PUBLIC HEARINGS IN THE AMBIT OF THE BRAZILIAN FEDERAL
SUPREME COURT: A NEW FORM OF PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
AFFAIRS?1
Mônia Clarissa Hennig Leal
2
1 Introduction
Judicial review has become increasingly prominent in the context of the
Democratic Constitutional State, particularly because of its role to ensure fundamental
rights, being common references to phenomena such as “judicialization” (of Politics
and Law) and “judicial activism”, which lead to questions about its limitations and
legitimacy. This task, however, has become increasingly challenging, especially
because of the plurality and complexity of our current society, so that the traditional
instruments of legal performance seem often insufficient, unable to satisfactorily meet
the demands that arise. In this context, in which a large portion of power is transferred
to the judges, who are called to decide on strategic issues of great social repercussion
(such as abortion, affirmative actions, environmental issues, etc.), it is necessary to
develop tools that also allow the Judiciary to be a locus for participation and exercise of
democracy. In this sense, public hearings – established by the legislation regulating the
acts of concentrated control of constitutionality – have been increasingly adopted by
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (from 2007 to date seven public hearings have
taken place, and seven other were called only in 2013, plus one more in 2014),
providing opportunity for society to take part in the constitutional debate, thus ensuring
that the decisions take into account cultural, social, economic, and scientific aspects.
1
This paper is the result of the activities developed in the research project entitled “Judicial
review of public policies: the role and limitations of the Federal Supreme Court in supervising
and implementing public policies of social inclusion – critical analysis and search for new
mechanisms/tools for a democratic and cooperative action between the Powers", carried within
the Research Group "Open Constitutional Jurisdiction" (CNPq), coordinated by the author and
developed in collaboration with the Integrated Center for Studies and Research on Public
Policies – CIEPPP (sponsored by FINEP), within the Master's and Doctorate Degree Program in
Law, University of Santa Cruz do Sul – UNISC.
2
Holds a Postdoctoral Degree from Ruprecht-Karls University Heidelberg (Germany) and a
Doctorate Degree in Law from the University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos – Unisinos, with an
exchange scholarship at Ruprecht-Karls University Heidelberg, Germany. Professor at the
UNISC Graduate Degree Program in Law, where she teaches Judicial Review and Judicial
Review of Public Policies, respectively. Coordinator of Research group on "Open Constitutional
Jurisdiction", sponsored by CNPq. CNPq Research fellowship holder. Member of the Advisory
Committee of Human and Social Sciences at the Research Support Foundation of Rio Grande
do Sul – FAPERGS.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to study the role of public hearings and its
theoretical foundations (such as the notion of "status activus processualis"), arguing
that they conform a new form of direct democracy. Finally, it proposes a critical
analysis of its implementation by the Court in order to determine whether they work
effectively as an instrument of opening and participation or end up becoming a mere
element of formal legitimacy of decisions.
2 The leading role of judicial review in the Democratic Constitutional State:
judicialization of politics, politicization of the Judiciary, and judicial activism
Judicial review has evolved, over time, in close connection with the
transformations that took place within the State itself, going from a restrictive and
limited approach (marked by the application of logical syllogisms and exegetical
empiricism) in the context of a liberal State to a broad and active participation in the
Democratic State3, in which are frequent references to phenomena such as
“politicization of the Judiciary” and “judicialization of politics”4, that result from a
historical process based on multiple factors, such as the centrality of the Constitution
and its normativity, associated with aspects such as its principle-based nature and the
transformation of fundamental rights5 (either by overcoming its classic negative
perspective6 to incorporate a positive one or by broadening7 and extending8 its content
based on the acknowledgment of its objective dimension9).10
3
HESSE, Konrad. Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 20.
Auflage. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1999.
4
For a comprehensive discussion on the relations between the Judiciary and politics, see
VIANNA, Luiz Werneck (org.). A democracia e os três poderes no Brasil. Belo Horizonte:
Editora UFMG; Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ/FAPERJ, 2002.
5
ALEXY, Robert. Grundrechte als subjektive Rechte und als objektive Normen. In: Der Staat.
Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte. Band 29. Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 1990. p. 63.
6
Ibidem, pp. 49-69.
7
One should bear in mind the concern expressed in the Brazilian Constitution regarding "human
dignity", a more generic and broader term than that associated with the notion of basic rights;
from this viewpoint, not only the application hypotheses are increased (in this sense, there is no
law issue that does not involve dignity), but also the complexity of rights and their realization are
maximized, particularly in cases of conflict between basic rights or in cases where new rights
must to be acknowledged in view of social and technological advances over time.
