Richard P. Bagozzi & David J. Moore
Public Service Advertisements:
Emotions and Empathy Gimle
Prosocial Behavior
The authors develop and test a theory of how public service advertisements function to induce helping responses.
Building on Lazarus's general theory of emotion and adaptation, they hypothesize that public service ads designed
to reduce the incidence of child abuse stimulate negative emotions; these, in turn, lead to empathic reactions and
end with the decision to help. Two field experiments are conducted to test the theory.
P
ublic so^ce ads (PSAs) are an in^itant part of social
mariceting (e.g., Aodteasen 1993; Hiisdunan 1991)
and each year mote than $4 billion are spent on them in the
United States sdoot (Advotiang Coundl). Thae are two distinct kinds of PSAs: One type is aiiaed at individuals in
need of Iwlp (e.g., akc^lics, peq>le suffering sevoe daptession) or persons who are vulnerable to health or aA^esr problems (e.g., teenagers exposed to hannfiil drugs, women and
breast cancer); the other is aimed at getting the public to
help others, typically by donating their time or money to a
worthy cause.
How do PSAs persuade people to act? Much of what
we know in this regard applies strictly to the "help-self
PSAs (e.g., Guy and Patton 1988). Fear appeals are one of
the most frequently used motivators to get people to help
themselves (e.g., McDaniel and 2^ithaml 1984; Ray and
Wilkie 1970; Spence and Moinpour 1972; Stemthal and
Craig 1974; Tanner, Day, and Crask 1989). Recently the research in this area has been brought into a coherent whole
by Tanner, Hunt, and Eppright (1991), who showed how
the protection motivation model borrowed from psychology can be adapted to predict people's intentions to use
condoms.
However, there is reason to question the applicability of
the fear appeal literature in general and the protection motivation model in particular to the context represented by
Richatd P. Bagozzi isttwDwight F. BetAxi Processor of Maitofing mi Behavioral Science in Msnagement, and David J. Moore is an Assign* Professor of Marketing in the Deparbnmt of Sport Management and Communication and TTie School of Busings Administration, Urmersity of Michigan. The authors thank Meryl P. Garter, the JM ecttor Tom Kinnear, and
three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on eailier drafts of
this article. Gratsfiri apprededon also is extended to Chuck Eddiemon, manager of the Dental School teieviskxi production i ^ , University of Michigan,
for assistance in editing the ads in Study 2, and the Department of Advertising television studk) at the University of Oklahoma for editing and prockjcing the ads used in Study 1. The sappoti of both the School of Business
AdministrHtkxi at the University of Michigan and the College of Business Administration at the University of Oklahoma is gratefully ackrK>wledged.
"help-other" PSAs. In the typical fear appeal context,
fright and anxiety in the target atKbem^ result because danger to themselves is perceived by masibets of Q» mtdmux.
Therefore, for example, an ml em^iasisong die negirtive effects of cocaiiK on the central nervous sy^em is int^^d
to instill fear in die aiuBence abcwt possibte futine harm to
them personally, should they start or continue to use cocaine. Hie appeal is direct in the sense of focusing on the
welfare of Ae message recipient.
But PSAs (fesigned to stimulate action on the behalf of
others operate in a fuiKkunentally different way. Hie dueat
in such ads is not of dia^ to tl^ m e s s ^ recipient, per se,
but radier to someone else, such as the victims of child
abuse. Hie goal is to motivate people to help odMrs in danger; the appeal is dius indirect.
The context for PSAs of die hdp-other variety is quite
broad and socially and eccMioniically significiutt. In 1992,
for example, $110 tnllion were dcMutted to charities by imiividuals in the United States (Detroit News 1993). Yet we
lack a theory about how I^As foacticxl in such situ^ons.
Our purpose is to develc^ ami test a ttwory of persuasion for PSAs desig^d to in^Ke peqile to he^ (Mbers. Tke
setting for testing the theory is anti-child abuse ads. Child
abuse is only one of many social problems in which appeals are matte to the ^lUic. Nevertheless it is an is^tMtant
issue and one that is ftotatyficai. In 1992, nearly 3 millitHi
cases of child abuse wererep<ntedto public social service
agencies in the United StiOes, an increase of 132% over die
past decade (American Hranan Associaticm). In d» next section, we jnesent an outline of dK theory. We then descritie
two experimrats to test parts of iL Finsdly, we int^»et the
results of die experiments and discuss needed work.
Theory
The Lazarus (1991) Model
Lazarus (1991) has developed a general theory of emotion
and adaptation that is particularly applicable to the effects
of PSAs on helping responses. In skeleton form, Lazarus proJoumal of Marketing
56 / Journal of Htariw^, January 1994
Vol. 58 (January 1994), 56-70
posed that appraisal processes of internal and situational conditions lead to emotional responses; these, in turn, induce
coping activities: appraisals -> emotional responses -»
coping.
An a[q>raisal is "an evaluation, often elemental and without awareness, of the significance of what is happening for
our personal well-being" (I^azanis 1991, p. 193). Two appraisal processes can be identified: primary and secondary
appraisal. Under a primary appraisal, one assesses (1) the
motivational relevance of the conditions leading to the appraisal (i.e., their importance in terms of one's goals), (2)
the motivational congruence, or the extent to which the conditions thwart or facilitate achievement of one's goals, and
(3) one's ego involvement. A secondary appraisal addresses
the resources or options for coping with internal or situational conditions. Concerns in tiiis area include (1) attribution to oneself or another of credit or blame for any harm or
benefit, (2) self-efficacy with regard to acting on the situational conditions, (3) self-efficacy with regard to regulating
one's own internal states, and (4) expectations of forces operating beyond one's control.
Lazarus hypothesized that three possible outcomes arise
as functions of appraisal processes, depending on the situation: biological urges to act, subjective affect, and physiological responses. The unique combination of these outcomes
determines which particulai- emotion (e.g., anger, anxiety,
joy) will result from any appraisal.
In the presence of a particular emotion, two coping responses then are possible. Problem-focused coping consists
of efforts to overcome or reduce the effect of an undesirable
situation. This response, for example, could entail changing
the physical situation, breaking off a relationship, or persuading someone to do something to remove an external threat.
Emotion-focused coping refers to cognitive strategies to master, reduce, or tolerate an undesirable situation. Such strategies include denial, avoidance of thinking about an appraisal, or reconceptualizing the source of dissonance or its
meaning.
A considerable body of research supports Lazarus's general theory (Folkman and Lazarus 1988; Lazarus 1991;
Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Smith and Lazarus 1990). The
task here is to develop a specific operationalization relevant
for PSAs designed to induce people to help others. Because
the field experiments we US<M1 investigate responses to ads
embedded in a television program people watched under relatively natural conditions, there is reason to believe that appraisal processes are elemental and occur without awareness, as Lazarus (1991, p. 193) maintains. In other contexts,
appraisal processes could well be more complex and involve greater self-awareness. As a consequence, no attempt
is made to operationalize appraisal processes in the present
experiments. Rather, we assume the significance of the information in the stimulus ads and focus on emotional reactions to elemental appraisals and the coping responses in
which one engages.
content with respect to child abuse, and the ads used in
Study 2 were developed to manipulate high and low levels
of emotions. In terms of Lazarus's theory, child abuse is an
issue of relatively high personal relevance for most people.
