-materialists. The differences between the post-war cohorts are however small. In these cohorts
the post-materialists outnumbered the materialists, but only narrowly. The difference with the two
surviving pre-war cohorts remains distinct. Therefore Inglehart (2008) expects that the
intergenerational shift will gradually lead to a shift toward more citizens with postmaterial values.
Older cohorts, who are more material, will slowly die off. The shift is expected to have slow but
profound impact. But this profound effect is only expected in case there is no reprise of rising
existential security. This thesis tests whether the 2008 economic crisis is such a reprise. If that is the
case I, following Inglehart’s theory, expect that citizens have less postmaterial values.
Period effects
Inglehart (1981) and Baker et al (1981) found significant differences in value priorities between
people who grew up during the Great Depression and those who were raised during the affluent
post-war years. Those raised during the Great Depression had more materialist values. Inglehart’s
theory also expects negative period effects for events like a major recession. From such an event not
only the younger cohorts will become less postmaterial but all cohorts will push downwards
(Inglehart, 2008). Different than the generation effects which have a lasting effects, the period
effects have a temporal impact. As the economic situation recovers the level of post-materialism will
return to their former level. In the long run the level of post-materialism will remain quite stable.
High levels of inflation is one of Inglehart’s (1985b, 2008) most visible period effects. Inglehart and
29
Welzel (2005) found that current economic conditions are reflected in the level of post-materialism.
Particularly they reflect inflation levels. In times of high inflation most people tend to believe that
fighting inflation is important. As he expected, Inglehart (2008) examining data of 35 years, argues
that these period effects are temporarily and have no lasting effect. It could be the case that the
2008 economic crisis only has a period effect on postmaterial values. This could however not yet be
tested since more years need to pass in order to examine the long term effects.
2.9 Critique on Inglehart’s claims
The work of Inglehart is not without criticism. Most of the criticisms point to the way Inglehart (1977,
1997) measures post-materialism. In drawing conclusions about general trends of value change in
advanced industrial countries, Inglehart uses most frequently his 4-item battery measurement. The
4-item measure, see table 6 , is defective for several reasons.
Table 6
Four-item measure of material-postmaterial value priorities
Maintain order in the nation (material)
Fight rising prices (material)
Give people more say in decisions of the government (postmaterial)
Protect freedom of speech (postmaterial)
Source: Inglehart (1977, p. 28).
The first criticism points to issue salience. In the 4-item battery there are only four questions
which measure material- and postmaterial values. This enhances the chance that a ‘deviant’ opinion
on one of these issues places you in the wrong category. Perhaps you are postmaterial on a range of
issues but you also prefer order in your nation. When you prioritize this item, you suddenly become a
‘materialist’ or a ‘mixed’ respondent. Issue salience is a especially a problem with the ‘fight rising
prices’ question (Clark, 2000; Clark & Dutt, 1991; Clark et all, 1999). In times of high unemployment
rates, respondents are not likely to prioritize fighting inflation. This because in times of a recession
demands will be low, which temper inflation rates. Also respondents who are in fact dominantly
material are not necessarily likely to prioritize ‘fighting rising prices’ above the other items in these
times.
Clark and Dutt (1991) show that fluctuations in the level of post-materialism correlate with
the economic situation in a country; i.e. salience of inflation or salience of unemployment. Clarke
(2000) shows that on a aggregative level this leads to higher scores on post-materialism in times of
high unemployment rates. This in contradiction with the expectations of Inglehart’s scarcity
hypothesis. In a survey held in Canada and Germany Clark et all (1999) substituted the inflation
statement by an unemployment statement. This change had major consequences for the ‘materialist’
30
and ‘post-materialist’ classification. Respondents were asked to fill in two surveys right after each
other. In the unemployment survey there were more post-materialists than in the inflation survey.
Due to this result the authors conclude that Inglehart’s postmaterial shift is not a real shift, but is an
artifact of a wrong measurement. A second conclusion of Clarke et all (1999) states that the
economic period effects have no lasting effects. It is according to them uncertain what the shortterm fluctuations of presence of postmaterial values mean in the long run. This is in line with
Inglehart’s (2008) conclusion that period effects have only temporal effects. In response to Clarke et
all (1999), Inglehart and Abramson (1999) show that even after controlling for unemployment and
inflation there is a real postmaterial shift.
Duch and Taylor (1993) also have strong criticisms on Inglehart’s conclusions. Their criticisms
focus on Inglehart’s conclusions concerning socialization. They argue that economic conditions
during maturation do not have a lasting effect. Instead fluctuations reflect economic conditions at
the time of the survey (period effect). Furthermore Duch and Taylor point to education as an
important explanation for fluctuations in the post-material score. Through education students learn
to value democratic norms, which are part of the post-materialist battery (Duch & Taylor, 1993).
They see that the effect of economic conditions during maturation disappears when it is controlled
for education. People who are highly educated score significantly higher on the postmaterial battery
than citizens with less years of education. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) respond to Duch and
Taylor by pointing to Duch’s and Taylor’s measurement which is according to them inadequate.
Periods of major deprivation are excluded by Duch and Taylor which reduces the explanatory power
of generational differences, according to Inglehart and Abramson. More over they state that Duch
and Taylor fail to recognize education being bounded to social background. They show using data
from forty countries that countries with high levels of GDP per capita tend to have high proportions
of postmaterialists (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994). Furthermore they show that countries that
experienced high economic growth rates tend to show relatively large differences between the
values of younger and older generations. Duch and Taylor (1994) respond to the criticisms of
Inglehart and Abramson in the same issue of the American Journal of Political Science. They state
that Inglehart and Abramson use only bivariate analyses in their response and evidence. Using only
bivariate correlations is in their eyes not sufficient to tackle their critiques. Duch and Taylor argue to
use and use multivariate analyses while control for the effect of education.
Davis and Davenport (1999) also strongly doubt the validity of Inglehart’s measurement.
They argue that based on individual level data and causal patterns one should not draw conclusions
on changing cultural orientation of mass societies. They see that not only Inglehart but virtually all
researchers who used the postmaterial battery make these kind of claims. Its fundamental validity
seems to be generally accepted which leads to a situation in which “the index appears to have taken
31
on a life of its own” (Davis & Davenport, 1999). In response to Davis and Davenport, Inglehart and
Abramson (1999) argue that the 4-item and 12-item battery have undergone a lot of validity tests on
an individual level. These tests have shown that the indices correlate with a lot of different
postmaterial items. Therefore Abramson and Inglehart state that the index is valid and its data may
be interpret on an aggregative level. In next chapter, discussing methods, some of the above and
other critiques on Inglehart’s measurement are discussed. This discussion leads to the creation of an
alternative operationalization using European Social Survey data.
2.10 Moving forward or backward? The 2008 economic crisis.
The above paragraphs have shown that there have been strong criticisms on the work of Inglehart.
These have mainly focused on the validity of his measurements. Some researchers (like Clarke et all,
1999) even conclude that Inglehart’s conclusions are an artifact due to his wrong measurement
method. Even though these strong criticisms, Inglehart’s research has been influential. Inglehart and
his co-writers have drawn strong conclusions about a postmaterial shift. The correlations of the
postmaterial battery with scores on several ‘postmodern issues’ are strong. In this way Inglehart has
created a convincing method of examining aggregative societal trends.
Inglehart (1999, p. 211) states that “prolonged period of economic growth tend to encourage
the spread of postmaterial values”. Under the condition of improving economic standards he expects
postmaterial values to become more dominant in advanced industrial societies. This is however only
expected is case there is no reprise of rising existential security (Inglehart, 2008). Prolonged periods
of economic decline tend to discourage the spread of postmaterial values. This thesis tests whether
the 2008 economic crisis, which is seen as a disruptive event threatening the rising existential
security, has led to a decline in the dominance of postmaterial values among citizens of advanced
industrial countries. A new wave of data from the World Values Survey (2014) gives a great
opportunity to test this.
The 2008 economic crisis took place between the fifth (2005-2007) and sixth (2010-2013) wave of
the World Values Survey. The crisis started as the subprime mortgage crisis at the U.S. housing
market in 2007/2008. This spilled over to a banking crisis and state support was needed to bail-out
some major banks. A downturn in economic activity let to a global recession from 2008 to 2012. The
bail-outs and the recession led to the European sovereign depth crisis. The budget cuts that followed
deepened the economic crisis. The average European unemployment rates rose from around 7
percent in 2008 to 12 percent in 2012 (European Commission, 2014). Especially in southern European
countries unemployment rates are high. In for example Spain and Greece unemployment rates
exceeded twenty-five percent (Ibid). Average European youth unemployment rates rose up to
32
twenty-five percent (European Commission, 2014). In Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Slovakia youth
unemployment rates hit above thirty percent and Spain and Greece youth unemployment rates hit
above fifty percent above (Ibid). Some analysts even call younger generations a lost generation
(Shah, 2013). The International Labour Organization (2012) named the crisis a global job crisis.
The 2008 economic crisis is often seen as a disruptive event and is frequently compared with
the ‘great depression’ of the 1930s. Since the 1960s there have been several crises, but they did not
have the same impact as the 2008 economic crisis. For this reasons the 2008 crisis is seen as different
than other crises of the postmodern era. The 2008 crisis is especially different because it lasts longer
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013). In for example the Netherlands there have been periods
with high unemployment rates during the 1980s. But back then the economy started to recover after
two years. The 2008 crisis is not everywhere as deep as earlier crises but it is distinctive because it
lasts longer than most previous crises. In Japan there has been a crisis which lasted several years. The
crisis in Japan during the 1990s is often referred to as “the lost decade” (Madsen & Katz, 2009). A big
difference with the 2008 economic crisis is that the 1990s crisis did only hit Japan severely. The 2008
crisis is seen as the first full-blown global crisis (MacMillan Centre, 2014). Due to the global
interconnectedness of the financial system the crisis has impact all over the world.
The crisis is not only seen as an disruptive event for those who suffer the direct
consequences. People who lose their job, see their income decline and/or whose business gets
bankrupted are hit the most. The crisis is however seen as disruptive event for a given society at
large. Not all people lose their job, but many of them know people in their surroundings losing their
job. In a crisis as big as the 2008 economic crisis almost everybody knows a colleague, neighbor or
family member who is hit by the crisis. This creates a mechanism of fear for the future. Apart from
knowing people that are hit directly by the crisis, the crisis is omnipresent through the media (see for
an example: Argos TV, 21 May 2014). The effects of these mechanisms become especially visible in
the measurement of the consumer confidence index. This index hit an all time low in the Euro area in
2009 (Trading Economics, 2013).
Several researchers have shown that, apart from economic effects, a crisis can have several
societal effects. Examples are a decline in health (Kentikelenis et al, 2011), increased economic
crimes (Gunnlaugsson, 2012) and increased suicide rates (Chang et al, 2009). Because of the fact that
the a crisis can have several serious impacts on society and because of the above discussed reasons,
it is likely that the 2008 economic crisis has an impact on values hold by citizens in advanced
industrial society.
33
Hypotheses and causal models
The spread, intensity and length of the crisis makes it a typical case for testing Inglehart’s
hypotheses. It is a typical case in the sense that the probability of this case being representative for
Inglehart’s theory is high, relative to other cases (Gerring, 2007). The economic crisis being a
disruptive event is expected to have a period effect on all generations. This leads to the following
hypothesis;
Scarcity hypothesis
After the start of the 2008 economic crisis there has been a decline in postmaterial values hold by
citizens of advanced industrialized countries.
Inglehart (1999) points out that values do not change overnight but are slowly socialized during
maturation. This would imply a generation effect on youngsters born around 1990. Due to the fact
that in the 2008 crisis youth unemployment is high (European Commission, 2014; Shah, 2013), the
crisis is expected to hit youngsters harder. Since youngsters are is their formative years while they
experience the 2008 crisis (with high youth unemployment rates) the following expectation is
formulated. If postmaterial values decline after the start of the 2008 crisis, it is most likely to be the
case for youngsters. This leads to the following hypothesis;
Socialization hypothesis
After the start of the 2008 economic crisis there has been a decline in postmaterial values in
advanced industrialized countries by youngsters who are in their formative years.
These two hypothesis are only descriptive. They tell something about the outcome but not about the
process. To get a first insight on the causal process a third hypothesis is formulated. Inglehart’s
predications are not merely descriptive. He expects that economic developments lead to value
change. For that reason it is expected that postmaterial value change (or absence of change)
corresponds with the economic conditions in a country. This macro relationship is shown in
figure 3 and leads to the following hypothesis;
Figure 3
Macro
Macro level model
+
economic conditions
postmaterial values
34
Economic hypothesis (macro level)
In countries with an economic crisis postmaterial values decline, whereas in countries where there is
no economic crisis postmaterial values continue to increase or remain stable.
If values, for example postmaterial values, have changed since the beginning of the economic crisis it
is most likely that the economic crisis has something to do with it. But having said this, the economy
is not all there is. The ‘varieties of modernity’ section showed that institutions, norms and culture
also play an important role. For that reason it is wrong to draw conclusions based on the results of
the first three hypothesis. Such conclusions suffer from an ecological fallacy. This fallacy holds that
results on an aggregative level do not directly say something about the individual causal mechanism
presupposed by Inglehart, or vice versa. An ecological fallacy means that one may not draw
conclusions about individual behaviour on the bases of data about aggregate behaviour (Freedman,
1999). At the same time one may also not make inferences on an aggregated level simply by
aggregating individual level data.
Because this thesis is focused on Inglehart’s hypotheses it is aimed at making inferences
about individuals. Namely; did and how did individuals change their values due to the 2008 economic
crisis. These inferences may not be drawn based on information on group (country) means. This is
something Davis and Davenport (1999) have also argued while doubting the validity of Inglehart’s
measurement. For this reason; in order to make inferences about individuals, the individual causal
pattern must be examined.
Figure 4 shows how the macro and micro level are related to each other. Hereby it is shown that the
causal logic is attached to the micro level. The key component of the causal mechanism is the
individual sense of security. One’s perceived level of security is at the centre of Inglehart’s
explanation of postmaterial value change. This security can be economic or physical. With physical
security Inglehart (1981) points to the presence or absence of armed threat or one’s estimation of
the likelihood of war in the coming years. Most of Inglehart’s work has been focusing on the
relationship of one’s economic security on postmaterial values. For that reason and since the
economic crisis is the object of this thesis, physical security is excluded from this study. It is assumed
that the physical security of the individuals under study did not change in the period before and
during the 2008 economic crisis.
35
Figure 4
Macro
Macro and micro level model
+
economic conditions
postmaterial values
-
+
Micro
negative news about economy
+
economic conditions
sense of economic security
+
+
postmaterial values
The first step in the model shows that the economic conditions in a country affect the satisfaction of
citizens with their financial situation. The status of the economy can lead to an improvement or a
decay in one’s personal financial situation. One’s real income can for example improve due to tax
cuts. A decay can for example be caused by losing one’s job or because taxes are being raised by the
government. This is a more direct effect of an economic crisis on one’s personal life. But, as said
above, in this thesis the crisis is seen as a disruptive event. In reaction to the negative economic
figures a lot of negative news about the economy is spread. This can create a sense of fear to the
future. Because of the worries about one’s financial future a citizen is expected to be less satisfied
with one’s financial situation. One might think that it is important to earn a little bit more in order to
be safe in case disaster strikes.
The second step in de model is the effect of one’s sense of economic security on one’s
postmaterial values. This is the key explanatory factor used by Inglehart and is already discussed in
depth. In the third, and last, step the individual’s postmaterial values are aggregated to country level
averages. With this simple aggregation the boat-like macro and micro level model is finished.
In this thesis two steps of this model are tested. These are the effect of the economic
conditions on one’s sense of economic security and the effect of one’s sense of economic security on
one’s postmaterial values. The model shows that the second effects lies in the extension of the first.
In the method chapter the way these concepts are measured is explained.
Causal model hypotheses
As economic conditions in a country are worse, individuals’ sense of economic security decreases.
As one’s sense of economic security decreases, one has less postmaterial values.
The effect of the economic crisis is not expected to affect all individuals equally. More wealthy
individuals may be hit by the crisis but are still economic save. Speaking in terms of a threshold;
unless individuals get under a certain threshold, the crisis does not affect one’s postmaterial values.