8
In this sense, GRIMM, Dieter. Rückher zum liberalen Grundrechtsverständnis? In: Die Zukunft
der Verfassung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991. p. 221.
9
Related to this objective dimension are concepts such as Austrahlungswirkung ("irradiation
efficiency" or vertical, from which results the notion of "constitutionalization of Law") and
Drittwirkung ("efficiency against third parties" or horizontal). For further discussion on the topic,
see SCHLINK, Bernhard. Die Entthronung der Staatsrechtswissenschaft durch die
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. In: Der Staat. Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, öffentliches Recht und
Verfassungsgeschichte, Band 28. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989.
10
SCHWABE, Jürgen. Die sogenannte Drittwirkung der Grundrechte. Zur Einwirkung der
Grundrechte auf den Privatsrechtverkehr. München: Goldmann, 1971.
All these factors combined result in the expansion and transformation of the role
of judicial review, placing it at a prominent position and leading to the transfer of
strategic decisions (traditionally reserved to the political and deliberative sphere) to the
Judiciary, so that Law becomes increasingly jurisprudential and implemented by the
bench11.
In this context, arguments such as the paternalism12 represented by the socalled "jurisprudence of values" arise, which, identified with fundamental rights and
their objective dimension13, are used as a factor of legitimacy to prevent any criticism
related to the decisions14, turning Constitutional Courts into “lords of the Constitution”
(Herren der Verfassung), as designated by Böckenförde15, a “superinstance”
(Supertatsacheninstanz)16, not only because of its broading comptences, but also
because of the strength and extension of its interventions17, so that the Democratic
State would be turning into a "Juristocracy" (Jurisdiktionsstaat).18
11
The role of the bench is crucial to the conformation of the Law, by means of a creative and
constructive activity integrating the normative text with reality. To read about judge-made Law,
see KOCH, Hans-Joachim. Die Begründung von Grundrechtsinterpretationen. Europäische
Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ), Heft 11/12, 30. Juni 1986.
12
See, for instance, MAUS, Ingeborg. O Judiciário como superego da sociedade – sobre o
papel da atividade jurisprudencial na “sociedade órfã”. Translated by Martonio Mont’Alverne
Barreto Lima e Paulo Menezes Albuquerque. In: Novos Estudos, n. 58. São Paulo: CEBRAP,
novembro de 2000. pp. 183-202. Also, DENNINGER, Erhard. Der gebändigte Leviathan.
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990.
13
One may mention the decision for the Lüth case, judged by the German Constitutional Court
in 1958 (BVerfGE 7, 198), which states that basic rights comprise a value system centered
around human dignity, providing guidelines and impulses to all areas of the Law (legislation,
management, and jurisdiction).
14
MAUS, Ingeborg. O Judiciário como superego da sociedade – sobre o papel da atividade
jurisprudencial na “sociedade órfã”. Translated by Martonio Mont’Alverne Barreto Lima e Paulo
Menezes Albuquerque. In: Novos Estudos, n. 58. São Paulo: CEBRAP, nov. 2000. p. 134.
15
The term appears in different moments in the work by the author, such as in
BÖCKENFÖRDE, Ernst-Wolfgang. Begriff und Probleme des Verfassungsstaates. In: Staat,
Nation, Europa: Studien zur Staatslehre, Verfassungstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie. Frankfurt
a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999. p. 132.
16
SCHULTE, Martin. Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. In: Deutsches
Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl.), Heft 18, 15. September 1996. p. 1015. In Brazil, Sampaio refers to the
fact – and expresses it overtly in the work's title – by arguing that "the performance of
constitutional jurisdiction bodies puts them outside and above the three powers or territorial
instances." Cf. SAMPAIO, José Adércio Leite. A Constituição reinventada pela jurisdição
constitucional. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2002. p. 893.
17
EBSEN, Ingwer. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Element gesellschaftlicher
Selbstregulierung: eine pluralistische Theorie der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im
demokratischen Verfassungs-staat. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985. p. 11.
18
Such aspect is mentioned by ISENSEE, Josef. Bundesverfassungsgericht – quo vadis? In:
Juristen Zeitung (JZ), 22. November 1996. p. 1085. According to the author, an authority such
as BverfG would be historically unlikely, but reality has proved otherwise because, in a society
skeptical to authority, a true and effective authority is emerging.
