The Protective Powers
of Crisis Response Strategies:
Managing Reputational Assets
During a Crisis
W. Timothy Coombs
ABSTRACT. This study examines how stakeholders perceive the various
crisis response strategies identified in the Situational Crisis Communication
Theory (SCCT). SCCT seeks to use research and theory to develop recommendations for the use of crisis response strategies. The crisis response strategies are matched to the nature of the crisis situation. The idea is to match the
level of responsibility and aid to victims in the crisis response strategy that
would be warranted by the crisis responsibility and reputational damage generated by the crisis situation. This study reviews previous research in SCCT,
establishes the need to examine stakeholder perceptions of crisis response
strategies, and examines how respondents perceive crisis response strategies
in terms of accepting responsibility and helping victims. The results and implications confirm many of the ideas about crisis response strategies advanced in SCCT. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document
Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.
com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press,
Inc. All rights reserved.]
KEYWORDS. Crisis communication, reputation, response strategies,
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), stakeholder
W. Timothy Coombs (PhD, Purdue University) is Associate Professor, Department of Speech Communication, Coleman Hall 1814, Eastern Illinois University,
Charleston, IL 61920-3099 (E-mail: [email protected]).
Journal of Promotion Management, Vol. 12(3/4) 2006
Available online at http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JPM
 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1300/J057v12n03_13
241
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INTRODUCTION
A crisis happens to your organization. After providing information
stakeholders might need, you are left with an array of options when
communicating further with stakeholders. Those options range from
denying any responsibility to accepting full responsibility for the crisis. A growing body of research is focusing on the public relations
messages delivered after a crisis has developed (i.e., Bradford and
Garrett, 1995; Ihken, 2002; Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, 1998). Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is one line of research
within this literature. SCCT was developed as a research-based guide
for selecting crisis response strategies, the communicative resources
used to protect an organization’s reputation during a crisis. SCCT recommends selecting the crisis response strategy(ies) that are appropriate to the characteristics of the crisis situation. The selection is
premised on the reputational threat posed by the crisis situation and
the protective properties of the crisis response strategy(ies) (Coombs,
1995, 2004; Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2005).
Research has already begun to map how stakeholders perceive the crisis situation (i.e., Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2002, 2005).
The next step is to understand how stakeholders react to the various crisis
response strategies. A clearer understanding of how stakeholders react to
crisis response strategies improves our ability to match them to the crisis
situation. The study reported here explores stakeholder perceptions of
crisis response strategies using an SCCT framework. The relevant literature is reviewed and hypotheses articulated, followed by a delineation of
the methods then the presentation of the results and discussion.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
Over the past ten years, a rapidly growing body of crisis management research has emerged that focuses on what organizations say and
do after a crisis hits, the use of crisis response strategies. The focus of
this research is on how communication can be used to protect the
organization’s reputation during a crisis (Benoit, 1995; Hearit, 1996,
2001). A critical limitation to this research is the dependence on simple lists of crisis response strategies and the use of case studies to develop recommended courses of action. While useful to generate ideas,
case studies are not a method for building causal relationships and,
therefore, not very precise when used to create recommendations for
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the utilization of crisis response strategies (Stewart, 2002). Situational
Crisis Communication theory (SCCT) is offered as a theory-based, empirically tested method for selecting crisis response strategies. SCCT is
composed of three core elements: (1) the crisis situation, (2) crisis response strategies, and (3) a system for matching the crisis situation and
crisis response strategies. Exploring the three core elements provides
the context and rationale for the study reported in this manuscript.
Crisis Situation: The Reputational Threat
The crisis situation is the focal point of SCCT. The amount of reputational
damage a crisis situation can inflict drives the selection of the crisis response strategy. SCCT holds that the potential reputational damage from
a crisis is a function of crisis responsibility and of intensifying factors. A
review of these factors sets the stage for a discussion of how to assess the
reputational threat posed by a crisis situation. Crisis responsibility, that is
how much stakeholders attribute the cause of the crisis to the organization, is a function of the crisis type and severity of the damage. Crisis type
is simply the crisis’ category or class. Stakeholders will attribute different
amounts of crisis responsibility to the various crisis types. Collapsing extant lists from Fearn-Banks (1996), Lerbinger (1997), Marcus and Goodman (1991), and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), SCCT has identified the
crisis types presented and defined in Table 1. Culminating in a cluster
analysis conducted by Coombs and Holladay (2002), SCCT groups the
crisis types into three categories based upon the amount of crisis responsibility generated by each. Table 1 also provides a breakdown of the crisis
clusters. Crisis expert Ian Mitroff (1988) is a proponent of grouping like
crises,creating crisis clusters. The assumption is that crises in the same
cluster will have underlying similarities that allow crisis managers to
have one crisis plan that can be applied to a group of crises. A single plan
should be applicable and adaptable to each crisis in the crisis cluster. As a
result, a crisis team does not have to develop a crisis management plan for
every single type of crisis to which the organization is vulnerable. The organization creates a crisis portfolio, the crisis manager creates a crisis
plan for each of the crisis clusters an organization may encounter (Mitroff,
Harrington, and Gai, 1996; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993).