This mechanism links to Wilkinson’s and Picket’s theory discussed in this chapter. The ‘wealthy
36
threshold’ mechanism is tested in two manners in this thesis. The first is by testing the causal model
effects separately for the poorer half and the richer half of the respondents. Hereby it is expected
that the mechanism is present for the poorer half and not for the richer half.
Figure 5
Macro
Interaction effect
Economic conditions
+
Micro
household income
sense of economic security
Wealthy threshold hypothesis
As the economic conditions in a country get worse the effect of household income on satisfaction with
household income gets stronger.
The second way in which this mechanism is tested is by measuring the interaction effect of
household income and the economic conditions on one’s sense of economic security. This effect is
shown in figure 5. It is a negative interaction effect because as the economic conditions in a country
are better the effect of household income on one’s sense of economic security is expected to be
weaker. Said the other way around; as the economic conditions in a country get worse, as during a
crisis, the effect of household income on one’s sense of economic security is expected to be stronger.
Table 7 summarizes all hypotheses. In the next chapter, the method chapter, these hypotheses are
specified in order to be tested.
Table 7 Hypotheses
1) Scarcity hypothesis
After the start of the 2008 economic crisis there has been a decline in post-material values hold by
citizens of advanced industrialized countries.
2) Socialization hypothesis
After the start of the 2008 economic crisis there has been a decline in post-material values in
advanced industrialized countries by youngsters who are in their formative years.
3) Economic hypothesis (macro level)
In countries with an economic crisis postmaterial values decline, whereas in countries where there is
no economic crisis postmaterial values continue to increase or remain stable.
4) Causal model hypotheses
A: As economic conditions in a country are worse, individuals’ sense of economic security decreases.
B: As one’s sense of economic security decreases, one has less postmaterial values.
5) Wealthy threshold hypothesis
As the economic conditions in a country get worse the effect of household income on satisfaction with
household income gets stronger.
37
3) Methods: measurement issues and the specification of hypotheses
The complexity concerning post-modernity and post-materialism, which is elaborated on in the
theoretical chapter, shows the importance of an accurate measurement. For that reason this chapter
points out the case selection, the methodological considerations and the operationalization. The
chapter starts with an explanation of the case selection and a paragraphs in which the quantitative
method for this thesis is justified. Thereafter choices concerning the operationalization of the
dependent (postmaterial values) and independent variables are described. In the final part of the
chapter the specified macro level and micro level hypotheses are formulated. The macro level
hypotheses focus on average scores of post-materialism on a country level and whether these
correlate with country level economic conditions. The micro level hypotheses are tested using
multilevel regression analyses. These hypotheses focus on individual level correlation.
3.1 case selection and population-level causality.
The 2008 economic crisis forms a typical case for testing Inglehart’s hypotheses. It is a typical case in
the sense that that the probability of this case being representative for Inglehart’s theory is high,
relative to other cases (Gerring, 2007). The spread, intensity and length of the 2008 crisis make it
likely that if economic decline leads to less postmaterial values, it will be the case for the 2008
economic crisis time. Selecting a typical case is a useful method for hypothesis testing (Ibid). The
2008 crisis is selected because it is a prolonged period of economic decline. Furthermore it is seen as
the first full-blown global crisis (MacMillan Centre, 2014). By selecting this typical case I try to detect
a typical set of values to generate understanding about the mechanism supposed by Inglehart
(Gerring, 2007).
According to Inglehart’s theory countries first need to pass a certain threshold before
postmaterial values become dominant (Inglehart, 1999). Since this thesis examines a retrenchment in
postmaterial values, presence of these values is a requirement. Therefore only countries which
reached a GDP of 10.000 dollar per capita in 2008 are included in the data-set. This is the threshold
according to Inglehart (1999). The units of analyses5 are citizens of advanced industrial countries.
This is the level on which ultimately inferences are made. The units of observation6 are in hypotheses
4 and 5 also citizens of advanced industrial countries. For testing the first three hypotheses country
averages are the units of observation.
57
Hereby I interpret ‘unit of analyses’ and ‘unit of observation’ as described by King, Keohane and Verba
(1994).
38
This thesis is a large-N quantitative research or in the words of Mahoney (2008); a populationoriented research. One could also try to detect, perhaps with psychological research, whether the
causal logic implied by Ingelhart is actually present at an individual level. Besides the fact that this
kind of research is perhaps impossible, political scientists are usually not interested in political
behavior of a few individuals. In testing Inglehart they are interested whether there is an actual value
shift among a fair share of a population. This could namely, as argued in the introduction, have
consequences within the political sphere. While doing population-oriented research I admit that
case-level causation comes ontologically prior to population-level causation (Ibid). By doing
population-oriented research it is possible to detect mean causal effects and by controlling for other
factors net-causal effects. This causation is epiphenomenal of causation at a case-oriented level
(Ibid). So if Maslowian causal patterns implied by Inglehart are present among a fair share of the
population in advanced industrial countries, this effect should be seen through a mean causal effect.
The mean causal effects are measured at two different levels, as the causal models in the theoretical
chapter already showed. The first three hypotheses measure at the macro level (countries) and the
fourth and fifth hypotheses measure at the micro level (individuals).
World Values Survey and European Social Survey
There are two reasons why this thesis starts with using the postmaterial concept as operationalized
by Inglehart (1977). The first reason is that this thesis wants to test Inglehart’s predictions. It seems
strange to test Inglehart without an examination of his own data. Furthermore Inglehart’s World
Values Survey (WVS) is generally seen as ‘the’ survey when it comes to post-materialism. The second
reason is that the WVS delivers longitudinal and recent data. There are some alternative, perhaps
better, operationalizations concerning post-materialism (see for example; Cheung & Leung, 2004).
These do however lack longitudinal and recent data. The first wave of the World Values Survey (WVS)
(2014) was conducted around 1973. After the first wave the survey wave repeated 5 more times.
Most importantly for this thesis, before the economic crisis of 2008 (wave 5) and most recently
during the years 2010-2014 (wave 6). There are 17 countries7 which have a GDP above the threshold
of 10.000 dollar per capita which were included in both successive waves8.
Since this thesis is critical about the (causal) logic of the operationalization of Inglehart, one
alternative operationalization is used. This alternative measurement and dataset is used to see
whether the findings of World Values Survey are corroborated. For this measurement questions and
7
These are: Argentina, Australia, Chili, Cyprus, Germany, Japan, Poland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Russian
Federation, Slovenia, South-Korea, Spain, Sweden Uruguay, Turkey, and the United States.
8
For the list of countries and the year in which the surveys were conducted see the appendix .
39
data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (2014a) are used. This survey is regularly, every two year,
employed in the period 2002-2012. The survey, as it names suggests, is only held in European
countries (including Russia and Israel). Therefore it is less probable that results can be generalized to
other (non)-European countries. On the other hand it could also be argued that it is an advantage
because these countries are culturally more close to each other. For that reason country differences
in post-material scores are less likely to be caused by cultural factors in the ESS than in the WVS. 14
countries9 are selected from the ESS. These countries have a GDP above 10.000 dollar per capita in
2008. Furthermore longitudinal data is available for them in the ESS.
3.2 Dependent variable: measuring postmaterial values
As argued this thesis first follows the operationalization of Inglehart. Hereby there are two options;
the 4-item battery or the 12-item battery. First the 4-item battery is discussed, thereafter it is argued
that the 12-item battery is a more complete measurement for post-materialism. Finally the
alternative battery, made of questions from the ESS is explained.
In his early work on value change Inglehart uses a 4-item measure of materialist and post-materialist
value priorities. These items, already shown in table 6, are once again shown in table 8. Respondents
are asked to prioritize these items. They are asked which of the above items is considered as most
important and second most important aim for their country. If respondents pick the postmaterial
items as most important and second most important aim, respondents are labeled as postmaterialists. If they choose the material items as most important and second most important aim,
respondent are labeled as materialists. If respondent pick a material and a postmaterial item they are
labeled as mixed. The 4-item battery thus results in three categories; postmaterial respondents,
mixed respondents and material respondents.
Table 8
Four-item measure of material-postmaterial value priorities
Maintain order in the nation (material)
Fight rising prices (material)
Give people more say in decisions of the government (postmaterial)
Protect freedom of speech (postmaterial)
Source: Inglehart (1977, p. 28).
The 4-item battery suffers at least two deficiencies. The first problem concerns issue salience and is
discussed in the previous chapter. A second disadvantage is the fact that respondents need to choose
9
These are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
40
between material and postmaterial items. Hereby an artificial dichotomy arises between material
and postmaterial values (Bean & Papadakis, 1994). In the real world people most often do not need
to choose between material or postmaterial values. Due to the forced choices of Inglehart people
become materialists or post-materialists, while in fact most people have characteristics of both. Bean
and Papadakis (1994) argue that most environmentalists (postmaterial) are for example not
necessarily deep ecologists. Furthermore a postmaterial person, fighting for freedom of speech,
might also behave like a materialist (by fighting for wage improvement and/or supporting economic
growth). For that reason it is important that respondents do not need to choose between similar
items, but have the possibility to prioritize both equally.
From 1973 onwards, Inglehart uses a more extensive battery to measure material and
postmaterial values. Inglehart (1977) does this to make his measurements more reliable. This twelveitem battery is shown in table 9. Similarly as in the 4-item battery respondent are asked to prioritize
items. Coding works in the same manner as with the 4-item battery. For each card scores range from
0 to 2, which afterwards are summed up to a scale ranging from 0 to 6. Factor analysis shows that
eleven of the twelve items load (>.300) on a postmaterial or a material item (Inglehart, 1977, p.).
Only the item ‘more beautiful cities’ does not load strong enough on one of the items. Therefore the
scores in card A are recoded. The ‘more beautiful cities’ item is recoded to 0. With only 5
postmaterial items left, the postmaterial 12-item battery ranges from 0 to 5.
Table 9
Card A
Twelve-item measure of material-postmaterial value priorities
Maintaining a high rate of economic growth (material)
Making sure that this country has strong defense forces (material)
Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their
communities (postmaterial)
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful (postmaterial)
Card B
Maintaining order in the nation (material)
Giving the people more say in important government decisions (postmaterial)
Fighting rising prices (material)
Protecting freedom of speech (postmaterial)
Card C
Maintain stable economy (material)
Progress toward a less impersonal, more humane society (postmaterial)
The fight against crime (material)
Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money (postmaterial)
Source: Inglehart (1977, p. 40-41).
Though the 12-item battery has some deficiencies it has some advantages over the 4-item battery.
The first advantage it that the unconventional coding made it possible for Inglehart (1977) to do
factor analysis. Secondly, with more items to prioritize, issue salience becomes less dominant.
Inglehart shows that those who pick a material item in card A are likely to do so in card B. This
41
increases the internal validity of his measurement. Some criticisms of the 4-item battery remain
however in the 12-item battery. Issue salience remains a problem, though it is not that strong as in
the 4-item battery. In the 12-item battery there is for still only a question about inflation and not
about unemployment. This could still, though to a lesser extent, lead to issue salience mechanisms.
Secondly problems with forced choices between material and postmaterial items remain.
Inglehart’s choice to recode the beautiful cities item to zero is also remarkable. In this way the
environmental item is seen as material, whereas the item still loads more on the postmaterial item
as on the material item. For comparing the results over time this has however no consequences. It
does only result in lower postmaterial scores in general.
The above arguments show that the 12-item battery is a better measurement tool than the
4-item battery. In the fifth chapter, the critical discussion, an extra analyses of the separate results
per card (A, B and C) will be discusses. This will shed some light of what is going on within the 12item battery. Because of these deficiencies an alternative measurement of post-materialism is made.
This is explained in the following paragraphs.
3.3 Alternative index measuring postmaterial values (European Social Survey)
Since there are several important critiques on Ingleharts 12-item battery it is important to see
whether other measurements corroborate his World Values Survey results. In selecting this
alternative measurement three criteria are used. The first is criteria is that the battery should include
different questions concerning material issues. The questions should be about sustenance needs and
safety needs. The second criteria is that the battery should include different questions concerning
postmaterial issues. It is important that questions on different dimensions of the postmaterial
concept are included, to reduce the problem of issue salience. The battery should include questions
about aesthetic needs, intellectual needs and belonging/esteem needs. Since one of the critiques I
pose on Inglehart’s battery is about forced choices, the third criteria holds that the alternative
measurement should not force respondents to choose between material and postmaterial items.
In an alternative survey, the European Social Survey, there is a set of questions which comes
close in matching the three criteria. For that reason an index is formed from these questions. In table
10 the questions are shown and categorized in Inglehart needs categories. As one can see, there is at
least one question per category. The questions are all phrased in a similar manner; “now I will briefly
describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not
like you”. (European Social Survey, 2014b). Respondents can score every question with a number
ranging from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not at all like me).
Although the questions clearly differ from Inglehart’s battery they mostly fit in his needs
categories. In the aesthetic category there is one question about care for nature. This is similar as
42
Inglehart’s environmental item. In the intellectual category the question on new ideas and being
creative is similar as the ‘ideas count’ item. There is however no question on self-expression (free
speech). Instead of this item there is one question on the importance of understanding different
people, which is about tolerance. Since tolerance towards out-groups is seen as postmaterial and
correlates with the postmaterial 12-item index (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), the question is selected. In
the belonging/esteem category the questions are also a little bit different. Instead of a question on
more say in on job, community or government there is a question on the importance of making own
decisions and be free. Though the question is different and not specified on participation in a
domain, it is about autonomous and free decision making. The last postmaterial question is about
helping people and care for others. I think this touches upon the wish for a less impersonal society.
For the material needs there is one sustenance question and one safety question. The safety
question is about the importance of a strong government which ensures safety. This clearly fits with
the category. The question in the sustenance category is the weakness of this index. Here one
question on the importance of being rich and having money is asked. Though this is clearly material
it is not about sustenance. Sustenance is about keeping your job and financial position, whereas this
question is about becoming rich. Since this is the only economic material question it is included in
the index.
Table 10
Social and self
actualization needs
(Post-materialist)
Physiological needs
(materialist)
Material and postmaterial question in European Social Survey
Aesthetic needs
1. To care for nature
Intellectual needs
2. To think new ideas and being creative
3. To understand different people
Belonging & esteem needs
4. To make own decisions and be free
5. To help people and care for others
Sustenance needs
6. To be rich and have money
Safety needs
7. That government is strong and
ensures safety
The above argues why it is possible, from a theoretical perspective to combine the seven
questions into one postmaterial index. Before this can be done unidimensionality and reliability
needs however be tested. To do so, a factor test and a reliability test is employed. The factor analysis
shows that the ‘to be rich’ and ‘strong government’ question do not correlate enough with the other
questions in the postmaterial index. When these questions are included the answers on the
questions do not load enough on one item. This signals that these two questions measure something
different than the other five questions. For this reason they had to be thrown out of the final index.
This results in a postmaterial index without material questions. Since it is remains interesting to see
what the results on these questions are, the results on these two material questions are separately
43
discussed in the critical reflection chapter. After the two questions were thrown out
unidimensionality is confirmed by factor analysis: the remaining 5 questions load high on only one
dimension (eigenvalue > 1), with communality scores above .2010 and factor scores above .40. The
Cronbach’s alfa score is relatively high with a score above .60.
Since the questions are all scored in the same way (ranging from 1-6) they are easily summed
up into an index. The total score, ranging from 0-30, is divided by 5. This leads to a final score ranging
from 1 (material) to 6 (postmaterial). Because of this the scores have an interval of 0.2, it is more
ratio like than the 12-item battery. In table 11 the items which are combined in the final postmaterial
index are once again listed.
Table 11 Postmaterial index (European Social Survey)
1. To care for nature
2. To think new ideas and being creative
3. To understand different people
4. To make own decisions and be free
5. To help people and care for others
3.4 Macro level Hypotheses
In the following paragraphs three macro level hypotheses, described in the theoretical chapter, are
specified for the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey. In the WVS the most
important waves are wave 5 and 6. The data of wave 5 is collected between 2005 and 2007, thus
before the start of the 2008 economic crisis. Wave 6 is conducted between 2010 and 2013, in this
period the crisis was already 2 to 5 years under way. The results of wave 5 and 6 are also compared
with results of previous waves (wave 2, 3 and 4)11. Although data from several countries is missing,
this comparison gives a grasp of what is going over a longer period of time. Suppose there is a decline
in post-materialism, these data show whether this is a new development or that it is part of an
already ongoing process, i.e. that it is less likely that the crisis is the cause for the decline.
In the European Social Survey there are six rounds in which data is gathered. The first three
rounds (2002/2004/2006) were held before the start of the 2008 economic crisis. The fourth round
at the beginning of the crisis (2008) and the fifth and sixth round while the 2008 economic crisis was
some years under way (2010/2012). It is most likely that the decline in postmaterial scores is
stronger as the crisis progresses. This because in 2012 the crisis was more enduring and more deeply
10
The ‘being creative’ question has a communality score of .18. When this question is thrown out it results in a
lower Cronbach’s alfa score and eigenvalue. For this and the fact that its factor score is >.4 the question
remains included in the postmaterial item.
11
In the first wave the 12-item battery was not yet incorporated.
44
felt across the European societies, than in the beginning when the crisis was still a banking crisis. In
the ESS scores are also compared with survey results from before the 2008 economic crisis.
1) Applied scarcity hypotheses
World Values Survey
1a) In 2010/2013 the respondents score lower on the 12-item battery than in 2005/2007.
European Social Survey
1b) In 2010 the respondents score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2008.
1c) In 2012 the respondents score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2010.
The scarcity hypothesis holds that postmaterial values for all citizens will decline, this implies a
period effect. The socialization thesis holds that they will only decline for youngsters who are in their
formative years, this implies a generation effect. In defining ‘formative years’ a similar
operationalization as Inglehart is used. According to Inglehart (2000) those aged between 15 and 24
years are in their formative years. In the WVS coherent data is missing for those below the age of 18,
in the ESS coherent data is missing for those below the age of 17. Therefore in the WVS those
between 18 and 24 years old are coded as youngsters, in the ESS those between 17 and 24 years are
coded as youngsters. In order to compare the ‘youngsters’ groups, those above the age of 24 are
recoded into age groups of similar time spans. In table 12 these age groups are shown.
Table 12
Recoding age into age groups
WVS
ESS
1
18-24
17-24
2
25-31
25-32
3
32-38
33-40
4
39-45
41-48
5
46-52
49-56
6
53-59
57-64
7
60-66
65-72
8
67-73
73-80
9
74-80
81-88
10 81-87
89-123
11 88-99
2) Applied socialization hypotheses
World Values Survey
2a) In 2010/2013 the respondents (aged 18-24) score lower on the 12-item postmaterial battery
than in 2005/2007.
European Social Survey
2b) In 2012 the respondents (aged 18-24) score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2010.
2c) In 2010 the respondents(aged 18-24) score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2008.
45
After testing the first two, merely descriptive, hypotheses it is time to see whether the results
correspond with the economic conditions. In the third hypothesis this is done on a macro level, the
country level. Although the 2008 economic crisis is referred to as a ´global´ crisis there is serious
variation in the impact of the crisis on different countries. The crisis is not global in the sense that
countries all over the world are hit in a same matter, but because the crisis affects countries all over
the world. It is expected that in a country with negative economic conditions, an economic crisis,
postmaterial scores will decline. Meanwhile in a country with positive economic conditions, no
economic crisis, postmaterial scores will continue to increase. The economic conditions, i.e. whether
there is a crisis or not is measured in two different ways12. The first measurement is the most
common way to measure how an economy is doing, namely; economic growth. Economic growth is
measured at three moments. In the year of the survey (year 0), one year before the survey (year -1)
and two years before the survey (year -2). In the ESS these are 2010, 2009 and 2008 for the
postmaterial index scores of 2010. For the postmaterial index scores 2012 these are2012, 2011 and
2010. For the WVS these years differ because the survey was carried out in different years in the
different countries. The years in which the WVS survey was carried out in the different countries is
shown in table 41 in the appendix. If there is economic decline in one of the three years before the
survey was held a country is coded as having (had) an economic crisis. Because the exact levels of
economic growth are also shown in the results, it is also possible to take a closer examination of
these numbers. An economic decline of 5 or 8 percent is likely to have more impact on a country
than a decline below 2 percent.
I choose to take these three measurement moments because not only economic conditions
at the moment of the survey are important. It can take some time before economic decline affects
the life of ordinary citizens. This fact leads to the second way in which the economic conditions are
measured; the level of unemployment. The unemployment levels says more directly something
about how the economy affect citizens. Low or negative economic growth will not per se change
one’s values. It are the consequences of economic decline which might change your thoughts. For
the third hypotheses unemployment is not measured by simply taking the absolute levels. The
change in unemployment levels is measured. Hereby the growth or decline of the level of
unemployment in the two or three years13 till the survey is taken. In table 13 the details of the way
economic growth and the change in the unemployment levels are measured is shown.
12
Initially the strength of the economic crisis was also measurement with the use of ‘consumer confidence’.
Due to a lack of data this was however not possible to carry out.
13
After examining the unemployment rates for the WVS countries it showed that a three years span gives a
better view on the effect of the crisis on the countries. This is mainly due to the fact that in most countries
unemployment rates show a strong increase from 2008 to 2009. For the ESS countries a two years span is used.
46
Table 13
Operationalization of economic growth and unemployment change
World Values Survey
European Social Survey
Average
year of survey (year 0)
2012 (year of survey)
Economic growth
year before survey (year -1)
2011 (year before survey)
(in percentages of GDP) two years before survey (year -2) 2010 (two years before survey)
Unemployment change
(in percentage points)
Difference between year of
survey (year 0) and three years
before the survey (year -3)
2010 (year of survey)
2009 (year before survey)
2008 (two years before survey)
Difference between 2012 and 2010
Difference between 2010 and 2008
3) Economic hypotheses (macro level)
World Values Survey
3a) In countries with economic decline in the two years before the survey scores on the 12-item
postmaterial battery will be lower, whereas in countries without economic decline in the two
years before the survey scores on the 12-item postmaterial battery will be higher.
European Social Survey
3b) In countries with economic decline between 2008-2010 scores on the postmaterial index will
be lower, whereas in countries without economic decline between 2008-2010 scores on the
postmaterial index will be higher.
3c) In countries with economic decline between 2010-2012 scores on the postmaterial index will
be lower, whereas in countries without economic decline between 2010-2012 scores on the
postmaterial index will be higher.
World Values Survey
3d)In countries in which unemployment levels rose in the three years before the survey scores
on the 12-item postmaterial battery will be lower, whereas in countries in which unemployment
levels declined in the three years before the survey scores on the 12-item postmaterial battery
will be higher.
European Social Survey
3e) In countries in which unemployment levels rose between 2008-2010 scores on the
postmaterial index will be lower, whereas in countries in which unemployment levels declined
between 2008-2010 scores on the postmaterial index will be higher.
3f) In countries in which unemployment levels rose between 2010-2012 scores on the
postmaterial index will be lower, whereas in countries in which unemployment levels declined
between 2010-2012 scores on the postmaterial index will be higher.
3.5 The need of a multilevel model
Moving to the individual level it is important to keep in mind that the variance on the postmaterial
battery and index is still partly explained by variables on a macro level. For that reasons the micro
level examination is employed using multilevel regression analysis. This multilevel model holds the
This is done because the ESS is held in 2010 and 2012. Would a three years span been used in the ESS this
would lead to a situation in which for example the unemployment level of 2009 is taken into account for round
5 and 6. I prefer not to do so in order to keep the rounds separate from each other.
47
idea that individuals are nested in countries. The multilevel regression model controls for the country
level effects. There are theoretical, empirical and statistical arguments to use a multilevel model.
Inglehart is much aware of characteristics of countries in examining post-materialism. Based
on the dominance of either traditional values, secular-rational values or self expression values he
defines different global cultures. He for example defines Protestants Europe, Catholic Europe,
Confucian countries and ex-communist countries as culturally different (for all cultures see figure 1
on page 17). Besides these cultural effects one might expect institutional effects on a country level.
The varieties of modernity school, discussed in the theory chapter, points to these effects. The
degree in which the 2008 global economic crisis affects countries differs. This because of the specific
place a country has within the global economy, the domestic economic conditions or due to domestic
measurements aimed at limiting the effects of the crisis.
There are also empirical argument for a multilevel model. The levels of post-materialism
show quite some variety between the countries under scrutiny. These differences per country are
shown in table 11. In the WVS the average score on the 12-item battery is 2.23 (range: 0-5). In Russia
the respondents score an average on 1.44 whereas in Sweden they score 2.71. In the ESS there are
less differences between countries. This might be due to the fact that they are culturally more
homogeneous. The total average on the postmaterial index in all rounds is 2.28 (range: 1-6).
Switzerland has the lowest score, 2.01. In Portugal has the highest score, 2.61.
Table 14
Mean scores per country on postmaterial battery (WVS) and postmaterial index (ESS)
World Values Survey
European Social Survey
Country
Mean 12-item battery
Country
Mean postmaterial index
(all waves)
(all rounds)
Russia
1.44
Switzerland
2.01
Cyprus
1.90
Spain
2.11
South Korea
1.97
Slovenia
2.17
Poland
1.99
Germany
2.19
United States
2.13
Denmark
2.21
Japan
2.22
Ireland
2.24
Turkey
2.23
Belgium
2.25
New Zealand
2.30
Netherlands
2.27
Slovenia
2.32
United Kingdom
2.24
Argentina
2.37
Finland
2.32
Australia
2.40
Poland
2.34
Netherlands
2.41
Sweden
2.43
Spain
2.41
Norway
2.48
Chile
2.42
Portugal
2.61
Uruguay
2.52
Germany
2.68
Sweden
2.71
48
The theoretical and empirical arguments are supported by statistical reasons. This is the fact
for both dependent variables. The intervening variable, satisfaction with household income has a
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of .0614 in the WVS dataset and .01315 in the ESS dataset. This
means that countries account for 6 and 13 percent of the variance of satisfaction with one’s
household income. Though this is a relatively low ICC score, it is still high enough for using a
multilevel model. Using a simple OLS regression model would mean that I assume that the
relationships do not vary across countries. The ICC score though it is low, is still well above zero. For
that reason it is better to use a multilevel model. A second method to measure the statistical need
for a multilevel model is the likelihood ratio test. In the WVS the one-tailed P-value = .000 16, which is
smaller than α=0.01. This is also the case in the ESS17. This means that there is significant variance in
the level of satisfaction with household income between countries.
For post-materialism the second dependent variable, the theoretical and empirical argument
is also supported by statistical reasons. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is .0718 in the WVS
dataset and 0.0519 in the ESS data. This means that countries account for seven and five percent of
the variance of the postmaterial variables. Using a likelihood ratio test the one-tailed P-Value is in
both datasets smaller .00020 21, which is smaller than α=0.01. This means that there is significant
variance in the postmaterial scores between countries.
3.6 Micro level hypotheses
Because of the lack of data and questions on some variables not all causal links of the causal model
(see figure 5) can be tested. The first variable which is impossible to test is the amount of negative
new about the economy. It is likely to assume, based on common sense, that from the start of the
economic crisis there has been more negative news items about the economy than before the
economic crisis. Furthermore from communications research it is known that mass attention on a
certain topic influences public opinion. In this thesis I am however not capable to test whether and
how negative news about the economy influences one’s satisfaction with one’s financial situation.
Secondly it is not possible to test the effect of the macro economic conditions on the
respondents income. In both surveys there is no questions on how much one’s income changed in
σ2u0 = .2869, σ2r = 5.0369: rho= .2869/(.2869+5.0369)= 0,0538.
σ2u0 = .0832, σ2r = .5735: rho= .0832/(.0832+.5735)= 0,1267.
16
-2LL Restricted model (OLS) = 201404,652 , -2LL Full model (multilevel) = 198634,459.
17
-2LL Restricted model (OLS) = 381304,871, -2LL Full model (multilevel) = 360827,400.
18 2
σu0 = .0948, σ2r = 1.3164: rho= .0948/(.0948+1.3164)=0,0671.
19 2
σu0 = .0213, σ2r = 0.4250: rho= .0213/(.0213+0.4250)=0,0477.
20
-2LL Restricted model (OLS)= 133245,545 , -2LL Full model (multilevel)= 129625,804.
21
-2LL Restricted model (OLS)= 306733,323, -2LL Full model (multilevel)= 299403,494.
14
15
49
the previous years. For these two reasons the causal model which is tested is different than the
model which is shown in the previous chapter. The model to be tested is shown in figure 6.
Figure 6
Macro
Macro and micro level model to be tested
Economic conditions
1) economic growth
2) level of unemployment
3) change in unemployment level
+
postmaterial values
+
Micro
+
Satisfaction with household income
postmaterial values
In table 15 the operationalization of the variables tested in the causal models is shown. In the WVS
the effects are tested including respondents from wave 5 and 6, which is the same as with the
previous analyses. In the ESS the effects are tested including respondents from round 4, 5 and 6,
respectively 2008, 2010 and 2012. This is due to the fact that for the relative income variable data is
only available for these rounds. The economic conditions are measured in three ways; economic
growth, level of unemployment and change in the level of unemployment. The effects of the
economic crisis variables are tested in separate models. This because of a problem with
multicollinearity, which means that the different economic crisis variables correlate too much with
each other. Multicollinearity is diagnosed using the variance inflation factor (VIF). While taking the
different economic crisis variables in one model the VIF score is 3.122 in the WVS and 3.590 is the
ESS. This is higher than 2.5, which is an usual critical value for VIF (Allison, 2012). Using separate
models the highest VIF score that is found is 1.400, this means that there is no problem of
multicollinearity in these models.
In table 15 the control variables are also shown. In order to have robust findings it is
important to include the most important control variables. These are the variables which also might
affect the dependent variable or which effect the causal relation between the independent and
dependent variable. For the first causal relationship which is tested a maximum of seven control
variables are included. The first is relative income, which is a measurement of one’s income relative
to the income of other citizens. It would have been better to include the absolute income level, but
this data is not available in the ESS. By taking this relative measurement as an alternative most of the
variance of income is captured. It is expected that richer citizens are more satisfied with their
income. By controlling for relative income, it is better possible to see what the real effect of the
economic conditions are. A second control variable is a dummy variable of whether someone is
50
unemployed or not. This is an important variable because this gives some insight in the way the
economic crisis affects the satisfaction with household income. It can be the case that the crisis leads
to more unemployed people, which are then more dissatisfied with their household income. It could
however also be the case that the crisis is a disruptive event, as explained in the theoretical chapter.
In that case, even by controlling for the employment status of the respondent the economic crisis
variables affect the satisfaction with household income. A third control variable is Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), which is a country level variable. It is important not to take too many country level
variables into a multilevel model. GDP is chosen as control variable because it controls for the size of
the economy in a country. A fourth control variable is self positioning on a political scale. If could be
the case that the economic conditions have a different effect on satisfaction with household income
for left or right citizens. Other demographic variables, on an individual level, are also picked as
control variables. These are age, gender and the level of education.
For the second causal link a maximum of six control variables is included in the model. A first
important variable is self positioning on a political scale. As described in the theoretical chapter,
some argue that postmaterial values are leftwing values. It is expected that being more leftist has a
strong effect on having postmaterial values. Therefore it is important to include this variable in the
model. A second control variable is one’s level of education. By controlling for this effect, one can see
whether being postmaterial is caused by being rich or by being highly educated. Although these
factors are likely to correlate to some extent with each other, it implies a big difference in
interpreting post-materialism. In the case that education is more important, this would support the
socialization hypothesis. In the case that income is more important, this would support the scarcity
hypothesis. A third control variable is age, this is according to Inglehart (1997) an artifact of the
socialization thesis. Younger people, raised in saver conditions are expected to be more postmaterial.
Other control variables at the individual level are relative income and gender. On a country level GDP
is included.
51
Table 15
Operationalization of variables
symbol
World Values Survey
γ01Wj
Economic
1) Average of economic growth
conditions
of year 0, year -1 and year -2.
γ02Wj
variables
2) Level of unemployment in
year of survey
γ03Wj
3) change in unemployment
level in year 0, year -1 and year
-2.
Satisfaction with
Model 1:
Satisfaction with household
household income Yij
income
Model 2:
γ10Xij
Postmaterial
values
Control variables
Relative income
Self positioning on
political scale
Age
Yij
γ 20Xij
γ 30Xij
γ 40Xij
Gender (dummy)
γ 50Xij
Level of education
γ 60Xij
Being unemployed
(dummy)
Gross Domestic
Product
γ 70Xij
γ04Wj
European Social Survey
1) Average of economic growth
of year 0, year -1 and year -2.
