BA IPT L7:
Neo-Neo Debates
on States Cooperation
Shunji Cui
Department of Political Science
School of Public Affairs
Zhejiang University
Email: [email protected]
Contents:
1.
Background: How Did Neoliberalism
Emerge?
2.
Debates: Possibility of International
Cooperation
3.
Security Dilemma: How to Escape?
4.
Neorealism v. Neoliberalism
1. How Did Neoliberal Emerge?



Interwar Idealism (1920-30s)
Classical Realism (1940-60s)
Liberalism (1950-70s)
 Economic

interdependence, transnationalism
Neorelism (1970-80s)
 Structure

Neoliberal Institutionalism(1980s-)
 Interdependence,

structure, states, institution
World Systems Theory (Marxist)(1980s)
 Structure,
economic, uneven distribution of
From liberalism to Neoliberalism

Pluralism/Liberalism:
Challenged: realist assumption – states
as unitary, rational actors.
主张：
Roles of non-state actors;
those processes breaking
domestic/international barriers;
Int. affairs going beyond governments 
importance of transnational relations
From liberalism to Neoliberalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism:
 Challenge
neorealism (structural realism), but
by utilizing realist assumptions
 Accepting: anarchy, state-centric, rational,
unitary actor assumption
 主张/假设：An anarchic environment of selfinterested, egoistic actors did not necessarily
impose debilitating realist constraints on
cooperation == possibility of cooperation.
Neoliberal Institutionalism


Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, 1983
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984
Central Theme: Possibility of states
cooperation, and the role of institutions
  leading to debates between Neorealism
and Neoliberals
  The Neo-Neo Debates in 1980s

Episode:

Security Dilemma
Hobbes and Security Dilemma
State of Nature
 Absence of Common Power
 People are living in constant fear
of each other.
  Security Dilemma

Dilemma  Security Dilemma



In an ordinary sense, refer to situations which present
governments, on matters affecting their security, with a
choice between two equal and undesirable alternatives. (在
涉及安全问题上处于一种两难境地)
In the literature on IP = a special meaning. The label
“security dilemma” = the most significant and pervasive
features of relations between states.
Security dilemmas arise from a perennial problem in
interstate relations —— the inherent ambiguity of some
military postures and some FP intensions. Difficulty to
determine unambiguously what is ‘defensive’ and what is
not. (国家间关系中— 把握不住 另一个国家 军事行为和外交
政策的意图) = 即 无法确定对方的行为是 “防御性”/ “进攻
性” =不断出现的问题。
Definition：

“A security dilemma exists when the military
preparations of one state create an unresolvable
uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those
preparations are for ‘defensive’ purposes only (to
enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whther they
are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to
its advantage).” Wheeler and Booth (1992: 30).
A国的
军备
防御性？
进攻性？
无法解决的不确定性
B国
困扰
信任？？？
Psychological Relations
in FP Interactions
Morgenthau: political power is a psychological
relation between those who exercise it and those
over whom it is exercised.
Types of FP:
 Policy of the status quo：aims at the
maintenance of the distribution of power that exists
at a particular moment in history.
 Policy of imperialism: seeks to overthrow the
existing distribution of power.

A policy of imperialism for a policy of
status quo  Security Dilemma:


State A: resort to certain measures defensive in
intent with respect to State B.
State B: in return, resort to countermeasures.
 These
countermeasures strengthen the initial
misapprehension.
 Ultimately, either both countries correct their errors with
regard to their respective policy, or else, the ever
increasing mutual suspicious, feeding upon each other,
end in war.

The Peloponnesian War, the history of European
diplomacy between Franco-German war 1870 and
WWI 1914 illustrates this situation.
Appeasement：

A foreign policy that attempts to meet the
threat of imperialism with methods
appropriate to a policy of the status quo.
 Eg.,
Neville Chamberlain’s policy of
appeasement towards German imperialism in
1930s was a good example. The final
catastrophe, WWII, was predetermined by the
initial error which responded to a policy of
imperialism as though it were a policy of the
status quo.
Problem v. Dilemma


A problem in IP: is a situation involving two or
more parties which is difficult to deal or
overcome(难以处理).
A dilemma: poses a different degree of difficulty:
it is a situation necessitating a choice between
two equal, especially equally undesirable,
alternatives (两难境地/选择).
a dilemma = is a problem that
incapable of a satisfactory solution
Anarchy & Security Dilemma
Can states cooperate in the anarchical
system, despite the challenge of security
dilemma?
 How states cope with security dilemma?