Severity of the damage represents the amount of financial, physical,
environmental, or emotional harm a crisis can inflict. SCCT posits that
severity increases perceptions of crisis responsibility. Attributions of
crisis responsibility are important to ascertain because the stronger the
attributions of crisis responsibility, the more damage a crisis will inflict
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TABLE 1. Crisis Clusters
Victim Cluster: In these crisis types the organization is also a victim of the crisis.
Natural disaster: Acts of nature that damage an organization such as an earthquake.
Rumors: False and damaging information about an organization is being circulated.
Workplace violence: Current or former employee attacks current employees onsite.
Product tampering/Malevolence: External agent causes damage to an organization.
Accidental Cluster: In these crisis types the organizational actions leading to the crisis were
unintentional.
Challenges: Stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropriate
manner.
Megadamage: A technical accident where the focus is on the environmental damage from the accident.
Technical breakdown accidents: A technology or equipment failure causes an industrial accident.
Technical breakdown recalls: A technology or equipment failure causes a product
to be recalled.
Preventable Cluster: In these crisis types the organization knowingly placed people at risk,
took inappropriate actions, or violated a law/regulation.
Human breakdown accidents: Human error causes an industrial accident.
Human breakdown recalls: Human error causes a product to be recalled.
Organizational misdeed with no injuries: Stakeholders are deceived without injury.
Organizational misdeed management misconduct: Laws or regulations are violated by management.
Organizational misdeed with injuries: Stakeholders are placed at risk by management and injuries occur.
on an organization’s reputation (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000; Coombs
and Holladay, 2001, 2002; Laufer and Gillespie, 2004).
Crisis history and relationship history act as intensifiers. Crisis history is
whether or not an organization has had a similar crisis or crises in the past.
Relationship history refers to the quality of the interactions between an organization and its stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay, 2001). Crisis intensifiers increase reputational damage directly.When intensifiers are present an
organization will suffer greater reputational damage from a crisis. Originally
intensifiers were believed to increase attributions of crisis responsibility.
However, empirical studies found that the intensifiers had more of a direct
effect on organizational reputation rather than an indirect effect through
crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2004; Coombs and Holladay, 2001). Figure 1
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FIGURE 1. SCCT Concepts and Relationships Between Those Concepts
Organizational
Responsibility
Severity
Reputation
Intensifiers
• Crisis History
• Relationship History
illustrates the relationship between crisis responsibility, the intensifiers, and
organizational reputation.
Ultimately the crisis situation is composed of four elements used to
assess its potential reputational threat: (1) the crisis type, (2) severity of
damage, (3) crisis history, and (4) relationship history. Assessing potential reputational threat from a crisis situation is a two-step process. First,
the crisis type is identified, attributions of crisis responsibility determined, and initial reputational damage assessed. By identifying the crisis type, a crisis manager can place the crisis into one of the three crisis
clusters that estimate the initial level of crisis responsibility the crisis
should generate. Second, the modifying effects of severity, crisis history, and performance history are considered. A crisis that is severe
should generate stronger attributions of crisis responsibility so the crisis
manager treats the crisis as if it were a member of the next stronger crisis cluster. For instance, a crisis in the victim cluster is treated as if it is
in the accidental cluster and a crisis in the accidental cluster is treated as
if it is in the preventable cluster. If either or both of crisis history or performance history are negative, reputational damage is intensified and
the crisis manager again treats his or her crisis as if it were in the next
stronger, more damaging crisis cluster. SCCT assesses the reputational
threat of a crisis situation in order to select the appropriate crisis response strategy(ies). An appropriate crisis response strategy matches
the level of reputational damage generated by the crisis situation with
the “protective powers” of the crisis response strategies.
