Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
Societal Values and Individual Values in Reward Allocation Preferences*
Jesse E. Olsen
Centre for Workplace Leadership
Faculty of Business and Economics
The University of Melbourne
Carlton, Victoria, Australia
Abstract:
Purpose - Prior research suggests that cultural values affect individuals’ preferences in whether work rewards (i.e.,
pay and benefits) are allocated according to rules based on equity, equality, or need. However, this research has
focused primarily on societal-level values or individual-level operationalizations of values originally
conceptualized at the societal level. Drawing on equity and social exchange theories, I present a theoretical model
and nine propositions that incorporate both individual and societal values as determinants of these reward
allocation rule preferences.
Design/methodology/approach - I briefly review of the relevant literature on values and reward allocation
preferences and present arguments supported by prior research, leading to a model and nine propositions.
Findings - I propose that societal values and individual values have main and interactive effects on reward
allocation preferences and that the effects of societal values are partially mediated by individual values.
Research limitations/implications - The model and propositions present relationships that could be tested in future
multi-level studies. Future conceptual/theoretical work may also build on the model presented in this paper.
Practical implications - The proposed relationships, if supported, would have important implications for
organizational reward systems and staffing.
Originality/value - Prior research on reward allocation preferences focuses mostly on the effects of societal or
individual values. This theoretical paper attempts to clarify and distinguish values at these two levels and to better
understand their main and interactive effects on individual reward allocation rule preferences.
Keywords: cultural values; equity; equality; reward allocation rules; rewards; human resource management;
organizational justice; values
1. Introduction
With the globalization of business, organizations around the world are taking on
workforces that are increasingly diverse with regard to employee nationality. The growing
prevalence of multinational operations, expatriate programs, and cross-national virtual work
teams, as well as the rising number of immigrants met by many of the world’s nations calls for a
better understanding of cultural differences and their effects on work processes and outcomes.
Organizational justice has been identified as a construct with important implications for
work attitudes and behaviors (Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg and Colquitt, 2004). Crosscultural research on organizational justice has emphasized the influence of cultural differences
*
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version, which is available here: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/CCM-09-2013-0130.)
1
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
on the formation of individual justice perceptions (e.g., Breland et al., 2011; Fischer, 2013).
Much of this research has paid particular attention to Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions of
individualism-collectivism (Kim et al., 2010; Leung and Bond, 1982, 1984; Tata et al., 2003) and
power distance (e.g., Blader et al., 2001; Kim and Leung, 2007; Tyler et al., 2000), though other
less explored dimensions also likely influence justice perceptions (Kirkman et al., 2006; Leung,
2004; Schilpzand et al., 2013). Furthermore, while societal values are conceptually and
empirically distinct from individual-level values (Hofstede, 1980; Kirkman et al., 2006;
Schwartz, 1999; Smith and Schwartz, 1997), much research has utilized individual-level
operationalizations of value constructs originally conceptualized at the societal level (see
Hofstede, 2001; Kirkman et al., 2006; and Leung, 2004, for discussions). Such individual-level
operationalizations are actually more consistent with such individual-level conceptualizations as
idiocentrism and allocentrism (corresponding to society-level individualism and collectivism,
respectively; Triandis et al., 1985) or Schwartz’s (1992) individual-level values—utilized in this
paper.
Organizational research considering societal values has contributed significantly to our
understanding of how culture impacts perceptions of organizational justice. However, I propose
that by accounting for values at both the individual and societal levels, organizational scholars
will obtain a more complete understanding of how these perceptions are formed. To illustrate the
potential utility of considering values at multiple levels, I propose a model that explains how
societal and individual values jointly contribute to the formation of individuals’ preferences
among different rules for the allocation of work rewards (i.e., pay and benefits). Research on this
dependent variable focuses primarily on three types of reward allocation rules: those based on
equity, equality, and need (Deutsch, 1975). The equity rule, rooted in equity theory (Adams,
1965; see also Carrell and Dittrich, 1978, for a review), entails reward allocation based on
individual inputs. Individuals with the highest performance receive the highest rewards. The
equality rule dictates that rewards should be distributed in equal proportions across all
participants. Finally, allocating rewards based on the need rule provides the greatest rewards to
those who are the least fortunate, or who are in the greatest need.
