Air Force
Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW
The Iranian air force is organized as follows:
Western Area Command, with
7 fighter squadrons
6 fighter/ground attack squadrons
5 transport squadrons
3 reconnaissance squadrons
2 training squadrons
1 support squadron
1 VIP squadron
1 ASW squadron
Southern Area Command, with
4 fighter/ground attack squadrons
Eastern Area Command, with
1 fighter/ground attack squadron
3 training squadrons
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
The air force has some 30,000 personnel, including a 12,000-man Air defense force.
Equipment
(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons
Database. Equipment is of U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)
AUG06
65
Nov. 2007)
60+
25
24
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
AIRCRAFT
65
64
64
Fighters/Ground Attack
F-4D/-E Phantom attack (one crashed
59
60+
#
25
24
#
25
24
40
#
#
25
24
F-5E Tiger II fighter
Azarakhsh (Iranian derivative of F-5)
Saegheh (Iranian derivative of F-5)
F-14A Tomcat fighter
Shenyang F-7M Airguard
attack/training
25
30
7
24
25
30
10
24
6
1
6
N/A
25
30
13
24
40
28
13
4
(Chinese J-7)
MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter (Russia)
Su-24MK Fencer (Russia)
Su-25 Frogfoot attack (Russia)
Mirage F-1E (France)
6+
#
6+
0
Reconnaissance
RF-4E Phantom tactical
Il-76 Adnan AEW (Russia)(crashed
5
5
5
P-3 Orion maritime patrol
3
3
3
4
1
17
10
4
1
17
10
4
1
17
10
3
1
4
1
19
10
3
2
1
1+
12
10
3
2
1
1
#
10
40
3
2
1
1
#
10
40
3
1
1
12
23
10
45
11
Transports
B707-3J9C tanker
B747 (Boeing 747)
B747F-131/-2J9F (Boeing 747)
B727-81 VIP transport (Boeing 727)
C-130E/-H Hercules
F27 Mk 400M Troopship/600 Friendship
(Netherlands)
Turbo Commander 681B liaison
Jetstar II VIP transport
Falcon 20F VIP transport (France)
Il-76MD Candid (Russia)
Xi'an Y7/Y7H/Y12 (China)
PC-6B (Switzerland)
An-140 (Russia)(Iran 140 Faraz)
An-72
20
20
7
15
15
40
22
4
8
15
20
20
7
#
15
40
22
4
8
15
20
20
7
#
15
40
22
4
8
15
20
25
9
#
23
45
25
4
8
15
12
15
Trainers
F-5B Tiger II
F-33A/C Bonanza
T-33A Shooting Star
MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Russia)
EMB312 Tucano (Brazil)
PC7 Turbo Trainer (Switzerland)
MFI-17 Mushshak (Pakistan)
Socata TB200 Tobago XL (France)
Socata TB21 Trinidad TC (France)
JJ-7 Mongol A
Paratsu
PC-6
2
Kiowa)
30
2
#
#
2
2
2
Helicopters
AB206A JetRanger utility (OH-58A
30
2
#
#
30
2
#
#
#
30
2
#
#
#
Sept. 2009)
150
15
150
15
150+
15
150+
15
AB214B/C Super Transporter SAR
CH-47
Shabaviz 2-75 (Iran)
Shabaviz 2061 (Iran)
Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)
MISSILES
Surface-to-Air
MIM-23 HAWK (U.S.)
Tigercat (U.K.)(many non-operational)
45
SA-2)
30
radar)
45
45
45
HQ-2J (Red Flag 2) launchers (Chinese
30
30
30
Towed Rapier launchers (w/Blindfire
10
#
10
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
29
10
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
29
10
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
29
(U.K.)
SA-5 Gammon (Russian S-200 Angara)
SA-6 Gainful (Russian 2K12 Kub)
SA-7 Grail (Russian 9K32 Strela 2/M)
SA-10 Grumble (Russian S-300P)
SA-11 Gadfly (Russian 9K37 Buk 1M)
SA-15 Gauntlet (launchers)(Russian
250
N/A
#
N/A
#
N/A
CPMIEC FM-80 launchers (Chinese)
Bofors RBS 70 low-altitude SAM
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
Hongqi-2/2B (CSA-1) launchers w/ 45+
missiles (Chinese)
Shahin (Iran)
Air-to-Air
MIM-23 HAWK (modified for air-to-air
#
#
#
Tor M1)
#
#
(Sweden)
#
2,400
role)
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
AIM-7 Sparrow
AIM-9 Sidewinder
AIM-54 Phoenix
AA-8 Aphid (Russian K-60)
AA-10 Alamo (Russian R-27)
AA-11 Archer (Russian R-73)
PL-2 (China)
PL-7 (China)
#
#
#
3,000
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
Air-to-Surface
AS-10 Karen (Russian Kh-25)
AS-11 Kilter (Russian Kh-58)
AS-14 Kedge (Russian Kh-29)
AGM-65A Maverick (U.S.)
CSS-N-4 Sardine (China)
#
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
ARTILLERY
Anti-Aircraft
57-mm SZ-60 towed (Hungary)
40-mm M1 towed (U.S.)
40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden)
37-mm Oerlikon
23-mm ZSU-23 twin towed (Russia)
*Editor's Note: Much of Iran's Western-supplied aircraft inventory is in a state of disrepair, due to the
inability to secure parts as well as undertake necessary upgrades. Iran's F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft suffer
from wear, and the avionics are largely obsolete. Iran also lacks advanced air force capabilities such as
beyond-visual range air-to-air combat and airborne sensors.
Deployment
The Iranian air force operates from less than a dozen tactical air bases (TAB), most
of which are located close to major urban centers. Most of the operational airbases
have hardened shelters for aircraft. Operational units are assigned to the following
locations:
Western Area Command
11 Fighter Squadron (MiG-29)
Tehran-Mehrabad
11 Transport Squadron (C-130)
Tehran-Mehrabad
Reconnaissance squadron (Il-76)
Tehran-Mehrabad
Transport squadron
Tehran-Mehrabad
(Boeing 707, Boeing 747)
11 Helicopter Transport Squadron
Tehran-Mehrabad
(CH-47)
Support squadron
Tehran-Mehrabad
(Falcon 20, F27)
VIP squadron
Tehran-Mehrabad
(Boeing 707, Falcon 50, AB212, Bell 412)
Reconnaissance squadron
Tehran-Mehrabad
(RC-707, RC-130)
21 Fighter Squadron (F-5)
Tabriz
23 Fighter Squadron (MiG-29)
Tabriz
31 Recce Squadron (RF-4E)
Hamadan
31 Fighter Squadron (F-4)
Hamadan
41 Fighter Squadron (F-5)
Dezful
43 Fighter Squadron (F-5)
Dezful
72 Fighter Squadron (Su-24)
Shiraz
Training squadron (PC-6)
Shiraz
71 Transport Squadron (C-130)
Shiraz
72 Transport Squadron (C-130)
Shiraz
73 Transport Squadron (Il-76)
Shiraz
71 ASW Squadron (P-3)
Shiraz
51 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7)
Isfahan
52 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7)
Isfahan
53 Fighter Squadron (F-7, FT-7)
Isfahan
81 Fighter Squadron (F-14)
Isfahan
82 Fighter Squadron (F-14)
Isfahan
85 Fighter Squadron (F-5)
Isfahan
Training squadron (PC-7)
Isfahan
Southern Area Command
61 Fighter Squadron (F-4)
62 Fighter Squadron (F-4)
91 Fighter Squadron (F-4)
101 Fighter Squadron (F-4)
Eastern Area Command
Training Squadron
(F-33, EMB312, PC-7)
Training Squadron (MFI-17)
141 Fighter Squadron
(Mirage F-1, F-5)
Training squadron (Beech F33)
Bushehr
Bushehr
Bandar Abbas
Chah Bahar
Tehran-Ghale Morghi AP
Tehran-Ghale Morghi AP
Mashhad
Kushke Nosrat
An air base at Omideyeh is in the process of being transferred to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps air force. In 2008, the 51st, 52nd and 53rd fighter
squadrons stationed there moved to Isfahan.
