Commitment to Equity (CEQ):
A Diagnostic and Ranking Tool of
Latin American Governments’ Fiscal
Policies
First Phase: Wrap-Up Workshop
CIPR & Inter-American Dialogue
Tulane University, New Orleans
October 27, 2010
Revised Version: November 17, 2010
Nora Lustig
Dept. of Economics and Stone Center, Tulane University
Non-resident Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue
1
Outline of Workshop
MORNING:
• 9:00-11:45 Session 1: CEQ Diagnostics and Index: Background and Results in Three Pilot Countries:
Argentina, Mexico and Peru
Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino (via oovoo), John Scott and Miguel Jaramillo
• 10:15-10:30 Break
CONTENTS: Background of project and intellectual content & results of CEQ
1.
What is the Commitment to Equity project?
2.
CEQ Project: Background
3.
Why a CEQ? Inequality, Poverty and Fiscal Policy in LA
4.
CEQ Diagnostics: Description and Results Highlights for Pilot Studies: Argentina, Mexico and Peru
Presentations by Scott, Pessino and Jaramillo
5.
CEQ Index: Description and Preliminary Results for Mexico and Peru
2
Outline of Workshop
12- 1:30 --LUNCH: BROWN BAG (NORA’S COLLEAGUES FROM ECON
DEPT WILL ATTEND; INCLUDING JIM ALM, EXPERT ON PUBLIC
FINANCE)
AFTERNOON:
• 1:30-1:45 Break
• 1:45-3:30 Session 3: Taking Stock, Next Steps and Next Round of CEQ:
Bolivia, Costa Rica and Uruguay
Nora Lustig, George Gray Molina, Maximo Rossi, Pablo Sauma (via oovoo or
skype)
• 3:30-4:00 Wrap-up
Nora Lustig will lead off
CONTENTS:
6.
7.
8.
Preparing the CEQ, Intellectual Outputs and Intellectual Property
Taking Stock
Next Steps
Brief Presentations by Gray, Rossi and Sauma
9.
Wrap-up
3
1. What is CEQ?
4
What is the Commitment to Equity
Project?
The CEQ project’s main purpose is to design and
implement diagnostic and ranking tools to:
• quantify, assess, compare, and publicize the
extent to which Latin American governments
use fiscal policies to reduce poverty and
inequality
• in ways that are broadly consistent with
macroeconomic stability and growth
5
What is the Commitment to Equity
Project? Basic Questions:
• Do governments collect and allocate sufficient
resources to substantially reduce poverty and
human capital gaps and protect the poor from
income fluctuations?
• Do taxes and public spending patterns reduce
inequality and by how much?
• Are policies efficient and can spending be
maintained?
• Is information to monitor outcomes readily
available and reliable, and is evaluation carried
out?
6
What is the Commitment to Equity
Project?
• The CEQ project has two
components:
–CEQ Diagnostic: an assessment tool
–CEQ Index: a scorecard
7
1. What is the Commitment to Equity
Project?
• Focuses on government efforts rather than
outcomes
– Different from/complement to HDI , MDG Monitoring
Reports and Equality of Opportunity Index at WB, for
example
• Based on “hard” data and not perceptions
– Different from Transparency’s Corruption Index
• Relies on primary sources of information and
research
– Different from PREAL’s Education Report Card
• CEQ more analytical than other exercises (e.g.,
Pew’s GPP). More similar to public expenditure
reviews, incidence analysis, or Jeff Sach’s needs
assessments
2. CEQ Project: Background
9
Background: Implementation of First
Phase – Pilot Studies
• Served to refine and adapt the questionnaire and
indicators
• Demonstrated that relying on secondary sources
alone does not work (experience from Peru)
• Demonstrated that diagnostic exercise takes several
months of preparation and requires a highly skilled
professional with expertise in poverty, incidence
analysis and public finance
• Demonstrated importance of homogenizing language
and methods: CEQ needs a handbook/mindbook
15
Background: Implementation of First
Phase – Pilot Studies
• Served to identify unresolved issues with the CEQ
Diagnostic & Index:
– how best to estimate required resources in the face of
idiosyncratic and adverse shocks:
• Unemployment poverty gap (Carola’s method)
• Increase in poverty due to systemic shocks (econ crisis,
natural disasters, policy reforms, etc.); three studies used
different methods
– What is the “benchmark” to establish an ideal goal for
the reduction of inequality?
• For now we used regression analysis to compare country
with international norm
– Standardization of indicators & scores across countries
when information is different (due to lack of data, for ex)
16
3. Why a CEQ? Inequality,
Poverty and Fiscal Policy in LA
(Section 2 of Lustig’s paper)
17
Latin America and Europe: Disposable Income (After Taxes and Transfers) and Market Income
(Pre-Taxes and Transfers) Inequality
(Gini Coefficients)
Europe
after
taxes &
transfers
Europe
before
taxes &
transfers
22
Source: Lopez and Perry (2007), p. 18.
Why a CEQ? Fiscal Policy in LA: Little
Redistribution
• Before direct taxes and monetary transfers Gini
is 13 percent higher than the European average
while disposable income Gini is 60 percent
higher
• Adding in-kind transfers (spending on
education and health), the redistributive
impact is larger but still limited.
– Incidence analysis finds a fairly flat distribution of
social spending across income quintiles in Latin
America
23
4. CEQ Diagnostics: Description and
Main Results for Pilot Studies:
Argentina, Mexico and Peru
(Section 3 of Lustig’s paper and
Diagnostics for Argentina, Mexico
and Peru)
24
What is CEQ Diagnostics?
• CEQ Diagnostic is an assessment tool to
quantify and evaluate how aligned fiscal
policies are with two principal policy
objectives:
– supporting a minimum living standard and
– reducing income inequality.
25
The Redistributive Power of the State:
Three Main Mechanisms
26
Policy Instruments Covered
• Monetary transfers
• Subsidies to consumption goods and (some)
producer subsidies (e.g., agriculture)
• In-kind transfers through the fully or partially
subsidized provision of goods and services
particularly in the area of education and
health
• Taxes on income, consumption and assets
(including tax expenditures)
27
CEQ Diagnostic: What form does it
take?
• CEQ Diagnostics’ is a questionnaire whose theoretical
underpinning can be found in:
– economics of the welfare state and
– criteria-based approach.
• Indicators derived from standard poverty and
inequality analysis, fiscal incidence analysis and public
finance
• Experimenting with approaches to generate indicators
in areas not well developed in the literature (e.g.,
estimate resources required due close poverty gaps
caused by systemic or idiosyncratic shocks)
• It uses static incidence analysis; it does not include
behavioral responses or general equilibrium effects.
