ADM 612 – Leadership
Predictable Surprise: Hurricane
Katrina and Government
Accountability
Source
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Max H. Bazerman and Michael D.
Watkins. 2004. Predictable Surprises:
The Disasters You Should Have Seen
Coming and How to Prevent Them.
New
Orleans,
Louisiana
Gulfport,
Mississippi
Biloxi,
Mississippi
Predictable Surprises
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A predictable surprise arises when leaders
unquestionably had all the data and insight
they needed to recognize the potential for,
even the inevitability of, a crisis, but failed to
respond with effective preventative action.
Example: 9/11.
Example: Enron scandal.
Characteristics of Predictable
Surprises
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Leaders know a problem exists and
that the problem will not solve itself.
Characteristics of Predictable
Surprises
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Organizational members recognize
that a problem is getting worse over
time.
Fixing the problem will incur significant
costs in the present, while the benefits
of action will be delayed.
Characteristics of Predictable
Surprises
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Addressing predictable surprises
typically requires incurring a certain
cost, while the reward is avoiding a
cost that is uncertain but likely to be
much larger.
Characteristics of Predictable
Surprises
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Decision-makers, organizations, and
nations often fail to prepare for predictable
surprises because the natural human
tendency to maintain the status quo.
A small vocal minority benefits from inaction
and is motivated to subvert the actions of
leaders for their own private benefit.
Cognitive Roots of Predictable
Surprise
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We tend to have positive illusions that lead us to
conclude that a problem doesn’t exist or is not
severe enough to merit action.
We tend to interpret events in ways that are selfserving.
Cognitive Roots of Predictable
Surprise
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We overly discount the future.
We tend to maintain the status quo, and refuse to
accept any harm that would bring about a greater
good.
Most of us don’t want to invest in preventing a
problem that we have not personally experienced
or witnessed through vivid data.
Organizational Roots
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Four critical information processing tasks.
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Scan the environment and collect sufficient information
regarding all significant threats.
Integrate and analyze information from multiple sources
within the organization to produce insights that can be
acted upon.
Respond in a timely manner and observe the results.
In the aftermath, reflect on what happened and incorporate
lessons-learned into the “institutional memory” of the
organization to avoid repetition of past mistakes.
Organizational Roots
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Scanning failures.
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Selective attention.
Background noise.
Information overload.
Integration failures.
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Silos.
Secrecy.
Organizational Roots
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Incentive failures.
– Collective action problems.
– Conflicts of interest.
– Illusory consensus.
Organizational Roots
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Learning failures.
– Organizational learning disabilities
(explicit versus tacit knowledge; individual
versus relational knowledge).
– Memory loss.
Political Roots
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Special interest groups.
Political action committees.
Campaign funding.
Hurricane Katrina
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Knowing the problem existed.
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U.S. GAO, 1976, 1982.
New Orleans Times Picayune June 23-27,2002.
Civil Engineering Magazine, 2003.
National Geographic October 2004.
FEMA, Allbaugh, three most likely disasters
(New Orleans, California, New York), 2001.
FEMA, Hurricane Pam simulation, 2004.
Hurricane Katrina
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Problem getting worse over time.
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Numerous articles on the destruction of
Louisiana wetlands.
Hurricane Katrina
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High current costs, delayed benefits.
– $2 billion to complete, $1 billion to
upgrade to Category 4 or 5, 30 years.
Hurricane Katrina
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Certain costs, uncertain larger
rewards.
– Emergency management traditionally
suffers from discounting future events.
Hurricane Katrina
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Maintain status quo.
– Incremental changes in New Orleans
levee system brought on by individual
disasters.
Hurricane Katrina
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Subversion by vocal minority.
– Dominance of homeland security over
emergency preparedness.
– Corruption in Louisiana.
– Mississippi casinos and anti-gambling
lobbying.
Preventing Predictable
Surprises
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Recognition.
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Measurement system redesign.
Intelligence network building.
Scenario planning.
Disciplined learning processes.
Preventing Predictable
Surprises
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Prioritization.
– Structuring dialogue.
– Decision analysis.
– Incentive system redesign.
Preventing Predictable
Surprises
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Mobilization.
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Persuasive communication.
Coalition building.
Structured problem-solving.
Crisis-response organization.
Preventing Predictable Surprises:
Catastrophic Disasters
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A representative set of natural and
manmade disaster scenarios.
A flexible set of response modules to
deal with expected scenarios or
combinations of scenarios.
Preventing Predictable Surprises:
Catastrophic Disasters
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A plan that matches response
modules to scenarios.
A designated chain of command.
Preset activation protocols.
Preventing Predictable Surprises:
Catastrophic Disasters
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A command post and backup.
Clear communication channels.
Backup resources.
Regular simulation exercises.
Disciplined post-crisis review.