2) Level of unemployment in
year of survey
3) change in unemployment
level in year 0, year -1 and year
-2.
Feeling about household
income
1= dissatisfied
10= satisfied
12-item postmaterial battery
1= having difficulties
4= living comfortably
Postmaterial scale
0= material
5= postmaterial
1= material
6= postmaterial
Income groups (deciles)
1= left
10= right
Age
Income groups (deciles)
0= left
10 = right
Age
0 = female
1 = male
Highest level of education
attained
1=low
8=high
0 = employed (or other)
1 = unemployed
GDP in year of survey
0 = female
1 = male
Highest level of education
1= low
5= high
0 = employed (or other)
1 = unemployed
GDP in year of survey
Besides the way the variables are described above and showed in table 15 it is also possible to show
the model in an equation. For the first causal link, the effect of the economic conditions on
satisfaction with household income, the equations are:
Yij=γ00+γ01Wj+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ70Xij+γ04Wj+u0j +rij
Yij=γ00+γ02Wj+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ70Xij+γ04Wj+u0j +rij
Yij=γ00+γ03Wj+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ70Xij+γ04Wj+u0j +rij
52
For the second causal link, the effect of satisfactions with household income on postmaterial values
the equation is;
Yij=γ00+γ10Xij+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ04Wj+u0j +rij
4) The causal model hypotheses
World Values Survey
4a) As the average economic growth in a country increases, one’s satisfaction with her/his
household income increases.
4b) As the level of unemployment in a country is higher, one’s satisfaction with her/his
household income decreases.
4c) As the level of unemployment in a country increases, one’s satisfaction with her/his
household income decreases.
4d) As one’s satisfaction with her/his household income decreases, one has less postmaterial
values.
European Social Survey
4e) As the average economic growth in a country increases, one’s feelings about household
income become more positive.
4f) As the level of unemployment in a country is higher, one’s feelings about household income
become more negative.
4g) As the level of unemployment in a country increases, one’s feelings about household income
become more negative.
4h) As one’s feelings about household income become more negative, one has less postmaterial
values.
After testing the two causal links, the threshold hypothesis is tested. This idea holds that more
wealthy individuals may be hit by the crisis but remain economic safe. For that reason it is expected
that the above causal mechanisms are not found for those who are better off in society. Whether
that is the case is tested in two different ways. For the first effect an interaction term, the effect of
the economic conditions on satisfaction with household income, is tested. For the interaction model
the main effect is the effect of household income on satisfaction with household income, which is a
positive effect. The more money someone earns, the more satisfied she or he is with her/his income.
This effect is, according to the to be tested model, influenced by the level of
unemployment/economic growth in the years before the survey. If the unemployment level is high,
the effect is stronger. If the unemployment level is low, the effect is weaker. In times of economic
crisis citizens get more insecure about their income. So even though their income may be the same,
they are less satisfied with their income. The interaction effects are tested for the effect of economic
growth and for the effect of the level of unemployment in the WVS dataset. These effects were in
53
the main model significant, whereas the other models, those in the ESS did not show significant
results. Therefore calculating the interaction effects is a useless exercise for these models. In the
economic growth model, the interaction effect is negative. As the economic growth is higher, the
effect of household income on satisfaction with household income gets weaker. In the
unemployment model the interaction effect is positive. As the level of unemployment is higher, the
effect of household income on satisfaction with household’s income gets stronger. In figure 7 and
figure 8 this is visually shown.
Figure 7
Macro
Interaction effect: economic growth*relative income
Economic growth
+
Micro
Figure 8
Macro
relative income
satisfaction with household income
Interaction effect: unemployment level*relative income
Level of unemployment
+
+
Micro
relative income
satisfaction with household income
The equations for the multilevel interaction models are:
Yij=γ00+γ01Wj+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ70Xij+γ04Wj+γ21 WjXij+u0j+u1jXij+rij22
Yij=γ00+γ02Wj+γ20Xij+γ30Xij+γ40Xij+γ50Xij+γ60Xij+γ70Xij+γ04Wj+γ22 WjXij+u0j+u1jXij+rij23
The second effect, the effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial values, is tested
by splitting the dataset. It is expected that in general satisfaction with household income has a
positive effect of postmaterial values. Those who feel more secure are expected to have more
postmaterial values. From the wealthy threshold hypothesis it is however expected that this is not
the case for all citizens. For those who have a higher income the expectation is that more satisfaction
does not lead to more postmaterial values. The dataset is splitted in a set including those who are
wealthy and those who have less money. Those less well off are those in the lowest five income
deciles, these include 64,3% of the respondents of the total dataset. Those better off are those in the
highest five income deciles, these include 35,7% of the respondents. The expectation is that in the
first group, a significant effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial is found,
22
23
γ21 WjXij = interactionterm: economic growth*relative income.
γ22 WjXij = interactionterm: level of unemployment*relative income.
54
whereas in the second group a significant effect is not found. This splitting method is chosen, above
employing another interaction effects because it is more in line with the theoretical assumptions.
Splitting the dataset shows that somewhere in the dataset there is a threshold above which more
satisfaction with household income does not lead to more likelihood of having postmaterial values.
This splitting of the datasets is also only employed for the WVS, since in the ESS the main effect
including all respondents is not significant.
5) the wealthy threshold hypothesis
World Values Survey
5a) As the economical growth is higher, the effect of household income on satisfaction with
household income gets weaker.
5b) As the level of unemployment is higher, the effect of household income on satisfaction with
household income gets stronger.
5c) For the subset of those in the top five income deciles, there is no effect of satisfaction with
household income on the 12-item postmaterial battery.
5d) For the subset of those in the lower five income deciles, there is positive effect of
satisfaction with household income on the 12-item postmaterial battery.
55
4) Results: macro an micro level
In this chapter the results on the five hypotheses are described. The most important results are
shown in various tables. The results on the hypotheses are successively described. Per hypothesis the
results of both the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey are discussed. After these
descriptions a short elaboration on the results is given. In the discussion chapter, chapter 5, a more
extensive elaboration on the results is given.
4.1 Lower scores of post-materialism?
World Values Survey
In Table 16 the average scores on the 12-item battery per country is shown. About half the countries
show an increase in the score of postmaterial values, whereas the other half shows a decline in the
score of postmaterial values. There is thus no general decline across these countries in the
dominance of postmaterial values. Interestingly, the average score of all seventeen countries is in
wave 5 and in wave 6 exactly the same, namely; 2.17. In ten countries the mean difference24, the
difference between the score of wave 5 and wave 6, is significant25. With a confidence of 95% I could
say that in Slovenia, Uruquay, Cyprus, Australia and the Netherlands there has been a decline in the
mean scores of the 12-item battery. In Spain this also seems the case, although it does not met the α
criteria (significance score of 0.053). In Australia the strongest decline, -0.47, is seen. If Australia
would be excluded from the database a small increase on the average postmaterial scores would be
the result. While in 5 countries there is a decline, there are also six countries in which there is an
increase in the mean scores of the 12-item battery. The standard deviation does show a small
decrease. This is however mainly caused by a big decrease of the standard deviation in Australia.
24
Mean difference is tested with an Independent-Samples T-test.
For the T-tests in this chapter a threshold of α < 0.05 is used. In the tables other commonly used thresholds
(<0.1 and <0.01) are also shown.
25
56
Table 16
Country
Country means on postmaterial score (World Values Survey)
Wave 5
Std deviation
Wave 6
Std deviation
2005-2007
2010-2013
Russia
1.26
1.01
1.57
1.08
South-Korea
1.89
0.99
2.14
1.07
Poland
2.01
0.99
2.22
0.98
Chili
2.34
1.29
2.53
1.23
Germany
2.62
1.12
2.77
1.17
Sweden
2.75
1.16
2.85
1.25
Turkey
2.00
1.23
2.08
1.09
Japan
2.11
2.11
2.09
1.05
Argentina
2.15
1.26
2.12
1.13
New Zealand
2.23
1.17
2.19
1.28
United States
1.99
1.23
1.94
1.21
Spain
2.26
1.27
2.21
1.15
Slovenia
2.39
1.05
2.28
1.04
Uruguay
2.51
1.16
2.38
1.26
Cyprus
1.97
1.19
1.82
1.15
Netherlands
2.54
1.15
2.34
1.19
Australia
2.43
1.31
1.90
0.89
Total
2.17
1.22
2.17
1.18
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Mean difference
+0.31***
+0.25***
+0.21***
+0.19***
+0.15***
+0.10*
+0.08*
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05
-0.05*
-0.11**
-0.13**
-0.15***
-0.20***
-0.47***
+0.00
In table 17 the mean scores per country of wave 5 and wave 6 are compared with mean scores of
previous waves. This comparison results in a notable finding. It is due to the missings for several
countries in wave 2, 3 and 4, not possible to draw strong conclusions based on these longitudinal
data. If, however, any conclusions are to be drawn from these data, they certainly are not in line with
the first hypothesis. The postmaterial scores are declining till wave 5. In wave 6 these scores show a
small increase or remain about equal. This finding is in contrast with the expectation of Inglehart. He
reports (Inglehart 1997) an increase in the dominance of postmaterial values over the years, due to
positive economic developments. For this subset of countries this is incorrect. There is a decrease in
the dominance of postmaterial values among citizens between 1989-2005. Since the economic crisis
there has been a (new) small increase or stabilization in the postmaterial scores. The direction of the
change differs from country to country, as is shown in table 16 and table 17. The long term analyses
of the 12-item battery strengthens the idea that overall, for these seventeen countries, the 2008
economic crisis did not led to a decrease in postmaterial values. This implies a rejection of the first
hypothesis.
57
Table 17
country
Country means on postmaterial score on the long run (World Values Survey)
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 4
Wave 5
Wave 6
1990-1992 1995-1998 1999-2001 2005-2007 2010-2013
Argentina
2.41
2.72
2.42
2.15
2.12
Australia
2.75
2.43
1.90
Chili
2.44
2.46
2.32
2.34
2.53
Cyprus
1.97
1.82
Germany
2.63
2.62
2.77
Japan
2.36
2.27
2.38
2.11
2.09
South-Korea
1.90
1.95
1.97
1.89
2.14
Netherlands
2.54
2.34
New Zealand
2.43
2.23
2.19
Poland
2.08
1.69
2.01
2.22
Russia
1.65
1.27
1.26
1.57
Slovenia
2.30
2.39
2.28
Spain
2.60
2.48
2.47
2.26
2.21
Sweden
2.54
2.67
2.75
2.85
Turkey
2.41
2.22
2.35
2.00
2.08
United States
2.30
2.45
1.99
1.94
Uruguay
2.66
2.51
2.38
Total wave 5 + 6
2.17
2.17
Total wave 4 countries
2.37
2.17***27
2.20*27
Total wave 3 countries
2.29
2.16***28
2.1728
Total wave 2 countries
2.19
2.05***29
1,93***29
2.05***29
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
European Social Survey
27
These scores show the average of those countries which are included in wave 4.
These scores show the average of those countries which are included in wave 3.
29
These scores show the average of those countries which are included in wave 2.
28
58
While in the WVS there is no general decline of post-materialism, the results of the ESS give a
different picture. In almost all of the ESS countries under scrutiny the scores on the postmaterial
index drop from 2010 to 2012, see table 18. In 10 of the 15 countries the mean difference between
round 5 and round 6 is significant. In the remaining four countries (Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland
and Netherlands) there is no significant difference. The average score of all fourteen countries
declines from 2.26 to 2.19. Although this decline of 0.07 points on a 6 points scale may not seem
spectacular, it remains remarkable that the decline is widespread across the European countries. The
standard deviation also shows a small decrease overall.
Table 18
country
Country means on postmaterial index (European Social Survey)
Round 5 Std deviation Round 6 Std deviation Mean difference
2010
2012
Denmark
2.17
0.65
2.17
0.62
0
Portugal
2.59
0.74
2.59
0.66
0
Switzerland
1.97
0.59
1.96
0.54
-0.01
Netherlands
2.25
0.62
2.22
0.63
-0.03
Norway
2.43
0.63
2.38
0.63
-0.05**
Germany
2.13
0.61
2.08
0.57
-0.05***
Spain
2.06
0.59
2.01
0.64
-0.05***
Belgium
2.29
0.59
2.22
0.58
-0.07***
Poland
2.30
0.65
2.23
0.63
-0.07***
United Kingdom
2.27
0.67
2.18
0.65
-0.09***
Slovenia
2.08
0.57
1.96
0.58
-0.12***
Finland
2.34
0.67
2.21
0.60
-0.13***
Ireland
2.34
0.83
2.21
0.71
-0.13***
Sweden
2.33
0.65
2.19
0.67
-0.14***
Total
2.26
0.68
2.19
0.65
-0.07***
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Table 19
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Country means on postmaterial index (European Social Survey)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2.23
2.25
2.26
2.25
2.29
2.22***
2.21
2.27**
2.24
2.19*
2.17
2.17
2.34
2.36
2.33
2.33
2.34
2.21***
2.24
2.27
2.27
2.20*** 2.13***
2.08***
2.28
2.24
2.26
2.12*** 2.34***
2.21***
2.33
2.29*
2.28
2.25
2.25
2.22
2.56
2.54
2.48**
2.48
2.43*
2.38**
2.40
2.38
2.35
2.36
2.30**
2.23***
2.54
2.68*** 2.56*** 2.66*** 2.59***
2.59
2.29
2.31
2.22***
2.18*
2.08***
1.96***
2,18
2.27*** 2.09***
2.09
2.06
2.01***
2.57
2.54
2.51
2.46*
2.33***
2.19***
2.06
2.04
2.05
1.98
1.97
1.96
59
United
2.36
Kingdom
Total
2.32
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
2.32
2.31
2.27
2.27
2.18***
2.34
2.30
2.26*
2.26
2.19***
In table 19 the average score of all countries in the period 2002-2012 are shown. From this table it
becomes clear that the decrease of .07 is unprecedented in the previous rounds. From 2002 to 2010
the average scores of all countries range between 2.26 and 2.34. The biggest mean difference of the
total score of all countries between two rounds, which is .04, is not statistically significant. In 2004,
2006 and 2008 some countries have significant changes on the postmaterial index, but these are few.
In 2010, after two years of economic crisis, the first signs of a decline becomes visible. From 2008 to
2010 there are 6 countries in which the mean difference declines. In 7 countries there is no statistical
mean difference between 2008 and 2010. Only in Ireland there is an increase of 0.22 points, which is
significant. The fact that the mean score of all countries remains equal has mainly to do with this
diverging result of Ireland. But even though from 2008 to 2010 mean differences decrease in six
countries, the widespread decrease from 2010 to 2012 is a new phenomenon in the ESS.
Conclusion on scarcity hypotheses
Based on the results in the WVS there is no decline in post-materialism after the economic crisis.
Remarkably the average score of all 17 countries remains equal before the crisis and when the crisis
is some years under way. Due to this result, the expectation of hypothesis 1a is not met and is
rejected. The fact that in some countries there is a decline whereas in others there is an increase in
post-materialism gives a good opportunitys to compare these countries. Testing the third hypothesis
will show if these changes correspond with the economic conditions per country.
World Values Survey
1a) In 2010/2013 the respondents score lower on the 12-item battery than in 2005/2007.
 Rejected
The ESS results show a different picture. The results show that in almost all of the countries postmaterialism declines in 2012, when the crisis is four years under way. With this result hypothesis 1c
is confirmed. On average there was no decline in post-materialism from 2008 to 2010, therefore
hypothesis 1b is rejected. There are however six countries in which postmaterial scores decline in
this period. Before the 2008 economic crisis, post-materialism shows to be relatively stable. This
gives a sign that it might be well the case that it is the economic crisis which caused the postmaterial
decline from 2010 and 2012. This still needs to be confirmed in testing hypothesis 3 and 4.
60
European Social Survey
1b) In 2010 the respondents score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2008.
 Rejected
1c) In 2012 the respondents score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2010.
 Confirmed
4.2 Lower scores on post-materialism among youngsters?
World Values Survey
Although there is on average no decline in postmaterial scores in the World Values Survey, it is still
possible that there is a decline among certain age groups. Such a decline might be nullified by
changing scores of other age groups. Inglehart (1999) predicts that younger generations that are
raised in safer conditions, are more postmodern than older generations. In table 42 (see appendix)
the average scores for different age groups on the 12-item battery scores are shown. It shows that as
citizens are younger, their postmaterial score gets increases. This pattern is also visible when the
waves are examined separately. This is in line with Inglehart’s expectation.
