04-1016/06
Research Paper
Staying Ahead of the Game:
Key Reforms and Initiatives in the
Evolution of the Singapore Public
Service
James Low and Toh Boon Kwan
13 October 2016
© 2016 Civil Service College
Staying Ahead of the Game| 2
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
James Low and Toh Boon Kwan are Lead Researchers at the Institute of Governance and Policy, Civil Service
College, Singapore.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
The Institute of Governance and Policy (IGP) is a node for research on strategic policy issues facing Singapore. It
aims to further new insights, catalyse thought leadership in the Public Service, and advance Singapore's public
governance model.
ABSTRACT
This research paper reviews and highlights the key reforms and initiatives over the years that have contributed
towards the professionalisation of the Singapore Public Service and transformed it into a first-class public service.
KEYWORDS
Singapore Public Service, Political Study Centre, Civil Service Institute, Public Service Division, PS21 movement
DISCLAIMER
This research paper is intended for class discussion only and not to illustrate effective or ineffective
management.
© 2016, Civil Service College
Staying Ahead of the Game| 3
Staying Ahead of the Game: Key Reforms
and Initiatives in the Evolution of the
Singapore Public Service
The Singapore Public Service today is regarded as “one of the most efficient and least corrupt
in the world”1 by the United Nations and other international indicators. 2 Yet in 1959, the
colonial bureaucracy inherited by the new locally-elected People’s Action Party (PAP)
government was known to be rent-seeking and disconnected with the citizenry. How did the
Singapore Public Service evolve into an institution renowned for competence, efficiency and
integrity? This paper highlights the key reforms and initiatives over the years that altogether
contributed towards the professionalisation of the Singapore Public Service.
The Colonial Background
The Singapore Public Service traces its origins to the administration set up in 1819 when the
British colonised Singapore. 3 The colonial bureaucracy was “the minimum administrative
infrastructure necessary for the promotion of economic activities”. 4 This was to reduce
operating costs as the British had colonised Singapore as a commercial enterprise. The few
civil servants sent out to Singapore had no formal training. An English university education
coupled with on-the-job training was thought sufficient to govern the colonies.5 Rank-and-file
positions such as clerks and policemen were filled by local inhabitants at low salary scales.
Even when tertiary education qualified locals for higher positions over time, their service
conditions were kept below those of European colleagues.
Over time, the colonial bureaucracy was conditioned into a sovereign’s agent ruling over the
local population as imperial subjects. Corruption among street-level bureaucrats, sparked off
by social-economic dislocation during the Japanese Occupation but continuing post-war,
worsened public perception of civil servants.6 Post-war reforms allowed local officers into
1
See United Nations, “Republic of Singapore: Public Administration Country Profile”, 2005,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ groups/public/documents/un/unpan023321.pdf, p. 10 (accessed 2 August
2011).
2
Under “Institutions”, Singapore ranked 1st from 2009 to 2012, ranked 3rd from 2013 to 2015, and ranked 2nd
from 2016 to 2017. See the various issues of World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report
between 2009 and 2017. The latest report is available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR20162017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf (accessed 7 October 2016).
3
The Singapore Public Service encompasses ministries which make up the civil service and statutory boards
(Constitution, 1980, Article 102).
4
See Seah Chee Meow, “Bureaucratic evolution and political change in an emerging nation: A case study of
Singapore,” PhD Thesis, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, pp. 4–5.
5
See Edward Blunt, The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1937), pp. 35 and 201.
6
See Jon S. T. Quah, Public Administration Singapore Style (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2010), p. 32.
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executive echelons, including the élite Administrative Service heading the Division 1 hierarchy
of the bureaucracy (see Table 1). But with a population that was overwhelmingly non-Englishspeaking, the use of meritocracy in a bureaucracy where English was lingua franca
perpetuated the gap between civil servants and the citizens.
Table 1: Personnel structure of the Singapore Public Service, 1959.7
Division 1
Division 2
Administrative Service,
Executive & Supervisory
Executive & Professional Grades
Grades
(University Degree)
(Tertiary
Education)
Division 3
1,200 (4.25%)
Technical & Clerical Grades 4,628 (16.38%)
(Secondary Education)
9,841 (34.83%)
Division 4
Manual Unskilled Posts
(Little or no formal education)
12,584 (44.54%)
Reforming the Public Service for State-Formation (1959–1970)
When Singapore attained self-government in 1959, the new locally-elected PAP government
found the Singapore Public Service rent-seeking and disconnected with the population.