Exposure to the ads should lead to motivation for additional
processing to maintain one's ego identity with respect to
self-esteem, moral values, and self and others' well-being
(Lazarus 1991, p. 101).' Therefore, the respondents' initial
reaction to the ads could be described as follows: "when information is appraised as having significance for our wellbeing, it becomes ... 'hot information.' Subsequent processing takes place with this hot information" (Lazarus and
Folkman 1984, p. 277). In other words, the ads come to be
perceived in emotion-laden terms.
What emotions are most relevant in the anti-child abuse
ad context? To answer this question, it is informative to examine two rival streams of research in the literature on emotions. One tradition involves seeing emotions as discrete categories, the other as overlapping dimensions. Consider first
the research into emotions as discrete categories. On the
basis of Rosch's (1978) work on categorization. Shaver and
colleagues (1987) found that people organize emotions in
memory into superordinant, basic, and subordinant categories. The superordinant level has two subcategories (positive and negative), the basic level five, and the subordinant
level 135 or more. For purposes of our study, the basic
level is most relevant. Shaver and colleagues (1987) assert
that it is at the basic level that people interpret their environment and process information. The five basic level categories are love and joy under the positive superordinant category and anger, sadness, and fear under the negative superordinant category. Shaver and colleagues (1987) maintain
that all finer grained emotions, for which there are about
558 terms in the English language, fall under one of the
five basic level categories. For example, caring, gladness,
disgust, gloom, and dread are subordinant level emotions
under the respective basic level emotions of love, joy,
anger, sadness, and fear. Because we use negative as opposed to positive appeals, the appropriate emotions based
on the categorization researeh are anger, sadness, and fear.
Rather than seeing emotions as discrete categories,
some researchers maintain that emotions exist in overlapping dimensions. Two dimensions are most fi'equently identified in empirical work: pleasant-unpleasant feelings and
high-low arousal (Russell 1979, 1980) or positive and negative affect (Watson and Tfellegen 1985). Occasionally, one
or two other dimensions have been found as additions to
pleasantness and arousal, but these generally explain less variance and have appeared less consistently in empirical studies (e.g., Russell and Ridgeway 1983).
Watson and TfeUegen's (1985) framework is representative of research into the overlapping dimensions tradition
and is particularly relevant for our study. Using Izard's
(1977) and Russell's (1979, 1980; Russell and Ridgeway
Negative Emotions
'The stimulus ads were composed to induce low to moderately high levels of negative emotions. Very high levels were avoided to create ads characteristic of normal viewing conations and avoid inducing avoidance or denial reactions in respondents, as well as demand characteristics.
The stimulus ads used in Study 1 (described under
"Method") were chosen to convey emotional and rational
Public Service Advertlsefflents / 57
1983) research, Watson and Tellegen (1985) suggested that
emotional reactions can be organized into two dimensions
of positive and negative affect, which in tum define a circumplex structure of eight adjacent emotions: high positive
affect, strong engagement, high negative affect, unpleasantness, low positive affect, disengagement, low negative affect, and pleasantness. For the present study, the two most
relevant sectors of emotions from the circumplex pattern
that capture negative feelings are high negative affect and
unpleasantness.
We then inspected the 315 emotional adjectives found
in nine studies examined by Watson and Tellegen (1985) to
identify the most appropriate negative emotions. After eliminating those adjectives associated with the six circumplex
sectors not applying to the present research and identifying
patterns and redundancies among adjectives for the two relevant sectors, four negative emotions remained: anger, sadness, fear, and tension. These are particularly relevant for
the issue of child abuse.
Frameworks based on discrete emotions (e.g., Lazarus
1991; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1990; Shaver et al. 1987)
and those based on overlapping dimensions (e.g., Russell
1979; Watson and Tfellegen 1985) obviously differ in fundamental ways. Nevertheless, they both converge in the sense
that the former identifies anger, sadness, and fear and the latter points to anger, sadness, fear, and tension as the most appropriate negative emotions for the anti-child abuse experiments described herein. As Frijda (1986, p. 259) notes,
' 'The dimensional and the categorical view are both valid because they apply to different levels of the emotion process." As a result of these analyses, anger, fear, sadness,
and tension were chosen as four negative emotions for operationalizing Lazarus's (1991) general theory.
Empirical support for the choice of these emotions can
be found in Boyle's (1986) higher-order factor analyses of
Izard's (1977) differential emotions scale. Boyle (1986)
found that the first-order fear factor loaded highest on the primary second-order factor (48.2% variance explained), and
sadness and anger jointly loaded highly on a third secondorder factor (12.1 % variance explained); the second secondorder factor was a pleasant/surprise dimension (32.1 % variance explained), whereas the fourth was a depression dimension (7.6% variance explained). Therefore, fear, anger, and
sadness emerged as three strong negative feelings. The differential emotions scale does not have items that reflect tension, per se. However, tenseness is an indication of high negative emotion in Watson and Tfellegen's (1985, p. 221) circumplex representation of emotional responses.^ From the
perspective of the Lewinian tension system (Lewin 1951),
the inclusion of tenseness is consistent with Homstein's
(1982, p. 230) notion of promotive tension, that is, "tension coordinated with another's need." This is relevant particularly to child abuse.
Empathy
The final step in Lazarus's (1991) theory is coping. We hypothesize that two broad coping reactions are taken in re^Watson and Ifellegen (198S) do not use "tense" in their presentation
but instead employ the close synonyms distressed, jittery, and nervous.
58 / Journal of Mariwthig, Januaiy 1994
sponse to negative emotions: empathic processes and the decision to help. Therefore, the general sequence of events in
response to public service ads directed at anti-child abuse
are perception of plight of another person —^ negative emotions (anger, sadness, fear, tension) -» empathic responses
—^ decision to help.
Previous studies demonstrate that experimentally induced negative emotions such as fear (e.g., Shelton and Rogers 1981) and sadness (e.g., Cialdini and Kenrick 1976)
lead to positive attitudes toward helping and/or intentions
to help. However, some studies have failed to find any effects for negative emotions (e.g., HoUoway, Tucker, and
Homstein 1977) or found that negative emotions even decrease helpfulness (e.g.. Underwood et al. 1977). The conflicting findings suggest that either strong mediators exist between negative emotions and helping or the relationship is
contingent on moderating variables. In addition, as negative
emotions increase in strength, a point can be reached at
which helping first increases but then eventually decreases,
thus exhibiting a curvilinear relationship (e.g., Stemthal and
Craig 1974). Negative emotions do not inevitably lead to
helping.
Carlson and Miller (1987) recently conducted a metaanalysis of the literature and found that, though the mean effect size generally pointed to a negative emotions —> helping sequence, the relation depended on many "features that
are structurally and necessarily intertwined with the experience of negative mood" (p. 104). Empathy-like responses
constituted one category of features in this sense.
But exactly what is empathy? The term "empathy"
was first proposed by Titchener in 1909, who asserted,
"Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, but I feel them in the mind's muscle.