Table 20
Age groups
Age group means on postmaterial index (World Values Survey)
Wave 5
Std deviation
Wave 6
Std deviation
2005-2007
2010-2013
18-24
2.30
1.22
2.35
1.19
25-31
2.25
1.19
2.25
1.15
32-38
2.20
1.21
2.18
1.67
39-45
2.16
1.21
2.19
1.67
46-52
2.18
1.25
2.18
1.18
53-59
2.20
1.24
2.13*
1.17
60-66
2.03
1.22
2.12***
1.19
67-73
2.04
1.23
2.06
1.22
74-80
2.03
1.19
2.01
1.13
81-87
1.94
1.23
1.88
1.17
88-99
1.98
1.16
1.93
1.19
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
The results shown in table 20 are remarkable. The results show that there is no significant change
among youngsters30. The socialization hypothesis expects a decline, whereas a small insignificant
increase is found. In wave 5 the average score among youngsters is 2.30 whereas in wave 6 this is
30
The average scores for wave 2, 3 and 4 cannot be given because the countries selected in each wave differ.
For that reason if average scores for these waves are compared, this would lead to flawed results.
61
2.35. At none of the alpha levels this increase is significant. The mean difference of those between
the age of 60 and 66 is significant. This finding is in contrast with the expectation of Inglehart’s
socialization thesis.
In table 21 a closer examination of the change among youngsters per country is given. The 6
countries at the top are the countries with a decrease on the postmaterial score in the first
hypothesis. It is remarkable that only Australia shows a significant decline among youngsters26. This
shows that in general the decline in post-materialism in these countries is not the mere result of a
decline among youngsters. Of the other countries there are two countries with a significant change
among youngsters. In Russia and South-Korea the postmaterial scores among youngsters increase.
These two are the countries which showed the biggest increase while examining the first hypothesis,
see table 16.
Table 21
country
Slovenia
Uruguay
Cyprus
Netherlands
Spain
Australia
Country means on postmaterial index among youngsters (World Values Survey)
Wave 5
Std deviation
Wave 6
Std deviation
difference
2005-2007
2010-2013
2.69
1.09
2.83
1.13
+0.14
2.66
1.21
2.44
1.23
-0.22
2.27
1.23
2.20
1.17
-0.07
2.53
1.21
2.51
0.95
-0.02
2.41
1.35
2.42
1.18
+0.01
2.70
1.37
2.20***
0.92
-0.50
Argentina
2.20
Chili
2.58
Germany
2.75
Japan
2.35
South-Korea
2.24
Netherlands
2.53
New Zealand
2.32
Poland
2.43
Russia
1.42
Sweden
2.82
Turkey
2.19
United States
2.20
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
1.20
1.24
1.06
1.15
0.95
1.21
1.06
0.98
1.04
1.03
1.19
1.36
2.08
2.70
2.96*
2.46
2.55***
2.51
2.25
2.33
1.71***
2.62
2.29
2.08
1.17
1.22
1.15
0.99
1.09
0.97
1.16
1.01
1.09
1.31
1.17
1.18
-0.12
+0.12
+0.21
+0.11
+0.31
-0.02
-0.07
-0.10
+0.29
-0.20
+0.10
-0.12
European Social Survey
In the ESS there is a decline in the postmaterial score from 2010 to 2012, see table 18. This decline is
also visible among youngsters. Table 22 shows a decline of the mean score of all countries together
of -0.06 (2.28 to 2.22) on the postmaterial index among youngsters. It shows furthermore that in the
26
Uruguay also shows a decline, but this is not significant.
62
previous rounds postmaterial scores have been declining among different age groups. Though this
isnot as widespread as in round 6. This is something which was also visibile while testing the first
hypothesis. The fact that the decline is visible in all age groups does once again say something about
the widespread character of the decline. This, however, is not in line with the socialization
hypotheses which expects change only among youngsters.
Table 22
Age groups
Age group means on postmaterial index (European Social Survey)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
17-24
2.34
2.37
2.32***
2.29*
2.28
2.22***
25-32
2.32
2.32
2.27*** 2.22*** 2.25**
2.17***
33-40
2.32
2.34
2.27***
2.25
2.24
2.16***
41-48
2.31
2.32
2.27*** 2.24**
2.24
2.19***
49-56
2.29
2.31
2.27**
2.24**
2.22
2.16***
57-64
2.30
2.31
2.29
2.26**
2,24
2.17***
65-72
2.32
2.34
2.31
2.30
2.26**
2.19***
73-80
2.38
2.42*
2.41
2.37*
2.31**
2.26**
81-88
2.41
2.44
2.46
2.43
2.38
2.30**
89-123
2.40
2.51
2.49
2.40
2.37
2.43
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Table 23
country
Portugal
Switzerland
Spain
Poland
Netherlands
Norway
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Sweden
Slovenia
Finland
United
Country means on postmaterial index among youngsters (European Social Survey)
Round 5
Std deviation
Round 6
Std deviation
difference
2010
2010-2013
2.33
0.71
2.47
0.69
+0.14*
2.00
0.54
2.07
0.57
+0.07
2.04
0.57
2.05
0.63
+0.01
2.28
0.58
2.26
0.61
-0.02
2.31
0.57
2.28
0.59
-0.03
2.39
0.60
2.35
0.62
-0.04
2.19
0.62
2.14
0.58
-0.05
2.35
0.66
2.28
0.61
-0.07
2.37
0.60
2.26
0.53
-0.10***
2.34
0.65
2.23
0.70
-0.11*
2.06
0.54
1.94
0.55
-0.12**
2.39
0.58
2.26
0.61
-0.13**
2.33
0.68
2.18
0.61
-0.15**
63
Kingdom
Ireland
2.46
Total
2.28
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
0.82
0.65
2.24
2.22
0.73
0.63
-0.22***
-0.06***
Table 23 shows that there is a significant decline among youngsters on the postmaterial index in 5
countries; Ireland, United Kingdom, Finland, Slovenia and Belgium. The fact that this number of
countries is lower than the 10 countries in hypothesis 1, when the whole populations were included,
has probably two reasons. The first reason is a lower number of respondents. Higher levels of change
are needed to reach the alpha levels. This plays a role for the mean differences of Germany and
Denmark. The second cause is that the mean differences among youngsters are not bigger than in
other age groups. This was already shown in table 22.
Conclusion on socialization hypotheses
Based on the results of the WVS the socialization hypothesis is rejected. Respondents between the
age of 18 and 24 do not score lower on the postmaterial battery. Once again the ESS data give a
different picture. There is no significant mean difference between 2008 and 2010. There is a
significant decline from 2010 to 2012.
World Values Survey
2a) In 2010/2013 the respondents (aged 18-24) score lower on the 12-item postmaterial battery than
in 2005/2007.
 Rejected
European Social Survey
2b) In 2010 the respondents(aged 18-24) score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2008.
 Rejected
2c) In 2012 the respondents (aged 18-24) score lower on the postmaterial index than in 2010.
 Confirmed
Although the socialization hypothesis 2c (ESS) is confirmed this does not imply that it is in line with
Inglehart’s socialization thesis. His thesis holds that the change in postmaterial is only or mainly
visible among youngsters. Because of a generation effect, being raised in safer conditions, youngsters
are more postmaterial. Due to this mechanism the whole population slowly becomes more
postmaterial. This logic is not confirmed by the ESS data. Youngsters are not more postmaterial than
older generations, as the ESS columns in table 42 (see appendix) show. Furthermore table 22 showed
64
that the decline is about equal among all age groups. For that reason I can conclude that the decline
in post-materialism in the ESS is not only but also visible among youngsters. This evidence rejects
that there is an age or a generation effect.
In the WVS an age effect is visible. Younger people are more postmaterial. If this is in fact a
generation effect is difficult to conclude. The evidence seems to show that there is no such thing as a
generation effect. The first hint is that only significant change is visible among those between the age
of 60 to 66. A second hint is given by the countries with a significant change among youngsters, these
are; Australia, South Korea and Russia (see table 21). Similar as in the ESS it is not the case that in
these countries the only change is seen among youngsters. This means again that change in postmaterialism in these countries is not only but also visible among youngsters.
4.3 Macro level correlation?
Inglehart does not only expects change in the dominance of postmaterial values among. He expects
this change to correspond with the economic conditions of a country. For that reason I, following
Inglehart, expect that change in prevalence of postmaterial values, tested in hypotheses 1 and 2 to
correlate with the economic conditions of the countries. It is expected that countries with decreasing
postmaterial scores faced an economic crisis. Countries with stable or increasing postmaterial scores
are expected not to have faced an economic crisis. The economic conditions are measured by
examining the economic growth rates in the years before the survey and by examining
the unemployment rates.
Does the level of economic growth correspond with the change of postmaterial values?
World Values Survey
Table 24 shows both the level of economic growth in the years before the survey and the WVS
results in the first hypothesis. Comparing these numbers, lead to mixed results. For the sake of clarity
the last column shows whether a country faced economic decline or not. It is expected that the
countries at the top, with increasing scores on the 12-item battery, are the countries without
economic decline. Meanwhile it is expected that the countries at the bottom, with decreasing scores
on the 12-item battery, are the countries that suffered economic decline.
In table 24 it becomes clear that these expectations are not met. 4 out of 6 countries that
show significant decline on the 12-item battery faced economic decline. On the other hand 4 out of 7
countries which show a significant increase on the 12-item battery faced economic decline. Although
in some countries the change of postmaterial scores corresponds with the economic situation, there
are about equal cases in which it does not. In Russia and Australia there was respectively a significant
increase and significant decrease in the level of post-materialism among youngsters. The economic
65
growth levels in both countries do not match these postmaterial changes. In South-Korea, were
youngster became more postmaterial, there was no economic crisis. This is in line with what I
expected.
Table 24
Country
Post-materialism compared with economic growth rates (World Values Survey)
Difference in
Level of
Level of
Level of
Did the country
postmaterial score
economic
economic
economic faced economic
wave 5  6
growth in
growth in
growth in
decline?
‘05/’07  ‘10/’13
% of GDP
% of GDP
% of GDP
(year 0)
(year -1)
(year -2)
Russia
+0.31***
4.3
4.5
-7.8
Yes
South Korea
+0.25***
6.5
0.7
2.8
No
Poland
+0.21***
1.9
4.5
3.9
No
Chile
+0.19***
5.8
5.8
-1.0
Yes
Germany
+0.15***
0.4
0.7
3.3
No
Sweden
+0.10*
2.9
6.6
-5.0
Yes
Turkey
+0.08*
8.8
9.2
-4.8
Yes
Japan
-0.02
4.7
-5.5
-1.0
Yes
Argentina
-0.03
3.0
0.9
8.6
No
New Zealand
-0.03
2.4
1.8
-0.1
Yes
United States
-0.05
1.8
2.5
-2.8
Yes
Spain
-0.05*
0.1
-0.2
-3.8
Yes
Slovenia
-0.11**
0.7
1.4
-8.0
Yes
Uruquay
-0.13**
7.3
8.4
2.4
No
Cyprus
-0.15***
0.4
1.3
-1.7
Yes
Netherlands
-0.20***
-1.2
0.9
1.5
Yes
Australia
-0.47***
3.6
2.2
2.0
No
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for levels of economic growth: The World Bank (2014).
European Social Survey
Table 25 shows whether the levels of economic growth correspond with the change of postmaterial
values in the ESS. On first sight this gives a mixed picture. Only half of the 10 countries in which there
is a significant decrease on the postmaterial index, faced economic decline in the years before the
survey. In the other 5 countries there was no economic crisis in the two year before the survey.
In the analysis for the survey of 2010, see table 43 in appendix, there is also no
unambiguously result.
Although the result is different than the result of the WVS and ESS 2012
round, it shows that in all European countries, expect for Poland, there was economic decline in
66
2009. In less than half of these countries this resulted in a significant decline on the postmaterial
index in 2010.
It could however be the case that for some countries it took a while before the crisis affected
society. In 2012 there was a widespread decline on the postmaterial index, as Table 17 shows. This
suggests a delayed effect of economic decline on postmaterial value change. Whether such an effect
is corroborated by the result on the declining unemployment rates, remains to be seen. The ‘delayed
effect’ is also tested in the WVS (See table 44 in appendix). This table shows that including a wider
time span of four years has only a small effect on the results.
In 4 of 5 countries in which youngsters scored significantly lower on the postmaterial index in
2012, there was economic decline in the two years before the survey. This could mean that for
youngsters the effect is earlier visible, whereas for older citizens the effect is slower. The results, is
the ESS and the WVS are however that complicated, with a lot differences between countries, to
draw strong conclusions about such an effect.
Table 25
Country
Post-materialism compared with economic growth rates (European Social Survey)
Difference in
Level of
Level of
Level of
Did the country
postmaterial index economic
economic
economic faced economic
Round 5  6
growth in
growth in
growth in
decline?
2010  2012
% of GDP
% of GDP
% of GDP
(2012)
(2011)
(2010)
0
-3.2
-1.3
1.9
Yes
0
-0.4
1.1
1.4
Yes
-0.01
1.0
1.8
3.0
No
-0.03
-1.2
0.9
1.5
Yes
-0.05**
2.9
1.3
0.5
No
-0.05***
0.7
3.3
4.0
No
-0.05***
-1.6
0.1
-0.2
Yes
-0.07***
-0.1
1.8
2.3
Yes
-0.07***
4.5
3.9
1.8
No
-0.09***
0.3
1.1
1.7
No
Portugal
Denmark
Switzerland
Netherlands
Norway
Germany
Spain
Belgium
Poland
United
Kingdom
Slovenia
-0.12***
-2.5
0.7
Finland
-0.13***
-1.0
2.8
Ireland
-0.13***
0.2
2.2
Sweden
-0.14***
0.9
2.9
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for levels of economic growth: The World Bank (2014).
1.4
3.4
-1.1
6.6
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Does the change in unemployment rates correspond with the change of postmaterial values?
World Values Survey
67
In table 26 the change in the postmaterial scores in the WVS is compared with the change in the
levels of unemployment27. As before, the results of the WVS are not mixed.
Table 26
Country
Post-materialism compared with unemployment rates (World Values Survey)
Difference in
Difference in level of unemployment
postmaterial score
(year of survey – three years before survey)
wave 5  6
percentage points
‘05/’07  ‘10/’13
Russia
+0.31***
0.20
South Korea
+0.25***
0.48
Poland
+0.21***
1.92
Chile
+0.19***
-0.63
Germany
+0.15***
-1.82
Sweden
+0.10*
1.6
Turkey
+0.08*
-1.15
Japan
-0.02
1.21
Argentina
-0.03
-0.67
New Zealand
-0.03
2.38
United States
-0.05
3.13
Spain
-0.05*
10.35
Slovenia
-0.11**
3.82
Uruquay
-0.13**
-1.61
Cyprus
-0.15***
4.26
Netherlands
-0.20***
1.56
Australia
-0.47***
0.84
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for unemployment rates: International Monetary Fund (2014b).
In 5 out of 6 countries with a decline in post-materialism, the level of unemployment increased in the
three years before the survey. In three countries (Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus) this increase was
strong, an increase of more than 3 percentage points. These are the countries with the greatest
increase of its unemployment level. On the other side, 4 of the 5 countries with an increase in postmaterialism, also show an increase in the unemployment levels. This increase is however limited,
27
Note while reading: In the tables on economic growth a negative number meant being in a crisis, in the
tables on unemployment the positive number means a country faces an economic crisis.
68
below 2 percentage points. For that reason the conclusion on the WVS postmaterial results and the
corresponding levels of unemployment is two-folded. On the one hand the correlation are far from
being perfect. In Australia, for example, there is an strong decrease in post-materialism and only a
small increase of the level of unemployment. In Poland there is an increase in the level of
unemployment, whereas the level of post-materialism shows a significant increase. On the other
hand while skimming table 26 it seems that in countries with higher unemployment rates,
postmaterial scores decrease.
European Social Survey
If changes of the postmaterial index scores are compared with levels of unemployment in the ESS, a
similar pattern as with the levels of economic growth is discovered. In half of the countries with a
significant decline on the postmaterial index unemployment level increase, whereas in the other half
they decrease (see table 45 in appendix). But when the postmaterial scores are laid next to the
change in the unemployment levels from 2008 and 2010, see table 27, the picture is different.
