FromCompetitiontoCooperation–
PublicAdministrationReformsforSustainableCities
by
MildredE.Warner,Ph.D.
CornellUniversity
September2016
PresentedatCentroLatinoamericanodeAdministracionparaelDesarrollo(CLAD)Congress
"Aspectosestratégicosdelagestiónpúblicaparaelcrecimientosostenibledelasciudades”
Santiago,Chile
November2016
forpublicationinCLAD’sreview,ReformayDemocracia
Abstract
The21stcenturyistheurbancentury.Citiesleadthewayingrowthandinnovation,butalsoin
inequality.Howcanpublicadministrationmeetthechallengesofdemographicchange,climate
changeandfiscalsustainability?Thelastdecadesofthe20thcenturygaveprimaryconcernto
efficiencyandchampionedthetoolsofdecentralizationandprivatization.Competitionwas
assumedtobethesourceofefficiency.Butcompetitionhaslimits,andinthe21stcentury,
cooperationisthenewreform.Publicadministrationisgivingincreasedattentionto
coordination,equity,anddemocraticvoice.Thisrequiresarebalancingoftherelationship
betweenthestateandthemarket,andbetweenthestateandlocalgovernment.Publicvalues
mustbereinsertedinthemarketforpublicservicedelivery.Cooperationacrosstheintergovernmentalsystemisrequiredbecauseinnovative,newtechnologieshavethepotentialto
disruptandfragmentthecityregion.Thechallengeforpublicadministrationistopromote
cooperationsothatgovernmentcanbetheconnectivetissuethatholdssocietytogetherto
addressthechallengesofthe21stcentury.
MildredE.Warner,Ph.D.
Professor,DepartmentofCityandRegionalPlanning
W.SibleyHall,CornellUniversity
Ithaca,NY14853
607-255-6816
[email protected]
http://www.mildredwarner.org
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FromCompetitiontoCooperation–
PublicAdministrationReformsforSustainableCities
Introduction
The21stcenturywillbetheurbancentury.Acrosstheworldwewillseeurbanizationratestop
50%by2050.LatinAmericawas41%urbanin1950andhasrisento80%today(UN2014).The
rapidrateofurbanizationintheglobalsouthcreateschallengesforenvironmental
sustainability,economicinclusionandinstitutionalcapacity.Publicadministrationmodels,
drawnheavilyfromtheglobalnorth,mayhavelesssalienceinregionsfacinggreaterinequality,
andurbangrowththatoutstripsformalinstitutionalcapacitytorespond.Thispaperwill
explorethepublicadministrationtrendsofthelastdecadesandsuggestimplicationsforthe
future,ifpublicadministrationistosupportsustainablecities.
PublicAdministrationreformsinthelastdecadesofthe20thCenturyfocusedoncompetitionas
thekeytoefficiencyanddemocraticresponsiveness.Twotrendscharacterizethisperiod:
decentralizationandprivatization.Botharebasedonthepositivepotentialofcompetition,ina
fragmentedsystem,topromotechoiceandefficiency.Decentralizationwasintendedto
enhanceefficiency,responsivenessandvoicebyshiftingresponsibilitydownwardfromstateto
locallevelsofgovernmentintheintergovernmentalsystem.Privatizationwasintendedto
enhanceefficiencyandchoicewithingovernmentbypromotingmarket-typeservicedelivery
mechanisms.
Bothtrendshavehadmajorimpactsoncountriesacrosstheworld.Theyhavebeenpushedas
“bestpractice”bytheOECDandEuropeanUnionandrequiredbyinternationalagencies(IMF,
USAID,IADBandWorldBank).WithMexicounderPresidentSalinasleading,muchofLatin
Americajoinedintheprivatizationprocess.Privatizationofinfrastructurewassignificantinthe
region.TELMEXwasthelargestsaleatthetime(Clifton2000).Giventhepersistenceof
clientelism,privatizationofferedpromiseasawayofbreakingthestatusquo.Decentralization
wasanimportantstepintheregion'sdemocratizationprocessesofthe1980swheretherewas
notjustashiftfromdictatorshipstodemocracy,butalsoanacknowledgmentthatnational
governmentswerenotresponsiveorhadabandonedmanyregionsanddecentralization
offeredthepromiseofincreasedlocalandregionaldevelopment(Goldfrank2011,Kohl2003).