Crisis Response Strategies
What an organization says and does after a crisis hits, the crisis
response strategies, has significant ramifications for its reputation
(Barton, 2001; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1999). SCCT takes a systematic
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approach to identifying the crisis response strategies that can be used to
maximize reputational protection. Obviously an organizational response to a crisis is more than an effort to protect the organization’s reputation. However, the organization’s reputation is now recognized as a
valuable asset (Alsop, 2004; Dowling, 2002; Fombrun and van Riel,
2004). Roughly, reputation is how an organization is perceived by its
publics. Research consistently links a favorable reputation to favorable
organizational results, including financial performance, sales, recruitment success, and government influence (Fombrun, 1996; Klein, 1999;
Nakra, 2000). Thus, reputation is a resource worthy of protection and a
legitimate concern during a crisis. The initial crisis response from an organization needs to provide what is called instructing information. A
discussion of instructing information helps to establish what crisis response strategies are and when they are to be used.
Instructing Information. SCCT separates crisis response strategies
from instructing information, another aspect of what an organization
says or does after a crisis. Instructing information represents what
stakeholders need and want to know after a crisis hits. There are three
types of instructing information: (1) crisis basics; the basic information
about what happened in the crisis event, (2) protection; what stakeholders need to do to protect themselves from harm, and (3) correction;
what the organization is doing to correct the problem/prevent a repeat of
the crisis (Bergman, 1994; Coombs, 1999; Sturges, 1994). Consistent
with recommendations made by crisis experts, SCCT argues that instructing information must be provided; it is not an option. The crisis
managers must tell stakeholders immdiately what to do to protect themselves. Providing batch numbers on recalled meat or locations for where
to return defective products are examples of initial protection instructing information. A crisis manager will not always know all of the necessary instructing information early in the crisis management process. For
instance, the cause of a crisis, part of the crisis basics, may not be known
at first. Without a cause, no corrective action can be planned. Airline accidents, for example, typically take months to determine a cause (Ray,
1999). Crisis basic and correction instructing information are provided
as that information becomes available to an organization (Bergman,
1994). Instructing information is an essential part of crisis management
and must be given to stakeholders.
Basic Crisis Response Options. Crisis response strategies are optional; crisis managers can choose which, if any, to use in a crisis situation. The key to protecting the organizational reputation is to select the
appropriate crisis response strategy(ies). Sturges (1994) refers to efforts
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to repair the organization’s reputation as internalizing information. Attribution theory and neoinstitutional theory serve as the basis in SCCT
for determining which crisis response strategies are appropriate for a
given crisis situation. SCCT provides a crisis manager with three basic
options for using crisis response strategies: (1) establish that no crisis
exists, (2) alter the attributions about the crisis event to make it appear
less negative to stakeholders, or (3) alter how stakeholders perceive the
organization–work to protect/repair the reputation (Coombs and Holladay,
1996). If a crisis manager can establish no crisis exists, there is no
reputational threat; no crisis equals no threat. A crisis manager can reduce the reputational damage if she or he can make the crisis appear less
negative–affect the attributions generated by the crisis. Finally, a crisis
manager may have to deal with the aftermath of a crisis by addressing
the stakeholders directly in order to rebuild the reputation. These three
basic response options are called deny, diminish, and deal. Table 2 organizes the various crisis response strategies according to these three
options.
The deny response option seeks to prove no crisis exists or that the
organization has no responsibility for the crisis. Disproving a crisis exists or the organization’s responsibility for the event serves to eliminate
the reputational threat presented by a crisis. For instance, an organization may deny there was a chemical release (accident) by proving the
gas cloud was simply steam vented by some turbines. Scapegoating,
blaming someone else for the crisis, denies any responsibility for the
crisis. There is a crisis but it does not involve/belong to the organization
in question.
The diminish response option reflects the attribution theory aspect
of SCCT. A crisis manager accepts a crisis occurred and that his or
her organization is involved but tries to change the attributions stakeholders make about a crisis in order to reduce the reputational damage from the crisis situation. Two tactics can be used to shape
attributions. First, crisis managers can argue the organization has
minimal responsibility for the crisis; the crisis event was primarily a
result of circumstances beyond their control. Second, crisis managers can claim the crisis was not as serious (severe) as stakeholders
might think it to be. The crisis managers must establish the true,
lower level of seriousness for the crisis thereby reducing the amount
of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization. The focus of
the diminish response option is to lessen attributions of crisis responsibility. If stakeholders attribute less crisis responsibility to the organization, the crisis will do less reputational damage. Moreover, a
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TABLE 2. Crisis Response Strategies by Response Option
Deny Response Option
Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization.
