Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting
An Experiment of Accountability in Maharashtra
JAYA GOYAL
Social Audits were carried out to understand people’s perception about the outcomes
of public services in thirty-two flagship schemes of the outcome budget exercise in
Maharashtra. The mandate of the Public Verification Exercise (PVE) was to make
state budgets sensitive to the outcomes that directly affect people’s everyday lives,
especially those in which they encounter state machinery. The paper reveals how the
concepts of social audit were adapted into a PVE jointly conducted by the state
government departments and a public university. The paper discusses the origins of
social audit and recent trends of using social audits as instruments of accountability in
the wake of democratic decentralisation and devolution of powers to local bodies. In
doing so, the paper critically examines two schemes implemented in Maharashtra and
poses more questions on the ongoing debates on the notions of public accountability
itself that differs across stakeholder groups.
Jaya Goyal is a Ph.D Scholar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
INTRODUCTION
The entry of mul ti ple service pro vid ers, both pub lic and pri vate, has raised
con cerns on the qual ity and ris ing costs of services; meet ing di verse needs of
the popu lation, es pe cially the poor, with equity and jus tice. One of the dom i nant dis courses led by the World Bank di ag noses systemic problems that
might ex plain poor ser vice de liv ery on the whole to weak ac count ability
mech a nism that acts as a bar rier to improv ing ser vices across board (World
Development Report, 2004). The principle of public accountability is also
pro moted by two other cat ego ries of ac tors. First, UN (United Na tions)agen cies, such as the United Na tions De velop ment Programme (UNDP), are now
seeking effective government intervention and implementation of
programmes through the bot tom-up ap proach of ac count abil ity. Sec ond,
civil society actors comprising numerous non-governmental (NGOs) and
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
538 Jaya Goyal
peo ple’s move ments are pro vid ing plat forms to the general pub lic to voice
their con cerns and en gage closely with the state to de liver ser vices.
Social audit is one such in strum ent of pub lic ac count abil ity which is gain ing ground, espe cially in the wake of dem o cratic de centralisa tion and de vo lu tion of power and fi nances to panchayats and urban local bod ies. In
Maharashtra, the con cept of so cial audit was used as a Pub lic Ver i fi ca tion
Ex er cise (PVE) across 32 flag ship schemes im ple mented by the State Gov ernm ent from 13 de part ments in 2006–2007. The schemes in cluded ag ricul ture, rural de velopment, public works, hous ing, health and nutrition, child
protection, primary education, social welfare, employment, water and sanita tion, prison and police. While the PVE fitted the bill of a pub lic ac count abil ity in stru ment, there were few on to log i cal as sump tions at the onset that
guided the expecta tions of such a pro cess. First, de mand ing ac count ability
from the sys tem in India is still weak (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). The RTI (the
Right to Infor ma tion) move ment is em pow er ing the cit izens by clos ing the
‘in for ma tion-gap char ac ter is tic’ of gov ern ment func tion ing, who oth er wise
face im mense hur dles to ac quire sim ple doc u ments like land re cords, pen sion dues, min i mum wages and pend ing po lice cases (Viju, 2006). How ever,
despite such positive trends including emphasis on decentralisation, account abil ity is the weak est at the level of panchayats and mu nic i pal bod ies.
Weak ac count abil ity at the local level en cour ages pil fer age of state re sources
and cor rup tion. Sec ond, ac count abil ity of panchayats can not be ex pected
when in reality, the de vo lu tion of pow ers has not taken place. Also, the
elected representatives of panchayats and municipal bodies are accountable,
who do not even know their roles and re spon sibili ties and sig nif i cance of
local self gov ern ment (Vaddiraju and Mehrotra, 2004).
Know ing that such re al i ties were in ci den tal to de cen trali sa tion, an in stru ment like the ‘so cial au dit’ was seen as an an swer to ac count abil ity con cerns
plagu ing all pub lic ser vices. Is sues of au dit ing are rooted in the con cerns of
the poor, their sur vival, and their right to live with dig nity and justice. So cial
audit is claimed to have the po tential for par tic ipa tion of the poor in gover nance by moni tor ing programmes that directly af fect their lives (Nagraj,
2006). This is what makes a social audit rel e vant and even cen tral to the out come bud get ing pro cess. A so cial audit blends citi zens’ vig i lance with gov ernance, transparency with accountability and democratic practice with
democratic institutions. Therefore, it becomes imperative to examine contexts and lo cales where so cial au dits have been im ple mented or ex per i mented with and learn les sons for par tic ipa tory gov er nance.
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 539
This paper is di vided into two parts. The first part dis cusses briefly the
or i gin of the term so cial audit and the meanings it has ac quired as an in stru ment for account abil ity in var i ous contexts. The sec tion also dis cusses the
trends on the use of so cial audit, both as an insti tution al ised mech a nism
within the gov ernm ent, and one by the civil so ciety to im prove ac count ability of vari ous pub lic programmes in India. In the second part, the paper
high lights how social audit was adapted in the out come bud get in
Maharashtra as an experimental PVE. The PVE allowed local communities
di rect in ter face with the state func tion ar ies at local and state level. Finally,
the paper ends with a section on the les sons learned from Maharashtra and
a crit ical analy sis on the po ten tial of so cial audit as an ef fec tive in stru ment
of ac count abil ity in pub lic service de liv ery in India. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to dis cuss and cri tique the the o ret i cal assump tions and con cep tual frame work of ac count abil ity, es pe cially the New Pub lic Man age ment and World Bank’s Good Gov er nance discourse under which so cial
au dits are un der stood.
SOCIAL AUDIT: CONCEPT AND EXPERIENCES
The word ‘audit’ is de rived from the Latin word ‘audire’ which means to
hear (FMSO, 2007). Dur ing the early stages of civili sa tion the account ing
par ties were re quired to pres ent ac counts orally to the au di tor, who heard
the ac counts (Egankosh, 1992). Social audits aim at giv ing a voice to stake holders and, hence, em power them to be heard (ibid).
The or i gin of social audit can be traced to the ‘manage ment’ disci pline.