However,researchhasshownthatthepromisesofthesereformshavenotproventobeas
clearcutastheprotagonistsexpected,norassustainable.Fromthe1990sLatinAmerican
countrieslargelyfollowedWashingtonConsensusrecipes,unliketheirAsiancousinswho
focusedmoreonstateleddevelopment(Evans1995).Somesuggestthatasanoutcome,Latin
AmericaexperienceditslostdecadeandAsiabecametheEastAsianTigers.Giventhedismal
performanceofthelostdecade,ahistoryofhavingthehighestginisasaregion,andtheneed
tobuildpublicsectorcapacitytoinvestininfrastructureandservices,asweenterthe21st
centurypublicadministrationisshiftingitsfocusfromcompetitionbasedschemes,to
cooperativeones.Thisisintendedtoaddresstheproblemsgeneratedbythepriorreforms,the
persistenceofproblemswhichpriorreformswereunabletoaddress(e.g.shortageofbasic
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serviceprovisioninmanycitiesoftheglobalSouth),andtoaddressnewchallengesrelatedto
sustainabilitythatrequiremoreintegratedapproaches.
Inthispaper,Iwilloutlinewhattheresearchshowsontheimpactsofcompetition-basedpublic
administrationreformsofdecentralizationandprivatization.ThenIwilldiscussnewreformsin
publicadministrationthatfocusoncooperation.21stcenturychallengesofsustainability
requireashiftinfocusfromcompetitiontointegrationandcooperation.Iwillgiveexamplesof
whatthislooksliketheoreticallyandempirically,drawingheavilyonrecentresearchfromthe
USandEuropeandlinkingittocaseexamplesfromLatinAmerica.
CompetitionandtheFalsePromiseofEfficiency
Thefoundationsofpublicadministration’senthusiasmforcompetitioncanbefoundinPublic
Choicetheory.Backinthe1960s,inresponsetoSamuelson’s(1954)critiquethatgovernment
wouldalwaysbeinefficientandoversupplypublicgoods,CharlesTiebout(1965)countered
that,atleastatthelocalgovernmentlevelthiswouldnotbethecase.Why?Becausethereare
manylocalgovernmentsandtheycompeteamongeachotherforpopulation,thuscreatinga
publicmarket.Thistheory,groundedinthepostWWIIrealityofahighlymobilesocietyrapidly
suburbanizingacrosstheUS,seemedtoreflecttherealityofthetime.While,today,such
fragmentationiscritiquedforcreatingahostofexternalitiesandinequalitiesacrossthe
metropolitanregion(Lowery2000),Tiebout’sproject,atthetime,wastodemonstratethe
positivepossibilitythatlocalgovernmentscouldbeefficient.
Thefiscalfederalists,alsogroundedinUSexperienceinthe1950sand60s,madesimilar
arguments,thatfundingandprovidingservicesatthelowestlevelofgovernmentwould
enhanceefficiencyandchoice(Oates1998).Theyarguedthatwhenthecostsandbenefitsof
publicservicesarecloselylinkedatthelocallevel,taxpayerswillnotdemandmoreservices
thantheyarewillingtopayfor.Thiswillcreateadisciplineof‘fiscalequivalence’inthelocal
governmentmarket.Thedecentralizationcampalsoarguedthiswouldcreatemore
opportunitiesfordiversityinlocalvoiceandinadministrativeresponse.IntheUS,thelegacyof
theseapproachesispoliticallyfragmentedmetropolitanregionswithinequalityinservice
deliveryandinfiscalcapacitytomeetlocalneeds(Lowery2000).
Privatization
Theseneoclassicalideasofapublicmarketoflocalgovernmentsformtheintellectualbasisfor
latertrendsinprivatizationanddecentralizationfromthe1980sonward.Privatization,pushed
byThatcherinEngland,ReaganintheUSandinearlyinnovators,Chile,Mexico,NewZealand
andAustralia,wasintendedtoopenuppublicservicesmarketstocompetition.).Thiscouldbe
withingovernmentunitsorwithprivateproviders–eitherforprofitornongovernmental
organizations.Theideawasthatmarketcompetitionwouldcreatedisciplinetoencourage
efficiencyandlowercosts.Proponentsargueditwouldalsostrengthenmarketdevelopment
bygettingthestateoutofservicesthatcouldbeprovidedbythemarket(Graham1998).Chile
wasanearlyadopterofprivatizationunderthePinochetdictatorship/regimeandFischerand
Serra(2007)finditincreasedproductivityandservicecoverage.Mexicowasalsoanearly
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leaderinsignificantinfrastructureprivatization(egTELMEX)winningPresidentSalinasthe
nickname“theThatcherofLatinAmerica”(Clifton2000).
Forlocalgovernmentsprivatizationhascreatedbothanopportunityandachallenge.The
opportunitytoexploremarketpotential,requiredlocalgovernmentstothinkabouttheir
serviceportfolioandwhichservicesmightlendthemselvestocontractingout.Butthe
challengesofmarketmanagementwereunderestimated.Researchshowsthatlocalpublic
servicemarketsarethinandsubjecttoconcentrationevenintheUSwhereexperiencewith
contractingislongstanding(HefetzandWarner2012).Thuscompetitionerodesquickly,ifit
everexistedinthefirstplace.Oftenlocalgovernmentssimplysubstituteapublicmonopolyfor
aprivateone–andbothchargemonopolyrents.Thedifferenceisthatinapublicmonopoly,
thoserentsaresocialized.Inaprivatemonopoly,theyarelosttoprofit.