• The organization threatened to sue the people who claim a crisis occurred.
Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis.
• The organization said that no crisis event occurred.
Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis.
• The organization blamed the supplier for the crisis.
Diminish Response Option
Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to
do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.
• The organization said it did not intend for the crisis to occur and that accidents happen as part of the operation of any organization.
Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
• The organization said the damage and injuries from the crisis were very
minor.
Deal Response Option
Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past
good works by the organization.
• The organization thanked stakeholders for their help and reminded
stakeholders of the organization's past effort to help the community and
to improve the environment.
Concern: Crisis manager expresses concern for the victims.
• The organization expressed concern for the victims.
Compassion: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims.
• The organization offered money and products as compensation.
Regret: Crisis manager indicates the organization feels bad about the crisis.
• The organization said it felt bad that the crisis incident occurred.
Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the
crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.
• The organization publicly accepted full responsibility for the crisis and
asked stakeholders to forgive the mistake.
crisis manager can match the level of crisis acceptance in a crisis response strategy to the level of crisis responsibility generated by a crisis.
The more responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization the
more the crisis response strategy must seem to accept responsibility for
the crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002).
There is more to the reputational damage inflicted by a crisis than crisis responsibility; there are the direct effects of the intensifiers. The deal response
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option addresses the intensifiers and reflects the neoinstitutional theory aspects of SCCT. According to neoinstitutional theory, organizations are expected to behavior in certain ways; act in ways that are consistent with
societal norms/expectations (Allen and Caillouet, 1994). Organizations are
considered legitimate when they conform to norms/meet expectations. A legitimate organization avoids criticism/problems with stakeholders and is
judged worthy of operating in society (Finet, 1994; Massey, 2001). A crisis
is frequently a violation of societal norms/expectations. We expect sulfuric
acid to be delivered safely or for trains not to derail. When a crisis hits, an organization must work to rebuild its legitimacy and it does so through corporate discourse (Allen and Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; Sellnow, Ulmer,
and Snider, 1998).
Organizational management utilizes crisis response strategies to
rebuild legitimacy and to protect the organizational reputation during a crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 1996). As a crisis threatens organizational legitimacy, it simultaneously threatens to damage the
organization’s reputation, how stakeholders perceive the organization. Legitimacy and organizational reputation have been conceptualized similarly with both utilizing the core elements of credibility
and trust (Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; Fombrun,
1996; Massey, 2001). The deal response options can be treated as efforts to restore legitimacy by directly addressing how stakeholders
perceive the organization-efforts to reshape its reputation.
Fundamental Matching Process
The basic matching process of SCCT can be outlined using the crisis
clusters and response options. For a more detailed treatment of the subject refer to Coombs (1995) or Coombs and Holladay (1996). If there is
no crisis, and the organization can prove that, the crisis manager uses
the deny response option. Combating rumors is an example of a crisis
type that favors denial. Any other crisis in the victim cluster requires
only instructing information from the organization. Crisis responsibility
is very low and there is little violation of societal norms. Crisis types in
the accidental cluster produce stronger attributions of crisis responsibility and there is a greater violation of societal norms and so the diminish
response option is used. The stakeholders are open to influence on attributions of the crisis because the threat is minimal. Crisis types in the
preventable cluster produce very strong attributions of crisis responsibility and represent seriously violations of societal norms and so the
crisis manager needs to use the deal response options. The potential
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damage to the organizational reputation is great and so the response
must work to rebuild the reputation.
Crisis Response Strategies and Hypotheses
SCCT utilizes the set of crisis response strategies located in Table 2.
