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Operation Atalanta: A Rational Choice
Approach
Supervisor: Dr Hylke Dijkstra
Ravi Sodha (I6019134)
Word Count: 14,678
Date: 1/7/11
MA Thesis
Abstract: It seems to be widely accepted that a different approach to tackle the root causes
in Somalia is necessary in order to successfully deal with piracy. This paper will analyse why
Operation Atalanta is still operational in its current form. This research will answer the
question by analysing the empirical data collected through the lenses of the rational choice
approach, the institutional explanation, and constructivism. The paper will show that the
rational choice approach will best answer the question through the utilisation of the costbenefit analysis. The empirical data clearly shows a cost-benefit analysis, with evidence of
there currently being significant benefits for low costs through this mission. This proves that
the rational choice approach comprehensively determines why Operation Atalanta is still
operational in its current form.
Key words: Operation Atalanta, EU NAVFOR, CSDP, piracy, Somalia, rational choice
approach
1
Contents
1) Introduction
p. 3
2) Explaining Operation Atalanta
p. 7
2.1) Rational Choice Approach
p. 7
2.2) Institutional Explanation
p. 10
2.3) Constructivism
p. 12
3) Operation Atalanta‟s Mandate
p. 14
4) Current Results of the Mission
p. 19
5) Why is Operation Atalanta still Operational in its Current Form?
p. 24
5.1) Institutional Explanation
p. 24
5.2) Constructivism
p. 27
5.3) Rational Choice Approach
p. 29
5.4) Overall Analysis
p. 31
6) Conclusion
p. 33
7) References
p. 37
2
1. Introduction
“What can be done to stop the surge of piracy on the high seas? The answer lies primarily
onshore1 in South Central Somalia” (IMB, 2010, p. 23). This is the view of the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) – a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) on
maritime affairs - on how to successfully tackle the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia
and in the Gulf of Aden. The IMB also states that “all measures taken at sea to limit the
activities of the pirates are undermined because of a lack of responsible authority back in
Somalia from where the pirates begin their voyages and return with hijacked vessels” (ibid.).
One would presume that the European Union (EU) would pay attention to views such as this.
Even though official statements are stating that we must target the root causes of piracy,
namely within Somalia, the EU and NATO are continuing to solely focus on issues at sea and
short term initiatives to tackle piracy (Strickmann, 2009, p. 3). Laing stated that “the
international naval response to Somali piracy has been tentative and reactive. Sixteen
warships patrolling an area that is two-thirds the size of the EU does not imply a strong
resolve to find a solution to the problem” (Laing, 2010). These statements confirm the view
that Operation Atalanta is only tackling the consequences of problems within the Somali
state, rather than actually engaging in the causes, which would in turn stop the allure of
piracy.
There are also other views on Operation Atalanta. At the operation‟s inception, David
Miliband – the former UK Foreign Minister – stated that the mission would be able to
effectively disrupt acts of piracy as well as tackle the issue as a whole (Norton-Taylor, 2008).
The idea of the mission being successful is supplemented by the opinion of Rear Admiral
Thomas Ernst - the Deputy Operation Commander of the EU NAVFOR up until the
beginning of this year - that Operation Atalanta has been successful in adhering to the
ambitions set out in the mandate (Ernst, 2010). This shows that Atalanta is not being solely
being considered as a failure, but also successful in its own right. Operation Atalanta has
been deemed a success by some, but the EU‟s response to piracy has been regarded by others
to be the major failure. Therefore, perhaps it is that the mandate of the operation, itself, is a
failure in the response to piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
1
Emphasis added
3
Although, primarily, the reasons as for the EU‟s involvement in Somalia must be
known. Germond and Smith (2009) have claimed that “Somalia [is] the new piracy capital of
the world” (p. 579). In 2008, 111 out of the total 293 global piracy attacks happened off the
coast of Somalia, which shows how the issue of piracy in the region has become a global
concern (Strickmann, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, the rise of piracy in the area has meant that the
waters have become very dangerous for the World Food Programme (WFP) and for shipping
companies. The danger to the WFP has been especially detrimental with the UN Security
Council resolution 1838 stating that almost 3.5 million Somalis will need food aid by the end
of 2008 (House of Lords, 2010, p. 7). According to officials at EU NAVFOR, piracy
currently makes more sense than conventional work because Somalia is a „failed state‟ and
pirates can earn substantially more money than others working in the country. The WFP have
been putting pressure upon the EU to act in the area and have stated that without assistance,
they will not transit the area, thus putting millions of Somalis at risk of a lack of availability
to necessary food (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). Furthermore, as well as
piracy posing a problem to the WFP and hence the Somali people, there is also the impact on
international trade. Insurance premiums have drastically increased because of the danger of
transiting the area and also the costs of diverting away from the Gulf of Aden mean that
goods and oil that travel through the region will increase in price to consumers (Middleton,
2008). Therefore, piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden is a major issue to the
Somali people and to the international community, and this proves why the EU is present in
the region under the Common Security and Defence (CSDP)2 mission Operation Atalanta.
Operation Atalanta is the EU‟s mission off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden to tackle piracy. The mission was created on 18 November 2008 after the Council Joint
Action of 10 November 2008 and was intended to run for just one year (Council of the EU,
2008). The operation was then subsequently extended in December 2009 for a period of one
year and then on 8 December 2010 for a further two years until the current deadline of
December 2012 (EU NAVFOR, 2010). As the operation has been extended twice, it would be
acceptable to say that the EU is content with the mandate and success of Atalanta, and hence
is maintaining the status quo.
Officials at the EU Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) have also admitted that the
“solution lies ashore” and that a comprehensive approach encompassing diplomatic relations,
2
Formerly, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
4
military force, economic assistance, and industrial development is needed (Interview with an
EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). Due to the fact that the mandate has been extended twice, it is
perhaps more prudent to research the reason for the extensions of the mission. This is very
important because since the mission began, there have been widespread views that a
comprehensive approach is needed, including from the IMB. The current mission is a major
part of the EU‟s developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP.
Although as has been shown thus far, there is much debate about whether this mission is
correct in order to tackle the issue of piracy in the region. Whilst there are admissions of
successes of the operation, many believe that more needs to be done and that the EU needs to
take a different approach to tackling piracy. Therefore, the aim of this study is to answer the
research question of this paper, which is „why is Operation Atalanta still operational in its
current form?‟.
This research will attempt to answer this question from a theoretical viewpoint, which
could give an insight into CSDP decision making. This paper argues that the rational choice
approach will offer the most comprehensive explanation to this question by comparing it to
two other theories: the institutional explanation and constructivism. The rational choice
approach would explain the research question by showing that the current mission is the
rational optimal outcome because of the cost-benefit analysis. The institutional explanation
would claim that institutions have influenced the decision to maintain Atalanta in its current
form because it is in their own interests. Finally, constructivism would explain this research
by highlighting the roles and responsibilities that the EU has in the global response to piracy
in the region, and that Atalanta has continued in its current form because the EU cannot
abandon these roles.
This paper argues that the rational choice approach offers a better theoretical
explanation than the other two theories. As will be shown later on in this study, there is clear
evidence that the cost-benefit analysis has been used to determine the extent of this mission.
Currently, Operation Atalanta is producing significant benefits that outweigh the costs of the
mission. A more comprehensive approach in tackling piracy is not being pursued because the
costs of that mission would escalate, but would not necessarily reap more benefits than the
costs. The empirical study will show the qualitative data that illustrates the usage of the costbenefit analysis in the current mission, and also shows how the cost-benefit analysis
disproves an extension of Atalanta.
5
The structure of the paper will begin with outlining the theories that are being used in
the next chapter. This will include describing the three theories, offering examples of how
they have been used in previous analyses of CFSP and CSDP, and then how they will be used
in terms of this research. The purpose of the chapter will be to present the theories so that
they can then be used later on to be able to decide which theory offers the best explanation to
the research question. Chapter 3 will then state the details of the official mandate of
Operation Atalanta in order to definitively understand the purpose of the mission and to be
able to later analyse whether the mission has been successful. Following the chapter on the
mandate, Chapter 4 will analyse the successes and shortcomings of the operation as of yet in
order to display the empirical data that can be used to analyse the research question alongside
the theories. Chapter 5 with then finally analyse the three different theories alongside the
empirical data in order to decipher which theory offers the best explanation as to why
Operation Atalanta is still operational in its current form. The data used in this research will
mainly come from primary sources, namely official documents, speeches and interviews. The
paper will therefore be able to conclude by discussing whether the rational choice approach
offers the best explanation, if so, then why it does, and if not, then which theory does offer a
better explanation. Therefore, this paper will be able to offer a theoretical analysis as to why
Operation Atalanta is continuing in its current form in spite of the widely accepted views that
a different approach is necessary. This research will also hopefully give an insight into the
decision making in the EU, which - alongside further studies on CSDP missions - could
suggest the way CSDP missions are decided upon.
6
2. Explaining Operation Atalanta
The purpose of this research is to answer the question „why is Operation Atalanta still
operational in its current form?‟. This chapter provides a theoretical standpoint. The three
theories that will be used in this paper are the rational choice approach, the institutional
explanation, and constructivism, due to the amount of past literature based upon these three
theories in CFSP, which will be evident later in the chapter. These three theories have been
chosen because of their differing nature, which should allow for a definitive conclusion on
which theory offers the best explanation. Therefore, in this chapter, there will be a brief
outline of each of the three theories that are being used in this research. Moreover, each subsection on a theory will firstly display the main components of the theory and then a brief
outline of how the theory has already been used in CFSP. There will also be an explanation as
to how each theory could be used to answer the research question. After outlining the
theories, the empirical data of Operation Atalanta will be presented in the next two chapters
in order to analyse the empirics of the study alongside each of the ideas in Chapter 5. Thus,
this will allow a conclusion to be made on which theory offers the best explanation to the
research question stated in the introduction.
2.1 Rational Choice Approach
The first theory that will be used in this research is the rational choice approach. The theory
has developed into being one of the major post-war approaches in International Relations and
has increased understanding of both anarchy and cooperation (Snidal, 2002, p. 73). The main
facet for the rational choice approach is the cost-benefit analysis. Actors “opt for the
rationally best strategy to maximize their individual hierarchy of preferences” (Goldthau,
2009, p. 50). This approach is therefore very different to other traditional theories due to its
calculative and often mathematical focus (Scott, 2000, p. 127). The focus on the cost-benefit
analysis is an important component in the rational choice approach, and will be the focus of
the theory in this paper. According to cost-benefit analysis, decisions are influenced by
whether the costs outweigh the benefits, and thus, whether the decision would be rational.
Therefore, there is a need to determine the outcomes of all possible actions (p. 128) and then
choose the optimal outcome. However, there is also the assumption of „bounded rationality‟
7
by Herbert Simon, with the possibility for one to be “successful by exploiting structures in
their environments” even if one has limited information (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002, p. 4).
The theory assumes that actors‟ preferences are fixed and stable (Wagner, 2003, p. 576) and
that “all involved players aim at achieving their goals at an optimal cost-benefit ratio”
(Goldthau, 2009, p. 51). In terms of the definition of „cost‟, it is not just financial cost, but
also the human cost and the cost to the social environment. For example, the optimal rational
outcome to a security issue would be to establish security without harming relations with
other allies (ibid.). On the other hand, within realism, the idea of establishing security without
harming relations with other allies would constitute against the idea of relative gains in
cooperation. Realists fear that “today‟s friend may be tomorrow‟s enemy in war”, therefore
states must beware of allies gaining more than they do (Grieco, 1988, p. 487). The theory can
also explain how actors behave in practice, as well as how they should behave (Snidal, 2002,
p. 75). Other important aspects of the rational choice approach are that many other aspects of
decision making must be ignored, such as the identity and culture of the actor (ibid.). The
rational choice theory is a “simple approach”, which is traditionally encompassed within
realism and neo-realism, but also now within neo-liberalism (pp. 74-76). Furthermore, Moe
(2005) looked at the role of power and cooperation in political institutions, and concluded
that rational choice theory needs to focus itself on power, as well as cooperation, which many
rational choice studies have solely looked at.
In terms of rational choice approach studies on the EU, many studies have been
written about the use of the theory in explaining CSFP and CSDP. Musu (2003) claimed that
national foreign policies can converge closer together whilst still being parallel to one another
(p. 49). Wagner (2003) conducted a study on whether rational institutional choice could
explain the intergovernmental nature of CFSP. According to him, under rational choice
theory, more supranational competencies are not required to make EU crisis management
more effective than it is with an intergovernmental nature (p. 589). The study looked at the
extent and explanation of cooperation between Member States. Jonson (2006) used the
rational choice approach to explain the development of CSDP, although again, this focused
on the levels of cooperation. Furthermore, Goldthau‟s (2009) study concluded that rational
choice offers a better explanation than neo-realism and domestic approaches to explain why
EU Member States were divided over Iraq but then united over Iran. Whereas neo-realism
was sufficient to explain both cases individually due to balancing or bandwagoning (p. 43), it
could not offer an overall explanation for the two scenarios. Goldthau used game theory
8
within rational choice to explain how access to information explains the difference in the two
cases, but also how rational choice and the cost-benefit analysis through game theory makes
it mutually beneficial for Member States to cooperate and achieve the optimal outcome (p.
52). Duke (2009) concluded that after Operation Artemis, it could be seen that normative
convergence was occurring in CSDP, and refuted the rational choice approach which would
imply that national interests would not change (p. 410). He also stated that, as opposed to
other theories on European integration, rational choice stipulates that actors‟ interest do not
change, hence distancing itself from theories that point to convergence or divergence in
states‟ interest (p. 395).
Therefore, it can be seen what topics have been covered using the rational choice
approach. Most academic literature surrounding CFSP and CSDP has used rational choice to
explain cooperation amongst Member States, although there are also focuses on specific
cases. Thus, the validity of using the rational choice approach in this paper is evident due to
its usage in previous CFSP and CSDP studies. This research will attempt to use it to explain a
different question but within the same policy area. According to the rational choice approach,
Operation Atalanta is still operational in its current form because of the cost-benefit analysis.
Any changes to the operation would either increase the financial and human costs or damage
the social environment and harm relations with allies. Therefore, the current operation is
providing the optimal outcome. More specifically, in order for the rational choice approach to
be the best explanation, there must be evidence of benefits (i.e. successes of the mission) that
are being achieved that can be concluded to outweigh the costs that the EU is facing. This
means that the operation must be achieving its mandate. Moreover, there needs to be
evidence that a more expansive mission would cause greater costs to the EU and would not
necessarily offer greater benefits. Therefore, there needs to be evidence of qualitative
analyses from officials that accept that if the operation was to become more comprehensive,
then the costs of the mission would surpass the achievements that are reached. Hence
showing that further goals would be more difficult to reach and also more costly or dangerous
to reach. Thus, the rational choice would state that not only is the current operation the
optimal decision, but also that any further developments to Operation Atalanta would not be
rational due to the cost-benefit analysis.
9
2.2 Institutional Explanation
The next theory that will be used in this study is the institutional explanation for the research
question. The role of institutions and bureaucracy has become increasingly important in the
decision making process within the EU with the increase in its competencies, and there have
therefore been many studies on the idea. The institutional explanation centres on agendasetting and decision making, and these will be the main issues to focus upon. The beginning
of the studies on institutions is believed by some to have been with Keohane and Nye‟s
Power and Interdependence (1977) and Keohane‟s After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), which has now formed into neoliberal
institutionalism (Milner, 2009, p. 3). Milner stated that international institutions must be
considered as non-state actors and that one must understand that they have more power than
just military force and threats (pp. 4-5). The reason for the focus on institutions is “to analyze
how the legal concept of state sovereignty and the practical fact of substantial state autonomy
coexist with the realities of strategic and economic interdependence” (Keohane, 1988, p.
380). Moreover, it is necessary “to understand the conditions under which international
cooperation can take place” because the preferences of individuals are influenced by the
existence of institutions (pp. 380-382). Whilst studying the institutional explanation, one
must remember the theory of „path dependency‟, which claims that institutions are difficult to
change and hence results are not necessarily what the original creators wanted (Pierson,
2000). Institutionalism encompasses three different strands: historical, rational choice, and
sociological institutionalism. These three strands need to be studied because of “the role that
institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996,
p. 936). Therefore, there has been an increase of focus on institutions, particularly by
Hawkins et al. (2006) stating that there is the need to determine whether they work for the
states that are members or if they “implement policy decisions and pursue their own interests
strategically” (p. 7).
The scope of material on using the institutional explanation is growing with the
increased prominence of the EU. In terms of studies on CFSP, Duke (2005) focused his study
on the role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC)3 and its relations with other
institutions. He stated that PSC are involved in every stage of Crisis Management (p. 25).
Moreover, focusing on CSDP, Menon (2011) stated that CSDP is an attempt by Member
3
In Duke’s study, he used the French acronym COPS, meaning Comité politique et de sécurité
10
States to respond to security challenges institutionally (pp. 83-83). He highlighted “the
importance of combining insights into the importance of institutional structures in shaping
politics and society” (p. 84). Therefore, he sought to explain the nature and functioning of
CSDP through the lens of historical institutionalism (p. 85). Furthermore, Mattelaer (2010)
studied the planning process of CSDP missions. He stated that “operational planning takes
the form of an iterative dialogue between political authorities and supporting staff”.