Thislackofcompetitioncreatesproblemsnotjustatthecontractingstage,butalsoduring
servicedeliveryasmonitoringisexpensiveandthemarketcannotbecountedontoprovide
competitivediscipline.Thuslocalgovernmentsmustbecomemarketmakersandmarket
managers.Thisprocessofmarketmanagementiscostly,inbothrealtermsandopportunity
costsforothercoreactivitiesofgovernment(Girthetal2012).
Lackofcompetitionhasalsoresultedinfewcostsavings.Theevidenceisin,andafter30years
ofcontracting,experienceacrosstheworldshowsthatforwaterandwaste,thetwolocal
governmentserviceswiththemostcontractingevidence(andacademicstudiesofcosts),there
isnosupportforlowercostswithprivateproduction(Beletal2010).Whywouldthisbe?
Reasonsinclude:lackofcompetitioninpublicservicemarkets,inadequatemonitoringto
ensureservicequalitydoesnoterode,organizationalrestructuringinpublicservicemarkets,
andinternalprocessimprovementinthepublicsectoritself.Wherewedofindcostorprocess
improvementsintheprivatesector,thepublicsectorofteninternalizestheminitsown
practice.Indeed,somearguethatoneofthebenefitsofprivatizationhasbeenthepressure
placedonthepublicsectortoimproveperformance.Insertionofcompetitionandprivatization
withinpublicservicemarketsintheEUhasbeenfoundtoincreaseprice,reduceconsumer
satisfactionandreduceservicesforvulnerablepeopleandregions(Cliftonetal.2011,Florio
2013).InLatinAmerica,earlyenthusiasmforprivatization(Graham1998),hasledto
dissatisfaction(Kohl2003)andconcernsoverstatecapacitytoregulateandmonitorprivate
providers.Forexample,Tankha(2008)foundthatlackofregulatorycapacitywaskeyas
privatizationofelectricityinBrazilledtopriceincreases,declineininvestment,andquality
deterioration.HerreraandPost(2014)describeaconflictbetweenprivatizationwhichwas
designedtoinsulateservicedeliveryfrompolitics,anddecentralizationwhichwasdesignedto
increasepoliticalresponsiveness.Today,LatinAmericaleadsinthesearchforalternativesto
privatizationwhichreasserttheroleofpubliccapacityandpublicinvolvementwithinpartially
marketizeddeliverysystems(e.g.corporatization)(McDonald2014,ChavezandTorres2014).
Inresponsetothesechallengeswithprivatization,therehasbeenareassertionoftheroleof
thepublicsectorinbasicserviceprovision.Thestateplaysacriticalroleindefiningthegoals
andnatureofpublicservicedelivery,andinregulatingproviders(Rameshetal2008).
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Governmentalsoplaysamarketstructuringrole.Marketmanagementtakesseveralforms.It
mayinvolvemixedpublicandprivatedeliverywithinthesameserviceandsamelocal
governmentmarket(dividingacityintodistrictsandcontractingoutsomeandkeepingothers
inhouse).Thisenablesbenchmarkingcostsandqualityandmaintainsinternalgovernment
capacityshouldthecontractfail(WarnerandHefetz2008).Thismixedmarketdeliveryismost
commonintheUSwhereexperiencewithlocalgovernmentcontractingislongstandingand
supportformarket-basedapproachesishigh.Itisalsocommonintheprivatesector.New
literaturefocusesontheroleofconcurrentsourcingasawaytoreducerisk,maximizemarket
complementaritiesandensureinternalcorecapacity(Hefetzetal.2014,Parmigiani2007).
Marketmanagementisadynamicprocessthatinvolvescontractingoutandbackinovertime.
Reversalsinprivatizationarenowcommonplace.IntheUS,reversalsequalnewlevelsof
contractingout(WarnerandHefetz2012).InEuropeandLatinAmerica,theprocesshasbeen
namedre-municipalization,ascities,dissatisfiedwithdecliningservicequalityandrisingcosts
havebroughtprivatizedservicesbackunderpubliccontrol(PigeonandMcDonald2012,Hallet
al2013).