28
29
Standards in CEQ: Two Policy
Objectives
30
Policy Objective 1: Supporting a
minimum living standard has 4
elements
1.
poverty reduction: ensuring that everyone has a minimum
level of consumption
2. insurance: preventing individuals from falling (or falling
further) below the minimum level of consumption due to
adverse shocks, both idiosyncratic (unemployment, illness,
bad harvests, etc.) and systemic (economic crises, natural
disasters, spikes in food prices, etc.)
3. income smoothing: ensuring that a minimum level of
consumption is achieved throughout an individual’s lifecycle (maternity/paternity leave and retirement, in
particular)
4. building poor people’s human capital: ensuring that
everyone has a minimum level of education and health.
31
Criteria in CEQ are 4
32
Indicators for PO 1: Synthesis (Fig 3)
33
Indicators for PO 2: Synthesis (Fig 4)
34
CEQ Diagnostic: Summing Up
• CEQ has two standards or policy objectives
1. Supporting a minimum standard of living
2. Reducing inequality
• First policy objective has four sub-standards: everyone
has a minimum level of (1) consumption and (2) human
capital (3) throughout the life-cycle and (4) in the face
of adverse shocks
• CEQ has four criteria: resources, equity, quality &
accountability
• CEQ has 71 indicators; 32 quantitative (Resources and
Equity sections of questionnaire) and 39 “qualitative”
(Quality and Accountability sections). Thirty one
indicators require poverty, inequality and incidence
analysis from a household survey (preferably, an
income-expenditure survey)
35
CEQ Diagnostic: Summing Up
• Primary data requirements: household survey
(income expenditure surveys preferred) and
detailed public sector accounts. => Incidence of
government revenues and expenditures analysis
– Calculate market, disposable, post-fiscal and final
income (described below)
• Imputation methods for in-kind income (health and education
services provided by government free or quasi free)
• Estimation of impact of indirect taxes (including tax
expenditures) and subsidies requires consumption data at the
household level
– Government Revenues and Redistributive Spending
– Calculate poverty gaps
36
– Calculate progressiveness of revenues and expenditures
Methodology to answer questions
under PO 1: Resources and Equity
Definitions, Indicators and Data
Requirements
p. 13 of Lustig
37
Definition of Concepts
• Income: market, disposable, post-fiscal and
final
• Government revenues
• Redistributive spending
• Poverty Gaps
40
Definitions of Income: Market,
Disposable, Post-Fiscal and Final
Income (Lustig, p. 20)
Table 1. Definition of Income Concepts
Market Income = ym
Earned + Unearned Market Incomes (monetary
and non monetary) before government taxes and
transfers of any sort
Disposable Income = yd
Market Income plus direct monetary transfers
minus direct taxes (including direct tax
expenditures)
Post-fiscal Income = ypf
Disposable Income plus indirect subsidies minus
indirect taxes (including indirect tax expenditures)
Final Income = yf
Post-fiscal Income plus in-kind transfers and minus
in-kind taxes
Source: author’s elaboration based on various documents
41
Definition of Government Revenue
• Includes the total budgetary income of the
federal government:
– tax and non-tax revenue
– plus income generated by direct budgetary
controlled entities or public enterprises
• In countries where revenue collected at the
provincial or state level is important, the total
will include the revenues obtained by
governments at the subnational level
42
Fig 5: Redistributive vs Social Spending
REDISTRIBUTIVE
SPENDING
--"Social" Producer
Subsidies
--Consumption
Subsidies
--Subsidized Portion
of Social Security
Pensions
--"Social" Tax
Expenditures
--Health
--Education
--Social Assistance
SOCIAL
SPENDING
--Public Goods (could
be included in Redist)
--Social Security
45
Indicators for Policy Objective 1:
RESOURCES :
• Must determine whether resources collected and allocated
to redistributive spending are sufficient to close all the pretransfers gaps.
• Steps:
1. Calculate total government revenues
2. Calculate redistributive spending
3. Calculate total requirements: add up all the pre-transfers gaps
(details next slides)
4. Calculate ratio of total requirements to a. government
revenues and b. government redistributive spending


If ratios “substantially” lower than unity, means total fiscal and
redistributive space is ample
If ratios close or above unity, government efforts in collecting
resources and/or allocating them for redistributive purposes are
insufficient
46
Indicators for Policy Objective 1:
RESOURCES : Pre-Transfers Gaps
TOTAL INCOME POVERTY GAPS (pre-Transfers)
• Total Income Transfers Poverty Gap
• Total Pensions Gap
• Total Unemployment Compensation Gap
• Total Systemic Shock Gap (economic crisis, rising food prices, natural disasters,
epidemics)
TOTAL OPPORTUNITY GAPS (pre-Transfers)
TOTAL HUMAN CAPITAL GAPS (pre-Transfers)
• Total Education Coverage Gap
• Total Health Coverage Gap
•
•
•
•
•
TOTAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS (pre-Transfers)
Total Drinkable Water Gap
Total Electricity Gap
Total Sewerage Gap
Total Access to Markets Gap
Total Housing Gap
47
Estimating the Relevant Poverty Gaps:
Definition of Variables
 z = income poverty line (US$2.50 and US$4 PPP a day, extreme and moderate, respectively)
 Education “poverty line:” Critical level of schooling is completion of 12 years of schooling. Poor is
defined as people whose disposable income yd is below the corresponding poverty line (US$2.50 and
US$4 PPP a day).
 Health “poverty line:” critical level of health coverage is universal health coverage of the poor. Poor
is defined as people whose disposable income yd is below the corresponding poverty line (US$2.50
and US$4 PPP a day).
