Development Under Fire:
####’s strategic decision-making in conflictaffected fragile states
Trystan Michael Scott Peckover
4220897
Utrecht University
01 August 2015
A Thesis submitted to
the Board of Examiners
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts in Conflict Studies and Human Rights
1
Name of Supervisor: Chris Van der Borgh
Date of Submission: 01 August 2015
Programme Trajectory Followed: Internship (15 ECTS), and Thesis (15 ECTS)
Word Count: 15,787
2
Acknowledgements
I would, first of all, like to thank my supervisor, Chris Van der Borgh. His
assistance in guiding my research and writing was a tremendous help.
I would particularly like to thank Don #### for his efforts in helping me to locate
and make contact with key interview targets. In that regard, I would also like to
thank Angelina ####, Angelo ####, Don ####, Gyan ####, Mark ####,
Raymond ####, and Roger #### for assisting me with my research – all of
whose interview testimony provided invaluable depth and perspective to my
analysis of #### decision-making in Liberia and South Sudan.
I would finally like to thank Melinda Davies, whose support with proofreading
and patience throughout helped me immensely.
3
Abstract
The majority of the most poverty-stricken and marginalised civilians in the
world live in the most fragile states. As such, NGOs committed to assisting the
most marginalised through the direct implementation of development
programmes, are required to operate in what are often inherently fragile settings
that frequently experience the onset of violent conflict. In this regard, this thesis
presents the example of ####, a development NGO not traditionally geared to
work in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS).
Nonetheless, frequently
confronted with the onset or escalation of conflict that impacts on its
programmes, and in the absence of a strategy or policy to guide its decisionmaking, #### is faced with the strategic decisions as to whether it should retain
a presence in country and, if opting to remain, how it should adapt its
programmes.
This thesis sets out to develop an understanding as to how #### has reached the
above strategic decisions, focusing on the case studies of Liberia (from 19891993) and South Sudan (from December 2013 to February 2014). Evidence
obtained in relation to these cases is primarily qualitative, with a focus on
interview testimony from a selection of key #### staff in each case study,
coupled with documentary evidence in relation to the strategic decision-making
processes, where available.
Adopting Vivienne Jabri’s theory of purposive
agency as the analytical lens for this thesis, the strategic decision-making
processes are unpacked in each case with a view to developing an understanding
as to how #### has reached decisions. Ultimately, four general claims are made
regarding #### strategic decision-making: that #### decisions to remain in
CAFS are heavily influenced by a perceived responsibility to the communities it
works with; that, nonetheless, #### will not work in the conflict-affected areas;
#### programming decisions are heavily influenced by donor preferences; and,
that, over time, bureaucracy has played an increasing role.
4
Contents
Acknowledgements
3
Abstract
4
Contents
5
List of Abbreviations
6
1 INTRODUCTION
7
A
9
B
About ####
Research outline and methodology
i) Research outline
ii) Terminology
iii) Research methodology
11
11
12
14
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
18
A
18
B
An overview of theories on decision-making
Purposive agency
i) Bureaucratic versus personal preferences
ii) Relative distribution of influence
iii) Application of theory to #### decision-making
21
23
25
25
3 DECISION-MAKING UNDER FIRE: THE CASES OF LIBERIA AND SOUTH
SUDAN
28
A
Liberia
i) Staying in Liberia
ii) Determining #### programming role and priorities
iii) Permanent withdrawal from Liberia
28
31
34
37
B
South Sudan
i) Determining whether #### should stay or go
ii) Adapting #### programme strategy in response to the conflict
38
43
46
C
How does #### reach strategic decisions in CAFs?
i) #### has a responsibility to remain in country and provide humanitarian assistance
where possible
ii) #### does not work ‘in’ conflict
iii) #### is a donor-led organisation
iv) Where you stand depends on where you sit
53
54
56
57
59
4 CONCLUSION
62
Bibliography
65
5
List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation
CAFS
CMT
ECOWAS
NGO
NO
####
####
RMT
RO
SAR
SitRep
SRA
SSOG
UNMISS
Definition
Conflict-affected and fragile states.
Country Management Team.
Economic Community of West African States.
Non-governmental organisation.
Refers to ‘National Organisations’, ####’s fundraising entities.
#### Incorporated.
####’s Headquarters in Woking, United Kingdom.
Regional Management Team.
Regional Office.
Security Assessment Report.
Situation Report.
Security Risk Assessment.
South Sudan Oversight Group.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
6
1
INTRODUCTION
Poverty reduction and the realisation of human rights for marginalised people
across the globe has been at the forefront of the international development
agenda at least since the formulation and global endorsement of the UN’s
Millennium Development Goals in 2000. This commitment is reflected in the
mission and vision of many of the most prominent NGOs in the international
development sector.1 As acknowledged by the World Bank2, the ‘Fragile States
Index’3, and ‘Human Development Index’4, the majority of the most povertystricken and marginalised civilians in the world live in the most fragile states.5 As
such, NGOs committed to assisting the most marginalized through the direct
implementation of development programmes, are consequently required to
operate in what are often inherently fragile settings (often post-conflict
contexts), where the distinction between peace and conflict is often vague.6 Such
settings frequently experience the onset (or recurrence) of violent conflict, with
such phenomena directly affecting NGOs’ operations. To exacerbate these
dynamics, the NGO sector is experiencing a progressive increase in casualties,
with NGOs becoming more frequently subject to violent attacks.7 Coupled with
this, prevention of access to conflict-affected areas, and the deliberate theft of
A cursory glance at the mission statements of some of the world’s largest development NGOs,
such as BRAC and Oxfam illustrate a focus on human rights realization and poverty reduction.
See, for example, BRAC, Who We Are, viewed 12 July 2015, <http://www.brac.net/content/whowe-are-mission-vision#.VaKE3bfe4gQ>. See also, Oxfam International, Our Purpose and Beliefs,
viewed 12 July 2015, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/our-purpose-and-beliefs>.
2 World Bank, Fragility, Conflict and Violence – Overview, viewed 9 July 2015,
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>.
3 Fund For Peace, Fragile States Index 2015, viewed 30 June 2015, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>.
4 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index, viewed on 12 July 2015,
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components>.
5 See above, n 3.
6 A key assumption inherent in this thesis is that development positively contributes to the
reduction of poverty and realisation of human rights, further assuming that development NGOs
should continue to play this role in conflict-affected fragile states. Such assumptions, however,
are not without criticism. Mark Duffield, for one, is heavily critical of the role of the development
sector in the “global South”, casting international development as a tool of the North’s
“biopolitical agenda”, allegedly aimed at controlling the lives of those in the South. Duffield, M.,
‘Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society’
in Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2008, p. 157.
7 Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., and Ryou, K., Aid Worker Security Report 2014 –Unsafe Passage: Road
attacks and their impact on humanitarian operations, (Humanitarian Outcomes: August 2014), p
1.
1
7
humanitarian supplies are also making it increasingly difficult for NGOs to
respond to civilians in times of conflict.
Unarmed and in some cases unprepared, development NGOs are increasingly
faced with the difficult decision of whether to maintain, scale down, or cease
operations altogether and withdraw in the face of violent conflict.
Such a
decision brings starkly to the fore the tension between development NGOs’
moral obligation to those they are committed to help and the duty of care owed
to their employees.
Much has been written on the impact of conflict on the
operations of humanitarian NGOs, many of which are openly orientated to
working in and on conflict, with a particular focus on the obstruction of aid
provision, including the violent targeting of aid workers. Debate in some
quarters has centred on the legality of the provision of humanitarian assistance8,
whilst others such as Rottensteiner9 and Reeves10 have argued that the denial of
humanitarian assistance amounts to a crime against humanity. Meanwhile, other
scholars have sought to explain the causes of increased aid worker targeting,
with the erosion of the principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality
and the politicisation of aid provision the most frequently pointed to causes.11
Nonetheless, very little literature exists that examines the emergence of conflict
and its impact on the operations of development NGOs whose core business
involves undertaking long-term projects in relatively stable contexts, and who
are not organisationally geared towards working in and on conflict. Why do
Stoffels, R., ‘Legal regulation of humanitarian assistance in armed conflict: Achievements and
gaps’, IRRC, vol. 86, no. 855 (September 2004), pp. 515-545.
9 Rottensteiner, C., ‘The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime Under International Law’,
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 835 (August 1999).
10 Reeves, E., ‘Humanitarian Obstruction as a Crime Against Humanity: The Example of Sudan’,
African Studies Review, Vol. 54, No, 3 (December 2011), pp.165-174.
11 Abiew, for example, argues that the emergence of “new humanitarianism” has led to NGOs
increasingly pursuing political agendas. According to Abiew, new humanitarianism embodies a
doctrinal shift that has seen traditionally relief-focused NGOs gradually shift their focus to
longer-term projects and “long-term developmentalism”. See, Abiew, F.K., ‘Humanitarian Action
Under Fire: Reflection on the Role of NGOs in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’, International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 203-216. See also, Nahikian, A., ‘Politicisation of aid
in Somalia hinders humanitarian action – Aid Agencies’, Harvard University – Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 23 February 2012, viewed 30 June 2015,
<http://hpcrresearch.org/blog/ana%C3%AFde-nahikian/2012-02-23/politicisation-aidsomalia-hinders-humanitarian-action-aid-agencies>.
8
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development NGOs stay (or go)? What informs their decision-making processes?
In circumstances where they stay, how do they adapt their programmes to the
changing landscape? Do their development priorities change?
A
About ####
These questions are particularly pertinent in the case of #### (####).
Predominantly a development NGO, but with a steadily growing humanitarian
capability, #### goal is “to reach as many children as possible, particularly those
who are excluded or marginalised, with high quality programmes that deliver
long-lasting benefits”.12 Working across eight impact areas13, it implements
programmes in 51 countries. #### is a loose federation, and its key entities
include:

20 National Organisations in the developed world (NOs);

#### Headquarters, situated in the United Kingdom (####);

4 regional offices (ROs) in West Africa, East and Southern Africa, the
Americas, and Asia; and

51 offices based in countries where #### implements development
programmes, referred to as Country Offices (COs).
Whilst ####, the ROs and COs all sit under ####, the NOs are separate legal
entities with only a ‘dotted line’ of accountability to ####. The NOs are
responsible for raising funds (sponsorship and grants) within their respective
countries, to contribute towards #### development programmes –
implemented by COs. #### governing body is the ‘Member’s Assembly’, which is
made up of delegates from each of the NOs. It is the International Board, itself
appointed by the Members’ Assembly, that appoints the CEO of ####. Whilst the
####, One ####, One Goal: Rights and Opportunities for Every Child – #### Global Strategy to
2015, June 2011, viewed on 22 June 2015, <http://####-international.org/about-####/howwe-work/strategy>.
13 Those impact areas include education, health, WASH, child protection, emergencies, economic
security, child participation, and sexual and reproductive health. See, ####, What We Do, viewed
30 June 2015, <http://####-international.org/what-we-do>.
12
9
NOs constitute #### ultimate decision-making body, programming decisions are
generally taken by the COs in consultation with the relevant ROs, under the
supervision and guidance of ####.
Whilst #### does not position itself as having unique expertise working in
conflict settings, or as working ‘in’ or ‘on’ conflict per se, there is an undeniable
link between its programme work and conflict. Of the 51 countries #### is
present in, 17 of these are conflict-affected (14 of which are classified as
“Medium Intensity” or “High Intensity”).14 #### currently has a presence and is
undertaking development programmes in South Sudan, Sudan, and the Central
African Republic – three of the four most fragile states in the world according to
Fund For Peace’s ‘Fragile States Index’. Overall, #### has a presence in 26 of the
38 most fragile states in the world – that is, those classified as at “Alert”, “High
Alert”, or “Very High Alert” status.15 To put #### operations in conflict-affected
fragile states into financial perspective, in the 2014 financial year16, of the
€466,836,000 spent on development and humanitarian programmes across the
51 countries #### works in, €93,313,000 (19.99%) was expended in the 14
medium and high Intensity conflict states, involving roughly the same proportion
of #### staff (19.68%) engaged in a similar number of programmes (22.92%).17
Statistically, the interface between #### operations and conflict is very clear. So
it is striking that #### has not formally endorsed a policy, strategy, or operating
model that provide specific guidance for working in conflict-affected fragile
states (CAFS). Whilst #### contributed to the development of the Conflict
Sensitivity Handbook, which provides guidance on the operational aspects of
development programming in conflict contexts, it is “not widely used”. 18
Moreover, whilst the Disaster Risk Management Manual is intended to apply to
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, viewed 30 June 2015,
<https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts?tags=D6943ABDB5364229B5A0E3338AC94EA1>.
15 See above, n 3.
16 #### financial year runs from 1 July to 30 June the following year.
17 These figures were generated from #### internal programmes database, which is only
accessible to #### staff. Documentation of these figures can be provided on request.
18 Author’s interview with Roger ####, Director of Disaster Risk Management at ####
Headquarters, on 16 June 2015.
14
10
conflict contexts, it is not tailor-made for conflict, designed to apply more
broadly to ‘disasters’.19 As such, #### staff working in CAFS are without
formalised strategic guidance. Furthermore, in spite of its presence in several
CAFS, #### has not undertaken any formal evaluation or assessment of how it
reached strategic decisions in these contexts.
This thesis seeks to contribute to addressing the gap in #### framework for
decision-making in CAFS by examining #### strategic decision-making
processes in two case studies – Liberia, and South Sudan.20 In doing so, it also
hopes to contribute to literature on decision-making within development NGOs,
particularly in the context of their operations in CAFS.
B
i)
Research outline and methodology
Research outline
How has #### reached strategic decisions regarding its
development programming in Liberia and South Sudan, subsequent
to the onset of conflict in each case in 1989 and 2013 respectively?
In the absence of a framework to guide decision-making, or any prior evaluation
of #### actual strategic decision-making in CAFS, it is unclear how #### has
reached decisions regarding its development programming in these contexts.
This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the dearth of academic literature on NGO
decision-making that may otherwise have shed light on #### strategic decisionmaking processes. This thesis seeks to address these gaps, unpacking ####
strategic decision-making processes in two case studies – Liberia between 1989
and 1993, and South Sudan between December 2013 and February 2014.
####, #### Disaster Response Manual: Book 1 – Response Activities Guidance, (May 22 2013).
In open acknowledgement of this gap, #### is currently working on drafting a conflict policy,
strategy, and ‘Operating Model for Working in Conflict-Affected Fragile States’ - all projects being
led by the Disaster Risk Management Department (the humanitarian arm of #### Programmes
Department), with this author involved in the latter initiative.
19
20
11
Particular focus will be given to how #### reached the following strategic
decisions in each case:

