Causes, Enablers, and the Counterfactual Analysis
Author(s): Lawrence Brian Lombard
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 195-211
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320128 .
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LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
CAUSES, ENABLERS, AND THE
COUNTERFACTUAL
ANALYSIS
(Receivedin revisedform21 March,1989)
In this paper, I discuss a problem for the counterfactualanalysis of
event causation.While it may well be that the counterfactualanalysisis
subjectto insuperabledifficulties,'I wish to arguethat the difficultythat
is to be discussed here may not be insuperableand that the counterfactual analysis may be revisable in a way that avoids the difficulty.
In addition, I try to explain an interestingasymmetrydiscovered by
JonathanBennett. My reason for doing that is that what explains that
asymmetryalso points the way to the solution to the problem for the
counterfactualanalysisI shallbe discussing.
I. THE COUNTERFACTUAL
ANALYSIS OF EVENT CAUSATION
The counterfactualanalysisof event causation(referredto here sometimes as 'CAEC'), whose most prominentchampionis David Lewis,2
proposesto give conditionsnecessaryand sufficientfor one event to be
a cause of another. They are conditions under which an individual
event would not have occurred. It is not concerned with statements like
'he failed the course because he did not study',insofaras they assert a
causal relationbetweenfacts and not events.3Nor is it concernedwith
conditionals like 'if he had studied, he would have passed', which
would,I suppose,analyze,accordingto a counterfactualanalysisof fact
causation,singularcausalstatementsrelatingfacts.4
Accordingto the counterfactualanalysisof eventcausation,
(C)
Event c is an immediatecause of an event e if and only if it
is the case that if c had not occurred, e would not have
occurred(e is counterfactuallydependenton c). And c is a
remote cause of e if and only if there is a sequence of
events, c, cl, . . ., cn, e, such that c is an immediate cause of
c, ... and cqis an immediatecauseof e.
PhilosophicalStudies59:195-211,1990.
? 1990 KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printedin the Netherlands.
LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
196
Remote causation cannot be analyzed directly in terms of counterfactual dependence, since, while the causal relation is transitive,the
counterfactualconditionalis not.
CAEC requiresrevision if it is to accommodate,and avoid refutation based on cases of, causal overdetermination.It might be the case
that, while c is an immediatecause of e, there is some other event, c',
which is such that, had c failed to occur, c' would have, and c' would
have been an immediatecause of e. But, despite its being false that had
c not occurred,e would not have occurred,we would not deny that c
was a causeof e.
Also, it has been claimed,for example,that my becomingan uncle
was not caused by my brother'swife's giving birth, even though the
counterfactual,'Had my brother'swife's giving birth not occurred,my
becomingan uncle would not have occurred',is true.5CAEC mightbe
saved from counterexampleslike this by some furtherrevision, or by
insistingthat we do have here a cause of causation,or by denyingthat
phraseslike 'mybecomingan uncle'andits ilk referto events.6
But these and the other standard difficulties for CAEC and the
revisions and complicationsthat may be introducedin an attempt to
deal with them shall be ignored here. The problem with the counterfactualanalysisI wishto discusshas a differentgenesis.
[I. PROBLEMS FOR THE COUNTERFACTUAL
ANALYSIS
Considerthe followingcase, adaptedfrom a recent paper by Jonathan
Bennett:7
In April, there was a heavy rainstorm,and in May and June there were electrical
storms. The lightningin June started a forest fire. If the rainstormin April had not
occurred,therewouldhavebeen a forestfirein May.
Now suppose we assume that no event can occur at a time other than
the timeat whichit in fact occurs.8It willfollowthat
(a)
If the rainstormin April had not occurred, the forest fire
(the one in June)wouldnot haveoccurred.
The reason for this is that, though there would have been a forest fire
(in May),it would not have been the one that actuallyoccurred,since it
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
197
would have occurred earlier than the actual one. But (a) and the
counterfactualanalysisof event causationtogetherimply
(b)
The rainstormin April causedthe Juneforestfire.