The con cept was uti lised to im prove the ef fectiveness of com panies and or ganisations. In commerce, the term ‘audit’ means an independent examination and verification of an organisation’s financial statement or other
public reports. Associating ‘social’ with ‘audit’ means that the organisation is account able to and seeks to involve the di rect partic i pation of all its
stakeholders.1
User feedback as a basis for mon itoring and as sess ing ‘pub lic ser vices’, is a rela tively new phe nomenon. As men tioned ear lier, audits
have been con ducted in the busi ness world for a much longer pe riod.
With the ad vent of New Pub lic Man age ment in the 1980s and 1990s, so cial audit found ap pli cations in the so cial and de vel opment sector.
How ever, there are hardly any ex am ples of gov ern ments adopt ing this
approach in developing countries. The few initiatives in developing
coun tries have come from civil soci ety or ganisa tions (Goetz and
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
540 Jaya Goyal
Gaventa, 2001; Paul, 2002). Civil so ciety or gani sations have been ex peri ment ing with audit of ser vice de liv ery, procure ment as well as with
dissemination and follow-up of audit findings and recommendations
through di rect cit i zen and media partici pa tion such as the ‘Cit i zen Re port Card Sys tem’ and par tic i pa tory audit lead ing to the ‘Right to In for ma tion Act’, which have pro duced pos i tive re sults in im proving the
qual ity of pub lic ser vices. (United Na tions, 2007).
Based on the claims made in of fi cial governm ent re cords, the con cept
note on the Outcome Bud get by the Tata In sti tute of So cial Sci ences
(TISS) defines social audit as a pub lic ver i fi cation and as sess ment of out puts and out comes of pro jects. This audit is con ducted by the com mu ni ties
of ben e fi cia ries them selves in their lo cales. (Nagraj, 2006). Al though lim ited in its scope of cov erage and tracks only a frac tion of the total ben e fi cia ries and stake holders, so cial audits are sig nif i cant for their qual i ta tive
anal y sis. The audit pro cess cul mi nates with the adoption of de ci sions or
res o lu tions ap proved for im proved ser vice de liv ery.
So cial audit was first intro duced in India in 1996 by the Mazdoor Kisan
Shakti Sangathana (MKSS), a civil so ciety or gani sation based in
Rajasthan. Focusing on liveli hood is sues, the MKKS used the RTI Act to
institute jan sunwais or pub lic hear ings (Jenkins and Goetz, 2007). The
need for con duct ing so cial au dits grew in re sponse to check ram pant ir reg ularities and corruption in minimum-wage regulations, drought-relief
works, sub sidised food through the Pub lic Distri bution System (PDS) and
to prevent the il legal oc cu pa tion of gov ern ment land by pow erful local in terests (ibid). Jan sunwais en abled peo ple to gain greater un derstand ing
and control over gov ernm ent de vel op ment programmes that tar get them as
main beneficiaries. Public hearings or jan sunwai (in an ideal sit u a tion) is
an inform al gath er ing of peo ple in the vil lage, where all stake holders like
users of ser vices, panchayat mem bers, NGO rep re sen ta tives, local pol i ti cians and government functionaries gather together to scrutinise details of
a public work or a pro ject.
The suc cess and pos itive im pact of the audit pro cess in Rajasthan led to
the institutionalisation of so cial audit in the Na tional Rural Em ploy ment
Guarantee Act, 2005 (NREGA). As per the NREGA guidelines, “so cial
audit is a means of con tinu ous public vig i lance for check ing and ver i fica tion of scheme im plem en tation with ac tive in volvem ent of the pri mary
stakeholders including the government functionaries and the community”
(Ministry of Rural Development, 2005).
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 541
Some of the pa rameters under which a pro ject is mon i tored in a jan
sunwai are quantity and qual ity of works in re la tion to the expenses in curred and dis burse ments made. These include wages, num ber of works
and ma teri als used, selec tion of works and lo cation of work-sites, and so
on. The basic ob jec tive of a social audit is to en sure pub lic account abil ity
in the im ple men ta tion of projects, laws, and pol i cies. The aim is to en sure
the effective implementation of projects and control irregularities (Singh
and Rajakutty, 2007).
So cial au dits can also be un der stood from the way it is re lated or not re lated to other types of au dits. Singh and Rajakutty (2007) have iden ti fied
three kinds of au dits.
1. Formal audits entailing periodic financial reviews are conducted by
institutions and governments. For example, audits conducted by the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India.
2. Facilitated by NGOs, pub lic au dits are con ducted by the ben efi ciaries
them selves. Such au dits have mini mal or no in volve ment of gov ern ment departments.
3. So cial au dits are ‘jointly’ con ducted by all the stake holders, in clud ing
beneficiaries and the government.
However, given the complexity and diversity of social situations, even
so cial au dits are seen to be of two types. The first is an ideal type of so cial
audit, as carried out by Gram Sabhas/Panchayats or local level Vig ilance
and Monitoring Committees (VMCs) as stipu lated by the gov ern ment in
the guide lines of var i ous so cial sec tor programmes. The sec ond, are those
car ried out by civil soci ety groups (CAG, 2010). It is, how ever, not clear in
such a classification, the presence and role of government functionaries
and departments participating in the audits.
While a fi nan cial audit like the one by CAG largely fo cuses on the ques tion of whether the money is spent ap pro priately, so cial audit fo cuses on
es tablishing whether the spend ing made a dif fer ence, that is, the outcome.
In fact, there are three major dif fer ences be tween an in sti tu tional audit and
so cial audit that makes them less com ple men tary to each other. First, in sti tu tional au dits are pas sive in na ture, and do not involve a two-way di a logue
pro cess be tween the stake holders and the gov ern ment. Sec ond ‘so cial’ as pect is in herent in most public de vel op ment programmes, but in sti tu tional
au dits seem only to focus on the eco nom ics and ef ficiency of funds while
ne glect ing the so cial im pact or ef fectiveness of the money spent, that
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
542 Jaya Goyal
di rectly im pacts peo ple (Singh and Rajakutty, 2007). Fi nally, audit of local
self gov ern ment in stitu tions is a state sub ject, and the ex ternal audit of
Panchayati Raj In stitu tions (PRI) and Urban Local Bod ies (ULBs) is with
the State Local Funds Audit De partm ent (LFAD), or with the des ignated
au ditors as spec i fied in the state laws, with an ex cep tion for West Bengal,
Bihar and Jharkhand. In such a scenario the CAG cannot audit the func tioning of local self gov ernm ents like PRIs and ULBs (CAG, 2010).