Whether to remain in or withdraw from CAFS after the onset of conflict;
and

How to adapt its programming.
To aid in examining how strategic decisions were reached in relation to each of
these issues, Vivienne Jabri’s theory of purposive agency21 (explained in Chapter
2) is adopted and applied to the case studies.
ii)
Terminology
For the sake of clarity, terminology that recurs throughout this thesis – ‘strategic
decisions’, ‘development programming’, and ‘conflict-affected fragile state’ – will
now be defined.
The term, ‘strategic decisions’, broadly refers to high-level (non-operational)
decisions. That is, where should #### work and why, what programmes should
it undertake, and when should it leave. This thesis is concerned with the
strategic decisions made by #### subsequent to the emergence of conflict in
Liberia (from 1989, until #### complete withdrawal in 1993) and South Sudan
immediately after the escalation of conflict (15 December 2013 to February
2014). Specifically, post-onset of conflict in each case, the strategic decisions of
interest are:

What should #### presence be – should it maintain business as usual,
scale down, suspend operations but retain a presence, or should it
withdraw altogether?

If it chooses to continue operating, what programmes should it undertake
and why?
Jabri, V., “A structurationist theory of conflict”, in Discourses on Violence (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1996). See also, Demmers, J., “Rational choice theory: the costs and
benefits of war”, in Theories of Violent Conflict: An introduction (New York: Routledge, 2012),
pp.107.
21
12
What is meant by ‘retain a presence’ is #### going into a temporary
organisational hibernation, which may include temporarily ceasing operations,
requiring staff to stay in their homes, or withdrawing staff from a country
altogether.22 This thesis is not concerned with decisions pertaining to
operational considerations (the ‘how’) – for example, logistics, security, human
resources, though it is acknowledged that these factors often inform strategic
decisions.
Development programming refers to the development work #### does in the
countries it operates in. #### undertakes programmes in eight key impact
areas – education, health, water and sanitation, child protection, economic
security, emergency relief, child participation, and sexual health (including HIV).
Development is #### core business and, as opposed to short-term humanitarian
relief, is premised on the implementation of projects in fulfilment of long-term
strategic ####s – typically undertaken in relatively stable environments.
Finally, in discussing #### operations in South Sudan and previously Liberia,
this thesis adopts the term ‘conflict-affected fragile states’ (CAFS) to refer to
those and other similar states. This is motivated partly by the term’s popularity
in policy circles23, and also due to its recent adoption by ####24. According to
the OECD, “States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or
capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction,
development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their
populations”.25 This definition is largely consistent with Fund For Peace’s
“common attributes” of state fragility, which include loss of territorial control or
This definition was ascertained from interviews with #### staff. See, for example, Author’s
interview with Roger ####, Director of Disaster Risk Management at #### Headquarters, on 16
June 2015. See also, Author’s interview with Don ####, former Field Director in Burkina Faso
and member of West African Regional Management Team, on 22 May 2015.
23 GSDRC, Chapter 7 – DFID Guidance on Working Effectively in Fragile States, viewed 15 July
2015, <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/fragile-states/chapter-7--dfid-guidance-on-workingeffectively-in-fragile-states>.
24 #### has adopted this definition in developing its ‘Operating Model for working in Conflictaffected Fragile States’.
25 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Concepts and Dilemmas of State
Building in Fragile Situations, from fragility to resilience, (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 16.
22
13
“monopoly on the legitimate use of force” and “inability to provide reasonable
public services”.26 The term ‘state fragility’ is disputed, however, frequently
criticized for being too vague and inconsistent in its application, with its
empirical indicators also questioned.27 Notwithstanding its alleged weaknesses,
critics do acknowledge that the ‘fragile state’ has a significant influence on policy
debates.28 A fragile state will, thus, be considered ‘conflict-affected’, when at
least “sporadic armed clashes”29 occur between groups pursuing “mutually
incompatible goals”30 on its territory.
iii)
Research methodology
In responding to the research puzzle identified above, this thesis almost
exclusively adopts a qualitative research methodology. In order to develop a
strong understanding of decision-making, it was determined that it was
necessary to examine decision-making in action (rather than in abstract). On
this basis, two case studies were chosen for analysis – namely, Liberia and South
Sudan. These case studies were chosen due to their somewhat contrasting
nature. In the case of Liberia, #### opted to retain a presence for several years
after conflict emerged, before ultimately withdrawing altogether.
Whereas,
#### has opted to remain in South Sudan to date, in spite of the escalation of
widespread conflict in December of 2013, with no indication it has or will
consider permanent withdrawal. Furthermore, it was hoped that the gap of
roughly twenty years between the two case studies would provide an
opportunity to see how #### strategic decision-making has evolved over time.
Data collection in relation to these two case studies was undertaken primarily
through the use of two techniques – interviews, and documentary analysis. In
Fund For Peace, What Does “State Fragility” Mean?, viewed 15 July 2015,
<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/faq-06-state-fragility>.
27 Overbeek, F. van, et al, Fragile States Discourse Unveiled (The Hague: Peace Security and
Development Network, 2009), p 8.
28 Ibid, p 12.
29 See above, n 14.
30 United States Institute of Peace, Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding,
viewed 15 July 2015, <http://glossary.usip.org/resource/conflict>.
26
14
identifying and seeking out interview subjects, preference was given to those
directly involved in the strategic decision-making processes. In this regard,
testimony of members of the ‘Country Management Team’ (CMT), ‘Regional
Management Team’ (RMT), and relevant staff from #### International
Headquarters (####) was sought. To this end, the following staff members were
interviewed in relation to #### operations in South Sudan and Liberia:

Liberia:
o Raymond #### – Regional Director for West Africa (1990-1993);
o Don #### – Field Director in Burkina Faso, and member of West
African RMT (1989-1993);
o Mark #### – Field Director in Liberia (1991); and

South Sudan:
o Roger #### – Director of Disaster Risk Management at ####
(2008-present);
o Gyan #### – Country Director in South Sudan (August 2012October 2014);
o Angelo #### – Programme Unit Manager in South Sudan (2012present); and
o Angelina #### – Gender and Child Protection Adviser in South
Sudan (2007-present).
Whilst it was not possible to meet with all interview targets 31, interviews were
conducted with key organisational decision-makers at country, regional, and
international level. Further, to supplement the testimony of these key decisionmakers, the testimony of in-country staff directly affected by strategic decisions
was obtained.
Interviews were ‘semi-structured’, with interviewees asked
several broad questions to guide the discussion and ensure that the strategic
decision-making processes in each case were addressed. Interviewees were,
nonetheless, provided with as much opportunity as possible to ‘tell their story’.
Each interview was audio-recorded32, and then transcribed. Each interviewee
For example, #### current International Head of Security, Stuart Mulholland, and ####
former Emergency Response Manager in South Sudan, Resom Habtegabriel, were both contacted,
but interviews were unable to be arranged.
32 Interviewees gave express permission to being recorded in each case.
31
15
was subsequently given the opportunity to review the draft transcript of his or
her interview to ensure accuracy in transcription.33
Documentary evidence of #### decision-making processes was only available
for the South Sudan case study, with no archival facility available to source
documentary evidence in relation to Liberia. Documentary evidence obtained in
relation to South Sudan included:

Situation Reports undertaken by #### in South Sudan from December
2013 to February 2014;

Humanitarian needs assessments;

Security reports;

Various email correspondence between key decision-makers regarding
#### operations in South Sudan; and

Minutes of South Sudan Oversight Group (SSOG) meetings.
In order to supplement the above data and provide context for #### decisionmaking in each case study, key policies relevant to #### operations in
emergency contexts, as well as third party reports and analyses regarding each
conflict were consulted.
The lack of documentary evidence in relation to Liberia meant that it was not
possible to provide as in-depth an account of decision-making in that case as
would have been preferable. Nonetheless, the quality of documentary evidence
contained in relation to South Sudan, coupled with the strength of the interview
material obtained across the case studies has allowed for the presentation of a
strong overview of #### strategic decision-making in CAFS.
As for the method of analysis, all evidence obtained in relation to the case studies
has been analysed through the lens of Vivienne Jabri’s theory of purposive
agency.34 Chapter 2 begins by briefly canvasing some of the prominent theories
on decision-making, before outlining why purposive agency was chosen as the
Copies of each transcript have been provided in confidence to this author’s thesis supervisor,
Chris Van der Borgh.
34 See above, n 21, p. 65.
33
16
analytical lens for this thesis, and then going on to explain its key facets normative and bureaucratic preferences, processes of legitimation, and rational
distribution of influence. It will then finish by discussing how the theory has
been understood and applied specifically to #### decision-making in the case
studies of Liberia and South Sudan.
Chapter 3 goes on to discuss #### operations in Liberia and South Sudan,
unpacking the decision-making processes in each case with a particular focus on
the key strategic decisions that were made subsequent to the onset of conflict –
that is, the organisational decisions to retain a presence, followed by the
decisions to adapt #### programming approach in light of the conflict in each
case. Discussion of Liberia will also briefly touch on the ultimate organisational
decision to withdraw. In unpacking #### decision-making processes in each
case, analysis will focus on how individual positions were reached and decisions
taken, before considering how these contributed to the ultimate organisational
decisions. In doing so, the theoretical lens of purposive agency will be applied
where appropriate, with a particular focus on identifying the existence and
interplay between personal and bureaucratic preferences, the interplay between
different actors, and the use of role to legitimise decisions. Ultimately, the
overview developed of #### strategic decision-making in both case studies will
be evaluated collectively, with a view to making some general claims regarding
how #### reaches strategic decisions regarding its programming in CAFS.
17
2
A
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
An overview of theories on decision-making
Literature on decision-making is largely grouped according to epistemological
and ontological divides (ex####atory/interpretive, and structure/agency).
Rational choice theory arguably represents the most prominent body of
literature on individual decision-making. Taking an ex####atory approach, and
based on an assumption that individual agency is the source of human action, it
is founded on the premise that individuals are self-contained, rational actors
who maximise their expected utility based on a weighing of the costs and
benefits associated with a proposed decision/action.35 The ‘thin’ version of
rationality, as Demmers refers to it, is not concerned with decision-makers’
motivation or the origins of their preferences. Rather, it is solely concerned as to
“how an actor best achieves his goals”.36 On the opposite end of the theoretical
spectrum lies role theory (homo sociologicus), which treats individuals as
‘puppets on a string’ whose actions are defined wholly by the roles they fulfil.
Role here does not strictly denote an institutional role, but more broadly the
normative expectations (rules, laws, customs etc.) “attached to a social
position”.37
Hollis and Snugden criticise rational choice theory, noting that it is entirely
forward-looking, concerned only with the final consequences of acts, and ignores
the moral psychological aspects of decision-making.38 This argument is echoed
by Cramer, whose critique of traditional rational choice theory is premised on
the argument that rational choice theorists ignore societal aspects and individual
Hollis, M., & Snugden, R., ‘Rationality in Action’, Mind, Vol. 102, No. 405 (January 1993), p 6.
Demmers, J., “Rational choice theory: the costs and benefits of war”, Theories of Violent Conflict:
An introduction (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 107.
37 Ibid, p. 108.
38 See above, n 35, p 32.
35
36
18
motivations in seeking to explain the centrality of political economy.39 In
responding to Collier’s argument of ‘greed over grievance’ 40, Cramer criticises
rational choice theorists’ assumption that individual action is defined by the urge
to maximize gains, exercised through rational cost-benefit analysis and decisionmaking – labelling Collier’s focus on material gain as “absurdly simplistic”. 41
March, one of the foremost writers on organisational decision-making, whilst not
rejecting traditional rational choice theory altogether, points to its inability to
explain decision-making in organisational contexts. According to March, the
“ecology of actors” present in an organisational context necessitates that
multiple analytical lenses be adopted in order to explain decisions in
organisations.42
Jabri expands on this critique of rational choice theory as
unsuited to explaining organisational decision-making. According to Jabri, “it
assumes unitary decision-makers whereas, in practice, governmental decisionmaking, especially within pluralist societies, tends to involve a number of
bureaucracies and agencies of the state”.43
March’s alternative approach to understanding decision-making, the “logic of
appropriateness”, bears greater similarity to role theory.44 According to March’s
theory, individual actors are rule-governed, with human action deriving from an
assessment of what would constitute ‘appropriate’ behaviour in a particular
context. March illustrates the decision-making process associated with the logic
of appropriateness as follows:

Situation. How do I define what kind of a situation this is?