Table 27
Country
Post-materialism compared with unemployment rates (European Social Survey)
Difference in
Difference in level of unemployment
postmaterial score
(2008 – 2010)28
Round 5  6
percentage points
2010  2012
Portugal
0
3.21
Denmark
0
4.02
Switzerland
-0.01
0.94
Netherlands
-0.03
1.39
Norway
-0.05**
0.99
Germany
-0.05***
-0.42
Spain
-0.05***
9.78
Belgium
-0.07***
1.17
Poland
-0.07***
2.52
United Kingdom
-0.09***
2.13
Slovenia
-0.12***
2.88
Finland
-0.13***
2.02
Ireland
-0.13***
7.45
Sweden
-0.14***
2.41
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for unemployment rates: International Monetary Fund (2014b).
28
Please note that these are the postmaterial results of 2012 compared with change in unemployment levels
from 2008 to 2010.
69
9 out of 10 countries, Germany is the exception, with decreasing postmaterial index scores show
increasing unemployment levels from 2008 to 201029. This pattern was also present while examining
the levels of economic growth. This once again points to a delayed effect, this time of the effect on
unemployment on the level on postmaterial value change.
Conclusion on macro level correlation
The results comparing the postmaterial scores with the levels of economic growth and the change in
the unemployment levels per country, show quite a complicated picture. In the paragraphs below
the main results on the third hypothesis is discussed.
In the World Values Survey the economic growth numbers do not correspond with the
change in post-materialism. The numbers on the change in the unemployment levels do not show
neither a perfect correlation, but tend to be in line with the expectation of hypothesis 3d. The fact
that the unemployment levels correlate better than the level of unemployment is not so strange.
The level of unemployment does more precisely say how a crisis affects citizens. In the theoretical
chapter unemployment did have a prominent place in discussing the effects of the 2008 economic
crisis.
In the European Social Survey all hypotheses are rejected. The levels of economic growth and
unemployment do not correspond with the expectations which were posed. In the examination of
the results, one striking result is found. In almost all of the countries with declining scores on the
postmaterial index in 2012, there was economic decline and increasing levels of unemployment
between 2008 and 2010. This seems to show some sort of delayed effect of the economic crisis on
change in postmaterial values.
In general I can conclude that there are several signs which point to a positive relationship of
economic conditions on postmaterial values. There are however two reasons why I must be careful
with such a conclusion. The first reason is that most results are far from showing perfect fit. In
several countries there are signs of an economic crisis but is there no decline in post-materialism,
even not after some years. There are also some countries which are economic fine but still show a
decline in post-materialism. The second reason is that we need to keep in mind that the differences
in postmaterial scores remain rather small over time. It is important to stay precautious while
drawing conclusions about what is going on in different countries. The third and most important
reason is the fact that in the third hypothesis macro level scores are compared. The ecological fallacy
tells that one cannot draw inferences on individual behaviour based on aggregative data about the
29
Table 46 in the appendix compares the change in the level of unemployment from 2008 to 2010 with the
change in the postmaterial index in 2010.
70
group to which the individuals belong. To do so, one must examine individual level data. This is done
in the following pages.
4.4 Micro level effects.
The analyses on testing the causal model (shown in figure 6) is separately performed for the WVS
and the ESS. The following paragraphs the results for the World Values Survey are discussed,
thereafter the results for the European Social Survey are shown. In each survey, two causal links are
tested. 1) the effect of the economy on one’s satisfaction with household income and 2) the effect of
one’s satisfaction with household income on postmaterial values. The first link is tested in two
manners. By testing the effect of the economic growth in the two years before the survey and by
testing the effect of the level unemployment in the year of the survey. The second link is tested in
one way, by measuring one’s satisfaction with household income.
World Values Survey
Table 28 shows the results on the first causal link under scrutiny, the effect of the economic crisis on
satisfaction with household income. Hereby the effect of the economy is measured by taking the
average economic growth of the two years before and in the year of the survey.
Model 1 does not give much information because only the intercept and the main effect are
included in the model. In model 2 four individual level control variables are included in the model.
This model shows that after including these variables, especially one’s relative income, there is a
significant effect of average economic growth on the satisfaction with household income. In model 3
and 4 two other control variables are included. These are on a individual level, whether the
respondent is unemployed at the moment on the survey, and on a country level, the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the country of the respondent. The models show that even after controlling for
various control variables there remains a significant effect of average economic growth. In model 4
the standard effects are also included in order to compare the different effects. These figures show,
as do the random effects, that the individual level effects are far more important in defining
satisfaction with household income than the country level effects. This is understandable because
one’s own income or employment status are far more important for the satisfaction of one’s income
than the current state of the economy. If someone is unemployed one’s satisfaction with household
income declines almost with one point on a ten point scale. If one’s income increases one income
scale one’s satisfaction with household income increases with .373 point. Furthermore age also has a
significant effect, if people become older the level of satisfaction with one’s household income
increases. Level of education and self positioning on the political scale also show small but significant
effects. The effect of economic growth is rather small. If the economy grew with one more
percentage point one’s satisfaction with household income increases with .078 point. The variation in
71
economic growth is not so big, ranging for -1.97% to 8.87%. From the lower to the high end of this
scale the difference due to the effect of economic growth can at most be around .7 on a 10 point
scale. Whereas even this small effect is most probably high estimated.
Table 28
Effect of economic growth on satisfaction with household income.
(World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Fixed effects
b
b
b
b
t
Intercept
6.175***
2.914***
3.139***
2.578***
19.237***
(0.137)
(0.125)
(0.127)
(0.134)
Average economic growth
-0.009
0.056***
0.045***
0.078***
7.650***
(country level)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
0.383***
(0.005)
0.049***
(0.005)
0.013***
(0.001)
-0.039
(0.022)
0.065***
(0.006)
0.371***
(0.006)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.022)
0.059***
(0.006)
-0.899***
(0.050)
Random effects
0.286
0.180
0.183
σ2r (variance country level)
2
5.037
4.049
4.009
σu0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.373***
(0.005)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.022)
0.056***
(0.006)
-0.908***
(0.050)
0.00002***
(0.000002)
66.339***
10.808***
16.129***
-1.185
9.376***
-18.092***
9.052***
0.136
4.002
72
Table 29, showing the results of the effect on the unemployment level, gives a similar picture as table
28. After controlling for various control variables there is a small but significant effect. The effect of
the unemployment level is negative, which was expected. If the unemployment level goes up the
satisfaction with household income goes down. The variation in the levels of unemployment is quite
big, ranging from 3.73% to 21.65%. From the lower to the high end of this scale the difference due to
the effect of the unemployment level is even at most smaller than .5 on a ten point scale.
The effect of the change in the level of unemployment is less consistent than the effect of the
level of unemployment, see table 47 in the appendix. The results, shown in this table, show some
significant results. In model 3, while including being unemployed, the effect of change in
unemployment is not significant. This result might indicate that it is not per the change in the level of
unemployment but the level of unemployment itself which plays a role for one’s satisfaction with
household income.
Table 29
Effect of unemployment on satisfaction with household income. (World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Fixed effects
b
b
b
b
t
Intercept
6.403***
3.411***
3.539***
3.273***
24.183***
(0.129)
(0.119)
(0.129)
(0.135)
Unemployment
-0.045***
-0.038***
-0.031***
-0.028***
-5.578***
(country level)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
0.383***
(0.006)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.013***
(0.001)
-0.037*
(0.022)
0.058***
(0.006)
0.371***
(0.006)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.024
(0.022)
0.054***
(0.006)
-0.889***
(0.050)
Random effects
0.257
0.194
0.194
σ2r (variance country level)
2
5.028
4.046
4.001
σu0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.373***
(0.005)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.023
(0.022)
0.048***
(0.006)
-0.890***
(0.050)
0.00001***
(0.000002)
66.271***
10.709***
15.607***
-1.058
8.300***
-17.693***
5.008***
0.176
4.005
73
Table 30 shows the results on the second link, the effect of satisfaction with household income on
postmaterial values. The four models show that there is a small but significant effect of the
satisfaction with household income on one’s postmaterial values. The models furthermore show that
the level of education and the place on the political spectrum are important for having postmaterial
values. The more leftist someone is, the more postmaterial values someone holds. The higher
educated someone is, the more postmaterial values someone holds. Age and GDP also show a small
but significant effect. Relative income has a small but negative significant effect. This is due to the
fact that education is also included in the model. The small negative effect is most likely the effect of
people who have become rich not due to their higher education but because they worked
themselves up. The model shows that it is not per se one’s income but more the level of education
which is important for generating postmaterial values. This is in line with Inglehart’s theory about the
importance of socialization. The effect of satisfaction with household income is as said significant,
but is small. The effect of the self placement on the political spectrum is for example about ten times
as strong as the effect of satisfaction with household income.
Table 30
Effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial values.
(World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Fixed effects
b
b
b
t
Intercept
2.131***
2.606***
2.938***
26.949***
(0.076)
(0.074)
(0.109)
Satisfaction with
0.011***
0.009***
0.010***
3.438***
household income
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(individual level)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
-0.008**
(0.003)
-0.096***
(0.003)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.015)
0.061***
(0.003)
Random effects
0.092
0.087
σ2r (variance country level)
1.315
1.259
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
-0.012**
(0.003)
-0.097***
(0.003)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.013)
0.068***
(0.003)
-0.00001***
(0.000001)
-3.582***
-32.264***
-10.159***
-1.327
20.542
-11.621***
0.165
1.254
74
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
In figure 9 a summary of the results of the World Values Survey is given. It shows that in the first
causal link there are two significant effects. The first is the economic growth on satisfaction with
household income. The second is the effect of the level of unemployment of satisfaction with
household income. As described above both effects are significant, but rather small. For the second
link there is also a significant result in the World Values Survey. As the satisfaction with household
income increases, the score on the 12-item postmaterial battery increases. In the next chapter an in
depth elaboration on these results is given. Hereby it is also discussed what value one may lay on
these significant results.
Figure 9
Micro level results (World Values Survey)
Economic growth 0.078
Satisfaction
Level of unemployment -0.028
with
0.010
household income
Change in unemployment
12-item
postmaterial
battery
European Social Survey.
Table 31 shows the results for the effect of average economic growth in the two year and the year of
the survey on satisfaction with household income for the ESS dataset. Also in the European Social
Survey the individual level variables are far more important for defining the feeling about
household´s income than the country level variables. Especially, one´s relative income position has a
strong effect on feeling about household´s income, as one would have expected. In model 2 and 3
there is no significant effect of economic growth in the past two year on satisfaction with household
income. In model 4 there is surprisingly a small significant effect after including GDP in the model as
control variable. This effect is negative, which is opposite to my expectation. It is the effect of
economic growth after controlling for the GDP level, in which the economic growth/decline is also
partly taken into account. The correlation of the two makes that one should not give much value to
the significant result in model 4.
75
Table 31
Fixed effects
Intercept
Average economic growth
(country level)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed during
last year
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
Effect of economic growth on feeling about household income.
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
b
b
b
b
t
3.118***
2.099***
1.981***
1.664***
17.842***
(0.078)
(0.069)
(0.070)
(0.095)
0.014***
-0.0004
-0.003
-0.014***
-3.135***
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.135***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.00002***
(0.000)
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.011)
0.00003*
(0.000)
-0.178***
(0.012)
Random effects
0.094
0.065
0.059
σ2r (variance country level)
2
0.587
0.438
0.512
σu0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.00003**
(0.000)
-0.177***
(0.012)
68.217***
2.549**
12.418***
-0.079
2.266
-14.857***
0.000007***
(0.000002)
4.120***
0.034
0.512
76
Similar to the effect of economic growth, the effect of unemployment is also not significant. Table 32
shows that after including the control variable ‘being unemployed’, there is no significant effect of
unemployment on a country level. This seems to show that besides the fact that an economic crisis
can have an impact on the level of unemployment, and thereby indirectly on the feeling about
household income, there is no extra effect of unemployment on those who have a job.
The result on change in unemployment does results in a significant effect, but in an unexpected
direction (see table 48 in appendix). Due to the inclusion of relative income the effect of change in
unemployment becomes positive. Once again one must not lay much value on this result because it
is really small.
Table 32
Fixed effects
Intercept
Unemployment
(country level)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed during
last year
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
Effect of unemployment on feeling about household income..
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
b
b
b
b
t
3.248***
2.152***
2.009***
1.825***
15.788***
(0.074)
(0.067)
(0.071)
(0.115)
-0.014***
-0.006***
-0.003
-0.000
-0.281
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.135***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.00003***
(0.000)
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.00005
(0.011)
0.00003**
(0.000)
-0.177***
(0.012)
Random effects
0.076
0.058
0.055
σ2r (variance country level)
0.586
0.438
0.512
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.00005
(0.011)
0.00003*
(0.000)
-0.177***
(0.012)
68.016***
2.559***
12.406***
-0.004
1.934*
-14.789***
0.000004**
(0.000002)
1.936**
0.040
0.512
77
In table 33 the effect of satisfaction with household income on the postmaterial scale is shown. It
shows that there is no significant effect of feeling about household income after inserting the control
variables. Similar as in the WVS, being left and one’s level of education are important predicators for
having postmaterial values.
Table 33
Fixed effects
Intercept
Feeling about household
income
(country level)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
Effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial values.
(World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
b
b
b
t
4.653***
4.831***
4.747***
82.675***
(0.042)
(0.046)
(0.078)
0.035***
0.002
0.001
0.359
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.004
0.007***
(0.001)
-0.018***
(0.001)
0.0004**
(0.000)
-0.088***
(0.005)
0.00009***
(0.000)
Random effects
0.023
0.027
σ2r (variance country level)
0.412
0.391
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.007***
(0.002)
-0.018***
(0.001)
0.0003**
(0.000)
-0.087***
(0.005)
0.00009***
(0.011)
0.000002***
(0.000001)
6.356***
-13.913***
2.384**
-16.685
12.748***
2.540***
0.027
0.391
78
In Figure 10 a summary of the results on the ESS dataset is shown. It shows that for the first link
there is one significant effect, namely; the effect of change in unemployment. This effect is in a
different direction than expected. This is likely to be caused by the large number of respondents
included in the dataset. If a large number of respondents is included in the analysis, it is more likely
to get some significant results. The effect only gets positive after including the control variables. It
could be the case that some sort of interaction between these variables is going on. This may have
led to this remarkable result. For economic growth and the level of unemployment no significant
effect is found. Neither for the second causal link is there a significant effect. For the ESS a better
feeling about household income does not lead to more postmaterial values. In the next chapter an in
depth elaboration is given on these results. In this elaboration I discuss more in depth why the ESS
results differ from the results found in the WVS.
Figure 10
Economic growth
Micro level results (European Social Survey)
Level of unemployment
feeling
about
household income
postmaterial
scale
Change in unemployment 0.010
79
4.5 the wealthy threshold
In the final part of this thesis a closer look is at the mechanism of the causal model is taken. First two
interaction effects are tested on the first causal link. This is only done in the WVS in the ESS there
were no significant effects in the expected direction. The models with the interaction effects are
shown in table 34.
Table 34
Effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial values.
(World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Fixed effects
b
t
b
t
Intercept
2.500***
18.308***
3.906***
26.762***
(0.136)
(0.146)
Average economic growth
0.110***
7.085***
(country level)
(0.016)
Level of unemployment
-0.111***
-12.152***
(0.009)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed
(individual level)
GDP
0.391***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.022)
0.056***
(0.006)
-0.884***
(0.050)
0.00002***
45.616***
10.738***
16.156***
-1.212
9.471***
-18.092***
8.063***
0.247***
(0.013)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.021
(0.022)
0.043***
(0.006)
-0.859***
(0.050)
0.00001***
19.181***
10.685***
15.500***
-0.970
7.494***
-17.090***
4.699***
80
(country level)
Interaction effects
Relative income *economic
growth
Relative income * unemployment
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.003)
(0.000)
-2.782***
Random effects
0.135
σ2r (variance country level)
2
4.001
σu0 (variance individual level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.018***
(0.002)
10.877***
0.169
3.99
Model 1 shows the interaction effects for average economic growth and relative income. In this
model the main effect of relative income on satisfaction with household income is .391. This is the
effect of household income, controlled for the other factors included in the model, when there is no
economic growth. The interaction effect (relative income*economic growth) is -0.007. This means
that the effect of relative income gets weaker when the economy grows faster. This confirms the
hypothesis. In table 35 this effect is shown.