Additionally, he stated the importance of researching the role of bureaucracy due to its
position as a “bridge between the political aims and objectives” as well as “the operational
means and resources” (p. 3). Vanhoonacker et al. (2010) conducted their research on
bureaucracy by analysing who the actors are, why they matter and their interactions with
other institutions including external institutions such as the UN. It is stated that the
importance of research on institutions is because “much of the day-to-day policy-making is
done through the supporting administrative level”. Moreover, the study on bureaucratic actors
has become increasingly important because of the contrast the institutional explanation has
with traditional International Relations theories, which “generally treat states as unitary
actors” (p. 3). Furthermore, Dijkstra (2011a) and (2011b) researched the role of the Council
Secretariat and concluded their vast involvement in the agenda-setting of CSDP missions.
Therefore, there already exists extensive literature on the institutional explanation of
CSDP missions. This paper will focus on the CSDP mission Operation Atalanta and the
institutional explanation for the continued decision for the existence of the operation. The
theory would state that the reason for the research question would be that Member States
have different opinions on piracy and that institutions have been able to influence the
continued existence of piracy at the top of the agenda. Institutions have also maintained the
mission in its current form because an extension of the mission would not be in their interests
and would offer disadvantages in comparison to the current form of Atalanta. Therefore, in
order for the institutional explanation to offer a comprehensive approach to Operation
Atalanta, there needs to be evidence of diverging Member State interests on piracy and how
to best tackle it. This will include evidence of the current mission being in the interests of EU
bureaucracy and institutions, with the operation being advantageous to them. The explanation
must also account for the arguments put forward that state there should be a more
comprehensive approach is necessary and show that the institutional explanation is able to
explain why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its current form and why other
approaches to the mission are not being implemented.
11
2.3 Constructivism
Finally, this paper will also analyse the constructivist explanation for the research question.
Constructivism rose as a theory to contrast the traditional rational-based theories (neo-)
realism and (neo-) liberalism. There are many different versions of the theory, but a major
facet of constructivism is “the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social
reality” (Adler, 2003, p. 111). This idea highlights the focus upon the creation of ideas and
the social definition of reality, which will affect the way that states will act. Adler also
explains that constructivism defines the social world as “intersubjectively and collectively
meaningful structures and processes” (p. 100). These statements by Adler have already
shown how constructivism is very different to the other two theories outlined so far,
confirming the usefulness of including it in this study. In analysing constructivism with
regards to the research question, key aspects will be the principles of roles and
responsibilities, which relate to the EU‟s external image and relations with other actors. As
Wendt stated, “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act
towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for
them”. Moreover, “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because
enemies are threatening and friends are not” (Wendt, 1992, pp. 396-397). Therefore, it is
possible to see that constructivism highlights the importance of an external image that is
important to maintain relations with other actors that are deemed „friends‟ and not „enemies‟.
Wendt also states that the structure of the social world is created by the identities (which lead
to responsibilities) of different actors, and furthermore, the social definition of identity is
what gives the specific roles and responsibilities to actors (p. 398). Thus, an important facet
of constructivism is the role and responsibility of an individual or an actor. Finally, Wendt
describes more specifically about security, stating that the responsibility of security belongs
to all actors, creating a „cooperative‟ security system (p. 400) because “if collective security
is high, however, the emergence of a predator may do much less damage” (p. 408).
Therefore, the important aspects of constructivism that can be used in this research are the
principles of roles and responsibilities that lead to the EU‟s external image.
Constructivism has become a widely used theory in International Relations, and thus
much exists on CSDP. Larsen (2002) conducted a study on why the EU has made little use of
its military means and why it acts on a regional rather than global level. The constructivistbased article explains that “the EU constructs itself as an international actor presently
focusing on Europe in the form of enlargement and the areas surrounding the EU”.
12
Furthermore, the military power of the EU is just a part of its civilian power and has only
been in existence since St. Malo (pp. 296-297). Tonra (2003) used the cognitive approach
within constructivism to explain the construction of CFSP. In doing so, he defined CFSP as a
regime. One of the stresses of the article was on the constructivist principles of “role, rules,
identities and ideas” (p. 738), confounding the statement above that these should be key
principles to analyse with regards to the research of this paper. Furthermore, Meyer (2005)
used constructivism to explain the changing norms of Member States that has directed them
toward convergence and a European strategic culture. His explanation was to decipher why
convergence was occurring that had led to the creation of the European Security Strategy in
2003, which has been used as a blueprint for CSDP. Additionally, another one of Larsen‟s
studies (2009) centred on the creation of a foreign policy for Member States and he used
constructivism within his analysis. Of the theory, he stated that “socially shared system of
meaning define who the principle actors are and make possible certain policies while
excluding others” (p. 546). This statement could be very useful in this research to explain
why only the current policy on piracy is in place and not the different policies that have been
mentioned.
Constructivism has been used in CFSP and CSDP, and will be used to explain the
case of Operation Atalanta in this research. In order for constructivism to explain the research
question of this paper, there will need to be evidence of specific roles and responsibilities that
the EU has that mean it cannot abandon its current mandate. Therefore, the constructivist
explanation for why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its current form would be
because the EU has a specific role to play in the global response and it has a responsibility to
other actors to continue the mandate that already exists. As well as necessary data on the role
and responsibility of the EU being evident, there also needs to be data on the way that third
countries view the EU and how they interpret the position of the EU to be important to the
global response to piracy. Therefore, if constructivism is to explain why Operation Atalanta
is still operational in its current form, there must be significant data to confirm that the main
reason that the operation still carries on is due to the role that the mission plays and its
responsibilities to other actors, and that this reason is not only part of the rational choice
approach, which encompasses the belief that part of the cost-benefit analysis is not harming
relations with other actors.
13
3. Operation Atalanta’s Mandate
Having outlined the three theories, this paper will now examine the empirical evidence. This
paper will look to describe the objectives within the mandate of Operation Atalanta in this
chapter, then discuss the current results of the mission since its inception in Chapter 4. These
next two chapters will allow empirical data to be set out, which will be vital in order to be
able to analyse these theories in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 will also contain added information on
the operation in terms of qualitative data that will allow a thorough analysis of each of the
theories in order to determine the reasoning behind the continued existence of Operation
Atalanta in its current form. Therefore, the intention of the paper is to evaluate which of the
three theories can substantially explain the research question, which will give an insight into
CSDP mission planning. This research will take into consideration the rational choice
approach, the institutional explanation, and a constructivist explanation of the continued
existence of Operation Atalanta in its current form. Additionally, it will explain why the
operation has not drastically changed to tackle the issues that have been stated to undermine
the EU‟s success in dealing with piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
According to the mandate for Operation Atalanta, there are two main objectives of the
mission. The first is “the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP)
delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia” (European Parliament, 2010). The
second objective is “the protection of vulnerable vessels sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off
the Somali coast and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed
robbery off the Somali coast” (ibid.). These are the two main aims and the rest of the mandate
is meant to support them. However, it is these exact goals that will allow an analysis of
whether the mission has been successful in both achieving its mandate and in tackling the
issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The mission is in support of UN Security Council
Regulations 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 (all 2008), and 1918 (2009) (EU NAVFOR, n.d.). In
addition, it is part of the UN‟s Djibouti process for peace and reconciliation in Somalia and
financially supports the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Furthermore,
according to the mandate, political control and strategic direction is to be done by the PSC.
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) will monitor the execution of the mission
(ibid.). These two bodies will oversee the implementation of the mandate, however what
exactly does the mandate contain?
14
The Headquarters of „European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta‟ (EU
NAVFOR) is based in Northwood in the UK. This location is important as the same
headquarters was already the base for Navy and NATO operations. With Northwood being
located close to London, the base is also in near proximity to the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO). London, furthermore, is known as “a hub for the global shipping
community” (UK Parliament, 2008). There are twelve states that make a permanent
operational contribution to the mission: nine EU Member States – the Netherlands, Spain,
Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and Luxembourg – joined by Norway,
Croatia and Montenegro (European Parliament, 2010). The operation also works alongside
the US-led coalition CTF-151, NATO, Russia, India, Japan, Malaysia and China. In terms of
funding, the budget is approximately €8 million per year. On top of this, states bear the cost
of any of their resources that they need (ibid.).
The size of the force on duty can vary, however the typical size is 5-10 Surface
Combatants, 1-2 Auxiliary Ships, 2-4 Marine Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts, and 2,000
military personnel. This force attempts to cover 2,000,000 square nautical miles, which
equates to thirty times the size of England (ibid.). However, what can this force actually do?
According to its mandate, “the military personnel involved in the operation can arrest, detain
and transfer persons who are suspected of having committed or who have committed acts of
piracy or armed robbery in the areas where they are present” (European Parliament, 2010).