As will be discussed below, studies have found cross-cultural differences in reward
allocation preferences, but in order to better understand these effects, research should account for
the distinct and joint effects of individual and societal values. In order to properly account for
2
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
individual and societal values, I incorporate past research based on Hofstede’s (1980) societal
values and Schwartz’s (1992) theoretical and empirical work on individual values1. I close with a
discussion of the opportunities for future theoretical and empirical research, as well as the
practical implications, associated with this approach.
2. Model and Propositions
I propose a model, illustrated in Figure 1, incorporating the effects of individual and
societal values on allocation rule preferences. This model entails several propositions regarding
the separate effects of societal and individual values on reward allocation preferences, the
interactive effects between societal and individual values on these preferences, and the effects of
societal values on individual values. I discuss all of these effects in turn.
Figure 1
The Proposed Model: The Joint Effects of Societal and Individual Values on Reward Allocation Rule Preferences
Individual Values
Reward Allocation
Rule Preferences
Societal Values
Achievement
EquityBased
Individualism
Benevolence
Collectivism
(Generosity Rule)
Universalism
EqualityBased
NeedBased
Conformity
2.1. The Effects of Societal Values on Reward Allocation Rule Preferences
1
Schwartz (1992) refers to individual-level values as “personal values,” but I use the term “individual values” to explicate the
level of the theory and operationalization of these constructs. Similarly, I use the term “societal values,” as opposed to “cultural
values,” which have sometimes been operationalized at the individual level (see Hofstede 2001; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson 2006;
and Leung 2004, for discussions). In this paper, I intend for the theory and operationalization of societal values to be at the level
of the society.
3
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
As mentioned previously, research suggests the existence of cross-cultural differences in
reward allocation preferences. Specifically, studies suggest that individuals from societies high
on individualism generally prefer equity-based allocation rules, while individuals from societies
high on collectivism generally prefer equality-based rules (Fadil et al., 2005; Leung and Stephan,
2001; Leung and Tong, 2004; Sama and Papamarcos, 2000). Additionally, a preference for needbased rules has also been observed in some collectivistic societies (Berman et al., 1985; MurphyBerman and Berman, 2002; Murphy-Berman et al., 1984). Individualism promotes individual
achievement (Hofstede, 1980), which is most strongly reflected in reward systems incorporating
equity (Leung and Bond, 1982, 1984; Leung and Park, 1986). Collectivism, on the other hand,
promotes the well-being of the group and fellow group members (Hofstede, 1980), which is
reflected in reward systems based on equality and/or need (Leung and Bond, 1982, 1984; Leung
and Park, 1986).
As noted by Fadil and colleagues (2005), while equity-based allocation rules tend to be
viewed as being in conflict with equality-based rules, different allocation rules may actually be
consistent with the original underlying theories conceptualized in the West. As mentioned above,
the equity-based allocation rule is explicitly linked to equity theory. This theory posits that
individuals compare their inputs and outcomes to those of referents in order to determine
whether or not their social exchanges are just. These assessments will in turn influence their
future behaviors (Adams, 1965). As this description implies, equity theory was intended to build
on social exchange theory by introducing a means by which exchanges may be evaluated as just
or unjust. Social exchange theory states that an individual participates in some behavior to serve
another individual, motivated by the potential reciprocation of an action. This action indeed does
typically create a feeling of obligation in the recipient, and he/she typically discharges this
obligation by reciprocating the action (Blau, 1964).
In societies seen as more individualistic, social exchange and equity theories have
typically been viewed as occurring between individuals, focusing on such concepts as effort,
skill, individual status, pay, benefits, etc., as inputs and/or outcomes that are relevant to
individuals (Blau, 1964; Fadil et al., 2005). However, the processes described in these theories
likely also occur in collectivist societies, with a greater focus on more group-relevant concepts
like loyalty, support, status within the group, harmony, cohesiveness, etc. (Fadil et al., 2005;
Triandis et al., 1985). Thus, in a more individualistic society, an individual puts forth effort
toward organizational goals (input), expecting reciprocation in the form of rewards that are
4
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
equivalent in value to the effort (input). This reciprocation is expected to come directly from the
organization as the target of the input. On the other hand, in more collectivistic societies,
individuals will likely see themselves as more interdependent with other organizations (Brockner
et al., 2000). This will lead them to put forth effort toward organizational goals as an expression
of loyalty for the group (input), expecting reciprocation in the form of stable membership in the
group, harmony, and support (including financial support to satisfy his/her physical needs), not
only from the organization as the direct target of his/her efforts, but from other individual
members, as a collective group.