Thus, the performance of judges is often questioned and criticized on the
grounds that, on behalf of realizing fundamental rights19, they exceed their limits of
performance as set by the Constitution, invading the competences of other Powers and
endangering the democratic system itself.20
Given these aspects, openness and democratization of jurisdiction – and in
particular of constitutional jurisdiction – are important factors, placing social
participation as a true condition for the Constitutional State. This requires restructuring
procedures, which brings out the need to leverage, among other aspects, the notion of
publicity21 in a broad sense and an effective incorporation of society in the process,
which theoretical foundations will be discussed below.
3 Participation and opening as counterpoints to the leading role of judicial
review in the Democratic Constitutional State
In the endeavor to build a theoretical foundation for this social participation in
the process, it is possible to identify some elements that can sustain this conception,
such as the theory of "open society of constitutional interpreters" and the notion of
status activus processualis, which break with a purely institutional understanding of
19
Minister Celso de Mello, of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, in his speech at the
inauguration of Minister Gilmar Ferreira Mendes as the Court president, defended that the
Constitutional Court is responsible for safeguarding the Constitution and basic rights, even if
this implies certain "activism". He argued that "one should not reprehend the Supreme Court for
some judicial activism, especially because, among the number of reasons that justify this
affirmative behavior by the Judiciary, resulting in a positive court precedents, is the need to
enforce the supremacy of the Constitution, often violated and neglected out of sheer and
convenient omission by the government. [...] Actions of judicial activism [...] are an institutional
need when bodies of the Government fail or take too long to fulfill the obligations they are
subjected to as set forth in the constitutional statute, especially if is clear that he Judiciary, in the
case of state behaviors violating the Constitution, cannot be reduced to a position of sheer
passivity. MELLO, Celso de. Speech greeting Minister Gilmar Ferreira Mendes for his
inauguration as President of the Supreme Federal Court, on April 23, 2008. Supreme Federal
Court Swering-in Ceremony: Minister Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, President; Minister Antonio
Cezar Peluso, Vice President: on April 23, 2008. Brasília: Supreme Federal Court, 2008, p. 1837.
Available
at:
<http://www.stf.jus.br/arqui
vo/cms/publicacaoPublicacaoInstitucionalPossePresidencial/anexo/Plaqueta_de_Posse_do_Mi
n._Gilmar_Mendes_na_Presidencia.pdf>. Access on: May 31, 2013.
20
German constitutionalist Winfried Brohm questions and brings to attention the creation of an
"oligarchy in democracy" (Oligarchie in der Demokratie), caused by increasing the competence
of the Constitutional Court based on the notion of objective connection of basic rights. Cf.
BROHM, Winfried. Die Funktion des BVerfG – Oligarchie in der Demokratie? Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (NJW), Heft 01, 2001, p. 2.
21
Although it is not utterly expressed and Häberle is not concerned with developing in theory
the conditions for this publicity and participation, one could see some common points and the
possibility to apply Habermas's communicative theory. Cf. HABERMAS, Jürgen. Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns: Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung.
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995.
interpretation and bring to light the need of analyzing an aspect usually unexplored by
hermeneutics: the question of who interprets.
This conception leads, therefore, to a democratization of the hermeneutic task,
whose broader scope results from the need to incorporate reality to interpretation.
Interpreters in the broad sense (Verfassungsinterpreten im weiteren Sinn)22 are an
important part of that reality; thus, interpreting the Constitution – as a cultural product –
also presupposes a permanent exercise of democratic participation, of status activus
processualis.23
Insofar the need for participation in the constitutional process increases in order
to influence the Court's legal interpretation24, which becomes broad in terms of
perspectives and approaches; at the same time, the potential of democratic legitimacy
and rational reasoning of the decision is increased, once that more aspects of reality
will be incorporated and hence will be more susceptible to the plural arguments
produced, as well as more contextualized in time and space (understanding and
localization of the problem as a social and cultural matter). It is not, therefore, a
technical interpretation, but rather an interpretation from a democratic perspective,
which gives meaning to constitutional life.25
22
HÄBERLE, Peter. Struktur und Funktion der Öffentlichkeit im demokratischen Staat. In: Die
Verfassung des Pluralismus: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft.
Königstein: Athenäum, 1980. p. 165.
23
“In der freiheitlichen Demokratie ist der Bürger Verfassungsinterpret!”. Häberle identifies the
participation in the interpretation process of the Constitution as a citizenship right, understood
from an active perspective – the term used by the author is Bürger – rather than from a
perspective of citizenship associated with the notion of subject of right. According to the author,
democracy is the supremacy of the citizen rather than the people in Rousseau's sense.