That is, I suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may
coin that term as a rendering of EinfUhlung'' (p. 21). In German, Einfuhlung means ''to feel one's way into." Hoffman
(1984) points out that empathy in the modem context typically is defined in terms of being cognitively aware of another person's intemal states and/or putting oneself in the
place of another and experiencing his or her feelings. Some
psychologists take a narrower view of empathy. For example, Lazarus (1991, p. 287) writes, "I do not consider empathy an emotion; instead, it should be regarded as an emotional capacity and a process." He defines empathy as "sharing another's feelings by placing oneself psychologically in
that person's circumstance" (p. 287). Likewise, Wispe
(1986, p. 318) regards empathy as "the attempt by one selfaware self to comprehend nonjudgmentally the positive and
negative experiences of another self." He defines the related concept of sympathy as "the heightened awareness of
the suffering of another person as something to be alleviated" (Wispe 1986, p. 318). Many researchers have focused recently on isolated parts of the broader conceptualization of empathy. For example, some maintain that empathy is (1) knowing what another person is feeling (e.g.,
Ickes et al. 1990), (2) the ability to perceive accurately how
another person is feeling (e.g., Levenson and Ruef 1992),
(3) feeling what another person is feeling (e.g., Eisenberg et
FIGURE 1
The Role of Negative Emotions and Empathic Responses as Mediators of the Effects of Exposure to
AntI Child Abuse Ads on the Decision to H e ^ Prevent Child Abuse
Exposure to Anti
Child Abuse
Public Service Ad
al. 1989), and (4) responding compassionately to another
person's distress (e.g., Batson et al. 1983).
Thus, some amhiguity exists as to the content and scope
of definitions of empathy in the literature. To compound
matters, empathy is used synonymously in everyday English with sympathy, pity, compassion, and feeling sorry for;
and researchers have included different combinations of the
following in definitions of empathy: awareness of another's
feelings, sharing those feelings, and having an urge to help
the other (cf. Goldstein and Michaels 1985; Stout and Leckenhy 1986).
It would he presumptuous to propose a definition for empathy resolving the ambiguities and ongoing debates found
in the psychology literature. For the child abuse context at
hand, a working definition that seems to meet the requirements of many psychologists is the following: Empathy is
the heightened awareness of another person in danger or distress and includes an urge to take action to alleviate the
other person's plight. This perspective is consistent with theories of self-regulation that propose that appraisal processes
and desires to act precede intentions to do so (e.g., Bagozzi
1992).
Given the ambiguity in conceptual definitions of empathy, it seems prudent to use an operationalization of empathy whereby four separate dimensions are measured. The
four dimensions are (e.g., Davis 1980, 1983a, b; Larsen,
Diener, and Cropanzano 1987) perspective taking, compassion/pity, protection motivation (toward victim), and fantasy elaboration (see "Method"). Perspective taking is the
tendency to adopt the point of view of a person in need.
Compassion/pity refers to other-oriented feelings such as
concern. Protection motivation is the desire to protect the
person in need or intervene on one's behalf. Fantasy elaboration is the propensity to go beyond information provided
about a person in need to develop feelings of identification
and other emotional attachments (e.g., Larsen, Diener, and
Cropanzano 1987). By operationalizing four specific dimen-
sions, we are able to interpret findings from the perspective
of any of the major definitions in the literature, because one
or more of the dimensions is contained within each definition. In this way, too, as new definitions of empathy are proposed and more is learned, the research findings presented
herein should lend themselves to comparisons and greater
ease of interpretation.
Support for the role of empathy in the decision to help
can be found in a number of studies. For reviews, see Batson (1987), Dovidio (1984), and Krebs and Miller (1985).
Coke, Batson, and McDavis (1978) found that taking the perspective of another in need of help elicits empathy, which,
in tum, enhances the perceiver's motivation to help. Shelton and Rogers (1981) found that the distaste felt as a result
of watching "gory scenes" of hunters killing and processing whales led to empathy. Empathy then led to stronger intentions to help save whales and support Greenpeace when
compared with a low distaste condition that omitted the
gory scenes.
Figure 1 presents an outline of the main variables and hypotheses. The solid arrows represent the primary paths of influence; that is, exposure to anti-child abuse ads are hypothesized to lead to negative emotions (path a); negative emotions are expected to stimulate empathic responses (path b);
and empathic responses are proposed to influence the decision to help (path c). Path e represents a direct residual effect of negative emotions on the decision to help. To the extent that the measures of empathy contain error, negative
emotions would be expected to have a direct effect on the decision to help, unmediated by empathy. Path d in Figure 1
is anticipated only to the extent that measurement error occurs in negative emotions, and therefore the ads stimulate
empathic responses directly.
The rationale for a direct path from negative emotions
to empathic responses is based on Lazarus's (1991) theory.
Each of the negative emotions creates a felt harm or threat
of one sort or another. In addition, the negative emotions
Public Service Advertisements / 59
are similar in the sense that "all negative emotions share
the property of being a reaction to thwarting" (Lazarus
1991, p. 11). At the same time, each negative emotion reflects "a separate and distinct reaction to diverse forms of
thwarting" (Lazarus 1991, p. 11).
Anger results from threat to one's ego identity and
"sometimes ... is a vicarious reaction to a real societal danger" (Lazarus 1991, p. 220). Lazarus (1991) defines anger
as ' 'a demeaning offense against me and mine'' (p. 222). It
is exacerbated under conditions of arbitrariness, inconsideration, and malevolence (Berkowitz 1989), which are common characteristics of child abuse. Sadness is a feeling of
loss and helplessness and is similar in meaning to anguish,
sorrow, and despair. The loss experienced when one is
made aware of child abuse involves a threat to one's ego
ideal, moral values, and image of other persons and their
well-being. Helplessness arises with respect to perception
of past child abuses or present ones over which one has no
control. It is likely that initial feelings of helplessness with
respect to child abuse lead quickly to feelings of anger toward the perpetrator. Indeed, sadness is not an isolated emotion: ' 'when we experience a loss, we rarely feel a single
emotion such as sadness. We grieve, are angry, anxious,
guilty, envious, even hopeful, and defensive" (Lazarus
1991, p. 250). Fear in the context of one becoming aware of
child abuse is likely to have two parts. One is anxiety in
which worry or apprehension define the response, and ambiguity or uncertainty increase its saliency. The threat that
produces anxiety is typically symbolic or existential as opposed to concrete or direct. A second part of fear is fright in
response to ' 'concrete and sudden danger of imminent physical harm" (Lazarus 1991, p. 235). As described under
"Method," the danger communicated in the test ads is to another person or persons, not to the target audience. Nevertheless, this danger vicariously reinforces anxiety. The final
negative emotion, tension, is less specific than the other
three. It refers to a generalized feeling of uneasiness and distress and is especially present when one feels fearful.
recognition or it is intrinsically self-rewarding (when the latter is based on, for example, intemalization of social or
moral norms). One difference between our interpretation of
helping and Cialdini's, however, is that we maintain that
negative affect results from appraisals made of another's
plight and these appraisals have personal significance (Lazurus 1991), whereas the source of negative affect is unimportant in Cialdini's approach.
Another rationale for why negative affect leads to empathy and the urge to help is Lemer's (1980) "belief in a just
world'' explanation. In this model, people are assumed to
value the welfare of others as a fundamental, even moral,
value with a deontological character to it. Child abuse, even
experienced by unknown persons, is seen as a threat, not
only to the victims and their welfare but also to the perceiver's basic values about a just world. One is upset about
child abuse and experiences an urge to help to correct the injustice and restore the balance required by one's values. Unlike the negative state relief model, however, the belief in a
just world explanation rests more on a moral argument than
the desire to feel good, per se.