Mixedmarketscanalsooccuratthelevelofthefirm.Thistakesseveralforms.Themixed
publicprivatefirmisquitecommoninEurope,especiallyforinfrastructuredelivery.State
ownedenterpriseshavemorphedintomixedpublic/privatefirmstocapturethebenefitsof
privateorganizationwhileretainingpublicvaluesatthecore.AspecialissueoftheAnnalsof
PublicandCooperativeEconomicsexploresthetheoreticalfoundationsandempiricalpractice
intheseformsofinstitutionalmixingaroundtheglobe(Cruzetal2014).InItaly,thesocial
cooperativesectorisquitecommonforsocialservices.InLatinAmerica,stateowned
enterprisesstilldominateinsomecountriesfortheprovisionofcriticalpublicinfrastructure
(PetrobasinBrazil,ANTELinUruguay,EmpresasPublicasMunicipales(EPM)inColombia,ICEin
CostaRica)(ChavezandTorres2014).Corporatizationputsthegovernmentagencyonan
enterprisebasisandhelpsinstillsomemarketprinciplesinsidethefirm,butkeepspublicvalues
atitscore.Colombia,perhaps,hasthelongestexperiencewithcorporatization,especiallythe
cityofMedellin.Herethefirm,EPM,hasprovidedwater,andelectricityservicesforovera
centuryanduseditsprofitstosupportbroadercommunitydevelopment(Furlong2013).While
somescholarscritiquethecorporatizedapproachforequityreasons,instillingsomemarket
ethosintothemanagementofinfrastructureprovisionisnowquitecommon,andcanleadto
greatersustainabilityofthefirm(McDonald2014).Theseformsofmixingatthelevelofthe
firm,whicharemorecommoninEuropeandLatinAmerica,maybemorestableandoffermore
developmentpotentialthanmixingatthelevelofthemarket(whichismorecommonintheUS
–whereprivatizationreversalratesarealsohigher)(WarnerandBel2008,ChavezandTorres
2014).
Whatisemergingnowisaglobalconsolidationofsuchinfrastructurefirmsastheyseekto
servemarketsbeyondtheirhomecountry.SeveralEuropeanfirmshavemovedintoLatin
Americanmarketsfortelecomandelectricityandwater(ChavezandTorres2014).GrupoEPM,
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headquarteredinMedellinColombia,alsohasholdingsalloverLatinAmerica.1Theconcern
whensuchinfrastructurefirmsgoabroadisiftheirpublicvaluestravelwiththem.Initial
researchsuggeststheydonot.Whenpublicfirmsoperateoutsidetheirhomecountrycontext,
theyoperatemorelikeprivatefirms–andsocialobjectivesaroundgreenenergy,local
economicdevelopmentorequity,takesecondplacetoprofit(Cliftonetal2016).
Moretroubling,theglobalrulesforpublicservicedeliveryareshiftingmoretowardmarket
approaches.BeginningwithNAFTAandexpandingwiththeGeneralAgreementonTradein
ServicesandnowtheTPP,publicservicesareincreasinglybeingopenedtointernational
competition.Whilethismayenhanceaccesstoawidermarketofpotentialproviders,thetrade
agreementsgivenovoicetosubnationallevelsofgovernmentinthetradedisputearbitration
system.Whileweincreasinglyseemayorsandcitiesactingonaglobalscale,thefreetrade
agreementsgivenostandingtosubnationalgovernments(regionsorcities).Thiswillconstrain
localgovernments’abilitytomanagepublicservicemarkets(GerbasiandWarner2007).These
areconcernsevenforcountrieswhichareleadingarchitectsoftheseagreementssuchasin
EuropeandtheUS(Clifton2014,Warner2009),butevenmoresoforsmallernationswithless
powertostructurerolesoftheinternationaltradesystem(Kohl2004,ChavezandTorres2014).
Somehaveaskedwhoisthepublicshareholderinthesearrangements?Insomehostcountries
–suchasUruguayorColombiaorCostaRica-suchcorporatizedinfrastructurefirmshavebeen
abletoinvestinbroadersocialobjectives(ChavezandTorres2014,McDonald2014).However,
wheninfrastructurefirmstravelabroad,theymaystripassetsorrepatriateprofitstotheir
homebaseratherthanmakingbroaderinvestmentsinthehostcountry(Kohl2004).This
underminesthesustainabilityoftheinfrastructureinvestment.
Decentralization
Thesecondbigtrendofthelate20thcentury,decentralization,restsonthepromisethatitwill
promoteefficiency,voiceandeconomicgrowth.Decentralizationcanbeadministrative,fiscal
orpolitical.Administrativedecentralizationputsthedecisiononserviceclosertothepeople
servedandcanallowfordiversityinresponsetolocalneeds.Politicaldecentralizationgives
morepotentialforlocalvoiceanddemocracy.Fiscaldecentralizationshiftsfunding
responsibilityclosertowheretheserviceisdelivered.Whilethisissupposedtoencourage
efficiency,italsocancreateinequalityacrossregionswithinthenation.Prudhomme(1995)
warnsthatserviceswithhightechnicalrequirementsshouldbeadministrativelyhandledat
higherlevels.Redistributivefunctionsshouldbehandledatthehighestlevelofgovernment
whereredistributioncanoccuracrossregionsofrelativewealthtothoseofgreaterpoverty.