“Demokratie ist ‘Herrschaft der Bürger’, nicht des Volkes im Rousseauschen Sinne. Es gibt kein
Zurück zu Rousseau. Die Bürgerdemokratie ist realistischer als die Volks-Demokratie.” Cf.
HÄBERLE, Peter. Struktur und Funktion der Öffentlichkeit im demokratischen Staat. In: Die
Verfassung des Pluralismus: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft.
Königstein: Athenäum, 1980. p. 170.
The
distinction
is
discussed
and
developed
again
in
HÄBERLE,
Peter.
Verfassungsinterpretation als öffentlicher Prozess – ein Pluralismus – konzept. In: Verfassung
als öffentlicher Prozess: Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft. 3.
Auflage. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998. p. 131.
24
To support this statement, the author argues that many of the issues concerning the
Constitution and its content do not even reach the Constitutional Court, making it clear that the
Constitution can survive without an "official" interpretation and that the formal process is not the
only way to access the process of constitutional interpretation. Cf. HÄBERLE, Peter. Die offene
Gesellschaft der Verfassungs-interpreten (1975) mit Nachtrag (1978). In: Verfassung als
öffentlicher Prozess: Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft. 3.
Auflage. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998. p. 172–173.
25
Such opening, however, implies some limitations and risks because, in a complex and
pluralistic society, the text becomes less important and the context gains significant relevance.
These aspects are discussed systematically in an analysis focused on the application of basic
rights in HÄBERLE, Peter. Die Grundrechte im demokratischen Staat (1974) mit Nachtrag
(1978). In: Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess: Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der
offenen Gesellschaft. 3. Auflage. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998. p. 587.
Thus, one may conclude that an important issue concerning judicial review
consists in increasing and improving the communication tools available for judges as
well as the possibilities of (effective) participation in the constitutional process. Having
said that, the question that arises is: how, by what means?26
In such a context, the opening of jurisdictional structure should take place in two
dimensions: internally, regarding the interpretive activity of a pluralistic society, and
externally, in the sense of opening its procedures to effective participation and
institutionalized exercise of the status activus processualis27 within the jurisdiction,
especially the constitutional jurisdiction.
This is so because the complexity and plurality of social relations require, as
argued by Häberle28, a new behavior, both by the State and citizens, where
participation and democratic procedures gain prominence.
It is, therefore, paramount to establish a relationship of cooperation between
State and Society, a fact that implies the creation of new mechanisms of participation29
that allow it to be included in this procedural sphere30, in which the status activus
processualis is “the” fundamental status for a democratic common life31.
It is, therefore, a constitutional right identified by a markedly processual and
procedural character, related mainly to a right to participation32 (Teilhaberecht) in and
26
According to Häberle, theses issues require further investigation by the Constitutional
Theory. Cf. HÄBERLE, Peter. Verfassungsinterpretation als öffentlicher Prozess – ein
Pluralismus-konzept. In: Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess: Materialen zu einer
Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft. 3. Auflage. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998. p.
177.
27
Here the author makes reference to the notion of status activus developed by Jellinek in his
"Theory of subjective public rights." Cf. JELLINEK, Georg. System der subjektiven öffentlichen
Rechte. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1905.
28
HÄBERLE, Peter. Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat. In: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Staatslehrer (VVDStRL), Band 30. Berlin: Gruyter, 1972. pp. 115-140.
29
This new perspective also assumes the creation of new functional and jurisdiction problems
because the traditional forms of operation reserved for negative individual rights are no longer
sufficient or adequate; this "competence crisis" also includes the constitutional jurisdiction,
required in new aspects and new dimensions.
30
HÄBERLE, Peter. Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat. In: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Staatslehrer (VVDStRL), Heft 30. Berichte und Diskussionen auf der Tagung der
Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer in Regensburg vom 29. September bis 2. Oktober
1971. Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1972. p. 59.
31
Several theories have tried to update Jellinek's Statuslehre, reformulating it and adapting it to
the new reality. An example of such effort can be found in BRUGGER, Winfried. Freiheit und
Sicherheit. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004.
32
The right to vote established by the Constitution is an offshoot of the right to participation,
requiring the development of other forms of participation; in addition, the right to participation
referred by the status activus can be both political and social (it has a wide range).
against State. It is through the exercise of the status activus33 that rights gain meaning,
which presupposes informed and engaged citizens when their interests are at stake
and, especially, citizens that take their rights seriously. Constitution and fundamental
rights are so understood as real res publica34, so that their application cannot be
reduced to mere "technique" (Technizität).