Policemen were accepting $10 to overlook traffic offences; a driver’s licence could be
guaranteed for $100 while back-room-rates for priority allocation of new government flats
was $90.8 The PAP’s anti-colonial nationalist stance leading up to self-government led civil
servants to regard the PAP government as “pro-communist and … anti-civil service”.9
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his government were “exasperated” by their civil servants’
lack of “appreciation of the grave challenges before us”.10 Civil servants failed to see that the
Chinese-speaking majority of the population, enfranchised at decolonisation, was being
courted into voting in a communist regime. Lee and his English-educated ministers had to
collaborate with Chinese-educated pro-communist trade unionists to secure the support of
the Chinese-speaking electorate. Civil servants, it seemed to Lee and his ministers, had
become conditioned to ruling by fiat of colonial authority, removed from the need to win the
hearts and minds of the local population.
7
See Public Service Commission, Report of the Public Service Commission for the years 1959–1960 (Singapore:
Government Printer, 1960), p. 4.
8
See Sunny Yap, Richard Lim and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story of Singapore's Ruling
Political Party (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2010), p. 296.
9
See Goh Sin Tub, Oral History, National Archives of Singapore, Accession no. 1422, 1993.
10
See Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: SPH, 1998), p. 319.
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Re-orienting the leadership of the Public Service
Against this backdrop of terse relationship between the new political masters and the Public
Service, the PAP government set up the Political Study Centre to educate public officers on
“the political milieu” in which they would be operating. The focus of the Political Study Centre
was reorienting senior officers, mostly Administrative Service officers (AOs). 11 Returning to
their posts across various ministries after their stints at the Centre, AOs carried with them the
new alignment with the government across the Public Service.
One year on, the Minister for Finance Goh Keng Swee was satisfied that, “senior officers who
went through these courses … understand now why Government policy is what it is”.12 Civil
servant Ngiam Tong Dow thought that the Political Study Centre “changed the mindset: you
are no longer the masters, now you are the servants of the people”.13
Reining in and reforming the Public Service
By 1960, the PAP government was tightening its control over the bureaucracy. Legislation was
amended to raise the penalties for graft. The Public Service Commission was empowered to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against errant staff; permanent secretaries could punish
officers for being discourteous to the public.14
These measures led to the departure of some officers, including “half a dozen or more top
civil servants who found their positions untenable”. 15 Their departure removed some
resistance within the bureaucracy to the PAP government, and opened up the upper echelons
to high-calibre young officers.16
Altogether, the reforms increased the efficiency of the Public Service. The Housing
Development Board (HDB), for example, constructed 44,251 public housing units between
1960 and 1962.17 This number was more than all the houses built in 32 years by the HDB’s
colonial-era predecessor, the Singapore Improvement Trust. 21 primary schools and eight
secondary schools were built, increasing school enrolments by 76,028 to 397,005.18 To stem
11
The Administrative Service is an élite scheme of service, set up during the colonial era and modelled after
the British administrative class, constituting the leadership cadre of the Singapore Public Service.
12
Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates,12 December 1960, section 388.
13
Ngiam Tong Dow, Interview with James Low, 10 January 2013.
14
See Public Service Commission, Report of the Public Service Commission for the year 1961 (Singapore:
Government Printer, 1961), p. 2.
15
See George Bogaars, “Public services,” in Towards Tomorrow: Essays on Development and Social
Transformation in Singapore (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1973), p. 78.
16
See Yap, Lim and Leong (2010), p. 174.
17
See Ministry of Culture, Year of Fulfilment, June 1961–June 1962 (Singapore: Government Printing Office,
1962).
18
As early as 1966, foreign diplomats had noted Singapore’s outstanding achievements in public
administration, housing and education relative to its region. See Airgram A-183 from American Consul in
Singapore, Mr Roger W. Sullivan, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. dated 25 February 1966, National
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high unemployment, the Economic Development Board was established in 1961 with a $100
million budget to attract $800 million worth of investment thereby creating jobs for 78,000
people.
Merger into Malaysia and Separation into Independence
In 1963, Singapore was finally freed from colonial rule when it merged with the Federation of
Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo to form the new Federation of Malaysia. There was
opposition from Indonesia and the Philippines, each with respective territorial claims over
parts of the new Federation. Indonesia subsequently launched Konfrontasi, a policy of
undeclared war against the new Federation.19
On the domestic front, merger with Malaysia was more remarkable for the tumultuous
relations between the Federal government and the Singapore State government; changes to
administrative structures were nominal. The conflict between the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) heading the coalition government in Malaysia, and the PAP in
Singapore culminated into racial riots. To avoid further violence, key UMNO and PAP leaders
agreed to separate Singapore from Malaysia on 9 August 1965.20
The suddenness of Singapore’s independence surprised its own Public Service, though civil
servants were now attuned to its operating context. 21 Radical elements in Malaysia
threatened to abrogate Singapore’s independence; a state of war remained with Indonesia.22
Singapore’s public officers by this time, having undergone “reorientation and retraining [at
the Political Study Centre] shared the same ideology as the ruling leadership and was sensitive
to its political tasks”. 23 Officers from across the Public Service pulled together to form a
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reorganised the Home Affairs Ministry into a Ministry of Interior
and Defence and volunteered to beef up a nascent defence force.24
Archives and Records Administration, RG59, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy File – Political & Defense, POL 6
– Singapore 1/1/65, Folder No 1.