Though we leave open the possibility that negative emotions and empathy interact to affect helping under special circumstances, we prefer to think of the process in most cases
as a mediational one in which negative emotions —* empathy -> helping (Figure 1). In this way, it is possible to conceive of a special case in which empathy leads to helping
without necessarily requiring that the process be initiated
by negative affect. That is, even when strong negative (or
positive) affects are absent, the model in Figure 1 acknowledges that empathy can still lead to helping. This could
occur when a genuine altruistic motive for helping accompanies empathy (e.g., Batson 1987). The present experiments do not explore this possibility, but it is important to
stress that negative emotions are hypothesized to function
as sufficient causes (along with the appropriate appraisals)
of empathy, and not necessary ones.
The four negative emotions—anger, sadness, fear, tension—create threatening conditions with which one must
cope in one way or another. Empathic responses constitute
one set of processes facilitating the coping processes in the
child abuse context. Though we are not aware of any studies explicitly showing that negative emotions induce empathy, research by Cialdini and colleagues demonstrates that
negative emotions are at least associated with empathy and
precede helping. Schaller and Cialdini (1988) found that subjects who scored high in empathy also were sadder, and
those who helped more scored high in both empathy and sadness (see also Fultz, Schaller, and Cialdini 1988). Likewise,
a study by Batson and colleagues (1986) shows that negative affect accompanies empathy and precedes helping.
One explanation for why negative emotions lead to empathic responses and the urge to help is Cialdini's negative
state relief model (e.g., Cialdini, Baumann, and Kenrick
1981). In this model, a person experiencing negative affect
has a need or motive to feel better and sees helping others
as a way to do tbis. That is, helping others is viewed as rewarding because either it is seen as a way to receive social
In Study 1, two broad sets of hypotheses are tested.
First, an experimental design is employed in which negative emotions, empathic responses, and the decision to help
are treated as parallel dependent variables. The hypothesis
is that viewing an emotional, as opposed to rational, appeal
will lead to greater anger, sadness, fear, tension, empathy,
and the decision to help. A structural equation MANOVA
is used to test hypotheses. Second, by use of step-down analyses, the sequences implied in Figure 1 are examined. The
hypothesis is that viewing an emotional, as opposed to rational, appeal will first lead to greater anger, sadness, fear,
and tension; tben it will induce empathic responses (i.e.,
higher levels of perspective taking, compassion/pity, protection motivation, and fantasy elaboration); finally, a favorable decision to help will ensue. Study 1 relies on a comparison of subjects exposed to either an emotional or rational appeal ad. In Study 2, the intensity of negative emotions is manipulated to provide a more direct test of tbe impact of negative affect on empathy. For tbe levels of intensity investigated, we hypothesize tbat higher levels of negative affect
will lead to greater empathy.
60 / Journal of Marketing, January 1994
Method: Study 1
Design and Procedures
The design used to examine the hypotheses implied in Figure 1 was a one-factor experiment wherein emotional versus rational ads were shown.^ Subjects were 143 undergraduates and were randomly assigned to either an emotional or
rational appeal condition presented as a PSA addressing
child abuse (for similar manipulations see Gardner and Hill
1988; Goldberg and Gom 1987; Golden and Johnson 1983;
Liu and Stout 1987). The test ads were embedded in a halfhour program of the popular TV game show "Jeopardy,"
in which college students were the contestants, thereby providing a setting of relevance to the subjects. There were
three commercial breaks in the program with three ads in
each break. To avoid primacy or recency effects, the test ad
was the second ad in the second break in each condition.
The remaining ads were fillers selected from national and
statewide programming (i.e., ads for Mrs. Smith's Pies, a
local self-help program, local attorneys, a truck driving
school, a local builder. Stay Trim, Aspercreme, and Slim
Fast). Subjects viewed the program in groups of two to nine
people.
As a cover story, subjects were told that the U.S Department of Education, in cooperation with their own and other
universities, was conducting a study to determine how
game shows can be used as effective teaching devices.
After being instructed that they would be exposed to a tape
recording of em episode of "Jeopardy," they were told that
they would have a chance to provide evaluations of the program following the presentation. This was in fact done and
included questions about the subjects' appraisals of the use
of game shows for classroom teaching. To obtain verbal protocols about their feelings concerning the target ad, subjects
were given 3V2 minutes to write down all the thoughts and
experiences they had when ihey were exposed to the child
abuse ad. Next, the focal measures of advertising effects
were administered. Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their cooperation.
Test Ads
Two test ads were professionally prepared, each approximately 40 seconds in length. Both began with the following
lead-in: Announcer (voice over): "The following is a message from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children." Similarly, both ads ended with the following close:
Announcer (voice over): ' 'Help us put an end to child
abuse in our society. We urgently need your help! If you
would like to help, please give us a call at 1-800-MYCHBLD or send your contribution to the Society for the Prevention of Cnielty to Children, Box 222, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma 74774."
In the emotional appeal condition, a young boy is in the
living room of his home playing with his dog. Suddenly,
'The original experiment was a two-factor type of appeal (emotional/
rational) by medium of exposure (visual plus audio/audio only) design. But
because a MANOVA test on the dependent variables indicated that no experimental efiects existed due to medium (F = 1.18, with 21 and 107 d.f.,
p > .28), data were pooled across cells to produce the one-factor analyses
described henyn.
the front door flies open, heavy footsteps are heard, and the
boy begins running from room to room and whimpering,
"no Daddy, no." The action ends with a piercing scream
and close-up of the boy's face. In the rational appeal condition, pages of a report entitled,' 'Department of Human Services CHILD ABUSE CASES," are slowly turned. As the
pages turn, the announcer reads the following aloud:
According to the latest report from the Department of
Human Services, 31 children died last year in [state] as a
result of fatal injuries inflicted by parents or stepparents.
This record number of child abuse cases represents an almost 50% increase over the number reported last year. Of
the 31 deaths recorded this year, 18 were the result of physical abuse, 11 resulted from neglect or abandonment, and
2 cases involved both neglect and abuse.
Pretests were conducted on a sample of 68 undergraduates similar to the population used to test the main hypotheses. One subsample of 28 viewed the emotional appeal ad,
and the other subsample of 40 saw the rational appeal ad. Respondents in each group were asked to express the strength
of their emotional reactions to the ad on the following 5point scales: "very angry" (l)-"not at all angry" (5),
"very sad" (l)-"not at all sad" (5), "very fearful" (1)"not at all fearful" (5), and "very tense" (l)-"not at all
tense" (5). As expected, the emotional (E) and rational (R)
ads differed in the felt reactions of respondents, with the
emotional ad experienced with the greatest intensity: anger
(Mg = 2.00, MR = 3.68, /(66) = 6.66, p < .01), sadness (M^
= 1.93, MR = 3.32, ti66) = 5.00, p < .01), fear (M^ = 2.86,
MR = 4.15, t{66) = 4.75, p < .01), and tenseness (M^ = 1.93,
MR = 4.12, f(66) = 9.18, p < .01). Thus, the ads produced
the hypothesized differences in negative feelings.