In addition, formal mechanisms of auditing and monitoring like the one
by CAG mech a nisms are quite divorced from the peo ple and have failed to
be a part of the pub lic dom ain (Nagraj, 2006). Also, judging by the im pact of
the CAG audit re ports or per for mance bud get ing of state gov ern ments, they
have proved inef fec tive in im prov ing the managem ent of public funds by the
government (Jo seph, 1986). Most audits are car ried out by NGOs. These fall
under ‘pub lic au dit’ rather than so cial audit as in most of the cases, there is
no participation of the government. The government departments come into
the pic ture only when the find ings are to be shared. For ex ample, social audit
was claimed to be used by SEARCH, a Gadchiroli based NGO, to trig ger
better reporting and corrective administration towards reducing child mortal ity (Bang, Reddy and Deshmukh, 2002). It re sem bled a par tic i pa tory eval uation of the Mon i toring and In for ma tion Sys tem (MIS) rather than an audit.
Many such in terven tions claim to be a form of social audit, but are more
evaluation surveys done by NGOs involv ing local people.
An other NGO, Anchalik Vikas Samiti, conducted a social audit to
streamline the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) programme
in the Bolangir dis trict of Orissa (ADHAR, 2007). The audit met with fair
suc cess by way of generat ing aware ness among the locals about their
entitlements and presenting the gross irregularities in the administration of
the scheme to the Dis trict Col lec tor. In 2008, 42 jan sunwais were held as a
part of community based monitoring (CBM) of health services under the
Na tional Rural Health Mis sion (NRHM) in Maharashtra (Kakde, 2010).
The ex er cise that cov ered five large dis tricts, was largely fa cil i tated by var i ous NGOs and by 2011, it was ex tended to eight more dis tricts in the state.
One of the inter esting findings was that most panchayats in Maharashtra do
not see health ser vices as their man date. How ever, SATHI, the NGO that
led the so cial audit pro cess, re ported a change in attitudes of func tion aries
and improved dialogue with locals. The community also experienced an
im proved sense of own ership of public health services, as well as in creased
women participation (ibid).
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 543
With var ied ex pe ri ences of so cial au dits across states and sec tors, ev i dence shows that effectiveness of community monitoring of public
programmes in develop ing countries has been con flict ing (Afridi, 2008).
When financial irregularities come to surface during the audit process and
er ring offi cials do not face disci plin ary ac tion or other sanc tions, then the
pur pose of the ex er cise is re duced to fact or fault finding, which by it self,
may not re sult in re duc ing corrup tion or im prov ing ser vices.
Social audit has been institutionalised into the government’s monitoring
mech a nisms in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. Lim ited ev i dence on so cial
au dits in spe cific states show that it has made de livery of pub lic
programmes like Na tional Rural Em ploy ment Guaran tee Scheme
(NREGS) more ef fec tive (Aakella and Kidambi, 2007). By def i ni tion, a
so cial audit is carried out by the com mu nity of stake holders like the bene fi ciaries/participants, representatives from implementing agencies, gram
panchayat rep resen tatives, and so on. In prac tice, formation of such an
ideal group may not be possi ble. So, an audit group may include rep re sen tatives of beneficiaries, self-help groups (SHGs), village level or ganisa tions, local/community leaders, youth clubs, marginalised sections like
sched uled castes, sched uled tribes, and women. For ex ample, VMCs
formed under NREGS in Rajasthan comprise beneficiaries, social workers,
re tired pro fessionals, teachers, and so on. In Andhra Pradesh, ed u cated un em ployed youth are trained as village social audi tors (VSAs) to help fa cili tate social au dits (ibid). So cial audits in some states like Maharashtra and
Andhra Pradesh, have been con ducted ei ther by civil so ci ety or through an
institutionalised mechanism in national programmes like the NRHM, the
Mid-Day Meal scheme (MDM), PDS, Sarva Siksha Abhyan (SSA), ICDS
and Indira Awas Yojana (IAY).
The ex peri ence of the out come bud get ex er cise in Maharashtra using so cial audit in the form of PVE is an op por tu nity in ret ro spect to com pare re cent and past ex pe ri ences of so cial au dits else where in the coun try in terms
of their determinants, contexts, commonalities and differences on larger issues of public accountability and participatory governance. In 2006, as a
part of the out come budget ex er cise, the De partm ent of Fi nance (DoF),
Govern ment of Maharashtra (GoM), and TISS col lab o rated to un der take a
PVE for 32 flagship programmes across 12 govern ment de part ments in
few dis tricts of Maharashtra to get the pulse of the ser vice de liv ery; im plemen ta tion chal lenges; fail ures; and also best prac tices in spite of many
odds. It was a downscaled ver sion of so cial audit, al most like a hy brid form
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
544 Jaya Goyal
of accountability mechanism that involved respective government departments and their field function ar ies, an ac a demic in stitu tion, and the ben e fi ciaries.
PUBLIC VERIFICATION EXERCISE: AN EXPERIMENT IN
MAHARASHTRA
In simple terms, a PVE is an audit con ducted under the open sky as op posed to one in a closed room, and the au di tors are not a select group of
technical (largely fi nan cial) experts, but the com mu nity of in tended bene fi cia ries them selves (Nagraj, 2006). At the very min i mum, the PVE is an
as sess ment of the programme out comes by the ben e fi cia ries against the
claims made in of ficial or governm ent re cords. Like so cial audit, a PVE es sen tially in volves shar ing with the com mu nity all the in for ma tion (fi nancial, tech ni cal and per form ance) pertaining to the pro ject and en gag ing in a
pub lic as sess ment of that scheme.
A PVE is aimed at yield ing signif i cant in sights and in for ma tion re garding the de liv ery of the schemes in the state. If a pub lic ser vice is not reach ing the peo ple ef fec tively, then such an ex er cise of fers mid-term
cor rections to im prove ser vice de liv ery in stantly. It is also aimed at iden ti fying and objectively understanding regional commonalities, contrasts and
stark vari a tions on scheme per for mance in urban, rural and tribal set tings.