Table 35
The effect of relative income
0.391 + (-0.007 * economic growth)
Economic growth
b
Range: -1.97 / 8.87
-1.97
0.405
0.74
0.385
3.45
0.367
6.16
0.348
8.87
0.329
The table shows that the interaction effect is, although significant, is just small. From the least
economic growth to the most economic growth the difference due to the effect is only about .08. In
table 34 the interaction effect for the level of unemployment and relative income is shown. The main
effect, see model 2, for the level unemployment on satisfaction with household income is -.111. The
interaction effect (relative income*unemployment) is 0.018. In table 36 it is shown how the
interaction effect affects the main effect. It shows that the effect of relative income on satisfaction
with household income gets stronger when the unemployment level is higher. Whereas for economic
growth the interaction effect was small, for the unemployment level it is quiet strong. In a country
with an unemployment level of 21.65 percent the effect is twice as strong as in a country with an
unemployment level of 3.73 percent.
Table 36
The effect of relative income
81
0.247 + (0.018 * unemployment level)
Unemployment level
b
Range: 3.73 / 21.65
3.73
0.314
8.21
0.395
12.69
0.475
17.17
0.556
21.65
0.637
World Values Survey
5a) As the economic growth is higher, the effect of household income on satisfaction with household
income gets weaker.
 confirmed
5b) As the level of unemployment is higher, the effect of household income on satisfaction with
household income gets stronger.
 confirmed
To go more in depth in the second causal link a different research method is used. The WVS dataset
is split in two groups. The first group consists of those who fall in the lowest five income deciles. The
second group consists of those who fall in the highest five income deciles. The effect of satisfaction
with household income on postmaterial values is separately tested for the two groups. The results
for the full model containing all control variables for the subsets is shown in table 37. In the table
also the results while including all respondents is given in order to compare the results.
Table 37
Fixed effects
Intercept
Satisfaction with household
income
(individual level)
Relative income
(individual level)
Effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial
values. (World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
b
b
b
2.938***
2.960***
2.867***
(0.109)
(0.139)
(0.113)
0.010***
0.006
0.012***
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.004)
-0.012**
(0.003)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.021***
(0.006)
82
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
-0.097***
-0.120***
(individual level)
(0.003)
(0.005)
Age
-0.004***
-0.002**
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.001)
Gender
-0.016
-0.014
(individual level)
(0.013)
(0.021)
Level of education
0.068***
0.065***
(individual level)
(0.003)
(0.006)
GDP
-0.00001***
-0.00001***
(country level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Random effects
0.165
0.156
σ2r (variance country level)
2
1.254
1.278
σu0 (variance individual level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
-0.082***
(0.004)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.019
(0.016)
0.068***
(0.004)
-0.00001***
(0.000)
0.154
1.232
The results of table 37 confirm both hypotheses. For the subset containing those from the highest
income deciles there is no effect. For the subset with the respondents from the lowest income
deciles there is a significant effect. In the following chapter an elaboration on these results, in light of
all results is given.
5c) For the subset of those in the top five income deciles, there is no effect of satisfaction with
household income on the 12-item postmaterial battery.
 confirmed
5d) For the subset of those in the lower five income deciles, there is positive effect of satisfaction with
household income on the 12-item postmaterial battery.
 confirmed
83
5. Critical reflection: what could the results mean?
After viewing the large amount of results, shown in the previous chapter, one might probably ask
what conclusions can be drawn. Using two datasets, containing several countries, testing different
hypothesis, let to a mixed picture. In this reflection I want combine the different results in order to
get a more clear picture of the results. While doing so I critically reflect on the methodological
choices made in this thesis. If needed some extra analyses are employed to underpin my arguments.
5.1 Difference between World Values Survey and European Social Survey
The finding that is most striking is the difference between the results of the WVS and the ESS. A first
possible explanation for the difference is the different set of countries. In the WVS ten non-European
countries are included, whereas in the ESS only European countries are included. This might partly
explain why the analyses on both datasets deliver different results. Being European or non-European
might be an explanatory factor for the different results. This would be in line with the idea of global
cultures, shown in figure 1 (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). If this is an important factor, it shows that the
generalizability of both datasets is low. One must be cautious in drawing conclusions based on these
datasets about other advanced industrial countries, especially if these countries are part of a
different global culture.
For at least two reasons the difference between the WVS and ESS results is not likely to be
caused by global cultural factors. The first reason is that there is no clear difference in the results
between European and Non-European countries in the World Values Survey. In the descriptive
results (see table 9) the European countries can be found at the top as well as on the bottom of the
table. It is not the case that postmaterial values became less dominant among citizens in European
and not among citizens in Non-European countries. The second reason is that for the countries which
84
are included in both datasets the results in both analyses differ. 6 European countries are included in
both datasets. In table 38 the descriptive results for these countries in both datasets are shown. It
becomes clear that for 3 countries the results are similar, showing a downward trend. The strength
of the downward effects is however different. In the Netherlands the decrease in the WVS is
stronger, in Spain and Slovenia the decrease in the ESS is stronger. In the 3 other countries (Poland,
Germany and Sweden) the effects are not only different in strength but also have a different
direction.
Table 38
Result for 6 European countries compared
World Values Survey / European Social Survey
country
World Values Survey
wave 5  6
‘05/’07 ’10/’13
Poland (616)
+0.21
Germany (276)
+0.15
Sweden (752)
+0.10
Spain (724)
-0.05
Slovenia (705)
-0.11
Netherlands (528)
-0.20
European Social Survey
round 3  6
2006  2012
-0.13
-0.19
-0.32
-0.08
-0.26
-0.05
Since the selection of countries is not the explanatory factor for explaining different results in
the WVS and ESS there must be other factors at play. Another factor one might think of, is different
measurement moments for the two datasets. This is unlikely to play an important role. Even if the
scores on round 3 and 6 of the ESS are compared with the scores of round 5 and 6 from the WVS30,
the differences prevail.
A disadvantage for the measurements moments in the ESS is that the causal models are only
tested for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012. This due to the lack of data for the important control
variable ‘relative income’. For testing the causal model it would have been better to include also a
measurement moment from before the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis. Table 39 shows that
already in 2008 the respondents are aware of the economic crisis. From 2006 to 2008 there is a
serious decrease in the level of satisfaction with the present state of the economy. Even though after
30
These measurements moments lay very close to each other.
85
2008 there is a small increase, the level of satisfaction with the economy is even in 2012 not on the
same level as before the economic crisis.
Table 39
Mean scores on satisfaction with present state of the economy
2002
4.71
2004
5.01
2006
5.52
2008
4.48
2010
4.57
2012
4.64
A third reason why the two datasets have different results might be due to different
operationalization of the concepts. The causal effects for the control variables are generally the
same, as is the way in which they are operationalized. In the causal model there are two variables
which operationalization may have let to different outcomes. The first is satisfaction with household
income. The second is the postmaterial concept.
The causal effects on satisfaction with household income differ per dataset. In the WVS I
found significant results, whereas in the ESS I found insignificant results or small but significant
results in an unexpected direction. This difference might be partially explained by a different
operationalization. In the WVS satisfaction with household income is measured on a 10-point scale,
in the ESS it is measured on 4-point scale. Because of the fact that in the WVS satisfaction with
household income has more variance, it is more likely for an effect to have a significant effect on it.
On the other hand the linguistic operationalization for this variable in the ESS is more in line with the
theoretical notions. In the WVS the questions speaks about ‘satisfaction’ whereas in the ESS the
questions asks about one’s ‘feelings about household income’.
The word ‘feelings’ and the
categories ‘living comfortably’ or ‘having difficulties’ refer more to a feeling of (in)security than the
word ‘satisfaction’.
The second concept which is differently measured, is the postmaterial concept. This is the
main concept of this thesis. For that reason the following section will in depth elaborate on the
different operationalizations of post-materialism in the two datasets. In the theoretical and method
chapter a lot of attention has been paid on the operationalization of both concepts. After running the
descriptive and causal analyses it is time to reflect on the methodological choices which have been
made in this thesis.
5.2 Measuring post-materialism
86
In the theoretical and method chapter a lot has been said about the way Inglehart operationalizes
post-materialism. The two most important criticisms on the 12-item postmaterial battery based on
the existing literature are the problem of issue salience and forced choices. The results in table 40
show that it is likely that these problems are relevant for the analyses in this thesis. The table zooms
into the results of change from wave 5 to wave 6 per battery. When all these numbers are summed
up the differences are not that big. In card C there is a increase of plus 4, whereas in card B there is a
decrease of minus 3 from wave 5 to wave 6. Per country, however, there are many striking
differences in the results per card. An example of this can be seen in the results of Australia. Whereas
in card B there is a decrease of -0.47 from wave 5 to wave 6, the change in card A (+0.02) and C (0.07) is different. When card B is further examined it is found that in 2005 20.75 percent saw fighting
inflation as the first of second aim for Australia. In 2012 this was 32,5 percent. The inflation issue is
an important reason for the decrease in the score in Card B, and thus for the decrease in the
postmaterial battery. In 2004 the level of inflation was 2.3 percent whereas in 2011 this was 3.4
percent. This relatively high level of inflation was partly caused by a rapid growth in the constructing
and mining industry (BBC, 2014). It is therefore likely that more people are concerned about rising
prices in 2012 than in 2005, I think. This has more to do with salience of the inflation issue than with
decreasing levels of post-materialism. In the final score this does lead to a change of -0.47 on the 12item postmaterial battery, merely caused by the big decrease in card B.
Table 40
Country
Change per battery (World Values Survey)
Wave 5  6
‘05/’07  ‘10/’13.
Card A
Card B
Card C
Argentina
+0.02
-0.02
-0.04
Australia
+0.02
-0.47
-0.07
Chili
-0.03
+0.09
+0.11
Cyprus
-0.05
-0.09
+0.01
Germany
-0.03
+0.12
+0.05
Japan
-0.09
0
+0.07
SouthKorea
Netherlands
+0.04
+0.14
+0.05
-0.05
-0.08
-0.09
New
Zealand
Poland
+0.04
-0.17
+0.09
+0.04
+0.07
+0.1
Russia
+0.11
+0.01
+0.19
Slovenia
+0.02
-0.07
-0.01
Spain
+0.02
0
-0.06
87
Sweden
-0.07
+0.04
+0.12
Turkey
+0.02
-0.02
+0.09
United
States
Uruquay
+0.02
-0.03
-0.05
0
-0.06
-0.08
Total
-0.01
-0.03
+0.04
The big variation within countries of the change in the 3 cards seems to show that these kind of issue
salience problems are likely to play a role. This points to the fact that even though factor analyses
showed that the batteries may be combined, one must be careful in drawing conclusions based on
the aggregated scores. This was an important reason why a second operationalization in the ESS has
been developed in this thesis.
Having said all these critical notes, it is remarkable that most of the causal hypothesis derived
from Inglehart’s thesis are confirmed in this thesis. The macro results show that the crisis did not
create a revolutionary change in the presence of postmaterial values in society. The micro level
results do however show that beneath a lot things which are going in modern society, the economy
(still) affects the presence of postmaterial values in society. Other important factors that are going on
in society are discussed in the theoretical chapter. These were for example the kind of welfare state
regime and the prevalence of liberation and authoritarian values. From the statistical analyses it
becomes clear that the effect of the economic condition is much smaller than the effect of for
example education and political orientation.
The development of an alternative index for the postmaterial concept led to several challenges.
While criticizing the way Inglehart uses the postmaterial concept it is difficult to create an alternative
operationalization, that is at the same time different but similar. Apart from this I had to deal with
the availability of questions in alternative datasets. The ESS dataset came closest to the criteria of
making an alternative index. After considering theoretical and statistical arguments, a postmaterial
index was constructed from 5 questions (see table 11). Since the index has scores ranging from 0 to
5, with intervals of 0.2 there is more variance to be explained compared to the 12-item postmaterial
battery. For that reason it is more probable to find significant results. In the analyses I, however, did
not found a significant effect of feelings about household income on the postmaterial index. One
explanation for this might be the case that not enough postmaterial questions are included in the
index. Two questions about postmaterial needs had to be excluded from the index due to statistical
reasons. It is however interesting to see what the results on these items are. For that reason three
extra micro level analyses are employed. These are on the second causal link of the micro level
model. In the first extra analysis the item ‘importance to be rich’ is included as dependent variable. In
88
the second analysis ‘importance of strong government’ is included as dependent variable. In the third
analysis both items are included in an extended postmaterial index, including seven questions. Table
49 and table 50 show that satisfaction with household income has a significant effect on both
‘importance to be rich’ and ‘importance of strong government’. Table 51 shows that after including
both material questions in the index feelings about household income has a significant effect on the
extended postmaterial index.
These results could mean that, in case the causal hypotheses are correct, these items are a
better measurement of the (post)materialism. Due to statistical reasons the seven questions may not
be integrated into one index, one must be reluctant in drawing such conclusions. These extra
analyses do hint that the operationalization used in this thesis is not ideal. Future research should try
to find an operationalization in which more, and foremost also material questions, are included in a
postmaterial index.
6. Conclusion: no postmaterial crisis
In the conclusion the most important findings of this thesis are once again brought to the fore. This
thesis tried to answer the questions whether the 2008 economic crisis led to a decline in postmaterial
values hold by citizens of advanced industrial countries? A economic crisis can have several serious
impacts on society. The spread, intensity and length of the crisis made it likely that dominant values
in society are affected by the economic conditions. Inglehart made the expectation that prolonged
periods of economic decline tend to discourage the spread of postmaterial values. The 2008
economic crisis was a likely case for this expectation.
Below the most important results for the World Values Survey analyses and European Social Survey
analyses are given. Thereafter three reasons why one must be reluctant in drawing firm conclusions
are given. Finally it is explained why I think that future research on post-materialism is not important
in understanding contemporary developments in advanced industrial countries.
In the descriptive results in the World Values Survey there was no general decline detected in
postmaterial values after the 2008 economic crisis. Neither was a setback in postmaterial values
visible among youngsters. The macro level average did not correspond with the economic growth
figures. While eyeballing the results on unemployment it seems that some correlation was going on
with the direction of postmaterial values. However, from these macro level results one may not draw
conclusions on causality based on macro level indicators. For that reason micro level analysis was
employed. By using micro level analysis it becomes possible to detect if beneath the macro level
89
findings a causal relationship with the economic crisis could be found. The causal model which was
tested dealt with the effect of the economy on how secure people feel financially (satisfaction with
household income). This level of satisfaction then was expected to impact postmaterial values of
citizens.
In general, three important significant results were to be found. It seems to be the case that
the economic development in a country affects the satisfaction of citizens with their household
income, despite the effect of their personal incomes. Secondly there is a small effect of this
satisfaction on postmaterial values. The results after testing the interaction effect gave some extra
insight in the working of this model. It showed that in times of an economic crisis the effect of
household income on the satisfaction with household income is stronger than in times of economic
welfare. Especially in times of high unemployment people are less satisfied with a same amount of
income. Thirdly it showed that the effect of satisfaction with household income on postmaterial
values is present only for the poorer people in society. For those who have a high income more
satisfaction with their income does not lead to more support postmaterial values. This is evidence for
the thesis that the economic crisis can be a disruptive event for a given society, which affect the
dominant values that are held in a society. Especially for those who are hit directly by the crisis but
also for other people who do not enjoy having a high income. An income threshold does play an
important role here.
The analyses were also employed with a different operationalization of the postmaterial
concept on the European Social Survey. In the descriptive results a decline in the level of
postmaterial values was detected. Similar as in the WVS one cannot draw conclusions on causality
based on these macro level findings. Although the macro level findings were in line with the
expectation, a decrease in the level of postmaterial values after the start of the 2008 economic crisis,
the micro level hypotheses were not confirmed. Therefore the ESS results do not corroborate the
finding of the WVS.
These results could lead to at least two different conclusions. 1) It could be the case that in reality
there is no effect of the economic crisis on postmaterial values and that the WVS results are flawed.
2) It could be the case that in reality there is an effect of the economic crisis on postmaterial values
but that the ESS measurement was flawed.