Though the emotional and rational ads begin and end in
identical ways, the center portions differ as a consequence
of the manipulations. To rule out the possibility that the ads
differ in ways other than the negative emotions engendered,
two alternative hypotheses were examined with the pretest
data. One alternative interpretation is that one ad could be
more informative than the other. To ensure that the ads
were equally informative, differences in responses were
tested across the same subsamples noted previously. Respondents evaluated each ad on a 5-point scale from "informative" (1) to "not informative" (5). As anticipated, the two
ads did not differ significantly in informativeness (Mg =
3.00, MR = 2.72, f(66) = 1.10, p > .10). A second rival hypothesis investigated whether the ads differed in terms of familiarity. Respondents appraised each ad on a five-point "familiar" (1) to "not familiar" (5) scale. As expected, the
two ads did not differ significantly in familiarity (Mg =
4.29, MR = 4.25, f(66) = .l4,p> .10).
In sum, the ads were found to differ in the generation of
the four negative emotions described previously but not in
terms of the cognitive responses of informativeness and familiarity. It should be noted further that neither ad contained any persuasive arguments or identifiable spokespersons (except at the ends of both ads at which identical appeals were made). Hence, there is no reason to believe that
the ads differed with respect to, or for that matter contained,
content commonly associated with cognitive responses in
Public Service Advertisements / 61
persuasive communication research (cf. Petty and Cacioppo
1986). Such factors as argument quality, number of arguments, source credibility, and source attractiveness were
not part of the manipulations.
Measures
Negative feelings. Four negative feelings were examined:
anger, sadness, fear, and tension. For each negative feeling,
subjects were asked to "describe the strength of your emotional reaction to the child abuse advertisement" on 7-point
"not at all strong" to "very strong" scales.
Empathy. After answering factual questions about the
program, subjects were given 3V2 minutes to "describe all
the feelings you experienced when you were exposed" to
the child abuse ad. They were told to provide "your reactions to the ad, not how you would describe it" and "ignore punctuation and grammar." Two judges (graduate students who were given prior training) independently coded
the responses using definitions of the four dimensions of empathy (Davis 1980, 1983a, b; Larsen, Diener, and Cropanzano 1987). These definitions are summarized in Table 1,
in which the resultant distributions of empathic responses
for both experimental conditions also are displayed. Using
Cohen's (1960) kappa, interjudge reliability was found to
be .83. Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations
of these variables.
Decision to help. The decision to help was measured
with the item, "How likely is it that you would give help to
abused children in our society?" Responses were recorded
on a 7-point scale anchored by "definitely would not help"
and "definitely would help."
Other affective and cognitive responses. All other emotional and nonemotional responses elicited during the
thought listing task were coded into four main categories.
First, emotional responses related to the child abuse issue,
subdivided into (1) negative emotional responses, (2) positive emotional responses, and (3) emotional assertions, that
is, affective responses that were neither negative nor positive in valence. Second, nonemotional responses, that is, factual assertions related to child abuse. Third, emotional and
nonemotional execution-related responses, that is, reactions
directly related to the ad execution. Fourth, irrelevant and
nonclassifiable reactions, that is, statements that were irrelevant to the issue of child abuse or the ad execution. In
Table 2, we show the distribution of responses in these categories for both experimental conditions and provide example elicitations. Negative emotional and execution-related responses were the most frequently expressed reactions. As detailed under "Results," a composite (i.e., sum) of all other
affective and cognitive responses was used, as well as the individual categories, to test rival hypotheses vis-a-vis empathy. In Table 3, we present the means and standard deviations for the composite and individual categories. Interjudge reliability was .89.
Analytical Procedures
A structural equation version of MANOVA was used to
test hypotheses in Study 1. The rationale for the procedure
and illustrations can be found in Bagozzi and Yi's (1989)
and Bagozzi, Yi, and Singh's (1991) article. For Study 2,
ANOVA was used.
TABLE 1
Empathy Categories and Frequencies (Study 1)
Emotional ad
sample'>
Rational ad
sample"
No.
%
No.
%
12
22.2
48
23.9
8
4.8
40
19.9
Protectior) motivation: desire to protect person in need or
intervene on behalf of person ("1 wanted to step between
the parent and the child")
34
63.0
77
38.3
Fantasy elaboration: tendency to go beyond information
in ad to demonstrate deep concem for person in need or
identify strongly with feelings and needs of person ("the
little boy did not do anything wrong")
0
0
36
17.9
100%
201
100%
Categories and examples
Perspective taking: tendency to adopt perspective of,
put oneself in shoes of, or demonstrate a diBgree of
sensitivity to feelings of person in need (e.g., "1 felt
the pain as if 1 had been struck")
Compassion/pity: expressions of compassion, pity, or
tender emotions of concern for person in need (e.g., "1
felt pity for the kid")
Total empathic responses
= 65
62 / Joumai of MaHceting, January 1994
54
!
TABLE 2
Categoric and Frequencies of All Other Affective and Cognitive Responses (Study 1)
Rational
sample*
Categoric and examples
Emotional Responses: Related to issue
Negative Emotional (e.g., "1 felt sacT)
.Rs»itt»(S'i5ra5itiflwa'vtejj'., "'ifeil*ite)5py'"/
Emotional Assertions (neither negative nor positive)
(e.g., "1 felt quite emotional about this issue.")
Nonemotional Responses: Related to issue (e.g., "1 have
never come across cases of child abuse.")
Execution-Related Responses
Emotional (e.g.. T h e ad brings on many strong feelings")
Nonemotional (e.g.. T h e ad was cleverly designed")
trrelevant/Nonclassifiable Thoughts
Total Nonempathic responses
Emotional
sample'>
No.
%
No.
%
76
&
9
33.5
173
52.4
4.0
27
8.2
52
22.9
28
8.5
5
2.2
41
12.4
27
11.9
4
1.2
227
100%
330
100%
= 65
TABLE 3
Uteans and Standard Deviations of iMeasures (Study 1)
Rational ad
sample*
Variable
Emotional ad
sample**
Mean
S.D.
Mean
S.D.
5.00
5.25
3.05
2.91
1.94
1.87
2.06
1.99
5.62
5.90
4.25
4.69
1.71
1.52
2.18
1.91
Empathy (composite)
perspective taking
compassion/pity
protection motivation
fantasy elaboration
1.89
.18
.12
.52
0
1.20
.58
.33
.90
0
3.63
.62
.51
.99
.46
2.31
1.03
.62
1.05
1.11
Decision to help
5.85
1.45
6.42
.86
All other affective and cognitive responses
negative emotional
positive emotional
emotional assertions
factual assertions
executional emotional
executional nonemotional
nonclassifiable
irrelevant thoughts
1.17
.09
.17
.80
.08
.80
.08
.42
1.21
.34
.52
1.00
.27
1.46
.32
1.15
2.22
.17
.35
.36
.53
.56
.01
.04
1.88
.61
.80
.62
.98
.99
.11
.27
Negative emotions
angry
sad
fearful
tense
an = 65
Results: Study 1
Dimensionality of Negative Emotions
The measures of anger, sadness, fear, and tenseness were analyzed to discover the organization of negative emotions.