Furthermore, they can seize vessels and the goods that are on board. Those that are caught by
the military personnel can be prosecuted by either EU Member States, in Kenya (after an
agreement made on 6 March 2009), or in the Republic of Seychelles since the agreement on
30 October 2009 (ibid.). However, on 1 October 2010, Kenya handed in a six month notice to
stop prosecuting pirates due to overcrowding in its prisons and has also claimed, due to a lack
of financial support from the international community (BBC, 2010). Therefore, from April
2011, trials will only be able to take place in EU Member States and the Republic of
Seychelles. Although, Kenya is still prepared to carry on the agreement depending on
negotiations with the EU, according to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Leposo, 2010). In fact
they have not stopped prosecuting pirates completely (Interview with an EU NAVFOR
Official, 2011). However, this still shows the difficulty in this regard. In addition, pirates
must be tried in accordance with international human rights standards (EU NAVFOR, n.d.).
Furthermore, in order for vessels to be protected, they must register with the Maritime
Security Centre-horn of Africa before they go through the area (European Parliament, 2010).
15
Although the two main objectives focus on the protection of certain vessels off the
Somali coast, deeper into the mandate it states that the mission will “employ the necessary
measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an
end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are
present” (European Parliament, 2010). Unlike the initial objectives of solely focusing on the
protection of specific vessels, this statement is the first to signal the intent to tackle the actual
problem of piracy and look to bring it to an end, rather than merely deterring pirates from
attacking vessels in the region. This means that the mandate encompasses a whole new
objective with the plan to try and permanently end the act of piracy alongside the main
objectives of protecting WFP vessels and also those which are vulnerable. However, officials
at the EU NAVFOR Headquarters have reiterated that the operation is solely a deterrence
mission (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). Alongside these objectives that can
be seen from the mandate, Rear Admiral Peter Hudson CBE (2010) stated in his speech at the
UN that another aim is to protect AMISOM ships, as well as to reassure and protect
vulnerable lawful ships passing through the area. Moreover, he states that his orders are to
“detect, disrupt and where possible seek to prosecute suspect pirates” (ibid.). Therefore, it
does appear that within the scope of Operation Atalanta, there is the possibility for „hard‟
power and military action to stop the advancements of pirates, alongside the use of the
international legal system. This claim is further supported by a German newspaper article that
has stated to have collected further information that confirms the fact that the EU has the
ability to sink pirate ships rather than just merely warding them off or capturing them
(Spiegel, 2008). Furthermore, although main objectives seem to be clarified, the mandate
allows the possibility of further action against pirates, hence showing the true large scope
available under the mandate for the EU to act to fight against piracy.
In addition to the mandate set out, when Operation Atalanta‟s mandate was extended,
updates were made to the mission. In December 2009, the main update was the inclusion to
contribute to the monitoring of fishing (Ernst, 2010). The intention is to collect data of
fishing boats present in the area, particularly looking at the existence of EU boats either
fishing illegally or dumping toxic waste into the ocean. The data is available to the EU and in
the future to a possible Somali Federal Government (ibid.). The inclusion of this is because of
accusations from some that the hidden agenda of Operation Atalanta is to “protect European
vessels accused by Somali seafarers and international organisations of illegal fishing and the
dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters” (Recalde, 2010). Therefore, Operation Atalanta is
16
also to collect data in order to show hard facts that show that EU vessels are not involved in
these activities (Ernst, 2010). As Rear Admiral Thomas Ernst stated, at the time of his speech
in December 2010, no illegal activities had been recorded (ibid.). Additionally, an official
from EU NAVFOR stated in May 2011 that not only had no illegal activities been recorded,
but also that the dangerous environment has meant that there is currently no existence of any
European fishing boats in the area (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011).
In terms of the mandate itself, the EU Operation Commander Rear Admiral Peter
Hudson RN has commended it for its clarity (UK Parliament, 2008). He stated that the main
objectives - supporting the WFP and AMISOM through protecting their respective ships
supplying the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in Mogadishu, protecting
vulnerable ships, and deterring and disrupting pirate groups – were clear for all to see.
However, shortfalls of the mission have already been identified. Rear Admiral Philip Jones –
a former EU Operation Commander between December 2008 and June 2009 – claimed that a
major issue is the fact that a boat only becomes a pirate boat once it attempts to commit an
act of piracy. Furthermore, he stated that there is a lack of knowledge of the activities of
pirates in Somalia. There is also the need for aviation in order to be able to monitor activity
from above, and Mr Kopernicki of Shell Shipping and Oil Companies International Forum
has spoken of the issue of the use of commercial tankers for refuelling. On the contrary
however, Commander Clive Dow RN has praised the mission for falling under numerous
laws of sea and has claimed that the operation only detains those who are committing acts of
piracy as this means that there is more chance of conviction (ibid.). In addition, the EU
NAVFOR website states that no WFP ships have been attacked by pirates since 2007 and the
International Maritime Bureau claimed that between 1 January and 30 September 2010
“attacks in the Gulf of Aden have dropped by more than 50 per cent due to naval patrols and
positive actions” (EU NAVFOR, n.d.).
Thus, Operation Atalanta has two main initiatives: to protect WFP vessels and to
protect vulnerable vessels. However, there are also other aims such as supporting AMISOM
and actively attempting to end acts of piracy. Although the mission has its own mandate,
what is interesting is that individual Member States create their own mandates on their
participation in Operation Atalanta, for example the German Bundestag decided in 2008 how
involved they will be and how many troops and what type of ships to deploy (EU NAVFOR,
2008). Therefore, alongside the Operation‟s mandate on aims and objectives, individual states
decide on what resources to deploy, which is unsurprising due to the fact that they bear the
17
costs of their resources. However, the aims and objectives of the overall operation are clearly
outlined in the official mandate of the mission. Having outlined the content of the mandate of
Operation Atalanta, the next chapter will be able to state the empirical data since the
beginning of the operation, hence summarising the current results of the mission.
18
4. Current Results of the Mission
As the main objectives were outlined in the previous chapter, now it is also important to look
at the current results of Operation Atalanta. This chapter will allow the presentation of hard
facts of what has happened during the mission and will enable the empirical data to be shown
in order to be analysed later through the lens of the different theories that were outlined in
Chapter 2. This section will look at the successes and shortcomings of the mission,
particularly looking to supplement and add to the views mentioned at the end of Chapter 3.
Firstly, the main successes will be stated before later outlining the current shortcomings of
the mission.
Various people have concluded that Operation Atalanta has been a success; therefore
it is important to highlight this fact and discover why they are saying this. Dr Charles
Tannock MEP has stated that this operation has been the EU‟s “flagship mission” (Tannock,
2011), stressing that although there still exists issues that need to be dealt with and improved,
it should not be forgotten what the achievements of the mission have been. Supplementing
this is the view from Rear Admiral Thomas Ernst, that “Atalanta is delivering its mandate”
(Ernst, 2010). From a speech by Ernst on 7 December 2010, he stated that 100% of World
Food Programme shipments had passed unharmed through the region, which has totalled 90
shipments delivering 500,000 metric tonnes of food aid to Somalia. Furthermore, 98% of
AMISOM shipments have also passed through the region safely with 73 shipments, which
has allowed AMISOM to grow during the period under Operation Atalanta‟s mandate. Ernst
also stressed that without the presence of EU NAVFOR, many Somalis would not have been
able to access resources from the WFP and AMISOM and thus Somalis have benefited a lot
from the presence of the EU‟s mission (ibid.). Due to the presence of Operation Atalanta,
close to 1.3 million Somalis are being fed each month through the WFP (Interview with an
EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). Therefore, it must be commended that Operation Atalanta has
received these successes. In particular, the successes mentioned so far were the main
priorities of the mandate, highlighting the fact that Ernst is correct to determine that “Atalanta
is delivering its mandate”, as the most important priorities are being achieved.
Moreover, another vital success in this operation is the role that EU NAVFOR is
playing amongst other global actors. Arguments have existed that the EU does not have the
military capacity and doubts exist on its role as a military player (c.f. Larsen 2002). However,
19
Ernst stated that the Operational Headquarters of EU NAVFOR is the “partner of choice” for
the many other countries that are also tackling the issue, such as NATO, Russia, China, India
and the US-led coalition of some 20 countries (Ernst, 2010). In addition, Tannock also
underlined the fact that a major success of the mission is that there has been good
coordination with the other countries present in the area (Tannock, 2011). This leadership
from the EU is a significant advancement in its CSDP and the fact that it is obvious that other
major global powers trust the EU‟s role is most definately an achievement that must be
lauded in order for the EU to develop in CFSP and CSDP.