Several air bases may operate SAR detachments using Bell 214 helicopters. The status of these
detachments is unclear.
Eastern Area Command operates two forward air bases at Birjand and Zahedan with no active units.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps air force operates several airbases across the country. Shiraz is the
main operating base. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:
Transport squadron (An-74, Il-76)
Transport squadron detachment
(An-74, Il-76)
VIP squadron (Falcon 20)
Support squadron (Y-12)
Helicopter transport squadron
(Mi-17)
Fighter squadron (Su-25)
Training squadron (EMB312A)
Support squadron (Y-12)
Support squadron detachment (Y-12)
Support squadron detachment (Y-12)
Helicopter squadron (Mi-17, AB206)
Helicopter squadron detachment
(Mi-17)
Helicopter transport squadron
(Mi-17)
Attack helicopter squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter training squadron
(AB205, AB206, Schweizer 300)
Training squadron (O-2, EMB312)
Training squadron (MFI-17)
Attach Helicopter squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter transport squadron
(AB214, AB205)
Training and Reconnaissance
Helicopter squadron (AB206,
Shahed 274, Shahed 278)
Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base
Mashhad
Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base
Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base
Tehran-Mehrabad, Qadr Air Base
Shiraz
Shiraz
Shiraz
Bandar Abbas
Bushehr
Shiraz
Ahwaz
Faraj
Faraj
Faraj
Badr
Nasr
Unknown, possibly near Isfahan
Unknown, possibly near Isfahan
Unknown, possibly near Isfahan
Issues
An F-4 Phantom fighter jet crashed into the Sea of Oman in November 2007.
A Sukhoi fighter crashed near Tehran in April 2008.
The Il-76 Adnan AEW aircraft crashed during a September 2009 air parade near Tehran.
Plans and Programs
Aircraft Acquisition and Modernization
The delivery of 14 Xian Y-7 transports is underway.
The Azarakhsh (Lightning), Iran's first domestic fighter and a derivative of the F-5 , was introduced in
1997. It reportedly entered mass production in 2000.
The Saegheh (Thunderbolt ) succeeded the Azarakhsh and attained operational capability in September
2006. The aircraft is a light fighter and ground attack plane with avionics and radar of Iranian design and
some Russian components. It made its first flight in late 2007.
Iran is developing an advanced trainer/light attack jet known as the Tavarze. The aircraft was designed by
the Aviation University Complex. It is a subsonic aircraft composed of radar-absorbing materials that
weighs about 11,000 pounds. Iran has a requirement for around 25 Tavarzes. The aircraft reportedly
entered serial production in 2007.
A contract for three Su-25UBT Frogfoot fighters was signed with Russia in 2005, and the aircraft were
delivered in 2006. The UBT model of the fighter is its most advanced variant, with new electronic warfare
and jamming systems.
Iran announced in early 2008 that it was in the "early stages" of the development and production of a fifthgeneration stealth fighter.
Russia completed deliveries of 29 Tor M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet ) SAM systems in January 2007.
Iran has expressed some interest in the Russian-made Ka-32 helicopter.
Israeli intelligence has suggested that Iran received S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia in late
2008. Iran has since publicly rebuked Russia for failing to deliver the systems. Moscow maintains it will
supply the systems, but has repeatedly postponed a delivery date. Iran announced in April 2010 that it
would develop its own version of the S-300 missile defense system.
Iran is also reportedly working to establish an independent missile command.
Iran announced that the domestically produced Shahin (H) anti-aircraft missile entered production in June
2009.
LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010
© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.
Army
Armed Forces Structure
Equipment
Deployment
Plans and Programs
Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW
The Iranian army is organized into:
5 corps headquarters
14 military districts
4 armored divisions, each with
2 armored brigades
1 mechanized brigade
1 self-propelled artillery battalion
1 reconnaissance brigade
4 infantry divisions, each with
3-4 infantry brigades
1 artillery brigade
2 mechanized infantry divisions, each with
1 armored brigade
2-3 mechanized infantry brigades
1 reconnaissance battalion
1 self-propelled artillery battalion
1 artillery battalion
1 special operations brigade
1 commando division
3 commando brigades
1 airborne division
6 artillery groups
12 SAM missile battalions
1 independent armored brigade
1 independent infantry brigade
5 army aviation groups, each with
2-3 light attack helicopter squadrons
1 utility helicopter squadron
A typical armored division has from 10,000-15,000 personnel; an infantry division
has about 16,000 troops.
Air defense forces are divided into three regions: northern, central and southern. All anti-aircraft artillery
and surface-to-air missile systems are under the operational control of the army. Air force and Pasdaran
units have retained some man-portable and towed surface-to-air missiles systems for base protection.
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
Active army manpower is approximately 350,000, including 220,000 conscripts.
Equipment
(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons
Database).
AUG06
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
100
480
75
540
100
168
150
80
#
(Iran)
#
480
75
540
100
168
150
80
#
#
480
75
540
100
168
150
80
#
100
480
75
540
100
168
150
80
#
GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES
Tanks
Zulfiqar MBT (Iran)(in production)
T-72M/S MBT (Russia)
T-62 medium (Russia)
T-54/T-55/T-59 medium (Russia)
Chieftain Mk 3/Mk 5 medium (U.K.)
M47M/M48A5 Patton medium (U.S.)
M60A1 MBT (U.S.)
FV010 Scorpion light (U.K.)
Towsan light tank (90-mm main gun)
300
(Russia)
210
400
200
35
140
300
300
300
Armored Vehicles
BTR-50/BTR-60 APC (incl. variants)
210
400
200
35
#
210
400
200
35
140
210
400
200
35
140
BMP-1 mechanized infantry (Russia)
BMP-2 (Russia)
M113A1 APC (U.S.)
EE-9 Cascavel armored car (Brazil)
Boragh amphibious APC (Iran)
30
10
985
30
10
985
30
10
985
30
10
985
Artillery
Guns
175-mm M107 self-propelled (U.S.)
170-mm M1978 self-propelled (Russia)
130-mm M46 towed (Russia)
20
30
70
180
120
15
#
30
#
100
20
30
70
180
120
15
#
30
#
100
20
30
70
180
120
15
#
30
#
100
20
30
70
180
120
15
#
30
#
100
Howitzers
203-mm M115 towed (U.S.)
203-mm M110 self-propelled (U.S.)
155-mm M114A1 towed
155-mm M109/A1 self-propelled (U.S.)
155-mm GHN-45 towed (Austria)
155-mm NORINCO Type WAC 21 (China)
155-mm Thunder-2 SP (Iran)
152-mm D-20 GH (Russia)
122-mm Thunder-1 SP (Iran)
122-mm Type 54-1 towed (China)
60
540
130
#
#
#
#
(Russia)
#
#
#
#
#
60
540
130
60
540
130
60
540
130
122-mm 2S1 Gvozdika SP (Russia)
122-mm D30 towed (Russia)
105-mm M101A1 towed (U.S.)