In addition, the PVE yields infor mation covering only a frac tion of the total
community of beneficiaries, but its qualitative depth is significant. The
audit pro cess cul mi nates with adopt ing de ci sions or res o lu tions for im proved service deliv ery. To this ex tent, a PVE com plem ents a wider but
more quan ti tative as sess ment of a scheme or programme through a large
scale sur vey. Al though, limited in its reach, a PVE is nev er the less a first
step in mov ing to wards a more peo ple ori en tated, re spon sive and trans par ent process of preparing, monitoring and evaluating budgets and their outcomes. Owing to these char ac ter is tic rea sons, a PVE is termed as an
ex per i ment and not strictly a so cial audit ex er cise.
The Process of PVE
The PVE was a joint exer cise involv ing all the stake holders—gov ern ment
function ar ies from each of the 12 de part ments2, the ben e fi cia ries of ser vices and TISS, which acted as a fa cil i ta tor in this pro cess. Twelve task
forces, each com prising 20–25, were created from 12 par tici pat ing de part ments. Each task force led by their re spec tive de part ment sec re tary was
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 545
composed of commissioners, directors, administrative staff, and mid and
field level of fi cers. An Out come Bud get Cell led by the Sec re tary of Fi nance was in sti tuted within the DoF for coordinating activities with other
departments and TISS.3 The TISS team com prised fac ulty and re search ers.
A broad framework outlining the process of conceptualising, planning,
initiating and completing a social audit was developed in consultation with
the con cerned departm ents. The var i ous steps in volved are listed below:
• Preparing a calendar of dates for conducting a PVE for each of the 32
schemes.
• Conducting workshops with the respective department task forces
delineating the objectives, purpose, process, coverage, sampling and
survey tools of the social audit process and the PVE.
• Selecting the locale—districts, blocks and villages for the PVE. The
districts were selected through purposive sampling by utilising
government data available on performance indicators of a scheme
and arriving at a poor performing district and a good performing
district in Maharashtra.
• Creating PVE teams constituting members from the task forces and
TISS researchers.
• Conducting initial field visits and discussions with beneficiaries of
the selected sites.
• Initiating the process and convening the forum for PVE in the
selected sites.
• Workshops on sharing results of the PVE with stakeholders.
• Using PVE results and recommendations to make mid-term
corrections in budgets, policy or programmes.
These steps briefly de lin eate the en tire pro cess of plan ning and con duct ing the PVE. This ex er cise was con ducted be tween De cem ber 2006 to Feb ru ary 2007. To help illus trate the process and find ings of the PVE in the
Maharashtra Outcome Budget, two significant schemes implemented by
the GoM in most dis tricts of the state are pre sented here as case stud ies.
These case stud ies are fol lowed by a critique and dis cus sion on so cial audit
as a tool for im prov ing the out come ef fec tive ness of pub lic programmes
and les sons learnt from the Maharashtra outcome budget ex pe rience on its
scalability and replicability in other con texts. These schemes are the Em ploy ment Pro mo tion Programme, and the Total San i ta tion Cam paign. The
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
546 Jaya Goyal
data presented in this section is ac cessed from the un pub lished
Maharashtra Out come Bud get Report 2007–2008, except where other
sources are stated.
Case Study 1: Employment Promotion Programme
The Em ploy ment Pro mo tion Programme (EPP) scheme is a 100 per cent
state spon sored scheme by the De partm ent of Em ploy ment and Self Em ploy ment (GoM). The scheme falls under the bud get head of Em ploy ment,
Market Infor ma tion and Youth Em ploy ment Ser vice with an an nual bud get of Ru pees 12.07 crores in 2007–2008. The main objec tive of the
scheme is to as sist ed ucated unem ployed youth in the state to ac quire and
ad vance their skills, and ap ti tude, by pro vid ing them on-the-job train ing in
private sector establishments and public sector undertakings. The scheme
en cour ages the youth to change their con ven tional mind-sets and take up
operatives or shop floor jobs, rather than looking for only white col lar jobs.
Till 2005–2006, the scheme provided jobs to more than 8,400 youths.
The el i gi bil ity cri te ria for avail ing this scheme re quires the youth to be un employed and above eigh teen years of age, a do mi cile of Maharashtra;
passed at least the Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSC); and
reg istered with the Em ploy ment Exchanges of the gov ern ment. The
scheme is op erated from the Dis trict Em ploy ment and Self Em ploy ment
Guidance Centre comprising 35 divisions and district offices, including
two of fices in Mumbai. The data on the fi nan cial and out come per formance of the scheme is tab u lated in Table 1. The per cent age of can di dates
se lected for EPP train ing against the va cant po si tions reg is tered by the em ployer with the em ploy ment ex changes has re mained close to 50 per cent
for the last four years ,that is, from 2002–2003 till 2005–2006. It means
that about 50 per cent of the va cant po si tions were not filled, even though
there were dou ble the num ber of can didates reg istered. A sec ond vis i ble
trend is the per cent age of can di dates who suc cess fully com pleted the train ing have been in creasing, from 67.3 per cent in 2002–2003 to 73.6 per cent
in 2005–2006. This means, that, even though there is an im prove ment in
the scheme output, there is yet a high drop out of can di dates who regis ter at
these ex changes, start the train ing, but do not com plete it. These ob servations were noted dur ing the plan ning phase of the PVE. A decision was
taken to probe fur ther with the candidates, em ploy ers and offi cials of the
EPP programme.
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 547
The key out come of the EPP scheme in terms of the per cent age of can di dates who success fully com pleted train ing and got gain ful em ploy ment,
mar gin ally increased from 16.2 per cent in 1996–2097 to 26.7 per cent in
2001–2002, but again fell to18.9 per cent in 2005–2006. It shows that the
scheme is largely in ef fec tive in plac ing the unem ployed youth in gain ful
em ploy ment. The PVE used this infor ma tion to seek ex plana tions for que ries on the inability of can di dates to com plete train ing; road blocks encoun tered; and re medial measures sug gested by stake holders.
