Cultural Theory and the Measurement of Deep Core Beliefs within
the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Joseph T. Ripberger, University of Oklahoma
Kuhika Gupta, University of Oklahoma
Carol L. Silva, University of Oklahoma
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, University of Oklahoma
Deep core beliefs represent an important yet theoretically underspecified concept within the
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). This underspecification can (in part) be attributed to the
ad hoc way in which ACF scholars have defined and measured the concept over time. To
overcome this, we advocate the development and future use of a standardized metric for
measuring deep core beliefs in ACF studies. Such a measure, we contend, should be multidimensional, generalizable, measurable using multiple techniques, and broad enough in scope to
operate across virtually all policy domains. Using these criteria as our benchmark, we evaluate
the viability of Cultural Theory (CT) as one such metric. In short, we find that CT meets all of
these criteria, and therefore provides ACF scholars with a way to measure deep core beliefs
across enduring public policy disputes that are demarcated by conflicting belief systems.
Accordingly, we advocate its use in future studies.
Keywords: Advocacy Coalition Framework; Deep Core Beliefs; Cultural Theory
1
Introduction
Over the last three decades, scholars working on the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) have developed a relatively robust model of individual cognition that specifies the way in
which individuals and coalitions make decisions in the policy process. At its core, this model
argues that actors involved in the policymaking process are endowed with a complex set of
beliefs that structure their perceptions and behavior. These beliefs, ACF scholars argue, are
embedded in three-tiered hierarchical belief systems that are anchored by an immutable set of
deep core (or normative) beliefs that transcend policy-specific subsystems (Sabatier and JenkinsSmith 1993). For example, deep core beliefs include fundamental normative and ontological
assumptions about human nature and the relative priority of values such as liberty, security, and
equality (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). They are a critical part of the ACF model because
they underpin the policy core beliefs that influence the formation, structure, and stability of
advocacy coalitions. Likewise, they serve as the principal filter through which actors in the
policymaking process perceive and interact with the world around them. In so doing, they bias
the way in which actors search for, process, and evaluate new information, which affect a
number of processes including policy-oriented learning.
Though researchers have developed a list of beliefs that partially fit this
conceptualization, extant literature has yet to propose, test, and agree upon a coherent system of
deep core beliefs that reflects the breadth and multi-dimensionality of the concept. As a result,
the literature is somewhat disjointed on how one should go about defining, operationalizing, and
measuring the concept. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998), for example, measure deep core beliefs by
way of a neo-classical conservatism scale (similar to political ideology) that is designed to
capture individual beliefs about the role of government in domestic policymaking. Altering this
2
measure ever so slightly, Leach and Sabatier (2005) employ an index they call laissez-faire
conservatism to measure deep core beliefs. Henry, Lubell, and McCoy (2011) use a similar, but
again slightly different, measure that they call economic conservatism in tandem with a measure
called environmentalism to demarcate deep core beliefs. Following this line of thought,
Matti and Sandström (2011) employ the same environmentalism scale but add the basic value
priorities introduced by Shalom Schwartz (1994) to their list deep core beliefs. Taking a
different approach, Weible, Sabatier, and Lubell (2004) develop a measure of deep core beliefs
based on attitudes about science and scientists and the importance of consensus-based decisionmaking for solving environmental issues.
A cursory look at this admittedly incomplete list of scholarship on deep core beliefs in
the ACF suggests two somewhat concerning issues. First, it suggests that there is some confusion
about how the concept should be defined. In particular, scholars seem to disagree about the
appropriate scope of the concept. In their preliminary description, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
insisted that deep core beliefs should “operate across virtually all policy domains” (1993, p.
180).1 In other words, they are highly abstract and extremely broad in scope. Many of the deep
core beliefs that the aforementioned list of researchers have employed (like environmentalism
and economic conservatism), however, are significantly less expansive in scope, spanning a
finite number of policy domains, rather than the wider gamut of policy problems. For example,
beliefs like environmentalism may operate in multiple policy subsystems, but they will be
significantly less relevant in domains that deal with issues like nuclear weapons or terrorism. As
a result, studies that deal with non-environmental issues will have to develop and utilize different
1
In subsequent work, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have remained relatively consistent in this
definition. For example, see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999 and Leach and Sabatier 2005.
3
metrics to measure deep core beliefs. This perpetuates the second issue. Almost all ACF studies
that account for deep core beliefs utilize a slightly different set of indicators to measure them.
Because of this, it is difficult to determine the extent to which divergent findings—say, on the
influence of overlapping deep core beliefs on coordination within advocacy coalitions—
represent theoretical discrepancies or artifacts of the measurement process.
To advance our understanding of the ways in which deep core beliefs influence actors in
the policymaking process, scholars interested in the ACF must address these issues. This will
require that we come to some agreement on the appropriate scope of the concept. Should deep
core beliefs operate across multiple (more than one) or virtually all subsystems? We believe the
latter—deep core beliefs, in our opinion, should be sufficiently abstract to touch upon critical
issues in nearly all policy domains. Only then could we compare the influence of deep core
beliefs on policy actors and policymaking in different subsystems. Moving forward will also
require that ACF scholars develop a more standardized way of operationalizing and measuring
deep core beliefs. Doing so will allow us to compare one study to another in a way that advances
theory rather than perpetual questions about measurement.