Air Defense Guns
(1,700 of the following:)
100-mm KS-19 (Russia)
85-mm KS-12 (Russia)
85-mm M1939 towed (Russia)
57-mm ZSU-57-2 self-propelled
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
#
#
(Russia)
#
#
(incl. IRGC)
#
#
#
N/A
#
#
57-mm S-60 towed (Russia)
40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden)
40-mm L/60 towed (Sweden)
37-mm M1939 towed (Russia)
35-mm GDF-003 Skyguard twin towed
(w/Skyguard radar) (Switzerland)
23-mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled
#
#
23-mm ZU-23-2 twin towed (Russia)
#
N/A
#
N/A
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
#
N/A
#
N/A
10
9
100
7
#
N/A
propelled (Iran)
50
50
propelled
10
9
100
7
N/A
10
9
100
7
N/A
50
50
#
700+
(Iran)
#
propelled
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
9
100
14.5-mm ZPU-2/4 (Russia)
37-mm NORINCO Type 55 LAAG (China)
Mortars
(5,000 of the following:)
120-mm Soltam M65 towed (Israel)
120-mm (Iran)
107-mm (4.2 in) M30 towed (U.S.)
82-mm (Iran)
81-mm M29 towed (U.S.)
60-mm (Iran)
60-mm M19 (U.S.)
Multiple Rocket Launchers
333-mm Shahin 1 (Hawk 1) towed
(Iran)(incl. IRGC)
333-mm Shahin 2 (Hawk 2) towed
(Iran)(incl. IRGC)
333-mm Fajr 5
320-mm Oghab (Eagle) self-propelled
(Iran) (incl. IRGC)
240-mm Fajr 3
240-mm M-1985 (China)
122-mm BM-21 (Russia)
122-mm BM-11 (Russia)
122-mm Hadid (30-round) self122-mm Hadid variant (40-round) self(Iran)(incl. IRGC)
122-mm Type 81 (China)
122-mm Fajr 6 minelaying rocket
107-mm Fajr 1 (12-round) self(Iran) (Chinese Type 63) (incl.
IRGC)
700
63)
700
700
700
107-mm Haseb SP (Iran) (Chinese Type
#
#
#
#
#
75
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
MISSILES
Anti-Tank
BGM-71A TOW air-to-ground (U.S.)
BGM-71A TOW (U.S.)
M47 Dragon launchers (U.S.)
MGM-32A ENTAC (France)
AT-4 Spigot (Russian 9K111 Fagot)
AT-3 Sagger (Russian 9K11 Malyutka)
(incl. some self-propelled)
AT-5 Spandrel (Russia)
RPG-7V (Russia)
SAGHEGH 80-mm (Iran) (improved RPG-7)
RPG-22 (Russia)
NAFEZ 73-mm recoilless (Iran) (based
#
#
#
#
200
#
Russian SPG-9)
106-mm M-40 recoilless rifle (U.S.)
107-mm B-11 recoilless anti-tank gun
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
75-mm M-20 recoilless rifle (U.S.)
82-mm B-10 recoilless rifle (Russia)
Shahin 1 (Hawk) (Iran)
#
300
#
12
on
(Russia)
#
variant)
#
300
12+
300
12+
Surface-to-Surface
SS-1 Scud B/Scud C (Russian R-17E)
(up to 18 launchers) (incl. IRGC)
Scud Mod B variants (North Korea)
(8-15 MAZ-543 TELs)(Shahab-1)
Shahab-2 (extended range Scud Mod C
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
175
N/A
N/A
175
N/A
N/A
175
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
#
#
#
attack mission, fired from HAWK)
Shahab-3
#
#
#
MRBM
Shahab-4 (derivative of N. Korean
#
Taepodong-2)
#
N/A
#
#
Shahab-5 (derivative of N. Korean
N/A
N/A
BM-25 (North Korea) (reported)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Surface-to-Air
FIM-92A Stinger MANPADS (U.S.)
MIM-23A Hawk launchers (U.S.)
MIM-23B I-Hawk (U.S.)
Iran-700 (North Korean Nodong-1 SSM)
(see Shahab-3)
FROG-7 (Russian 9K21 Luna-M)
CSS-7 (Chinese DF-11/M-11)
CSS-8 (Chinese M-7) (30 launchers)
(Mushak-120, Iran-130, Nazeat-10)
MGM-52 Lance (U.S.)
RIM-66B Standard (U.S.) (modified for
land
#
Nodong-2)
#
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
#
RBS-70 (Sweden)
HQ-7 self-propelled (China)
(reported)
10
SA-22 Greyhound self-propelled
(Russian
#
Igla-1)
#
Strela 3)
#
Strela-2)
#
#
#
#
#
Pantsyr S-1)
SA-16 Gimlet MANPADS (Russian 9K310
#
#
#
SA-14 Gremlin MANPADS (Russian 9K34
#
#
#
SA-7 Grail MANPADS (Russian 9K32
#
#
N/A
N/A
#
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Misagh-1 man-portable SAM
Misagh-2 man-portable SAM
HQ-23/2B (CSA-1)
HN-5A MANPADS (China)
Army Aviation
(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database. Equipment is of
U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)
AUG06
FEB09
AUG10
2
2
2
4
10
4
10
4
10
4
10
1
1
1
1
50
20
50
50
20
50
50
20
50
50
20
50
68
10
Kiowa)
25
68
10
68
10
68
10
Helicopters
AH-1J Cobra attack
CH-47C Chinook heavy transport
Bell 214A/C Isfahan transport/SAR
(U.S. Bell 214 Super Transporter)
AB205A-1 transport (U.S. UH-1H Huey)
AB206A/-B Jetranger scout (OH-58A
25
25
25
Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)
#
#
#
#
2
Friendship
OCT07
AIRCRAFT
Utility/Observation
F27 Mk 400M Troopship/F27 Mk 600
transport (Netherlands)
Turbo Commander 690 liaison
Cessna 185A Skywagon utility (U.S. U-
17)
Dassault Falcon 20E-2 (France)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Mohajer III/II/IV
Deployment
1st Army Headquarters
2nd Army Headquarters
Tehran
Isfahan
3rd Army Headquarters
18th Armored Division
23rd Special Forces Division
28th Mechanized Division
30th Infantry Division
40th Infantry Division
55th Airborne Division
58th Infantry Division
64th Infantry Division
77th Infantry Division
81st Armored Division
84th Mechanized Division
88th Armored Division
Shiraz
Tehran
Tehran
Kerman
Tehran
Hamadan
Tehran
Ahvaz
Bandar e Mah Shahr
Tabriz
Qazin
Khorramabad
Ahvaz
Iranian army aviation operates a handful of airbases. Operational units are assigned
to the following locations:
Aircraft Battalion Command
Transport squadron (F27)
VIP squadron (Falcon 20)
Support squadron (RC690)
Helicopter transport squadron
(Bell 214)
Helicopter transport squadron (CH-47)
Helicopter assault and transport
Squadron (x4) (Bell 214)
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter training squadron
(AB205, AB206, AH-1)
Central Training School
Helicopter training and
reconnaissance squadron (x2)
(AB205, AB206)
Helicopter training and transport
squadron (x2) (CH-47)
1st Support and Assault Group
Helicopter assault squadron (x2)
(Bell 214)
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter reconnaissance squadron
(AB206)
2nd Support and Assault Group
Helicopter assault squadron
(Bell 214)
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter reconnaissance squadron
(AB206)
3rd Support and Assault Group
Helicopter assault squadron (x2)
(Bell 214)
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter reconnaissance squadron
(AB206)
Provisional Support and Assault Group
(part of 3rd S&A Group)
Helicopter assault squadron
(Bell 214)
Tehran-Mehrabad
Tehran Ghale-Morghi
Badr
Badr
Badr
Badr
Isfahan
Isfahan
Masjed Suleyman
Kerman
Zahedan
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter reconnaissance squadron
(AB206)
5th Support and Assault Group
Helicopter assault squadron
(Bell 214)
Helicopter attack squadron (AH-1)
Helicopter reconnaissance squadron
(AB206)
Mashhad
Plans and Programs
Ground Combat Vehicles
Mass production of the locally built Zulfiqar main battle tank for regular army and
Pasdaran units continues, but the exact status of the program is not publicly known.