And (b) is unacceptable.It is a bit of good common sense that heavy
rains can put out fires, they don't start them;it is false to say that the
rainscausedthe fire.9
David Lewis too has expressed concern about combining CAEC
withthe thesisthatthe timeof occurrenceof an eventis essentialto it:
Who would dare to be a doctor, if [the time of an event is essential to it]? You might
manageto keep your patient alive until 4:12, when otherwisehe would have died at
4:08. You would then have caused his death. For his death was, in fact, his death at
4:12. If that time is essential,his death is an event that would not have occurredhad he
died at 4:08, as he wouldhavedone withoutyouraction.Thatwillnot do."'
These arguments are valid. The counterfactual analysis of event
causation,as currentlyformulated,is incompatiblewith the thesis that
an event cannot occur earlier(or later)than it does. Whichof these two
claimsshouldwe give up?
There are undoubtedlymore adherentsof the counterfactualanalysis
of event causationthan there are believers in the thesis that no event
can occur earlier than it in fact does, and many of those who have
considered the latter thesis have rejected it." However, if one thinks
that this problem for CAEC - that it is false if the time of events is
essential - can be avoided by rejectingthis essentialistthesis, one is, I
think,mistaken."2
For CAEC, as currentlyformulated,mustbe rejected
anyway.The counterfactualanalysisseems to be in troublefrom other
cases similarto the one mentionedabove, thoughthese other cases do
not involve acceptanceof my essentialistthesis concerningthe time of
occurrenceof an event. So, rejectionof that essentialistthesis will not
save CAEC fromthe problemthatthe essentialistthesisraises.
Supose that Jones lives in a very dangerousneighborhood,and that
one evening Smith attempts to stab him to death. Jones is saved
because of the action of Brown who frightensSmith off. However, a
year later,Jones is shot to death by the persistentSmith.So, if Brown's
action had not occurred,Jones's death due to the shooting would not
have occurred,since he would have died of stab wounds a year earlier.
But, I find it intuitivelyquite unacceptableto suppose that Brown's
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LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
action was a cause of Jones's dying as a result of a gunshot a year
later."3If so, there is somethingwrongwith CAEC, and my essentialist
thesisplaysno role in the derivationthe objectionableconsequence.
Again, suppose we assume that the time of an event is not essential
to it. In that case, it seems true that had Caesar'sbirthnot occurredhis
death would not have occurred,because in such a case Caesarwould
not have been born at all. And it surely seems true to the defendersof
the counterfactualanalysisthat there is a chain of causal dependencies
stretchingfrom Caesar's birth to his death. But I am not the least
inclinedto thinkthatCaesar'sbirthwas amongthe causesof his death.
Regardlessof one's position on the thesis that events occur essentiallywhen they do, there simplyis a distinctionwith whichany version
of the counterfactualanalysisof event causationwill have to take note
of and accommodate.And that essentialistthesis is in no difficultyfrom
a version of the counterfactualanalysisthat accommodatesthat distinction. For it will tum out thatif CAEC is revisedto take accountof that
distinction,the revised version will be neithersubjectto difficultyfrom
the last two cases, which do not assume that essentialist thesis, nor
incompatiblewiththatessentialistthesis.
The offensiveclaims,that the rain in April was a cause of the forest
fire, that life-savers'actions cause their patients'deaths, and that births
cause deaths, are derivable principally because the counterfactual
analysis of event causation,as currentlyformulated,incorrectlyrules
certainevents to be causes of others.And it so rules,because it fails to
make and then to take accountof a certaindistinctionbetweenways in
whicheventsmayfit into the causalhistoryof anotherevent.
III. DELAYERS
Despite my view that the forest fire that actuallyoccurred is not the
same fire that would have occurredearlier,had it not rainedin April,
there is a sense in which the rain in April "delayed"the forest fire by a
month;it delayedthe occurrenceof a forest fire, even thoughthere was
no forest fire such that the rain made it occur later. The rain in April
delayedthe occurrenceof the forest fire, thoughit did not cause the fire
it delayed.