In addition, the creation of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
has been a major success. This has helped in “the management and provision of protection to
commercial shipping transiting these dangerous waters” (EU NAVFOR, 2009). According to
Ernst, the creation of the IRTC has allowed the operation to be a success as the corridor is
manned, which leads to a lesser time delay between acknowledging a threat and dealing with
it (Ernst, 2010). Although the average time between recognising a threat and the attack
actually happening still stands at less than ten minutes (Interview with an EU NAVFOR
Official, 2011). However, whether the achievements of Operation Atalanta in disrupting
pirates in figures is debateable. Ernst stated in his speech that there has been a six-fold
increase in disruptions in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin, and that the success rate of
pirates has been lowered (ibid.). Pedro Teles Ferreira also agrees and states that “naval
operations managed to reduce the success rate of attacks in the Gulf of Aden” (2011, p. 30).
According to official figures at EU NAVFOR headquarters, the success rate of pirates in
2009 was 28%, which fell to 27% in 2010 and has now fallen to just 19% in 2011 up until 12
May4 (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). However, according to reports just a
month before Ernst‟s speech, Ban Ki-moon – the UN Secretary General – declared that
although there has been an international presence in the area, from January to August 2010,
the rate of successful hijackings by pirates stood at 22.6%, an increase on the rate of 17.1%
for the same period in 2009 (Varner, 2010). Therefore, it can be said that the creation of the
IRTC has been a success, although the declaration by Rear Admiral Ernst that the success
rate of pirates has fallen is a contentious one and one that seems to completely contradict
findings stated by Ban Ki-moon just one month before Ernst‟s speech. However, the reason
for this discrepency could be because EU NAVFOR only records data of piracy in the region
4
2009: 46 successful attacks and 117 failed attacks = 29%, 2010: 47 successful attacks and 127 failed attacks =
27%, 2011: 19 successful attacks and 79 failed attacks = 19%
20
that the operation is focused upon and not globally (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official,
2011). This now leads onto an analysis of the shortcomings of the mission, which cannot be
stated as failures until the mission comes to an end.
The main shortcoming of the operation so far is the poor prosecution rate of pirates
captured, which has effected Operation Atalanta from being able to effectively deter pirate
activity. Tannock stated that a view coming from within the EU is that no one wants to bring
the pirates into the EU and try them (Tannock, 2011). A major reason why EU Member
States do not want to prosecute pirates is because after they have completed their jail term,
they can seek asylum in the country that they are in (Interview with an EU NAVFOR
Official, 2011). Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
countries that capture pirates are allowed to try them in their own country under Article 105
(UN, n.d.). However as stated by Tannock, this does not seem to be the wish of any EU
Member State. Moreover, the major concern is the lack of strategic and operational
deterrence (Ernst, 2010). Ernst stated that in 2010 (up until his speech on 7 December), about
400 pirates had been captured by EU NAVFOR. However, out of all of those, only about 15
are awaiting trail (ibid.). This equals a rate of under 4%, which shows that there is not really a
solution to the problem. Officials from EU NAVFOR have confirmed that it is this lack of
prosecution rate that has undermined the mission‟s deterrence intentions, as there is very little
risk for pirates because even if they are caught, the majority are then later freed (Interview
with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). Due to the fact that those within the EU do not want to
try pirates, the EU has attempted to send pirates to nearby countries that the High
Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have agreed transfer
agreements with, namely Kenya and the Seychelles. Although Kenya have not stopped
prosecuting pirates completely, they are instead taking the responsibility on a case by case
basis (ibid.). The fact that they sought to end the transfer agreement shows how prosecution
remains a major issue in tackling piracy. Furthermore, Ernst confirmed that the Seychelles
does not currently have the legal and prison infrastructure to deal with the issue (Ernst, 2010).
Much more could be discussed on this issue from a legal perspective, however for this paper,
it is sufficient to highlight that the issue of trying pirates is one that is a major shortcoming of
the current operation.
Another shortcoming stated by Rear Admiral Thomas Ernst is that although he claims
pirates‟ success rate is falling, real numbers of pirate attacks are on the rise (ibid.). In 2010,
the number of attacks rose by 9% from 2009 and in the first five months of 2011, the area has
21
already seen 62% of 2010‟s total attacks, which has in part been due to the use of formerly
pirated mother ships. The utilisation of pirated ships as „mother ships‟ has meant that pirate
activity is now also possible during the monsoon months (Interview with an EU NAVFOR
Official, 2011). Furthermore, the Somali Basin has seen a threefold increase in activity from
pirates and they have also significantly extended their area of operation (Ernst, 2010). The
area that pirates are now operating in is close to 1,500 nautical miles, which is further than
Operation Atalanta‟s mandate (ibid.). For example, the northernmost attack was on the MV
Star of Dhabi on 30 January 2011 1,475 nautical miles from the Somali coast. Additionally,
two successful attacks ocurred in December 2010, with the easternmost attack on MV Jahan
Moni 1,450 nautical miles from the Somali coast and the southernmost attack on FV Vega 5
1,750 nautical miles from the coast (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). The
expansion of the sphere of pirate activity has been because of merchant ships travelling closer
to the Indian cost to avoid pirates and hence pirates have now followed the merchant ships
further from the Somali coast. Therefore, EU NAVFOR are now working alongside the
Indian Navy so that the Indians can respond to attacks that are getting closer to their own
coastline (ibid.). These statements underline the reason why arguments exist that Operation
Atalanta is not succeeding. Ernst has confirmed that the EU have been unable to effect the
number of pirate activities in the area and moreover, they are unable to every disrupt many
attacks due to the limited area that operation‟s mandate covers.
The focus of this paper has been on why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form. Part of the reason for analysing this question is because of views that the
operation is not adequately tackling the issue of piracy. However, as has been reiterated by
officials, Operation Atalanta is not a counter-piracy operation (Interview with an EU
NAVFOR Official, 2011). Its main objective is to protect WFP shipments and only if the EU
has vessels in an area where piracy is taking place can they aid other counter-piracy
operations, such as those by NATO and the US-led coalition (ibid.). Therefore, the view that
Operation Atalanta is not succeeding carries little substance because it is not a counter-piracy
operation. Moreover, Operation Atalanta is not considered to be a comprehensive approach to
tackle piracy, it is just one approach. An EU official stated that “there is the principle of the
„3 Ds‟: Diplomacy, Development and Defence/Security” (Correspondence with EU Official,
2011) and officials at EU NAVFOR have stated that Atalanta is merely “holding the line”
and that a “Comprehensive Somalia Strategy” is needed (Interview with an EU NAVFOR
Official, 2011). A comprehensive approach would include diplomacy, military, economic
22
development and industrial development (ibid.). Therefore, the views that Atalanta is a
counter-piracy mission and also the sole intended way to tackle piracy must be dispelled as a
myth. Furthermore, in terms of the core essence of Atalanta as a military mission, this is
necessary because “one of the main pillars to avoid piracy is security. [...]. For such
operations you mainly have to fall back on military assets” (Correspondence with EU
Official, 2011). Thus, the opinion is that a military mission is necessary; however there also
needs to be a more comprehensive approach. The acknowledgment that a more
comprehensive approach is necessary directly affects the research of this paper. It must be
considered that if they know that more needs to be done, why are they not doing it?
Therefore, not only does the theory need to explain why Atalanta is still operational in its
current form, but also why is nothing more being done when it seems that it is accepted that
Atalanta should run alongside other initiatives?
Therefore, what can be seen form the empirical data since the mission began is that
there have been a mix of successes and shortcomings. Operation Atalanta has been lauded as
the “partner of choice” of other global powers, which is a huge development in CSFP and
CSDP. Furthermore, as far as what is included in the mandate of the operation, the priorities
have been focused upon and EU NAVFOR has succeeded thus far in these respects.
However, the legal aspect of trying and prosecuting captured pirates is still a long way off
what should be desired, and is a major factor in the shortcomings of the current mission.
Although some say that the success rate of pirates has been lowered by the EU‟s impact, what
is sure is that Operation Atalanta has not worked as a deterrent because the number of pirate
attacks is still on the rise. These empirical data will allow the analysis of the continued
existence of the operation alongside the three theories explained in Chapter 2. Thus, it will be
possible to answer the research question laid out in the introduction.
23
5. Why is Operation Atalanta still Operational in its Current Form?
Having outlined the theoretical debate in Chapter 2 and then presenting empirical data in
Chapters 3 and 4, it is now possible to analyse the validity of the different theories by
incorporating the empirical data, whilst also adding further data to that already shown. The
purpose of this chapter is to decipher which of the theories best answers the research
question, thus allowing the conclusion of why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form. The structure will be to analyse each of the three theories culminating in the
rational choice approach, and then conclude which theory is the most appropriate to answer
the research question and why it offers a better explanation than the other two.