 ŷ = “net” average income of the poor ((US$2.50 and US$4 PPP a day)
 Q = number of poor (US$2.50 and US$4 PPP a day)
 yd = disposable income of the poor: Market Income plus direct monetary transfers (targeted
transfers, workfare/non-contributory unemployment compensation, non-contributory pensions, etc.)
minus direct taxes (including direct tax expenditures) (see Table 2). Unless otherwise specified, it is
assumed that the incomes reported in household surveys are net of direct taxes in the case of the
poor. (US$2.50 and US$4 PPP a day)
48
Total Requirements
Total (Pre-Transfers) Income Poverty Gaps
Total Income Transfers Poverty Gap:
TITG = (z - ŷT) QT, where ŷT is the average shortfall for the “income transfers poor” calculated as ŷT = Σ (ydi
– targeted cash transfer programsi)/QT
Total Unemployment Compensation Gap:
TUG= (z - ŷl U) QU, where ŷl U is the average shortfall for the “unemployment compensation poor” calculated
as ŷil U = Σ (ydil – workfare programs/non-contributory unemployment benefitsi)/Qu, for the unemployed and
underemployed, where the subscript l, refers to labor income
Total Pensions Gap:
TPG= (z - ŷP) QP, where ŷP is the average shortfall for the “pension poor” calculated as ŷP = Σ (ydiP –
minimum/non-contributory pensions for poor people 65 or olderi)/ QP
49
Total Requirements (cont)
Total (Pre-Transfers) Human Capital Gaps
Total Education Coverage Gap:
TEG = [(Public spending on education by level/students by level * Total (disposable income) poor
population in schooling age by level) + Opportunity cost]
Total Health Coverage Gap:
THG = [Cost of Basic Health Insurance/insured person * Number of (disposable income) Poor]
50
Total (Pre-Transfers) Requirements (TR)
Total (Pre-Transfers) Gaps
Requirements to Close Pre-Transfers Total Income Poverty Gap:
TRI = TITG + TUG + TPG
Requirements to Close Pre-Transfers Total Human Capital Gap
TRHK = TEG + THG
Requirements to Close Pre-Transfers Total Overall Poverty Gap
TR = TRI + TRHK
51
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
• Must determine whether resources collected and
allocated to redistributive spending are sufficient to
close all the pre-transfers gaps.
• Steps:
1. Calculate total government revenues
2. Calculate redistributive spending
3. Calculate total requirements: add up all the pre-transfers
gaps (details next slides)
4. Calculate ratio of total requirements to a. government
revenues and b. government redistributive spending
 If ratios “substantially” lower than unity, means total fiscal and
redistributive space is ample
 If ratios close or above unity, government efforts in collecting
resources and/or allocating them for redistributive purposes are
insufficient
52
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
Indicators for Policy Objective 1:
RESOURCES : Pre-Transfers Gaps
TOTAL INCOME POVERTY GAPS (pre-Transfers)
• Total Income Transfers Poverty Gap
• Total Pensions Gap
• Total Unemployment Compensation Gap
• Total Systemic Shock Gap (economic crisis, rising food prices, natural disasters,
epidemics)
TOTAL OPPORTUNITY GAPS (pre-Transfers)
TOTAL HUMAN CAPITAL GAPS (pre-Transfers)
• Total Education Coverage Gap
• Total Health Coverage Gap
•
•
•
•
•
TOTAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS (pre-Transfers)
Total Drinkable Water Gap
Total Electricity Gap
Total Sewerage Gap
Total Access to Markets Gap
Total Housing Gap
53
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
(2009 Billion Mx$; z = US$4 a day)
• PO1 - RESOURCES
1.Total Government Revenues =
2.Total Redistributive Spending =
3.Total Requirements to Close (Pre-Transfers) = TR =
1.Total Income Tranfers Gap = TITG =
2.Total Pension Gap = TPG =
3.Total Human Capital Gaps = TRHK =
4.Total Systemic Shock Gap =
4.Ratio of 3/1 (in %)=
5.Ratio of 3/2 (in %) =
2,824.70
1,699.10
240.1
15.1
2,824.70
1,699.10
460.2
81.5
40.0
159.4
309.4
17.4
29.4
16.3
27.1
48.2
8.5
14.1
54
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
PO 1 - RESOURCES
Resources: measures whether government revenues and redistributive spending are potentially
consistent with what would be required for supporting a minimum standard of living.
R1. Does the government collect sufficient combined resources to:
R1.1 Close the total income poverty gap (transfer, unemployment and pension gaps
combined? YES
R1.2 Close the overall poverty gap (transfer, unemployment and pension gaps plus human
capital gaps combined)? YES
R1.3 Protect the poor from the impact of systemic shocks? YES
R2. Is redistributive spending potentially sufficient to:
R2.1 Close the total income poverty gap (transfer, unemployment and pension gaps
combined? YES
R2.2 Close the overall poverty gap (transfer, unemployment and pension gaps plus human
capital gaps combined)? YES
R2.3 Protect the poor from the impact of systemic shocks? YES
55
Indicators for Policy Objective 1
EQUITY
Remember that EQUITY measures whether:
i. existing programs are adequate
ii. allocation of redistributive spending is
consistent with supporting a minimum
standard of living for everybody
iii. coverage among the poor
iv. leakages to non-poor
56
Equity: measures whether menu of programs and allocation of redistributive spending is actually
consistent with supporting a minimum standard of living.
E1. Is the menu of anti-poverty, insurance, income smoothing and human capital building programs
targeted to the poor (including targeted price subsidies) adequate ? List them
a. Are there conditional or unconditional cash transfer programs?
b. Are there programs for the unemployed poor (e.g., workfare programs)?
c. Are there programs to protect poor households from the financial impact of illness,
disability or death?
d. Are the poor covered by non-contributory health insurance?
e. Are there programs to prevent people from falling into poverty during old age?
f. Are there programs or policies specifically addressed to building human capital and
assets of the poor:
•
early childhood development for poor children?
•
pregnant and lactating poor women?
•
poor youth at risk?
•
increase school attendance of the poor (e.g., scholarships, CCTs)?
•
improve the poor’s nutrition and health (e.g., food coupons, subsidized basic
foodstuffs, nutritional supplements, etc.)?
•
improve the poor’s access to housing?
•
improve the poor’s access to energy (e.g., differential prices)?
improve the poor’s access to credit and private insurance?
•
empower the poor?
•
reduce social exclusion and discrimination?
•
achieve other socially desirable objectives?
g. Other programs
E2. Is government spending on each of the following programs sufficient to eliminate the
corresponding gaps?
a. flagship targeted cash transfers
b. insurance for the unemployed or workfare
c. non-contributory pension program
d. of a, b and c combined
e. education spending (supply of services and demand subsidies)
f. non-contributory health insurance
g. of d, e and f combined
E3. Do programs that compensate the poor from the costs of systemic shocks (natural disasters,
economic crises, epidemics, rising food and fuel prices and policy reforms) exist? List them
E.4 Is spending on these programs enough to eliminate the increase in extreme and total income
poverty associated with systemic shocks?
57
Equity: measures whether menu of programs and allocation of redistributive spending is actually
consistent with supporting a minimum standard of living.
(continued)
E5. What is the coverage rate for the extremely and total poor of the following programs?
a. flagship targeted cash transfers
b. insurance for the unemployed or workfare
c. non-contributory pension program
d. of a, b and c combined
e. education spending (supply of services and demand subsidies)
f. non-contributory health insurance
g. of d, e and f combined
E6. What proportion of total benefits in the following program reaches the extremely and moderately
poor as well as the bottom 20 and top 20 percent of the population?
a. flagship targeted cash transfers
b. insurance for the unemployed or workfare
c. non-contributory pension program
d. of a, b and c combined
e. education spending (supply of services and demand subsidies)
f. non-contributory health insurance
g. of d, e and f combined
E 7. In the event that fiscal cuts must be made, are transfer programs and non-contributory
unemployment insurance and pension programs targeted to the poor protected from cuts?
E 8. Are per capita benefits adjusted for changes in cost of living for the poor whenever necessary?
58
Indicators for Policy Objective 1
EQUITY
Remember that EQUITY measures whether:
i. existing programs are adequate
ii. allocation of redistributive spending is
consistent with supporting a minimum
standard of living for everybody
iii. coverage among the poor
iv. leakages to non-poor
59
Indicators for Policy Objective 1
EQUITY
• Must determine whether resources allocated to the
poor per relevant category are sufficient to close each
and all the after-transfers gaps.
• Steps:
1. Calculate government spending per relevant category
2. Calculate additional requirements per category (details
next slides)
3. Calculate difference in spending per relevant category
minus additional requirements in relevant categories
 If positive, government is spending sufficient resources in the
relevant category to potentially close the gap
 If negative (or zero), government efforts in terms of how much
it is spending on the relevant gaps are insufficient
60
Indicators for Policy Objective 1: EQUITY
INCOME POVERTY GAPS
• Income Transfers Poverty Gap
• Pensions Gap
• Unemployment Compensation Gap
• Systemic Shock Gap (economic crisis, rising food prices, natural disasters,
epidemics)
OPPORTUNITY GAPS:
HUMAN CAPITAL GAPS
• Education Coverage Gap
• Health Coverage Gap
•
•
•
•
INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS
Drinkable water
Electricity
Sewerage
Access to markets
61
Additional Requirements
After Transfers Income Poverty Gaps
After-Transfers Income Transfers Poverty Gap:
ITG = [GTP - TITG], where GTP is the actual government spending on transfers for the (disposable
income) poor; it can be obtained directly from household surveys when questionnaires ask households for
this information; otherwise it has to be imputed.
After-Unemployment Benefits Unemployment Compensation Gap:
UG = [GUP - TUG], where GUP is the actual government spending on unemployment benefits for the
(disposable income) unemployed poor; it can be obtained directly from household surveys when
questionnaires ask households for this information; otherwise it has to be imputed.
After-non-contributory Pension Pensions Gap:
PG = [GPP - TPG], where GPP is the actual government spending on pensions for the (disposable income)
poor 65 or older; it can be obtained directly from household surveys when questionnaires ask households for
this information; otherwise it has to be imputed.
62
Additional Requirements
After-Transfers Human Capital Gaps
After-Education Transfers Education Coverage Gap:
EG = [GEP - TEG], where GEP is the actual education spending on the (disposable income) poor by level +
Demand-side subsidies by level going to the poor. GEP is calculated by multiplying the number of children in
(disposable income) poor households attending school times the relevant cost (public spending) per student
plus the actual demand-side subsidies given to (disposable income) poor households.
After-Health Transfers Health Coverage Gap:
HG = [GHP - THG], where GHP is the actual health spending on the (disposable income) poor. GHP is
calculated by estimating the amount of free health-related goods and services received by the (disposable
income) poor.
63
Total Additional Requirements (AR)
Total (After-Transfers) Gaps
Additional Requirements to Close After-Transfers Income Poverty Gap:
ARI = ITG + UG + PG
Additional Requirements to Close After-Transfers Human Capital Gap
ARHK = EG + HG
Additional Requirements to Close After-Transfers Overall Poverty Gap
AR = ARI + ARHK
64
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
(2009 Billion Mx$; z = US$4 a day)
PO1 - EQUITY (2009 MX$ in Millions (millones))
1. Government spending on transfers for the poor
78,960
140,907
2. Total income gap
80,732
150,836
-1,772
-9,930
4. Government spending on human capital for the poor
111,365
217,556
5. Total HK gap
159,413
309,430
6. Additional requirements to close the HK gap (4 - 5)
-48,048
-91,874
TOTAL SHORTFALL
-49,820
-101,803
As a share of Government Revenues (in %)
-1.8
-3.6
As a share of Redistributive Spending (in %)
-2.9
-6.0
3. Additional resources to close income gap (1 - 2)
65
Example: Mexico (Scott, 2010)
(2009 Billion Mx$; z = US$4 a day)
Equity: measures whether menu of programs and allocation of
redistributive spending is actually consistent with supporting a
minimum standard of living.
E2. Is government spending on each of the following programs
sufficient to eliminate the corresponding gaps?
a. flagship targeted cash transfers YES, IN THE ABSENCE OF
SYSTEMIC SHOCKS
b. non-contributory pension program NO
c. education spending (supply of services and demand subsidies)
NO
d. non-contributory health insurance NO
E.4 Is spending on targeted programs enough to eliminate the
increase in extreme and total income poverty associated with
systemic shocks? NO
66
Calculating Systemic Shocks Poverty
Gaps (econ crisis, nat disaster, policy
reform, etc.
• Three different methods:
– Arg (frequency of economic crisis, average
impact on GDP; impact on poverty calculated
using a poverty/growth elasticity)
– Mx (“arithmetic” calculation of additional
income poverty due to 2008-2009 recession)
– Pe (probability of facing shock by the poor
and estimated income loss for the poor due
to a shock using regression analysis)
67
Example PO 1
Resources: Questions 1.1, 1.2
• R1. Does the government collect sufficient combined
resources to:
– R1.1 Close the total income poverty gap (transfer,
unemployment and pension gaps combined?
– R1.2 Close the overall poverty gap (transfer, unemployment and
pension gaps plus human capital gaps combined)?
• ANSWER: in Argentina, Mexico and Peru, government
revenues are more than sufficient to close the income
(orange highlight) and overall poverty (green highlight) gaps
See Table 1 in next slide (it will also be available in hard copy)
70
PRELIMINARY TABLE 1:
REQUIRED RESOURCES TO CLOSE THE OVERALL POVERTY AND INCOME GAPS AS A % OF TOTAL GOV REVENUES
(This table summarizes the results corresponding to PO1, Resources, Question 1)
% OF GOV REVENUES
% OF GDP
EXT MOD EXT MOD
ARGENTINA (2009) - GDP/CAP US$14413
Overall pov gap (before transfers excpt noncontrib pens) 6.8
Overall Poverty Gap (before all transfers & after taxes)
9
Transfers pov gap
2.21
MEXICO (2008)- GDP/CAP US$14560
Overall Poverty Gap (before all transfers & after taxes) 8.6
Transfers pov gap
1.7
NOTE: PERU IS NOT COMPARABLE (see 1. below)
PERU (2009)- GDP/CAP US$8580
Systemic Shock Poverty Gap
na
Education Spending Gap (as a % of soc spend)
28.1
Income pov gap (disp income)
3.4
GINI H $2.5
H $4 REV/GDP
(in %) (in %)(in %)
34.2*
14.2 2.1 4.5 0.47 10.4 20
17.2 2.8 5.4
14.7 25
5.33 0.69 1.67
23.7
16.4
2 3.8 0.51 14.6 28
2.9 0.4 0.69
H $1.7H $3
H $1.7 H $3
0.48 12.6 36 18.04
na na 0.17
na 5.1 na
na 0.62 na
SOURCE: For Argentina, Pessino (2010), for Mexico, Scott (2010) and for Peru, Jaramillo (2010); otherwise specified.
71
na= not available; yellow highlights "comparable"
NOTES:
1. In Peru, the gaps are calculated as additional resources (that is, to estimate pov gap one uses disp income instead
of before transfers income) and social spending is used instead of redistributive spending. The education spending
gap was estimated as the resources required to subsidize the demand for education of all the high-school drop-outs
younger than 29 years old
2. Extreme (moderate) poverty lines is 2.50 (4.0) PPP dollars a day; Peru used national poverty lines equal to U$1.7 and US$3 current dollars
3. For definitions of redistributive spending see Lustig (2010).
4. H are the headcount ratios.
5. GDP/capita in PPP dollars using 2005 international prices; source World Bank, WDI
6. EXT and MOD compares requirements for eliminating extreme and total poverty, respectively, vs revenues and redist spending
7. "After non-contributory pensions" is "before all transfers& after taxes" plus non-contributory pensions
8. Government revenues for Argentina include federal and provincial revenues except for non-tax provincial revenues.
72
Results from three pilots: authors’
presentations (15 mins. each)
• Carola Pessino, Argentina
– Tracking the impact on poverty and inequality
• John Scott, Mexico
– Matrix of needs vs. available resources
• Miguel Jaramillo, Peru
– Learning by doing
73
CEQ: Argentina
Impact of Fiscal Policies on
Poverty and Inequality
Carola Pessino
Universidad Torcuato di Tella
74
Argentina: Impact of Monetary and Inkind Transfers on Headcount, Pov Gap
and Gini (Pessino, 2010)
Table
Poverty Rate and Gap and GINI calculated from EPH directly before and After monetary and in-kind Transfers
Argentina-1st Semester 2009
Pre_moratorium After
After Monetary After Education After Health
After Food
With Subsidy Without in Kind
Pensions
Moratorium
Transfers
expenditure
Expenditure
Subsidy
per Child
Transfers*
2.5 US$
FGT0
FGT1
Absolute Change in FGT0
Relative Change in FGT0
4 US$
FGT0
FGT1
Absolute Change in FGT0
Relative Change in FGT0
Gini coefficient
RS= Absolute Change in Gini
Percentage Change in Gini
14.7
8.5
10.2
4.8
-4.5
-30.6%
8.9
3.8
-5.8
-39.5%
2.2
0.9
-12.5
-85.0%
1.0
0.4
-13.7
-93.2%
1.0
0.4
-13.7
-93.2%
0.7
0.3
-14
-95.2%
5.4
1.8
-9.3
-63.3%
24.9
12.8
20
8.7
-4.9
-19.7%
0.468
-0.031
-6.2%
18.9
7.6
-6
-24.1%
0.461
-0.039
-7.7%
7.4
2.3
-17.5
-70.3%
0.399
-0.100
-20.0%
4.0
1.1
-20.9
-83.9%
0.378
-0.121
-24.3%
3.9
1.0
-21
-84.3%
0.377
-0.122
-24.4%
2.7
0.8
-22.2
-89.2%
0.366
-0.133
-26.7%
15.7
5
-9.2
-36.9%
0.444
-0.055
-11.0%
0.499
* With monetary transfers and Subsidy per Child (does not include Education, Health and Food)
75
CEQ Mexico
Estimating the Poverty Gaps
John Scott
CIDE and CONEVAL
76
PO1: Resources
Poverty
line
Resources
Million
Total Gap
pesos
Needs
Poverty Gap (2008)
Total
Education
Gap
Health
Gap
<2.5
52,235
34,388
13,660
4,187
<4
99,678
62,607
29,267
7,804
All
Gap after transfers
Gap before
transfers
Total Revenue
48,206
3,574
7,025
159,413
105,132
54,280
15,133
17,393
<4
460,266
81,451
5,450
11,766
309,430
197,341
112,089
39,998
29,388
8.5%
1.7%
0.1%
0.2%
5.6%
3.7%
1.9%
0.5%
0.6%
16.3%
2.9%
0.2%
0.4%
11.0%
7.0%
4.0%
1.4%
1.0%
14.1%
2.8%
0.2%
0.4%
9.4%
6.2%
3.2%
0.9%
1.0%
27.1%
4.8%
0.3%
0.7%
18.2%
11.6%
6.6%
2.4%
1.7%
18.1%
3.6%
0.3%
0.5%
12.0%
7.9%
4.1%
1.1%
1.3%
34.7%
6.1%
0.4%
0.9%
23.3%
14.9%
8.4%
3.0%
2.2%
131.2%
26.3%
2.0%
3.8%
87.1%
57.4%
29.7%
8.3%
9.5%
251.5%
44.5%
3.0%
6.4%
169.1%
107.8%
61.2%
21.9%
16.1%