Studiesofdecentralizationacrosstheworldhavenotfoundempiricalsupportforitsgrowth
claims(Rodriguez-PoseandGill2004;Rodriguez-PoseandEzcurra2010).Ifhigherlevel
governmentsdonotprovideequalizinggrants,thendecentralizationcanincreaseinequality
(Lessman2012).InfederalsystemssuchastheUSwherethesubnationalstateplaysamajor
redistributiverole,decentralizationcanresultindramaticdifferencesinlocalgovernment
capacityandcommunitywellbeingacrossthenation(XuandWarner2016).
1
Seelistingherehttp://www.grupo-epm.com/Home/Filiales/FilialesInternacionales.aspx
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Somescholarsworrythatrecentdecentralizationtrendsaremoreaboutdismantlingsocial
welfareandredistributivefunctionsofthenationstate.InEuropeandtheUSsincetheGreat
Recessiondecentralizationhasledtoaprocessofscalardumpingofserviceresponsibilitieson
localgovernment(Peck2012,WarnerandClifton2014).InLatinAmericandecentralization
reflectsanefforttodesignamorecollaborativeintergovernmentalrelationshipofpolitical
decentralization,andfiscalredistributionwhichcanleadtoimprovementsinlocalandregional
governance(Tendler1997).Decentralizationhasbeenmoreassociatedwithdemocratic
opening,andinanumberofcountries(Ecuador,Honduras)nationalconstitutionshavebeen
rewrittentoincludespecificpercentagesofnationalbudgetsreservedforlocalgovernment.
DecentralizationinLatinAmericainthe1980sand1990sinvolvednotjustinstitutionalizationof
politicalcompetition,butincreasedfocusoncitizenparticipation,humanrightsand
democratizationofsocialpractices(Avritzer,2002,Tendler1997).Decentralizationhasledto
expansionsinbasicpublicserviceprovision–water,sanitation,roads,education,andhealth
services.However,distributionalissuesremainthroughoutLatinAmerica.Localcapacity
constraints,corruption(Kohl2003)andprejudiceagainstindigenousgroups(GonzalezRivas
2014)resultindifferentialaccesstoimprovedservicessuchasdrinkingwater.Thechallengeis
capacity,especiallyatthelocalgovernmentlevel,asdecentralizationmayleadtoaformof
“minufundismo”amonglocalgovernments(Carrion2003).Thereisalsotheconcernthatelite
capturetobiasinvestmentchoicesawayfromcoreneedstoluxuryinvestments(egswimming
poolsinsteadofdrinkingwatersystems)ifmechanismsarenotputinplacetoensureeffective
politicalvoicesofmarginalizedgroups(Kohl2003,Myers2002).
Fiscalandpoliticalpressureswithintheintergovernmentalsystem–fromnationaltoregional
tolocal–makethedecentralizationprocessonethatmustbeempiricallyfollowedtoseewhat
theresultsreallyare.Atthelocallevel,decentralizationcreatesproblemsofreintegration.In
countrieswithmanysmalllocalgovernments,theinabilitytogettotheregionalscalefor
coordinateddevelopmentandpublicservicedeliverycanunderminegrowthand
competitiveness(Martínez-Vasquezetal2015).
CooperationandtheChallengeofIntegration
Ifthelate20thcenturywascharacterizedbytestingthepotentialofcompetition,theearly21st
centuryiscallingformorecooperation–withintheintergovernmentalsystemandbetweenthe
publicandprivatesector.Addressingsustainabilityproblemsfacedincities,requiresamultisectorandmultilevelgovernanceapproach.
CooperationacrossGovernments
Withregardtoprivatization,intheUSwenowseeinter-municipalcooperationismore
commonthancontractingtoforprofitfirmsandmorestable(Hefetzetal2012).ThisintermunicipalcooperationmovementiscommonacrosstheOECDnationsandinLatinAmericaas
well(Bel2010,Martínez-Vasquezetal2015).Inter-municipalcooperationachievesthebenefits
ofeconomiesofscaleandcoordinationacrossthemetropolitanregionwithoutsacrificing
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publiccontrol(Warner2011a).Becausetheparticipatingpartnersarecities,theyshare
commonpublicvalues.Thisavoidsthepreferencealignmentproblemsfoundwithprivate
contractors.Becauseinter-municipalcooperationinvolvesneighboringmunicipalities,italso
reducestransactioncosts,whichhavebeenfoundtobeespeciallyhighinforprofitcontracting
(HefetzandWarner2012).Inter-municipalcooperationcanresultincostsavingsdueto
economiesofscaleandscope(BelandWarner2015).Attheinternationallevel,wehavealso
seentheemergenceofPublic-PublicPartnerships,PUPswherehighfunctioningutilities
(typicallyincitiesintheglobalnorth),partnerwithmorechallengedutilities(oftenincitiesin
theglobalsouth)toimprovetheirpractices.Thesepartnershipsleverageexpertiseandcapital
exchangewhilekeepingtheservicepublic(Kishimotoetal.2009).