As researchers move in this direction, we suggest that the agreed upon set of measures
should be multi-dimensional, generalizable, and measurable using multiple techniques. By multidimensional, we mean that the measures should speak to several rather than one deep core belief
at a time. An ideal measure, for instance, would account for beliefs about a wide range of things,
like the role of government vs. the market in society, preferences for expert-led vs. communal or
consensus-based decision-making, and views about the relative priority of values such as liberty,
equality, and security. All else equal, a single measure that can accomplish all of this is better
than multiple and potentially overlapping measures that capture a single dimension at a time. By
4
generalizable, we mean that a standardized measure of deep core beliefs should be applicable in
multiple contexts within and beyond US borders. For example, unidimensional measures of
political ideology seem to work rather well in two-party systems as found in the US and the UK,
but are considerably less useful in multi-party systems where policy debates are seldom reduced
to a single dimension with only two poles. As such, political ideology and other measures (like
partisanship) that are tied to a particular set of political institutions are less than ideal candidates
for a standardized measure of deep core beliefs that all ACF scholars can utilize. Lastly, by
measurable using multiple techniques, we mean that the agreed upon set of deep core beliefs
should be detectable using a wide variety of research tools, including content analysis,
interviews, and survey research. A set of deep core beliefs that can only be measured using
survey research, for example, is sub-optimal because it would be of little use to the large body of
ACF scholars that employ qualitative research designs.
Coming up with and agreeing upon a set of deep core belief measures that meets all of
these criteria is a tall order. Fortunately, psychologists, anthropologists, and political scientists
have been working on the project for quite some time. In this article, we introduce cultural theory
(CT) as one such research program that has received considerable attention in the last thirty
years. In doing so, we argue that CT provides a theoretically derived and finite set of deep core
beliefs that meets each of the criterion that we have established—it is multi-dimensional,
generalizable, measurable using multiple techniques, and (most importantly) applicable across
disparate policy domains. Accordingly, we endorse its candidacy as a standard measure of deep
core beliefs in future research using the ACF.
Cultural Theory
5
Cultural Theory (which is also referred to as “grid-group” analysis) was developed in the
1970s by the renowned British anthropologist Mary Douglas in order to explain societal conflict
over risk (e.g., Douglas 1970; 1978).2 Since then, CT has been used across the social sciences to
explain a wide variety of social phenomenon, including preference formation (e.g., Wildavsky
1987). A central tenant of the theory is that the patterns of social interaction within which
individuals prefer to live their lives propagate a series of worldviews (or “cultural biases”) that,
in turn, shape their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.3 More specifically, individual orientations
with respect to two basic social dimensions—“group” and “grid”—promulgate the
aforementioned worldviews and subsequent cognitions. The group dimension captures the
degree to which a person identifies with a bounded unit or social group. Douglas explained this
as the extent to which “the individual’s life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership”
(Douglas 1982, p.206). People that find themselves at the low end of the group continuum prefer
to stand outside group boundaries and are identified (by themselves and others) as autonomous
actors who (for better or worse) are dependent for survival on their own devices. Individuals at
the high end of the group continuum, by comparison, define themselves according to their group
affiliations and allow the group to determine what they do and when they do it. The grid
dimension denotes the degree to which a person’s life—including their relationships with
2
This section provides a necessarily abbreviated summary of CT. For a more complete
description, see Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Ellis and
Thompson 1997; Wildavsky 2006; and Swedlow 2002; 2011.
3
It is important to note that individual decisions about how their social life is structured are not
always “voluntary.” There are many times in life and many places throughout the world where
individuals have little if any control over how they interact with others.
6
others—is defined by externally imposed rules. According to Douglas, grid refers to “an explicit
set of institutionalized classifications [that] keeps [individuals] apart and regulates their
interactions” (Douglas 1982, p.192). Individuals at the low end of the grid continuum prefer few
(if any) societally imposed limits (or guidance) on how their relationships are to be transacted.
Rather, their relationships require the establishment of their own terms, which provides leeway
but may add to transaction costs and uncertainties. People at the high end of the grid continuum,
by contrast, prefer that their interactions with others are regulated by externally imposed rules
and guidance, which may constrain their options but it will also reduce uncertainties.
[FIGURE 1]
When the grid and group dimensions are overlaid (as shown in Figure 1 above), they produce a
finite set of four worldviews: hierarchism, individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism (Douglas
1982; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Coyle and Ellis 1994).
Is CT Multi-Dimensional?
In order to justify, preserve, and strive towards achieving their preferred “way of life,”
the individuals that subscribe to one of these worldviews adopt a multi-dimensional bundle of
normative and ontological beliefs that, in turn, structure their perceptions, attitudes, and
preferences about public policy (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Among other things,
these bundles contain individual beliefs (or myths) about human nature, the role of government
vs. the market in fixing societal problems, the relative importance of basic values such as
equality, liberty, and security, who should be involved in the collective decision-making process
(i.e., experts, the public at large, or both), as well as beliefs about how collective decisions
should be made (i.e., on the basis of expert recommendations, a negotiated compromise between
key stakeholders, or public consensus).