According to Iranian officials, the tank weighs 40 tons and has a top speed of 43
mph (70 kph) over flat terrain. During test-firings, the main gun did not appear to be
stabilized and there do not appear to be any sighting mechanisms on the turret.
Production timetables and numbers have not been made public. The Iranian army
announced in May 2010 that it would soon reveal an upgraded version of the
Zulfiqar .
A large number of T-54 MBTs captured from Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) have been rebuilt and
modernized using locally produced parts. Renamed the Safir-74 (Messenger-74), the modified T-54
incorporates an upgraded engine, transmission, internal fire extinguishing systems and fire control systems.
According to Iranian officials, target acquisition and accuracy against mobile and static targets have been
greatly improved. The Safir-74 can reportedly operate in water up to 16.4 feet (5 m) deep when fitted with
special underwater equipment, and up to 4.9 feet (1.5 m) without special equipment.
Iran is also mass-producing the Boragh IFV, a simplified derivative of the BMP-1.
Iran announced the production of the indigenous Tosan "quick reaction" tank in July 2008.
*Editor's Note: For information on Iran's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, see the
Issues and Notes section of the Iranian Overview.
LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010
© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.
Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW
The Islamic Republic of
Iran is bordered to the
south by the Persian
Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman, to the west by
Pakistan and
Afghanistan, to the north
by Turkmenistan, the
Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan
and Armenia, and to the
west by Turkey and
Iraq.
Historical
Background
Iran's Western-backed
monarchy was
overthrown in 1979 and
replaced with a Shi'ite
Muslim theocracy. The
government has since
been guarded in its
relations with the West,
and hostile toward the
United States, which has
been propagandized as
the "Great Satan ."
Soon after the
revolution, Iran began a bitter eight-year war with Iraq and the Sunni-dominated government of Saddam
Hussein.
Terrorist Activity
The Iranian government has been a long-time supporter of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah and several
Palestinian groups -- including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC -- providing
them with funding, safe haven, training and weapons. Iranian agents are even known to operate as senior
officials in some of these organizations, such as Muhammad Riza Zahdi, an Iranian intelligence official
who succeeded the assassinated Imad Mughniyeh as Hezbollah's military chief.
The United States levied imposed economic sanctions against Iran in 1995, calling its government a state
sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. State Dept. has named Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in
the world, saying that Tehran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) support terrorist groups in planning and executing attacks around the globe.
U.S. President George Bush in 2002 called Iran, Iraq and North Korea an "axis of evil." In mid-2007, the
State Dept. declared the IRGC a foreign terrorist organization. The IRGC became the first government
agency on the list.
After Israel's three-week offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that ended in mid-January 2009, Iran
almost immediately began to reinforce the terrorist group with weapons and supplies lost during the
conflict. Iran and Hamas utilized tunnels from Egypt to Gaza to smuggle the supplies. Iran also reportedly
encouraged Hamas to confront Israel and pressured the group not to accept a truce.
Nuclear Ambitions
Adding to the instability of the Persian Gulf region has been Iran's conventional military buildup and
suspected ongoing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development programs.
In December 2000, Russia and Iran agreed to launch a new long-term program of political and military cooperation. This bilateral agreement included military-technical co-operation (including the 2002
development of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr -- a cause of great concern for the United States and
countries in the region), consultations on mutual security threats such as terrorism and drug-smuggling, as
well as exchanges of service personnel, including the training of Iranian military officers in Russian
academies.
During 2003, concerns from the international community led by the United States prompted International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to call for immediate inspections of suspected atomic weapons
programs in Bushehr and other sites. While this round of inspections turned up no evidence of an
underground nuclear program, the IAEA rebuked Iran in June 2004 for not fully cooperating with its
investigation. Iran maintains its nuclear capacity development is strictly for civilian energy purposes.
Tehran's nuclear program and apparent desire for regional dominance continue to cause concern among
Iran's neighbors and the international community. Western countries have offered economic incentives to
get Iran to cease uranium enrichment, to no avail. The U.N. Security Council levied sanctions against Iran
in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 for its continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA and its failure to suspend
uranium enrichment activity. Throughout, Tehran has maintained its right to develop nuclear energy, and
has continued to enrich uranium on an increasingly industrial scale.
In August 2007, Tehran agreed on a timetable of cooperation with the IAEA designed to answer questions
about its nuclear program. The schedule called for all issues to be resolved by the end of the year.
However, the U.S. and French governments criticized the agreement as part of Iran's strategy to give up
little information while it drags out the process to avoid further punishment by the U.N. Security Council.
Iran on occasion does offer the IAEA access to declared nuclear sites. Inspectors had reported finding "no
evidence on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon
or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies." They also said
they could not verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program until Iran adopts requested
"transparency measures," such as access to centrifuge manufacturing sites.
Testing began at the Bushehr nuclear plant in February 2009, around the time that a new IAEA report
indicated that Iran had stockpiled enough nuclear fuel for a weapon. A November 2009 IAEA report
suggested that Iran was working on an advanced nuclear warhead that could be equipped on ballistic
missiles. Agency documents have indicated that Tehran has mastered many aspects of constructing a
nuclear warhead, including uranium metallurgy, heavy-water production and the high-precision explosives
used to trigger a nuclear detonation.
In April 2009, Iran was invited to join six other nations -- the United States, Britain, Russia, China, France
and Germany -- for joint nuclear talks. The so-called G5 +1 talks began in October 2009 in Geneva,
Switzerland. Iran ultimately rejected an offer to export its low-grade uranium in exchange for enriched
uranium to be used in a medical reactor. This refusal led to the U.N., E.U., U.S. and other members of the
international community imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran in the summer of 2010.
Days before the talks began, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA disclosing the existence of a second uraniumenrichment facility at Qom. Tehran apparently revealed its existence because the U.S., the U.K. and France
were about to disclose details of the mountain facility.
In January 2010, the New York Timesreported that much of Iran's nuclear program is hidden in underground
tunnels similar to the the facility at Qom.
Election Unrest
Incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed victory in June 12, 2009, elections amid widespread
claims of fraud. Reform candidate Mirhossein Mousavi and his supporters took to the streets in protest.
The government reacted swiftly, employing police and the Basij militia to crack down on protesters. The
government said there were 36 deaths in the following three months; Mousavi's Green Movement said at
least 72 were killed. Hundreds were arrested.
The international community, including the U.S., France and Britain, condemned the crackdown.
Independent think tanks and observers, including Chatham House in the U.K., also suggested fraud took
place in the elections.
Nine Iranian employees of the British Embassy were arrested for allegedly playing a role in the protests,
although eight were eventually released. The final worker was sentenced to four years in prison in October
2009.
Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami endorsed Ahmadinejad in late June, reportedly calling for the execution of the
leaders of the demonstration. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in for his second term on Aug. 5.
Other Issues
Officially, the Iranian government has been neutral during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the U.S. has
accused Iran of interfering in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and supplying weapons to Iraqi Shi'ite
militias. The U.S. has also maintained that Tehran is arming and training the Taliban f ighting NATO
forces in Afghanistan.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is notorious. He has questioned the veracity of the Holocaust
and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.
Iran has worked to establish closer military ties with Sudan, Iraq and Syria. Tehran has also worked to
increase ties with Venezuela, which has allegedly assisted Iran with its nuclear program.
In an attempt to deter a possible strike against its nuclear facilities, Iran has threatened to destroy U.S. and
Israeli interests in the Middle East if attacked. Potential Iranian targets could include U.S. bases in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Dimona, the Israeli nuclear site.
In August 2009, three American backpackers were arrested in the border area near Iraq's Kurdish region. It
is unclear if the hikers crossed the border as Tehran has alleged. As of this update, the three remain in an
Iranian prison.