We can formulatethe idea of a delayerin the followingway:
(D)
An event, c, is a delayer of an event, e, just in case e is of
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
199
type P, and had c not occurred, an event, e', of type P
would have occurred anyway,but at a time earlierthan the
timeat whiche in fact occurred.14
Delayers are generallynot causes of what they delay. That this is so
is one half of a thesis that Bennett dubbed "the asymmetryfact",the
other half of which is that "hasteners"generallyare causes of what they
hasten.15Bennett,however,did not explainwhy he thoughtthat fact to
be a fact. It is one of my goals here to provide at least part of the
explanation."6
(b) is not true;it seems absurdto say that delayinga forest'sburning
is causing it to burn. Why does it seem absurd?Perhaps because to
delay is in part to prevent,and to preventis to "uncause".But delaying
is only in part preventing;to delay an event of a certaintype is to make
an event of that type occur at a time later than an event of that type
would otherwisehave occurred.But this seems to imply that to delay
an eventis to makeit happen,andthatis, it wouldappear,to causeit.'7
I have no doubt that (b) false. But to see whatin the derivationof (b)
needs to be rejected,we must see just what it is about (b), which says
that a delayerof a certainevent is a cause of that event, that is irksome.
The previous paragraphsuggests, however, that (b) is true, and that
delayers are causes of what they delay. So, how is it possible for
delayersto fail to be causes of whatthey delay?Bennett'scase involves
the following.The rains made the forest wet; so anothermonth had to
pass for the forest to be dry enough to allow lightningto start a forest
fire. Thus, the April rain actuallycaused the onslaughtof a condition
(the wetness of the forest) the presence of which preventedlightningin
May from causing a fire and the absence of which in June made it
possible for lightningin June to cause a fire. And this is enough to
convince me that (b) is false; and it also suggeststo me the reason why
thatis so.
IV. HASTENERS AND DELAYERS
In a sense analogous to (D), an event may hasten the occurrence of
another:
(H)
An event, c, is a hastenerof an event, e, just in case e is an
event of type P, and had c not occurred,an event, e', of type
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LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
P would have occurredanyway,but at a time later than the
timeat whiche in factoccurred.
And it seems clearly right to suppose that an event that hastens the
occurrence of another may well be a cause of the other. The fatal
shooting of a person surely hastens the victim'sdeath and is clearly a
cause of it.18But, while hastenersmay often be causes of the events
they hasten,the delayersof events are generallynot their causes.What
explainswhythisis so?
A patient is broughtto the emergencyroom, having recently been
poisoned. A doctor administersan antidote, thus saving the patient's
life. But the patient is allergic to the antidote and dies of the allergic
reaction to it. The doctor's action delayed the patient'sdeath. What
makesthis case one in which a delayerof a certainevent is also a cause
of it is that the giving of the antidote (the delayer) was an event that
caused the allergicreaction,which, in turn, caused the patient'sdeath.
Thus,in the sense of (D), the delayerof the death was also a cause of it.
If there are to be cases of delayers that are not causes of what they
delay, the causal patternwill have to be different.Indeed, if it delayers
are generallynot causes of what they delay, it will have to be that the
causalpatternexhibitedby the casejustdescribedis an unusualone.
But two ideas suggest that that patterncannot be unusual.First, as
mentioned,to delay an event of a certaintype is to make it occur later
than an event of that type would otherwise have occurred;and that
seems to imply that to delay an event is to make it happen, that is, to
cause it. The second idea that suggeststhat delayersmust be causes of
the events they delay involves the combinationof CAEC and the thesis
that events cannotoccur earlierthan they do. Let e be an event delayed
by c; if c had not occurred,and if e could not have occurredearlier
than it did, then, while an event, e', much like e, would have occurred
(for c delayed e), e would not have occurred (for e could not have
occurredat the earliertime of e'). So, if c had not occurred,e would
not have occurred.Thus, CAEC rules the delayer, c, to be a cause of
the delayed event, e. Therefore,delayersmust be causes of what they
delay.