19
See Toh Boon Kwan, ‘“Same bed, different dreams”: Singapore’s merger with the Federation of Malaya and
the Malaysia Agreement, November 1962–September 1963,’
http://issuu.com/tohboonkwan/docs/malaysiaagreementillustrated (accessed 6 October 2016); John
Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the MalaysianIndonesian Confrontation, 1961–5 (London: Macmillan, 2000); Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in
South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); David Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960–1966 (London: Tauris
Academic Studies, 2004); A. J. Stockwell, Malaysia (London: The Stationery Office, 2004); Patrick Keith, Ousted!
(Singapore: Media Masters, 2005); Tan Tai Yong, Creating ‘Greater Malaysia’: Decolonisation and the Politics of
Merger (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).
20
See Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore:
Times, 1998); Straits Times (ST), 5 August 2015, p. A26; ST, 22 December 2015, p. A20.
21
See Lee (1998), p. 631.
22
See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew
(Singapore: SPH and Times Editions, 2000), p. 22.
23
See Chan Heng Chee, “Political developments, 1965–1979,” in Ernest Chew and Edwin Lee, eds., History of
Singapore (Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 162.
24
See Francis D’Costa, V. K. Rajan and Chia Cheong Fook, “First Step,” in Heart of Public Service: Our People
(Singapore: Public Service Division, Prime Minister’s Office, 2015), p. 25; Toh Boon Kwan, “Securing Singapore:
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Before the fledgling state could find its footing, Britain announced an early withdrawal of its
military forces from Singapore by 1971. This was an alarming move as, apart from the removal
of the defence cover, British military forces accounted for 20 per cent of the Singapore
economy. Public officers rushed to build-up the country’s defence and economic capabilities.
National Service conscription expanded the defence force. The conversion of large tracts of
British military land into commercial use coupled with intense efforts to attract foreign
investment saw the Singapore economy turning out an impressive 17.5 per cent growth in
1971.
Reforms to Lead Change in a Developmental State (1970s–1980s)
The Public Service undertook various reforms to keep pace with changes across the country
in the 1970s and 1980s. The ramping up of state-led industrialisation post-independence
evolved Singapore into, what Johnson called, a developmental state.25 For Singapore’s public
officers to be effective policy-makers and regulators, dealing with foreign multi-national
corporations (MNCs) and local companies while keeping an eye on the country’s overall
development, officers needed to be equipped with management training. The Staff Training
Institute was set up in 1971 to raise public officers into the ‘economic general staff’ to manage
the emerging developmental state.
The competition for qualified manpower, brought on by the thriving economy, highlighted
the gap in remuneration between civil servants and the private sector. New university
graduates were earning $250 more every month in MNCs than in the Public Service. 26 A
survey of 50 senior public officers revealed that 32 would leave for higher pay; only 13 would
serve long-term in the Public Service. In 1973, a ‘13th month pay’ was introduced to reduce
the annual wage gap between the private and public sectors. 27 The salaries of senior civil
servants were also raised the following year.
Training as an institution of change
Investment towards training grew steadily. The move into new and modern facilities allowed
training to be expanded from a focus on equipping Administrative Service officers with
management skills to broader range of courses for officers across the Public Service. The Civil
Service Institute (CSI), succeeding earlier training schools, evolved into a focal point through
which change was introduced into the Public Service and across the country. In response to
the 1979 global recession, the PAP government restructured the economy towards high-value
From Vulnerability to Self-reliance,” in Heart of Public Service: Our Institutions (Singapore: Public Service
Division, Prime Minister’s Office, 2015), p. 69.
25
See Chalmers Johnson, “The developmental state: Odyssey of a concept,” in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed.,
The Developmental State (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 40; Robert Wade, Governing the
Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), pp. 25–27; Linda Low, “The Singapore developmental state in the new economy and
polity,” The Pacific Review 14.3 (2001): 416.
26
See ST, 25 April 1971, p. 8. See also Bogaars (1973), p. 83.
27
See Quah (2010), p. 105.