The measurement of the postmaterial index in the ESS was indeed flawed. In the index
questions on materialism were not included for example. Some extra analyses on two material
questions showed that it might be the case that if these kind of items are included, this leads to
significant results. On the other hand a lot of criticisms have been made about the 12-item
postmaterial index of Inglehart. The variety of results per battery shows that the measurement in the
90
WVS also has it flaws. In this thesis only one possible causal model was tested, in which the feeling of
insecurity plays a key role. The operationalization here was not ideal, measuring satisfaction with
household income. This aside, the model included two dependent variables. One must thus be
careful drawing conclusions about an overarching effect, based testing only two partial-effects.
I, however, think that for two reasons the 12-item battery is more trustworthy than
the ESS postmaterial index. The first is that it includes more items intended to measure the
material/postmaterial dichotomy. The second is that the 12-item battery has been used in a lot of
different research before. Although it has been criticized, the relationship between economic
variables and the 12-item battery has been corroborated many times. This is obviously not the case
for the postmaterial index which has been developed in this thesis. For that reason I conclude that
even though a lot of different things are going on in society, there seems to be a small effect of the
2008 economic crisis on the level of postmaterial values in advanced industrial countries.
Even though while the World Values Survey results seem to confirm the causal model, one should
remain reluctant to draw firm conclusions. There are three reasons to be reluctant which I want to
emphasize here. The first reason is the diversity of the results between the countries under scrutiny.
The second reason is the big number of respondents that is included. This quite often leads to
significant results. More than once the results of the causal model in the WVS were small. As a
political scientist employing quantitative research I think one must be careful not only to focus on
levels of significance. In understanding the sociopolitical reality the size of causal effects is often
equally important. The third reason is the small change in the level of postmaterial values. In both
descriptive analyses the mean postmaterial scores per country differed to the utmost only a few
decimals. Because of these reasons it would be greatly exaggerated to conclude that a decrease in
post-materialism in advanced societies is an effect with great significance of the 2008 economic
crisis.
It is a good use to end a thesis with suggestions for future researchers working in the same research
field. I can deliver two suggestions for future researchers working with the postmaterial concept.
One suggestion is to work on the development of an alternative operationalization of postmaterialism. This should be with non-forced questions including different dimensions of what is
perceived material and postmaterial. A second suggestion is directly meant for Inglehart and the
World Value Survey. The survey includes many different countries, which makes it possible to
research dominant values among various cultures. This makes it hard to draw conclusions about
long-term developments within certain countries. Inglehart’s research is focused to a great extent on
changing value patterns over time. Although I understand the difficulties of gathering data, it should
91
be better to focus on making a selection of countries with different cultures and to include these in
every wave.
But even if these suggestions are taken into account I would not suggest future researchers
to continue working with the postmaterial concept as it was developed by Inglehart. This might come
over as a strange advice after dedicatedly working with the concept for nearly half a year. I, however
think that the material/postmaterial dichotomy has lost its momentum. Inglehart developed his
postmaterial concept during the 1960s and 1970s. The concepts and its language reflect the time in
which it has been developed, I think. The fact that many other researchers have developed new
modernity concepts, including the notion of globalization, already indicates that there might be
better ways to describe developments in advanced industrial societies.
Apart from the fact that globalization is not much included in Ingelhart’s theory, I think there
is a more fundamental problem with his concept. This is about the dichotomy between materialism
and post-materialism, which, according to me, is a false assumption. I think that, following
Maslowian reasoning, there is truth in the fact that countries that reach a certain threshold become
more postmaterial. I do however think that once countries have reached this threshold the
dichotomy loses most of its relevance. Material values and postmaterial values are important. In
times of a economic crisis, the assurance of a good income is of great importantance. Even though, I
think this does not come at the expense of the importance of freedom of speech, having something
to say at your job or concerns about the environment. In a lot of ‘new’ developments which,
according to popular thought, are encouraged by the 2008 economic crisis different values play a
role. Materialism and post-materialism are not dichotomous but are aligned. A perfect example of
this is the ‘sharing economy’, or ‘peer-economy’, in which a focus is put upon sharing of creation,
production and consumption of goods and services. In recent years this is seen as an important
economic trend (The Economist, 2013). Good examples of the sharing economy are sharing a car,
working tools or your house. As the word ‘sharing’ indicates a lot of attention goes to helping other
people and cooperation. The sharing economy as being environmental friendly is also something that
is frequently emphasized. For example, when people jointly build a solar power facility, share a car
ride or goods are being re-used. In this sense one can see sharing as a postmaterial phenomenom.
The sharing economy, however, is also material in a sense. It is not so much about charity but chiefly
about mutual benefits. One person benefits from the possibility to use a hedge trimmer from a
neighbor. This neighbor benefits from getting a small amount of money for sharing his hedge
trimmer, which he was not using anyway for that day. Although money is not always involved the
idea of mutual material benefit is firmly associated with the sharing economy. Therefore it is not per
se a material or postmaterial development. Furthermore the sharing economy is not something for
92
especially poor or rich people. Those who have material belongings can share it with other, while
other with less material belongings can borrow these things.
The point I want to make is that ‘new’ development, such as the share-economy, are not best
explained while using the material and postmaterial concepts. Its vocabulary is not capable of
capturing the essence of contemporary developments. One cannot blame Inglehart for this, times
and concepts just change. Therefore the most important conclusion of this thesis is two-folded. One
the one hand the (post)material concept can still be useful in understanding (retrenchment) in
modernization processes. As this thesis has shown, it seems that the developments of the 2008
economic crisis is still associated with changes in postmaterial values among advanced industrial
societies. On the other hand I think that for understanding dominant contemporary socio-economic
and political happenings other concepts are more useful.
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Appendix
Table 41
Countries and years in which waves are conducted (World Values Survey)
Country
Ronde 1
Ronde 2
Ronde 3
Ronde 4
Ronde 5
Ronde 6
Argentina
1984
1991
1995
1999
2006
2013
Australia
1981
1995
2005
2012
Chile
1990
1996
2000
2006
2011
Cyprus
2006
2011
Germany
1997
2006
2013
Japan
1981
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
South
1982
1990
1996
2001
2005
2010
Korea
Netherland
1981
2006
2012
s
New
1998
2004
2011
Zealand
Poland
1990
1997
2005
2012
Russian
1990
1995
2006
2011
Federation
Slovenia
1992
1995
2005
2011
Spain
1990
1995
1999
2007
2011
Sweden
1996
2000
2006
2011
Turkey
1990
1996
2001
2007
2011
United
1995
1999
2006
2011
States
Uruquay
1996
2006
2011
Source: World Values Survey (2014).
98
Table 42
Age group means on postmaterial scores
(World Values Survey and European Social Survey)
World Values Survey
European Social Survey
Age groups
Postmaterial
Age groups
Postmaterial
score
score
18-24
2.47
17-24
2.30
25-31
2.39
25-32
2.26
32-38
2.29
33-40
2.27
39-45
2.25
41-48
2.26
46-52
2.20
49-56
2.25
53-59
2.11
57-64
2.26
60-66
2.02
65-72
2.29
67-73
1.99
73-80
2.35
74-80
1.96
81-88
2.40
81-87
1.87
89-123
2.42
88-99
1.99 (small N)
Table 43
Country
Post-materialism compared with economic growth rates (European Social Survey)
Difference in
Level of
Level of
Level of
Did the country
postmaterial index economic
economic
economic faced economic
Round 4  5
growth in
growth in
growth in
decline?
2008  2010
% of GDP
% of GDP
% of GDP
(2010)
(2009)
(2008)
+0.22***
-1.1
-6.4
-2.2
Yes
+0.04
2.3
-2.8
1.0
Yes
+0.01
3.4
-8.5
0.3
Yes
0
1.7
-5.2
-0.8
Yes
Ireland
Belgium
Finland
United
Kingdom
Netherlands
0
1.5
-3.7
Switzerland
-0.01
3.0
-1.9
Denmark
-0.02
1.4
-5.7
Spain
-0.03
-0.2
-3.8
Norway
-0.05
0.5
-1.6
Poland
-0.06**
3.9
1.8
Germany
-0.07***
4.0
-5.1
Portugal
-0.07***
1.9
-2.9
Slovenia
-0.10***
1.4
-8.0
Sweden
-0.13***
6.6
-5.0
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for levels of economic growth: The World Bank (2014).
1.8
2.2
-0.8
0.9
0.1
5.1
1.1
0.0
3.6
-0.6
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
99
Table 44
Country
Post-materialism compared with economic growth rates (World Values Survey)
Difference in Level of
Level of
Level of
Level of
Level of
postmaterial economic economic economic economic economic
index
growth in growth in growth in growth in growth in
Wave 5  6 % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
‘05/’07
(year 0)
(year -1)
(year -2)
(year -3)
(year -4)
’10/’13
Russia
+0.31***
4.3
4.5
-7.8
5.2
8.5
South Korea
+0.25***
6.5
0.7
2.8
5.5
5.2
Poland
+0.21***
1.9
4.5
3.9
1.8
5.1
Chile
+0.19***
5.8
5.8
-1.0
3.3
5.2
Germany
+0.15***
0.4
0.7
3.3
4.0
-5.1
Sweden
+0.10*
2.9
6.6
-5.0
-0.6
3.3
Turkey
+0.08*
8.8
9.2
-4.8
0.7
4.7
Japan
-0.02
4.7
-5.5
-1.0
2.2
1.7
Argentina
-0.03
3.0
0.9
8.6
9.1
0.1
New Zealand
-0.03
2.4
1.8
-0.1
-1.9
2.0
United States
-0.05
1.8
2.5
-2.8
-0.3
1.8
Spain
-0.05*
0.1
-0.2
-3.8
0.9
3.5
Slovenia
-0.11**
0.7
1.4
-8.0
3.6
6.9
Uruquay
-0.13**
7.3
8.4
2.4
7.2
6.5
Cyprus
-0.15***
0.4
1.3
-1.7
3.6
5.1
Netherlands
-0.20***
-1.2
0.9
1.5
-3.7
1.8
Australia
-0.47***
3.6
2.2
2.0
1.7
3.7
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for levels of economic growth: The World Bank (2014).
Table 45
Country
Did the
country
faced
economic
decline?
Yes
No (No)
No (No)
Yes
No (Yes)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No (No)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No (No)
Yes
Yes
No (No)
Post-materialism compared with unemployment rates (European Social Survey)
Difference in
Difference in level of unemployment
100
postmaterial score
(2010 – 2012)
Round 5  6
percentage points
2010  2012
Portugal
0
4.85
Denmark
0
0.06
Switzerland
-0.01
-0.61
Netherlands
-0.03
0.83
Norway
-0.05**
-0.36
Germany
-0.05***
-1.64
Spain
-0.05***
4.93
Belgium
-0.07***
-0.60
Poland
-0.07***
0.45
United Kingdom
-0.09***
0.10
Slovenia
-0.12***
1.63
Finland
-0.13***
-0.64
Ireland
-0.13***
0.82
Sweden
-0.14***
-0.61
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for unemployment rates: International Monetary Fund (2014).
Table 46
Country
Post-materialism compared with unemployment rates (European Social Survey)
Difference in
Difference in level of unemployment
postmaterial score
(2008 – 2010)
Round 4  5
percentage points
2008  2010
Ireland
+0.22***
7.45
Belgium
+0.04
1.17
Finland
+0.01
2.02
United Kingdom
0
2.13
Netherlands
0
1.39
Switzerland
-0.01
0.94
Denmark
-0.02
4.02
Spain
-0.03
9.78
Norway
-0.05
0.99
Poland
-0.06**
2.52
Germany
-0.07***
-0.42
Portugal
-0.07***
3.21
Slovenia
-0.10***
2.88
Sweden
-0.13***
2.41
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01
Source for unemployment rates: International Monetary Fund (2014).
101
Table 47
Effect of change in unemployment on satisfaction with household income.
(World Values Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Fixed effects
b
b
b
b
t
Intercept
6.149***
3.122***
3.315***
3.003***
23.671***
(0.130)
(0.121)
(0.123)
(0.127)
Change in unemployment
-0.008
-0.012**
-0.004
-0.013**
-2.278**
(country level)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (1=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
Being unemployed
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
0.384***
(0.005)
0.054***
(0.005)
0.013***
(0.001)
-0.036
(0.022)
0.058***
(0.006)
0.372***
(0.006)
0.055***
(0.005)
0.010***
(0.001)
-0.024
(0.022)
0.053***
(0.006)
-0.911***
(0.050)
Random effects
0.285
0.187
0.190
σ2r (variance country level)
5.037
4.052
4.013
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
0.373***
(0.006)
0.055***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.023
(0.022)
0.048***
(0.006)
-0.904***
(0.050)
0.00001***
(0.000002)
66.277***
10.613***
15.536***
-1.028
8.128
-17.969
6.028
0.162
4.001
102
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
Table 48
Effect of change in unemployment on satisfaction with household income.
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Fixed effects
b
b
b
b
t
Intercept
3.139***
2.093***
1.974***
1.689***
18.260***
(0.081)
(0.069)
(0.071)
(0.092)
Change in unemployment
-0.005***
0.005***
0.006**
0.010***
3.464***
(country level)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Relative income
(individual level)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
(individual level)
Age
(individual level)
Gender
(individual level)
Level of education
(individual level)
0.135***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.00003***
(0.000)
Being unemployed during
last year
(individual level)
GDP
(country level)
Random effects
σ2r (variance country level)
0.079
0.065
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.00003*
*
(0.000)
-0.178***
(0.012)
0.060
0.149***
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.00003**
(0.000)
68.230***
-0.177***
(0.012)
-14.830***
0.000006***
(0.000002)
3.870***
2.555**
12.475***
0.952
2.344***
0.060
103
0.572
0.438
0.512
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
0.514
Table 49
Effect of feeling about household income on importance to be rich
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Fixed effects
b
b
b
t
Intercept
4.345***
3.995***
3.800***
57.099***
(0.053)
(0.053)
(0.067)
Feeling about household
-0.034***
0.038***
0.037***
5.042***
income
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(country level)
Relative income
-0.026***
-0.026***
-12.691***
(individual level)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
-0.057***
-0.057***
-24.190***
(individual level)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Age
0.015***
0.014***
52.075***
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Gender
-0.306***
-0.306***
-31.579***
(individual level)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Level of education
-0.0001
0.00001
0.825
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
GDP
0.000004***
3.956***
(country level)
(0.000)
Random effects
0.034
0.029
0.017
σ2r (variance country level)
1.508
1.343
1.342
σ2u0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
104
Table 50
Effect of feeling about household income on importance of strong government
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Fixed effects
b
b
b
t
Intercept
2.181***
2.443***
2.574***
22.907**
(0.042)
(0.084)
(0.112)
Feeling about household
0.087***
0.081***
0.080***
11.166***
income
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.004
(country level)
Relative income
0.025***
0.025***
(individual level)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
-0.019***
-0.019***
(individual level)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Age
-0.006***
-0.006**
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Gender
0.055***
-0.054***
(individual level)
(0.005)
(0.009)
Level of education
-0.00009*** -0.00009***
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.011)
GDP
0.000003**
(country level)
(0.000)
Random effects
0.089
0.089
0.115
σ2r (variance country level)
2
1.304
1.315
1.315
σu0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
12.414***
-8.221***
-20.586***
5.662***
-6.662***
-2.145**
105
Table 51
Effect of feeling about household income on extended postmaterial index
(European Social Survey)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Fixed effects
b
b
b
t
Intercept
4.257***
4.372***
4.301***
112.938
(0.029)
(0.032)
(0.038)
Feeling about households
0.032***
0.002***
0.018***
6.015
income
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(country level)
Relative income
0.005***
0.005***
(individual level)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Left-right (0=left, 10=right)
-0.024***
-0.024***
(individual level)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Age
0.001***
0.001***
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Gender
-0.099***
-0.099***
(individual level)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Level of education
0.00006***
0.00006***
(individual level)
(0.000)
(0.000)
GDP
0.000002***
(country level)
(0.000)
Random effects
0.013
0.011
σ2r (variance country level) 0.011
2
0.223
0.214
0.214
σu0 (variance individual
level)
* <0.1 ** <0.05 *** <0.01 Only reported for fixed effects (Z-test)
b = effect, (Std. Error), t = Standard effect.
6.146***
-25.024***
13.363***
-16.685***
9.733***
9.733***
106
107