An exploratory factor analysis revealed that anger and sadness loaded on one factor and fear and tenseness loaded on
a second factor, with 64.5% of the total variance explained.
Therefore, the findings are consistent with Watson and Tel-
legen's (1989) research in that anger and sadness correspond to the unpleasant quadrant and fear and tenseness correspond to the high negative affect quadrant in their
frameworic.
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the
four measures of negative emotions to see if both factors
could be used as covariates in the same MANOVA models.
The results show that two factors indeed explain the data
well: x^(l) = 1.71, p = .19. However, because the two fac-
PiMic Service AdvMtteeimnts / 63
tors are more highly correlated (r = .59) between themselves than with the measures of empathy and helping, multicollinearity affects the precision of key parameter estimates in a detrimental way when both factors are included
in tests of hypotheses. As a consequence, tests of hypotheses had to be performed twice: once with anger and sadness
as measures of negative emotions and once with fear and
tenseness as measures of negative emotions.
Test of Homogeneity
A structural equation MANOVA analysis was performed
on the measures of negative emotions, empathy, and helping. The findings reveal that one must reject the assumption
of homogeneity in variances and covariances for both the
model with angry/sad as measures of negative emotions
= 61.98, p = .00) and the model with fearfiil/tense
= 53.77, p = .00). Both models also included measures of empathy and helping. Therefore, the multiple group
approach for testing means and step-down analyses is used,
because it is appropriate even when the homogeneity assumption is violated (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi, and Singh 1991).
Structural Equation MANOVA Tmts of Moans for
Negative Emotions, Empathy, and Helping*
Angry/sad. The findings show that one must reject the null
hypothesis of equal means across the groups for latent variables of angry/sad, empathy, and the decision to help (Xd(3)
= 31.56, p < .01). The univariate tests on individual means
demonstrate that the means of angry/sad differ marginally
(Xd - 3-42, p < .06), and the means of overall empathy (Xd(l)
= 29.36, p < .01) and the decision to help (x^(l) = 7.47, p <
.01) differ strongly.
Fearful/tense. Likewise the results show that one must
reject the null hypothesis of equal means across groups for
the latent variables of fearful/tense, empathy, and the decision to help (Xd(3) = 34.26, p < .01). The univariate tests reveal that the means differ significantly for fearful/tense
(X^(l) = 12.19, p < .01), overall empathy (x^(l) = 29.36, p <
.01), and the decision to help (x^(l) = 7.47, p < .01).
Step-Down Anaiyses
To see whether the data are consistent with the hypothesized sequence in Figure 1, in which negative emotions —>
empathy -> helping, step-down structural equation MANOVAs were performed (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi, and Singh 1991).
Angry/sad. A chi-square difference test showed that the
causal paths among the variables were invariant across
groups (Xd(3) = 6.56, p > .09). The next step investigated
whether the observed differences in angry/sad, overall empathy, and helping were determined directly by the manipulation or indirectly as a result of the hypothesized causal ordering. The initial part of this analysis showed that the
means in helping did not differ across groups when the effects of angry/sad and overall empathy were partialled out
-96, P > .15). Therefore, the effect of the manipu''In the interest of brevity, only a summary of the results for tests of hypotheses are presented. The full findings are available on request from the
authors.
64 / Journal of iWarketing, January 1994
lation on helping is channeled through angry/sad feelings
and empathy. The pathsfix)mangry/sad to helping (p = .32,
s.e. = .08) and empathy to helping (P = .072, s.e. = .039)
were significant. The final part of the analysis ascertained
whether the manipulation affected overall empathy when
angry/sad feelings were controlled. This hypothesis must be
rejected (Xd(l) = 21.11, p < .01), and we conclude that the
manipulation directly influenced empathy even after partialling out angry/sad. Nevertheless, the path from angry/
sad to empathy was significant (P = .40, s.e. = .10).
Fearful/tense. A chi-square difference test indicated
that the causal paths among the variables were invariant
across groups (Xd(3) = 3.08, p > .40). Next it was found that
the means in helping were invariant across groups when the
effects of fearful/tense and overall empathy were partialled
out (x^(l) = 1.47, p > .20). Hence the effect of the manipulation on helping is channeled through fearful/tense and empathy. The paths from fearful/tense to helping (p = . 13, s.e.
= .06) and empathy to helping (P = .09, s.e. = .04) were significant. Finally, we must reject the hypothesis that the
means in empathy differ across groups when fearful/tense
feelings are partialled out (Xd(l) = 9.59,p < .01), and we conclude that the manipulation has a direct effect on empathy
even after controlling for fearful/tense. Nevertheless the
path from fearful/tense to empathy was significant (p = .44,
s.e. = .11).
Test of Rivai Hypotheses
The results so far support the mediating role of overall empathy on helping. As a rival hypothesis, the question was
asked whether the results could be explained by cognitive
and affective responses other than overall empathy. Structural equation MANOVAs similar to those described previously were used except that in place of overall empathy a
composite variable was used consisting of all other cognitive and affective responses. The results showed that the effect of the experimental manipulation on helping was channeled entirely through negative emotions, not the composite, for all other cognitive and affective responses. Furthermore, the path from negative emotions to the composite of
all other cognitive and affective responses was nonsignificant for the analyses with angry/sad and fearful/tense.
A final class of rival hypotheses was investigated
whereby the individual means for the components of all
other affective and cognitive responses were examined. On
the basis of a sufficient number of elicitations, negative
affective reactions, factual issue-related assertions, execution-related emotional responses, and execution-related
nonemotional responses were selected as individual components for hypothesis testing. The results revealed that the effect of the experimental manipulation was channeled
through negative emotions with one exception. An indirect
effect was found through nonemotional issue-related assertions. This cannot explain the experimental effect for empathy, however, because subjects in the emotional ad condition actually showed significantly lower levels on these responses than those in the rational ad condition. In summary, the findings show that neither a composite of all
other affective and cognitive responses nor their individual
components account for the changes in the decision to help.
TABLE 4
RMponaes to Manipulation Check IMeasures
of Emotions for Study 2
Method: Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 is to investigate more directly the
link between negative emotions and empathy. Study 1 compared an emotional appeal with a rational one and therefore
did not address the effect of the level of negative emotions
on empathy. In Study 2, the intensity of negative emotions
is manipulated to test whetlier empathy can be stimulated
more strongly as a function of negative affect. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been directly examined before
in either the psychology or marketing literatures.
Design and Procedures
A one-factor experiment was conducted wherein three levels of negative affect were manipulated. Subjects were 78 undergraduates recruited from the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts and randomly assigned to one of the
three conditions. One subject was eliminated because he
could not remember seeing the child abuse ad, and two others were eliminated at their request because they had been
victims of child abuse. The subjects were told that the study
was being conducted by the Research Bureau for Mass
Media Education by the School of Education in cooperation
with the U.S. Department of Education. The purported aim
was to leam how television game shows can be used as effective teaching devices. As in Study 1, the test ads were embedded in a half-hour program of "Jeopardy." Each test ad
was the second ad in the second commercial break. Subjects viewed the program in groups of three to six people
and then responded to a questionnaire containing measures
evaluating the program and for expressing their felt negative affect and empathy. Subjects were then debriefed.