Participation and procedure35 need to secure space to cooperative and
communicative means, because constitutional rules are open-ended, a situation that
requires a directly proportional relationship to be established between legislation and
procedure: the more flexible the legislation, the more relevant is (should be) the
procedural element.
Therefore, the core of the concept of citizenship can no longer be associated
with a passive status (status passivus subjectionis36), acquiring a markedly active and
procedural dimension of participation (status activus processualis).37
In light of the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that the right to participation in
the Democratic State is as essential as the position of "citizen" (passive) in the Rule of
Law State, having the procedural aspect an important role in the realization of
fundamental rights.
This opening of procedural aspects must also be extended to jurisdiction, a
context in which the conduct of public hearings by the Courts can be comprehended as
33
For purposes of this analysis, we will ground our reflection on the theoretical framework
formulated by Häberle in a paper about the change of nature performed by the positive
dimension of social basic rights. Cf. HÄBERLE, Peter. Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat. In:
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer (VVDStRL), Heft 30. Berichte
und Diskussionen auf der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer in Regensburg
vom 29. September bis 2. Oktober 1971. Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1972. p. 43-191.
34
Die Verfassung wird damit noch nicht zum “juristischen Weltenei”, aus dem alles hervorgeht,
sondern wirkligkeitsbezogener Rahmen und Sozialprogramm einer “res publica semper
reformanda”, Substanz von Aufgaben. Cf. HÄBERLE, Peter. Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat. In:
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer (VVDStRL), Heft 30. Berichte
und Diskussionen auf der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer in Regensburg
vom 29. September bis 2. Oktober 1971. Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1972. p. 99.
35
This new perspective also assumes the creation of new functional and jurisdiction problems;
this "competence crisis" also includes the constitutional jurisdiction, required in new aspects and
new dimensions
36
This shows that the typically modern, liberal discourse, which identifies citizenship with
passive citizenship, is an outworn idea. WIEACKER, Franz. História do Direito Privado
moderno. Translated by Antonio Manoel Botelho Hespanha. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian, 1980.
37
Several theories have tried to update Jellinek's Statuslehre, reformulating it and adapting it to
the new reality. An example of such effort can be found in BRUGGER, Winfried. Freiheit und
Sicherheit. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003.
a privileged tool for enabling this participation in the process by institutionalized and
plural means.
4 The figure of public hearings in Brazilian law: theoretical delineations and
critical analysis
Public Hearings may be considered an auxiliary instrument in trials, by allowing
the dialog and communication between authority and society representatives (whether
because they have expertise in the area, or because they are the direct or indirect
subject of the decision effects).
Although in Brazil they were already used in the ambit of the Legislative Power
(being set forth by the National Constituent Assembly as an important tool for the
process of drafting the democratic Constitution of 1988), in the jurisdictional sphere, the
figure of public hearings was only introduced much later, by two laws that rule the
actions of the concentrated control of constitutionality, allowing the Reporting Judge to
broadly gather information on the matter in debate.
Law 9868/99 (that regulates the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality – ADIn) sets
forth, in its article 9th, §1st, that, in case there is a need to clarify a matter of fact
circumstance or in case of a flagrant insufficiency of information existing in the records,
the rapporteur may set a date to, in a public hearing, listen to depositions by people
who have experience with and authority on the matter. On the other hand, Law 9882/99
establishes, in its article 6th, §1st, that, if necessary, the Rapporteur may define a date
for statements, in public hearings, made by people who have experience with and
authority on the matter.
Thus, the possibility of summoning public hearings in the scope of the Legal
System38 must be seen as a recent phenomenon in the Brazilian context, being part of
a broader process, that can also be reflected upon the adoption of some other
elements, such as the expansion of the list of legitimized people to the proposition of
actions of the concentrated control of constitutionality (among which political parties,
associations, and trade unions, as well as the Brazilian Bar Association - OAB and
Legislative and Executive representatives in the federal and state arenas are included)
and the possibility of amicus curiae intervention, in order to allow civil society entities
and citizens to take part in discussions that are thought to be of public relevance
(DIAS, 2010).
38
It is possible to identify the existence of Public Hearings in every function performed by the
State, that is, in the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary levels (RAIS, 2012, p. 34).
As provided by the quoted39 legal texts, the adoption of such information
mechanisms is under the Rapporteur40 discretion41, in cases where clarifications are
needed in face of the matter complexity or regarding factual circumstances. Despite
these aspects, in practice no significant distinctions can be observed regarding public
hearings in the scope of the two kinds of actions (ADIn and ADPF). Distinctions seem
to result yet from other aspects, such as the nature of protected rights, which shall be
further analyzed by the end of the present paper.