Since (b) is false, there is at least one delayer that is not a cause of
the event it delays; so, this reasoning must be unsound. And it is
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
201
CAEC, as formulatedby (C), that is responsiblefor the unsoundness,
not the thesisof the essentialityof an event'stimeof occurrence.
It can happen that an event, c, can prevent the occurrence of an
event, e, and also be a cause of an event, e', that is in some salient
respect like e. In such a case, c is a delayerand a cause of the delayed
effect e'. But it can also happen that c prevents e from occurringand
an event like e does later occur, due in part (in some sense) to the
occurrenceof c, but where c is not a cause of the delayed event. And
such cases are not only common,they are, I think,usual.How are such
cases possible?
V. CAUSES AND ENABLERS
The solution to our problem requiresthat the counterfactualanalysis
find a way to cope with the distinctionbetweenthe causes of events and
those conditions or states the obtaining of which merely makes it
possiblefor one eventto causeanother.
One reason for making this distinction is that, according to the
counterfactualanalysisof event causation,causes and effects are events.
States of objects and conditions, however, are not. Events are
changes;19and an object's being blue, a piece of salt's being soluble,
andthe structuralweaknessof a bridgeare not changes.
Causes make things happen; they are bringings about. What is
brought about must not have been there before; so, what is brought
about, an effect, is a change.And it is hard to see how a changecan be
broughtabout except by anotherchange.Causes and effects, then, are
changes,thatis, events.
Of course, if the match hadn'tbeen dry, it would not have lit. But
from this, I do not want to infer that the match'sbeing dry was a cause
of the match'slighting,for the drynessof the matchis not an event (for
it is not a change)and only events are causes (accordingto the view we
are considering).
In addition,at least accordingto standardviews of event-causation,
there are to be no temporalgaps between causes and their effects that
are not filled by intermediarycauses and effects. But the match had
been dry (and in sufficientoxygen,etc.) for quite some time before it lit.
Why did the match not light when it became dry? Because, I contend,
202
LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
the cause of its lighting,the striking,had not yet occurred.The match's
being dry was not a mere "non-salient"cause of its lighting;it was not a
cause of the lighting at all. It was just one of those conditions the
obtaining of which made it possible for an event, a striking of the
match,to causeit to light.
Any version of CAEC that ignores the distinctionbetween causes
and those conditions the presence of which make it possible for one
event to cause anotherwill be unable to distinguishbetween an event
that is a cause of effect, e, and an event that causes a thing to be in a
state that makes it possible for an event to cause e. And an event that
causes a thing to be in a state that makes it possible for an event to
cause e - an enabler - is generally not, I contend, a cause of e. But
both the causes of events and the causes of enablers of events make
counterfactualstrue:it is not only true that if the match'sstrikinghad
not occurred the match'slightingwould not have occurred,it is also
true that the lightingwould not have occurredif whatevercaused the
matchto becomedryhadnot occurred.
CAEC's failureto incorporatethis distinctionleads it to rule falsely
that the rain in April was a cause of the fire. But all the rain in April
did was to make it impossible for lightningin May to cause a fire (it
prevented,it disenabled,a forest fire in May) and to make it possible
for the lightning in June to cause a fire. The April rain made it
impossiblefor lightningin May to cause the fire, for the rain in April
made the forest too wet to burn even after a month. And the rain in
April made it possible for lightningin June to cause a fire then, since if
it hadn'trainedin April, the forest would have been dry enoughin May
for the lightningin May to cause the forest to burn;and a forest that is
completelyburntin Maycannotburnagainin June.
Delayers are generally not causes of the events they delay, for a
delayergenerallycauses a thing to be in a state the obtainingof which
makes it possible for anotherevent to cause the delayedevent at a time
later than that at which an event similar to the delayed event would
haveoccurredhad the delayernot occurred.