<2.5
2,824,741
<2.5
1,699,091
<2.5
1,326,540
<4
Targeted (antipoverty, net of
admin 10%)
<2.5
183,009
<4
Education
<2.5
432,446
24.3%
45.6%
<4
Health
<2.5
324,201
16.7%
34.6%
<4
Social Security: Old
Age
Pension Shock
Gap
Gap
240,145
<4
Social Spending
Age 5-
<2.5
<4
Redistributive
Spending
Age
65+
Social Security
Gap
HK Gap
<2.5
<4
338,483
1.1%
4.5%
1.6%
11.8%
PO1: Equity (resources reaching poor)
Resources
Poverty
%
line
Share
Gap before
transfers
Redistributive
Spending
Social Spending
Targeted (antipoverty)
Education
Health
Social Security: Old
Age
Million pesos
Needs
Total
Gap
Poverty Gap (2008)
Social Security
Gap
HK Gap
All
Age
65+
Age 5-
Total
Education
Gap
Health
Gap
Pension Shock
Gap
Gap
<2.5
240,145
48,206
3,574
7,025
159,413
105,132
54,280
15,133
<4
460,266
81,451
5,450
11,766
309,430
197,341
112,089
39,998
<2.5
10.5%
177,610
135%
27%
2%
4%
90%
59%
31%
9%
10%
<4
21.1%
358,442
128%
23%
2%
3%
86%
55%
31%
11%
8%
<2.5
12.5%
165,508
145%
29%
2%
4%
96%
64%
33%
9%
11%
<4
24.6%
326,229
141%
25%
2%
4%
95%
60%
34%
12%
9%
<2.5
37.2%
68,014
353%
71%
5%
10%
234%
155%
80%
22%
26%
<4
59.4%
108,713
423%
75%
5%
11%
285%
182%
103%
37%
27%
<2.5
16.4%
70,744
149%
<4
31.2%
134,734
146%
<2.5
12.5%
40,620
134%
<4
25.5%
82,822
135%
<2.5
3.2%
10,946
33%
138%
Measures of Tax
Progressivity
Kakwani
Change in Gini
(Reynolds- Smolensky)
Change in Gini with
revenue redistributed
equally (Lora)
Personal Income Tax
Benchmark (Lora)
Mexico
Most
Median Progressive
Mexico
VAT
Benchmark (Lora)
Most
Median Progressive
0.32320
0.15600
0.33800
0.01460
-0.08900
0.07000
-0.00960
-0.00006
-0.00200
-0.00080
0.00009
-0.00003
-0.02370
-0.01600
-0.03100
-0.02710
-0.02500
0.04000
Source: Mexico: SHCP 2009. LA: Eduardo Lora, 2007, “Trends and Outcomes of Tax
Reform,” in The State of State Reform in Latin America (Table 6.8, p. 204).
Gráfica 3
Ingresos Tributarios como porcentaje del PIB
40
35.5
35
30.6
30
26.3
25
23.1
20.9
20
18.4
15
13.7
11.6
10
9.4
9.5
5
0
Fuente: CEPAL (2010),
14.2
14.6
15
15.9
16.5
16.5
17.4
21.7
21.7
23.3
CI Education
Chile, 2006
Uruguay, 2003
Argentina, 2003
Costa Rica, 2004
Colombia, 2003
México, 2006
Panamá, 2003
América Latina
Perú, 2004
Paraguay, 1998
Jamaica, 2000
Guatemala, 2000
R Dominicana, 1998
Honduras, 2004
Nicaragua, 2005
Bolivia, 2002
Ecuador, 1999
México, 1992
Brasil, 1997
-0.300
-0.250
-0.200
-0.150
-0.100
-0.050
-
0.050
Source: ECLAC 2007; Mexico: own estimations based on ENIGH 1992, 2006.
0.100
0.150
CI Health
Chile, 2006
Uruguay, 2003
Colombia, 2003
Costa Rica, 2004
El Salvador, 2002
América Latina
Honduras, 2004
Ecuador, 1999
Nicaragua, 2005
Panamá, 2003
Argentina, 2003
Guatemala, 2000
Brasil, 1997
México, 2006
México, 1996
Bolivia, 2002
Perú, 2004
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Source: ECLAC 2007; Mexico: own estimations based on ENIGH 2006,
0.2
0.4
CI Pensions
Denmark
Australia
Finland
New Zealand
Ireland
Norway
United Kingdom
Sweden
Switzerland
Netherlands
Canada
Czech Republic
OECD-27
Belgium
United States
Slovak Republic
Hungary
Japan
Spain
Germany
Argentina, 2003
Greece
Luxembourg
Italy
Austria
France
Poland
Bolivia, 2002
Portugal
Uruguay, 2003
Turkey
Ecuador, 1999
Brasil, 1997
México, 2006
América Latina
Costa Rica, 2004
Panamá, 2003
Perú, 2004
Guatemala, 2000
Colombia, 2003
Honduras, 2004
-0.600
-0.400
-0.200
0.000
0.200
Coeficientes de Concentración
0.400
0.600
Source: OECD 2008; ECLAC 2007; Mexico: own estimations based on ENIGH 2006 .
0.800
Indices de Concentración para el gasto público redistributivo: 2008
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
Oportunidades
IMSS-Oportunidades
Piso Firme (2006)
PET (2006)
Seguro Popular
Adultos mayores Fed
SSA Centros
Despensa DIF (2006)
Edu Primaria
SSA Hosp.
Edu Preescolar
Edu Secundaria
Desayunos DIF (2006)
Vivienda (Tu Casa) (2006)
Otros dirigidos
Crédito Palabra (2006)
Liconsa (2006)
Habitat (2006)
Regresivos (concentración en población
de ingresos medios y altos)
Aumentan
desigualdad
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
Progresivos (concentración en
población de ingresos bajos)
Edu Media Superior
Opciones Productivas (2006)
Transferencias total
Subsidio Electrico (2006)
Gasto Fiscal IVA
Subsidio para el empleo
Salud IMSS
Subsidio Gas LP
Edu Superior
PROCAMPO (tierras, 2006)
Becas públicas (excl. Oport.)
Salud PEMEX, FA
Adultos mayores DF
Subsidio Gasolinas (IEPS)
Salud ISSSTE
Gini
Pensiones IMSS
Pensiones ISSSTE
Pensiones PEMEX, FA
Subs. Agric (2006)
Fuente: calculos del autor a partir de ENIGH 2008 , el “Modulo de Programas Sociales” levantado con la ENIGH 2006 (Sedesol), y bases administrativas
de ASERCA.
Gráfica 6
Coeficientes de Concentración y gasto público por programa: 2008 (tamaño de burbujas proporcional a magnitud de gasto)
1.00
Pensiones PEMEX, FA
Subs. Agric.