In spite of the vanguardism attributed to Laws 9868/99 and 9882/99, however,
the first Federal Supreme Court Public Hearing was only held years later, on April 20th,
2007, having as object a discussion about the Biosafety Law (Law 11105/2005) and
the possibility of embryonic stem-cells research (ADIn 3.510).
Back then, the Court did not provide on the procedures to be adopted, so there
were no specific conditions or legally bound deadlines to be adopted. In view of that, in
a decision of March 16th, 2007, Minister Carlos Ayres Britto, rapporteur in the case,
determined the Chamber of Deputies By-Laws should be used as reference.42 Then,
due to the reach and repercussion verified in this first experience, the rules for
summoning and holding Public Hearings in the scope of the Federal Supreme Court
were instituted through the Amendment of Procedural Rule no. 29/200943, which has
broadened its comprehension, determining that the Rapporteur may summon
“whenever he/she understands the clarification of matters or factual circumstances are
needed, in cases with general repercussion and that are of relevant public interest”,
39
Despite the similarity verified in both legal diplomas, some differences may, however, be
verified: Law 9882/99 does not expressly include acceptability hypotheses (in opposition to Law
9868/99, which refers to the need of clarification on the matter and or questions in fact),
granting broad discretion to the Rapporteur, in cases which he or she “deems necessary” (art.
6th, §1st, Law 9882/99).
40
Law 9868/99 allows only the proceedings Rapporteur to summons a Public Hearing;
however, the Amendment n. 29, made to the Supreme Federal Court By-Laws, on February 18,
2009 – which deals with Public Hearings – states the Court President is also authorized to
summon them.
41
Mechanisms that can be adopted by the Supreme Federal Court are: require additional
information, appoint an expert or a experts commission so then can issue an opinion on the
matter, or set a date to, in a public hearing, hear testimonies made by people who have
st
th
experience and authority on that matter, according to §1 , article 9 of Law 9868/99.
42
These procedures are set forth by arts. 255 to 258 of the House of Representatives By-Laws.
Cf.:
BRAZIL.
House
of
Representatives.
Available
in:
http://www2.camara.gov.br/legin/fed/rescad/1989/resolucaodacamaradosdeputados-17-21setembro-1989-320110-republicacaoatualizada-40374-pl.html. Access on 10.05.2012.
43
Art. 13 and art. 21: The following are the President’s attributions: XVII – summon a public
hearing to hear the testimony made by people who have experience and authority on a given
matter, whenever they deem necessary to clarify issues or factual circumstances, with general
repercussion and of relevant public interest, which should be debated in the Court.
being possible to deduce, therefore, the possibility of adopting a Public Hearing in any
sort of claim or appeal under a Court.44
It is also worth mentioning the provision, contained in articles 154 and 155 of the
Federal Supreme Court By-Laws45, stating that, when there are people opposing the
matter at hand, the participation of diverse opinion currents must be secured, an aspect
that further strengthens the jurisdiction opening character here supported. Finally, as a
framework of this approximation between Judiciary and Society, there is the
determination that the Public Hearings should be publicized, through their broadcast, in
its entirety, by TV Justiça and by Rádio Justiça (art. 154, subsection V), which provides
the entire population with general, unrestricted, and immediate knowledge on the
debates held there.46
Since then, this practice has been reiterated, and twelve Hearings have been
summoned by the Federal Supreme Court so far: a) embryonic stem-cells research –
Biosafety Law (in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality – ADIn 3510, held on April 20,
2007); b) used tires import (in the Non-Compliance of Fundamental Rule Claim - ADPF
101, held on June 27, 2008); c) abortion of anencephalic fetuses (in the NonCompliance of Fundamental Rule Claim - ADPF 54, held on August 26-27, and
44
According to Rais (2012, p. 59), when one compares the two provisions added by the
Supreme Federal Court By-Laws (art. 13, subsection XVII and art. 21, subsection XVII), one
observes that the faculty assigned to the Supreme Federal Court President refers to the
interests of the same Court, whereas the Rapporteur’s attribution relates exclusively to the
proceedings.