5.1 Institutional Explanation
The institutional explanation, as outlined in Chapter 2, is based on bureaucratic procedures,
agenda-setting and decision making. The theory looks at the people or bodies that have
influenced decisions or have helped for a certain policy to reach the top of the agenda. In the
case of this research, the institutional explanation would suggest that Member States have
diverging interests in piracy. Therefore, bureaucratic bodies have kept the issue of piracy at
the top of the agenda and been heavily involved in the decision making of Operation
Atalanta, as well as maintaining its existence in its current form. Therefore, there needs to be
evidence of involvement from institutions rather than cooperation between Member States.
Although not the focus of this research, the decision making of the creation of
Operation Atalanta needs to be briefly analysed. This will allure as to why the mission was
extended and is still in existence in its current form, and also how it was extended. The
decision itself to create Operation Atalanta was made by the PSC on 18 November 2008 with
regard to the Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 (Political and
Security Committee, 2008). The PSC is comprised of an official from each Member State
plus one from the Commission, which shows the role of Member States in the decision
making. Furthermore, it was the role of Member States that helped setting the agenda of
piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly the role of France. France is regarded to have
raised awareness of the issue after the hijacking of the French yacht Le Ponant in April 2008
(Germond & Smith, 2009, p. 583). France pushed the UN Security Council to pass
24
Resolution 1816 so that they could operate in the area, but there was also a case of Nicolas
Sarkozy using his role as the rotating EU President between July and December 2008 to raise
the agenda within the EU (ibid.). In order to do so, France looked to Germany and the UK for
support, with the former accepting due to its inability to act unilaterally because of domestic
criticism and the latter only accepting because it did not want France to take the lead in a high
profile operation and because NATO was overstretched at the time (pp. 584-585). Therefore,
the role of Member States and in particular France was very important in the agenda-setting
at the time. This has shown that Member States were united in wishing to tackle the issue of
piracy – although in different ways - and thus, there was no space for bureaucracy to
influence the existence of piracy at the top of the agenda.
In terms of how this is relevant to the research of this paper, the agenda-setting in
2008 of piracy by Member States continues to be relevant with the extension of the operation.
The latest extension of the operation was in December 2010 with the Council Decision
2010/766/CFSP to extend the mandate to 12 December 2012 (Council of the EU, 2010).
Therefore, we are still seeing the role of Member States in the decision making in this regard.
Moreover, as stated earlier in this paper, Member States bare the extra costs of resources that
they use (EU NAVFOR, n.d.) and countries such as Germany have their own mandate on
how involved they will be (EU NAVFOR, 2008). Thus, a further development of the
operation would be reliant on Member States agreeing to extra costs on their part, which is
particularly difficult during times of financial hardship, and this could suggest that they have
decided not to change the nature of Operation Atalanta because of their own national
interests. Moreover, there is the presence of pressure from external institutions. The UN and
WFP put considerable pressure on the EU to act upon piracy, particularly the WFP who
stated that it is too dangerous for them to transit the region and would not without assistance
(Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). It is this pressure from an institution
external to the EU that has meant that the primary priority of the operation is still to protect
WFP ships delivering resources to Somalia. Moreover, the EU has launched the EU Training
Mission in Somalia (EUTM), which began in 2010 (EEAS, n.d.). This appears to be a
Brussels-based initiative with Headquarters coming from Brussels within the EUMS unlike
EU NAVFOR, which is run from Northwood, UK. The influence of bureaucracy and of
institutions is evident because the training mission has created another institution – the
EUTM Somalia Mission Monitoring Team – and hence more jobs and funding, which are
clear interests of institutions. Therefore, alongside Atalanta, there is the presence of
25
institutional influence in the creation of the training mission to compliment the military
mission based in the UK.
However, there are also other views that would suggest that the role of bureaucracy
has not been important in the agenda-setting and decision making of Operation Atalanta. The
arguments base around the fact that piracy is a „real‟ threat and one that directly threatens the
EU‟s interest, unlike other CSDP missions (Vines, 2010, p. 1091). The existence of this
direct threat to the EU would force the continued presence of EU NAVFOR and undermine
the institutional explanation. Thus, this mission is different to other CSDP missions where
studies have existed on the role of bureaucracy in agenda-setting and decision making. Real
threats exist to EU citizens through kidnapping and ransoms, to maritime trade and European
economy, to energy security, to the marine environment, and to the Somali people (Germond
& Smith, 2009, pp. 580-581). Therefore, as a counter to the institutional explanation, the
direct threat to the EU and the severity of the issue may have forced the agenda-setting of the
EU.
Even though these views exist that would dispel the major influence in the
institutional explanation for the continued presence of the mission, the role of the WFP as an
external institution that has forced the decision to keep the protection of WFP vessels as the
main priority of the mandate should not be underestimated. Moreover, the creation of the
EUTM Somalia does appear to be created by institutions for their own interests. Although,
the existence of „real‟ threats and Member States‟ converging views point towards a lack of
bureaucratic influence in the agenda-setting of the issue. Due to the fact that there is heavy
involvement by the Member States, there is generally less scope for institutions to intervene.
However, ideas such as „path dependencies‟ would mean that institutions will ensure that
their own institution will not be removed or altered because of the mission. In the future, with
EU NAVFOR officials predicting a further extension of the mandate after 2012 (Interview
with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011), the role of the High Representative and the EEAS
could be an area for research. With the gradual operationalisation of the High Representative
(currently Catherine Ashton) and the EEAS and also their movements towards political
contact in order to tackle the problem (Ernst, 2010), their role could be vital and be an
important area of research in the future, if the mandate is indeed extended. For this research,
although the creation of the EUTM has shown the influence from the EUMS, there is
insufficient evidence to prove that the institutional explanation can explain the research
26
question. The convergence in Member States‟ interests show that institutions were unable to
influence the fact that Operation Atalanta has maintained in its current form.
5.2 Constructivism
In general, constructivists would see that the EU would place its external image as a very
important factor. Therefore, the way that the EU is viewed by other actors would influence
their decisions, as well as upholding the responsibilities that they have and the role that they
have to play. Thus, the EU would not reverse a decision due to the construction of it
becoming a norm that the EU has to adhere to. In terms of this research, constructivists would
argue that Operation Atalanta would remain in its current form because it has the
responsibility to the other actors in the region, as well as vulnerable states in the area, and
also to maintain its role as the leader amongst other actors. We would then see the EU
carrying on with what has been happening for the last few years because of the role it has and
the responsibilities it has to the rest of the world and to the WFP.
Constructivists would not alter the mission to focus on a different area because of
their role and responsibilities. As the operation started to protect WFP ships, constructivism
would state that the EU would continue to prioritise WFP ships whilst the danger is still
there. Therefore, constructivism can be used to explain why the nature of Operation Atalanta
has not changed and why it is still primarily based around protecting WFP ships rather than
looking to evolve into a counter-piracy operation (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official,
2011). The operation would also not change because “Atalanta is delivering its mandate”
(Ernst, 2010), hence showing the success of the mission that constructivists would look to
continue, particularly to its responsibility to the WFP, which is the main priority and who
refused to transit the area without protection as it is so dangerous (Interview with an EU
NAVFOR Official, 2011). Additionally, Operation Atalanta has played a major role in the
delivering of food aid to Somali people with all WFP vessels successfully transiting the area,
feeding close to 1.3 million Somalis each month. A vital aspect that would mean the
operation would not change in nature is the EU‟s responsibility to other actors and their role
in the region. As Ernst stated, the EU is the “partner of choice” (ibid.) and is working
alongside the other actors to tackle the problem, meaning that the operation should not
change because of the responsibility to other actors to maintain its current role. The EU has
extra pressure to maintain its role because of its leadership amongst the other actors, and is
27
hence showing that it is a global power and can be the leader (Interview with an EU
NAVFOR Official, 2011). The EU is the leader in the global response because it chose to
take responsibility when the US and NATO would not (Germond & Smith, 2009, p. 585). An
important facet of constructivism is also the external expectations of the EU from third
parties. With the EU leading the global response to piracy, other actors would expect the EU
to maintain this role in order for other actors to maintain their own roles. For example, the
EU‟s current role as the leader of the global response has allowed the US-led coalition to
solely focus on a counter-piracy operation rather than also leading other actors outside of the
coalition. Therefore, constructivism explains why Operation Atalanta maintains in its current
form due to the responsibility it has to other actors and due to the role it plays in the global
response, which both culminate in portraying an image externally that other actors can
respect and look to for leadership.