VI. DISTINGUISHING
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
Supposethat substanceswith molecularstructureS are soluble in water
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
203
and that one can make a substancehave structureS by sprinklingDust
on it. SprinklingDust on a substance,then, is an enabler;it is a cause of
something'scoming to be in an enablingcondition,a state (the state of
being soluble) the obtainingof which makes it possible for some event
(a putting of the substance in water) to cause a certain effect (the
dissolvingof the substance).And suppose that I sprinklesome Dust on
a substanceand then toss the substancein some water, whereuponit
dissolves. SprinklingDust on the substance was not a cause of its
dissolving;all it did was producein that substancea capacity,a capacity
to dissolve if dropped in water. And that capacityis a capacityto be
affectedin a certainwayif actedon in a certainway.
The notion of a capacityis "multi-layered".
"Primary"
capacitiesare
capacities to be affected in certain ways if acted on in certain ways.
"Secondary"capacitiesare capacitiesthe activationof which makes it
possible for other capacitiesto be realized by causing objects to have
those othercapacities.20
I am locked in my study;so, of course, I cannot get to the kitchen.
Nevertheless,I can get to the kitchen:if the door were to be unlockedI
could get to the kitchen.Similarly,a substancewithoutstructureS lacks
the primarycapacityto dissolve; but it has the secondarycapacity to
dissolve, since it has the capacityto have Dust sprinkledon it, and if
thatweredone, it wouldacquirethe primarycapacityto dissolve.
Causes are, roughlyspeaking,activatorsof primary,not secondary,
capacities.
SprinklingDust on a substancethat is to be dropped into water is
not a cause of the substance'sdissolvingand unlockingthe door is not a
cause of my gettingto the kitchen.And in the same sense, my poisoning
of the tea you are about to drink is not a cause of your death by
poisoningand my placingof an explosive device, which must still have
its timerset, underthe libraryis not a causeof the library'sblowingup.
A primarycapacity is a condition that makes it possible for one
event to cause another;it is a dispositionof a substanceto be affected
in certain ways. A secondary capacity is a condition that makes it
possible for a thing to come to have a primarycapacity.The solubility
of salt is a primarycapacity;it makesit possible for a droppingof some
salt into waterto cause it to dissolve;it has the dispositionto dissolve if
placed in water. But an otherwiseinsoluble substancecan dissolve, in
204
LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
the sense that if Dust were sprinkledon it, it would become soluble;it
wouldthenacquirethe dispositionto dissolveif put in water.
An enableris a cause of a thing'sacquiringof a primarycapacity,of
an enabling condition. A pure enabler is an event the occurrenceof
whichmakesit causallypossible for a certaineffect to occur,but which
does not itself bringabout that effect;it is an event that merelycauses a
thing to acquire a primarycapacity, but does not also activate that
capacity.
A disenableris an event that causes a thingto lose a certainprimary
capacity.The occurrenceof a disenablerpreventsthe occurrenceof an
effect, a certain change, in a thing that would have occurred,had the
disenablernot occurred, by causing the thing to lose the capacity to
changein thatway.
VII. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ENABLER AND
A REMOTE CAUSE?
The first domino in a row is pushed over, and its going over is a remote
cause of the fourteenthdomino'sgoing over. And it is true that had the
first domino'sgoing over not occurred,the fourteenthdomino'sgoing
overwouldnot haveoccurred(barringoverdetermination).
The first domino's going over is a cause of, and is not merely an
enablerof, the fourteenthdomino'sgoing over. But its going over seems
to make the fourteenthdomino'sgoing over possible.Is it both a cause
and an enabler?No.
The first domino's going over does not make it possible for the
thirteenthdomino'sgoing over to cause the fourteenthdomino'sgoing
over. The thirteenthdomino's going over, had it occurred,would still
have caused the fourteenthto go over, even if the first domino'sgoing
over had not occurred.It is true, of course, that had the first domino
not fallen over, the thirteenthwould not have fallen over; and neither
would the fourteenth. That fact notwithstanding,if the thirteenth
domino'sfalling over had occurred,so would the fourteenthdomino's
fallingover. The first domino'sgoing over does not make it possible for
the thirteenthdomino's going over to cause the fourteenth domino's
going over; rather, it causes the thirteenth domino's going over.
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
205
Remote causes are not enablers;they are remote activatorsof primary
capacities.
This contrastswith the case of killing by poisoning someone's tea.
Even if the tea isn't poisoned, it still gets drunk;poisoningthe tea does
not cause the tea to be drunk.It is just that withoutthe poisoningof the
tea, the drinkerdoes not get poisoned and die. Poisoningthe tea, then,
isn't a remote cause of the death;it is an event that causes the tea to be
in such a state that drinkingit causes the death.On the other hand,it is
false to say the following:the first domino's going over isn't a remote
cause of the fourteenth domino's going over, it merely causes the
thirteenthdomino to be in such a state that its falling over causes
the fourteenth domino's going over. Rather, it causes the thirteenth
domino'sgoingover.
There is a differencein the causal role played by a genuinecause of
a remote effect such as the first domino'sgoing over, and an enabler,
such as the placingof the thirteenthdomino in the proper position (so
that when it falls it falls into the fourteenth).The differenceseems to
involve the idea that there is no causal chain of events leadingfrom a
pureenablerof a certaineffectto thateffect.
There is a sequence of causes and effects that leads to the placingof
the thirteenthdomino in its proper position. This sequence terminates
in that domino's being in the state of having a certain spatiallocation
relativeto the other dominos. And there the causal story (apartfrom
irrelevanteffects such as the disturbancesof small particles) of that
causal sequence comes to an end. Everythingis now right for another
sequence of events, involving the falling over of the first domino, to
lead to the fourteenthdomino's falling over. And in that sequence of
events, the placing of the thirteenthdomino in its proper position has
no place. In a similarway, the causal story of the tea-poisoningends
whenthe tea has become poisonous.
VIII. THE ASYMMETRY FACT
An event can be a mere disenablerof a certaineffect, by simplybeing
the cause of a thing's losing of the primarycapacity to undergo the
changewhichis that effect.The rainstormin April is a disenablerof the
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LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
forest's catching fire in May, for it causes the loss of the forest's
capacityto burnthen by causingthe loss of an enablingconditionof the
burning,the forest'sdryness.
But a single event can be both a disenablerof a certain effect, by
being the cause of a thing'sloss of the capacityto undergothe change
whichis that effect, and an enablerof a similareffect, by being a cause
of the thing's acquiringof that capacity at a later time. Suppose, for
example,that a substanceis soluble if it has either molecularstructure
S or molecularstructureS' and that sprinklingGunk on a substance
with structureS causes it to lose structureS and also causes it to
acquirestructureS' at a later time;and suppose that Gunk is sprinkled
on a substancethat is then placed in water and dissolves. Sprinkling
Gunkon the substanceis a disenablerof the dissolvingthatwould have
occurred had Gunk not been sprinkled;and it is an enabler of the
actualdissolving.In this case, the sprinklingof Gunk is a cause neither
of the dissolving that would have occurred if Gunk had not been
sprinkled on the substance (it already had structure S) nor of the
dissolvingthatdid occur.
The April rain, in Bennett's case, counts as both enabler and
disenabler.The rain disenabledthe May fire by makingthe forest too
wet to burnthen.But it also enabledthe June fire, for, in preventingthe
May fire, it made it possible for lightningin June to have something
unburntto ignite.
One and the same event can be both a disenablerof a certaineffect,
by being the cause of a thing'sloss of a certaincapacity,and a cause of
a similar effect. The administeringof an antidote to a poison, an
antidotewhich is also poisonous to the patient,preventsa death of the
patient due to the activityof the first poison and causes a later death
due to the activityof the poisonous antidote.The administeringof the
antidoteis a disenablerof a death and it is also a cause of (a distinct)
death.It is a delayerof the patient'sdeath.