45
Art. 154. The following hearings shall be public: I (suppressed); II – for the instruction of the
proceedings, except for a relevant reason; III – to hear the testimony of those people referred to
by arts. 13, subsection XVII, and 21, subsection XVII, of this By-Laws. Sole paragraph: The
hearing set forth by subsection III shall observe the following procedure: I – the order that
summons it shall be broadly spread and shall set a deadline for the appointment of people to be
heard; II – if there are defenders and objectors regarding the matter that is the object of a given
hearing, the participation of diverse currents of opinion shall be assured; III – the Minister who
presides over the public hearing shall be responsible for selecting those people who will be
heard, as well as to make the list of qualified people available, determining the order of activities
and setting the time each one will have to speak out; IV – the deponent shall be limited to the
theme or matter at hand; V – the public hearing shall be broadcast through TV Justiça and
Rádio Justiça; VI – the public hearing activities shall be recorded and added to the proceedings,
when appropriate, or filed in the scope of Presidency; VII – omitted cases shall be resolved by
the Minister who summons the hearing. Art. 155. The Minister that presides over the hearing
st
shall deliberate on what is required. § 1 apart from attorneys’ prerogative, none of the
attendees shall speak to the hearing president, unless if this attendee is standing and is allowed
to do so. § 2nd The hearing secretary shall include in the minutes whatever happens during the
hearing. Cf: BRAZIL, Supreme Federal Court. Current By-Laws. Available at:
http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoRegimentoInterno/anexo/RISTF_Julho_2012.pdf.
Access on: 10.05.2012.
46
TV Justiça is an institutional and public television channel, managed by the Supreme Federal
Court, which aims at being a space of communication and approximation between citizens and
the Judiciary. Rádio Justiça is an institutional and public radio station managed by the Supreme
Federal Court, being that FM broadcast started on May 5, 2004; besides radio frequency
104.7MHz, the radio station is also tuned in via satellite and the internet. (MENDES; DO VALE;
2008/2009, p. 06)
September 4-6, 2008); d) judicialization of the right to health (in different diffuse control
actions, held on April 27, 28, and 29, and May 4, 6, and 7, 2009); e) affirmative action
and racial quote policy in Public Universities admission (in the Non-Compliance of
Fundamental Rule Claim - ADPF 186, held on March 3, 4, and 5, 2010); f) ban on the
sale of alcoholic beverages in areas surrounding freeways – Lei Seca (Dry Law) (in the
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality - ADIn 4103, on May 7 and 14, 2012); g) ban on the
use of asbestos (Direct Action of Unconstitutionality - ADIn 3937, on August 24 and 31,
2012); h) new legal framework on cable TV (Direction Action of Unconstitutionality ADIn 4679; 4756, and 4747, held on February 8, 2013); i) impacts of electromagnetic
radiation on health and the reduction of the electromagnetic field in power supply
(Extraordinary Appeal no. 627189, held on March 6, 2013); j) burning of sugarcane
straw (Extraordinary Appeal no. 586224, held on April 22, 2013); k) possibility of
serving time in a less severe regimen when the State cannot provide, in the
penitentiary system, a place that complies with the regimen appointed by the sentence
(Extraordinary Appeal no. 641320, taken on May 27, 2013); l) election campaigns
funding system (Direct Action of Unconstitutionality - ADIn, held on June 17, 2013).
The table below shows some of the main aspects of the Public Hearings carried
out so far (considering the period from 2007 to 2012):
Biosafety Law
Used tires import
Anencephalic
fetuses
Racial
policy
4
Marco
Aurelio
Mello
(RAPPORTEUR)
3
Judicialization
of the right to
health
Gilmar Ferreira
Mendes
(PRESIDENT)
3
Summoning
Carlos Ayres Brito
(RAPPORTEUR)
Carmen
Lúcia
(RAPPORTEUR)
Attending
ministers
No.
of
participants
Participants
4
22
10
25
51
Physicians,
lawyers,
neuroscientists,
biophysics,
bioethics
professionals and
anthropologists.
Businessmen,
environmentalists,
chemists, and
jurists.
Physicians,
geneticists,
professors,
anthropologists,
and bioethics
professionals.
Procedure
followed
Two blocks:
Against and in
favor of Law
11105/05.
Each block
provided 1h:30min
for presentation.
Two blocks:
Against and in
favor of the import
activity.
Two blocks: Pro
and against the
interruption of
anencephalic
fetuses.
quotas
Ricardo
Lewandowski
(RAPPORTEUR)
3
Alcohol
Prohibition (Dry
Law)
Luiz
Fux
(RAPPORTEUR)
Ban on the
of asbestos
3
Marco
Au
Mello
(RAPPORTE
3
38
30
35
Magistrates,
prosecutors,
public
defenders,
users,
physicians,
SUS (Unified
Health System)
managers and
experts.
Associations,
foundations,
social
movements,
entities and
representatives
of different
Powers.