Identity. What kind of a person am I?

Matching. What is appropriate for a person like me in a
situation such as this?45
Cramer, C., “Homo economicus goes to war: methodological individualism, rational choice and
the political economy of war”, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 11 (2002), p. 1849
40 Collier, P. “Doing well out of war: an economic perspective” in Berdal and Malone (eds.) Greed
and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
41 See above, n 39.
42 March, J.G., ‘How Decisions Happen in Organisations’, Human-Computer Interaction, Vol. 6
(1991), p.111
43 See above, n 21, p. 65.
44 See above, n 42.
45 Ibid, p. 105.
39
19
According to March’s theory, human action is the result of mediation between an
individual’s identity and the ‘rules’ that govern a given situation. Rules, in this
case, can be interpreted broadly to include customs, norms, laws – essentially,
what is considered socially appropriate. Rule following, according to March, is
motivated by an “implicit agreement” to, in effect, do unto others as you would
have them do unto you. March goes on to identify three processes that may lead
to the emergence or formation of the rules that define “proper behaviour”.
Those are “experiential learning”, “an evolving collection of invariant rules”, and
decision-making through imitation.46
Context-specific analyses of organisational decision-making using models such
as March’s have tended to focus on the corporate firm47, and on foreign policy48.
March’s approach is also, however, adopted by Heyse in her work on NGO
decision-making.49 According to Heyse, March’s work primarily espouses two
theories of decision-making – “consequential” decision-making (in essence,
rational choice), and “appropriate” decision-making (as articulated above).
Further, she argues that these decision-making models are implicitly linked to
particular organisational types, which she characterises as “administrative” and
“institutionalised”.50 In doing so, she identifies typical characteristics of each of
the organisational types, ultimately seeking to test whether the organisational
types are actually indicative of particular types of decision-making. Heyse tests
her “framework of organisational determinants” for decision-making through
the assessment of decision-making processes within two case study NGOs –
Médècins Sans Frontières Holland (identified as “administrative”) and Acting with
Churches Netherlands (identified as “institutional”). 51 Heyse’s choices of
Ibid, p. 106.
Cyert, R., and March, J.G., “Chapter 4: Behavioural Theory of the Firm”, in Milner, J.B.,
Organisational Behaviour 2: Essential Theories of Process and Structure, (New York: M.E. Sharpe
Inc., 2006).
48 See, for example, Hollis, M. & Smith, S., ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’,
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 1986), pp. 269-286. See also, Carlsnaes, W.,
‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
36, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 245-270.
49 Heyse, L., ‘Tragic Choices in Humanitarian Aid: A Framework of Organizational Determinants
of NGO Decision Making’, Voluntas, Vol. 24 (2013), pp. 68-92.
50 Ibid, p. 71.
51 Ibid, p. 70.
46
47
20
organisational determinants are, however, highly questionable. The
characteristics Heyse attributes to ‘administrative’ organisations place emphasis
on a level of structural formality (hierarchy, procedures, compliance
mechanisms). In reality, however, structural formality is a common trait in most
modern day organisations. Furthermore, even if we are to take for granted that
the link between structural formality and administrative organisations (as
distinct from institutional organisations) is valid, Heyse’s framework rests on the
assumption that formal structures are in fact adhered to. That is, that the
hierarchy is respected, procedures are followed, and compliance mechanisms
enforced. When applied to ####, a highly bureaucratic and process-driven NGO
that possesses all the ‘administrative’ characteristics Heyse identifies, it is
apparent that this framework is untenable. Notwithstanding #### similarity to
Heyse’s administrative organisation on paper, many of the characteristics
identified by Heyse do not impact on #### decision-making processes. As such,
Heyse’s model is not appropriate to this context, and therefore will not be
adopted in analysing #### strategic decision-making in Liberia and South
Sudan.
B
Purposive agency
When examining organisational decision-making (a form of ‘group agency’), one
must bear in mind that organisations are made up of a variety of individuals, all
of whose individual decision-making processes influence the final decision.
#### is a perfect example of this, with its ultimate organisational decisions a
melange of the decision-making processes of various individuals’ with differing
roles, set in the context of distinct entities and institutional settings. A highly
bureaucratic organisation, it is described by Raymond ####, former Regional
Director for #### in West Africa, as “too big and too slow, and too many people
with competing interests”.52 Strategic decisions, such as where to establish
Author’s interview with Raymond ####, former Regional Director for #### in West Africa, on
30 June 2015.
52
21
and/or maintain a presence, and what programmes to undertake involve a
variety of individual agents from the aforementioned institutional settings
voicing often-competing views. As will be demonstrated in the following
chapters, this dynamic is particularly pronounced in the context of strategic
decision-making surrounding #### operations in CAFS.
Given #### organisational dynamics, it is apparent that rational choice theory –
with its ignorance of role and unsuitability to organisational contexts, as
identified above - is not fit for purpose for analysing #### decision-making.
Furthermore, whilst March’s theory of appropriateness is more suited to
organisational settings, and has been tested in the NGO context53, it restricts
analysis to the evaluation of rule-following behaviour. Whilst it does take into
account context, and is not focused solely on the consideration of consequences,
it is still a rather instrumental theory – arguably, leaning more towards the homo
sociologicus school of thought. Such an approach is arguably inappropriate in the
context of ####, where the non-existence of “rules that provide guidelines for
decision making”54 in relation to #### work in CAFS makes it difficult to
undertake a thorough analysis. Furthermore, it does not take into account how
differences of opinion in an organisational setting are addressed and influence
the final ‘organisational decision’, nor how actors’ varying capacities to influence
decision-making processes affect this.
Effectively analysing decision-making within #### necessitates the use of a
framework that takes into account the influence of varying institutional settings,
individuals’ roles within those institutional settings, and the multitude of oftencompeting voices in a given decision-making process. Vivienne Jabri’s theory of
purposive agency55 arguably provides the most appropriate framework and will,
therefore, be used as the theoretical framework through which to analyse ####
strategic decision-making in Liberia and South Sudan. Jabri’s approach, building
See above, n 49, pp. 68-92.
Ibid, p. 73.
55 This author notes that the term ‘purposive agency’ appears to have been coined by Demmers in
articulating Jabri’s ‘broad’ approach to rationality. See above, n 36, p. 109.
53
54
22
to a large extent on the work of Hollis and Smith56, is effectively an individualist
take on role theory. Whereas role theory treats individuals as “puppets on a
string” whose actions are wholly determined by their roles - that is, “where you
stand depends on where you sit”57 – Jabri’s approach takes into account the
influence of role and its constituent elements on individual decision-making. In
this regard, Jabri still sees individuals as capable of rational decision-making, but
takes into account the institutional context in which individuals formulate their
preferences. They are influenced by their roles, but still have room for reflexive
self-direction”.58 Essentially, what Jabri proposes through purposive agency can
be characterised as a ‘middle road’ between rational choice and role theory as
discussed in Part A of this chapter.
i)
Bureaucratic versus personal preferences
According to Jabri’s theory of purposive agency, the decisions taken by an actor
are defined by his or her personal preferences, which are in turn influenced by
the normative expectations associated with his or her role (i.e. rules to follow,
instructions to carry out etc.). An actor’s individual decision-making and action
then results from the “interplay between personal and bureaucratic
preferences”.59 Carlsnaes echoes this view, arguing in the context of foreign
policy decision-making that there is a “dynamic interplay” between institutional
roles and individual agency.60 This interplay is neatly characterised by Hollis
and Smith, also in the context of foreign policy decision-making, when stating
“bureaucrats think for themselves in the service of their bureaucracies”, meaning
See, for example, Hollis, M., The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987). See also, Hollis, M. & Smith, S., “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making”,
British Journal of Political Science, Col. 16, No. 3 (July 1986), p 269-286.
57 See above, n 36, p. 109
58 Ibid.
59 See above, n 21, p. 68.
60 Carlsnaes, W., “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September, 1992), p. 255.
56
23
that “where you stand would depend both on where you sit and how you
think”.61
Personal preferences are understood by Jabri to derive from individual desires
and beliefs.62 The ‘bureaucratic preferences’ referred to by Jabri have two
constituent elements – the normative expectations, and the processes of
information gathering associated with an individual’s role.63 Processes of
information gathering refer to the influence of an agent’s perceptions,
incorporating tendencies to favour certain conclusions over others.64 Based on
the outcome of interviews, it was not possible to effectively ascertain decisionmakers perceptions or tendencies. As such, processes of information gathering
will not be given in-depth consideration in the analysis of decision-making in
Chapter 3.
Jabri defines normative expectations in a general sense as “those codes of
conduct, some enshrined in law and others more informal, which legitimate
some actions while censoring others”.65 Hollis, on the other hand, defines
normative expectations as constituted by “rules to follow, tasks to perform and
demands to fulfil”.66 Both, however, recognise that normative expectations
derive from an individual’s role and the institutional context within which they
are situated. As such, normative expectations (thus, ‘bureaucratic preferences’)
will vary depending on an individual’s role, just as personal preferences will
differ from individual to individual.
Jabri adds a further layer of analysis to the interplay between personal and
bureaucratic preferences. That is, the constraining and enabling nature of roles.
Whilst on the one hand, the normative expectations associated with a role may
constrain a decision-maker, a role itself may also enable certain courses of action
Hollis, M. & Smith, S., “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making”, British Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July, 1986), p. 273.
62 See above, n 21, p. 67.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, p. 83.
66 Hollis, M., The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 162.
61
24
by providing actors with “legitimating reasons” in support of personal
preferences.67
ii)
Relative distribution of influence
In organisations such as ####, the multitude of (often-conflicting) voices is not
always capable of being reconciled through transparent and unbiased processes
such as voting. As such, Jabri’s concept of the “relative distribution of
influence”68 enables us to better understand how conflicting views of individual
actors within an organisation are reconciled, leading to the ultimate
‘organisational decision’. Drawing on Hollis, Jabri argues, “the question of whose
choices prevail is dependent on the resources they have as individuals and as
role players”.69 In any given institution, individuals will likely have a
“differential capacity to draw upon institutional resources”, with such resources
then able to be used to control the availability and use of information, and
manipulate normative expectations such that a particular point of view becomes
dominant. In addition to influencing the ultimate ‘organisational decision’ that
gets made, differential capacity to draw upon resources (both individual and
institutional) in seeking to influence a decision-making process can influence
how such a process is framed. As Jabri points out, actors with greater access to
resources are able to position debates so that they favour a particular outcome.
iii)
Application of theory to #### decision-making
As Figure 1 below demonstrates, the decisions taken by an actor are defined by
his or her personal preferences, which are in turn influenced by the normative
expectations associated with his or her role, and framed according to the actor’s
information gathering processes.
See above, n 21 p. 69.
Ibid, p. 68.
69 Ibid, p. 69.
67
68
25
Bureaucratic
Personal
RDoI
Desires
Expectations
Role ------------------------------------- Legitimation -------- Decision
Information
Belief
Desires
Org.
Action
Expectations
Role ------------------------------------- Legitimation -------- Decision
Information
Belief
Figure 1: Influence of role on decision-making70
In unpacking #### decision-making in Chapter 3, this thesis identifies
normative expectations in the rules, policies, and guidance that were applicable
to decision-makers in each of the case studies, as well as instructions, requests,
and demands that were made by those individuals’ colleagues (particularly their
superiors). Personal preferences, made up of individuals’ desires and beliefs,
will be identified in individuals’ motivations that the evidence suggests are
divorced from their roles – to the extent that these motivations can be clearly
ascertained. As such, personal preferences (and, in turn, the interplay between
personal and bureaucratic preferences) will be most easily identified where the
evidence illustrates conflict between individuals’ wishes and the normative
expectations those individuals are subjected to. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged
that identifying personal preferences and their interplay with bureaucratic
preferences is not straightforward in the case of ####, partly due to the analysis
Figure 1 is adapted from Jabri’s illustration of the impact of role on decision-making. Ibid, p
67.
70
26
of #### decision-making taking place retrospectively (thus, rendering the
analysis somewhat reliant on individual recollection). Jabri, nonetheless,
acknowledges that the distinction and interplay between personal and
bureaucratic preferences differs from case to case, and is often blurred.71
In addition to the normative expectations, the role itself can provide legitimating
reasons for actor’s decisions. Interview testimony will primarily be relied upon
to identify individuals’ use of role (i.e. their role as a development worker, or as
an employee of an NGO) to legitimise a preferred course of action.
Finally, in applying Jabri’s concept of relative distribution of advantage where
competing voices are identified in #### decision-making processes, focus will be
placed on the “differential capacity to draw upon institutional resources”.
Institutional resources are understood in #### context to include, for example,
relative decision-making power (through position in the organisational
hierarchy), organisational relationships, influence, and access to or control over
programme funding.
With the analytical framework in place, discussion will now turn to
consideration of the two case studies of Liberia and South Sudan.
71
Ibid, p. 70.
27
3
DECISION-MAKING UNDER FIRE: THE CASES OF LIBERIA AND
SOUTH SUDAN
In both Liberia and South Sudan, #### had an established presence prior to the
onset of violent conflict. In each case, #### was faced with the following
strategic decisions:

Whether to remain or withdraw from the country; and

If choosing to remain, what its programming priorities should be.
Furthermore, the absence of a conflict-specific strategy and policy left #### staff
involved in the decision-making processes in each case to form their own views
regarding #### strategic direction. Whilst #### ultimately withdrew from
Liberia, it has so far remained in South Sudan. What led to the above strategic
decisions?
This chapter will set out the situational context that led in each case to the
strategic decisions identified above. Each case study will then outline the
organisational context– particularly as it related to decision-making – before
going on to examine how the key strategic decision-making processes unfolded.
Where appropriate, the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2 will be applied
– in particular, identifying personal and bureaucratic preferences where they are
ascertainable, and highlighting the interplay between the two.
In addition,
where individuals’ roles are used to legitimise decisions, this will also be
highlighted. Finally, this chapter will conclude by evaluating #### strategic
decision-making across the two case studies, with a view to developing an
understanding as to how #### has reached strategic decisions in each of the
cases.
A
Liberia
Civil war emerged in Liberia in 1989 and rapidly spread across the country.
Instigated and led by Charles Taylor, a former aide of then-Liberian President
Samuel Doe, the civil war commenced when forces of the National Patriotic Front
28
of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Liberia from the Ivory Coast in December of 1989.72
Within six months, Taylor’s rebel forces had taken control of most of Liberia, and
in June of 1990 began attacking government forces defending Monrovia. At this
point, Prince Yormie Johnson split from Taylor and the NPFL, forming the
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). With Monrovia then
under attack from two separate rebel forces, areas on the outskirts eventually
fell to the INPFL, prompting the evacuation of foreign nationals from Monrovia.73
An armed intervention led by ECOWAS74 forces in August of 1990, however,
managed to take control of most of Monrovia, nonetheless leaving the remainder
of Liberia under rebel control. Mark ####, Field Director in Liberia in 1991,
recites his experience of the conflict, commenting that the conflict was
“everywhere but Monrovia”, with Monrovia becoming a heavily guarded
“island”.75 In spite of Doe’s death in 1990, attempts at achieving a cease-fire
were unsuccessful. With the civil war being fuelled by multiple factors,
including the provision of arms and mercenaries by Burkina Faso’s President,
Blaise Compaore, the conflict continued.76 Don ####, Field Director in Burkina
Faso and member of the Regional Management Team (RMT) at the time, recalls
Taylor frequently visited Burkina Faso both due to his alliance with Compaore,
and also to smuggle conflict diamonds.77 By this point in the mid-late 1990, all
of #### programmes had been suspended, and #### staff had been evacuated,
with the chaotic environment leading to #### Field Director in Liberia in 1990
fleeing across the border on foot. #### recalls an anecdote regarding the nature
of his predecessor’s evacuation, commenting:
I do remember one story, which I’m sure...he went to great lengths to
load up all #### material assets. Computers, machines, equipment,
Insight on Conflict, Liberia: Conflict Profile, Peace Direct, 2014, viewed 22 July 2015,
<http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/liberia/conflict-profile/>
73 Global Security.org, Liberia – First Civil War - 1989-1996, viewed 22 July 2015,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm>.
74 ECOWAS stands for ‘Economic Community of West African States’.
75 Author’s interview with Mark ####, former Field Director for #### Liberia, on 22 May 2015.
76 Don #### recalls Charles Taylor’s frequent visits to Burkina Faso, and close relationship with
Blaise Compaore. He further recalls that it was widely known across Burkina Faso at the time
that direct support was being provided to Taylor’s forces. Author’s interview with Don ####,
former Field Director in Burkina Faso and member of West African Regional Management Team,
on 22 May 2015.
77 Ibid.
72
29
and get that stuff out. While he wasn't able to get his personal
belongings out. And the feedback he got was ‘well all of #### stuff
was insured. You should've taken your personal stuff because that's
not insured.’ So you can imagine how he felt.78
In addition to illustrating the chaotic environment in Liberia at the time, this
anecdote suggests the absence of bureaucracy (particularly in terms of clear
instructions), which arguably led to the former Field Director to act on
misunderstood normative expectations as to what action he should have taken.
The conflict in Liberia emerged at a time when #### was in a state of
organisational transition – decentralisation of the global structure leading to the
creation of four ‘Regional Offices’ (ROs) in 1990 whose function was to oversee
programme work and operations in #### countries. In terms of in-country
management, rather than one central ‘Country Director’ as is the case now, each
#### country had several geographically-based ‘Field Directors’ – three in the
case of Liberia – each of whom had autonomy in the design and development of
their programmes. Whilst Field Directors retained a significant level of
autonomy post-transition, the new organisational structure meant key strategic
decisions were made by the Regional Director in consultation with the RMT
(consisting of the Regional Director and West African Field Directors), and the
CEO.
Nonetheless, the decision-making processes at the time were not formalised.
#### explains that “there was no policy or framework that helped the
organisation and decision-makers in the organisation decide what they would do
in a prolonged conflict”, with all strategic decisions handled “on a case by case
basis”.79 Whilst Raymond ####, the West African Regional Director from 199092 who was based in Senegal, saw the benefit of consulting with the RMT, he was
not obliged to do so in his role as Regional Director.80 With respect to ####
initial decision to remain in Liberia, and ultimate decision to leave, ####
See above, n 75.
See above, n 76.
80 Ibid.
78
79
30
considers that “those kinds of decisions were made by the Regional Director and
the CEO”.81
#### in-country information-gathering practices at the time were similarly ad
hoc. With no formalised structure, staff relied on strong in-country networks,
including other NGOs, the United Nations, and Western embassies. ####
explains “There was no kind of procedure…no kind of set of a checklist of who
you should go and see”.82 This was not necessarily seen as an issue, however, as
#### notes that most members of the RMT had been in West Africa for a
number of years, and considered themselves “pretty well informed”.83
The Liberian civil war also coincided with a shift in #### programming focus.
Prior to the conflict, #### had primarily been community focused, with ####
remarking that “the word child didn’t appear that much” in #### programming
vocabulary. #### notes he made strong attempts to change this, feeling that “the
impact on children had to be clarified in the community approach”.84
i)
Staying in Liberia
Given the lack of evidence regarding #### operations in Liberia from 1989-90,
the nature of early strategic discussions regarding #### presence in Liberia is
unknown. What is known, however, is that #### did not pull out of Liberia
altogether, instead temporarily suspending operations and withdrawing staff
from the country due to concerns over their security. By the time #### became
Regional Director, a lot of #### national staff had been “killed, and chased”, and
#### International Board was pushing for a permanent withdrawal.85
According to ####, #### was “not ready for emergency situations at that time”,
remarking that the decision to remain in Liberia was primarily driven by the
Ibid.
Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 See above, n 52.
85 Ibid.
81
82
31
West African RO. #### echoes ####’s sentiments, noting that “organisational
orientation” discouraged #### from retaining any kind of presence in Liberia,
let alone undertaking programmes.86 In response to the deteriorating situation,
the RO, under the advice of the RMT, took the initial step of suspending all of
#### programmes in Liberia and evacuating the remaining international staff.87
Under ####’s direction, #### subsequently re-opened its office in Liberia
several times only to then have to temporarily suspend operations again in
response to the fluctuating conflict. Regional and in-country staff nonetheless
remained convinced that #### should retain a presence no matter what. ####
asserts “you always have a role to play”. 88 Whilst personal desires at times
played a part in individual decisions as to whether to stay or go – as was the case
with ####’ predecessor in Liberia, who left due to concerns as to the safety of
his family89 – from ####’s standpoint, #### had an obligation to respond if a
need was identified. In ####’s view, “if there is a need, an organisation like
#### needs to be there”.90 And from his perspective, the needs of children were
particularly pronounced in Liberia:
In this period, children needed even more assistance than ever…
[There were] so many children in Liberia that were abandoned, that
were orphans, that needed help…and not many organisations were
willing to help…Everybody was focused on the masses, nobody was
there specifically for the children.91
Whilst he concedes that concern for staff safety is valid, remarking “you don’t
want dead heroes”, in ####’s view risk is “part of the job”, and concerns as to
safety (from a personal and organisational standpoint) needed to be mediated
against the responsibility as an NGO you will do all you can to make a difference
See above, n 75
See above, n 52.
88 Ibid.
89 See: Author’s interview with Don ####, former Field Director in Burkina Faso and member of
West African Regional Management Team, on 22 May 2015; Author’s interview with Mark ####,
former Field Director for #### in Liberia, on 22 May 2015; and Author’s interview with
Raymond ####, former Regional Director for #### in West Africa, on 30 June 2015
90 See above, n 75.
91 Ibid.
86
87
32
to the lives of children.92 In the absence of a clear organisational obligation
(rules, instructions), #### has engaged his role as a humanitarian as a means of
legitimising his personal preference to provide assistance to children in conflictaffected areas. ####’s push to set up a general #### initiative focused on
helping children in emergencies, though unsuccessful, is indicative of his strong
personal preferences in favour of working with children under any
circumstances. #### laments the constraining nature of his position within
####, explaining:
It’s an oil tanker, it moves very slow…so if you don’t have the right
people there who can advocate for children’s needs in conflict, this
organisation is not going to change. It’s too big and too slow, and
too many people with competing interests.
In ####’s view, whilst “not unimportant”, an inability to deliver on sponsorship
obligations was of far greater concern to senior management at #### than staff
safety.93 At the time of the Liberian conflict, #### was entirely dependent on
sponsorship funding. #### accepted sponsorship funds and, in exchange,
implemented development programmes in the communities in which sponsored
children lived. #### sponsorship obligations also included the production of
‘sponsor child deliverables’ – including personalised letters from sponsor
children, and reports on sponsorship programmes. The conflict, however,
significantly changed the landscape. Stretching across the entire country, the
conflict resulted in mass displacement of Liberian children. As a result, it was no
longer possible for #### to run traditional sponsorship-based programmes, due
to an inability to locate and, in many cases, guarantee the safety of sponsor
children – let alone meet its obligations to sponsors. As #### notes:
[T]he sponsorship piece was impossible. The only children that
#### might have been able to find…were those that were in
Monrovia…
92
93
Ibid.
See above, n 76.
33
It was tough. You know, it was really tough. Because kids would be
sent down in the morning to go buy fish and, while they were at the
market, the frontlines would change and all of sudden they're on the
other side and can't come home. It was that fluid.94
Furthermore, #### notes that #### was concerned that attempting to operate
traditional sponsorship programmes could negatively impact on the safety of
children. As many basic necessities were in short supply, children and families
that were supported by #### risked being targeted by other members of the
community.95 This demonstrates the constraining and enabling nature of roles
as discussed by Jabri. Whilst normative expectations related to #### donor
commitments and concerns over child safety constrained #### senior
management, #### was able to engage his role as an enabling influence.
Fortunately for #### and his regional colleagues, donors were not put off by
#### inability to deliver orthodox sponsorship programmes. Sympathising with
the plight of the Liberian children, donors and stakeholders indicated to ####
that they would prefer that #### used their resources “in the best way possible,
to benefit any children at all”.96 This clarification of donor expectations
ultimately encouraged the Board and CEO at the time to acquiesce to the region’s
recommendation to remain in Liberia.
ii)
Determining #### programming role and priorities
What followed was a stark shift in #### role. Upon receipt of the donors’
blessing to use funds for any and all children, #### was left with a significant
amount of space within which to determine #### approach. Under his direction,
#### reinvented itself – shifting its programming approach from undertaking
direct implementation to becoming the ‘enabler’. ####, largely of his own
volition, set up a partnership with UNICEF and Médècins Sans Frontières Belgium
See above, n 75.
See above, n 76.
96 See above, n 75.
94
95
34
(MSF). The rationale behind this partnership was that UNICEF would bring its
“authority…gravitas and influence”, and MSF would bring its operational
strengths, in particular its ability to move relatively freely outside of Monrovia
and throughout Liberia.97 #### shifting operational role in this case is arguably
a result of the combination of external expectations placed on #### by donors,
and pressure from local and regional staff whose personal preferences to assist
children in Liberia were legitimised by their perceived role as humanitarian
actors. The donors’ influence acted to alter the normative expectations placed
on #### – their willingness to assist all Liberian children overruling the
International Board’s initial push to permanently withdraw. In that regard, the
normative expectations placed on #### actually acted as an enabling force,
complementing both his personal preferences and his perception of his own role.
The engagement of Mark #### as Field Director in Liberia in 1991 represented a
continuation of #### adapted role and programming approach. By the time
#### was introduced, all international #### staff had been evacuated from
Liberia, and #### office in Monrovia had been “ransacked and shot up”.98
Furthermore, the conflict had placed increased pressure on #### ad hoc
information gathering processes. #### recalls that #### did not undertake any
of its own research in relation to the conflict, nor did it engage in any conflict
analysis. #### sees this as due in part to #### organisational orientation,
explaining that “#### wasn’t set up to work in conflict”99 – a fact that, no doubt,