This list is a fusion of other crisis response typologies. The stimulus section goes into the development of the crisis response strategy list in
greater detail. SCCT starts with the assumptions that instructing information must be delivered and that part of crisis management is dedicated to protecting the organization’s reputation. Moreover, SCCT
recognizes the need to understand how stakeholders actually perceive
the crisis response strategies. Past discussions of crisis response strategies reflect a sender-orientation. Researchers list various crisis response
strategies and assume stakeholders will respond to them in a particular
fashion and that the crisis response strategies will be perceived as intended by the sender (crisis manager) (Allen and Caillouet, 1994;
Benoit, 1995; Hobbs, 1995). While this may be a starting point for or
ganizing crisis response strategies, there is a need to move to a receiver-orientation. Before using a crisis response strategy, crisis managers should have some idea of how stakeholders will interpret those
message strategies. SCCT recommends understanding how stakeholders perceive crisis response strategies (Coombs and Holladay,
2002). The study reported here is an attempt to uncover and to map
stakeholder perceptions of the crisis response strategies.
The many crisis response strategy typologies that exist assume that
the stakeholders will perceive the crisis response strategies in particular
ways. Hence, it is possible to estimate how people will perceive the crisis response strategies from extant research. It is believed that the ten
crisis response strategies will cluster according to the three response options of deny, diminish, and deal. Four hypotheses were derived from
this belief:
H1: The ten crisis response strategies will cluster into groups that
correspond to the deny, diminish, and deal response options.
H2: The deny, scapegoat, and attack the accuser crisis response strategies will cluster together.
H3: The excuse and justification crisis response strategy options will
cluster together.
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H4: The ingratiation/bolster, apology, concern, compassion, and regret crisis response strategies will cluster together.
METHODOLOGY
Participants
The respondents in the study were 78 undergraduate students enrolled in communication courses at an urban, Midwestern university.
Of the respondents, 71.8% were women (n = 56) and 28.2% were men
(n = 22). The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 48 years (M = 23,
SD = 5.05).
Measures
Respondents were asked to rate each of the ten crisis response strategies for its (1) emphasis on protecting the victim of the crisis and (2) organization’s acceptance of responsibility for the crisis. A 7-point Likert
scale was used with response options ranging from “1 = Strongly disagree” to “7 = Strongly agree.” The two evaluative criteria were select
ed to reflect SCCT’s roots in neoinstitutional theory and attribution theory. Helping the victim reflects neoinstitutional theory’s need to meet
expectations–stakeholders do expect organizations to help the victims.
Seeking to assist the victims indicates the organization acting appropriately by trying to reestablish the norms it violated when the crisis created victims. Aiding the victim should help to protect reputational assets
as well (Coombs and Holladay, 1996; Sellnow et al., 1998). Accepting
responsibility reflects the attribution theory’s concern for responsibility
for an act/crisis. If stakeholders perceive the organization is responsible
for the crisis, accepting responsibility in the crisis response should serve
to lessen the reputational damage from the crisis (Coombs, 1995;
Coombs and Holladay, 2002).
Stimulus
The respondents were given examples of ten different crisis response
strategies to evaluate. Each crisis response strategy was presented as a
one-sentence description of how an organization responded to a crisis.
No specific crisis type was used because that could have affected the
results; thus, the generic term “crisis” was used. Table 2 includes the
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one-sentence description of the crisis response strategies. The ten crisis
response strategies were based on previous SCCT-related research that
distilled a list of crisis response strategies from a wide array of crisis
communication writings (Coombs, 1999). Three changes were made to
the original list of crisis response strategies developed by Coombs
(1999). First, corrective action was removed from the list because it was
considered to be a form of instructing information rather than an optional crisis response strategy. Second, scapegoat was added because of
previous research finding it to be such a problematic crisis response
strategy (Benoit, 1995; Hobbs, 1995). Third, the compassion, concern,
and regret crisis response strategies were added because of consistent
calls in the crisis management literature to express some form of sympathy (compassion, concern, or regret) for victims (Augustine, 1995;
Coombs, 1998; Tyler, 1997; Sen and Egelhoff, 1991).
Procedures
Respondents were given a packet containing a cover page with directions and five pages containing the ten crisis response strategies to evaluate. The procedure took 20 to 25 minutes.
RESULTS
H1-H4 were based on the grouping of the crisis response strategies so
a hierarchical cluster analysis was used. A hierarchical cluster analysis
is used to discover relatively homogeneous clusters of cases based on
some measured characteristic or characteristics. Cases, in this study of
crisis response strategies, are sorted into groups or clusters such that the
degree of association is stronger between members of the same cluster
and weaker between members of different clusters. An effective cluster
analysis requires two important decisions: (1) identify the variables to
be used to create the clusters and (2) select a method for assessing the
optimum number of clusters. Crisis responsibility and protecting the
victim were selected to create the clusters because they reflect the two
theoretical foundations of SCCT-attribution theory and neoinstitutional
theory. Repeated measures ANOVAs and t-tests were used to assess the
optimum number of clusters. Both statistical tests help to establish if
there are significant differences between the clusters. The best fit was
found when the clusters were shown to be distinct from one another
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when compared using the crisis responsibility and protect the victim
scores.