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products. To raise labour productivity, a national committee concluded that “the public sector
in Singapore should set an example in improving productivity, work attitudes and human
management”.28
The CSI was tasked to operationalise the productivity movement by starting-up Work
Improvement Teams (WITS) to enhance efficiency in daily work. For a quick multiplier effect,
CSI would train up WITs leaders who would return to their ministries to train more WITS
leaders.29 By 1989, 76,000 officers or 45 per cent of the Public Service were involved in WITS.
This introduction of the productivity movement into the Public Service catalysed its
subsequent propagation into the national economy.
The CSI also spearheaded the introduction of computerisation into the Public Service. The
bureaucracy was again asked to lead the way: “To stimulate computer utilisation in Singapore,
it is important for the Government to take the lead and demonstrate its willingness to
computerise”. 30 The CSI launched wide-ranging computer courses for officers across the
Public Service. The computerisation drive was later taken over by the specially-created
National Computer Board but the CSI played an instrumental role with the initial training to
start off the computerisation programme across the Public Service.
Reforms in personnel management and budgeting
The 1980s saw fundamental changes in the personnel management and budgeting systems
of the Public Service. Less than a decade after major wage increments, a 1981 survey found
that the average private sector pay was 42 per cent more than that in the Public Service.
Rising educational and living standards, fuelled by social development and a booming
economy, had widened the pool and increased the quality of human resources. But with the
economy continuing to grow, the Public Service felt the competition for manpower.
Apart from revising salaries, the Public Service adopted an employee-centred policy aimed at
developing officers to their fullest potential. 31 This employee-centred philosophy provided
the Public Service with the value proposition to recruit, motivate and retain talented officers.
In 1983, the Public Service Division (PSD) was established as the dedicated personnel
management unit of the bureaucracy. This centralised the human resources policy-making,
recruitment, appointment, promotion and other personnel management functions, erstwhile
distributed between various HR management units. The creation of PSD allowed greater
coordination and coherence in the management of public officers.
The adoption of the Block Vote Budget Allocation System in 1989 was a major reform. The
line-item budgeting system, inherited from the colonial administration, centralised control of
expenditure with the Ministry of Finance. This allowed tight fiscal accountability but
overlooked the outcomes of expenditure. Block vote budgeting allocated Public Service
28
See Singapore Annual Report 1983 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 41.
See ST, 9 August 1982, p. 13.
30
See National Computer Board, Connected Government — Using IT in the Singapore Civil Service (Singapore:
NCB, 1998), p. 43.
31
See Quah (2010), p. 137.
29
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agencies with broad sums of resources to fulfil objectives agreed upon with the Ministry of
Finance. This allowed agencies the autonomy to pursue their domain responsibilities, and an
accounting of their performance vis-à-vis their objectives at the end of the financial year.32
Public Service for the 21st Century (1990s–Present)
By the 1990s, as Singapore emerged out of developing country status, the Singapore Public
Service was also coming to be known for its “competence, efficiency and integrity”.33 But
there were areas that could be improved: “fostering a more open attitude to change and
innovation, greater empowerment at the lower levels of the Public Service, more emphasis
upon performance and outputs to ensure higher quality services”.34 The operating milieu of
the Public Service was also evolving, “first, a public that is increasingly demanding higher
standards of service, and second, an economy that is increasingly outward-oriented”.35
The Public Service for the 21st Century movement
The Public Service for the 21st Century (PS21) movement was launched in 1995 against this
background. Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary (Prime Minister’s Office) who was the
chief advocate of PS21, recognised that the Singapore Public Service should neither rest on
its laurels nor be lured into a sense of complacency:
the motto [for PS21] was ‘Be in time for the future’, because the Singapore Public
Service already had such a high standing worldwide, it had a high standing for
efficiency and competence and integrity. So if everybody in the world say, ‘You are
already so good,’ and the people in the Service therefore also say, ‘We are already
so good,’ then how do we move our people to be thinking about how can we be
better?
That’s why the motto came out to be ‘Just in time for the future’. It is to say, ‘Who
of you can claim we are good enough for the future?’ The future is unknowable,
the future is uncertain? And so who in the Service, not even the political
leadership, can claim to know? And that’s why the motto is ‘Be in time for the
future’. The idea of PS21 is to be able to work in that future and that future is really
32
See Jean Chia, Financing a City: Developing Foundations for Sustainable Growth (Singapore: Centre for
Liveable Cities, 2014), pp. 32–33.
33
See David Seth Jones, “Public Service for the 21st century — PS21,” in Chua Fook Kee and Thana Luxshme
Thaver, eds., Everyday Life, Everyday People (Singapore: Ministry of Education and National Institute of
Education, 1997), p. 76.