Butinter-municipalcooperationrequiresaninstitutionalstructuretofacilitateit.Thechallenge
ofgettingtotheregionalscaleiscriticalfor21stcenturygovernancebutmanycountrieslacka
regionalgovernancescale.Citiescompete;avestigeoftheTieboutworld.Butnowweneed
themtocooperate.Howtoovercomecollectiveactionproblemsatthecity-to-cityregional
scaleisacoreproblemofthecurrentera.Themidlevelgovernmentcanplaythisroleasthe
ProvinceofTungurahuahasdoneinEcuador.Ithascreatedaterritorialcoalitionofpublicand
privateactorstopromoteregionalinfrastructureanddevelopmentandtoadvocateforregional
needsatthenationallevel(HollensteinandOspina2015).IntheUS,regionalismisbeing
heraldedasthesuperiorgrowthstrategy–arguingthatbuildingthewealthofallcommunities
inthemetropolitanregioniskeytodevelopment(Pastoretal.2009,KatzandBradley2013).
Toaddressthechallengesofgrowth,equityandsustainabilityweneedcitiestocometogether
attheregionallevel.Mostenvironmentalproblemscrosspoliticalboundaries.Watersheds
are,bydefinition,regional.Pollutionisaswell.Transportationsystemsmustberegionalin
scale.Mosteconomicdevelopmentisregionalaswell.Indeed,geographersthinkthatthecity
regionisthekeydevelopmentforceforthe21stcentury(Storper2013).Evidenceofthisnew
economicgeographyrecognizesbothhardfactorsofresourcesandinfrastructurenetworks,
andsoftfactorsofnetworksandsocialcapital(Escobaletal2015).Berdeguéetal(2015)
describeaprocessoftransformationalterritorialcoalitionsthathaveemergedinLatinAmerica
topromotepublicinvestment,marketlinkagesandcooperationacrossgovernment,business
andcivilsocietytopromoteanintegratedregion.
ElinorOstromwontheNobelPrizeinEconomicsforherworkonthepotentialofpolycentric
approaches,wherelocalactorscometogethertovoluntarilysolveproblems.Thiscouldbe
individualsatthecommunitylevel,orlocalgovernmentsattheregionallevel.Shearguedthat
suchpolycentricapproachescouldevenhelpaddressglobalproblemssuchasclimatechange
(Ostrom2010).Butsuchregionalcollaborationsrequireastructure–acentralcoordinating
role–toensurecapacity(information,technicalandfinancialsupport)acrossthelocal
governmentsinthesystem,andthepowertosanctionnonperformers(Homsyetal2016).
Multilevelgovernanceisthuskeytotheeffectivenessoftheseapproaches.Forasustainable
publicadministrationforthe21stcenturyweneedtodevelopmultilevelgovernancestructures
thatjoinlocalgovernmentstogetherincollaborativearrangementswitheachother,andwith
higherlevelsofgovernmentinapartnershipmodel.
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CooperationwiththeMarket
Cooperationcanalsooccurbetweenpublicandprivate.Complexproblemsofthe21stcentury
requireamulti-sectorresponse.Synergiesandcomplementaritiescanoccurbetweensectorsif
theyarejoinedincooperativestructures.Thisisnotasimplecontractingoutandwalkaway,
butrequiresremainingengagedinapartnership.Weareseeingtheproliferationofpartnership
approachesinanetworkedgovernancesystemtheworldover.PublicPrivatePartnerships,
PPPs,arebecomingmorecommoninphysicalinfrastructuretobringprivatefinanceandspeed
theprocessofinvestment.Failuretoadequatelytransferrisk,problemswithinformation
asymmetriesandtargetingofinvestmentonlytothemostprofitablesectorsandcityregions
arecommoncritiquesofPPPs(HodgeandGreeve2009,Siemiatycki2011).Morerecently
publicprivatepartnershipsareemerginginsocialservicesthroughsocialimpactbonds,SIBs,or
developmentimpactbondsDIBs.Insocialservices,concernswithpotentiallossofpublic
valuesareevengreater(Warner2013).Thechallengewiththesenewgovernmentpartnershipsistheneedtobalanceasymmetriesofpower,informationinthesegovernance
networks.Itisalsoachallengetoensureaccountabilityandvaluealignment.
Thisiswhygovernmentmustbeatthecore.Aciviccorecanensureinformationflow,
sanctioningpower,andalongtermview.Theimportanceofthishasbeendemonstratedin
energyinfrastructure(Tankha2008,ClarkandBradshaw2004),urbanpublictransit(Barter
2008),andsocialservices(MilwardandProvan2000).However,akeyconcernishowto
controlthepowerofevermorepowerfulprivateactorssuchasinfrastructuremultinationals
andglobalinvestors(Cliftonetal2016,O’Neill2012).Thefreetradeagreementsmakethis
moredifficultastheyprivilegeforeignprivateactorsandinterestsoverdomesticpublicones.