The cluster analysis found a 5-cluster solution after one stage, a
4-cluster solution after three stages, and a 3-cluster solution after six
stages. The crisis response strategies in each cluster were combined to
create cluster scores, then a series of repeated measure ANOVAs and
paired-sample t-tests were used to determine which of the cluster solutions was the best fit. The 3-cluster solution seemed to best represent the
data in that the clusters were all significantly different from one another
on their scores for both crisis responsibility and protect the victim; this
was not the case for either the 5-cluster or 4-cluster solutions. In the
5-cluster solution, there was no clean separation among all clusters for
both responsibility and help the victim scores. In the 4-cluster solution,
there was not a clean separation among all clusters for help victim
scores. The 3-cluster solution provided a clean and clear distinction between the crisis response strategy clusters. The repeated measures
ANOVA was significant for both responsibility (Wilks’ l = .11, F(2,
66) = 286.18, p < .001) and help the victim (Wilks’ l = .14, F(2, 73) =
227.99, p < .001). This indicated that there were significant differences
between clusters; so pairwise comparisons were used to determine
which clusters were significantly different from one another. Pairwise
comparisons between the clusters were conducted using paired-sample
t-tests. Table 3 provides the results of the t-tests. The ten crisis response
strategies formed three clusters: denial, diminish, and deal. Table 4
presents the clusters.
The three clusters match perfectly with those anticipated in H1-H4.
Deny, attack accuser, and scapegoat formed the denial cluster. All
three claim no crisis exists for the organization in question. Excuse
and justification formed the diminish cluster; each tries to limit the organization’s responsibility for the crisis. Compassion, concern, regret,
ingratiation (operationalized to include thanking stakeholders), and
apology formed the deal cluster; all five make direct efforts to address
the stakeholders. The crisis response strategies clustered as anticipated indicating that how researchers view the crisis response strategies is consistent with how respondents evaluate the crisis response
strategies. It is critical to check for such consistency between conceptualization and perception because the perceptions of the researcher
can be wrong.
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TABLE 3. Cluster t-Test Results
M
SD
Deny
1.58
.78
Diminish
3.60
1.24
Deny
1.60
.79
Deal
4.99
.95
Diminish
3.64
1.23
Deal
4.99
.95
t
2
p
n
13.27
p < .001
.71
23.30
p < .001
.89
9.14
p < .001
.55
10.59
p < .001
.59
21.49
p < .001
.86
13.16
p < .001
.70
Responsibility
Help the Victim
Deny
1.67
.83
Diminish
2.84
1.17
Deny
1.68
.85
Deal
4.41
1.06
Diminish
2.86
1.17
Deal
4.41
1.06
TABLE 4. Crisis Response Strategy Clusters
Deny Cluster
Deny
Attack Accuser
Scapegoat
Diminish Cluster
Excuse
Justification
Deal Cluster
Concern
Regret
Compassion
Ingratiation
Apology
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DISCUSSION
An organization’s reputation is one of the resources crisis management
attempts to protect and communication plays a vital role in those protective efforts (Barton, 2001; Benoit, 1995). Crisis managers should select
crisis response strategies that best serve to protect the organization. It is
vital that crisis managers make informed choices about crisis response
strategies based upon theoretically derived and empirically tested evidence rather than rely on hunches or recommendations for simple case
studies (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000). Situational Crisis Communication
Theory (SCCT) is an effort to build a theory-based and empirically tested
set of guidelines for selecting crisis response strategies.
SCCT is premised on matching the crisis response strategy to the demands of the crisis situation. The demands are a function of the crisis responsibility and reputational damage a crisis situation is likely to
generate. Previous research has begun to detail the way stakeholders
make attributions about crisis situations (Coombs, 1998, 2004; Coombs
and Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2005). This study sought to shed light
on the other half of SCCT–the way stakeholders perceive the crisis response strategies. SCCT posits that as perceptions of crisis responsibility and reputational damage increase, the crisis managers should use
crisis response strategies that accept greater responsibility and seek to
repair legitimacy by aiding the crisis victims (Coombs and Holladay,
2002). The protective properties of crisis response strategies are found
in their ability to create perceptions of the organization taking responsibility for the crisis and aiding victims. These two dimensions reflect
SCCT’s attribution theory and neoinstitutional theory roots. To have
more faith in these recommendations, we should have some idea of how
stakeholders will react to the crisis response strategies–how they perceive the protective properties of the crisis response strategies. Do the
crisis response strategies create the desired perceptions of taking responsibility and helping victims?