34
Ibid.
35
See Lim Siong Guan, “The Public Service,” in Yeo Lay Hwee, ed., Singapore: The Year in Review 1995
(Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1996), p. 36.
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what we are prepared to imagine, visualise, take initiative, try out and hence the
whole idea about engaging people and imagining the future.36
In the words of an analyst of local public administration, PS21 was “the most comprehensive
administrative reform to be introduced in Singapore”.37 In sum, PS21 comprised four focal
areas:
• staff well-being, focusing on the individual public officer;
• service quality, focusing on the customer, i.e. the citizenry;
• Work Improvement Teams (WITS) and Staff Suggestion Schemes, focusing on
developing officers towards an attitude of continuous improvement; and
• organisational review, focusing on structuring government agencies towards strategic
improvements.38
Most of these initiatives were already operating for several years. WITS, for example, started
in the 1980s. PS21, hence, was really “an extension of existing schemes and campaigns”.39
But the combined effects of these concurrent efforts under the PS21 banner, and the main
thrust of PS21, were to improve the quality of public services delivered to the citizenry.
PS21 coincided with the wave of New Public Management ideas spreading across the world
then. The corporatisation of public service functions, granting discretionary powers to
autonomous agencies and introduction of market competition to improve efficiency were
conceptually similar to New Public Management.40 But Lim Siong Guan distinguished PS21 by
its quest for ‘excellence’:
The whole impetus for PS21 has nothing to do with the idea of ‘small
government’…. [PS21] is this whole concept of ‘excellence’ — and ‘excellence’ is
being the best that you can be, it’s a never ending journey, being the best that you
can be — which to me is a different paradigm than just ‘efficiency’ and
‘effectiveness’.41
36
Lim Siong Guan, Interview with James Low, 20 November 2013. See also Lim Siong Guan and Joanne H. Lim,
The Leader, The Teacher & You: Leadership through the Third Generation (London: Imperial College Press,
2014), pp. 91—105.
37
See Quah (2010), p. 147.
38
A summary of the four areas is found in N.C. Saxena, Virtuous Cycles: The Singapore Public Service and
National Development (Singapore: United Nations Development Programme, 2011), p. 89 and Commonwealth
Secretariat, Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the
Public Service of Singapore (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998), p. 21.
39
Prime Minister’s Office, 1995, 2, quoted in Quah (2010), p. 147.
40
M. Shamsul Haque, “Public administration and public governance in Singapore,” in Pan Suk Kim, ed., Public
Administration and Public Governance in ASEAN Member Countries and Korea (Seoul: Daeyoung Moonhwasa
Publishing Company, 2009), p. 255.
41
Lim Siong Guan, Interview with James Low, 20 November 2013.
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Training to change
Training was recognised as a medium to improve the quality of public services. Lim explained
that, sandwiched between rising demands from the public and pressures from “bosses” to
improve the organisation of the public service, “The way to develop [the civil servant’s]
muscles was to build up his competency, build up his skills-level”.42 A target was set to deliver
12.5 days of training per year for each employee by the year 2000. This ‘100 hours’ target was
a five-fold increase in the commitment towards training.43
To be in time for the future necessitated the inculcation of a mindset among public officers
to welcome, anticipate and execute change amidst a rapidly changing and volatile operating
environment. Lim Siong Guan highlighted the importance of change to a public service that is
aiming to maintain high performance and staying relevant to the evolving needs of its
stakeholders.
Any organisation that affects change only in reaction to circumstances becomes
the slave of circumstances. It dooms itself to running around making urgent
change after urgent change because it allows circumstances to catch up with it.44
PS21, therefore, aimed to build a public service that embraces change and constant
improvement; develop officers who are empowered and engaged, and are agents of change.
PS21 in Action
There are numerous examples of successful change under the PS21 ambit.45 Two examples
will suffice to illustrate the PS21 principles in action. The first illustrates change that was
largely a ground-up initiative. The second example was a top-down initiative involving major
corporate restructuring.
In 1998, the Singapore Prison Service (SPS) started its transformation journey from an
organisation focused on the custody of criminals to one that works closely with the people
and private sectors to rehabilitate and reintegrate former inmates into society. This has
resulted in one of the lowest national recidivism rates in the world. Through its successful
transformation effort, the SPS has managed to address issues like high staff attrition rates and
poor public perception of the department. SPS’s journey towards organisational excellence
42
Ibid.
See ST, 28 February 1996, p. 23.
44
Lim Siong Guan, “Change .. Change .. And more change,” Speech delivered at the 6th Global Forum on
Reinventing Government, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 26 May 2005,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan020467.pdf (accessed 2 September 2015).
45
For examples, see June Gwee and Neo Boon Siong, “Leading change in the Ministry of Education,” in June
Gwee, ed., Case Studies in Public Governance: Building Institutions in Singapore (London: Routledge, 2012), pp.
76–90; June Gwee and Neo Boon Siong, “A library for the people: A case study of the National Library Board,”
2013, https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Pages/A-Library-for-the-People-A-Case-Study-of-the-NationalLibrary-Board.aspx (accessed 1 September 2015); and Lena Leong, “IRAS — From regulator to service provider
to partner of taxpayers in nation building and economic development,” 2013,
https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Documents/Website/IRAS%20From%20Regulator%20to%20Service
%20Provider.pdf (accessed 1 September 2015).
43
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received numerous accolades, including the Singapore Quality Award (SQA) in 2006 and the
SQA with Special Commendation in 2012. The transformation effort was led by the Director
of Prisons amidst initial scepticism expressed by officials in the supervising Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA). SPS officials had to lobby hard to convince their MHA counterparts to give their
blessings for the proposed changes to the SPS.46
The Public Utilities Board (PUB) was the agency responsible for the production and supply of
water and electricity, and development and maintenance of the drainage network. The
strategic importance of water to a small and vulnerable island state necessitated changes to
create a central public agency which would focus on improving and sustaining Singapore’s
water self-sufficiency. In 2001, PUB underwent major restructuring. It hived off its regulatory
functions over electricity generation to the Energy Market Authority (EMA), was transferred
from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) to the Ministry of the Environment (ENV) and
merged with the ENV’s Sewerage and Drainage departments. PUB launched the Active,
Beautiful and Clean Waters programme in 2007 to promote greater community ownership
over Singapore’s water bodies. The agency also spearheads efforts to promote and develop
Singapore’s water industry. PUB’s successful transformation efforts have garnered it a host
of national and international awards, including the SQA in 2008 and the Stockholm Industry
Water Award in 2007.47
These two examples of successful organisational transformation from both ends of the
spectrum illustrate the continuing contribution of PS21 to the development of a dynamic,
progressive and nimble public service.
Devolution of personnel management functions
Concurrent with the introduction of the PS21 movement in 1995, the same year also saw the
shift from a centralised personnel management framework to a decentralised system of
personnel boards. One major problem arising from a centralised framework was overcentralisation. Ministries had little say over the recruitment and promotion of their staff. This
created “a severe misalignment in people management responsibilities”.48 The introduction
of a decentralised system of personnel boards devolved personnel management functions to
the Permanent Secretaries in individual ministries and their respective line managers. This
reform provided ministries with greater autonomy to make hiring and promotion decisions.
The ministries’ human resource departments take on a larger role in designing and
implementing ministry specific personnel management policies that best suit their needs.
However, to maintain a modicum of discipline, PSD continues to ensure that the devolved
authority is exercised fairly and consistently across the various personnel boards as it
46
See Lena Leong, “Towards a society without re-offending,” 2014,
https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Documents/Website/Towards%20a%20Society%20without%20Reoffending.pdf (accessed 1 September 2015).
47
See James Low, “Sustaining the value of water,” in June Gwee, ed., Case Studies in Public Governance:
Building Institutions in Singapore (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 95 and 116.
48
See Neo Boon Siong and Geraldine Chen, Dynamic Governance: Embedding Culture, Capabilities and Change
in Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), p. 328.
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continues to set the central direction and issue broad guidelines for ministry personnel boards
to follow.
Developing anticipatory capabilities
One crucial impetus for the PS21 movement was to imbibe within the Singapore Public Service
a constant quest for relevance, even “to be in time for the future”. As a small, vulnerable
country that’s a price-taker in the international arena, Singapore needs to anticipate,
welcome and execute change in order to stay relevant to the world and stay ahead of the
curve. Thus, “thinking ahead” requires the public service to anticipate impending trends,
understand the implications, improve its sense-making capabilities and prepare for the
future.49
Riding on the Ministry of Defence’s (MINDEF) pioneering efforts in using the tool of scenario
planning to anticipate the future, a Scenario Planning Office (SPO) was established in PSD in
1995. 50 SPO officers engaged decision-makers to map out possible scenarios that could
impact Singapore in the near future. Two early national scenarios that were developed in
1997 quickly gained traction with decision-makers. One was “Hotel Singapore” and the other
was “Home Divided”. A former SPO officer recalled that “Hotel Singapore” questioned
whether in the future, “Singaporeans feel a sense of belonging to the nation or will they treat
this as a hotel? Will we stay as one united people, or will we not?” SPO subsequently
developed national scenarios every three to five years that were used by ministries in
developing their strategic plans.51 Thinking about the future was further institutionalised with
the establishment of “futures” units in some of the ministries.52 Recognising that scenario
planning had limitations dealing with strategic shocks like the 9/11 terrorist attacks and SARS
epidemic, then Permanent Secretary of MINDEF, Peter Ho set the wheels in motion to develop
the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme in 2005. RAHS enabled the
Singapore Public Service “to better deal with a complex and uncertain future”. A Centre for
Strategic Futures led by Peter Ho was also established in 2009 and it acts as a “futures” think
tank within the Singapore Public Service. 53
Connecting with citizens
Another constant quest of the Singapore Public Service is to remain connected with the
citizenry it serves. In the early nation-building years when the population lived in squalor
conditions, this took the form of efficient delivery of public services. The government
emphasised job creation and housing a rapidly growing population. Specialised agencies like
49
Ibid., p. 388.