Put differently, the recipient of individual inputs/efforts and the source of
outcomes/rewards in individualistic societies is the organization as an institution or entity in and
of itself. Meanwhile, the recipient of individual inputs/efforts and the source of
outcomes/rewards in collectivistic societies is the organization as a group of individual members,
and less as an institution in and of itself. The individual’s implicit motive here would be to create
a sense of obligation among the group of individuals in the organization, toward such benefits as
the maintenance of his/her membership, future support, the stability of the group, etc. Equalityor need-based reward allocations that help to serve such group-oriented aims would therefore be
acceptable or preferable among individuals in collectivistic societies.
Thus, equity and social exchange theories provide reasonable explanations for the effects
observed in prior research. I argue in this paper that individually held values are important, and
more proximal, predictors of preferences in reward allocation, as well as channels of the indirect
effects of societal values on these preferences. However, I also acknowledge the significant role
of societal values in shaping individual behavior directly, as a result of the effects implied by
equity and social exchange theories described above. Thus, consistent with prior theoretical and
empirical work on the effects of individualism and collectivism on individuals’ preferences
among reward allocation rules, this model incorporates the following general relationships:
Proposition 1: Individuals from individualistic societies will prefer equity rules to
equality and need rules as a result of both direct and indirect effects of societal values.
Proposition 2: Individuals from collectivistic societies will prefer (a) equality and (b)
need rules to equity rules as a result of both direct and indirect effects of societal values..
These two propositions incorporate the prior work discussed above by recognizing a
direct effect of societal values on reward allocation rule preferences, but they make the
additional suggestion that other mechanisms are also at work. In the next section, I draw on
5
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
Schwartz’s (1992) theory of personal values to expound on these indirect effects and predict the
effects of individual values on reward allocation rule preferences. It should be recognized that
Schwartz (Schwartz and Ros, 1995; 1990, 1994, 1999) has also proposed a system of values at
the societal level. His societal values of autonomy versus conservatism are roughly equivalent to
individualism and collectivism, respectively. However, Schwartz’s typology allows for further
distinction among individualistic and collectivistic societies, requiring the consideration of a
number of additional value types. In an effort to incorporate prior research on allocation rule
preferences using the individualism-collectivism distinction, and in order to start with a more
parsimonious model, I have drawn on Hofstede’s (1980) individual-collectivism dimension for
the societal level. However, extending this model to Schwartz’s (1990, 1999) typology may be a
fruitful direction for future research.
2.2. The Effects of Individual Values on Reward Allocation Rule Preferences
Individuals’ values entail their preferences of particular actions or end-states of existence
(Allport, 1961; Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996). This would include
preferences with regard to the fulfillment of organizational justice. Indeed, much of the research
on the effects of cultural values on organizational justice perceptions has actually used
operationalizations of individualism and collectivism at the individual level (e.g., Brockner et al.,
2000; Chen et al., 1997). This research is important because it emphasizes the role of individuallevel values in the determination of allocation rule preferences. However, theory originally
conceptualized at the societal level may be less than optimal for explaining individual-level
phenomena. Rather, I propose that incorporating theory originally conceptualized at the
individual level may contribute more utility to understanding the allocation rule preferences of
individuals.
Schwartz’s (1992) theory of individual values provides such a framework, proposing that
individual values represent broad and relatively stable personal goals that can be categorized into
ten basic types: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity,
tradition, benevolence, and universalism. Schwartz (1992) depicts the structural arrangement of
these values as circular, such that adjacent values may be pursued simultaneously but that values
in opposite positions on the circle are incongruent. For example, the pursuit of hedonism, in
which an individual seeks to obtain pleasure and gratification, may be compatible with the
pursuit of stimulation, in which an individual seeks novel situations and challenges in life.
However, the pursuit of hedonism is likely to be incongruent with the pursuit of conformity, in
6
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
which an individual seeks to restrain himself/herself such that social norms are upheld. Thus, in
the circular structure of values, hedonism is found opposite to conformity and adjacent to
stimulation (Schwartz, 1992). I propose that the individual values most relevant in determining
allocation rule preferences are those of achievement, universalism, benevolence, and conformity.