The dis tricts, com pa nies and can di dates se lected for the PVE are listed
in Table 2. Ac cording to the de part ment of fi cials, Thane was a better per form ing dis trict, while Bhandara was weak on scheme im ple men ta tion.
Four organisa tions from Thane Dis trict and two or gani sations from
Bhandara dis trict, who reg u larly em ployed can di dates reg is tered with Em ploy ment Ex changes agreed to partic i pate in the PVE. Among a total of 64
can di dates, who were part of the PVE ex er cise, ma jor ity had passed the
Higher Sec ond ary Cer tif i cate (HSC) with lit tle or no ex pe ri ence, while the
re maining were equipped with an ITI di ploma. The train ing was for a du ra tion of six months with no un der tak ing signed or a guar an tee that the
trainee would get ab sorbed in the com pany. The train ees’ stipend ranged
from Rupees 2,200–3,500 per month, and var ied from em ployer to em ployer. Training was im parted for low skilled to semi-skilled jobs, usu ally
re quired for shop floors. These in cluded train ing for pack ag ing and bun dling of goods; and training for assistance in operating manufacturing machines, tools, and equipments.
The ob servations and findings of the PVE can help the de part ment to in tro spect on its pol i cies and budgets. The main mo ti vation for em ploy ers to
em ploy EPP can di dates was to ful fil the com pany’s require ment, while
discharging minimum obligations. Considering the occupational risks involved, most employers provided the candidates with accident insurance
cover. In ad dition, they also claimed to have pro vided free trans port, ar ranged for over time pay ment and free pri mary med i cal fa cil i ties. How ever,
the can di dates were not en ti tled to any leave, which had im pli cations on
their sal ary being cut in lieu of any ab sence. The train ees seemed to be sat is fied with the qual ity of train ing pro vided, but felt that the du ration of
train ing could be extended to more than six months. Nev erthe less, most
candidates were unsatisfied with the employment conditions like low stipend, expect in Bhandara where they reported con tent ment with their sti pend.
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 549
TABLE 2: Sampling of EPP for the PVE, Maharashtra 2007-2008
Division and
and
Districts
Name of the
of Industry/
the
Industry/
Employment Exchanges
Visited for PVEfor
PVE
Division-Thane
Clariant Chemicals (India) Ltd.,
Kholse Road, Thane
10
10
District-Thane
Caprihans India Limited, Wagle
Industrial Estate, Thane
12
12
Mukund Ltd., Thane-Belapur
Road
07
Employment and Self-Employment
Self-Employment
Centre, Thane
Centre, Thane
13
Division-Nagpur
Division-Nagpur
Ashok Leyland Ltd., Bhandara
Ashok Leyland Ltd., Bhandara
08
08
District-Bhandara
District-Bhandara
Employment and Self-Employment
Employment and Self-Employment
Centre, Bhandara
14
14
Total
2 Districts
Centre, Bhandara
6 Organisations
64 Candidates
Total
2 Districts
6 Organisations
64 Candidates
Sl.
No.
I.
II.
II.
Number of
Candidates
Candidates
Interviewed
Interviewed
Source: Outcome Budget Maharashtra Report, 2006-2007.
As pointed out earlier, the gap be tween the num ber of candi dates reg is tered with the em ploy ment ex changes (1,03,046 in 2005-2006), outweighs
the reg istered vacant po si tions (15,896 in 2005-2006). However, the ac tual num ber of can di dates who join the train ing cover just about half (8,456
in 2005-2006) of the reg is tered vacan cies. This means that de spite a high
registration of unemployed candidates, the demand for jobs (measured by
the num ber of can didates who fill up the regis tered va cancies) is low as
com pared to the sup ply of jobs (measured by the reg is tered va cancies).
There is a clear mis match be tween the na ture of man power skills avail able,
and the specific de mands of the indus try needing train ees. This fact can be
ex plained better with the ex am ple of candi dates seek ing blue-col lared jobs
in BPOs, in surance, market ing, trad ing or ex port firms. If the va cancies
listed in the em ploy ment ex change do not match their prefer ence, the can di dates do not apply and con tinue to search for other options. This anom aly
was re vealed during the PVE as it was found that the com pa nies which
were reg is tered with the em ploy ment ex changes were largely from the
manufacturing sector.
IJSW, 72(4), 537-562, October 2011
550 Jaya Goyal
There fore, one of the im por tant les sons that emerged for the con cerned de part ment spon sor ing the EPP scheme was to en gage in pol icy that could cre ate
an em ploy ment de mand in sec tors like food grain processing; hor ti cul ture and
flori culture; wood and wood prod ucts in cluding paper pulp; leather and tan ning industry; transport; communication; hospitality; real estate, healthcare,
bank ing and in sur ance; and re tail trades. These sectors have dem on strated
high potential for labour absorption and income generation opportunities.
Reg u lar ‘skill-map ping’ of can di dates was seen as a nec es sary de part men tal in ter ven tion to bridge the gap between dem and and sup ply. One of
the em ploy ers shared the ben e fits of using the map ping pro ce dure dur ing
in terviews and final se lec tion of candi dates. Through skill-map ping, the
apparent competencies and aptitude of the candidates was matched with
the avail able man power re quire ments for a par tic u lar de part ment of the in dus try. The ad van tage of the map ping pro cedure is that both candi dates
and the em ployer can get the op ti mum learn ing and output from the train ing pro cess. The de part ment should consider aggressive publicisation of
employment exchanges via regional and national television channels.
Also, the web based soft ware needs to be con tin uously upgraded with cur rent avail able tech nol o gies to make it more competitive with private
portals like Naukri.com or Jobsahead.com.
Low sti pends and no guar an tee of ab sorp tion within the com pany after
completion of training have de terred youth from taking up train ing offers.
The PVE gave valu able in formation on the effectiveness of the EPP
scheme in terms of ac tual out comes, cal cu lated as the per cent age of can di dates com pleting the train ing and get ting gain fully em ployed ei ther in the
same com pany or elsewhere. By providing trained la bour, the EPP scheme
has the po ten tial to drive growth not only in the large scale man ufacturing
in dus try, but also in small and me dium scale in dus tries, cot tage in dus tries
and the ter tiary sec tor.