Furthermore, as Germond and Smith (2009) stated, there is the “opportunity to
increase the EU‟s scope of action and spread EU‟s values” (p. 583), which are core aspects of
constructivism that show why the current operation is in existence. In addition, they stated
that through this mission, the EU can “affirm its position, to make it more visible on the
world stage” and also to show the “grandeur of the EU and the affirmation of its values”
(ibid.). These views support the view that constructivism can explain why Operation Atalanta
is still in operation in its current form because it aides the EU to spread its norms and values
across the globe, showing it to be a major world power and to show its capabilities.
Therefore, constructivists would not believe that the operation to change to one that may not
compliment these values. Also, it has been said that “when you are a strategic planner, you
don‟t stop when a mission is launched. You don‟t fall back to a waiting position”
(Correspondence with EU Official, 2011). This once again affirms the possibility of
constructivism explaining why Atalanta is still operational in its current form because
constructivists would argue that the norm of the existence of Atalanta has been constructed.
Therefore, it will continue to stay in existence because of some of the other factors mentioned
above, such as responsibility and external image.
Thus, in order to explain the research question of why Operation Atalanta is still
operational in its current form, constructivists would explain it by highlighting the fact that
the EU has certain responsibilities to other actors and is playing an important role. This role
is very important to other actors to be able to continue their own roles, thus they expect the
EU to continue to be the leader. These factors coupled with the fact that constructivists would
28
also claim that the EU cannot stop what they have started, equate to the current situation of
Operation Atalanta still operationalised in its current form and also explains why there has
not been a drastic evolution of the EU‟s role. However, constructivism has been unable to
answer why there has not been an extension of the operation‟s role whilst maintaining its
current responsibilities. Alongside the military mission, the EU could conceivably create a
more comprehensive approach to tackle issues within the state of Somalia. This would allow
the EU to maintain its roles and responsibilities on the sea, as well as a further extension to
the mission. Although, constructivism is unable to explain why the EU has not extended the
mission in order to manage the root causes of the problem within Somalia.
5.3 Rational Choice Approach
The final theory to be analysed in this paper is the rational choice approach, which is the
hypothesis of this research. In short, the rational choice approach states that all choices are
rational and thought through substantially. Therefore, a major consideration is the costbenefit analysis and the decision will only be made if it is felt that the benefits of the decision
will outweigh the costs. Thus, a rational choice will be the optimal outcome that offers the
most benefits for least costs. In terms of Operation Atalanta, the rational choice approach
dictates that the operation is still in existence in its current form because the mission is more
beneficial than costly and any other options would cause the cost-benefit analysis to become
imbalanced and hence would not be a rational choice. Therefore, with the data already
presented added to other qualitative data, it will be possible to analyse whether Operation
Atalanta is still operational in its current form due to the cost-benefit analysis.
Ferreira (2011) stated that counter-piracy operations, as well as the cost of stop
shipping, are very expensive and are not a priority to tax payers, who have other concerns
that affect them more directly (p. 30). This analysis from Ferreira supports the rational choice
approach, as it states the heavy costs involved in running a counter-piracy operation, which
would be a further step from the current mission. As has been stated, Operation Atalanta is
not intended to be a counter-piracy operation, unlike those of NATO and the US-led coalition
(Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). It would not be a rational decision for the
EU to conduct a counter-piracy operation due to the costs involved, especially as “naval
vessels and their crews are very expensive resources in short supply” (House of Lords, 2010,
p. 5). Therefore, it is rational to determine that the EU cannot develop Operation Atalanta
29
into a counter-piracy operation because the increased costs would not befit the benefits from
the mission. As has been seen, in 2011 the cost of operation has dropped to only €7.8 million
(EU NAVFOR, n.d.), however the operation is still producing benefits that have been
intended in the mandate, as has been shown in the previous chapter. Furthermore, any extra
resources are paid for by the Member States themselves (EU NAVFOR, n.d.) and an
extension of the operation‟s mandate would need to be ratified by them. However, it has
already been seen that not all Member States are contributing and countries such as Germany
setting their own mandate about how involved they wish to be (EU NAVFOR, 2008).
Therefore, it appears that both the EU and Member States do not wish to pour more money
into the operation, which could affect the cost-benefit balance.
Moreover, it does not seem to be feasible for the EU to attempt to tackle the entire
problem. Atalanta is battling the consequences, which is piracy in the area, however not the
causes (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official, 2011). There is also a difference between
being effective and being efficient (Correspondence with EU Official, 2011). The opinion is
that “being effective with tackling piracy in that area would mean that we tackle it all [...] but
at what cost?”. A full scale mission to rid the issue of piracy would involve a much larger
operation, however “in practice this is not only financially not feasible, but it would mean an
intrusion in the sovereignty of the concerned country/countries” (ibid.). EU NAVFOR have
admitted that the solution to the problem is on the ground in Somalia, although that does not
appear to be desired due to not only the huge financial costs but also due to the human costs
of sending people into Somalia, which would be very dangerous (Interview with an EU
NAVFOR Official, 2011). Therefore, “we have to be efficient: doing the best at a lesser cost”
(Correspondence with EU Official, 2011). Hence showing that the costs of a larger operation
- that would perhaps be better than the current mission – is not rational because, yet again, the
costs of such a mission would be extortionate compared to the benefits that it would offer.
Thus, the rational choice approach appears to define why the EU is continuing with
Operation Atalanta in its current form and not increasing the scope of its involvement in
order to better tackle the issue of piracy. However, with an expected extension of the
operation at the end of its current mandate in 2012 (Interview with an EU NAVFOR Official,
2011), the cost-benefit balance will perhaps again need to be analysed. As stated by EU
NAVFOR, currently there are increasing ransom demands, which lead to increased
negotiation times, which cause increased detention times for hostages and frustration amongst
pirates. This all culminates in a higher risk to crews in terms of harm and ill-health (ibid.),
30
which could potentially disrupt the current cost-benefit balance if piracy continues to develop
at its current rate. This is becoming increasingly evident with ransom demands rising
exponentially, with a reported ransom of $13.5 million paid by Intertanko5 for the release of
Irene SL on 7 April 2011 (Pelton, 2011). However, at this time, it must be said that the EU is
following the definition of efficiency stated above and continuing the current operation,
which is producing benefits with a lesser financial and human cost. Therefore, the rational
choice approach proves that it explains why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form because any further action would require greater financial and human costs,
which would cause the cost-benefit balance to tilt more towards higher costs for fewer
benefits, rather than the current situation where there is a low cost but significant benefit.
Therefore, the current operation is the optimal outcome.
5.4 Overall Analysis
Firstly, the different explanations to the research question from the three theories will be
summarised. The institutional explanation focuses on the role of individuals or bodies that
have influenced the agenda-setting and decision making process. So therefore, who has
caused piracy off the coast of Somalia to stay at the top of the agenda and why are the current
priorities at the top of the agenda? The institutional explanation dictates that the role of the
WFP has been vital in keeping the protection of its ships as the most important issue in this
operation, therefore causing the EU to focus on keeping Operation Atalanta mainly being
focused on protecting WFP ships. However, the existence of „real‟ threats to the EU has
helped piracy to stay at the top agenda, which counteracts the institutional explanation for the
reason for piracy being at the top of the agenda. Furthermore, the fact that Member States do
not diverge over the issue suggests that there was not space for bureaucracy to influence the
decisions. Therefore, although the institutional explanation offers an explanation to the
research question, there are arguments that would counteract this.
Constructivism states that the reason why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form is because the EU has roles and responsibilities to other actors and to the Somali
people, which contribute towards the EU‟s external image. The role that the EU plays as a
leader in the global response to piracy is very important, so the EU has a responsibility to the
5
“an organisation of independent tanker owners” (Pelton, 2011)
31
other actors to maintain this role. Moreover, the EU has a responsibility to the WFP and the
Somali people to help WFP shipments reach Somalia and thus cannot abandon the current
mission. This responsibility is why Operation Atalanta has not developed into a counterpiracy mission and maintains in its current form. However, constructivism would state that
they must maintain their role and responsibility, which does not stop an extension of this role
and these responsibilities. Therefore, constructivism fails to determine why the EU is not
looking to extend the scope of its role and of its responsibilities in this issue whilst still
maintaining their current responsibilities.
Finally, the rational choice approach determines that Operation Atalanta is still
operational in its current form because of the cost-benefit analysis. Currently, the costs are
low but still reap benefits, thus making the decision rational. Even though more could be
done, and EU NAVFOR officials have stated that there is a need for a more comprehensive
strategy, it would cause costs (financial, human and to the social environment) to rise
substantially and may not increase benefits at the same rate. Therefore, the EU would only
conduct a more comprehensive strategy once either the costs for a more developed strategy
are decreased, or if the current operation becomes no longer rational because of the costbenefit analysis.
Having analysed the different theories with data collected on the mission, the rational
choice approach appears to be the best explanation. Not only does the theory provide a valid
explanation to the research question of why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form, but it also gives an explanation as to why the EU is not pursuing further
developments that would work alongside Atalanta that have been stated by many.