Individuals with a value for achievement are motivated to demonstrate their competence
and success, and they are likely to be described as ambitious (Schwartz, 1992). Equity-based
reward allocation systems allow for more individual-focused social exchanges, in which people
are able to identify the fruits of their individual efforts through rewards based on their own input.
Thus, rewards are reflective of effort and the individual demonstration of competence, congruent
with a value for achievement. I therefore predict that:
Proposition 3: Individuals valuing achievement will tend to prefer equity rules to equality
and need rules.
Individuals holding a strong value for universalism have the desire to protect other
individuals and nature. This value is conceptualized as being somewhat opposite to achievement,
as it is more other-focused, while achievement is more self-focused (Schwartz, 1992).
Individuals valuing universalism are likely to place less emphasis on individual-focused social
exchanges in favor of equality-based allocation rules, because they appeal to these individuals’
egalitarian preferences. Such individuals may also favor need-based allocation rules, because
these rules may be seen as preserving or promoting the well-being of the less fortunate. I
therefore propose that:
Proposition 4: Individuals valuing universalism will tend to prefer (a) equality rules and
(b) need rules to equity rules.
Adjacent to the value of universalism in Schwartz’s (1992) value structure is the value of
benevolence. Like universalism, benevolence is other-centered, but it is more exclusive than
universalism. Individuals holding a strong benevolence value tend to be primarily concerned
with the well-being of ingroup members, or with family, friends, coworkers, etc. with whom the
individual has frequent contact (Schwartz, 1992). I predict that this value will have a unique
effect on individuals’ distributive rule preferences. Leung (1997, 2004) and Leung and Bond
(1984) have proposed that individuals in collectivistic societies prefer different reward allocation
rules for ingroup versus outgroup members. These scholars argue that outgroup members are
held accountable for their inputs according to an equity rule. However, ingroup members benefit
from a “generosity rule,” in which the more favorable of either equity or equality rules is applied.
7
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
This is consistent with the group-focused social exchange approach discussed previously,
because it allows an individual to make contributions to his/her own group exclusively, in
anticipation of reciprocation from other members of his/her own group. I posit that this
phenomenon is less a function of society-level collectivism and more a function of the more
proximal individual-level value of benevolence, which reflects the individual’s motivation to
focus on the well-being of ingroup members (Schwartz, 1992). As I discuss later, the societal
value of collectivism is likely one determinant of the prevalence of individuals valuing
benevolence within a society, which may explain the findings of Leung and Bond (1984).
However, at this point I propose that:
Proposition 5: Individuals valuing benevolence will prefer (a) equity rules for outgroup
members and (b) generosity rules (the more generous of either equity or equality rules)
for ingroup members.
As mentioned above, conformity is a personal value that entails self-restraint in favor of
upholding societal norms (Schwartz, 1992). Because individuals holding a strong conformity
value will subvert themselves to the expectations of society, societal values will play an
especially important role in determining their behaviors and preferences. Thus, I expect that the
effects of societal individualism and collectivism described in the first two propositions will be
strengthened for individuals with a high value for conformity. As I discuss in the next section,
the individual conformity value will likely be more prevalent in collectivistic societies, but the
interactive effect described here should also apply to cases of conformity-valuing individuals in
individualistic societies.
In other words, it may be intuitive that individuals valuing conformity in collectivistic
societies will have a strong preference for the equality or need rules. Not only are such rules
more commonly preferred in their societies, as described above, but these rules also tend to seek
benefits for the group or for group members. Thus, an individual who values conformity within a
collectivistic society would likely rationalize his/her preference with such thoughts as, “I like
equality and need rules, just like everybody else here, because these rules help my peers.”
However, I argue that even where individualistic societies expect individuals to achieve personal
goals, conformity-valuing individuals are more likely to express preferences consistent with the
societal average. The rationalization used by such individuals may be as simple as, “I like equity
rules, just like everybody else here.” Any other preference would put them at odds with the
“average” member of their society. In sum, I therefore propose the following:
8
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
Proposition 6: The effects of society-level values on individual preferences among
reward allocation rules will be stronger for individuals valuing conformity.