influenced ####’s decision to position #### as an enabler rather than an
implementer. In this regard, #### was solely reliant on the networks MSF and
UNICEF brought to the partnership, using these networks to identify “what were
the real needs and how we could add value”.100
Author’s interview with Mark ####, former Field Director for #### Liberia, on 22 May 2015.
See also, Author’s interview with Raymond ####, former Regional Director for #### in West
Africa, on 30 June 2015.
98 See above, n 75.
99 Ibid.
100 See above, n 52.
97
35
#### went in to Liberia, subject to the parameters and structure set out by
#### regarding the partnership and provision of funds, but otherwise was able
to operate with “a lot of autonomy”. For reasons unclear, UNICEF and MSF
“couldn’t stand each other”.101 As such, by his own account, a key facet of ####’
role in Liberia was keeping the partnership intact. He recalls:
I spent a lot of time doing shuttle diplomacy and trying to convince
each one of the value of working with the other. Which wasn't too
hard to do considering I had the purse strings.102
In addition to playing diplomat, #### took on the role of Programme Director in
Liberia on behalf of ####. #### was granted free reign to make any and all
programming decisions, subject to ####’s blessing. Notwithstanding his
autonomy within ####, ####’ ability to make programming decisions was
limited by what he could “get MSF and UNICEF to agree to and be interested
in”.103 In this regard, #### met resistance early on in trying to get MSF to adopt
a child focus in its programming, as it was not consistent with MSF’s traditional
role.
They said ‘Yeah, we're not a child sponsorship organisation, we're
not a child-focused organisation, these aren't the kinds of things that
are real priorities to us’. You know, and I'd have to explain ‘Well
these are the priorities for the children of Liberia, and this is the
priority for the financial backer’.104
As #### was now playing the role of enabler rather than implementer, its
changed role constrained ####’ – and, by extension, #### – ability to act.
Nonetheless, ####’ ultimate success in convincing MSF to engage in childfocused programmes demonstrates the influence of funding on NGOs’
programming priorities, with #### donors having an indirect influence on the
programming activity of MSF notwithstanding MSF’s traditional role.
See above, n 75.
Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
101
102
36
####, on behalf of ####, subsequently facilitated several child-focussed
programmes, including: provision of financial support to orphanages;
establishment of a new orphanage by MSF to cater for the most vulnerable
children; and, implementation of #### first family tracing and reunification
project. Finally, #### funded a Save the Children UK programme dealing with
conflict-affected street children. Discussing #### partnership with Save UK,
#### indicates that a primary motivator was Save UK’s adaptation to the
changed context, and ability to deliver on actual needs.
They had gotten it down to some basic nuts and bolts. Kids needed a
mailing address so they could write. They needed a place to store
their stuff where things wouldn't get stolen. And they needed a place
to get clean safely. And that...those were their priorities. You know,
and the [other] development organisations were so ‘well what they
need is literacy and a job’. And it wasn't, because nobody had a job
at that point. There weren't any jobs. Everything was shut down.
The programming decisions made by #### are illustrative of the interplay
between his personal and bureaucratic preferences. Whilst ####’ role in Liberia
was subject to the normative expectations that money would be spent on
children, there was otherwise very little bureaucracy at play that constrained
####’ personal preferences and impacted on his decision-making. In the
absence of strong bureaucratic preferences, there was far greater space for
personal preferences to influence decision-making. The partnership #### set up
with Save UK is indicative of this. Whilst ####’ own initiative and vision
arguably contributed to the establishment of the partnership in the first instance,
his years of experience of the ‘realities’ of conflict and ability to identify
children’s ‘real needs’ ultimately informed his preference to work with children
in particular ways.
iii)
Permanent withdrawal from Liberia
At the time #### left Liberia in late 1991 at the completion of his contract, he
recalls that there was a “very strong commitment to staying in Liberia however
37
#### could”.105 Subsequent to ####’ and ####’s departures, however, ####
withdrew altogether from Liberia in 1993. Whilst the recommendation of the
RMT continued to be that #### should retain a presence in Liberia, the CEO
ultimately opted to close down. It is not known what ultimately led to this
decision to permanently withdraw #### presence from Liberia. During the
preceding years, the primary considerations that mediated against a presence in
Liberia were the risk to #### staff in the field, and #### inability to fulfil its
commitment to sponsors. #### rejects the latter consideration as justification
for ultimately pulling out, however. Reminiscing on the success of #### work in
Liberia, #### remarks:
I think what we did with #### while I was there was appropriate
and spot on. A continued presence is so valuable that it merits a
modified programming model. So, if #### couldn't do child-specific
child sponsorship, it could certainly do childhood sponsorship, where
sponsors recognised that they're not going to get the letters, that
there's not going to be that individual contact. But there is going to
be programming as best possible directed at meeting children's
needs until such time as a regular sponsorship model could be
reassembled.106
Interestingly, less than a year later, #### was faced with a similar situation in
Sierra Leone. With senior management tacitly accepting that it had made a
mistake withdrawing from Liberia altogether in 1993, it ultimately acted on the
RMT’s recommendation in Sierra Leone – to scale right back but not
permanently withdraw.107
B
South Sudan
South Sudan’s on-going civil war commenced on the evening of 15 December
2013, following the eruption of violence between rival Dinka and Nuer members
Ibid.
Ibid.
107 See above, n 76.
105
106
38
of the Presidential Guard in Juba. President Salva Kiir, of Dinka background,
accused the former Vice-President Riek Machar, of Nuer origin, of inciting a coup
against the South Sudanese Government, further claiming that the coup had been
quelled by 16 December.108 In spite of Kiir’s claims, fighting continued between
the two ethnic groups on 16 December and thereafter, quickly spreading beyond
Juba to the conflict-prone Jonglei region. Following this, conflict quickly spread
to the states of Unity and Upper Nile in the north-eastern corner of South Sudan.
According to claims made by Human Rights Watch, the number of deaths as a
direct result of the fighting had reached the thousands prior to Christmas.109
Prior to the conflict, #### was primarily undertaking programmes in Eastern
and Central Equatoria, in addition to an emergency response to the flooding in
Jonglei.110 As such, the eruption of the conflict in Juba, and subsequent spread to
Yei, Bor and other parts of Jonglei state impacted directly on #### operations.
In addition to losing assets and being unable to access its offices in Bor111,
continued sporadic fighting in Juba had resulted in #### staff hibernating in safe
houses unable to work112, while sporadic fighting in Yei had led to the closure of
Juba-Yei road113. Marko Lesukat, #### Regional Disaster Risk Manager who was
deployed to Juba from the Regional Office in Nairobi to undertake a security
assessment, aptly depicts the volatile and unpredictable nature of the conflict as
it impacted on Juba. Consecutive emails sent from Lesukat to #### senior
management on the morning of 4 January 2014 describe events unfolding in
Juba:
Juba is under siege…continuous gun shots/fighting going on…114
Guardian Online, South Sudan President says Military has foiled coup, 16 December 2013,
viewed 3 July 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/south-sudan-capitalgunfire-coup-reports-machar>.
109 Human Rights Watch, South Sudan: Ethnic Targeting, Widespread Killings, viewed 16 January
2015, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespreadkillings>.
110 Author’s interview with Angelo ####, Programme Unit Manager for #### South Sudan, on 28
May 2015.
111 ####, 3 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
112 ####, #### South Sudan Security Situation Internal Report, No. 2, 17 December 2013.
113 Lesukat, M., Security Assessment Report – Juba, South Sudan, ####, 5 January 2014
114 Lesukat, M. ‘Juba under siege’ (email to H. Nyathi, R. ####, G. ####, T. Bergsma), 4 January
2014
108
39
This was followed shortly after by another email roughly an hour later, which
stated:
It is calm now after an hour of heavy gunfire...As we understand, it
was just a fight that broke out but not an assault on Juba.115
At the time the conflict erupted, #### had been caught wholly unprepared, with
the majority of #### South Sudan’s Country Management Team (CMT) absent
from the country on Christmas leave. In addition, there was no up to date
‘Disaster Preparedness ####’ for in-country staff to rely upon.116 Why #### was
caught unprepared is not entirely clear. According to #### staff in the CO and at
####, the escalation of conflict was “nothing new”117, with sporadic violence in
the Jonglei region in the preceding months and years coupled with South Sudan’s
turbulent history meaning a conflict-related emergency in South Sudan had been
on-going.118 Furthermore, several in-country staff members note that warning
signs of a looming civil conflict had been present for months – particularly
following Kiir’s decision to dismiss his entire cabinet, including Machar, in July of
that year. However, as Angelo ####, Programme Unit Manager in #### South
Sudan, points out, “people did not take it seriously” – pointing to the visit of
#### CEO at the same time, and the CEO’s subsequent request to travel outside
of Juba to Yei on the day following the cabinet dismissal in July.119
Shortly after the escalation of conflict, a ‘Security Situation Internal Report’
(SitRep) was issued by the CO on 17 December 2013, declaring the emergency in
South Sudan a “Yellow Alert” – defined as a “high risk of the evolving situation
becoming a disaster and generating suffering for children and youth that will
Ibid.
Author’s interview with Angelo ####, Programme Unit Manager for #### South Sudan, on 28
May 2015. See also, Author’s interview with Angelina ####, Gender and Child Protection Adviser
for #### South Sudan, on 29 May 2015.
117 Author’s interview with Roger ####, Director of Disaster Risk Management at ####
Headquarters, on 16 June 2015.
118 Author’s interview with Gyan ####, former Country Director for #### South Sudan, on 11
June 2015.
119 See above, n 110.
115
116
40
require #### to respond”.120 By this time, all commercial transport routes (air
and land) in and out of South Sudan had been closed and were under
Government control.121 With all national CO staff hiding at their homes,
international staff hibernating at a team house in Juba, and a curfew in force,
#### operations had, for all intents and purposes, been suspended. By 23
December, #### had begun responding to the crisis on an ad hoc basis,
providing water to IDPs that sought refuge in a Catholic church in Juba.122
Nonetheless, with the situation in South Sudan deteriorating rapidly, most of
#### national and international staff had been evacuated from Juba (primarily
to Kampala) by 25 December 2013.
In the period between departing Liberia in 1993, and the escalation of conflict in
South-Sudan in 2013, #### had become a more sophisticated and increasingly
bureaucratic organisation. Its structure had evolved such that Country Offices
(COs) now had Country Directors who reported to Regional Directors, in
addition to Programme Unit Managers assigned to each programme unit (similar
to the Field Director position in Liberia) who reported to Country Directors. In
addition, the Regional Directors now reported to the International Programmes
Director (IPD) who was based at ####. In addition, 2009 saw the formation of a
new Disaster Risk Management Department (DRM) – designed to increase ####
capacity to respond to disasters and humanitarian crises. The creation of the
DRM Department also saw the proliferation of governance material, including
the DRM Strategy123, DRM Policy124, and the #### Disaster Response Manual125.
Collectively, these additional layers of management and governance material
significantly increased organisational bureaucracy, with an on-paper impact on
decision-making processes.
####, #### South Sudan Security Situation Internal Report, No. 2, 17 December 2013. See
also, ####, #### Disaster Response Manual: Book 1 – Response Activities Guidance, (May 22
2013), p. 7.
121 See above, n 112.
122 Habtegabriel, R., ‘RE: ++URGENT++ Conference Call on South Sudan - humanitarian response
to the new emergency situation’ (email to S. Mace, C. Cushing, P. Rundell, G. ####, R. ####, U.
Krishnan, V. Macklenin, S. Williams, A. Lasuba), 23 December 2013.
123 ####, Disaster Risk Management Strategy (2009).
124 ####, Disaster Risk Management Policy (November 2009).
125 ####, #### Disaster Response Manual: Book 1 – Response Activities Guidance (May 22, 2013).
120
41
From a decision-making standpoint, in the Country Management Team’s
absence, the role of Acting Country Director had been passed to Resom
Habtegabriel, a South Sudanese member of #### South Sudan. As was standard
practice in non-emergency situations, decision-making authority lay with the
line management chain, as described above. Final accountability lay with ####
CEO, and the International Board. In accordance with the #### Disaster
Response Manual, and in the absence of #### South Sudan’s Country Director,
Gyan ####, the IPD (Tjipke Bergsma) set up an oversight group.126 Roger ####,
Director of Disaster Risk Management at ####, explains that the purpose of the
oversight group:
is to have an organisation-wide management of risk. And a forum in
which you can have the conversations with the NO and IH
perspectives. But the group is there to strengthen and to inform the
decision-making of the Regional Director.
It's not a line
management function. But it's there so that the Regional Director
and the Country Director are then making decisions knowing that IH
and the NOs are comfortable with the levels of risk they're either
taking or avoiding.127
The South Sudan Oversight Group (SSOG) that was created incorporated senior
management from #### Headquarters (####), the Regional Office, and the Irish
National Organisation (NO), as well as eventual representation from the Country
Office.128 With the deteriorating state of affairs continuing until at least 29
December, and #### unable to be contacted, a decision was made by Bergsma,
on the advice of Lesukat, to undertake a security assessment in South Sudan
before authorising international deployments.129 It was not until the beginning
of January, when Lekusat and the Regional Security Adviser were deployed to
Bergsma, T., ‘Re: #### South Sudan Response Strategy’ (email to M. Lesukat, R. ####, G.
####, H. Nyathi, R. Angerer, S. Mulholland, L. Anukur), 29 December 2013.
127 See above, n 117.
128 The following people participated in SSOG calls: Tjipke Bergsma and Roger #### from ####;
while Hazel Nyathi (Acting-Regional Director from December 2013 to January 2014) and Roland
Angerer (Regional Director from January onwards); David Dalton, National Director for ####
Ireland; and, from 9 January 2014 onwards, Gyan ####, Country Director for #### South Sudan.
129 See above, n 126.
126
42
Juba to undertake a security assessment that #### had access to reliable and