Case Study 2: Total Sanitation Campaign
The Total San i tation Programme (TSC), a sig nif i cant flag ship programme
of the Gov ern ment of India (GoI) as pires to pre vent open defe ca tion by ac celerating sanitation coverage in rural areas. The TSC, with an outlay of
Rs.13,423.97 crores (US$ 3.35 bil lion), com prises the con tribu tions made
by the Centre, the State and the com mu nity in the ratio of 60:20:20 re spec tively. This scheme is op er a tional in 578 out of 600 rural dis tricts
(UNICEF India, 2008).
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 551
With increasing emphasis on community involvement and partnership
in pub lic programmes, Maharashtra has been the front-runner in the Com mu nity led Total Sani ta tion (CLTS) ap proach since 2002. Mahatashtra ac com plished a feat in 2006, when its two pilot blocks—Mahabaleshwar in
Satara District, and Murud in Raigad Dis trict were de clared Open Def e ca tion Free (ODF) blocks (Kar and Bongartz, 2006). In 2006, the GoI
awarded the Nirmal Gram Puruskar to 770 Gram Panchayats (GP), of
which 381 were awarded to Maharashtra alone (ibid). Al though, a lot re mains to be done to achieve total ODF panchayats, Maharashtra has shown
the way with the high est num ber of ODF GPs.
Prior to the in troduction of the CLTS, the quality of san i tation in
Maharashtra was poor. Ac cord ing to the World Health Survey (2003), 73
per cent of house holds in Maharashtra did not have any ac cess to san i ta tion
fa cil i ties (SATHI, 2008). As per the data gath ered from an eco nomic sur vey of Maharashtra con ducted in 2010–2011, 60 per cent of rural house holds in Maharashtra and 8 per cent urban households had no ac cess to
toi let facil i ties available to them. Women, ad o les cent girls and chil dren are
the worst hit as man i fested in a vi cious cycle of dis eases, ill ness, mal nu tri tion and poverty. The situ ation is not much dif ferent in other parts of the
coun try. This means, that even as India reg isters a fair growth in GDP
(Gross Dom estic Prod uct), a vast major ity of her peo ple liv ing in rural
areas have no ac cess to proper san i ta tion fa cil i ties.
One of the tar gets of The Millen nium De velop ment Goals (MDG) for
improving san i tation in both rural and urban areas in India is to halve, by
2015, the pro por tion of peo ple without sus tain able ac cess to safe drink ing
water and basic sanitation. Eradicating the practice of open defecation by
2012, and to mini mise the risk of con tamination of drink ing water sources
and food is an other target to be achieved. Con sid ering the ex ist ing ground
realities, only an outcome-focused imple men ta tion of the scheme can con tribute to the realisation of the goals, and to the over all so cio eco nomic de vel op ment of the states and the coun try.
The de sign of the scheme informs the ob jec tives for achiev ing the goals.
The scheme cov ers con struct ing toilets and priv ies for all rural house holds.
While sub si dies are pro vided for BPL households, pri or ity is given to APL
house holds. The scheme also cov ers pri mary schools and anganwadi cen tres in rural areas. Pro mot ing hy giene and san i tary habits among students
and the gen eral pop ulation is an ob jec tive achieved by way of creat ing
awareness and health education.
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
552 Jaya Goyal
The De partm ent of Water Sup ply and Sani tation, GoM had al lo cated Ru pees 28.8 crores from its An nual Bud get towards the TSC. While the state
sub sidy for the con struc tion of toi lets for BPL households is shared between
the State and the Cen tre, there is no sub sidy for APL house holds. Of the total
92.9 lakh toi lets con structed, ap proxi mately 32 lakh toi lets were for BPL
households, while 60.8 lakh toi lets were built for APL house holds (TISS,
2007). Sub sidy kills col lec tive com mu nity ac tion (Kar and Bongartz, 2006).
The high state sub si dies could be a factor inhib it ing BPL households from
acquiring sanitation facilities.
Additionally, 72,782 toilets were constructed in government
schools, 50,433 toi lets in anganwadis and 2,723 toi lets in com mu nity
complexes.
In con sul tation with the de part ment task force, the PVE was initiated
with a clear dis tinction being made be tween the out put and out come in di ca tors. 115.9 per cent of the funds were dis bursed for uti li sation in
2005–2006 (Table 3). This fig ure can not be used as a yardstick to as sess
fair or poor out come of the scheme im ple men tation. In stead, in di ca tors
like percentage of uncovered households; or percentage reduction in
water borne dis eases in vil lages cov ered by TSC, or num ber of vil lages
that have at tained open def e cation free status could as sess how the
scheme faired on ac tual out comes. While the de part ment had data for
some in di ca tors listed in the table, for data like water borne dis eases, es tab lish ing for mal convergences with the De part ment of Health (DoH)
was recommended.
Workshops were con ducted for the task force from the Departm ent of
Water Sup ply and San i ta tion and the TISS team to iden tify the dis tricts and
blocks for the PVE. Tools like Logframe Anal y sis were used to pri ori tise
the road blocks perceived by the ac tors (both gov ernm ent func tion ar ies and
vil lag ers as ben e fi cia ries); match the ob jec tives of the scheme in view of
the cur rent sta tus; dis tin guish be tween out puts and out comes and link these
with in di ca tors and strate gies of achiev ing the goals. As per the feed back
and sugges tions from the task force, four dis tricts were se lected for the
PVE, namely – two poor per forming districts (Jalgaon and Chandrapur)
and two best performing districts (Jalna and Satara) on the basis of out come in di ca tors like the ODF sta tus. The 4-6 blocks or vil lages se lected are
listed in Table 4.
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 553
TABLE 3: Distinction between Output and Outcome Indicators for TSC in
Maharashtra
Sl.
No.
No.
Output Indicators
Maharashtra
Maharashtra
1
2004–0205
(in percent)
2005–2006
2005–2006
(in percent)
1.
Percentage ofofvillages
villages
in 1HHL
which 1HHL 2.7
in which
installations are done for BPL families
7.81
2.
Percentage ofofvillages
villages
in which
in which
1HHL 1HHL 4.37
installations are done for APL families
11.43
3.