Cases such as this last one, where an event is both a disenablerof a
certaineffect and also a cause of a later,similareffect, seem to me to be
ratherhard to come by. Insofaras this is so, we have an explanationof
Bennett's insight that delayers are generally not causes of what they
delay.
But for a hastenerto be a cause of an event it hastens,it is sufficient
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
207
that the hastener cause the occurrence of an event belonging to a
certainsort, where anotherevent of that sort would have occurredlater
anyway.And thatis not at all rare.
But hastenersare not always causes of the events they hasten. An
event may hastenthe occurrenceof anotherby causingthe loss of a disenablingconditionthat would have been removedlater.For example,a
certaindamp log, which is next to a fire, will not ignite until it is dry;it
is left out in the sun and its drying out in that mannerwill take two
days. However, I take a hair dryer to the log, and it dries out in three
hours, whereuponit ignites. My action hastens the log's catchingfire,
but is not a cause of it. Blowingmoderatelyhot air on a thingis not a
cause of its catchingfire; it just makes is possible for it to catch fire, it
makesit flammable.
A delayerthat is also a cause of what it delays would have to be an
event that (i) causes the onslaughtof a disenablingcondition (which
prevents a cause from having its effect), and (ii) activatesa condition
enabling the effect (that is, either by itself or by some other event,
brought about after the disenablingcondition is brought about) by
causing an event whose occurrence was (in the sense of (D)) first
disenabledand then enabled. That is quite a lot of work for a single
event to do; and it is reasonableto thinkthat events like that are rather
rare.Delayersareusuallynot causesof the eventstheydelay.
A hastenerthat is not also a cause of what it hastenswould have to
be an event that (i) causes the loss of a disenablingconditionthatwould
have ceased obtaining anyway, though later, and (ii) causes the
onslaught of an enabling condition. And while such cases are not
uncommon, they seem less common that cases of hasteners that are
causesof whattheyhasten.
If this is right,then we have an explanationof this asymmetry:while
hastenersgenerallyare causes of what they hasten, delayersgenerally
arenot causesof whattheydelay.
IX. THE COUNTERFACTUAL
ANALYSIS
Enablers are usually not causes of the events they enable. Their
occurrence,though,makescertaincounterfactualsrelatingthem and the
events they enable true; and the counterfactualanalysis of event
208
LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
causationtakes that fact as evidence for the claim that they are causes.
Whatthis shows is that CAEC, as formulatedby (C), must be given up.
If a version of CAEC is to avoid this difficulty,it must be sensitiveto
the different ways in which events may fit into the causal history of
otherevents.
There is a chain of counterfactualdependencies that leads from a
person's birth to his or her death. So, CEAC rules the birth to be a
cause of the death.And such a rulingis surelyfalse. The birthwas not a
cause of the death;it was merelya cause of an enablingconditionof the
death.Nothinghas the capacityto die unless it is alive, for being alive is
an enablingcondition of dying, and the birth is a cause of a person's
comingto be alive.
Similarly,since all humansare mortal,a doctor who saves a patient's
life only (thoughnot merely) delays the patient'seventual death. This
fact, however,does not by itself make the life-savingactions of doctors
causes of their fortunatepatients'eventual deaths. They may merely
make it possible for later events to cause those deaths;and that'snot so
bad.The physicianshavenothingto fearfromthe metaphysicians.
If a counterfactualanalysis of event causationis to be saved from
counterexampleslike these, the analysismust not count as a cause of a
given effect any event that is merely a cause of the onslaught of a
condition that makes it possible for some event to cause that event. It
mustnot countmereenablersas causesof the eventstheyenable.
The counterfactualanalysis(C) assertsthat an event, c, is a cause of
an event e just in case either c is an immediatecause of e - in which
case, if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred - or c is a
remotecause of e - in whichcase, there is a chain of immediatecauses
andeffectsconnectingc and e.