In October 2009, Tehran said the U.S. kidnapped an Iranian nuclear researcher, Shahram Amiri, while he
was on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Amiri eventually surfaced in Washington, D.C., and returned home to
Iran in July 2010. Via Iranian media, he claimed to have been kidnapped by the CIA. American officials
said he had been a willing informant. Upon his return, Iran said he was a double agent.
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
The constitution of 1979, drafted after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi, established a Supreme Defense
Council (SDC) to govern all Iranian defense matters. The council consists of the President, Prime Minister,
Defense Minister and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contains the three regular armed forces commanders.
The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) commander and the commander of the Basij (volunteer militia) are
also members of the council.
The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Faqih, supervises the Supreme Defense Council. The
Faqih names two representatives to sit on the council.
The position of armed forces commander-in-chief (Wali Faqih) is also technically assigned to the Faqih
under the 1979 constitution. In 1980, the Faqih delegated the title to the office of the President, with the
Faqih retaining supervisory privileges. In 1989, however, the post was returned to the Faqih.
ARMED FORCES
The regular armed forces include the army, air force and the navy, including a naval infantry/marine corps.
For additional information on the individual services, see separate database entries for Iran
Ground Forces
Air Force
Navy/Marines
Special Operations Forces (Revolutionary Guard Corps)
CONSCRIPTION
Service in the regular military is by conscription. The period of conscription is 16 months for all services,
including the Pasdaran. Iran has been gradually reducing the length of its mandatory service from a high of
24 months at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.
The army is the only service to maintain an active reserve. Reservists form battalion-sized units known as
"quds" during time of war.
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
The armed forces currently number 545,000 personnel, of which roughly 220,000 are conscripts.
Paramilitary Forces
The paramilitary order forces, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Army of 2 Million" or the
"Mobilization of the Oppressed," are under the operational control of the Revolutionary Guard Corps
(Pasdaran). The two main paramilitary forces are the Basij (volunteer militia) and various law-enforcement
forces under the Ministry of Interior. The exact size of the Basij is not known, but could be as low as 1-2
million or as high as 12.5-20 million.
Ministry of the Interior
The 40,000-strong Ministry of Interior security forces is available to be mobilized for military action if
required. In peacetime, interior land and naval border guard units are under the operational control of the
Ministry of Interior where they carry out law enforcement in rural areas and in towns with fewer than 5,000
inhabitants. Equipment reported to be in use with the interior forces includes:
AUG06
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
AIRCRAFT
#
#
utility
24
24
#
#
24
#
#
24
#
#
AB205/206 JetRanger helicopters
2
90
craft
40
craft
Cessna 185 utility
Cessna 310L
Iran-140 transport
90
90
90
SHIPS
coastal patrol
40
40
40
harbor patrol
Opposition Forces
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO)
The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), also known as the People's Mujahedin of Iran
(PMOI), includes the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK) and the
Muslim Iranian Student's Society (a front organization used to garner financial support). College-educated
offspring of Iranian merchants founded MEK in 1965. Its ideology, a mixture of Islam and Marxism,
emphasizes the need for social change within Iran.
Iran carried out strikes against MKO strongholds throughout the 1990s, forcing the MKO leadership into
self-imposed exile in France.
In late April 2003, the U.S. concluded a cease-fire agreement with the MKO in Iraq, despite the fact that
the group has been placed on the State Dept. list of foreign terrorist organizations. Under the terms of the
agreement, the U.S. allowed the MKO to keep its arms, stay in Iraq and continue to fight. The agreement
drew sharp criticism from Tehran.
The U.S. later in 2003 offered group members protection in return for disarming. By early 2009, the Iraqi
government was stepping up pressure to expel the group from Iraq. For more information on the MEK, see
Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was founded after World War II as a splinter of an
Association for the Resurrection of Kurdistan. The party was practically liquidated when a Kurdish
rebellion was crushed in 1966-67. It was reinstituted after 1973, when Abd ar-Rahman Qasemlu was
elected as the party's secretary-general. The KDPI is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish
opposition groups, and seeks autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. It operates in northwest Iran and from
Kurdish areas in Iraq and Turkey, saying its seeks a socialist democratic society within an Iranian federal
republic.
Kurdish Communist Party of Iran (Komala)
The Kurdish Communist Party of Iran is a small opposition group concentrated around Sanandaj. Komala
seeks a secular autonomous region under Kurdish control. For more information on the Kurdish
Communist Party of Iran, see Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
The Kurdish PKK operates mainly in Turkey and northern Iraq, but the Iranian government has accused it
of launching attacks on Iranian border troops. For more information on the Kurdistan Workers' Party, see
Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.
Jundallah
The Baluch separatist group Jundallah is primarily active in Iran's southeast, near the border with Pakistan.
A Jundallah attack on Oct. 18, 2009, killed more than 40 people, including 15 members of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, in Sistan-Baluchistan province.
Group leader Abdolmalek Rigi was arrested in February 2010 on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan when
Iranian jets intercepted the aircraft over the Persian Gulf and forced it to land. Rigi's brother was executed
in May. Rigi himself was executed on June 20, 2010.
A pair of Jundallah suicide bombers attacked a mosque in the southeastern city of Zahedan in July 2010.
The attack was said to be in revenge for their leader's execution.
Iran claims that Jundallah is backed by the U.S.
Budget
Defense Budget for FY08: $9.6 billion
Defense Budget for FY07: $7.2 billion
Defense Budget for FY06: $6.6 billion
Issues
Iranian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Programs
Chemical Weapons
Despite being a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has reportedly developed and
stockpiled a large arsenal of chemical weapons (CWs) -- including nerve, blood, choking and blister agents
-- as well as their delivery systems.
Iran began producing chemical weapons in response to Iraqi CW attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (19801988). Recognizing its inability to respond effectively to Baghdad, Tehran began placing a high priority on
CW programs in the early 1990s. This culminated in the building of the country's major CW production
facility at Damghan, 186 miles east of Tehran. Other major reported CW facilities include sites at Isfahan,
Parchin and Qazvin.
The U.S. government believes Iran is able to produce as much as 1,000 tons of weapons-grade chemicals a
year; including sulfur-mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
maintains that Iran has mastered shell and bomb delivery systems and may be producing CW warheads for
its short- and medium-range missiles. After 2003, U.S. intelligence began to downplay such assertions,
suggesting that dual-use facilities could quickly field chemical agents but were not necessarily active in
their production.
Iranian officials insist the CW program was abandoned after the Iran-Iraq War.
Biological Weapons
The Iran-Iraq war was also the catalyst for Iran's biological weapons (BW) program, despite its ratification
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Tehran is thought to be in the advanced research and
development stage, though the program's existence and current status are unconfirmed. Most of the
information on such a program comes from CIA reports, uncited writings of experts and claims made by
Iranian dissidents.
Iran may have small quantities of weaponized BW agents.
Nuclear Weapons Programs
In April 2003, the U.S. called on the international community to stop all trade in nuclear material with Iran.
Washington urged the 187 members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare that Iran violated IAEA regulations when it secretly built two
nuclear facilities. The IAEA directive states that signatories to the NPT must declare the existence of
nuclear facilities before construction.
Iran has received Russian support on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This
arrangement was formalized in February 2005 and the reactor is reportedly nearing completion. The
resulting expertise and technology, as well as the establishment of contacts and commercial channels, could
be used to supplement the country's nuclear weapons program, according to analysts at the Dept. of Energy.
Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only.
Iran has also been enriching uranium since 2006. The enriched product can fuel nuclear generators, while
highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons. Iran reported in December 2008 that it has at
least 5,000 gas centrifuges working to enrich uranium and plans to have at least 6,000.
An unclassified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran released in December of 2007 concluded
with "high confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Other countries,
including Israel and France, disagreed, judging that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon by 2009. The
United States has continued questioning Iran's intentions. Reports in January 2010 indicated that the NIE
about Iran was being revised.