A set of ten crisis response strategies was identified and operationalized.
Respondents were asked to read each crisis response strategy and to rate
(1) how much responsibility the organization seemed to take for the crisis
and (2) the organization’s emphasis on helping the victims of the crisis.
Based on previous research, the crisis response strategies were anticipated
to form three clusters: deny, diminish, and deal. The cluster analysis found
three clusters: deny, diminish, and deal. The results indicated that respondents did perceive the crisis response strategies as intended in terms of crisis responsibility and helping the victim.
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Understanding how stakeholders may perceive the various crisis response strategies is valuable to crisis managers. The deny strategies
claim no organizational responsibility for a crisis. This is a risky response if stakeholders feel an organization does hold some crisis responsibility. The organization must “prove” it has no responsibility no
be effective. Deny strategies should be reserved for crisis situations that
require a fight such as rumors or unfair challenges. The diminish strategies reinforce the low levels of crisis responsibility attributed to accidental crises. The crisis manager seeks to highlight the unintentional
nature and/or minimal damage associated with the crisis.
The deal strategies offer a wide range of options that seem to accept responsibility and attend to victim concerns. Expressions of concern, compassion, or regret were rated equal to a full apology. This equivalence is
significant because full apologies create definite legal liabilities (Tyler,
1997). Expressions of concern, compassion, or regret may be used
against an organization in court but juries may reject the statements as admissions of guilt. Moreover, some states, including California and Massachusetts, have laws protecting organizations from liability when using
expressions of concern, compassion, or regret (Fuchs-Burnett, 2002;
Patel and Reinsch, 2003).
The results of this study are useful to crisis managers and to crisis researchers. SCCT started with a system for matching the crisis response
strategy(ies) to the crisis situation (Coombs, 1995). A number of studies
have helped to establish how SCCT can be used to estimate the amount of
crisis responsibility and reputational damage a crisis situation will generate
(Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2002). The crisis situations can be
divided into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable. These three
clusters are in a sequence that reflect an increasing amount of crisis responsibility and reputational damage. This current study examined respondent
perceptions of the protective power of crisis response strategies and
grouped the crisis response strategies into three clusters using accepting responsibility and helping the victims: deny, diminish, and deal. A crisis
manager can now have more confidence in how well a particular crisis response strategy will protect the organizational reputation. This study provides some insight into how stakeholders might perceive the levels of crisis
responsibility acceptance and concern for victims associated with various
crisis response strategies. Additional research with a more diverse respondent pool would serve to strength these insights.
SCCT recommends crisis managers use instructing information alone
or a deny crisis response strategy be used in the victim cluster; the diminish crisis response strategies should be used in the accident cluster, and
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257
deal, including apology, crisis response strategies should be used in the
intentional cluster. The choice between apology and the other deal crisis
response options is primarily a legal one. Apologies leave an organization
open to legal liabilities and so an organization may seek the sympathy
strategies and less liability (Fitzpatrick, 1995; French, 2002; Tyler,
1997). However, for grievous organizational misdeeds an apology would
be recommended because the organization will suffer legal losses with or
without the apology and an apology might actually lessen the financial
damages (French, 2002). This study provides additional empirical evidence to support the recommendations for SCCT by verifying the perceived protective powers of crisis response strategies.
Crisis research can use the results of this study to conduct future research. Now that the two basic aspects of SCCT have been studied (crisis situation and crisis response strategies), researchers can examine the
matching recommendation of SCCT in greater detail. So far only a limited testing of SCCT matching recommendations has been performed
(Coombs and Holladay, 1996; Coombs and Schmidt, 2000). If we are to
have greater confidence in SCCT matching, further research is required.
This study has provided crisis managers with information to make more
informed choices when selecting what to say and do in order to maximize the protection of reputational assets of an organization during a
crisis.
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Received: March 31, 2004
Revised: August 16, 2005
Accepted: September 12, 2005