THE SWEDISH SECOND PILLAR Design, Performance, Outstanding Issues, and Applicability to Other Countries Background • Pension reform legislated in 1994 • Transforms PAYG DB Scheme into: – NDC (PAYG) (16% contribution) – FDC (FF) (2.5% contribution) • Makes occupational funds mandatory, converts them from DB to DC (3.5% contribution) • Therefore, second pillar has 2 components and total contribution of 6% • Presentation focuses on first part of second pillar Background • Reform only implemented in 2000 • Need to prepare IT systems, raise information from 1960 (NDC capital) • Individual choices introduced in 2000, supported by: – Local offices (SSSA) – Call center – Internet (personal account, providing information on the system, pension projection model) Design of Second Pillar • Designed to minimize costs, especially in view of small contribution of 2.5% • Achievement of economies of scale and competition simultaneously through: (i) single basic service provider; (ii) blind accounts/blind quotation system; (iii) several asset managers; (iv) system of fee rebates Design of Second Pillar • The single basic provider: The Premium Pension Authority (PPM), utilizing the existing structures of the SSSA and the Tax Authority • Functions of PPM: – Organizes collection of contribution through SSSA and Tax Authority – Manages accounts, information – Contracts asset management from private funds on behalf of members, clears all flows of funds – Benefit payments (monopoly annuity provider) Regulation, Structure, Performance of Private Funds • All asset management companies licensed in the EU are allowed to operate • By 2004, 75 companies licensed, managing 650 funds, 4.4 million participants • PPM is the legal representative of all participants vis-à-vis these funds • Clients can choose up to 5 funds • Non-choosers allocated to a default public fund • In the first year, substantial information provided by PPM and marketing expenses by private funds Preliminary results • Assets grew to 5% of GDP in 2004 • Large base, but small contribution and poor returns in 2001, 2002 • Large share of participants making active choices in the first year, declining sharply in following years, average choice: 3.4 funds • Strong preference for equity funds: 72% of active choosers chose only equities • Default fund has large share of equities (80% equities, 10% indexed bonds, 4% hedge funds) Percent of New Participants Making an “Active” Investment Choice 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Market Structure (2004) Market Share (Assets) Default Fund 32% Next 20 funds 32% Next 580 36% Costs of Operating Second Pillar Three Basic Components • PPM’s Own Operating Costs – Internal management of individual accounts, information to members • Reimbursements to SSSA – Revenue collection, sharing of annual individual statements, sharing of local offices (NDC, FDC) • Payment of Private Fund Fees, Net of Rebate – Very low marketing expenses – Rebate system based on size of assets, reduces fees further Fee Rebate System • Gross charges apply to all customers, whether in second or not • However, to operate in second pillar funds have to accept additional rules, especially a fee rebate system • Rebate increases (reducing net fees) with the volume of second pillar assets managed • Rebate is credited in the individual accounts Distribution of Funds According to Pre-Rebate Fees Number of funds 200 150 100 50 0 -0.24 % 0.25-0.49 0.5-0.74 % % 0.75-0.99 % 1-1.24 % 1.25-1.49 1.5-1.74 % % 1.75 % % of Total Asse ts 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -0.24 % 0.25-0.49 % 0.5-0.74 % 0.75-0.99 % 1-1.24 % 1.25-1.49 % 1.5-1.74 % 1.75 % Share in total PPM assets Return 2003 Pre-rebate fee 31,8% 18,7% 0,50% 0,15% S AMF Pensions Aktiefond Världen 3,2% 21,5% 0,40% 0,27% S Roburs Aktiefond Pension 2,8% 19,8% 0,42% 0,28% S AMF Pensions Aktiefond Sverige 2,8% 30,8% 0,40% 0,28% S Didner & Gerge Aktiefond 2,7% 33,4% 1,25% 0,36% S Roburs Aktiefond Contura 2,7% 17,9% 1,44% 0,39% S SPP Generation 50-tal 2,4% 13,5% 0,42% 0,28% S SPP Generation 60-tal 2,3% 17,2% 0,42% 0,28% S Roburs Aktiefond Medica 1,6% 0,9% 1,44% 0,44% S AMF Pensions Balansfond 1,5% 14,7% 0,40% 0,29% S SPP Generation 40-tal 1,4% 7,8% 0,42% 0,30% S Carnegie Fund Medical subfund 1,2% 16,1% 1,70% 0,52% U Folksam LO Sverige 1,1% 31,3% 0,40% 0,30% S SPP Generation 70-tal 1,1% 19,3% 0,42% 0,31% S Folksam LO Världen 1,1% 8,7% 0,40% 0,30% S Premievalsfonden 1,0% 19,6% 0,50% 0,33% S HQ Rysslandsfond 1,0% 52,6% 2,50% 0,73% S SEB Läkemedelsfond 0,8% -1,6% 1,50% 0,58% S Carnegie Fund Worldwide subfund 0,8% 6,8% 1,60% 0,62% U SPP Aktieindexfond Sverige 0,7% 31,0% 0,23% 0,23% S Fund name Non-chooser fund (Premiesparfonden) Net rebate fee Domestic (S) or foreign (U) Charges of Administration of the PPM System Year PPM charge 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 0.30% 0.23% 0.18% 0.15% 0.12% 0.08% 0.04% 0.41% 0.36% 0.32% 0.29% 0.27% 0.25% 0.24% 0.71% 0.59% 0.50% 0.44% 0.39% 0.33% 0.28% (% of assets) Fund charge* (% of assets) Total charge (% of assets) Long run fees over assets 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% Hungary Average Cost MPF Hungary Highest Cost MPF Sweden Hungary Lowest Cost MPF Chile 33 31 29 27 23 25 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 0% Long run fees over assets 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% Hungary Average Cost MPF Hungary Highest Cost MPF Sweden Hungary Lowest Cost MPF Chile 33 31 29 27 23 25 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 0% Issues for Other Countries • Attractive option, especially for small countries • Strong aspects: combines economies of scale and competition, leading to small fees • Possible weaknesses/issues include: – – – – – Excessive number of funds Investment regime without risk limits Regulation of basic provider Governance issues for public default fund Monopoly on the payout phase • Most of these potential weaknesses can be addressed
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz