Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Reputation based Cooperation Enforcement
Mechanism in Wireless Ad hoc Networks
Using Game Theory
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Manish Chaturvedi (200711034)
Supervisor: Prof. Sanjay Srivastava
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
September 2008
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Outline
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
1
Problem Definition
2
Some terms and Concepts
3
Motivation
4
Related Work
Related Work
5
Analysis of existing schemes
Analysis of
existing
schemes
6
Open Issues and Conclusion
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Problem Definition
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Problem Statement
Outline
Assumptions
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
To design a lightweight reputation based cooperation
enforcement scheme for wireless ad hoc networks.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Every node has unique unforgeable identity.
All the links are bidirectional.
Destination node is not malicious.
Nodes may be mobile and network topology may
change dynamically.
5. Nodes can have different traffic patterns and different
energy constraints.
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Problem Definition
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Objectives
1. To enforce/stimulate cooperation among nodes for
packet forwarding activity without compromising on
overhead (in terms of control packets or intensive
computations).
2. To identify and isolate malicious nodes without affecting
legitimate nodes’ performance.
3. Mathematical(Game theory) and Simulation based
analysis of proposed scheme with respect to
parameters like stimulating cooperation, throughput and
network life time.
4. Tuning protocol parameters for various network
configurations.
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Problem Definition
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Outcomes
1. Protocol Design
2. Simulation results stating effectiveness of proposed
scheme on throughput, network life time, and
cooperation degree among nodes.
3. Mathematical model supporting simulation results.
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Some related terms and concepts
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Reputation: Measure of cooperation of given node.
Selfish node: A node which asks other nodes to
forward its packets but is not interested in providing the
service to others in order to save resources. Does not
aim to damage network.
Malicious node: A node who tries to attack the system
(by dropping packets, injecting traffic etc.) and
maximize the damage.
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Some Cooperation related terms and concepts
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Game theory Concepts [21]
Nash equilibrium: Set of strategy profiles of all the
players comprised of mutual best responses of the
players. None of the player can gain more by
unilaterally changing his strategy.
Pareto Optimality: Set of strategy profiles of all the
players comprised of best response for all the players.
i.e. No other strategy set can give better payoff than
Pareto optimal solution.
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Some Cooperation related terms and concepts
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Figure: Packet Forwarding game
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Need of Cooperation
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
Characteristics of Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
1. No existing infrastructure.
2. Nodes with limited resources(energy, bandwidth).
3. Nodes perform networking tasks e.g. routing packets.
If nodes belong to different authorities, they may not be
willing to forward packets for others.
Why Cooperation enforcement is Necessary?
1. [3] investigates scenarios in which cooperation can
exist without incentive/enforcement mechanism and
concludes using simulations that such scenarios occur
very rarely in practice.
2. [1], [2], and [5] performs game theory analysis of
packet forwarding process for selfish nodes and
conclude that the node should not help its neighbor
more than its neighbor has helped it.
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Classification of Cooperation Enforcement
schemes
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Pricing based Schemes
1. Adhoc VCG [6], COMMIT [7]
2. Nuglet [11], Sprite [11] [18]
Reputation based Schemes
1. Local reputation schemes: OCEAN [11] [18], LARS [11]
2. Global reputation schemes: CONFIDANT [11] [18],
CORE [11] [18], ARCS [10]
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Classification of Cooperation Enforcement
schemes
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
Figure: Payment calculation in ad hoc VCG
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Classification of Cooperation Enforcement
schemes
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Figure: Reputation update using Watchdog mechanism
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Analysis
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
Limitation of Pricing based schemes
1. Pricing based schemes require tamper proof hardware
or central authority for secure e-payment.
2. Routing overhead is very high as caching mechanism
as that of DSR can not be used.
3. Do not address the malicious behaviors.
Limitation of reputation based schemes
1. Local Reputation Schemes requires less overhead but
may not be effective when nodes are mobile and
network topology changes very frequently.
2. Global reputation schemes has large overhead as it
requires to maintain reputation information about all the
nodes in the network.
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Open Issues and Conclusion
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
1. Pricing based schemes: Special hardware/central
authority requirement and does not address malicious
behavior effectively.
2. Local Reputation schemes: Less effective with dynamic
network topology.
3. Global Reputation schemes: Global cooperation is
costly.
There is really need of a cooperation scheme which is
light weight as local reputation schemes, effective as
global cooperation schemes and address various
misbehaviors.
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Thank You
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
References
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
1
Nash Equilibrium Analysis of packet forwrding in Ad hoc network
[1] Vikram Srinivasan, Pavan Nuggehalli, Carla F. Chiasserini, Ramesh R.
Rao, ”Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks”, in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM, vol. 2, Apr. 2003, pp:808–817.
[2] E. Altman, A. A. Kherani, P. Michiardi, and R. Molva, ”Noncooperative
forwarding in ad hoc networks”, in Proc. 4th Int. Networking Conf.,
Waterloo, ON, Canada, May 2005, pp:486–498.