Ibid., p. 389.
51
See Patricia Lam, “Building a Public Service ready for the future,” in Heart of Public Service: Our Institutions,
p. 154; Neo and Chen (2007), p. 390.
52
See Devadas Krishnadas, “The future of futures,” Ethos 7 (January 2010): 24, 28.
53
See Edna Tan Hong Ngoh and Hoo Tiang Boon, ed., Thinking about the Future — Strategic Anticipation and
RAHS (Singapore: National Security Coordination Secretariat and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
2008), pp. vii–viii. xi, xix; Lam, “Building a Public Service ready for the future,” pp. 154–155.
50
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the Economic Development Board and the Housing and Development Board were created to
develop a vibrant economy and a country with one of the highest home ownership levels in
the world. Given the pressing nation-building challenges, the government took the lead as
public service legislator, deliverer and regulator. The barometer of government effectiveness,
as with traditional Westminster parliamentary democracies, remained the ballot box and the
government tweaked its policies in accordance with its electoral performance.
By the end of the first decade of the new century, there was a nascent awareness in the
Singapore Public Service to go beyond public consultation in policy making. A more
participatory approach emerged in policy design and implementation. While efficient public
service delivery remained the primary driver, the Singapore Public Service needed to perform
additional roles as convenor and facilitator in an environment where civil society is more vocal
and citizens more demanding. This requires the parallel development of relational
governance: a partnership between the government, the bureaucracy and the citizenry in
creating public value together, with shared ownership of policy outcomes, engendering trust
and enhancing state legitimacy in the process. Geoff Mulgan, former advisor to British Prime
Minister Tony Blair argued that the quality of the government’s relationship with the public
matters, and this could be improved “by acting with others, rather than just doing things to
or for them”. This line of thinking manifested in the Singapore Public Service, evidenced by
greater public engagement and citizen participation in the public policy process. The
Singapore Public Service has performed well in a Government-to-You model, but it also
anticipated the need to be a Government-with-You.54
The importance of relational and participatory governance became even more pronounced
in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections. Though the ruling party garnered about sixty
per cent of the popular vote, it was the party’s worst electoral performance since
independence. In analysis thereafter, concerns over an influx of immigrants, rising housing
prices and over-crowded public infrastructure were thought to account for the reduction in
popular support for the government.55
Following the elections, public participation in the policy process was widened and deepened.
A national level “Our Singapore Conversation” was launched by Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong in September 2012 to engage the public to canvass ideas and build consensus on the
kind of Singapore that citizens envisage for the future. Over 47,000 Singaporeans participated
in the exercise and their sharing served to shape key public policies.56 The following year, as
a consequence of feedback gleaned from “Our Singapore Conversation”, the government
announced a major shift in its nation-building approach. Greater risk pooling and increased
social support for the elderly and vulnerable were progressively rolled out. The government
introduced a Pioneer Generation Package and Silver Support Scheme that increased
54
See Lena Leong and Toh Boon Kwan, “Developing resilience in Singapore,”
https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Pages/Developing-Resilience-in-Singapore.aspx (accessed 12
October 2016); Toh Boon Kwan, Mark Chen and Vernie Oliveiro, “Urban governance: Foresight and
pragmatism,” in Liveable & Sustainable Cities: A Framework (Singapore: Centre for Liveable Cities and Civil
Service College, 2014), pp. 115–116.
55
See Toh, Chen and Oliveiro (2014), pp. 162–163. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explained his government’s
policy-making pitfalls and lessons learnt in The Business Times, 29 January 2013, p. 1.
56
See Melissa Khoo and Yee Lai Fong, “Redefining engagement: Lessons for the Public Service from Our
Singapore Conversation,” Ethos 13 (June 2014): 10–11.
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healthcare subsidies and supplemented the income of the elderly. The Workfare Income
Supplement Scheme was enhanced for lower wage workers. A national medical insurance
scheme, Medishield Life that provides cradle to grave coverage was implemented.
“Our Singapore Conversation” was followed up with “SGfuture” which provided a platform to
engage Singaporeans on their aspirations for the future. Over 2015–2016, 121 engagement
sessions involving more than 8,300 Singaporeans were held. 57 On the economic front, a
Committee on the Future Economy was also launched to engage the industries and businesses
to position Singapore’s economy for the future.
These public engagement efforts were preceded by a Public Service Transformation (PST)
push in August 2012. It marked “a shift from a transactional mode of governance to a more
relational one”. With the aim of “One Trusted Public Service with Citizens at the Centre”, PST
sought to create a more empathetic and citizen-centric Public Service. The Head of Civil
Service, Peter Ong, laid out the tasks ahead for the Public Service: “to partner Singaporeans
and harness their energies and ideas for the good of Singapore. No one has the monopoly on
ideas and the public service may not always have the answer, or be the answer. We are
constantly on the lookout for opportunities to crowdsource, consult and co-create — both
within the service and with Singaporeans — as we shape our future together”.58
Through the judicious harnessing of technology, the Singapore Public Service has been
utilising digital platforms to actively engage citizens as well as encourage their participation
in policy processes. For example, the Municipal Services Office’s OneService mobile
application allows citizens to provide prompt feedback on municipal issues and makes it more
convenient for them to access municipal services. Through the Beeline public transport
application, the Land Transport Authority aggregates data on commuters’ transport needs
and feed these to transport operators to consider providing a new service to plug the gap.
This crowdsourcing platform has led to the initiation of new bus routes, to the benefit of both
bus operators and commuters.59
The government’s willingness to acknowledge policy mis-steps and to take prompt remedial
action in concert with both the Singapore Public Service and the public has led to a drastic
change in its electoral fortunes. In the 2015 general elections, the government was re-elected
with an almost seventy per cent landslide of the popular vote. Singaporeans had
overwhelmingly endorsed the government’s new participatory approach as well as policy
shifts to meet citizen’s needs and aspirations.
57
See https://www.sg/sgfuture/About-SGFuture (accessed 12 October 2016).
See June Gwee, “Introduction,” in June Gwee, ed., Case Studies: Building Communities in Singapore
(Singapore: Civil Service College, 2015), p. 2; ST, 5 November 2015, p. A29.
59
See Cindy Tan, “Engaging citizens in the digital age,” Ethos 13 (June 2014): 18. See
http://www.mnd.gov.sg/mso/mobile-about.htm and https://www.beeline.sg/ (accessed 12 October 2016) for
more information on OneService and Beeline, respectively.
58
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Conclusion
The Singapore Public Service has constantly adapted itself in order to stay relevant. Reforms
were thrust upon the bureaucracy at self-government to pull it out of the colonial culture of
rent-seeking and alienation from the citizenry. The reorientation towards nation-building
bore fruits when public officers rallied together when faced with sudden independence: they
quickly built up Singapore’s defence and economic capabilities for the nascent state to
survive. As the country geared up for rapid development in the 1970s and 1980s, the Public
Service adapted itself to keep pace. With training as a point of reforms, public officers rose
up to plan, lead and implement the economic and social transformation of the country. In
turn, rising standards of living and educational levels provided progressively higher quality of
human capital for the Public Service. Today, the Public Service is made up of a highly-educated
professional workforce, in sharp contrast from the colonial bureaucracy inherited at selfgovernment (see Table 2).
Table 2: Personnel structure of the Singapore Public Service, 2013.60
As Singapore moved towards developed country status, the Public Service moved in tandem,
working closely with the political leadership to mobilise Singaporeans to achieve national
prosperity. Under visionary public service leaders like former Head of the Civil Service, Lim
Siong Guan, the Public Service recognised the danger of incumbency and internalised the
mantra that change is the only constant. Initiatives like the PS21 movement and the
60
See Civil Service College, “Professionalising Adult Educators,” Singapore Workforce Development Agency
website, http://www.wda.gov.sg/content/dam/wda/pdf/L325B/WS1a_Rinkoo%20Ghosh.pdf (accessed 4
February 2014).
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introduction of a decentralised personnel management system ensured that the Public
Service remains committed to change and enabled the Service to stay nimble amidst a volatile
and rapidly changing operating environment. The ability to adapt rapidly to changing
circumstances remains a key strength of the Public Service and ensures that the Service shall
continue to be in time for the future in the years to come.
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