0.80
Regresivo
Pensiones ISSSTE
0.60
Pensiones IMSS
Salud ISSSTE
Adultos mayores DF
Salud PEMEX, FA
Subsidio Gasolinas (IEPS)
0.40
Becas públicas (excl. Oport.)
PROCAMPO
Edu Superior
Salud IMSS
Gasto Fiscal IVA
0.20
Opciones Productivas
Subsidio para el empleo
Habitat
0.00
Vivienda (Tu Casa)
Edu Media Superior
Liconsa
Desayunos DIF
-0.20
Progresivo
Electrico Residencial
Edu Secundaria
Edu Preescolar
Adultos mayores Fed
Edu Primaria
Salud SSA
Seguro Popular
-0.40
PET
IMSS-Oportunidades
Oportunidades
-0.60
-0.80
Fuente: calculos del autor a partir de ENIGH 2008 , el “Modulo de Programas Sociales” levantado con la ENIGH 2006 (Sedesol), y bases administrativas
de ASERCA.
Gráfica 5
Participación del 20% más pobre de la población en el gasto público: 2008
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
IMSS-Oport.
Oportunidades
Piso Firme (2006)
PET (2006)
Adultos mayores Fed
Seguro Popular
Despensa DIF (2006)
SSA Centros
Otros dirigidos
Edu Primaria
SSA Hosp.
Edu Preescolar
Vivienda (Tu Casa) (2006)
Edu Secundaria
Desayunos DIF (2006)
Opciones Productivas (2006)
Crédito Palabra (2006)
Habitat (2006)
Transferencias total
Edu Media Superior
Liconsa (2006)
Subsidio Electrico
Gasto Fiscal IVA
Subsidio Gas LP
Edu Superior
PROCAMPO (tierras, 2006)
Becas públicas (excl. Oport.)
Subsidio Gasolinas (IEPS)
Salud IMSS
Salud PEMEX, FA
Subsidio para el empleo
Ingresos pre transf
Adultos mayores DF
Salud ISSSTE
Pensiones IMSS
Subs Agric (2006)
Pensiones ISSSTE
Pensiones PEMEX, FA
culos del autor a partir de ENIGH 2008 , el “Modulo de Programas Sociales” levantado con la ENIGH 2006 (Sedesol), y bases administrativas de ASERCA.
CEQ Peru
Are fiscal resources enough to
protect the poor?:
Vulnerability vis-á-vis idiosyncratic
shocks. The case of Peru
Miguel Jaramillo Baanante
GRADE – CEQ Project
The problem
• High vulnerability vis-á-vis natural disasters,
compared to other Latin American countries.
• In 2007, 30.1% of Peruvian households (38.3% of
poor households) experienced an idiosyncratic
shock (loss of employment, loss of family
business, serious health problem, delinquency
victim, natural disaster).
• Natural disasters account for 38.8% of these
shocks, 62.3% for households below the poverty
line.
Estimating fiscal cost of shocks
• ¿Does Peru’s state have the financial capacity to
protect poor households from these shocks?
• Fiscal cost = (Pr(s)*Hp) *Ch,
donde Pr(s) is the probability of having a shock, Hp
is the number of poor households, and Ch is cost
per hh.
• We know Pr(s) and Hp from household survey.
• We need to estimate Ch.
Estimating impact of shocks on poor
households
• Mincer equation with dummy that identifies
shocked households and interaction of having
received shock and being poor.
Results
• Households that experienced a shock observe
income 11.1% below those not suffering a shock.
An additional 24.8% impact is associated to poor
households.
• Subtracting 35.9% from the annual income of
poor households that faced a shock and
multiplying by the number of poor households
that faced a shock we arrive at a figure of
229’500,000 USD, or 0.17% of GDP, which
compares to government revenue of 18% of GDP.
Conclusion
• It is financially feasible for the Peruvian state
to finance protection of the poor vis-á-vis
natural disasters.
5. CEQ Index
(section 6 of Lustig’s paper)
94
CEQ Index
• CEQ Index is a scorecard designed to rank
countries on how they use their fiscal powers
to advance social equity as defined by the
policy objectives and indicators outlined
above.
• It is not perceptions-based. As such, differs
from the WEF’s Global Competitiveness
Report, Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions, etc.
95
CEQ Index: Description and Preliminary
Results for Mexico and Peru
• Questionnaires were not exactly the same
• During pilot studies
– Questionnaire has been evolving
– Indicators have been fine-tuned
96
Commitment to Equity Index: MEXICO by Policy Objective and Effort
Policy Objective #1
Support a minimum
standard of living
Effort
Score
Resources
Equity
Quality
Accountability
Policy Objective #2
4.9
5.2
5.1
5.7
Policy
Objective #1
Policy
5.2 Objective #2
Overall Scores
Reduce income inequality
Effort
Score
Resources
3.3
Equity
4.6
Quality
5.3
Accountability
4.3
Effort
Resources
Equity
Quality
Accountability
Total
4.1
4.9
5.2
5.0
Overall
4.4
4.8
NOTE: All BLUE NUMBERS are the result of formulas that use the entries of other cells. Only
the individual scores in the Policy Objective Score Cards are entry based.
NOTE: Overall scores are based on averages.
98
Commitment to Equity Index: Mexico
10 - Maximum
5 - Average
0 - Minimum
10.0
8.0
Scores
6.0
4.9
5.2
5.0
4.8
Quality
Accountability
Overall
4.1
4.0
2.0
0.0
Resources
Equity
99
Commitment to Equity Index: PERU by Policy Objective and Effort
Policy Objective #1
Policy Objective #2
Support a minimum standard
of living
Reduce income inequality
Effort
Resources
Equity
Quality
Accountabili
ty
Policy
Objective
#1
Score
5.5
2.9
5.2
5.0
4.6
Effort
Resources
Equity
Quality
Accountabili
ty
Policy
Objective
#2
Score
3.9
4.3
6.5
4.6
Overall Scores
Effort
Resources
Equity
Quality
Accountabili
ty
Total
4.7
3.6
5.9
4.8
Overall
4.8
4.7
NOTE: All BLUE NUMBERS are the result of formulas that use the entries of other cells.
Only the individual scores in the Policy Objective Score Cards are entry based.
NOTE: Overall scores are based on averages.
100
101
Pending
• Overall “grade” has little variation. Develop a
“true” index (John Scott’s suggestions)
• Re-visit weights?