State
organizations and
entities, jurists,
life defense
foundations,
bars, hotels, and
restaurants trade
unions.
Participants
were divided
according to
themes
previously set
forth by the
MinisterPresident.
Each day of
public hearing
corresponded
to a theme.
The RapporteurMinister divided
participants in
advance, who
were basically
divided into
those in favor
and against the
quota policy.
The RapporteurMinister defined
in advance the
themes he would
like to be
clarified.
Health
professionals
environment
departments
businessmen
civil enginee
chemists,
biologists,
biochemists,
victims of
asbestos
exposition.
Two blocks:
those in favo
against the u
of asbestos.
By analyzing the data presented and taking into consideration the purposes of
the present article, which aims at identifying the figure of Public Hearings as a new tool
to foster participation and direct democracy, one of the most striking aspects is the –
reiterated – low level of Ministers attendance, particularly if we take into account the
complexity of the themes approached, whose information were determining and
essential for the judgment.
Besides, it is possible to establish that there is a trend that, as well as being
responsible for the summoning, the same judges follow public sessions, that is, only a
sector of the Court members seem to be open regarding the possibilities of Society
manifestation brought by this new judgment information mechanism.
Thus, one can question up to what extent Hearings held in the scope of the
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court have effectively played their role in the leverage of
the constitutional debate or if they work as a mere rhetorical strategy, with a more
formal than material role in the legitimation of the decisions pronounced in the ambit of
judicial review.
5 Final Words
Laws 9868 and 9882 – which discipline Brazilian concentrated control of
constitutionality actions – both passed in 1999, strengthen the performance of judicial
review once they authorize the participation of civil society in procedures, especially in
a context characterized by phenomena such as judicialization (of Law and Politics) and
judicial activism.
Public Hearings in the scope of the Judiciary represent, on their hand, a
possibility
of
approximation
between
State
and
Society,
by
allowing
the
democratization of the constitutional debate, granting more democratic legitimacy to
decisions and conducing to a plural debate, through the participation of different social
segments, that contributes to the development of a more enlightened, complete, and
conscious judgment.
Although it has been legally set forth since 1999, the first Federal Supreme Court
Public Hearing only took place in 2007, having its procedures been incorporated, in
2009, to the By-Laws, which advanced in relation to what had been established by the
ordinary legislator, once that, in spite of recognizing only the Rapporteur’s competence
to summon a Public Hearing, it included the President as a legitimated therefore, and
also extended the possibility of holding such Hearings in every kind of proceedings.
In this context, the seven Public Hearings held by the Court from 2007 to 2012
were analyzed. One aspect common to all of them was the highlight given by Ministers
(especially Rapporteurs) to their relevance and indispensability in a democratic context
(at least in rhetorical terms).
In this sense, it was observed that the Hearings have taken up several functions
(technical, social, cultural, instructional or statistical), so that those that approached
very specific themes (such as the import of used tires, the alcohol prohibition in
freeways – dry law, the ban on the use of asbestos), that demand from the magistrates
detailed knowledge regarding the matter at hand, tended to take up essentially
technical characteristics.
For those that dealt with more complex legal matters, on the other hand, which
involved hard cases or fundamental rights conflicts (such as the Biosafety Law and the
case of anencephalic fetuses, which involved the right to life, or the quotas issue, which
dealt with equality, for instance) this participation has equally performed a social
function, by allowing the hearing of several segments of society (religious people,
physicians, family members, etc.) during the proceedings.
In what concerns to the use of the adduced arguments on the reasoning of votes,
was observed that this aspect also varies, to some extent, according to the nature of
each Hearing: those that were notably technical Hearings counted on evident
contributions brought by experts, both to corroborate and counterpoint the Ministers’
positions; on the other hand, in those Hearings on affirmative action policies for higher
education admission, which incorporated essentially social issues, there were no
references to the elements brought whatsoever.
Thus, in these cases, Ministers found in Public Hearings another possibility of
validation and formal legitimation of decisions, more than a proper element of
information and pluralization of the constitutional debate.
Taking into consideration the relevance of this tool for the democratic order,
however, there are no doubts that the elements brought by experts and by different
sectors of civil society could – and should – be better employed in the formulation of
votes. Besides, the presence of judges in decisions should be more frequent.
But it should be considered that such operational deficiencies do not remove or
compromise the potential and relevance of Public Hearings in the Brazilian legal
scenario, while a privileged locus of exercise of citizenship and direct democracy in the
jurisdictional sphere. Public Hearings can be understood, thus, as a new form of
participation in public affairs.
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