Test Ads
The same emotional ad used in Study 1 was modified to produce three levels of negative affect. The strong emotional
ad was identical to the one used in Study 1. Two versions
of weak emotional ads were prepared. In the first, the onesecond long piercing scream and close-up of the boy, which
occurred near the end of the ad, were removed. In addition,
the brief whimpering and statements of the boy, "no
Daddy, no," which occurred at three points in the ad, were
masked. In the second weak emotional ad, background
music was added to the first weak emotional ad to soften
the intensity of the drama.
Mams for
Ad
Strong Weak
Ad
Ad
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
at
at
at
at
at
all
all
all
all
all
emotional—very emotional
angry—very angry
sad—very sad
fearful—very fearful
tense—very tense
6.19'>
6.04c
5.42"
6.23>>
5.84t>
4.28
4.68
4.08
4.20
3.84
Music
4.80
4.20
3.80
4.38
4.44
a7-point scales.
^Planned comparison of strong ad group versus average of weak
ad groups significant at p < .001 level,
cpianned comparison of strong ad group versus average of weak
ad groups significant at p < .01 ievel.
(see Table 4). The five manipulation checks were interspersed among 18 total items (e.g., irritated, violent).
Empathy. Empathy was measured by asking subjects to
disagree or agree on 7-point scales with the six items listed
in Table 5. These items were designed to tap the four categories of empathy found in the literature (e.g., Davis 1980,
1983 a, b; Larsen, Diener, and Cropanzano 1987) and investigated in Study 1: perspective taking, compassion/pity, protection motivation, and fantasy elaboration. The six empathy items were interspersed with 17 items (e.g., "I enjoyed
looking at this ad").
Decision to help. The decision to help was measured
with a single item: "In general, how likely is it that you
would give help to abused children in our society?" A 7point "definitely would not help" to "definitely would
help" scale was used to record responses.
Analysis
Separate ANOVAs were run on the manipulation checks
and empathy responses. Multiple planned comparisons
were performed by contrasting the mean of the strong emotional ad condition to the average of the two weak emotional ad conditions. The F-tests for the comparisons thus
are based on one degree of freedom for the comparison of
means and corresponding sums of squares. An F-test was
used for testing the effect of the manipulation on the decision to help.
Measures
Negative feelings. As manipulation checks, reactions of
anger, sadness, fear, and tension were measured by asking
subjects to "tell us how the child abuse advertisement
made you feel, not how you would describe it. You may indicate how strongly you felt these feelings using the 1-7
point scales below. While exposed to the child abuse advertisement, how would you describe your feelings?" In addition, an item measuring overall emotionality was included
Results: Study 2
Manipulation Checks
Table 4 presents the findings for the tests of overall emotionality and negative affect. It can be seen that greater overall
emotionality and higher levels of anger, sadness, fear, and
tension were perceived by subjects exposed to the strong versus weak emotional ads.
Public Service Advertteements / 65
Empatiiy
Table 5 shows the results for the tests of empathy. It can be
seen that more empathy is felt by those exposed to the
strong emotional ad than by those exposed to the weak emotional ads. People viewing the former reported a greater
sense of actually experiencing and feeling the plight of the
child, as well as showing greater sympathy, concern, and
the desire to protect the child.
Decision to Heip
The means for the decision to help for the groups exposed
to the strong ad, weak ad, and weak ad with music were
6.35, 5.16, and 5.12, respectively. Planned comparisons
show that the mean for the strong ad condition is significantly higher than the average of the means for the two
weak ad conditions: F(l, 73) = 8.19, p < .01.
Discussion
The results of this study provide insight into how public service advertising infiuences the decision to help victims of
child abuse. The experimental part of Study 1 looked at the
effects of viewing emotional versus rational ads on felt negative emotions, empathy, and the decision to help. These dependent variables were treated as multiple measures in a
structural equation operationalization of a MANOVA design. The results showed that the experimental groups differed in negative feelings, overall empathy, and helping.
Therefore, viewing emotional versus rational appeals in public service ads led to predictable changes in felt negative
emotions, empathy, and the decision to help (see Figure 1).
The exploratory or correlational part of Study 1 investigated whether the sequences shown in Figure 1 were consistent with the data. Step-down analyses were performed with
the structural equation MANOVA. The results revealed that
negative emotions and empathy indeed channeled the effects of the manipulations on helping. Furthermore, negative emotions also mediated the effects of the manipulations on empathy; however, the manipulations had a direct
effect on empathy, as well. Therefore, though negative emotions and empathy mediate the effects of viewing the plight
of a victim of child abuse on the decision to help, empathy
is stimulated directly by the perception of abuse as well as
indirectly through the negative emotions it engenders.
Because Study 1 was based on a comparison of a negative emotional ad to a rational one, it did not address the
issue of the role of intensity of negative emotions. Study 2
was designed to explore whether empathy is a function of
the strength of felt negative emotions. The results showed
that the greater the magnitude of the negative emotions
(i.e., anger, sadness, fear, and tension), the stronger the empathic responses.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation of the role of negative emotions and empathy as explanations for the decision to help within the context of public
service advertisements. We now discuss several novel features of the studies and consider some caveats.
66 / Journal of Marketing, January 1994
TABLE 5
Mean Responses to Empathy Measures for Sfaidy 2
Means for
Experimental Groups
Strong Weak
Ad
Ad
Weak
Ad
with
Music
I felt as though I was right there
in the ad experiencing what the
child was experiencing.
5.58''
3.64
3.84
As I watched the ad I could actually
feel the fear the child was
experiencing.
5.88^
4.00
4.72
At the end I felt the pain as if I had
been struck.
4.54t>
2.76
2.44
The ad tended to evoke within me
a desire to offer help or protection
to the child.
6.12'^
4.88
4.96
I really felt deep sympathy for
the child.
5.81 <*
4.80
4.64
The ad caused me to have tender
feelings of concern for the child.
6.35'^
4.76
5.04
^7-point disagree-agree scales.
>>Planned comparison of strong ad group versus average of weak
groups significant at p < .001 level.
<=Planned comparison of strong ad group versus average of weak
groups significant at p < .01 level.
"Planned comparison of strong ad group versus average of weak
groups significant at p < .05 level.
Negative Feeiings and Empathy
The results confirm the role of ad-induced negative emotions as determinants of attitudinal responses found by
Burke and Edell (1989; Edell and Burke 1987), Mitchell
(1986), and Stayman and Aaker (1988). At the same time,
four specific negative emotions were identified: anger, sadness, fear, and tension. These represent four fundamental
classes or basic categories of negative emotions found in
the psychology literature (e.g.. Shaver et al. 1987; Watson
and Tellegen 1985). All four functioned to affect empathy
and the decision to help. Previous research has found negative affect to function as a single factor of undifferentiated
responses but has used instances of emotions from both
basic and subordinate levels (e.g.. Burke and Edell 1989;
Edell and Burke 1987).
Past research has investigated negative affect in response to ads for consumer durables and nondurables, as
well as for services (e.g.. Burke and Edell 1989; Edell and
Burke 1987; Stayman and Aaker 1988). The results of these
studies show that negative feelings decrease one's favorability toward the ad execution and depress one's attitude toward brands. Here, negative emotions functioned as positive motivators and actually enhanced the decision to help.