complete information regarding the situation on the ground.130
i)
Determining whether #### should stay or go
It is not immediately clear, based on the evidence available, whether a formal
decision was made that #### would remain in South Sudan, or whether it was a
question from the outset of how #### would adapt its programming. What is
clear, however, is that permanent withdrawal from South Sudan was never
seriously considered.
The manner in which security assessments were undertaken by #### indicates
that permanent withdrawal was never a consideration. From the outset, the
basis of undertaking security assessments was to ascertain when, not whether,
#### could re-deploy to South Sudan. This is illustrated in Bergsma’s email to
Lesukat on 29 December 2013, which states:
I have just had a call with Roger and we agreed that doing security
assessment is our first priority now. Based on the assessment we
could eventually agree on deployments…establish a response base in
Juba and bring a team back in again…131
This statement clearly does not contemplate the possibility that #### could be
forced to withdraw altogether. The absence of withdrawal from ####
consideration was then reiterated in the terms of reference for #### Security
Risk Assessment, #### first post-conflict on the ground assessment in South
Sudan, the objective of which was to establish #### “capacity to adapt and/or
timely respond to humanitarian needs of communities” rather than to assess
whether it should be present in South Sudan at all.132
See above, n 117.
See above, n 126.
132 ####, ToR for Security Risk Assessment for South Sudan (2-4 Jan 2014), 31 December 2013, p.
3.
130
131
43
The above could arguably suggest that absence of consideration of permanent
withdrawal was due to #### not being seriously concerned about the security
situation. However, the extent to which the eruption of conflict directly
impacted on #### operations in both Juba and Bor illustrates that #### was
acutely aware of the security risks posed by the conflict. This awareness would
not doubt have been heightened in light of the deaths of two UNMISS employees
in Akobo, Jonglei state, on 19 December.133 Furthermore, from #### perspective
re-deployment hinged on when senior management “judged that it was safe
enough to go back”.134 Whilst the security update communicated on 2 January
2014 by Lekusat noted “operations can resume in Juba”135, the SAR, issued on 5
January, recommended #### “hold the travels for all international staff into Juba
or South Sudan”136. This was quickly followed by the SSOG’s recommendation on
the same day that remaining international staff be withdrawn and operations to
be coordinated from the Regional Office in Nairobi. Security recommendations
are not binding on either the CO or RO, so the fact they were followed
demonstrates that #### took security very seriously in determining whether or
not to re-deploy. The prominence of security considerations in senior
management’s thinking is further illustrated through its emphasis in SSOG
discussions in the days following the release of the SAR.137 Nonetheless, the
worst-case scenario, identified in the final Security Assessment Report, merely
contemplated “the possibility of scaling down operations”. Thus,
notwithstanding #### clear appreciation of the gravity of the security risks,
withdrawal was still not on the table.
Given that permanent withdrawal was never on the table in spite of the
significant initial impact on #### operations and appreciable on-going security
concerns, what drove #### to remain? As far as #### in-country staff were
BBC News, ‘South Sudan crisis: Deadly attack on UN base condemned’, 20 December 2013,
viewed 23 July 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25469736>
134 See above, n 117.
135 Lesukat, M., ‘Re: Updates on Security Risk Assessment for South Sudan DAT ONE and approval
for visit to Awerial in Lakes State’ (email to H. Nyathi, G. ####, T. Bergsma, R. ####, R.
Habtegabriel), 2 January 2014.
136 See above, n 113.
137 ####, 10 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes). See also, ####, 13
January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
133
44
concerned, permanent withdrawal was not necessary as #### was still capable
of operating in South Sudan.138 Angelina ####, Gender and Child Protection
Adviser for #### South Sudan, remarked during interview that:
If you look at the level of the conflict, it's on some states. It's not all
over the country. And I think that's why, the fact that they could not
make a decision for pull-out. It's only responding to the area
affected by the emergency. But not ever pulling out of the country.139
This perception is echoed in third-party reports, which note that the conflict was
highly localised, primarily affecting Jonglei and Unity states.140 Nonetheless, as
indicated in Bergsma’s above-quoted email, as well as in the terms of reference
for the Security Risk Assessment, #### was lacking reliable on-the-ground
information prior to undertaking the assessment. As such, it is unlikely it would
have had a clear enough picture of the extent of the conflict in the early stages to
(on its own) justify eliminating the option of withdrawal.
#### tacit insistence on remaining in South Sudan in spite of security concerns
was arguably motivated primarily by a normative expectation that, as a
children’s rights NGO, it had a responsibility to remain to provide assistance
where it could. #### supports this view, stating:
…if you've got a presence then you've got the responsibility that goes
with the presence. As far as possible you want to uphold that, and
you want to preserve the relationships and credibility.
Your
assumption will always be that the conflict will end someday and you
will be able to do stuff. And if you've lost your presence, that will be
much more difficult.
From ####’ perspective, this responsibility is primarily owed to the
communities #### works with, characterising it as a “moral responsibility
through child sponsorship to accompany those children” when an emergency
See above, n 110.
Ibid.
140 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch Database - South Sudan, 5 January 2014, viewed 23
July 2015, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatchdatabase.aspx?CountryIDs={8B313EA2-534B-4421-B78C-776E93632115}#results>.
138
139
45
situation arises, a view echoed by ####.141 Interestingly, ####’ statement is a
reiteration of claims made by both #### and #### in the context of Liberia.
Whilst ####’ and ####’s views on #### ‘responsibility’ to assist children were
largely personal, #### decision to remain in Sierra Leone in 1994142 coupled
with ####’ statement lend weight to the suggestion that the perceived
responsibility to remain in conflict-affected areas has evolved into an
‘organisational principle’.
ii)
Adapting #### programme strategy in response to the conflict
With #### staff unanimous in their view that #### should retain a presence in
South Sudan, #### key strategic decisions centred on how it would adapt its
programming. Following the escalation of conflict in South Sudan, ####
significantly adapted its pre-existing programmes. Specifically, it suspended its
emergency flood response operations in Bor, also scaling down operations in Yei
– the location of its only pre-existing development programme in South Sudan.
In place of these operations, #### opted to focus the majority of its resources on
the growing IDP crisis in the Awerial County of the Lakes State – where ####
had no presence prior to the conflict – initially identifying six programme areas
to focus on, with a combined (####ned) budget of US$3.8m.143 It additionally
deployed a team to Nimule in Eastern Equatoria, also to support the influx of
IDPs in the area. Whilst some guidance was available to #### to aid its strategic
decision-making regarding its programmes, this was not used.144 As such, how
were #### programming decisions reached?
Author’s interview with Roger ####, Director of Disaster Risk Management at ####
Headquarters, on 16 June 2015. See also, Author’s interview with Gyan ####, former Country
Director for #### South Sudan, on 11 June 2015.
142 Don #### commented that the decision to remain in Sierra Leone was partly the result of an
acknowledgement that #### had made a mistake in pulling out of Liberia. See above, n 76.
143 Programme foci included WASH, nutrition and food assistance, psychosocial support,
education, shelter, and child protection. See, #### South Sudan Oversight Group, “Minutes of
Oversight Group Crisis Call: 06/01/14”.
144 Whilst #### contributed to the drafting and had access to the Conflict Sensitivity
Consortium’s How to guide to conflict sensitivity - guidance on the technical and operational
aspects of undertaking development programmes in CAFs – this document was not referred to in
strategic discussions, nor was it used on the ground. See, Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, How to
141
46
#### threshold decision concerned whether or not to operate in areas that were
affected by conflict, which it ultimately opted not to do. ####, Country Director
for #### South Sudan, was strongly of the view that #### should work in the
conflict-prone areas, remarking “if #### wasn’t going to work on the conflict,
why did it need to be in South Sudan?” Working for the benefit of the most
marginalized children necessitated that #### work in conflict-affected areas
where, in ####’s view, children were most at need.
So, if we are working for the benefit of children, and marginalised
people and poor people. This is the most demanding country. And
why you say we are not working in the conflict?145
Whilst ####’s position that #### should work in conflict-affected areas was
primarily dictated by personal preferences, it also reflects how he perceived his
role as an employee of a child-focused development NGO and the concomitant
responsibility to assist those who were perceived to be most in need.
Nonetheless, senior management did not share ####’s insistence that ####
should operate in conflict-affected areas. #### asserts, “I was told…[by ####
senior management]…that the conflict-prone areas, we should not go, we should
pull out”.146 Opposition to working in conflict-affected areas was echoed by
members of ####’s in-country staff. ####, #### Programme Unit Manager in
Yei, appears to have mediated more heavily in favour of security considerations
than humanitarian need, noting that “if the front line is so hot, you cannot
operate” because the risk to staff is too great.147 #### was arguably in a unique
position to comment on the security realities in South Sudan, having been caught
in the midst of the conflict himself.
I was even not happy, because I was in Yei and my family was in
Juba. So I was a little bit disturbed. Even personally, with ####, and
the decision on what I can do with my family was an
guide to conflict sensitivity, (February 2012). The same can be said for Book 3 of the DRM Manual
– #### only emergency-specific programming guide. See, above, n 125.
145 See above, n 118.
146 Ibid.
147 See above, n 110.
47
issue…personally when I was in Juba, people were not secure. You
can't feel that you are secure in Juba at that time.148
Whilst #### recognised the extreme needs of civilians in conflict-affected
communities, he highlights the difficulty of reconciling the needs of the
marginalised children #### was committed to assisting with his personal
preference for his own safety.
There was need to give support to those who are suffering but how
do you support an individual? Because, you too also need the
support and need protection. So, a little bit challenging at times.149
Whilst ####’s personal experience of the conflict no doubt influenced the
position he took, the infeasibility of #### operating in the conflict-affected
Jonglei state is not without bureaucratic support in light of senior management’s
instructions to withdraw. The declaration of state of emergency in Jonglei by the
South Sudanese Government on 1 January 2014150, denying humanitarian access
to the region, supports ####’s view and provides a partial insight into ####
decision to suspend operations in Jonglei. Indeed, this development was directly
referred to in Lesukat’s security update, which ultimately informed the decisions
of #### senior management.151 It also supports ####’ view that programming
decisions should be “mediated according to the security realities.152 Nonetheless,
UNOCHA, the WFP and others moved back into the region in early January to
provide relief to those affected by the fighting, indicating that space soon
emerged for humanitarian actors to play a role. As such, #### decision to cease
operations in Jonglei altogether, where other humanitarian actors were present,
is indicative of an unwillingness to work in conflict for reasons that arguably go
beyond security.
Whilst #### chose not to work in conflict-affected areas, it would be misleading
to suggest it did not work in response to the conflict. Its decision to focus its
Ibid.
Ibid.
150 Smith-Spark, N., and Mortensen, A., ‘South Sudan’s President declares state of emergency,
CNN, 1 January 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/01/world/africa/south-sudanconflict/>.
151 See above, n 135.
152 See above, n 117.
148
149
48
efforts and resources primarily on Awerial County and Nimule is illustrative of a
decision to work on the consequences of conflict. Awerial County, bordering on
Jonglei state, was home to tens of thousands of IDPs who had fled from fighting
in neighbouring Jonglei state. Furthermore, it was “the only non-UNMIS support
camp with immense need of support IN ALL sectors…”.153 In response to the
perceived humanitarian gap in Awerial, #### undertook a Rapid Needs
Assessment, which ultimately informed its decision to establish a humanitarian
operation in the area.154 The initial humanitarian response identified by ####
covered six areas that had been identified as lacking, with a forecast budget of
US$3.8 million. Similarly, in Nimule where IDPs had begun to congregate, ####
provided assistance primarily in the form of food distribution in response to
needs identified in an inter-agency coordinated assessment.155
#### response in Awerial and Nimule is consistent with ####’s view that
strategic programming decisions ought to be motivated by the needs of civilians,
and responsive to gaps in the provision of assistance by other NGOs.156
Furthermore, it is consistent with #### DRM Strategy, which dictates that ####
will respond to an emergency whenever it can “add value”.157 Whilst it is clear
that #### was at least partially motivated by the demonstrable humanitarian
need of civilians in Awerial and to a lesser extent in Nimule, it is nonetheless
unlikely this was #### sole motivation. Notably, #### only undertook needs
assessments in the conflict-free areas of Awerial County and Eastern Equatoria
province. As such, #### information-gathering practices and ultimate response
are not fully reflective of all or even the most prominent needs and humanitarian
gaps, as they were blind to children still caught in conflict-affected areas. The fact
that #### chose only to assess humanitarian need in areas not directly affected
by conflict further supports the claim made earlier that #### senior
management was reluctant to work in conflict-affected areas. It also suggests
See above, n 135.
Lesukat, M., Rapid Needs Assessment in Emergencies: Awerial County, Lake State – South Sudan,
####, 5 January 2014.
155 Coordinated Assessments, Initial Rapid Needs Assessment: IDPs in Nimule, Eastern Equatoria
State, 15 January 2014
156 See above, n 110.
157 See above, n 123, p. 8.
153
154
49
that #### had motivations for working specifically in Awerial and Nimule that
went beyond need. Lesukat’s security update sheds some light on ####
eagerness to operate in Awerial County, observing at one point that “most of the
