The Chinese Room Argument
Part II
Joe Lau
Philosophy
HKU
The issues
 Certain computations are sufficient for
cognition (computational sufficiency).
– Objection : The Chinese room argument
– Evaluation : Not valid.
 A more general argument
– The argument from syntax and semantics
The argument
 Computer programs are formal
(syntactic).
 Human minds have mental contents
(semantics).
 Syntax is neither constitutive of nor
sufficient for semantics.
 Conclusion : Programs are neither
constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.
Initial comments
1. Programs are formal.
2. Minds have contents.
3. Formal syntax not
enough for contents.
Conclusion :
4. Programs not enough
for minds.
Comment
Comment
#2 #1
: :
Comment
#3 : is valid.
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The second premise is
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support of premise #3.
Thoughts,
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desires
So we have
to decide
all have
content
whether
premises 1 to 3 are
(intentionality,
true or not. aboutness).
Brentano’s “mark of the
mental”
First premise :
“Programs are formal”
 True in the sense that :
– Symbols are defined independently of
meaning.
– Computational operations are defined without
reference to the meaning of symbols.
 False in the sense that :
– Programs cannot / do not contain meaningful
symbols.
– The function of symbols is to encode content!
Third premise :
“Syntax not sufficient for semantics”
 Question : Do the symbols have meaning or
not?
– If so, then there is content / semantics.
– The symbols in the Chinese room do have
content.
– Symbols in AI programs can have assigned
content.
– So programs with meaningful symbols might
still be sufficient for minds.
What is “semantics” for Searle?
“Having the symbols by themselves … is not
sufficient for having the semantics. Merely
manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee
knowledge of what they mean.”
• So having meaningful symbols in a
system is not enough for mental content.
• The system must know what those
symbols mean.
But why?
Response
 Mental representations (symbols) are used
to explain intentional mental states.
– E.g. X believes that P = X has a mental
representation M of type B with content P.
– X is not required to “understand” M.
 They cannot do that if they themselves have
to be understood or interpreted.
– Infinite regress otherwise.
Summary
 Searle thinks that the symbols in a system
must be understood / interpreted by the
system to generate meaning / understanding.
 Begs the question against the thesis of
computational sufficiency :
– Understanding is having symbols that encode
information in the right way.
– The symbols do not require further
understanding or interpretation.
Remaining issues
 Suppose formal operations on meaningful
symbols can be sufficient for mental states.
 Q1 : Where do the meanings of symbols
come from?
 Q2 : Can formal operations be sufficient to
give symbols meaning?
Where does meaning come from?
 The meaning of words
(linguistic meaning)
depends on conventions
governing their use.
 Words are “voluntary
signs” (John Locke)
A different theory is needed
 The theory of linguistic meaning does not
apply to mental representations :
– No conventions governing the use of the
mental representations.
– Presumably we cannot change the meanings
of mental representations arbitrarily through
conventions.