ISPOR Annual International Meeting Plenary Session May 24, 2016 Douglas E. Hough, Ph.D. The neoclassical economics approach ◦ Internal consistency of choice (Arrow) ◦ Self-interest maximization (Becker) ◦ Maximization in general (Posner) The annoying anomalies ◦ The Allais paradox ◦ Bounded rationality (Simon) ◦ Quasi rationality (Thaler) 1 Mainstream All participants are rational All participants know their preferences All participants have full information Preferences are pathindependent Deviations from rational choice are random Behavioral Economics Participants are not always rational Participants learn their preferences through experience Asymmetric information abounds Preferences are pathdependent Deviations from rational choice can be systematic A Caveat “Think how hard physics would be if particles could think.” - Murray Gell-Mann 2 Loss Aversion Endowment Effect Framing Power of the Default/Opt-In vs. Opt-Out Hyperbolic Discounting System 1 vs. System 2 thinking 3 Presentation 1 • Surgery: “Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the post-operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the 1st year and 34 are alive at the end of 5 years” • Radiation therapy: “Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through the therapy period, 77 are alive at the end of the 1st year and 22 are alive at the end of 5 years” Presentation 2 • Surgery: “Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the 1st year and 66 die by the end of 5 years” • Radiation therapy: “Of 100 people having radiation therapy none die during the therapy period, 23 die by the end of the 1st year and 78 die by the end of 5 years” McNeil, B., Pauker, S., Sox, H., & Tversky, A. (1982). On the elicitation of preferences for alternative therapies. NEJM, 306(21), 1259-1262. Effective consent % 100 80 60 40 20 0 Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338-1339. 4 SO WHAT???? 5 6 7 8 http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/ Willingness to pay ≠ Willingness to accept If people don’t have strong preferences, decisions can be swayed by framing and defaults If people can’t accurately predict future preferences, . . . 9 Behavioral economics is not a magic bullet 10
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