2.3. The Effects of Societal Values on Individual Values
I propose that not only do societal and individual values have direct effects on reward
allocation rule preferences, but also that societal values themselves are determinants of
individual values. This suggests that in addition to their direct effect on reward allocation rule
preferences, societal values also have an indirect effect via their influence on individual values.
These relationships can be seen in Figure 1, in which the relationships between societal values
and reward allocation rule preferences are partially mediated by individual values.
Schwartz (1992) suggests that individual values originate as a response to three
necessities common to all individuals: biological needs, requirements for coordinating social
interactions, and group survival needs. Individuals choose to deal with these in different ways,
resulting in different value structures. Similar social situations, however, tend to prompt some
similarities among individuals in the values they hold, likely due to similarities in the
experiences that shape their value systems (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Smith and Schwartz,
1997). Thus, the values that characterize a society contribute to a social context in which
individuals are exposed to and rewarded for the expression of certain individual values that are
congruent with the dominant societal values. Because individualism emphasizes the pursuit of
individual goals and the importance of individual achievement (Hofstede, 1980), it would follow
that members of individualistic societies would tend to be exposed to and to develop an
individual value for achievement. Thus, I propose that:
Proposition 7: Individuals from individualistic societies will tend to value achievement
more than individuals from collectivistic societies.
Similarly, because collectivism emphasizes the pursuit of group goals and the importance
of conforming to group norms (Hofstede, 1980), it would follow that members of collectivistic
societies would be exposed to and rewarded for the expression of the individual values of
universalism, benevolence, and conformity. Universalism motivates individuals to care for and
protect others, benevolence focuses individuals on the well-being of their fellow ingroup
members, and conformity preserves the social norms of the group (Schwartz, 1992). The
expression of these values ultimately promotes and preserves societal collectivism, so they
would therefore be rewarded and become prevalent in such contexts. Thus, I propose that:
Proposition 8: Individuals from collectivistic societies will tend to value (a) universalism,
9
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
(b) benevolence, and (c) conformity more than individuals from individualistic societies.
As stated previously and integrating the propositions thus far, I also propose that
individual values partially mediate the relationship between societal values and individuals’
reward allocation rule preferences. Consistent with the discussion and supporting research for
Propositions 1 and 2, I propose partial, rather than full, mediation to acknowledge the potential
direct effects of societal values on reward allocation rule preferences, as well as other potential
mediating processes. In other words:
Proposition 9: The effect of societal values on reward allocation rule preferences will be
partially mediated by individual values.
These nine propositions constitute the primary predictions of the new theoretical model,
depicted in Figure 1. In the following section, I point out the contributions that this model has for
both research and practice.
3. Discussion
The theoretical model presented in this paper has a number of implications for
management scholars and practitioners. It presents several opportunities for future research, both
theoretical and empirical. This model, if supported, would also form the foundation for
improving organizational practices such as staffing. I discuss the research implications first,
followed by the practical implications.
3.1. Implications for Research
I have presented nine propositions which could form the bases of hypotheses to be tested
in future empirical research. In fact, a large well-designed multi-country study could conceivably
investigate all nine of the predicted relationships. Such a study would require a number of critical
design elements to significantly contribute to prior research and could benefit from approaches to
multilevel organizational research methods (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985). For
example, both individual and societal values must be measured. While measuring individual
values is a necessity, some researchers may opt to rely on prior measurements of societal values,
such as those of Hofstede (1980), the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) study (House et al., 2004), or Schwartz (Schwartz and Ros, 1995; 1994).
However, doing so would assume that the researcher has sampled from the same population and
that there has been no significant shift in values (Smith and Schwartz, 1997).
More rigorous research designs, on the other hand, would follow the advice of Kirkman
and colleagues (2006) in not only documenting the country of origin for all research participants
10
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
but also re-assessing the societal values for the sample(s) used. In this way, the researcher can
more easily exclude alternative explanations for any significant effects that could arise from
other characteristics of the national contexts examined. Scores on scales designed to measure
societal culture may be subjected to tests of within-group agreement, such as an assessment of
James, Demaree, and Wolf’s (1984) rWG statistic, to confirm that the measurements represent the
society-level constructs as intended (Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). Such techniques would also
facilitate the use of multi-level statistical analysis tools such as hierarchical linear modeling
(HLM, or random coefficient modeling [RCM]; Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), though this would
require at minimum a sample of about 30 individuals from each of about 30 countries (in other
words, 900 individuals from 30 countries) to obtain reliable results (Hofmann et al., 2000).