In November 2008, the IAEA announced that Iran has produced 1,390 pounds of low-enriched uranium,
enough to make one bomb, assuming Iran has other technologies in place to do so. Iran's nuclear chief
announced in June 2010 that his country had produced more than 37 pounds of 20 percent enriched ura
nium.
The Iranian government announced in November 2009 that that it would build 10 new enrichment plants.
Construction on two of those sites is scheduled to begin by March 2011.
Nuclear Research Facilities (reported)
Bushehr
The Bushehr nuclear research facility originally contained two incomplete Siemens 1,250-MWe nuclear
reactors built by the Germans in the 1970s. Both reactors, only 75 percent complete when the project was
abandoned in 1979, were heavily damaged by Iraqi bombers during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).
According to reports, the reactor core areas of Unit 1 and Unit 2 were completely destroyed in the attacks.
In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed an $800 million contract calling for completion of Unit 1 by 1999
and Unit 2 one to two years later. Two Russian-built VVER-1000 reactors were to replace the destroyed
reactors. Construction of two new N-213-type VVER-440 Mwe reactors (Units 3 and 4) at an adjacent site
was also studied. By mid-2002, 600 Russian specialists were working at Bushehr alongside hundreds of
Russian-trained Iranian technicians. The sprawling 6th Fighter Base, home to two squadrons of F-4 and F-7
fighter aircraft, is located north of the Bushehr facility. Bushehr is also the site of Iran's "Nuclear Energy
College."
In December 2002, the Russian Atomic Energy Agency said it had manufactured 180 fuel rods for the first
reactor unit. The agreement calls for the spent fuel rods to be returned to Russia. Spent fuel rods can also be
easily converted into plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear warheads.
The Bushehr facility is not yet operational, but it is anticipated it will be ready in September 2010. Russia
apparently slowed its work on the facility in 2007, saying Iran had not paid its bills in full. Moscow did,
however, begin delivering uranium to the facility in December 2007.
Natanz
Natanz is the location of Iran's main uranium enrichment facility. By mid-2007, Iran had assembled and
begun using more than 1,300 centrifuges into eight cascades. By early 2009, there were at least 5,000
centrifuges. The large facility is built partially underground, leading to questions about its declared
peaceful purpose. When completed, Natanz is expected to be capable of producing enough weapons-grade
uranium to build several nuclear weapons per year.
Qom
The existence of the enrichment facility at Qom was revealed in September 2009. Construction apparently
began in 2005. Western intelligence agencies maintained that they had been monitoring the site for years.
Iran publicly admitted to the site after discovering the surveillance. U.S. President Obama said the facility
is designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges; it is built into a mountain.
Arak
Arak is the site of two heavy water facilities. One is a heavy water production facility, first disclosed by
Iranian opposition groups. After the IAEA visited the site in February 2003, Iran said that it intended to use
the heavy water to moderate a prospective research reactor in Arak. This facility opened in August 2006.
The second facility is a 40 MW heavy water reactor. Construction was scheduled to begin in 2004. Exactly
when construction began is unclear, but commercially available satellite imagery indicated that it was well
under way by early 2005. When completed, the Arak reactor will enable Iran to produce plutonium suitable
for nuclear weapons assembly, perhaps one to two nuclear weapons annually per year. In August 2006,
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that the reactor was scheduled to be opened in 2009, although the
IAEA gave an expected commissioning date of 2011. The Iranians say the plant is intended for medical
research and development.
Isfahan (GEMA Energy Center, University of Isfahan)
This facility contains a small 27-kW Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor, electromagnetic
isotope separator and "desk-top-sized" calutron. Construction of the underground facility began in late 1991
and was reportedly completed with Chinese assistance in March 1994. A related site near Isfahan
reportedly houses a Chinese-built "nuclear starter device."
The center has a total of four small research reactors. A deal with the Chinese to build a uranium
conversion plant at Isfahan was suspected to be part of Iran's nuclear weapons program, because Iran's
civilian reactor at Bushehr does not require the uranium product that would be derived from the conversion
plant.
Uranium hexafluoride gas is produced at Isfahan. The gas is then transferred to Natanz for enrichment.
Saghand, Yazd Province
A uranium mine and processing facility is located in Saghand, Yadz Province. Identified uranium ore
deposits at this site exceed 3,000 tons, and undiscovered reserves are estimated at 7,500 tons. A yellowcake
uranium plant also is located at Saghand. Smaller uranium deposits are located near Isfahan and in
Azerbaijan, Khorasan and Sistan-va-Baluchestan.
In 2005, U.S. State Dept. officials used the capacity and production capabilities of Saghand to suggest that
Iran could did not possess sufficient uranium reserves to achieve nuclear power self-sufficiency. They
argued that Tehran would have to import outside sources of uranium if it truly intended to construct nuclear
reactors for energy purposes, tending to discredit Iran's assertions it could profit from nuclear energy by
opening up oil and natural gas reserves to the world market.
Ballistic Missile Programs
Iran has advanced capability in the area of ballistic missile production. Tehran's missile program includes
copies of the Russian-made Scud (Shahab-2 in Iranian service) and North Korean No-dong (Shahab-3).
Iran has also imported the Chinese M-7 solid-fuel missile, which has a 93-mile range. Iran's long-range
rocket arsenal reportedly tripled in 2008.
Iran is also developing the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, based on the North Korea's Taepo-dong missile,
according to a report on foreign-missile development produced for the Central Intelligence Agency.
The acquisition in 2006 of BM-25 surface-to-surface missiles from North Korea increased the range of a
potential Iranian strike. The BM-25 has a range of approximately 2,500 km.
Iran launched a satellite into orbit using a suborbital rocket in February 2007. Western analysts are
concerned that the launch vehicle could be converted into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with
a range of up to 2,500 miles (4,023 km).
"A reconnaissance satellite of reasonable performance should weigh about 300 kg (660 lb.)," said the
former head of the Israel Missile Defense Organization Uzi Rubin, in a report for the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs. "Once Iran learns how to put 300 kg. into earth orbit, it could adapt the satellite launcher
into an ICBM that could drop more than 300 kg anywhere in the world." U.S. intelligence reported that Iran
failed to put a dummy satellite into orbit on Aug. 16, 2008.
In September 2007, Iran displayed its new Ghadr -1 missile for the first time. The missile is believed to be
an improved version of the Shahab series. Iran said the missile has a range of 1,800 km (1,100 miles).
The government announced the construction of the Ashura ballistic missile in November 2007. It
reportedly has a range of 2,000 km (1,240 miles).
The solid-fuel Sajjil missile was successfully test-fired in November 2008. The Sajjil-2 was successfully
test-fired in May and December 2009. Both have a range of 2,000 km (1,250 miles).
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency informed Congress in late 2006 that Iran could develop an ICBM
with a range of 3,000 mi. (4,828 km) by 2015.
In July 2008, Iran released a photo purportedly showing the successful test-launch of four Shahab-3
missiles. The photo turned out to be a poorly Photoshopped image, a suspected attempt to cover up the
misfiring of at least one weapon.
Plans and Programs
See separate ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, and SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES entries for additional
information.
LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010
© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.
Navy
Armed Forces Structure
Equipment
Deployment
Issues and Notes
Plans and Programs
Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW
The maritime forces of Iran consist of the regular navy, a naval air arm and a naval infantry force. The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) or Pasdaran operates a separate naval force to reinforce the
navy and marines. (See separate database entry for Iran/Special Operations Forces for additional
information.)
The Iranian navy is organized into three operational zones: the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean. Iran's operational headquarters is at Bandar Abbas, as is its primary ship-repair facility. A second
operating base and ship-repair facility is located at Bushehr.
The naval infantry/marine force consists of two battalions with approximately 2,600 active troops.
Although the marines are responsible for amphibious operations, it is the Revolutionary Guard Marine
Force that carries out most of the amphibious special operations.
Three navy brigades and one Pasdaran brigade make up Iran's extensive coastal defense anti-ship missile
system. At least 12 batteries of HY-2/HY-4 Silkworm and SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile sites are
operational at sites along the Strait of Hormuz and on Kharg Island.
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
The total active strength of the Iranian navy is approximately 18,000 personnel, including the 2,600-strong
naval air arm and 2,600 marines.
Equipment
(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database.)
AUG06
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
SHIPS
Submarines
3
3
3
3
TAREGH class (Russian Kilo
design)
1
1
3+
AL SABIHA-15 swimmer delivery
vehicle
10
10
10
North Korean swimmer delivery
vehicles
(unconfirmed)
7
GHADIR class (Iran)
Destroyers
1
MOWDGE-class destroyer (Iran)
Frigates
3
3
3
4
ALVAND class (U.K. VOSPER Mk
5 design)
Patrol Boats
1
1
1
JOSHAN class torpedo boat (Iran)
1
1
1
ZOLFAQAR class (Iran)
2
2
2
2
BAYANDOR
class (U.S. PF 103 design)
10
10
10
13
KAMANclass missile craft (France LA
COMBATTANTE II design)
3
3
3
3
PARVIN class
(U.S. Improved PGM 71 design)
2
KAIVAN
class (U.S. CAPE class)
3
N/A
N/A
N/A
ZAFAR class
15
PEYKAAP I class (Iran)
11
PEYKAAP
II class (Iran)
Patrol Craft
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
Boston Whaler 6.7-m design motorized launches
#
9
9
9
U.S. Mk III class (Marinette Marine 20-m
design)
#
6
6
6
U.S. 50-ft class (Peterson
Builders design)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
U.S. Swift Mk II
class (Peterson Builders
15-m
design)
#
6
6
6
U.S. Enforcer class (Bertram
Yacht 9.5-m
design)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
MAHNAVI HAMRAZ class (Stewart Seacraft 40-ft
design)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
MIG-G-1900-class coastal
(Iran 20-m design)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
MIG-S-1800-class
coastal (Iran 19-m design)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
PBI-type
coastal (Iran 15-m design)
Amphibious
2
2
2
CHAVOUSH-class LST (Iran)
2
2
2
ARYA SAHAND class (Japanese Teraoka Shipyards
design)
3
3
3
3
FOQUE-class landing craft
(Iranian 36-m
design)
3
N/A
N/A
N/A
37-m Iranian-design landing craft (Iran)
4
4
4
4
HENGAM-class logistic landing ship (ex-U.K.
Yarrow 92-m design)
3
N/A
N/A
N/A
IRAN HORMUZ 24class LST (South Korean 73-m
Inchon
design)
3
N/A
N/A
N/A
IRAN HORMUZ 21 class
(Netherlands 65-m
Ravenstein
design)
6
N/A
N/A
N/A
Type 412 Sea Truck utility
landing craft
(U.K. Rortork 12-m
design)
Mine Countermeasure
2
1
1
2
RIAZI-class inshore minesweeper (ex-U.S.
CAPE class)
2
N/A
N/A
2
Type-292 MSC
Mine Laying
3
N/A
N/A
N/A
HEJAZ (LST)
Auxiliary
2
2
2
2
BANDAR ABBAS-class oiler
(German 108-m
Luhring design)
1
1
1
1
KHARG-class replenishment oiler (U.K. OLWENclass design)
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
47-m Iranian-design
logistics ship (Iran)
5
7
7
6
DELVAR-class
support (Karachi SY 63-m
design)
2
2
2
2
KANGAN-class water tanker (Indian Mazagon
Dock 148-m design)
1
0
0
0
KISH training ship
(German 37-m design)
(stricken)
1
1
1
N/A
ABNEGAR-class survey (Malahide SY 20-m
design)
12
12
12
12
BAKHTARAN-class tender
(Damen, Gorinchem 47-m
design)
1
1
1
1
HAMZEH-class training ship (U.S)(exSHAHROKHclass minesweeper)
1
1
N/A
CHAH BAHAR-class repair ship
(ex-U.S. AMPHION)
MISSILES
Surface-to-Surface
#
#
#
#
TONDAR anti-ship
(improved C-802)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
MM38 Exocet (France)
#
0
0
0
RGM-84A Harpoon (U.S.)
#
#
#
#
C-801 (CSS-NX-4 Sardine) (China)
#
#
#
#
C-802 (CSS-NX-8 Saccade) (China)
#
#
#
#
HY-1 Silkworm (SS-N-2B/C Styx)(China) (incl.
coastal batteries)
#
#
#
#
HY-2 Seersucker
(Chinese CSS-3)(8-10 mobile
launchers/coastal batteries)
#
#
#
#
HY-4
Silkworm (China)
#
N/A
N/A
N/A
Gabriel (Israel)
#
0
0
0
Sea Killer Mk 2 (Italy)(non-operational)
#
C-701 Kosar (China)
Surfaceto-Air
#
#
#
0
Standard SM-1 MR (U.S.)(nonoperational)
#
#
#
#
SA-7 Grail MANPADS
(Russian 9K32M Strela-2)
#
#
#
N/A
Seacat
(U.K.)
Multiple Launch Rocket
Systems
#
#
#
#
107-mm Fajr self-propelled
(Iran) (Chinese
Type 63)
#
#
#
#
107-mm Haseb self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese
Type 63)
Naval Aviation
(For additional information on the equipment listed below search our Weapons Database.)
AUG06
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
AIRCRAFT
4
4
4
4
Turbo Commander 690 liaison (U.S.)
4
4
4
4
F27 Mk 400M Troopship/Mk 600 Friendship
transport (Netherlands)
3
3
3
3
Falcon 20E
VIP transport (France)
5
3
3
3
P-3F Orion
(U.S.)
5
5
5
5
Do-228 (Germany)
Helicopters
2
2
2
2
AB206A-1 Jetranger
liaison/training (U.S.)
5
5
5
5
AB205A-1
transport/SAR (U.S.)
10
10
10
10
AB212AS ASW
(U.S. UH-1)
10
10
10
10
SH-3D Sea King ASW (U.S.
UH-3)
3
3
3
3
RH-53D Sea Stallion
MCM/transport (U.S.)
#
#
Mi-8/17
transport (Russia)
Deployment
Iranian navy ports and facilities are located at:
Navy Headquarters
Tehran
Operational
Headquarters
Bandar Abbas
Naval Aviation Headquarters
Tehran
1st Naval District
Tehran
2nd Naval
District
Bushehr
3rd Naval District
Bandar-e-Khomeini
4th Naval District (Caspian Sea) Noushehr
Coastal Defense Missile Sites:
8 SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile
sites near Bandar Abbas
At least 12 Silkworm anti-ship missile
sites near Bandar Abbas and
Kharg Island
Additional Bases:
Abadan
Abu Musa
Asalouyeh
Bandar-e-Anzali
Chah
Bahar (Bandar Beheshti)
Chalus
Farsi
Isfahan
Jask
Kharg Island
Mahshahr
Shiraz
Sirri
Iranian naval aviation operates two airbases. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:
Helicopter ASW squadron (SH-3)
Bushehr Helicopter Transport
and SAR squadron Bushehr (RH-53, AB212) Transport and Navy Patrol
squadron
Bandar Abbas (F-27) Helicopter ASW squadron (SH-3)
Bandar Abbas Helicopter Transport and SAR squadron Bandar Abbas (RH53, AB212) Helicopter Transport squadron (Mi-17) Bandar Abbas
(Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps)
Issues
Iran has adopted a swarm strategy for its navy in the Persian Gulf. Hardened terminals have been
constructed that can deploy large numbers of small assault vessels to overwhelm enemy targets. The fast
boats are reportedly armed with cruise missiles, mines, torpedoes and rocket-propelled grenades. As of
mid-2007, the U.S. Navy estimated that Iran's navy and IRGC had deployed more than 1,000 fast patrol
boats in and around the straits of Hormuz.
