Why Experimental Finance?

What Have We Learned
from Experimental
FInance?
Shyam Sunder
Yale School of Management
Kozminski Academy
Warsaw, Poland
June 22, 2013
Questions to Address
• Why do we need even more data on
financial markets?
• How could the data from such
simple “Mickey Mouse” markets
help us in a far more complex
investment environment?
• Is experimental finance a branch or
variation of behavioral
economics/behavioral finance?
• What have we learned so far from
asset market experiments?
• What is next?
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1. Why Do We Need
More Data from
Experimental Markets?
• Of all branches of economics,
financial economics probably has the
most detailed and up-to-date
observational data available
• Consequently, this branch of
economics is characterized by one of
the strongest empirical traditions
• Why, then, spend time and money to
conduct experiments with financial
markets and gather more data?
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Transactions v.
Expectations
• Data from the stock exchanges
include bids, asks, transaction prices,
volume, etc.
• Data from information services on
actions and events that may
influence markets
• Neither does or can report on
expectations
• Theory of financial markets (and
economics of uncertainty) is built on
expectations
• Need data on expectations to
empirically distinguish among
competing theories
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Relating Market Actions
to Expectations and
Parameters
• In experimental markets, the
researcher knows the expectations,
and the underlying parameters
• With this knowledge, we know the
price and other predictions of
alternative theories
• We can therefore conduct powerful
tests of theories which were not
possible from the field data (because
we know little about the parameters
and expectations that generate the
field data from the stock exchanges).
• Examples to follow
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•
2. What Can Simple
Experiments Tell Us
about Complex
Markets?
Experimental markets are typically
conducted in simple settings
• Student subjects of typical
laboratory experiments have little
experience
• Security markets are complex, and
populated by experienced
professionals
• What could we possibly learn from
experiments about the “real”
markets?
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Simplicity is Science
• All sciences aim at finding simple
principles that explain or predict a
large part (rarely all) of the
phenomenon of interest
• Simple models: in math or in
laboratory make core as well as
convenience assumptions
• The power of a theory depends on
the robustness of its predictions as
the data environments deviate from
the assumptions of convenience
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Simple Experiments
Help Discover/Verify
Basic Principles
• How do we learn to count?
• How do we learn to swim?
• How do we learn the laws of
electricity?
• Noise generated by countless factors in
complex environments makes it
difficult to detect the fundamental
principles
• Simple math and laboratory models
help us learn better, before we immerse
ourselves in the complexity of the real
phenomena
• If the principle is general, it better be
applicable to the simple environments
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3. Is This Behavioral
Economics/Finance?
• Experimental economics: emphasis is on
design of market and other economic
institutions to gather empirical data
– Institutions and rules matter (e.g.,
microstructure)
– People do what they think is best for
them, given what they know (they
learn, are not dumb)
– Design experiments to sort out the
claims of competing theories
– Engineer test beds for alternative
institutions
– Focus on equilibrium, efficiency,
prices, and allocations
– Complements modeling and field
empirical research
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4. What Have We
Learned from
Experiments?
• Within the past two decades,
asset market experiments have
revealed some important
findings by exploiting their
advantages
• These findings were not, and
could not have been, reached
from the field data alone
• We shall summarize a few key
findings in the time available
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Key Findings
• Security markets can aggregate and
disseminate information (efficient
markets)
• But they do not always do so
(inefficiency)
• Information dissemination, when it
occurs, is rarely instantaneous or
perfect (learning takes time)
• Markets permit costly research to
persist in equilibrium (why pay for
research?)
• Price, as well as bids, offers, timing,
etc., transmit information (many
channels for information flow)
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More Findings
• Well-functioning derivative
markets help improve the
efficiency of primary markets
• Most important: statistical
efficiency or inability to make
money from past data does not
mean informational efficiency
(can’t make money the price
is right)
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Efficient Markets:
Information
Dissemination
• Can markets disseminate
information from those who
know to those who don’t?