Percentage of utilisation
of utilisation
of funds of
disbursed
54.98
115.91
4.
Percentage of sanitation in schools
9.02
20.85
5.
Percentage of balwadi
of
toilets
balwadi
3.41
18.38
6.
Percentage of uncovered
of uncovered
households
households 65.39
(TSC)
(2001-2007)
7.
Percentage utilisation of IEC funds
funds
8.
Number ofofvillages
villages
that that
have have
attained
attained 13 villages
villages
‘open defecation free’ status/Number
of villages that have recieved the
Nirmal Gram Puraskar
9.
Percentage of covered households
(APL and BPL)
funds
toilets
10. Number
Number of of
uncovered
uncovered
household
household
(Census)
-
5.92
3.69
3.83%
381 villages
10.18
Total percent of
Total percent of
households
households
covered till now
covered till now
= 43.25 percent
= 43.25 percent
62.39 lakhs
(2001-2007
-
Source: TISS-Department of Finance, Maharashtra Outcome Budget Report, 2007-2008.
The PVE en tailed in terac tion with a large num ber of ac tors and organi sa tions. These in cluded 14 mem bers of the TSC, who im plem ented the
scheme at the vil lage level; 3 CEOs (Chief Ex ec u tive Of fi cers) and dep uty
CEOs from the selected districts; 39 personnel belonging to participating
NGOs, 4 sarpanches and 675 users from var i ous ben e ficiary households in
villages.
IJSW, 72(4), 537-562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 555
Data showed that Mahabaleshwar block of Satara Dis trict had achieved
100 percent sanitation coverage for individual households and schools, and
was de clared as an ODF block. In rec og ni tion of the clean envi ron ment and
the benchmarks achieved, the GoI awarded the Nirmal Gram Puruskar to
the Mahabaleshwar block in 2006. While four blocks in Jalna and three
blocks in Satara had achieved results close to this bench mark, the other two
dis tricts were found to be lag ging behind.
There were two key de ter mi nants for the suc cess of the TSC in Jalna and
Satara dis tricts. First, a proactive local level lead er ship com pris ing CEOs
and deputy CEOs of dis tricts, ICDS su per vi sors, in di vid u als of local re li gious groups and for mer mil i tary of fi cers in stru mental in the achieve ment
of the ODF sta tus took keen inter est in the im ple men ta tion of the scheme.
De mands for construc tion of toi lets not only in their homes, but also in
schools, anganwadis and at the com mu nity level, were made by var i ous
women’s groups. Higher level of fe male liter acy and women em pow er ment in these districts has led to the cre ation of strong women’s groups.
The suc cessful or gani sation of the com mu nity is a re sult of the gov ernm ent
led Infor ma tion Ed ucation Communication (IEC) cam paign, and the local ised Sant Gadge Baba cam paign on san i ta tion.
Sec ond, the high convergence of the DoH in these dis tricts, helped to
track the in ci dence of water borne and com mu ni ca ble dis eases among its
pop u la tion, prior to the ODF and post ODF phases of TSC im ple men ta tion.
The DoH reported con siderable re duc tion in dis eases after the vil lages
achieved ODF sta tus. Strict mon i toring of the scheme en cour aged gov ernment functionaries to improve implementation of the TSC. The positive
impact of the scheme was vis i ble to the vil lage com mu nity, motivating all
residents to demand better sanitation facilities. In addition, these districts
cre ated websites and updated data on var i ous as pects of the scheme. Open
and transparent communication of information aided the smooth flow of
fund ing to these dis tricts.
The situ a tion was ex actly the op po site in the other two dis tricts of
Jalgaon and Chandrapur, where the TSC implementation was poor. The
vil lages in the se lected blocks were far from achiev ing the ODF sta tus. The
CEOs were ei ther in differ ent, or did not con sider san i ta tion as a cru cial
sec tor for pri ority, which re sulted in demor alisa tion of the frontline func tionar ies. Women in these dis tricts were not em pow ered enough to par tici pate in the de mand for san i ta tion ser vices. The de velopment quotient and
community partic i pa tion was found to be low in these districts. As
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
556 Jaya Goyal
community latrines were not cleaned, they were not used. Lack of sus tained cam paigns was an other lim iting factor. In abil ity of the Zilla
Parishads to fill in the va cancies for the con tract posts was an adm in is tra tive failure, contributing towards weak implementation of the scheme.
Conver gence with other de partm ents, such as Health and Edu cation, and
other water re lated schemes like the Jalswarajya was found to be miss ing
in these dis tricts.
LESSONS FROM MAHARASHTRA
So cial audit, in the form of a PVE jointly con ducted by state de part ments
and a uni ver sity, was one of Maharashtra’s ini tial at tempts at pub lic ac count abil ity. The ex er cise re sulted in bridg ing the di a logue void be tween
local stake holders and users in the vil lages and the gov ernm ent func tion ar ies to gether with civil so ci ety or gani sa tions. This re sulted in ac curate diagno sis of the roadblocks to effi cient adm in is tra tion of ser vices, and the
re struc tur ing of the scheme. Rather than chase fi nan cial and phys i cal tar gets, the re struc tured scheme was peo ple-centric and out come-fo cused.
Iden ti fy ing and re cog nis ing the rea sons for suc cess of the schemes,
rather than fault find ing was the USP of the PVE in Maharashtra. Even
though, Jalna and Satara, were se lected through pur pos ive sam pling as dis tricts with better cov erage of san itation, and Jalgaon and Chandrapur as
districts with inefficient implementation of the scheme, the PVE identified
local lead er ship and women’s em pow er ment as cru cial de ter mi nants of su pe rior outcomes. This find ing helped the de part ment to ‘bench mark’ both
the out puts and out comes of the scheme as of achievable stan dards and cite
it as a role model for other lag ging dis tricts in the State.