7
Individuals that are disposed to the hierarchic worldview prefer strong group attachments
and binding external prescriptions (high group, high grid). Accordingly, they place substantial
weight on the welfare of the group and are keenly aware of whether other individuals are
members of their group. Likewise, they prefer that organizations and relationships be stratified
according to externally defined rules. They believe that human beings are unequal and flawed
(sinful), but that strong institutions can steer people onto the path of “goodness.” Because of this,
hierarchs tend to place great value on procedures, lines of authority, social stability, tradition,
and order. When forced to choose, they prefer security to liberty or equality. Likewise, they
prefer that the government (as long as it is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the group) rather than
the market define what is and is not permissible in society. Lastly, hierarchs believe that experts
(i.e. scientists or religious authorities) rather than “the public” should be responsible for making
decisions about highly technical and/or controversial issues. When thinking about how decisions
should be made, hierarchs care less about consensus (or even majorities), and more about what
the experts think should be done.
People that are disposed to the individualist way of life, by comparison, tend to attach
little if any weight to group affiliation and reject externally defined prescriptions (low group, low
grid). They believe that human beings are neither good nor bad; rather, they are self-seeking and
capable of good if properly motivated. As such, they prefer a society with few rules and
regulations and hesitate to define themselves in terms of group membership. Rather,
individualists perceive themselves to be involved in bidding and bargaining with others to
establish their own terms for social relations. In other words, they prefer to rely on themselves
rather than external prescriptions or other members of a group to chart their course in life.
Because of this, individualists believe that personal liberties are more important than equality
8
and security. Likewise, they believe that the market rather than the government offers the best
solution to societal problems and are therefore reluctant to embrace institutions that restrict the
market. When it comes to collective decision-making, individualists believe that those who have
a direct stake in the outcome of a decision should negotiate with one another in order to come to
some agreement about how a problem should be solved.
People that are disposed to the egalitarian worldview seek strong group identities but
prefer minimal prescriptions imposed from outside the group (high group, low grid). They
believe that human beings are basically good and that institutions (power and status) are
responsible for corrupting them. Accordingly, they reject differentiation of the basis of status and
believe that everyone in the group should be treated equally. As such, they believe that equality
is more important than liberty or security and that a primary function of government should be to
ensure social equality when the market is working in the opposite direction. That said,
egalitarians are suspicious of the government because they distrust authority and believe that
power corrupts. Consequently, they believe that the members of their group, rather than the
government or an externally defined expert should make collective decisions. When reflecting
upon how collective decisions should be made, egalitarians value deliberation and consensus and
believe that everyone in their group (regardless of status) should have the opportunity to voice
their concerns.
Lastly, people that are disposed to the fatalist worldview consider themselves subject to
binding external constraints, yet they feel excluded from membership in important social groups
(low group, high grid). Because of this, they believe that they have little control over their lives
and that one’s fate is much more a matter of chance than choice. When forced to choose between
security, liberty, and equality, fatalists tend towards security because they believe that liberty and
9
equality are not possible. When it comes to collective decision-making, fatalists tend to stay out
of the mix, believing that “the system” is incapable of fixing anything because the things that
happen in life are essentially random or (at the very least) beyond human control.
Is CT Generalizable?
Having discussed the multi-dimensional nature of CT, we look now to the issue of
generalizability. Can the worldviews derived from CT be used to explain the nature and content
of deep core beliefs among the myriad of cultural and institutional contexts within which ACF
researchers are currently working?4 The short answer to this question is yes—we believe that
they can. In fact, Mary Douglas developed the theory for precisely this reason. She was
frustrated with the inability of the cultural anthropologists (of her time) to recognize basic
similarities and patterns in human behavior across culturally diverse settings (Douglas 1978). As
such, she forwarded the relatively radical proposition that all cultures—ranging from tribal
societies in remote parts of Africa, the “hippie” enclaves in California and northern New Mexico,
to the corporate workforce in urban China—can be assessed and classified according to the grid
and group dimensions of sociality. In other words, individuals that adhere to worldviews defined
by CT are theorized to exist in all societies, regardless of the institutional and cultural differences
that exist between them.
In support of this proposition, scholars have used the theory to measure and explain
individual beliefs, behavior, and policy dynamics in many different countries around the world.
In her earliest work, for example, Douglas used a nascent version of the theory to explain
patterns of institutional variation in Africa (1966). Subsequently, she teamed up with Aaron
4
For a relatively recent list of the geographic settings in which the ACF has been applied, see
Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009).
10
Wildavsky to explain perceptions of risk and danger in “Western” world, particularly the US and
the Britain (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). After that, Douglas, Wildavsky, and their
collaborators argued (and demonstrated) that CT explains political dynamics in settings as
diverse as China, Germany, Mexico, and Italy (e.g., Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).