Thismustbebroughtbackintobalance.
Anotherconcernisaccountabilityandcitizenvoice.Howdoweensurecitizenvoice,public
scrutinyandbroaderaccountabilityinthesecooperativenetworkarrangements?Inmarkets
anddirectcontracting,competitionandmonitoringhelpensureaccountability.Butinrelational
networkgovernance,directlinesofaccountabilityarehardertomaintain.Theconcernis
collusionmayresult.InEurope,theEurobarometerisusedtomeasurecitizensatisfactionwith
thepriceandqualityofpublicservices.InmanyLatinAmericancities,similarmeasures,suchas
ComoVamosinMedellín,areusedtoassesscitizensatisfactioninrealtime.2
TowardsSustainability
Forasustainablegovernanceforthe21stcenturyweneedtodevelopabalancedreform.Inthe
late20thcenturyweprivilegedmarketcompetition–beittheprivatemarketofprivatizationor
thepublicmarketofdecentralization.Inthe21stcenturyweneedtoshiftourfocusto
2
Organizedsystemsforcitizenscrutinycanbefoundin10LatinAmericancountries,seethese
http://redciudades.net
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governancemodelsthatencouragecooperation–betweengovernmentsandwithgovernment,
marketandcivilsocietyactors.Butthiscooperationneedstorecognizetheneedsandinterests
ofallparties.Weneedtoevolvenewmodelsforcooperationthatbalancecitizen,marketand
collectivesocietalinterests(Warner2008).Andthesemustbebasedonbroaderconceptionsof
developmentwhichincludeattentiontodemocraticprocessandcommunityand
environmentalwellbeing.AmartyaSen’s(1999)capabilitiesframeworkhasbroadenedthe
focusfromeconomicmetricstobroadersocialandpersonalagencyconcerns.Thecommunity
wellbeingmovementglobally,ofwhichthe“buenvivir”Andeanvariantisapart,links
communitywellbeing,activecitizenshipandenvironment(AcostaandMartínez2009).
Programsto“endmisery”incountriessuchasCostaRicaandEcuador,demonstrate
alternativeswhichbuildtheselinks.Involvingmarginalizedcitizensandneighborhoodsinthe
citybudgetprocessthrough,participatorybudgetingwaspioneeredinPuertoAlegre(Abers
1998),andisnowspreadingacrosstheworld(Cabannes2004).
Atthecoreofwhatsustainabilitymeansisadoubletriadofinterests.Whilethetriplebottom
lineinindustryiseconomy,environmentandequity;forgovernmentthereisaneedto
effectivelycooperateacrossstate,marketandcivilsociety.Itisthebalancewithineachof
thesetrianglesthatwillensuresustainabilityforpublicadministrationinthe21stcentury.Local
governmentsitsatthecore–aplacewherethesetriadsofinterestcometogether.
Figure1:DoubleTriadforSustainableDevelopment–LocalGovernmentattheCenter
Economy
State
Sustainability
Environment
LocalGovernment
Equity
Market
CivilSociety
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Late20thcenturyexperimentswithprivatizationanddecentralizationhaveledtocompetition
andfragmentation.Technologymakesitpossibletojumpoverspace–andleavesomespaces
behind,resultinginasplinteringoftheurbanregionalfabric(GrahamandMarvin2001).The
worldisspiky,notflat.Manygovernanceinnovationswithinthecitycontributetofurther
politicalfracturing.Proliferationofprivateformsofclub-basedgovernment(business
improvementdistricts,privatehomeownersassociationsetc.)createchallengesforlocal
governmenttoreintegrateacityofclubs(Warner2011b).Theprivilegingofelitesisleadingto
displacementofalreadymarginalizedgroupsandanurbansprawlthatespeciallydisadvantages
thepoor(Smith2002).Thechallengeforthe21stcenturyishowtoreintegrate.Isthispossible?
Absolutely,andsomecitiesinLatinAmericaareleadingtheway.Letmesufficewithtwo
examples.
TransformationalTerritorialCoalitionsinTungurahua,Ecuador
ThesmallcityofAmbatointheprovinceofTungurahua,Ecuadorhasbeenheraldedasacity
thatiswellconnectedwithitsruralhinterland.Theprovincehasawellintegratedsystemof
roads,ruralandurbanmarkets,andinfrastructurewhichpromotesanintegratedrural-urban
developmentstrategy.Theregionisknownasthe‘TierradeFrutasyFlores’becauseofits
strongmarket-basedagriculturalsectorwithmanysmallproducers.Whilemostrural
producersareminifundios,theseareconcentratedinthelowerelevationswhereconditionsfor
vegetableandfruitproductionarebetter.Haciendasaremorelikelytobelocatedinthehigher
elevations–wheredairyfarmingiscommon.Theprovinceishometotextile,clothing,leather,
shoeindustrieswhicharesupportedbyaseriesofsmallscalefamily-basedproducers
throughouttheprovince(MartínezandNorth2009).Ambatohasbeencalled“rurban”forits
closeintegrationwithitsruralsurroundings(Escobaletal2015).