displaced are communities we work with in Bor and in the same Awerial
location”.158 It is arguable that this quote is indicative of #### sense of
responsibility towards the communities it works with. This would appear to be
supported by the previously discussed organisational responsibility that has
arguably emerged within ####. It is also consistent with ####’s call for funding
addressed to #### National Organisations, which asserts “unmet needs of
children and existing commitments to donors are the key criteria we are
using”.159
Whilst the evidence supports a view that significant humanitarian need, ####
familiarity with the communities and related donor commitments, and the
absence of ‘hot conflict’ influenced #### decision to undertake a response in
Awerial and Nimule, it is argued that reputational considerations played at least
an equally influential part in #### programming decisions. From the outset, the
possibility of #### launching an emergency response in South Sudan was
framed as an opportunity to build its profile. In Lesukat’s security update issued
on 2 January 2014, the following recommendation is made:
#### to mount a response immediately as our profile and mandate
is questionable especially in our areas of operation in Juba and
Awerial.
#### reiterates this sentiment in his email call for programme funding in
February, where he states:
While it is a complex scene here in South Sudan, we also spot a big
opportunity for ####. If we are able to inject resources now, it will
help to position #### as a key actor. Next 4 to 8 weeks is a crucial
See above, n 135.
####, G., ‘South Sudan Humanitarian Crisis & #### response: An URGENT appeal for support’
(email to National Directors Team, R. Angerer, R. ####, T. Bergsma, N. Chapman, R. Habtegabriel,
U. Krishnan, National Organisation Programme Directors, L. Anukur, H. Nyathi), 12 February
2014.
158
159
50
period that may open up more opportunities if #### is seen
operational on the ground.160
#### concern with its reputation and profile interestingly also had a
constraining influence on programming decisions. Concerned #### was risking
diluting its clout by responding to multiple different areas, the SSOG placed
emphasis on the need to scale up in a small number of focus areas in order to
maximise #### visibility and reach.161 #### observed that this was a key point
of disagreement between #### senior management and the field, in particular
####, remarking:
The other disagreement was the extent of the focus that we needed
to give to the emergency programme. So, we were saying ‘Keep
much more focused in fewer sectors and fewer areas. Don't start
trying to do four different things in six different areas.’ And the
country, I think very much influenced by the shape of their previous
programmes, were at risk of diluting their clout when those
circumstances became much harder.162
#### went on to argue that ####’s push to extend #### programming to
multiple different areas “was a recipe for higher cost and higher risk”.163 Whilst
it is possible that #### reputation and ‘position’ in the sector is an equally
significant consideration in typical development contexts, it does not detract
from its influence on #### strategic decision-making in CAFS.
Concern regarding #### reputation and prominence amongst humanitarian
actors in South Sudan also appears to have been related to funding concerns.
Minutes from the SSOG’s meeting on 9 January include the following instruction
to the Country Office:
Ibid.
####, 5 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes). See also, ####, 7
February 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
162 See above, n 117.
163 Ibid.
160
161
51
Increase internal advocacy on the ground so #### gets recognition
for the work we are currently undertaking in camps, which will in
turn boost future funding opportunities.164
This quote neatly segues to the final observation in relation to decision-making
in South Sudan – that the key determinant of the nature of programming ####
undertook appears to have been the availability of funding. Whilst the issue of
funding is an equally influential factor in #### typical development
programming in non-conflict contexts, funding is largely viewed as ‘enabling’ –
that is, it mobilises #### to undertake projects. Conversely in the case of South
Sudan, it is the constraining effect that is particularly pronounced. This dynamic
is highlighted in minutes from the SSOG’s meeting on 7 February 2014, which
state “with limited money #### cannot make solid commitments to the
communities at the moment”, lamenting that “the situation is very bleak”.165
Those same minutes note that #### should “ensure that NOs are appropriately
approached to ensure the funding is secured”, going on to remark:
[German] NO and [Canadian] NO good at putting money up front as
long as they get a return on it. [Australian] NO is interest[ed] also
but has less money available to put up front.166
Whilst it was not possible to interview staff from any of #### NOs, nor obtain
documentary evidence from them, the above clearly illustrates that ####’s
senior management perceived that control of programming decisions was
somewhat out of its hands. ####’s subsequent blanket call to all NOs for funding
further emphasises #### dependence on NO support to undertake
programming, and thus the significant influence of funding availability.
Strategic decisions regarding #### programming in South Sudan seem to
predominantly have been reached through the medium of the regular SSOG calls.
Whilst email correspondence obtained suggests there was some discussion of
strategic issues between #### staff outside of this forum, many of the ultimate
organisational decisions appear to have been reached and communicated via the
####, 9 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
####, 7 February 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
166 Ibid.
164
165
52
SSOG calls. This is arguably not particularly surprising, however, given that these
calls were the primary opportunity for key management staff from all levels of
#### (CO, RO, International Headquarters, and NO) to meet as a group.
Interestingly, however, representation of the #### South Sudan Country Office
was absent from meetings of the SSOG prior to 8 January 2014. By that stage,
#### had already made some of the key strategic decisions including the
decision to focus its efforts on Awerial.167 Whilst ####’s early absence from the
oversight group calls can be explained due to his absence from the region on
annual leave, no other in-country staff were requested to attend calls in ####’s
stead. This is notwithstanding that #### South Sudan had an Acting Country
Director in place at the time in Resom Habtegabriel. As such, the evidence
suggests that the Country Office was left somewhat without a voice in the
decision-making process during the early stages. This observation is supported
by ####’s testimony, which emphasised poor communication between the incountry staff and staff from the Regional Office and ####. #### remarks that
#### senior management “have no understanding of the conflict, and they are
saying ‘do this, do that’…they are not very trying to understand, or to listen”.
#### senior management’s inconsistent regard for the views of in-country staff
is also illustrated, according to ####, in the occasional shifting of decisionmaking responsibility from senior management to the field. #### remarks,
“when the crisis comes and you need to make a decision, they will say that ‘you
are the Country Director’”, implying that #### should make the decisions. Yet,
on other occasions, #### recalls, “they pushed me saying ‘why are you not
there’”.168
C
How does #### reach strategic decisions in CAFs?
For example. SSOG meeting minutes from 7 January 2014 note, “our focus is Awerial”. See,
####, 7 February 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
168 See above, n 118.
167
53
The preceding analyses shed light on how the individuals involved in strategic
decision-making processes in Liberia and South Sudan reached decisions,
illustrating the relative interplay between individuals’ personal and bureaucratic
preferences, and how roles were used to legitimise decision-making. In doing so,
it also provided an overview of the interplay between the various actors involved
in the decision-making processes and what led to the ultimate organisational
decisions. Having unpacked the decision-making processes in isolation, this
section goes on to evaluate the decision-making processes collectively, making
some general claims in response to the empirical questions reiterated through
this thesis – how has #### reach decisions about whether to remain or
withdraw from CAFs, and how has it adapted its programming?
i)
#### has a responsibility to remain in country and provide
humanitarian assistance where possible
#### strategic decision to remain in country in both South Sudan and Liberia
(initially) was strongly influenced by a perceived responsibility to retain a
presence. In both case studies, #### staff – particularly those on the ground –
indicated that they owed a responsibility to the children and communities
affected by conflict to remain in country. #### and #### take the view that
development NGOs like #### always have a role to play in providing
humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the presence of conflict. From their
perspectives, #### was obliged to remain in Liberia and South Sudan due to the
appreciable humanitarian need, and in the case of Liberia the lack of NGOs
dedicated to providing assistance specifically to children. In #### and ####’s
view, #### owed a responsibility to children and communities at large.
Whereas, for ####, and to a lesser extent ####, the responsibility is primarily
owed to #### sponsor children, with both remarking on the importance of
retaining a presence and providing whatever assistance was possible until such
time as ‘regular’ development programmes can resume. Whilst ####’ cites the
risk to #### credibility in the eyes of the communities it works with by not
54
retaining a presence, #### stresses the benefit of continuing to undertake
programming “as best possible directed at meeting children’s needs”, noting:
Appreciation of the people and the local partners, and the national
stakeholders is really high when you stick with them and you
demonstrate solidarity. Even in a much reduced and almost, you
know, really small role. The continued support is pretty
valuable. And people don't forget it.169
Interestingly, the case studies demonstrate a shift in the source of this
responsibility. In the case of Liberia, the perceived responsibility appears to have
stemmed very much from ####’ and ####’s personal preferences, with the
decision to remain, and the programming undertaken a direct result of their
individual initiative and expertise, divorced from their normative expectations.
Whilst their roles as NGO workers aided in legitimising their points of view, it
was ultimately their own preferences as to what was the ‘right thing to do’ that
drove #### to remain. The fact that #### permanently withdrew from Liberia
shortly after #### and #### had departed lends weight to this argument. On
the other hand, #### presence in South Sudan appears to have been strongly
predicated on an ‘organisational responsibility’. The lack of discussion of
withdrawal at any level of the organisation suggests both that it has become a
normative expectation that #### will remain in states that become conflictaffected, and that the personal preferences of #### staff were largely aligned
with this expectation. This emergence of this ‘organisational responsibility’ is
illustrated through #### decision to remain in Sierra Leone shortly after it
withdrew from Liberia. ####, member of the West African Regional
Management Team whilst #### was in Liberia, sees it as due in part to an
organisational recognition that withdrawing from Liberia had been a mistake,
recalling:
[W]hen we had a discussion about pulling out of Sierra Leone, with a
similar team, we had further, how can I say, deepened our
understanding and done a lot of analysis. So when we made, when
169
See above, n 75 and 117.
55
the management team made a recommendation that we don't pull
out of Sierra Leone, and kind of even made reference to the fact that
it would have been better to stay in Liberia, that argument was given
serious consideration. In the end, we did do what we said which was
scale right back but not pull out.170
####’ reiterates this notion of #### having evolved as an organisation,
remarking:
[I]t was Sierra Leone that we kept going…The recognition that you
didn't disappear, even if you couldn't do anything much. I think
there were significant chunks of time where we couldn't do anything
much in Sierra Leone. But, the fact that we were there meant that
when we could do something, we could get going quite quickly. And
we did a lot of re-opening of schools in Sierra Leone as the crisis
deteriorated. So, as far as possible, we wouldn't close down
completely.171
ii)
#### does not work ‘in’ conflict
In spite of the organisational responsibility to remain in countries that become
conflict-affected as discussed above, #### reluctance to work in conflict has
persisted. #### continued presence in Liberia was predicated on it purely
taking on the role of enabler, with no mandate to implement programmes in
conflict-affected areas. Further, in addition to the explicit instructions given to
#### to pull out of the conflict-affected areas of South Sudan, the absence of
needs or security assessments in conflict-affected areas indicates that #### did
not even consider working in conflict.172 In spite of #### being committed to
responding to demonstrable humanitarian need, this was not sufficient to
persuade #### to operate in the conflict-affected areas of both Liberia and South
Sudan.
See above, n 76.
See above, n 117.
172 Both the documentary evidence, as well as interview testimony of Angelina ####, Gyan ####,
Raymond ####, and Mark #### support this contention.
170
171
56
In both cases the reluctance to work in conflict was primarily felt at the
organisational level, with prominent field staff – #### and #### in Liberia, and
#### in South Sudan – all fighting against what appears to be a strong
bureaucratic preference to avoid working in conflict. Whilst the reasons for this
reluctance are not clear, ####’ reference to #### organisational orientation as a
development (as opposed to humanitarian) NGO arguably sheds some light on
the issue. When asked why #### senior management had been opposed to
retaining a presence in Liberia, and why #### could not directly implement
programmes, #### noted that “#### wasn’t set up to work in conflict…wasn’t
geared to work in that kind of context”.173 Broadly speaking, #### lack of
orientation to conflict contexts is explicable due to its core operations being
development-focussed, resulting in a lack of analytical capability174, and the
absence of security or risk apparatus specifically designed to address conflict
contexts. #### sheds further light on this issue, noting #### lack of mobility in
conflict-affected areas as compared to other NGOs. This arguably explains why
in both cases other NGOs with more orthodox humanitarian mandates are seen
to be operating in conflict-affected areas, where #### would not.175
Nonetheless, #### reluctance to work in conflict should not be interpreted as
due to the lack of an appetite for working in CAFS. Coupled with the perceived
organisational responsibility discussed above, the evidence – particularly in the
case of South Sudan – supports the claim that #### will work on the
consequences of conflict, with its programmes in Awerial and Nimule focused on
mitigating the humanitarian impact to IDPs affected by the civil war.
iii)
#### is a donor-led organisation
See above, n 75.
In neither case did #### undertake a conflict-specific situational analysis or conflict