Shortly thereafter, Per Selle, Gunnar Grendstad, and their colleagues started using the
worldviews posited by CT to explain risk perceptions and policy preferences in Norway,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and other parts of Europe (e.g., Selle 1991; Grendstad 1995, 1999;
Grendstad and Selle 2000; Grendstad and Sundback 2003). Since then, scholars have leveraged
the worldviews offered by CT to analyze political battles and policymaking in increasingly
remote and developing settings, like Sierra Leone (Richards 1999) and various rural
communities in India (Gyawali 1999). If nothing else, this admittedly terse look at some of the
literature on CT suggests that they theory is generalizable and that it can be used to explain the
nature and content of deep core beliefs in a wide variety of intuitional and cultural contexts.5
Is CT Measurable Using Multiple Techniques?
A signature feature of ACF research is the plurality of methodological techniques that
researchers have employed to test the various propositions about belief systems forwarded by the
framework. Dating back to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), for example, researchers have
used both qualitative case studies and quantitative content analyses of public documents in order
to evaluate the merits of the theory. Soon thereafter, Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, and their
colleagues started using elite surveys to validate what they had found in their initial explorations
of the theory (e.g., Barke and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Zafonte 1995). Since then, ACF
5
For additional examples of CT’s generalizability, refer to the collections of research compiled
in Coyle and Ellis 1994; Wildavsky 2006; and Swedlow 2011.
11
scholars have continued in this tradition by using these three methods—case studies, content
analysis, and survey research—to delineate and explain the belief systems that motivate
individual action in the policymaking process. Accordingly, a standard indicator of deep core
beliefs should (at the vary least) be measurable using all three techniques. An indicator that is
only measurable by way of survey research, for example, is of little use to the group of ACF
scholars that use case studies and/or content analysis to measure deep core beliefs.
Due in part to the multi-disciplinary nature of the research program, CT shares a similar
history of methodological pluralism. In their early work, anthropologists like Mary Douglas and
her colleagues used a variety of qualitative tools (most notably ethnography) to isolate and
explain individual and collective variation with respect to the cultural worldviews (e.g., Douglas
1966; 1992). As the theory developed, Aaron Wildavsky (a political scientist) and his
collaborator Karl Dake (a psychologist) relied upon systematic survey research to measure the
wordviews set forth by the theory (e.g., Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Dake 1991). In more recent
years, researchers have added content analysis to the suite of techniques available to people who
are looking to employ the theory (e.g., Stenvoll 2002; Lodge, Wegrich, and McElroy 2010;
Lodge 2011). Today, researchers interested in CT use all three techniques—case studies, content
analysis, and survey research—to measure individual affinities with the worldviews advanced by
the theory. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that CT offers a set of deep core beliefs that
can be measured using the set of techniques that are most often employed by ACF scholars.
Is CT Sufficiently Broad in Scope?
Having argued that CT meets the first three criteria that we established at the beginning
of this article, we turn now to the issue of scope. Are the worldviews offered by CT sufficiently
broad in scope to be categorized as a deep core belief within the ACF? Previous research
12
suggests that the answer to this question is a qualified yes. Since their inception and development
in the 1980s, the worldviews posited by CT have been used to explain policy dynamics in an
increasingly diverse mix of substantive issue domains, ranging from environmental, regulatory,
energy, and economic policy, to public health, homeland security, national security, and foreign
policy.6 This fairly impressive list of issues to which the theory has been applied suggests that
CT is sufficiently broad in scope to be categorized as a deep core belief within the ACF.
Nevertheless, this is an important proposition that can be tested by exploring the
relationship between cultural worldviews and policy core beliefs in the range of domains around
which subsystems form. According to the ACF, policy core beliefs stem from deep core beliefs
to demarcate fundamental policy positions and basic strategies for achieving those positions
within issue-specific subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Within the context of
environmental policy, for example, policy core beliefs might include beliefs about the fragility of
nature, the severity of basic problems (i.e., global warming), who is responsible for those
problems (i.e., man or nature), and strategies for addressing them (i.e., regulation vs. incentives).
Note that these beliefs are not as broad in scope as deep core beliefs. Beliefs about the fragility
6
For the application of CT to environmental policy, Schwarz and Thompson 1990; JenkinsSmith and Smith 1994; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Grendstad and Selle 2000; and Jones 2011.
For a discussion of economic policy and CT, see Malkin and Wildavsky 1991; Swaney 1995;
and Lodge and Wegrich 2011. For a look at CT and regulatory policy, see Lodge, Wegrich, and
McElroy 2010 and Lodge 2011. To see how some have applied CT to public health issues, see
Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil, and Slovic 2010; and Jenkins-Smith, Silva, and Song 2010.
Lastly, for an example of the application of CT to national security issues, see Jenkins-Smith and
Herron 2009; and Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and Herron 2011.
13
of nature, for example, do not necessarily influence beliefs about foreign policy, homeland
security policy, or energy policy. Policy core beliefs are, however, guided by deep core beliefs
that are applicable across these domains. Thus, a valid measure of deep core beliefs would
explain policy core beliefs in all of these issue areas.
