Water Economics and Financing Water Markets in Integrated Water Management Trading into and out of trouble Australian water allocation & trading experience Prof Mike Young, The University of Adelaide Zaragoza, 29 July 2008 Progressive unbundling Land Title with Water Licence attached Water Land Tradeable Rights Entitlement Shares in Perpetuity Bank-like Allocations Delivery Price Use licences with limits & obligations National Competition Policy 1993/94 National Water Initiative 2004 Markets rather than governments as the integrator Murray-Darling Basin Water Entitlement Transfers - 1983/84 to 2003/04 1 200 1 100 Intrastate Intrastate Interstate Interstate 1 000 Transfer Volume (GL) 900 Temporary (GL) Permanent (GL) Temporary (GL) Permanent (GL) 800 700 Intra Intra Inte Inte 600 500 400 300 2003/04 2002/03 2001/02 2000/01 1999/00 1998/99 1997/98 1996/97 1995/96 1994/95 1993/94 1992/93 1991/92 1990/91 1989/90 1988/89 1987/88 1986/87 1985/86 1983/84 0 1984/85 100 2003/04 2002/03 200 2001/02 2000/01 Scarcity and Trading Source: Murray Darling Basin Commission, 2007. Trading has enabled adoption of new technology and “greenfield” development Benefits of trading 1200 Cotton Index 1100 Sugar Index 1000 Total crops sector Index 800 Total Livestock sector Index Milk Index 700 Total prices received Index 900 Total Grains Index 600 Waterdex 500 400 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Year Psi-Delta 2007 Bjornlund and Rossini 2007 Costs of not getting fundamentals right • Australia introduced trading without getting the foundations right • Markets reveal flaws – Trading has increased the costs of fixing system flaws • Revealed over-allocation by increasing use • Revealed administrative reluctance to keep the system in balance • Trade now seen as a way to reduce the costs of structural adjustment 0 2004 300 2004 2001 1998 1995 1992 1989 1986 1983 1980 14% less 2001 1998 1995 1992 1989 1986 400 1983 1980 1977 1974 1971 1968 1965 1962 1959 1956 1500 1977 1974 1971 1968 1965 1962 1959 1956 PERTH 1953 1950 1947 1944 1941 1938 1935 1932 1929 1926 1923 1920 1917 1914 1911 Rainfall (m m ) 2000 1953 1950 1947 1944 1941 1938 1935 1932 1929 1926 1923 1920 1917 1914 1911 S tr e a m flo w (G L ) Insufficient planning for less water Rainfall for Jarrahdale 20% less - 1% 1000 500 0 1000 900 S tre a m in flo w fo r P e rth d a m s (P rio r to S tirlin g D a m ) 800 700 600 500 4 8 % le s s - 3% 66% le s s 200 100 Volume of Water in the System Indicative template for sharing and allocating water Unbundling framework Scale Policy Objective Distributive Equity System-wide Sharing regime Management (Strategic Instruments) Individual users (Market Instruments) Economic Efficiency Environmental Externalities Seasonal Catchment Plans allocation of water to River flow and pools quality protocols Trading Protocols Individual Individual entitlements allocations Water-use approvals Individual entitlements 1. Issue shares not volumetric entitlements 2. Validate registers early 3. Ensure register compatibility 4. Don’t deepen droughts – – Allow individual users to manage interseasonal risk Allow carry-forward of allocations and give market access to storage capacity System wide planning & management 1. Install meters and convert from area to volumetric allocation systems (asap) 2. Give the environment a share don’t expect communities to plan for adverse climate shifts 3. Account for all forms water use – especially the unmeterable •Forests, farm dams, return flows 4. Manage groundwater inter-connectivity –When use of one increases the other must decrease Efficient supply and delivery 1. Don’t subsidize supply and infrastructure provision – – Charge at marginal cost of delivery Transfer ownership of the supply system to entitlement holders. 2. Use separate instruments to manage externalities • Reward users who reduce externalities Administrative separation - Murrumbidgee Murrumbidgee Irrigation: Index of costs in real terms since privatisation 1.15 1.10 1.05 Index of costs 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 Bulk Water Costs Overheads and environment 0.80 Water distribution & maintenance Total costs 0.75 0.70 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Source: After Young et al.costs. 2006. Separation of policy from water supply has lowed Allow irrigators to own and run their supply systems Year Efficient market design 1. Removal of administrate impediments to trade difficult but necessary. 2. Allocate entitlements to individuals not water supply companies. 3. Announcement policies must attend to equity and fairness. 4. Make trade information available • Daily trade volume and price 5. Develop broking industry Implementation sequence (Will take a decade) 1. Vest ownership of water in national as whole • Establish government right to manage and vary allocations at the system level 2. Issue “unbundled” entitlements to defined parts of each system 3. Install meters and validate registers 4. Convert area entitlements to volumetric entitlements as basis for determining entitlement shares 5. Establish credible accounting and enforcement systems 6. Develop protocols and trial trading 7. Let the market drive innovation Concluding Comments 1. Develop a principled reform agenda and start the sequence 2. Get the foundations for trade right 3. See trading as a way of facilitating change in a changing world not as a panacea. Download our reports and subscribe to Jim McColl and my droplets at www.myoung.net.au Contact: Prof Mike Young Water Economics and Management Email: [email protected] Phone: +61-8-8303.5279 Mobile: +61-408-488.538 www.myoung.net.au Water Use-Efficiency in Australia Australian irrigators have increased water use efficiency significantly – 1991 -2001 water use per hectare down by 50% – Area under irrigation only reduced by 6% This has been driven by – Low rates of agricultural protection – Water reform - since 1994 • Improved entitlement and risk specification • Water trading • Separation of policy from delivery – Impact of prolonged drought since 2001 National Water Reform 1. Recognition of Scarcity – freeze on new licences 2. Separation of water title from land and trading 3. Administrative separation 4. Full cost pricing (Lower Bound) 5. Formal Planning 6. Reduced allocations per entitlement 16 Over last 25 years rice yields have risen from 5 to 10 tonnes per hectare1.6 14 1.4 12 1.2 10 1.0 8 0.8 6 0.6 4 0.4 Measured field water use (ML/ha) Grain yield (t/ha) Water productivity (g/L) Linear (Measured field water use (ML/ha)) 2 0 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Source: Modified from Humphreys and Robinson (2003). 2000 0.2 0.0 2002 Water productivity (g/L) Water use (ML/ha) or Yield (t/ha) Trends in Rice productivity, MIA Annualised delivery costs, Pyramid Boort Irrigation Area Source: Goulburn Murray Irrigation, pers. com. Move away from postage stamp pricing or transfer pod management to local farmers Water Sharing Plans • Have a statutory legal basis • Assign climate change risk to irrigators • Forced community engagement in planning process • But rarely plan for adverse climate change – River Murray Plans reduce env. allocations 83% & users 17% • Have not succeeded in restoring river health as fast as now seems necessary
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