sensitivity analysis. See, for example: Author’s interview with Mark ####, former Field Director
for #### Liberia, on 22 May 2015; and, Author’s interview with Angelina ####, Gender and
Child Protection Adviser for #### South Sudan, on 29 May 2015.
175 For example, MSF and UNICEF in Liberia, and UNOCHA in South Sudan.
173
174
57
#### ability to undertake programme work in Liberia and South Sudan was
predicated on its ability to gain the support of donors. In Liberia, the support of
donors was essential to #### and #### getting #### senior management to
acquiesce to retaining a presence in the first place. Subsequently, as ####
exclaims, #### ability to get other NGOs to undertake programme work on its
behalf was significantly influenced by what ####, as the money-holder, and in
turn #### donors, wanted done. This claim is supported by the fact that MSF
Belgium – not traditionally a child-focussed NGO – was cajoled into undertaking
child-focused programmes. Because, as #### puts it, that was “the priority for
the financial backer”.176
South Sudan equally demonstrates the influence of those with control over the
funds over #### programmes. As discussed above in the South Sudan case
study, #### ability to undertake programmes was dependent on it being able to
convince NOs177 (NOs) of the benefit of funding programmes in South Sudan.
Minutes of SSOG calls, coupled with ####’s email call to NOs for funding clearly
illustrate this dynamic. Interestingly, this dynamic not only influenced ####
strategic decisions around its programming, but also how it framed discussions
around its programme work in South Sudan. As the documentary evidence
discussed in relation to South Sudan demonstrates, #### made strategic
decisions around its programming based, in part, on an insistence on positioning
itself as a prominent humanitarian actor in the area, for the purpose of raising its
profile. The push to increase #### profile was, in turn, motivated by the belief
held by #### senior management that this would increase the likelihood of
securing further funding.
The above dynamic illustrates the role of bureaucratic preferences in influencing
strategic decisions regarding programming in South Sudan, with the ability to
gain the support of NOs pivotal to undertaking programmes. So much so was
this the case that #### had to scale down programmes it had previously
Ibid.
National Organisations (NOs) are the entities within the #### federation responsible for
raising funds and remitting them to Country Offices.
176
177
58
identified as necessary due to the lack of donor support. The ability of NOs to so
heavily influence strategic decisions is also demonstrative of Jabri’s concept of
‘relative distribution of influence’. The differential capacity of NOs to call on
institutional resources – in this case, through their control over donor funds –
enabled them to both set the normative expectations, and ‘frame’ the discussion
around development programmes. Indeed, the framing of the South Sudan
emergency undertaken by #### staff in the field and in senior management
positions was at least partly due to attempts to present a more persuasive case
to NOs to secure funding.
iv)
Where you stand depends on where you sit
Analysis of #### decision-making in Liberia and South Sudan illustrates a strong
connection between actors’ roles within #### organisational hierarchy and the
interplay between personal and bureaucratic preferences. In both case studies,
#### staff at the senior management level demonstrated a tendency to favour
bureaucratic preferences in reaching their decisions, mediating strategic
decisions more heavily in relation to security considerations, donor
commitments, organisational profile, and other normative expectations.
Moreover, there is little indication in either case of senior management acting in
a ‘self-directed’ manner that was not consistent with their normative
expectations. On the other hand, the positions taken by ####, ####, and ####
were primarily motivated by personal preferences: in ####’ and ####’s case,
that #### was able to contribute to ameliorating the humanitarian crisis, and
that it had a responsibility as a children’s rights NGO to do so; and in ####’s
case, that #### should work in conflict. #### acknowledges this distinction
between the approach taken by field staff as compared with senior management,
remarking, “there always has been this tension between the headquarters and
the field”.178 Whilst the reason for this dichotomy is not entirely clear, it is
arguable that it is a result of the differing roles and associated normative
expectations of senior management compared to the field. Senior management
178
See above, n 52.
59
roles, due to their position in the organisational hierarchy, are situated closer to
the source of #### bureaucracy, and are responsible for both developing and
enforcing it. As such, it is arguable that normative expectation placed on senior
management to comply with #### bureaucracy is greater. Field-based staff, on
the other hand, are somewhat separated from #### bureaucratic machinations,
primarily concerned with undertaking programme work. As such, their roles
naturally provide greater room for the engagement of personal preferences. This
is largely consistent with Jabri’s view of the interplay between personal and
bureaucratic preferences, remarking that it will vary across different
institutional settings.179
Related to this, one of the starkest differences between #### in Liberia and
#### in South Sudan is the extent to which bureaucracy influenced the ultimate
organisational decisions. A less sophisticated and bureaucratic organisation in
the early 1990s, the work undertaken by #### and #### is indicative of field
staff having far greater space for reflexive self-direction, with the programming
undertaken entirely a result of ####’s and ####’ initiative. Furthermore, with
the exception of the initial support of #### donors, bureaucratic considerations
appear to have had minimal influence on the work undertaken in Liberia. Since
Liberia, #### has become a more “sophisticated”180 and heavily bureaucratic
NGO. With respect to #### work in CAFS, this is arguably due in part to the
formation of the DRM Department, and proliferation of policies and guidance.
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a dedicated conflict policy or strategy to
guide strategic decision-making in CAFS, bureaucratic considerations heavily
influenced the final strategic organisational decisions. The early absence of incountry staff from strategic discussions in South Sudan further illustrates the
influence of senior management bureaucracy on decision-making. Additionally,
it demonstrates the impact of Jabri’s notion of relative distribution of influence.
In this case, senior management possessed greater capacity to draw on
institutional resources (through participation in SSOG calls from the outset),
179
180
See above, n 21.
See above, n 76.
60
with the strategic decision to focus on Awerial at that time reached largely
without the input in-country staff ultimately framing subsequent discussions as
to how #### should adapt its programming.
The increased influence of bureaucracy has arguably left #### less capable of
working in conflict. The autonomy afforded to #### and #### left them free to
adapt #### programming as they saw fit, based on their individual experience
and expertise, and allowed them to be less constrained by #### traditional
organisational orientation. In contrast, the increased role of bureaucracy in
South Sudan and concomitant increase in the role of senior management has
reduced the space within which individual actors can operate. More constrained
by bureaucratic preferences, #### has less room to adapt its traditional
approach to suit rapidly changing contexts.
61
4
CONCLUSION
#### provides an example of a development NGO not traditionally geared to
work in CAFS. Nonetheless, frequently confronted with the onset or escalation of
conflict that impacts on its traditional development programmes, #### is faced
with the strategic decisions as to whether it should retain a presence in country
and, if opting to remain, how it should adapt its programmes. In the absence of a
dedicated conflict strategy or policy to guide its decision-making, #### is forced
to make strategic decisions on a case-by-case basis, at times appearing to muddle
through on the basis of individuals’ preferences, whilst on other occasions
appearing heavily constrained by bureaucracy. In spite of the somewhat ad hoc
nature of #### strategic decision-making, it is possible to make certain claims as
to how #### has reached strategic decisions.
#### decisions to retain a presence in Liberia (initially) and South Sudan were
the result of a perceived responsibility to remain and provide humanitarian
assistance where this was possible.
Whilst in the case of Liberia, this
responsibility stemmed from the personal preferences of key actors in the field,
#### subsequent experiences of conflict in Sierra Leone and South Sudan
illustrate
the
evolution
of
this
responsibility
into an
organisational
responsibility. This responsibility appears to have become so entrenched in
#### normative framework that the option of permanent withdrawal from
South Sudan was not even considered.
Whilst committed to retaining a presence in countries that become conflictaffected, the case studies nonetheless depict a lack of organisational appetite for
working within conflict itself. Influenced by a combination of perceived
‘organisational orientation’ and security considerations, #### made strategic
decisions to adapt its programming in both Liberia and South Sudan such that it
avoided operating directly in conflict. #### operations in South Sudan do,
however, indicate a willingness to work on the consequences of conflict, to the
extent that this is possible without operating in areas where active fighting is
occurring. However, whilst this tendency ‘directs’ the areas in which #### is
62
willing to operate, strategic decisions regarding the specific programme work
#### undertakes appear to be significantly influenced by the preferences of
#### donors. Donor support encourages #### senior management to
undertake certain types of programmes, whilst constraining its ability to
undertake others. Given the organisational structure of ####, reliance on its
NOs in order to obtain programme funding is not unique to conflict contexts.
However, given the urgency attached to programming in emergency contexts,
coupled with the increased costs of operating in unstable conflict environments
(particularly security costs), the impact of delays or uncertainties in funding is
arguably far greater.
Analysis of #### decision-making in both cases illustrates the growing role of
bureaucracy in its decision-making processes. In Liberia, personal preferences
largely dictated the strategic programming decisions #### took, with field staff
afforded a lot of autonomy to find their own solutions to the unique challenges of
working in conflict contexts. Conversely, the increased role of senior
management in South Sudan – most clearly illustrated through the absence of incountry staff from early decision-making processes - resulted in programming
decisions being predominantly driven by bureaucracy. Given the fluid and
unpredictable nature of conflict contexts, it is arguable that the increased
influence of bureaucracy has rendered #### less adaptable and thereby less
capable of operating effectively in such environments.
What emerges from the above overview of #### strategic decision-making in
CAFS is the impression that #### vision of a better world does not fit with its
action or organisational orientation. If #### intends to follow through on its
vision “to reach as many children as possible, particularly those who are
excluded or marginalised, with high quality programmes that deliver long-lasting
benefits”181, this necessitates working in CAFS. Further, given children are most
marginalised and at greatest risk when caught in the midst of conflict, it arguably
necessitates working in conflict-affected areas. Alternatively, this may not
181
See above, n 12.
63
necessarily be of significant concern to ####, if there is not a genuine
organisational appetite to work in conflict in the first place. Either way, it is
necessary for #### to address this contradiction between its vision and action,
which will firstly require #### to make a conscious decision as to whether it
wants to continue to operate in CAFS and work with the most marginalised
children. Acknowledging that it has a role to play in CAFS will necessitate an
evaluation of its actual (rather than perceived) organisational orientation, and
the development of a framework that strengthens #### capacity to operate
effectively in these contexts. In this regard, #### would arguably benefit from a
review of other traditionally development-focused NGOs that have recently
made concerted efforts to expand their capacity to work in CAFS.182 On the other
hand, continued insistence that ‘#### does not work in conflict’ will require a
wholesale re-think of #### organisational mission and vision to more accurately
reflect the kind of work #### is currently willing and able to undertake.
World Vision, for example, has done a lot of work recently on building its capacity to work in
CAFS through the establishment of peace-building and conflict sensitivity as a key area of its
programme work. It has also developed a dedicated training course, ‘Making Sense of Turbulent
Contexts’, aimed at training NGO staff on how to work in conflict contexts. See, World Vision,
Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity, viewed 1 August 2015, <
http://www.wvi.org/topics/peacebuilding-and-conflict-sensitivity>.
182
64
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####, What We Do, viewed 30 June 2015, <http://####-international.org/whatwe-do>.
EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE
####, G., ‘South Sudan Humanitarian Crisis & #### response: An URGENT
appeal for support’ (email to National Directors Team, R. Angerer, R. ####, T.
Bergsma, N. Chapman, R. Habtegabriel, U. Krishnan, National Organisation
Programme Directors, L. Anukur, H. Nyathi), 12 February 2014.
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INTERVIEWS
Author’s interview with Angelina ####, Gender and Child Protection Adviser for
#### South Sudan, on 29 May 2015.
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Sudan, on 28 May 2015.
Author’s interview with Don ####, former Field Director in Burkina Faso and
member of West African Regional Management Team, on 22 May 2015.
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Sudan, on 11 June 2015.
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22 May 2015.
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West Africa, on 30 June 2015.
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#### Headquarters, on 16 June 2015.
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####, Disaster Risk Management Policy (November 2009).
66
####, Disaster Risk Management Strategy 2009-2015 (2009).
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(May 22, 2013).
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####, 3 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
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####, 7 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
####, 10 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
####, 13 January 2014, South Sudan Oversight Group (Meeting Minutes).
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REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS
Coordinated Assessments, Initial Rapid Needs Assessment: IDPs in Nimule, Eastern
Equatoria State, 15 January 2014.
####, #### South Sudan Security Situation Internal Report, No. 2, 17 December
2013.
67
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