To see if CT satisfies this test, we use public opinion data to analyze the relationship
between individually held worldviews and policy core beliefs in all four of these domains—
foreign policy, homeland security policy, energy policy, and environmental policy. If the
worldviews conceptualized within CT are sufficiently broad in scope to be categorized as deep
core beliefs within the ACF, then individual dispositions with respect to these worldviews will
systematically orient their policy core beliefs in four domains.
Data and Measures
Before introducing our data and analysis, it is important to remind our readers that the
ACF is primarily concerned with mapping the belief systems of actors within advocacy
coalitions (aka “policy elites”), rather than the mass public. Nevertheless, we believe that our
research provides a valid test of our hypothesis for two reasons. First and foremost, previous
work that compares “public” to “elite” belief systems finds that they are roughly similar in
content (e.g., Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004). Second, any differences that do exist
between the two populations relate to the degree of association between deep core, policy core,
and secondary beliefs (in the public opinion literature, this is referred to as “ideological
constraint”). Elites, on average, demonstrate more constraint in their belief systems. Because of
this, our use of public rather than elite data actually constitutes a harder test of our hypothesis. If
previous research is any indication, the relationships that we observe between the worldviews
14
specified by CT and the policy core beliefs held by members of the mass public will be even
stronger among the actors that join advocacy coalitions.
Consistent with common practice in public opinion research (e.g., Welzel 2002), we use
the completion of an advanced degree (e.g., Master’s degree or doctorate) as a rough proxy for
“policy elite.” If the abovementioned proposition is correct, the pattern (direction and
significance) of relationships between cultural worldviews and policy core beliefs should be
roughly consistent when comparing the mass public to the relative small number of people in our
sample who hold an advanced degree. If there are differences, they should be reflected in the size
of the CT coefficients and/or the proportion of variation that CT explains across the two groups.
The data we use to test our proposition were collected in two different national surveys
that were undertaken as part of a larger, on-going project that seeks to delimit and explain US
public preferences with regard to foreign policy, homeland security policy, energy policy, and
environmental policy. We use these data because they include batteries of questions designed to
measure policy core beliefs in the disparate domains that we are interested in. Likewise, both
surveys included multiple sets of questions designed to tap the worldviews specified by CT. The
first of these surveys, which captured data in the foreign policy and homeland security policy
domains, was administered in May 2011 (n = 2,610). The second survey was administered in
June 2011 and collected public opinion on energy and environmental policy (n = 2,125). Both
surveys were administered on the Internet to a Census-based panel of the US public that was
provided by Survey Sampling International (SSI).7
7
In order to cross-validate the Internet samples that were provided by SSI, both surveys also
included an RDD telephone component that was collected by the University of Oklahoma’s
15
Policy Core Beliefs
To capture a policy core belief within the foreign policy domain, we created an
international disposition scale based on individual answers to six questions about how the US
should interact with other countries on the global stage (alpha = 0.70). This scale, which varies
from one to seven, is designed to place respondents on a continuum that ranges from cooperative
internationalism (1) to militant unilateralism (7).8 Respondents that placed themselves at the low
end of the scale believe that the US should cooperate with other countries and international
institutions (like the United Nations) when making decisions about world affairs. Those that
placed themselves at the high end of the international disposition scale, by comparison, prefer
that the US act alone when conducting foreign operations. Descriptive statistics for this variable
are listed in Table 1.
[TABLE 1]
To capture a policy core belief within the domain of homeland security policy, we
created a security vs. liberty measure by prompting respondents to think about the tradeoffs
between liberty and security that are sometimes required to protect the homeland. After this
prompt, we asked the respondents to indicate their preferred balance of the two values by
responding to the following question:
Assume that black marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the security of
Americans and white marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on liberties of
Public Opinion Learning Laboratory. For a detailed comparison of these samples, please contact
the authors.
8
The questions used to create this index, see Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2010.
16
Americans. How many of each color would you place in a total combined mix of 100
marbles?
Using answers to this question, we created a liberty vs. security measure by subtracting the
number of black (security) marbles from the number of white (liberty) marbles that an
individual placed in the combined mix. This transformation resulted in a variable that ranges
from -100 to +100, where a -100 represents an individual that is not willing to sacrifice any
of their liberty in order to advance security and a +100 represents an individual that is willing
to sacrifice all of their liberty in order to advance homeland security.
Next, we employed a view of nature measure to capture a policy core belief within the
environmental policy domain. Roughly speaking, this measure was designed to capture
individual beliefs about the extent to which “nature” can withstand anthropogenic activities. To
create this measure, we simply asked respondents to indicate their views about nature by way of
a zero to ten scale, where zero means that nature is robust and not easily damaged and ten means
nature is fragile and easily damaged.