• Could not be established from
analysis of field data because
we don’t know the distribution
of information among investors
• Plott and Sunder (Journal of
Political Economy, 1982)
established the basic proposition
through a simple experiment
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Equilibria in a Simple
Asset Market
State X
State Y
Prob.=0.4
Prob.=0.6
Trader Type
Expected
Dividend
I
400
100
220
II
300
150
210
III
125
175
155
PI Eq. Price
Asset Holder
400
Trader Type
I Informed
220
Trader Type I
Uninformed
RE Eq. Price
Asset Holder
400
Trader Type
I
175
Trader Type
III
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Results
• Markets can disseminate information
from the informed to the uninformed
investors
• Dissemination can occur through
trading, without exchange of verbal
communication
• Such markets can achieve high
levels of informational efficiency
• Securities end up in the hands of
those who value them most
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Efficient Markets:
Information Aggregation
• Can markets behave as if diverse
information in the hands of a few is
aggregated so it is in the hands of
all?
• Suppose there are three possible
states of the world: X, Y and Z
• Some people know that the state is
Not X, and some people know that it
is Not Y
• Can the market behave as if
everyone knows that the state is Z?
• Plott and Sunder (Econometrica,
1988)
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Equilibria in an
Information Aggregation
Experiment
Traders
X-Asset
Y-Asset
Z-Asset
I
II
III
X Y Z
70 0 0
230 0 0
100 0 0
X Y Z
0 130 0
0 90 0
0 160 0
X Y Z
0 0 300
0 0 60
0 0 200
RE Eq. P 230 0 0
0 160 0 0 0 300
Holder
- III -
II
-
-
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Aggregation Results
• Complete markets can
aggregate and disseminate
diverse information
• Such markets can achieve high
information and allocative
efficiency
• Same happens when investors
have homogenous preferences
(which makes it easier for
traders to infer information from
actions of others)
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Inefficiency
• Just because markets can aggregate and
disseminate information does not mean
that all markets do so under all conditions
• Experiments show that market conditions
must allow investors the opportunity to
learn the information from what they can
observe
• Even in these simple experimental
markets, these conditions are not always
satisfied (too many states, too few
observations and repetitions to facilitate
learning)
• For example, a complete market for three
Arrow-Debreu securities is efficient, but an
incomplete market for a single security is
not
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Learning Takes Time
• Even in the best of circumstances,
equilibrium outcomes are not
achieved instantaneously
• Markets tend toward efficiency, but
cannot achieve it instantaneously
• It takes time for investors to observe,
form conjectures, test them, modify
their strategies, etc.
• With repetition, investors get better
at learning, but the environment
changes continually, including the
behavior of other investors; so the
learning process never ends
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Why Pay for Research?
• This has been the conundrum of the
efficient market theory: If the markets are
efficient, why pay for research.
• This finite rate of learning makes it
possible to support costly research, even in
markets which tend toward efficient
outcomes
• Enough people would conduct research so
the average returns to research equal the
average cost. Research users have higher
gross profits, but their net profits are the
same as the profits of the others
• Sunder (Econometrica, 1993)
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Difference between
Gross and Net Profits of
the Informed and the
Uninformed Traders
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Results
• As investors learn (in a fixed
environment), their value of information
decreases because they can ride free on
others’ information
• Market price of information falls
• If the supply of information can be
sustained at the lower price, price drops to
a level sustainable by learning frictions:
get equilibrium
• If the supply of information also falls with
its price, we get a noisy equilibrium
• Consequences of mandating provision of
free research to investors
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Many Channels for
Information Flow
• In economic theory, transaction
prices are considered the primary
vehicle for the transmission of
information in markets
• Experimental markets show that
other observables (bids, asks,
volume, timing, etc.) also transmit
information in markets
• In deep markets, price can be the
result of the information
transmission through these other
variables
• Example: see trading in period 8 on
slide number 15
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Effect of Derivatives on
Primary Markets
• Derivative markets help increase the
efficiency of primary markets
• Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott
(Econometrica 1982), the first asset
market experiment, showed that
futures markets speed up
convergence to equilibrium in the
primary market
• Kluger and Wyatt found that the
option markets increase the
informational efficiency of the
equity market
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Convergence with Two
Spot Markets
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Convergence with a Spot
and a Futures Market
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Error in Pricing Primary
Security with and
without Option Market
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How Can We Tell If a
Market is Efficient?