Incorporation of such rigorous study design, measurement, and analytical techniques will allow
for a more accurate test of this theoretical model, as well as a stronger contribution to crosscultural research in general.
Future research may also test corollaries derived from the model, propositions, and
discussions presented in this paper. For example, researchers could explicitly test mediating
processes implied by social exchange theory, including feelings of obligation among various
organizational members and intended targets (organization vs. other employees, for instance) of
work behaviors. In addition, given the relationships proposed, one may form additional
propositions and hypotheses concerning the relative degrees of preference or acceptability of
different reward allocation rules among different individuals in different societies. Personality
researchers have proposed that implicit motives and explicit personality traits may combine to
channel the expression of unique behaviors (e.g., Frost et al., 2007; James and Mazerolle, 2002;
Winter et al., 1998). Similarly, the theoretical model presented in this paper and illustrated in
Figure 1 implies that societal and individual values may combine to result in the expression of
unique preferences. Table 1 describes the ultimate joint effects of societal and individual values
on reward allocation preferences. Future empirical research may test the hypothesis, for example,
that an achievement-valuing individual in a collectivistic society would show a stronger
preference for an equity rule and a weaker opposition to equality and need rules than an
achievement-valuing individual in an individualistic society. This theoretical model and its
capability to simultaneously consider values at both levels can paint a fairly detailed picture of
individuals in different societies.
11
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
Table 1
Descriptions of Proposed Joint Effects of Individual and Societal Values on Reward Allocation Rule Preferences
Within the context of societal value
Individual value
Individualism
Collectivism
Achievement
Individual and societal value congruence motivates a
Rationalizations for equality and/or need rules are seen
strong preference for the equity rule. Equality and
as reasonable, but the individual value of achievement
need allocation rules are regarded as inferior, if not
motivates a general preference for the equity rule.
irrational.
Universalism
Rationalizations for the equity rule are seen as
Individual and societal value congruence motivates a
reasonable, but individual value of universalism
strong preference for the equality and/or need rules.
motivates a general preference for equality and/or
The equity rule may be incomprehensible, seen as
need rules.
potentially disruptive to society, and/or deemed to be
cruel treatment of the less fortunate.
Benevolence
Rationalizations for all rules are seen as reasonable,
Rationalizations for all rules are seen as reasonable,
though familiarity with the equity rule may result in
though familiarity with the equality and/or need rules
a preference for it. Nonetheless, individuals with
may result in a preference for them. Nonetheless,
whom one is unfamiliar are expected to “prove”
outgroup members (contextual factors may define
themselves according to an equity rule. On the other
these as strangers, non-friends, individuals from other
hand, family, friends, former classmates, etc., are
regions, etc.) are held to an equity rule. On the other
provided the benefit of the “generosity rule,” in
hand, ingroup members (contextual factors may define
which the more favorable of the equity or equality
these as family, friends, former classmates, members
rules is applied.
of the same community/society, etc.) are provided the
benefit of the “generosity rule,” in which the more
favorable of the equity or equality rules is applied.
Conformity
The equity rule is strongly preferred over other rules,
Equality and/or need rules are strongly preferred over the
due to a strong motive to conform to the societal
equity rule, due to a strong motive to conform to the
expectations accompanying individualism.
societal expectations accompanying collectivism and
to preserve societal norms.
Additionally, the approach presented in this paper may be applied to study the effects of
other values and value frameworks on organizational justice-related perceptions. While I have
attempted to build this model around the values most likely to influence reward allocation rule
preferences, one may propose that other values within Schwartz’s (1992) framework have effects.
For example, a self-direction value may promote preferences for an equity rule, since this rule
may be better equipped to reward individuals for independent thought and action. Other value
frameworks, both at the individual and societal levels, may also present research opportunities.
Schwartz’s (Schwartz and Ros, 1995; 1990, 1994, 1999) proposed societal values, mentioned
previously, or the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) framework could be examined, for instance.