Lastly, we created an energy tradeoff measure to capture a policy core belief within the
energy policy domain. This measure was intended to capture individual beliefs about the relative
tradeoff between finding and using domestic energy (particularly oil and gas) that can harm the
environment vs. relying on international and/or alternative sources of energy that can be
relatively inefficient and expensive. To do this, we prompted individuals to think about this
tradeoff by giving them arguments on both sides of the debate. Then, we asked them to indicate
their feelings about further exploring and developing US deposits of oil and gas on a one to
seven scale, where one indicates strong opposition and seven denotes strong support.
Cultural Worldviews
17
Drawing upon the seminal work of Wildavsky and Dake (1990), we used a set of twelve
indicators to measure individual orientations towards each of the worldviews posited by CT.9
The questions are quite general in nature, and are designed to tap the primary “cultural biases”
that result from the combinations of grid/group preferences rather than measure grid and group
directly. For example, a respondent’s affinity with the individualist orientation is captured by a
series of agree/disagree statements concerning individual responsibility for one’s own well
being, and the importance of allowing people to reap the rewards of their efforts. The exact
question wording for each of the items are shown in Table 2.
[TABLE 2]
To evaluate the extent to which these questions adequately capture the worldviews
posited by CT, we conducted two tests. First, we used principal component analysis to uncover
latent patterns in how individuals answered these questions (Table 1). As suggested by the
theory, this analysis revealed four latent components that are highly correlated with the items
designed to tap each worldview. The pattern of loadings associated with Component 1 (C1), for
example, revealed high correlations between that component and the fatalism items and
significantly lower correlations between C1 and the items designed to measure individualism,
hierarchy, and egalitarianism. The loadings associated with Components 2, 3, and 4 revealed a
similar pattern of high correlations between those components and the egalitarianism,
9
The measures are modifications of similar metrics originated by Wildavsky and Dake (1990).
Their original formulations were iteratively revised based on opinion survey research conducted
during the 1990s (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994). Now, three-item survey scales (like
these) are rather common (e.g., Grendstad 2000; Swedlow 2008; Jones 2011; Ripberger, JenkinsSmith, and Herron 2011).
18
individualism, and hierarchy items (respectively) and low correlations between them and the
items meant to measure the other worldviews. Next, we conducted the standard battery of
psychometric tests for scale reliability. As shown in Table 2, the alpha value for all four scales is
above 0.6, which indicates a relatively high degree of internal consistency given the relatively
small number of items used to create the scales (Cortina 1993). These tests suggest that our
scales adequately gauge the worldviews posited by CT. As such, we created an index for each of
the four worldviews by averaging an individual’s responses to these questions. Note that this
means we are measuring an individual’s affinity with each of the worldviews, rather than
assigning individuals to a particular worldview. As such, we are allowing a single respondent to
score high or low multiple indices.
Completion of an Advanced Degree
As mentioned above, we use the completion of an advanced degree to approximate the
beliefs of “policy elites.” To measure this, we asked respondents to indicate the highest level of
education that they have received. The 704 respondents that have received an advanced degree
(Master’s or Doctorate) were assigned a one, and the 5,131 respondents that have not completed
an advanced degree were assigned a zero.
Analysis
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we explore the extent to which
individual affinities with individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy, and fatalism systematically
guide policy core beliefs in the foreign policy, homeland security policy, environmental policy,
and energy policy domains. To do this, we estimate four linear models using ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. In these models, the policy core beliefs that we described in the
previous section serve as the dependent variables, and individual orientations with respect to
19
each of the four worldviews were included as independent variables. In the second stage, we
provide an indirect test of the possibility that “policy elites” differ from the public at large, by reestimating these models using the subset of our sample that have completed an advanced degree.
[TABLE 3]
Table 3 and Figure 2 summarize of our stage one findings. When evaluating these
findings, it is important to note that some worldviews will be highly salient in some domains and
less salient in others—an individual’s disposition with respect to fatalism, for example, may be
highly influential in the foreign policy domain, but less important to their beliefs about energy.
That said, people maintain dispositions with respect to all four worldviews, so in domains like
energy policy—where fatalism might be less salient—CT posits that individual affinities (be they
positive or negative) with the other worldviews will take over. With this in mind, a brief look at
the Table 3 reveals a pattern that supports our hypothesis—identifying an individual’s orientation
with respect to all four worldviews helps us to explain variation in policy core beliefs across all
four domains. In fact, thirteen of the sixteen CT coefficients exhibit a statistically significant
impact on policy core beliefs.