• Traditional statistical approach: if
you can’t make money from
information (past data, public, or all
information), the market is efficient
• Experiments: statistical efficiency is
a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the informational
efficiency of markets
• Example: Slide 19, second half is
efficient by statistical criteria but is
not informationally efficient
• Even when investors know that the
price is not right, they may have no
means of profiting from that
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knowledge(c) Copyright
Sunder
5. What Is Next?
• The above is a highly selective
summary of what we have
learned from experimental asset
markets
• What is coming up next?
• The existence and causes of
market bubbles is a perennial
subject in financial economics
• What might we learn about
bubbles from experiments?
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Bubbles in Simple Asset
Markets
• Smith, Suchanek and Williams
(Econometrica 1988) showed that
bubbles can arise in simple asset
markets with inexperienced subjects,
and tend to diminish with experience
• Lei, Noussair and Plott
(Econometrica 2001) showed that
bubbles can arise even when
investors cannot engage in
speculative trades. They suggest that
bubbles can arise from errors in
decision making even in absence of
a lack of common knowledge of
rationality (“bigger fool” beliefs)
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Valuing Equity without
Dividend Anchors
• Fundamental economic model of
valuation is DCF
• When security matures beyond
investment horizon, personal DCF
includes the sale price at horizon
• Sale price depends on other
investors’ expectations of DCF
beyond my own horizon
• Applying DCF involves backward
inducting from the maturity of the
security through the expectations
and valuations of the future
“generations” of investors
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Valuation be Equal to
Fundamental Value if
• All investors form rational expectations
• All investors form higher order
expectations
• Common knowledge of rational
expectations
• Common knowledge of higher order
expectations
• Common knowledge of maturity
• These are very difficult conditions to meet
in a market
• Bubbles arise, even with rational investors
who make no errors, if they cannot
backward induct the DCF
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Exogenous Terminal Payoff
Period
1
Period 15
15-period security, termination date is
common knowledge
Single terminal dividend (may vary across
traders)
A separate set of subjects record their price
predictions at the beginning of each period,
their mean is announced at the end of each
period
Hirota and Sunder (2002), Yale Working
Paper
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Figure 4: Stock Prices and Efficiency of Allocations for Session 4
(Exogenous Terminal Payoff Session)
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Endogenous Terminal
Payoff
Period
1
Period 1517
Period
30
30-Period Security with a terminal dividend
to be paid at the end of period 30
The security will be terminated earlier than
30 at a time written in the sealed envelope
(in fact terminated at 15-17 periods)
Liquidation at average of the prices
predicted by the predictors for the period
following termination
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Figure 10: Stock Prices and Efficiency of Allocations for Session 8
(Endogenous Terminal Payoff Session)
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Understanding Bubbles
• DCF valuation makes heroic assumptions
about the knowledge necessary to do
backward induction
• Even if investors are rational and make no
mistakes, it is unlikely that they can have
the common knowledge necessary for price
to be equal to fundamental valuation in a
market populated by limited horizon
investors
• Not surprisingly, pricing of new
technology, high growth, and high risk
equities are more susceptible to bubbles
• In such circumstances, if we do not have
common knowledge of higher order
beliefs, how can we test valuation theories?
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Wrap Up
• Only a thumbnail sketch of
some experimental results on
asset markets
• Could not discuss many other
important and interesting
studies
• See Sunder’s survey paper in
Kagel and Roth’s Handbook of
Experimental Economics
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Better Understanding
• As the experimental camera focused
on information processing in asset
markets, the theoretical line drawing
has been filled by details, shadows,
color, and warts
• This finer grain portrait of asset
markets confirms the rough outline
of the extant theory
• But it is considerably more complex,
and is providing guidance and
challenges for further theoretical
investigations of interplay of
information in asset markets
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You Have to Try This
• It is a unique experience to watch trading
in an experimental asset market
• You know all the information, parameters,
and alternative theoretical predictions
• Yet, what you see often surprises you,
forcing you to rethink, and discover new
insights into how these markets work
• Experimental asset markets are our LEGO
sets. Playing with them produces new
ideas, and helps us sort out good ideas
from the bad ones
• I would have preferred to have you sit in
my lab and experience all this yourself,
instead of talking to you because students
who participate in these markets gain a
sophisticated understanding of the markets
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Thank You
• Please send any comments you
may have to me at
• [email protected]
• This presentation will be
available at
• www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sund
er/research
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