The na ture of the PVE, how ever, rem ained top-down, as it was planned
and exe cuted by gov ern ment task forces and an ac a demic insti tu tion. In volve ment of the stakeholders or users was lim ited to field dis cus sions,
meet ings or in ter views. Al though, the task forces were in volved in planning
the audit exercise in terms of its cov er age, scope, sam pling and so on, only a
limited number of government functionaries accompanied the PVE teams
from TISS. As this was an tici pated, the work shops con ducted with the 12
de part ment task forces were termed as a pub lic ver i fi ca tion ex er cise and not
a so cial audit. The PVE teams did a fair anal y sis of data and gained a re al is tic
understand ing of the im ple men ta tion of the scheme on the ground. The per ceptions of the gov ern ment func tion ar ies were also ob tained. This in forma tion was taken to the local stake holders for feed back and sug gestions. The
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 557
final findings were communicated to the senior political leadership of the
state—the Fi nance Min is ter of Maharashtra at the Cab i net level, and the
Min is ters and the Prin ci pal Sec re tar ies of the var i ous De part ments. The Sec re tary of Fi nance, and the Out come Bud get Cell of the DoF, Mantralaya, was
the hub for all in ter face be tween TISS and the GoM.
Senior politicians and bureaucrats expressed great interest in the findings of the PVE, as it was per ceived to be a re port card for state pol i cies and
gov er nance. Much of the findings from vari ous schemes were accepted by
the respective departments, amid critical comments and clarifications.
Many de part ments with proactive sec re taries, such as those be long ing to
the Pris ons (Home De partm ent), Health, Tribal De vel op ment, and Em ployment and Self Employment departments, incorporated many of the
recommendations listed in the report. This direct advocacy for implementa tion of pol icy was a strength of the PVE and the Out come Bud get ex er cise. It is also true, how ever, that the scope of the PVE was not to find
fi nan cial ir reg ulari ties in the fund flow of the scheme or to stage con fron ta tions be tween local stake holders and gov ernm ent func tion ar ies on cor rup tion. The mandate of the PVE was to make state bud gets sensi tive to the
out comes that di rectly af fect peo ple’s ev ery day lives, es pe cially those in
which they en coun ter the state ma chin ery, such as the po lice, road works,
water, hous ing, health cen tres, and so on.
Sim i lar au dits can be rep li cated in other In dian states. The re spec tive de partm ents will need to de fine the cov er age, sam pling, fre quency, sur vey
tools and se lect a part ner agency for con ducting a so cial audit or a PVE.
Consid ering the scale, human and fi nan cial resources required to con duct a
PVE, such an ac tivity should be re peated only after a gap of three years.
More over, a PVE is also de pendent on the nature of the scheme im ple mented, as some schemes prom ise out puts and out comes only after a cer tain pe riod of time.
REFLECTIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD
Di rect ac count abil ity of the state to its peo ple has taken cen tre-stage today.
This is re flected in the first jansunwais held in the villages of Rajasthan in
the 1990s, the en act ment of the RTI Act and more re cently, the Jan Lokpal
movement.
The GoI and the coun try’s su preme audit insti tu tion, the CAG, have
real ised the sig nif i cant con tri bu tion of var i ous so cial audit groups in en sur ing ac count abil ity of the programme man ag ers and im ple ment ing
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
558 Jaya Goyal
agencies. The GoI has embedded social audits (village level monitoring,
committees/vigilance committees) in almost all its flagship social sector
programmes, such as NREGS, ARWSP, NRHM, MDM, and so on (CAG,
2010). In the pres ent neo-lib eral contexts, in which the Indian govern ment
is functioning, the state is increasingly entrusting implementation of various so cio eco nomic de vel op ment schemes to au ton o mous agen cies or so ci et ies, PRIs/ULBs, many of whom are either quasi-govern men tal or NGOs,
or even pri vate play ers. In such a sce nario, account abil ity to the users of the
services assumes all importance.
Even with high lev els of con sensus on making ac count abil ity functional
through numerous instruments, there are many fundamental unanswered
questions. Scholars are arguing whether local government institutions like
the PRIs/ULBs and their organisations like PHCs, schools, PDS ra tion
shops, po lice sta tions, and so on, are to be ac countable to their cre ator, that
is, the State or to the peo ple or both? For ex am ple, M. A Oommen ar gues
that the scope of ac count ability of panchayats is not only limited to for mal
and ex ternal gov ern ment audit, but also to gram sabhas through social au dits (Oommen, 2009). Datta strongly re buts this point and argues that so cial ac count abil ity of panchayats to gram sabhas needs to first become a
reality through state legislation after actual devolution of finances and
functions have taken place (Datta, 2009). In most states, in clud ing
Maharashtra, panchayats func tion poorly in an en vi ron ment of lim ited de volution of pow ers and lack of ca pac i ties and autonomy.4 According to
Datta, panchayats are pri mar ily ac count able to its cre ator, which is the
state government, in the vertical accountability framework.
Multiple understandings and perceptions of accountability co-exist
among various actors in government, civil society, international agencies
and the pub lic or users. Nev erthe less, so cial audits or PVE are one among
many mechanisms of accountability in public service delivery. When integrated in the larger frame work of out come budgets, it has a po ten tial for
being a powerful mechanism of planning, implementation and monitoring
as sess ment for the govern ment on the one hand, and a po tent tool to de mand better gov ernance for the peo ple on the other.
NOTES
1.
Zadek and Evans (1993) defined social audit as “…a process of defining, observing
and reporting measures of an organisational ethical behavior and social impact against
IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011
Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 559
its objectives with the participation of its stakeholders and the wider community.”
(Fraser and Hill, 2000).
2.
The departments that participated in the Maharashtra Outcome Budget exercise were:
Public Works, Housing, Home, Public Health, School Education, Social Justice,
Women and Child Development, Agriculture, Employment and Self Employment,
Tribal Development, Rural Development, and Water Supply and Sanitation.
3.
A GR was passed by the Government of Maharashtra on March 6, 2006 which
officiated all activities on the outcome budget. It meant that outcome budget became a
special commitment of the State Government with its own resolution, funding and
personnel. In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between
the Department of Finance, Government of Maharashtra and TISS which listed down
the roles and responsibilities of both the parities together with mutually agreed
activities,timelines and meeting schedules.
4.
Karnataka is the only state (barring Sikkim) which has devolved all these 29 subjects
to panchayat raj bodies, according to a recent evaluation report of the government of
India (Ghorpade. 2002).
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