This is consistent with suggestions that fear and other negative emotions can have positive effects on behavior in certain circumstances (e.g., Ray and Wilkie 1970; Stemthal
and Craig 1974). However, in contrast to previous empirical research examining the effects of fear appeals on a tar-
get audience under personal danger, we investigated the effects of fear appeals on the decision to help others.
How does negative affect produce a favorable decision
to help another in need? We helieve that Lazurus's (1991)
theory of emotions is helpful here. It is maintained that exposure to the ads featuring the child leads to appraisals of distress and danger for the child; this then produces the negative emotions of anger, sadness, fear, and tension; and the
viewer copes with the negative affect through empathic responses and a decision to help. The negative affect could
function to attract and focus audience attention on the victim, thereby heightening the chances that audience members will place themselves psychologically in the victim's
circumstances (e.g., Schwarz 1990). Negative affect also
could serve to prime or accentuate feelings of compassion,
pity, or sorrow. The latter effects are somewhat similar to
the impact found for mood on memory, which are based, in
part, on the stimulation of emotional categories in semantic
memory (e.g.. Bower 1981; Forgas and Bower 1987). Negative emotions accompanying appraisal processes might activate and spread to the categories in memory constituting
empathy and the capacity and urge to act. These processes
deserve further study in the public service context.
A logical direction for further inquiry would be to explore the psychological bases of empathy in greater depth.
For example, is empathy an altruistic or egoistic response?
This question is beyond the scope of our study and currently is being debated in the psychology literature (e.g., Batson et al. 1989, 1991; Cialdini et al. 1987; Dovidio, Allen,
and Schroeder 1990). The physiological bases of empathy
are also worthy of further study (e.g., Levenson and Ruef
1992). Finally, more insight is needed into the moral bases
of empathy such as that found in the just world phenomenon (Lemer 1980).
Additional research also should examine the dimensionality and implications of empathy in greater depth. A composite measure of empathy based on cognitive responses
and used by psychologists wiis explored in Study 1, but it is
possible that empathy has distinct components (cf. Stout
and Leckenby 1986). To test for the effects of separate dimensions of empathy, one would need explicit measures of
each dimension. The results of Study 2 are suggestive in
this regard, because separate paper and pencil measures of
the components of empathy were employed. Likewise, further research should manipulate overall empathy or its individual components to understand better how fear appeals
are processed.
Finally, other psychological processes mediating or moderating the effects of negative emotions on attitudes deserve
attention. Self-efficacy, internal control of reinforcements,
self-monitoring, attitude toward the ad, source credibility,
sensory mode preference (e.g., visual versus auditory), and
media and product/brand involvement represent possible
candidates in this regard (cf. Golden and Johnson 1983;
MacKenzie and Lutz 1989). Though we limited inquiry to
mediational processes, it is likely that a number of variables
can moderate the negative emotion-empathy relationship.
Decision to Heip
It would be desirable to study the effects of fear appeals on
actual behavior as well. Because exposure to an appeal on
television is likely to be followed by a gap in time before action is taken, it would be interesting to study the persistence
of attitude change and intentions, their impact on subsequent behavior, and the sleeper effect, if any.
i\4ethodoiogicai issues
Our study has some methodological advantages over previous studies investigating ad-induced affect that deserve mention. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation to use MANOVA to examine experimental effects for public service ads. Other studies either employed
ANOVA and/or ANCOVA and regression-based procedures. These latter methods do not control for experimentwise error rates or the interdependencies among dependent
variables that are inherent in the design under study. The
MANOVA procedure offers an advantage here. Second,
step-down analyses were conducted to explore the plausibility of causal orderings among dependent variables. Third,
the analyses corrected for random error in measures of negative emotions and empathy (the latter only when empathy
was treated as a composite). The traditional procedures assume that measurement error is negligible. Finally, unlike
classical analyses procedures such as MANOVA, which assume homogeneity of variances, covariances, and causal
paths among dependent variables, we used a procedure
based on multiple group comparisons that does not make
these assumptions (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi, and Singh 1991).
Practicai impiications
In the advertising community, the use of graphic, sensational, and negative emotional appeals is a controversial
issue (Brooker 1981; LaTour and Zahra 1989). Some critics
claim that such ads should be restricted from use because
they tend to be jarring and excessively intense, therefore
causing the message recipient to tune out the ad or react in
a negative fashion. For example, one TV commercial for a
drug and alcohol treatment center in New York showed a
young woman digging through a trash can to find a pill bottle. In a dramatic voice the announcer pitches: "If it comes
to this, come to us" (Alsop 1988). This ad, though sensational and controversial, attracted a lot of attention to the
sponsor's program and created a significant degree of curiosity among consumers who talked among themselves
about the ad. Word of mouth publicity is created in this manner, but it is sometimes difficult to predict the positive and
negative effects.
The results of the present study featuring anti-child
abuse PSAs underscore the relative effectiveness of dramatic emotional advertising appeals. The more emotionally
intense ads in the current study stimulated a strong desire to
help and contribute to support the goals of the sponsoring organization. Given that most nonprofit organizations usually
have limited advertising budgets, it becomes necessary to
create high-impact ads to generate widespread public attention to the sponsor's program. High-impact ads that evoke
strong emotions and stimulate empathy could require fewer
Public Service Advertisements / 67
exposures, yet be successful in influencing attitude formation and decision making. This gives the advertiser more impact for the advertising dollar. However, when an advertising appeal creates strong negative emotions such as fear,
anger, and distress, these feelings can become more intense
as the ad is repeated, thus leading to early wear-out and possibly negative attitudes toward the ad and sponsoring organization (e.g., Stayman and Aaker 1988). These issues
should be addressed in further research.
The results of this study could be particularly relevant
to settings in which message recipients respond to ads for social ideas as compared with products or services (Manrai
and Gardner 1992). A social idea could be either a social
issue or a social cause (Fine 1981). Social issues are usually
controversial (e.g., abortion rights), whereas social causes
are generally accepted by society (e.g., prevention of child
abuse). One also would expect different responses to an ad
for the prevention of child abuse as compared with an ad
for, say, a new car. It is unlikely that counterarguing will
occur against the need to help prevent child abuse; in contrast, an ad for a car could well evoke counterarguments.
These and other possible differences between public service
ads and ads for commercial products deserve further attention.
Additional Caveats
A limitation of our study is that individual beliefs about
the consequences of helping or failing to help to prevent
child abuse were not examined. It is possible that these beliefs could be influenced by negative feelings and A^^. This,
too, is an interesting issue for further research. However,
we suspect that, in contrast to the purchase of consumer
durables and nondurables, decision making with respect to
public service issues, such as child abuse, is less reasoned
and more emotionally determined. Moreover, this is especially true in our study when the test ad was shown only
once and was embedded in a half-hour program with other
ads, a convincing cover unrelated to the experimental effects was employed, the ads did not employ arguments for
helping, and subjects were not directed to focus on the ads
at all. It is unlikely that beliefs about the consequences of
child abuse, the analog to brand beliefs, were an important
factor in our particular experiment. Other limitations to acknowledge are the use of students, focus on a narrow topic,
child abuse, and investigation of only one rational ad and
three versions of an emotional ad.
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