• Standardization method to compare results
across countries
102
From numbers to qualitative
categories
• In the pilot version of CEQ Index we used
words such as “mediocre” for the average
score
– The average score was set up at 5 (variables were
re-scaled)
• Terminology may not be suitable (“too
aggressive”)
• An alternative proposal: see next slide
103
CEQ QUALITATIVE CATEGORIES
Nora Lustig’s Proposal
October 23, 2010
CEQ INDEX: QUALITATIVE CATEGORIES
SCORE
CATEGORY
9 and 10
Outstanding Commitment
7 and 8
Strong Commitment
5 and 6
Average Commitment (Average for LA)
3 and 4
Weak Commitment
1 and 2
No Commitment
104
6. Intellectual Outputs, Process and
Intellectual Property
105
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Project Outputs
• Four key outputs:
–CEQ Diagnostic at the country level
–CEQ Index, country report
–CEQ Index, regional report
–Interactive website/s
• In addition, there are derived
outputs such as academic
publications, training manuals, etc.
106
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Process
• CEQ Diagnostic is prepared by an expert in the
fields of poverty, inequality and incidence
analysis (sponsoring institutions will pay 2,500
dollars per study—at a minimum); author can
hire whomever they choose to help
• Once CEQ Diagnostic is completed, the author
convenes a CEQ National Committee
integrated with experts in the fields of poverty
and inequality, public finance, public
economics, labor economics, evaluation of
social programs and macro-economics
107
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Process
• Members of the Committee should not be
government officials or work in an
organization which may create conflict of
interest
• Based on the CEQ Diagnostic, each member
assigns scores to every question at the one
digit level (that is, Resources: R1, R2, etc.);
scores can go from 1 to 10 (see Table 3 for
correspondence between numbers and
qualitative categories)
108
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Process
• Scores will be determined by the “distance”
between the actual indicator and a pre-defined
goal (ideal).
• The pre-defined goal can be:
– endogenous and absolute (for example, allocate
enough resources to eradicate extreme poverty,
where the amount of resources will depend on the
poverty rates in the country in question) or
– exogenous and relative when indicators are subject to
benchmarking (that is, when the country’s
performance is compared with international norms).
109
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Intellectual Property Rights
• CEQ Diagnostics
• Outputs are published as internal reports
and/or academic outputs under the name of
the respective author(s) who preserve(s) the
intellectual property right to use it for
teaching, research or other activities
• HOWEVER:
110
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Intellectual Property Rights
• Lustig as coordinator and CIPR retain the right to
be the first to publish the Diagnostic and derived
academic outputs in any language; if there are no
publication plans or no such publication takes
place, the author is free to publish it somewhere
else; author must request permission in writing
• AND in any and all reports, publications,
presentations, etc., role of CIPR and the Dialogue
must be acknowledged as sponsoring institutions;
authors (Nora Lustig and collaborators) must be
acknowledged as author of the CEQ Diagnostic
tool and Index. Nora will send language.
111
CEQ Diagnostics and CEQ Index:
Project Outputs and Intellectual
Property Rights
• CEQ Index reports:
– Regional Report: published and disseminated as “institutional”
outputs (Dialogue and Tulane’s CIPR and national institution in
the case of country reports and CIPR and Dialogue for the
regional report)
– contributions of CEQ’s author (N. Lustig & collaborators), authors
of country CEQ Diagnostics, members of the National Committees
and members of the AB are explicitly acknowledged
– National Report: published and disseminated by local institutions.
Role of CIPR and the Dialogue must be acknowledged as
sponsoring institutions; Nora Lustig & collaborators must be
acknowledged as author of the CEQ Diagnostic tool and Index.
CEQ Steering Committee will provide appropriate language
112
7. Taking Stock of First Stage
114
Taking Stock of First Stage: CEQ
Diagnostics
• Diagnostic exercise turned into a full-fledged
research project that used primary sources of
information such as household surveys and detailed
government accounts. Research time is longer than
was anticipated.
• Diagnostic tool has a much greater potential than
initially anticipated.
=>It serves its own purpose whether accompanied by the
scoring process or not
115
Taking Stock of First Stage: CEQ
Diagnostics
In particular,
• CEQ Diagnostics can be used by governments (executive
and legislative branches) to inform policy and the budget
process
• Multilateral organizations could include it as part of their
diagnostic toolkit to help governments identify strengths
and weaknesses and orient their economic and sector work
• Diagnostic tool useful for teaching and advising
undergraduate and graduate theses (Tulane’s experience)
• Diagnostic tool can be used as a training device for staff in
finance and planning ministries
116
Taking Stock of First Stage: CEQ
Diagnostics
• Based on experience, diagnostic exercise will take
around 9 months
• Peru, de facto, became the “test” case for CEQ
Diagnostics and
– led to substantial revisions of the diagnostic tool and
the method.
– revealed the great limitations of relying on secondary
sources.
=> Peru’s results are not really comparable for this
reason. “Update” will require re-doing a large portion
of the diagnostic
117
Taking Stock of First Stage: CEQ Index
• Scoring process:
–
–
–
–
Confirm if equal weights for each criterion and question is fine
Must choose a method to standardize across countries
Will country scores be reported before or after the standardization?
Must decide if initial scores are provided by author of CEQ
Diagnostic or everyone starts from a clean slate
– Application of CEQ Index to Mexico and Peru shows that, with
current scoring and weighing methods, the (overall) index has little
variation.
• Dissemination:
– Must find language and format to convey results of CEQ Diagnostics
and Index to the wider public (comments by Peter Bell in the Sol
Linowitz Forum). However, it must preserve rigor and be used to
educate the wider public
– Suggestions: CGD’s CDI & Dialogue’s ERC
118
8. Next Steps
119
Presentations by authors of Bolivia,
Costa Rica and Uruguay
• George Gray Molina (Bolivia)
• Maximo Rossi (Uruguay)
• Pablo Sauma (Costa Rica) (via oovoo)
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9. Wrap-up
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Wrap-up : Summing Up Tasks
1. Lustig with Jaramillo, Pessino, Scott (in person and/or
electronically) will complete Diagnostic studies
(previously called technical documents); prepare
publishable versions; design of yearly update
=> PERU will repeat exercise using primary data
2. Lustig with Grey Molina, Rossi and Sauma to set up
Diagnostic studies in Bol, CR and Uru. Questions: send
to NL with copies to MMJ (Mariellen Jewers) & SG
(Samantha Greenspun)
3. Lustig with MMJ and SG Handbook/Mindbook
4. CIPR will present WEB proposal
5. Dialogue will prepare proposal for dissemination
reports of CEQ Index
6. Dialogue will prepare proposal for conference
7. CIPR/Dialogue (Lustig) will convene AB
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