Severely wrong or slightly wrong?
Sanctions and Moral Behavior
Laetitia Mulder
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
My previous research

Context: social dilemmas

Sanctions’ effect on trust

Alternative behavioral options
Sanctions and trust
+
Expectations of
cooperative behavior
“assurance” (Yamagishi)
Sanction
_
Expectations of
cooperative intentions
“trust” (Yamagishi)
“Removing the Sanction” Paradigm
Condition:
No-sanction
Sanction
Phase 1:
Phase 2:
No sanction:
No sanction:
Trust
Trust
Sanction:
Assurance
No sanction
Phase 2 trust
(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Low initial trust
No sanction in phase 1
High initial trust
Sanction in phase 1
Phase 2 cooperation
(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Low initial trust
No sanction in phase 1
High initial trust
Sanction in phase 1
My previous research

Context: social dilemmas

Sanctions’ effect on trust

Alternative behavioral options
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Garbage
reduction
No garbage
reduction
Dumping
Paying taxes
Tax fraud
Moving to
Belgium
Focus on moderating factors:

Expectations

Authority
Alternative defective option
no sanction
sanction
2,9
0,3
low expectations
0,63
0,5
high expectations
Contribution to group
(in three—options condition)
6,55
6,19
7,2
no sanction
sanction
4,12
low expectations
high expectations
Conclusions from my previous research

Sanctioning systems may foster negative
motivational effects (i.e. distrust in cooperative
intentions)

Social decisions more complex than a simple
dichitomous decision. Essential for the issue of
sanctions.
Present research
Influence of sanction on moral norms

Sanctions may trigger business-like considerations
and induce a business frame (e.g. Tenbrunsel & Messick,
1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Frey, 1999; Fehr & Falk, 2000)

But may they also trigger moral considerations and
induce a moral frame?

When does a sanction trigger a business frame and
when a moral frame?
First factor of research:
sanction size
Research question:
How does the size of a sanction on a certain
rule affect moral considerations? How does
it affect moral judgement of how “wrong”
breaking the rule is?
How sanction size may affect moral
judgements

Sanction indicates “how bad” certain behavior is.

Hypothesis: Large sanction higher moral judgments
than a small sanction

2 experiments to test this
Experiment 1

Participant: unknown number of lottery tickets.

“Participants of an other experiment” no lottery
tickets (i.e. no chance of winning)

Possibility to donate tickets to participants of other
experiment.

Request: “please donate 2 tickets”

“When you donate less than 2 tickets: fine of €0,20
(small sanction) / €2,50 (large sanction)”
Control condition: no fine, only the request.
Dependent variables
Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter (4
items):
-
The experimenters think that donating less than 2 tickets
is very unfair
The experimenters morally dissapprove of donating less
than 2 tickets to the other participants
Moral dissapproval (5 items):
Donating less than 2 tickets…
- …seems morally wrong
- …is something I would morally dissapprove of
- etc.
Results
Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter :
no sanction: 3.64
small sanction: 3.86
large sanction: 5.04
Moral dissapproval:
no sanction: 3.41
small sanction: 3.47
large sanction: 4.27
Experiment 2
The effect of sanction size on social dissapproval of
someone who does not follow the rule.
Role of authorities: Sanction installed by authority.
Therefore sanction shows the moral judgement of the
authority. Whether people adopt this judgement,
depends on their trust in authorities.
Hypothesis: Sanction size influences moral judgements to a
greater extent when people have high rather than low trust
in the authority.
Experiment 2
General trust in authorities (8 items):
-“Generally I completely trust authorities’ decisions”
-“Authorities often do not know what they are talking about”
-“Authorities usually know what is best for the group”
Sanction size: small vs large
Dependent variables:
-Social dissapproval (preferring a rule-complier to
a rule-breaker)
-Moral judgement
Experiment 2

Participant in observer role. Observed the following
situation:

10 chips

whether they would be monitored)
division

Allocator:
each chip €2
Recipient:
each chip €?
Experimentator requested a 3/7
division
Fine of €0,50 or €5 (uncertain

Allocator A (“Susan”) obeyed
and proposed 3/7
Allocator B (“Eve”) disobeyed
and proposed 5/5
Dependent variables
Moral dissapproval (7 items):
That divider B donated less than 7 chips…
- …I found morally wrong
- …is something (s)he should feel ashamed of
- etc.
Social dissapproval
Which would you prefer:
- a division of €3/ €3 with you and allocator A (“Susan”)
- a division of €4/ €4 with you and allocator B (“Eve”)
Results
Figure 2: Moral judgment as a function of sanction size and
general regard for authorities
Moral judgment
6
5
4
low general trust in
authorities (SD = -1)
3
2
high general trust in
authorities (SD = 1)
1
0
Small sanction
Large sanction
Results
Social dissapproval
Figure 1: Social Dissaproval (percentage of participants
choosing to split money with allocater A rather than B) as a
function of sanction size and general regard for authorities
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
low general trust in
authorities (SD = -1)
high general trust in
authorities (SD = 1)
Small sanction
Large sanction
Conclusion

Sanctions can increase moral norms. Large
sanctions increase moral norms more than
small ones.

Especially when people trust authorities
Further research

Large sanctions may be excessive/unjust. Effect of
sanction size may be moderated by perceived
(in)justice of sanction.

Recognizing the goal behind rule/sanction? 
Influence self-benefitting or self-sacrificing
leadership

Difference sanctions and rewards?

Do sanctions work through anticipated shame? And
if so, do rewards work through anticipated pride?