Furthermore, it also helps to understand the other theories used. The institutional explanation
focuses on agenda-setting and decision making and once the idea is on the top of the agenda,
the rational choice approach would influence the decision making by determining what
decisions are possible. Additionally, the rational choice approach would decide what the
optimal outcome would be. Constructivism focuses on roles and responsibilities and the costbenefit analysis would hinder advancements to increase the role and responsibilities of the
EU if it is not deemed rational. Moreover, the optimal cost-benefit ratio would include not
harming relations with allies, thus the rational choice approach would state that the EU would
not abandon the other actors (Goldthau, 2009). Therefore, from the analysis of this paper, the
rational choice approach best answers why Operation Atalanta is still operational in its
current form.
32
6. Conclusion
In conclusion to this research, it has been found that the reason why Operation Atalanta is
still operational in its current form is because, currently, the benefits provided by the mission
outweigh the costs of it. The analysis in the previous chapter used the empirical data from
Chapters 3 and 4, plus the addition of some further data, to analyse the theories that were
outlined in Chapter 2. The conclusion has then culminated to state that the rational choice
approach is in fact the best explanation. Therefore, the reason is because of the cost-benefit
analysis. Thus, it can be concluded that the hypothesis made at the beginning of this paper
was correct to suggest that the rational choice approach appropriately answers the question.
This has been proved by outlining the empirical data of the operation in qualitative form and
also by disproving the validity of the institutional explanation and constructivism to
substantially explain the research of this paper. Where these two theories have failed to
provide an appropriate explanation, the rational choice approach has given an answer. This
paper has also shown the versatility of the rational choice approach. With its simple structure,
it is able to compliment other theories and can be used alongside other theories to better
explain phenomena. The significance of the conclusion that the rational choice approach
offers the best explanation is that this gives an insight into the ideas behind the decision
making of this operation. The cost-benefit analysis has been an important tool in determining
whether to continue Operation Atalanta and also whether to change parts of the mission.
Although this has only been proven in this specific case study, alongside future studies on
other CSDP missions, there is the possibility of drawing generalisations on CSDP decision
making.
The research conducted in this study has also helped the understanding of two other
issues that were allured to in the introduction that helped to reach the conclusion of the
research question. These issues are the reasoning behind the EU‟s apparent contentment with
Operation Atalanta, and also, the explanation as to the lack of a more comprehensive
approach. The EU is content with Operation Atalanta and continued to extend its mandate
because the cost-benefit analysis has proved that the current mission is the rational optimal
outcome. This is supplemented by the evidence that has shown that the mission has been
successful in achieving its aims. Furthermore, the EU has not implemented a more
comprehensive approach towards piracy in the region because the case would be that the
33
costs would rise substantially but the benefits may not rise at the same rate. A different
approach or a more comprehensive approach would only be conducted if their cost-benefit
analysis provides the rational optimal outcome. This will only be the case if, either the costs
of these approaches become less or the benefits are higher, or if the costs of the current
mission rise substantially. Therefore, both these issues have been answered by this study in
proving that the rational choice approach offers the best explanation for Operation Atalanta.
As this paper has also shown, Operation Atalanta has proved a success in achieving
its mandate. Therefore, the mission must be considered a success, especially with the
protection it has given to WFP ships and AMISOM shipments. However, it is still widely
considered that there has not been a deterrent factor to pirate activity and raw numbers of
attempted pirate attacks are on the rise in the region under question in this research. It has
been stated that Operation Atalanta is not a counter-piracy operation and the main objectives
are to protect WFP ships and AMISOM shipments. Although, is the mandate itself the reason
why the EU does not appear to be successfully countering piracy? As has been discovered in
this research, the reason why the current mandate is in place is because of the cost-benefit
analysis, and if the current cost-benefit analysis maintains constant to the end of 2012, it will
be unsurprising if the operation is extended once again. Nevertheless, will the EU continue to
use the cost-benefit analysis to determine its mission in Somalia? Or could there be a case for
looking at long term benefits, even though there could be high short term costs? This would
be an interesting research that could be conducted in the future, particularly when the current
mandate expires at the end of 2012.
What is certain is that if the EU actually wants to tackle piracy off the coast of
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the mission also needs to focus within Somalia. It appears
that the only way to successfully target piracy is by state-building in Somalia in order to
tackle the problem at the source, instead of dealing with the consequences, which is what the
current mission is doing. Moreover, there needs to be a working legal system in order to
effectively deter pirates by increasing the risk of prosecution for captured pirates. If this
cannot be secured in either EU Member States or by countries in the vicinity of Somalia, then
a focal point of a state-building mission would be to create a working legal system within
Somalia. The intricacies of the legal possibilities to prosecute pirates would be another area
within this subject to study, although this would need to be from a legal perspective. Looking
at things from a rational choice approach, Operation Atalanta will only develop once the costbenefit analysis no longer proves that the current mission is the optimal outcome. However,
34
with the increase in ransoms, detention times for hostages, and the increased risk of harm to
hostages, it is looking as if the current mission will not be the optimal outcome in the future if
piracy develops as it currently is. Although, the human and financial costs of entering
Somalia are very high, the rational choice approach would be able to explain an extended
operation, where a civil-military state-building component is run to compliment the current
operation. This would then allow the EU to maintain its role and responsibilities on the sea.
However, this would only be the case if the EU is looking long-term because the benefits
would not be evident until after a lot of costs are spent. This appears to be the only way to
successfully tackle piracy by focusing on the source and still maintaining the role dealing
with the consequence (which is piracy) in order to not harm the social environment and
relations with other actors. Therefore, in terms of where the future lies for Operation
Atalanta, the current mission runs until the end of 2012. If it does get extended, then a further
research on why it was extended would be useful, as it would dictate if the rational choice
approach still offers the best explanation. Further developments will only occur if either the
current mission is no longer the optimal outcome, or if the EU is willing to look at the costbenefit analysis on a longer term basis, being prepared to spend now for benefits in the future.
Nevertheless, what does this current study contribute to the understanding of CSDP?
Operation Atalanta has been lauded as being the flagship military mission of the EU,
particularly due to the fact that this is the first time that the EU has not had to rely upon
NATO resources to carry out a military operation. This may signal to more future EU
military missions using their own capabilities because of the experience of the success of
Atalanta in achieving its mandate. However, this cannot be concluded as of yet until further
missions are conducted. Moreover, according to this research, CSDP decision making
appears to be effected by the cost-benefit analysis. Although other studies that were
mentioned in Chapter 2 claimed that other theories have explained other missions, perhaps
with the current precarious global financial climate, the cost-benefit analysis has become
increasingly significant because of domestic and financial pressures. This research would
compliment future studies on any future missions to determine whether the rational choice
approach is becoming used in general within CSDP to determine the extent of missions.
Moreover, this paper could be linked to future studies on previous missions to determine
whether the rational choice approach could explain their existence. The rational choice
approach could be able to better help understand previous missions alongside other theories.
This paper has also allured to the fact that the EU has decided upon this CSDP mission on a
35
short-term basis, with Atalanta having short mandates that have been extended. In addition,
the EU has focused on short-term benefits from the mission. This also points to a link to
further studies. Does the EU only look for short-term benefits? In the case of piracy off the
coast of Somalia, this appears to be the case with the EU only targeting the consequences of
issues within Somalia. Do other CSDP missions look for short-term benefits in exchange for
low short-term costs? Therefore, this paper could be very useful alongside other future
studies on CSDP in order to create a generalisation on whether the rational choice approach
offers the best explanation on CSDP missions in general. This will offer an insight into the
decision making in the EU and also the EU‟s aims and objectives as a global actor.
Therefore, in conclusion, this paper has successfully answered the research question
of „why is Operation Atalanta still operational in its current form?‟. The reason for this is
because the rational choice approach has concluded that through the cost-benefit analysis, the
current mission is providing the rational optimal outcome. With a low risk of prosecution,
piracy in the region is also the rational choice. Thus, with both actors acting rationally, it will
be interesting to see which actor has to be the first to act irrationally in order to achieve its
goals. Piracy is an issue that has become increasingly glorified through the mediums of film
and literature; however the issue in this region is real. Piracy has undermined the creation of a
stable state and has caused many economic consequences in Somalia. Johnny Depp, in his
role as the pirate Captain Jack Sparrow in the popular film series Pirates of the Caribbean,
repeatedly stated, “This is the day that you will always remember as the day you almost
caught Captain Jack Sparrow” (Verbinski, 2003). What is known is that the EU must develop
Operation Atalanta in order to stop this quotation from being a reality off the coast of
Somalia, with the EU currently unable to stop pirates like Captain Jack Sparrow was not
stopped in the films.
36
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