"The Iranian navy is fully ready to confront any enemy threat or designs," said Iranian navy commander
Rear Adm. Sajad Kouchaki in April 2007. "The navy's strategy is based on all-out defense of Iran's
territorial waters, national interests and islands in the Persian Gulf region."
By early 2009, an Iranian warship was serving in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast on an anti-piracy
mission. The Iranian government announced in May 2009 that it would send two warships to the region on
five-month anti-piracy tours.
Plans and Programs
The navy has planned three new corvettes to be known as the ZOLFAQAR class. The first ship in the class,
the MOUJ, entered service in 2006. The expected delivery date of the other ships is unknown.
A new indigenously developed torpedo boat called the JOSHAN entered service in September 2006.
An Iranian-built destroyer was reportedly commissioned in November 2007, along with a new class of
submarine. Another submarine and two small missile boats were commissioned in November 2008.
The Iranian navy said it had successfully tested an indigenous high-speed torpedo during large-scale
exercises in the Persian Gulf in early April 2006. The underwater missile travels at speeds up to 350
km/hour (217 mph), according to Iranian navy leaders.
In February 2008, the Iranian navy announced the delivery 74 new domestically produced gunboats
intended for logistic and patrol operations in the Persian Gulf.
The GHADIR-class midget submarine began operations with the Iranian navy in 2009.
Iran's navy said it launched the first of its MOWDGE-class destroyers in February 2010. The vessel,
dubbed the JAMARAN , is equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare capabilities. It can
reportedly carry 120 to 140 personnel, has a top speed of 30 knots and is equipped with a helipad.
LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010
© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.
Special Operation Forces
Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Pasdaran Inqilab, was formed following the Islamic
Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the
new regime, and to counter the influence and power of the regular military.
The Pasdaran consists of ground, naval and aviation units that parallel the structure of the regular military.
The Pasdaran's naval wing operates largely from bases along the coastline of southern Iran and from many
of the islands and oil production platforms that dot the Persian Gulf. Naval assets once under the control of
the Pasdaran, including many small patrol boat and numerous coastal defense missile batteries, were
transferred to or placed under joint operational control of the regular navy beginning in 1991. Many jointly
controlled assets continue to be manned by Pasdaran personnel. In September 2008, Iran specifically
charged the Pasdaran with the defense of the Persian Gulf.
The Basij (also known as the Popular Mobilization Army) is under the operational control of the Pasdaran,
as are a number of units drawn from 175 of Iran's ancient tribes and clans.
A secret military organization known as the Guards Special Quds Force also is also under Pasdaran control.
This force reportedly plays a role in Iran's network of external terrorist activity.
Basij forces are organized into two regionally based commands comprising 741 Ashura (male only) light
infantry battalions and 134 al-Zahra (female only) light infantry battalions of 300-350 personnel each, plus
a number of local reserve battalions. Ashura and Zahra battalions are named for the day marking the death
of Mohammad's grandson Hussein and Mohammad's daughter and the mother of Hussein, respectively.
These battalions are supplemented by 2.2 million college students organized into reconnaissance and
advance guard units. Most Basijis are now given regular military training. Volunteers range from 14 to 70
years of age and are usually lightly armed.
In the early 1990s, the Basij was "reconstructed" with substantial grants from the federal treasury to act as a
moral police force and defender of fundamentalist Islam's code of conduct. New uniforms and weapons
were issued and an accelerated recruitment drive undertaken within universities and secondary schools.
Beginning in early 1993, the Iranian government allotted 40 percent of available university admissions to
Basij members as an incentive to join and as a reward for service.
At full strength, Pasdaran has the following structure:
13 regional commands
2 armored divisions
5 mechanized divisions
10 infantry divisions
1 special forces division
15-20 independent brigades, incl.
special forces brigades
infantry brigades
armored brigades
parachute brigades
6 artillery groups
5 artillery/surface-to-surface missile groups
border defense brigades
aircraft units
independent infantry groups
1 marine brigade
Note: The size of these units vary greatly, and some are only lightly manned during peacetime.
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
The Pasdaran currently numbers more than 125,000 personnel, including at least 100,000 ground forces
personnel, 20,000 naval personnel and 5,000 marines. The Basij paramilitary forces can number up to 1
million upon mobilization, although figures as high as 12.5 million to 20 million have been mentioned by
Iranian officials.
Equipment
The Pasdaran primarily operates equipment that is attributed to the regular armed forces. The following list
contains equipment operated independently of the regular armed forces.
(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database.)
AUG06
40
(Sweden)
10
with C-802
6
OCT07
FEB09
AUG10
SHIPS
32
32
40+
BOGHAMMAR-type fast-attack craft
10
10
10
HUDONG-class missile patrol boats
6
3
6
3
9
3
SSM (China)
CHINACAT-class catamaran (China)
IRAN HORMUZ 24-class medium landing
ships
(South Korea)
3
3
3
HEJAZ-class medium landing ships
8
8
8
TYPE 412 SEA TRUCK-type landing craft
6
6
Coastal Patrol Boats
MIG-G-2600-PB-class (Iran 26-m
10+
50
10+
50
#
#
MIG-G-1200-SC-class (Iran 12-m
#
#
MIG-G-0900-CPB-class (Iran 9-m
#
#
#
#
#
#
MIG-G-0790-PB-class (Iran 8-m design)
MIG-G-0700-PB-class (Iran 7-m design)
MIG-G-0500-PL-class (Iran 5-m design)
#
MISSILES
Surface-to-Surface
Shahab-1/2 IRBM (12-18 launchers)
#
Shahab-3 IRBM (up to 12 launchers)
(Netherlands)
design)
(aka ZAFAR-class)
MIG-G-1900-class (Iran 20-m design)
MIG-G-1800-TRB-class (Iran 19-m
design)
design)
design)
(Iran)
6
20
#
(Iran)
Deployment
The Pasdaran ground and air forces are relatively mobile, operating from established military bases and at
least five island bases in the Persian Gulf, including Larak (Silkworm sites), Abu Musa (Silkworm sites),
Sirri, Al Farsiyah islands and the Halul oil platform. The Pasdaran naval headquarters and main operating
base is located at Bandar Abbas.
Pasdaran land and air defense units are concentrated for the most part in and around Tehran and the
military districts adjacent to the Iraqi border.
Coastal defense batteries equipped with Silkworm and Sunburn anti-ship missiles are located at several
sites along the Strait of Hormuz.
Issues
The extent of Iran's participation in the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is a matter of dispute.
The U.S. has accused the IRGC of supplying advanced weaponry to Shi'ite militias in Iraq and, to a lesser
extent, to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Washington added the IRGC to the State Department's list of
foreign terrorist organizations in mid-2007.
In December 2008, Tehran proposed the creation of a Basij naval arm designed to patrol the Persian Gulf in
coordination with the Pasdaran maritime force.
In March 2009, the IRGC commander boasted that all Israeli nuclear sites were within range of the Shahab3 missiles.
In December 2009, the Iranian government gave the Revolutionary Guards full responsibility for naval
operations in the Persian Gulf in the event of a conflict.
Plans and Programs
In August 2008, the IRGC said it had successfully tested a new indigenous anti-ship weapon capable of
striking targets at a range of 300 km (186 miles).
The elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps said in February 2010 that it developed a weapon designed to
shoot down U.S. Apache attack helicopters. There were no other details provided.
LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010
© 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.