Answer: NR v. NL
Neorealism (NR):

The condition of Anarchy / Int. Environment:
 An
all-encompassing, unchanging
 Human beings are subject to this environment, and
unable to control outcomes and ensure survival,
 Thus, generates the paranoia, fear, and drive for power.
Neoliberal (NL) understanding of Anarchy:
as a vacuum  that is gradually being filed
with human-created processes and institutions.
 These processes can lead to counteract the inability to
control outcomes and ensure survival.
 Thus, the paranoia, fear and drive for power induced by
anarchy can be mitigated.
 Anarchy
On the Westphalian History Record:
NR:
 Unchanging
quality of anarchy,
 Ongoing warfare, military/trade competition
NL:
change in history – prior to the 20c and after.
 Before 20c = confirm to realist expectations
 Two important developments after 20c:
1. Increasing interdependence: Participating actors obtain
important interests and benefits; end relationship would be
costly.
2. Hegemonic stability: Lessons from the Great Depression,
 free trade system, institutions, the role of US.
 Important
NL: Barriers to Int. Cooperation
NLs do not assume cooperation will be easy
 Interdependence and common interests do
not automatically leading to cooperation

 Eg,
common interests in controlling the spread
of deadly viruses, nuclear weapons, trade
protectionism, environmental pollution 
leading to cooperation???
NL: Barriers to Int. Cooperation






lack of information
Others will take advantage of cooperative
arrangement by cheating
Others will free-ride on the back of their
cooperative efforts
Transaction costs, too high?
Unknown consequences & penalties,,,
Thus, even when all actors share a common
interest and would gain from the cooperative
effort, significant barriers remain among those
self-interested actors to cooperate.
Views over Barriers to Cooperation

For NR: They are intractable (棘手的)

For NL: They are not insurmountable
 The Role of Institutions
NR: Barriers are Intractable






International system = anarchy; self-help, competitive
Un-resolveable uncertainty  defensive or offensive?
Even when both parties have common interests and
would gain from cooperation, they fear any relatively
greater gains will be employed for completive purposes
– care about relative gains.
Since they cannot trust the future intentions of their
cooperative partners – future enemies??mistrust
Security Dilemma cannot be escaped
Cooperation: difficult to achieve; even more difficult to
sustain.
NL: Barriers are not Insurmountable



Fear of relatively greater gains do not necessarily
inhabit cooperation.
If their concerns over future intentions can be
mitigated, then 
states can be motivated to cooperate in order to
achieve absolute.
 Absolute
gains = the total gains made regardless of the
greater gains of others.



International system = anarchy  any agreement
must be self-enforcing.
But states are still capable of recognizing when it
is in their interest to curtail cheating or to trust in
the future actions of others
Eg, cooperative difficulties in game theory
The Prisoner’s Dilemma

1.
2.
(A) (B) 持有毒品 / 贩毒者？  监禁 1 年的可能
 0 y （揭发对方） （D C）
 1 y （双方都沉默）（C C）
 20 y（被对方揭发）（C D）
 10 y（双方都招供）（D D）
 DC > CC > DD > CD
Pay-off structure encourages each to turn against
the other  barriers to cooperation 合作的障碍
The lack of information or transparency
The incentive to cheat on one’s partner, or, the
fear of being cheated  a basic mistrust about
the actual intentions of others.
Overcoming barriers to cooperation
Things would be different if one can achieve
the following???:
From one-shot relationship  to develop
expectation of future interaction.
The recurrent ability to exchange
information, monitor one another’s behavior
 can reduce concerns over actual
intentions & the consequences of being
cheated???
What can Institutions offer?



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Can foster the exchange of information about one
another’s intentions, and they can reveal common
concerns over cheating, free-riding and other transaction
cost, which can then be addressed directly.
Transparency is enhanced, thereby reducing the
apprehension that can inhibit a mutually beneficial
agreement.
Foster iteration (重复) by ensuring constant and regular
meetings occur between national leaders & policymakers.
Thus, allow states to learn one other’s preferences,
discover they have common interests and constrains,
and consider a variety of solutions to collective problems.
NL Research Agenda:
Institutional Design

Since institutions play such a fundamental role in
reducing these sorts of barriers to international
cooperation, the following questions became
their central research agendas
 How they are designed
 Who use them for what purpose

 ‘Rational design of institution’ ==
became foundational context for NL analysis &
shapes its research agendas.
Study of International Institutions
Research focus:
1.Identifying
the shared self-interests that a particular
cooperative effort is meant to obtain in an Int. institutional
setting —— what common goal was the institution designed.
2.How/ whether particular institutional design ensures those
interests are sufficiently obtained? ——eg, what aspects of the
institution are more or less successful in obtaining a
cooperative result.
In
doing so, they identified three broad difficulties in Int.
institutional design, which affect the extent to which Int.
cooperation can be achieved —— Bargaining,
Defection, Autonomy.
Some criticism
Adopting the same state-centric assumptions – missing
important dynamics of WP.
 Unitary actor assumption -- undermine the role of
domestic politics play in determining interests and FPs.
 Rational actor assumption – impossible to separate the
independent causal effects of regimes from what states
did or wanted.
 Analytical inconsistency: epistemology = post-positivist,
ontology = positivist 
 These criticism led to an important theoretical
foundation for the development of constructivism.



Neorealists – Relative Gain
World systems Theory
Immanuel Wallenstein
 Endorses
realist emphasis on fundamental clash of
interests and importance of zero-sum logic.
 interdependence —— is a misleading term
 The reality of world political economy —— is
‘dependency’ （not interdependence）
 World system ——
 Core v. Periphery / North v. South
Thank You !!!