[FIGURE 2]
More importantly, the posterior predictions derived from these coefficients (plotted in
Figure 2) unfold in a manner that is entirely consistent with our theoretical expectations.10
10
Posterior predictions were derived using the procedures outlined in King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg (2000) to simulate the predicted policy core beliefs of “ideal type” egalitarians,
hierarchs, individualists, and fatalists in 10,000 MCMC draws. Ideal types were represented by
adjusting the respective cultural parameters in the models according to the following procedure:
ideal type = +1 standard deviation on the respective CT index and -1 standard deviation on the
20
Beginning with international disposition, for example, we see that egalitarians tended towards
cooperative internationalism, whereas individualists were inclined to support militant
unilateralism. Hierarchs and fatalists, by contrast, fell in the middle of these two extremes with
minor leanings in either direction. A slightly different pattern characterizes individual
willingness to trade liberty for security in order to protect the homeland. Hierarchs were more
than willing to make this trade, whereas individualists and, to a lesser extent fatalists and
egalitarians, were exceedingly reluctant to trade liberty for security. Moving on to individual
beliefs about nature, egalitarians believe that nature is fragile and easily damaged, whereas
individualists believe the opposite—that nature is robust and not easily damaged. Fatalists and
hierarchs, by comparison, lean in the “fragile” direction (slightly above midscale), but do not go
as far as their egalitarian counterparts. With respect to the fourth and final policy core belief, we
see that egalitarians opposed the idea that we should further explore for and develop US oil and
gas deposits, while individualists and hierarchs supported this endeavor. Again, all of these
relationships are consistent with our theoretical expectations, which supports our contention that
the worldviews derived by CT serve as useful guide to understanding deep core beliefs across a
disparate range of policy domains.
[TABLE 4]
Table 4 and Figure 3 summarize of our stage two findings. When re-estimating the
aforementioned models using the subset of our sample that have completed and advanced degree,
we find a pattern that is strikingly consistent with the findings described in the previous
paragraph. Egalitarians and individualists staunchly oppose one another with respect to
other indices. For example, egalitarian = +1 SD on the egalitarianism index and -1 SD on the
hierarchism, individualism, and fatalism indices.
21
international disposition views about the fragility of nature. Hierarchs and fatalists, by
comparison, fall somewhere in between in both domains. The opposite is true with respect to the
liberty vs. security tradeoff—egalitarians and individualists prefer liberty to security whereas
hierarchs are more than willing to sacrifice individual liberty to enhance national security. Last
but not least, individualists and hierarchs believe that the US should further explore and develop
domestic deposits of oil and gas, whereas egalitarians strongly oppose this decision. Again, these
results are quite similar to the results presented in the previous stage, indicating that CT is a
significant predictor of policy core beliefs within this segment of the population.
[FIGURE 4]
Similarities aside, it is important to note at least two differences between the first and
second set of models. First, the coefficients that are statistically significant in the second model
are larger (on average) than the coefficients in the first model, suggesting that orientations with
respect to the four worldviews exert more influence (on average) on policy core beliefs in this
sample of the population. Second, the adjusted R2 values are slightly higher in the second set of
models, indicating that CT also explains more variation in the policy core beliefs held by this
subset of the population. These differences are consistent with the proposition that highly
educated individuals maintain belief-systems that are similar, but a bit more “constrained” than
the public at large. If—as Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron (2004) indicate—this is true of
policy elites, then we would conclude that CT offers a sufficiently broad measure of the deep
core beliefs that motivate “elite” actors in wide variety domain-specific subsystems.
Conclusion
Deep core beliefs represent an important yet underspecified concept within the ACF. This
can (in part) be attributed to two issues in the literature on belief systems: first, scholars seem to
22
disagree about how the concept should be defined—particularly with regard to the appropriate
scope of the concept. Second, researchers have approached the measurement of deep core beliefs
in an ad hoc way that varies greatly from study to study. As a result, we know relatively little
about the role that deep core beliefs play in the policymaking process. This is unfortunate
because deep core beliefs underpin the policy core beliefs around which advocacy coalitions
form and fracture. More importantly, deep core beliefs serve as the primary filter through which
actors in the policymaking process perceive and interact with the world around them. In so
doing, they bias the way in which actors search for, process, and evaluate new information,
which may affect coalition stability, behavior, policy-oriented learning, and (ultimately) policy
change (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta, Ripberger 2013; Sotirov and Winkel 2013).
To overcome these issues, we advocate the development and future use of a standardized
metric for measuring deep core beliefs in ACF studies. This metric, we believe, should be multidimensional, generalizable, measurable using multiple techniques, and broad enough in scope to
operate across virtually all policy domains. Using these criteria as our benchmark, the findings
we present in this article suggest that CT offers one such metric for conceptualizing and
measuring deep core beliefs across the range of substantive issues and contexts that ACF
researchers are interested in. Accordingly, we endorse its candidacy as a standard measure of
deep core beliefs in future research using the ACF.
It is important to note, however, that CT may not provide the only (or even the best)
framework for measuring deep core beliefs. Rather, we contend that it meets this basic set of
important criteria and should thus be included in the list of possible candidates. We hope that
future research will use these criteria and others to compare CT against alternative frameworks to
determine the best approach to conceptualizing and measuring deep core beliefs. Alternative
23
frameworks, for example, might include Milton Rokeach’s set of instrumental and terminal
values (1973) or Shalom Schwartz’s system of value types (1992). Other criteria might include
things like reliability—does the framework provide a set of deep core beliefs that (as required by
the ACF) are stable across time or space? Such studies would provide a much-needed theoretical
and empirical basis for operationalizing and measuring deep core beliefs in future research. This
would facilitate the development and testing of new theories about the content of belief systems,
the kind of coalitions they propagate, the policy goals they advance, the strategies they use to
advance them, and (ultimately) the type of policy changes we are likely to see in the future.