Beginningin2000aterritorialcoalitiondevelopedintheprovinceofTungurahuaandbrought
togetherindustryandgovernmentalleaderswithagriculturalcooperativesandindigenousand
women’sgroupstodevelopastrategyfortheregion.Thistransformativeterritorialcoalition
wasabletoeffectivelypressurethenationalgovernmentandguidenationalinvestmentin
infrastructuretoproductiveassets,supportingastrategyofbotheconomicgrowthandsocial
inclusion(OspinaPeraltaandHollenstein2015).Thisterritorialcoalitionhashelpedtoguide
investmentininfrastructure,socialservicesandintegratedregionaldevelopmentinthe
Provinceandincorporateadiversityofactorsindeterminingsectoralstrategies.Thisdiversity
ofactors,emphasisonsocialinclusionandfocusonmultiplecommunitycapitals(political,
financial,social)hasresultedinimprovedopportunitiesforsmallscaleproducers(Hollenstein
andOspinaPeralta2014).
Berdeguéetal.(2015)findthatTungurahuaisoneofasmallminorityofplacesinruralLatin
Americawherebothgrowthandequityhavebeensimultaneouslyachieved.Thishasbeen
achievedthroughadynamiclinkagebetween“hardfactors”oftheneweconomicgeography
(location,accesstopublicservices,adjacencytothecity)and“softfactors”ofeconomic
sociology(inter-familyrelations,trustandreciprocity)(Escobaletal.2015).Tungurahua
11
provincehaslowerinequalitythanelsewhereinEcuador,andmoreentrepreneurshipand
dynamicdevelopment.Acooperativeapproach,thatlinksacrosssectors(government,market,
civilsociety)andacrosslevels(local,regional,national)liesatitsbase.
Corporatizedpublic/privatepartnershipsforurbandevelopmentinMedellín,Colombia
Medellínisacityknowninternationallyforitsleadershipinpromotinginnovativeapproaches
tourbandevelopmentthatseektopromotedevelopmentandsocialinclusion.Coalitionsof
businesselites,governmentandcivilsocietyhavecometogethertocreateamoresustainable
citybasedonthemoreholisticconceptof“socialurbanism”(Sotomayor2015).Thiscross
sectoralcollaborationhasresultedincomprehensiveplansandurbanimprovementstrategies
whichpromoteeconomicdevelopmentbutalsoincorporatemarginalizedneighborhoods.
Urbancapacityisstrengthenedbythepresenceofpublicfirmsthathaveastrongcommitment
tocorporatesocialresponsibility.Whilecorporatizationisareformthatismorerecently
appearinginothercitiesaroundtheworld,MedellínishometoEmpresasPublicasdeMedellín
(EPM)–acorporatizedutilitythathasbeenaroundalmost100years.EPMisaleaderand
providescriticalinfrastructure(water,electricity)butitrepatriatesitsprofitstothecity
(accountingforalmost30%ofthecitybudget)tobereinvestedinlocaldevelopment(Furlong
2013).Thesefundsandthisprogressivecorporate/public/civilsocietyleadershiphasresultedin
severalurbaninnovations–neighborhoodlibraries,newformsoftransport(cablecarsto
informalsettlements),publicspace,watertankswithgreenzones,allofwhicharefocusedon
incorporatingthemoremarginalizedneighborhoods(Restrepo-Meith2016).Thesecoalitions
persistacrosschangesinmayorandpoliticalparty.Whatenablesthisstablebutprogressive
urbancoalition?LikeinthecaseofAmbatoabove,itisanetworkofgovernmentandbusiness
leaders,civilsocietyandgrassrootsneighborhoodgroups.Thesegroupscometogetheraround
avisionofthecitythatismoreholisticandsocial.
Conclusion
Integrationisthechallengeforurbansustainabilityinthe21stcentury.Urbancoalitionsthat
buildnetworksacrosssectors,acrosscommunitiesofadvantageanddisadvantage,andacross
levelsofgovernmentarekeytoasustainablecity.LatinAmericanisaplaceofinnovationin
publicadministrationforsustainablecities.Theregionisknownfortakingamorecritical
stanceondevelopment.PublicadministrationinLatinAmericahasexploredinnovationsin
privatizationanddecentralization,butitalsounderstandstheneedtomanagemarketsand
ensurepublicvaluesaremet.Decentralizationintheregionrecognizestheimportanceof
democratizationanddiversity.Increasingattentionisbeinggiventotheenvironment.
Pressuresandchallengesremain,butwithaneffectiveintergovernmentalcoalitionand
partnershipswithcivilsocietyandmarket,cooperationmayleadthewaytoasustainable
future.
12
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