[3] M. Felegyhazi, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttyan, ”Nash equilibria of packet
forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks”, IEEE Trans. Mobile
Comput., vol. 5, no.5, May 2006, pp:463–476.
[4] W. Yu and K. J. R. Liu, ”On optimal and cheat-proof packets forwarding
strategies in autonomous ad hoc networks”, in Proc. 40th Annu. Conf.
Information Sciences Systems, 2006, pp:1455–1460.
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
[5] A. Urpi, M. Bonuccelli, S. Giordano,”Modelling cooperation in mobile
ad hoc networks: a formal description of selfishness”, in WiOpt
Workshop: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless
Networks INRIA Sophia-Antipolis, France, Mar. 2003.
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
2
Pricing based Schemes
[6] Luzi Anderegg,Stephan Eidenbenz,”Ad hoc-VCG: A Truthful and
Cost-Efficient Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad hoc Networks with
Selfish Agents”, International conference on Mobile Communications
and Networking,2003, pp:245–259.
[7] Stephan Eidenbenz,Giovanni Resta,Paolo Santi,”COMMIT: A
Sender-Centric Truthful and Energy-Efficient Routing Protocol for Ad
Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes”, Proceedings of the 19th IEEE
International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium
(IPDPS-05).
[8] Hua Liu and Bhaskar Krishnamachari,”A price-based reliable routing
game in wireless networks”, Workshop on Game theory for
communications and networks ,Pisa, Italy,2006.
3
Reputation based schemes
[9] W. Yu and K. J. R. Liu, ”Secure Cooperation in Autonomous Mobile
Ad-Hoc Networks Under Noise and Imperfect Monitoring: A
Game-Theoretic Approach”, in IEEE Transaction on Information
Forensics And Security, VOL. 3, NO. 2, JUNE 2008.
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
[10] Wei Yu, K. J. Ray Liu,”Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation in
Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks”, IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED
AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 23, NO. 12, DECEMBER 2005.
[11] Jiangyi Hu, ”Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, Survey and
Locally Aware Reputation System (LARS) Scheme.
[12] Jamal N. Al-Karaki,”ON THE NODE COOPERATION IN MOBILE AD
HOC NETWORKS”, IEEE,2006.
[13] Jamal N. Al-Karaki, Ahmed E. Kamal, ”Stimulating Node Cooperation
in Mobile Ad hoc Networks”, Wireless Pers Commun (2008) 44:
219–239.
[14] Kamal Deep Meka, Mohit Virendra, Shambhu Upadhyaya, ”Trust
Based Routing Decisions in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks”, The Second
Secure Knowledge Management Workshop (SKM) 2006.
4
Others
[15] Toshihiro SUZUKI, Ashiq KHAN, and Wataru TAKITA,”Proactive
Cooperation Mechanism against Selfish Power Off for Mobile Ad Hoc
Networks”, IEICE TRANS. COMMUN., VOL.E90B, NO.10 OCTOBER
2007.
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
[16] Djamel Djenouri,Nadjib Badache,”New Approach for Selfish Nodes
Detection in Mobile Ad hoc Networks”, IEEE Communications Surveys
and Tutorials, 7(4), 2005.
[17] Yanbin Liu, Yang Richard Yang,”Reputation Propagation and
Agreement in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks”, IEEE Wireless
Communications an Networking Conference,2003.
[18] G. F. Marias, P. Georgiadis, D. Flitzanis, K. Mandalas,”Cooperation
enforcement schemes for MANETs: A survey”, Wireless
Communication and Mobile Computing 2006; 6:319–332.
[19] Christian Facchini and Fabrizio Granelli,”ANALYSIS OF TCP/MAC
INTERACTIONS USING THE GAME THEORY”, Technical Report
DISI-08-025 May 2008.
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
[20] Vivek Srivastava, James Neel, Allen B. Mackenzie, Rekha Menon,
Luiz A. Dasilva, James E. Hicks, Jefferey H. Reed, and Robert P.
Gilles, ”USING GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE WIRELESS AD HOC
NETWORKS”, IEEE Communications Surveys, FOURTH QUARTER
2005, VOLUME 7, NO. 4.
[21] Mark Felegyhazi, Jean-Pierre Hubaux,”Game Theory in Wireless
Networks: A Tutorial”, In EPFL technical report,
LCA-REPORT-2006-002, February, 2006.
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar
Reputation
based
Cooperation
Enforcement
Mechanism in
Wireless Ad
hoc Networks
Using Game
Theory
[22] Sylvie Laniepce, Jacques Demerjian, Amdjed Mokhtari,”Cooperation
Monitoring Issues in Ad Hoc Networks”, in IWCMC-06, July 3-6, 2006,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
[23] Marco Conti, Enrico Gregori, Gaia Maselli, ”Cooperation Issues in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW-2004).
Outline
Problem
Definition
Some terms
and Concepts
Motivation
Related Work
Analysis of
existing
schemes
Open Issues
and
Conclusion
References
Modelling and Analysis Group of NeTworks (MAGNeT), DA-IICT, Gandhinagar