Further, perceptions of organizational justice other than reward allocation rule preferences may
be examined with this framework. For example, cross-cultural research has shown that values
drive the degree to which different facets of justice drive overall perceptions of fairness (Kim
and Leung, 2007). This model may contribute in such research areas by making a distinction
between the effects of societal values and individual values.
Finally, the theoretical framework presented in this paper may contribute to cross-cultural
research in areas other than organizational justice. A tremendous amount of cross-cultural
research has been conducted on various organizational behavior topics, such as job satisfaction,
12
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
leadership, and motivation (see Chen et al., 2009; Gelfand et al., 2007; and Kirkman et al., 2006,
for reviews). Such research may benefit from further clarification of the levels at which values
originate and consideration of the effects of both societal and individual values. Propositions
may be formed to understand the joint influence of various societal and individual values on
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), organizational commitment, leadership style
effectiveness, and other work outcomes. In addition, the construction and consideration of
channeling models such as the one presented in Table 1 may also lead to a better understanding
of how societal and individual values are channeled to influence employee preferences, attitudes,
and behaviors.
3.2. Implications for Practice
Not only does this theoretical work contribute to cross-cultural organizational research,
but it also has several implications for management practice. As stated in the introduction,
managers in modern global organizations must be able to effectively manage multinational
operations and an increasingly international workforce. This research not only emphasizes the
need to consider within-country individual value differences, but also their effects on employees’
preferences in various national contexts. Returning to the example used previously, while
achievement-valuing individuals around the world may strongly prefer equity reward allocation
rules, those from collectivistic societies may be more tolerant of equality or need rules than their
counterparts from individualistic societies. Thus, changing reward systems in collectivistic
societies to accommodate a more achievement-oriented younger generation may be premature
and unnecessarily costly, particularly if a significant proportion of the workforce is still
comprised of members of older generations.
Staffing provides another example of how this research may contribute to practice.
Drawing on the person-organization fit literature (Chatman, 1989; O’Reilly et al., 1991;
Schneider, 1987), research suggests that organizations may explicate their values in recruitment
materials in order to allow potential applicants to more effectively self-select into the
organization (Judge and Cable, 1997; Schneider, 1987). Attracting applicants with values
congruent with those of the organization is beneficial because high value congruence ultimately
leads to such beneficial outcomes as higher job satisfaction and lower turnover among
employees (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Descriptions of organizational practices can serve as
signals of what an organization values (Turban and Keon, 1993; Williams and Bauer, 1994), so
describing an equality reward allocation rule, for instance, may signal a value for benevolence or
13
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
universalism and generally attract applicants who share such values. Organizations that embrace
such values may therefore be advised to implement and publicize equality-based reward systems.
This will facilitate organizational staffing efforts to fill positions with employees holding similar
values, thereby maximizing employee satisfaction and retention.
However, the theory presented in this paper and detailed in Table 1 suggests that
achievement-valuing individuals in collectivistic societies are likely to be more tolerant of
equality and need rules. Thus, a benevolence- or universalism-valuing organization in an
individualistic society will likely be more successful in attracting only benevolence- or
universalism-valuing employees, while such an organization in a collectivistic society is likely to
remain exposed to variation in employee values. Specifically, the achievement-valuing
individuals of collectivistic societies may also apply for positions in these organizations, given
their increased tolerance for such reward systems. This may not pose a problem if these
individuals are also tolerant of these value differences with regard to job satisfaction and
withdrawal behaviors, but empirical research is required to determine whether or not this is
indeed the case.
As a caveat, the practical implications of this theoretical model are, of course, tentative.
Further empirical work is needed before any definitive suggestions can be made. However, it is
my hope that this theoretical work might draw the interest of practitioners to facilitate and
promote further empirical research in this area.
4. Conclusion
To date, cross-cultural research on reward allocation preferences has focused primarily
on the effects of societal values or individual-level operationalizations of societal values. This
paper is intended to make a clearer distinction between values at these two levels, starting with
the level of the theory, and to understand the main and interactive effects of these values on
reward allocation rule preferences. I have presented a research model, nine propositions, and a
detailed channeling model of the joint effects of these values to guide empirical tests of this
theory. The current paper and subsequent future research based on this theory are expected to
have important implications for both management research and practice.
14
Societal and Individual Values in Reward Preferences
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