24
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30
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Min
Max
Mean
Egalitarianism Index
1
7
4.15
Hierarchism Index
1
7
4.45
Individualism Index
1
7
4.35
Fatalism Index
1
7
3.67
International Disposition Index
1
7
4.41
Security vs. Liberty
-100
100
2.32
View of Nature
0
10
5.98
Energy Tradeoff
1
7
4.88
Advanced Degree
0
1
0.12
SD
1.52
1.29
1.28
1.38
1.11
38.35
2.53
1.69
0.33
Alpha
0.77
0.66
0.68
0.74
0.70
—
—
—
—
Table 2: PCA Analysis of Cultural Orientation Indicators
Prompt: Please respond to the following statements on a scale
from one to seven, where one means you strongly disagree and
C1
C2
seven means you strongly agree.1
E1: What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the
0.29 0.77
distribution of goods more equal.
E2: Society works best if power is shared equally.
E3: It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income
between the rich and the poor.
I1: Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for
society to let people succeed or fail on their own.
I2: Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way
in the world.
I3: We are all better off when we compete as individuals.
H1: The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do
what you are told to do.
H2: Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in
authority.
H3: Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and
swift punishment on those who break the rules.
F1: The most important things that take place in life happen by
chance.
F2: No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely
determined by forces beyond our control.
F3: For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance.
1
2
Items were presented to respondents in random order
Loadings greater than 0.5 are listed in bold
31
C3
C4
-0.24
0.13
0.07
0.84
0.07
0.02
0.25
0.76
-0.25
0.04
0.03
-0.17
0.77
0.19
0.05
-0.03
0.76
0.18
0.03
-0.08
0.72
0.03
0.06
0.08
0.24
0.66
0.17
0.03
0.01
0.82
0.01
0.04
0.14
0.77
0.81
0.16
0.11
0.03
0.73
0.14
-0.04
0.18
0.82
0.17
0.06
0.04
Table 3: OLS Models of Policy Core Beliefs
(Entire Sample)
International
Security vs.
View of
Disposition
Liberty
Nature
Intercept
4.680***
-21.416***
4.835***
(0.114)
(3.983)
(0.208)
Egalitarianism Index
-0.268***
-0.347
0.473***
(0.016)
(0.556)
(0.029)
Hierarchism Index
0.072***
9.803***
0.092**
(0.018)
(0.628)
(0.032)
Individualism Index
0.166***
-3.890***
-0.348***
(0.018)
(0.643)
(0.033)
Fatalism Index
-0.056**
-0.259
0.071*
(0.017)
(0.603)
(0.031)
R2
0.243
0.101
0.149
adj. R2
0.242
0.099
0.148
N
2202
2250
3767
Energy
Tradeoff
3.600***
(0.212)
-0.198***
(0.030)
0.260***
(0.032)
0.267***
(0.034)
-0.053
(0.032)
0.145
0.143
1595
Table 4: OLS Models of Policy Core Beliefs
(Subset of Sample with Advanced Degree)
International
Security vs.
View of
Disposition
Liberty
Nature
Intercept
4.093***
-36.767**
4.936***
(0.390)
(12.545)
(0.607)
Egalitarianism Index
-0.265***
-2.398
0.499***
(0.052)
(1.706)
(0.085)
Hierarchism Index
0.050
14.063***
0.108
(0.060)
(1.962)
(0.092)
Individualism Index
0.272***
-6.295**
-0.508***
(0.069)
(2.247)
(0.105)
Fatalism Index
-0.036
3.097
0.126
(0.058)
(1.910)
(0.090)
R2
0.272
0.182
0.232
adj. R2
0.260
0.169
0.225
N
254
260
422
Energy
Tradeoff
4.643***
(0.663)
-0.340***
(0.095)
0.238*
(0.097)
0.248*
(0.108)
-0.182
(0.094)
0.295
0.277
162
32
Figure 1: Cultural Worldviews
Hierarchism
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Grid
Fatalism
Group
Figure 2: Posterior Predictions of Policy Core Beliefs by Cultural Type (Full Sample)
International Disposition
Security vs. Liberty
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
Density of Posterior Predictions
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.00
0
Density of Posterior Predictions
2
4
6
8
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
5.5
-20
-10
View of Nature
0
10
20
30
Energy Tradeoff
Density of Posterior Predictions
1
2
3
4
5
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
0
0
Density of Posterior Predictions
1
2
3
4
5
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
3.5
33
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
Figure 3: Posterior Predictions of Policy Core Beliefs by Cultural Type
(Subset of Sample with Advanced Degrees)
Security vs. Liberty
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
Density of Posterior Predictions
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.0
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
0.00
Density of Posterior Predictions
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
International Disposition
6.0
-40
-20
0
40
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
0.0
0.0
Egal
Hier
Indi
Fatal
Density of Posterior Predictions
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Energy Tradeoff
Density of Posterior Predictions
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
View of Nature
20
3
4
5
6
7
8
3
34
4
5
6
7