A mere enabler of e, however, cannot be an immediatecause of e
for it only causes somethingto be able to undergo e. The event that
makes a substance soluble cannot be an immediate cause of its
dissolving,for it merely causes the substanceto become soluble. And
nothingdissolvesjust becauseit is soluble.2'Thus, while it is true that if
e's enablerhad not occurred,e would not have occurred,it is not true
that e's enableris an immediatecause of e. So, c is an immediatecause
of e just in case, (i) if c had not occurred,e would not have occurred
and (ii) c is not a mere enablerof e. An event, c, is a remotecause of e
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
just in case there is a sequence of events, c, c1, ..
an immediate cause of
cl,...
209
.,
c, e,
such that c is
, and cnis an immediate cause of e.
Thus, an event is a cause of e just in case it satisfies the original
version of the counterfactualanalysis(C) and is not a mere enablerof
e.
In Bennett'scase, the combinationof the thesis that the time of an
event is essential to it and this revised version of the counterfactual
analysis cannot be used to derive the objectionable claim that the
rainstormin April caused the June fire. The reason for this is that the
rain was merely an enabler, and not a cause, of that fire. The revised
version of the counterfactualanalysisand thesis of the essentialityof an
event'stimeof occurrenceare not incompatible.
This revision of the counterfactualanalysisof event causationdoes
not, of course, address other difficultiesthat can be raised againstthe
idea that causationcan be analyzedin terms of counterfactualdependence. And perhapsone of those other difficultieswill eventuallyprove
to be insuperable.However, I think that the difficultiesthat I have
discussedhere are not insuperable,and that the counterfactualanalysis
can be revised,by takingaccountof the distinctionbetween causes and
enablers,so as to meetthose difficulties.
On the other hand, it is not clear that a counterfactualanalysisso
revisedcan retainits originalgoal of understandingcausationstrictlyin
terms of counterfactualdependence of one event on another, since
effects depend counterfactuallyboth on their causes and on the causes
of the conditionsthatenabletheircausesto be effective.22
NOTES
In his paper, "Causesand Counterfactuals",Joumal of Philosophy 70 (1973), pp.
570-572, JaegwonKim provides a summaryof at least some of the (now) standard
objectionsto the counterfactualanalysisof event causation.I shall, in this paper, take
no position on whetheror not they can all be met; I do think, however, that at least
some of themcan be.
2 See, for example,Lewis's"Causation",
reprintedin his PhilosophicalPapers, Volume
II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 159-172. This paper originally
appearedin Journalof Philosophy70 (1973), pp. 556-567.
3 Whetherthey actuallydo or do not willnot be a matterof concernhere.
I Perhapsone good reason for distinguishingclaims about fact-causationfrom claims
about event-causationis that there is no match between such claims, unless the
circumstancesin which, e.g., the statements'the house burned down' and 'the house's
210
LAWRENCE BRIAN LOMBARD
burningdown occurred'are true, are the same. But this is not so, since the former,but
not the latter,would be true if the house burneddown twice. This point is Davidson's;
see "The Logical Form of Action Sentences",reprintedin his Essays on Actions and
Events(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1980), p. 1 4.
5 See Jaegwon Kim, op. cit., and his "NoncausalConnections",Noais 8 (1974), pp.
41-52. Kim holds this view, in part, because if the relation between the two were
causal,it wouldbe a case of instantaneouscausalinteractionat a distance.
6 I preferthe last mentionedway of dealingwith such cases. I thinkthat the case is not
a case of causation,for reasonshavingto with my view that there are no events that are
the changes that objects undergowhen they merely change relationallyor Cambridgely; and when I become an uncle that is how I change.Thus, there is no event involving
me (my becomingan uncle) to be causallyrelatedin the way requiredto my sister-inlaw's giving birth.Thus, I do not see a problemfor the counterfactualanalysiscreated
by such cases. See my Events:A MetaphysicalStudy (London:Routledge & Kegan
Paul,1986), pp. 102-104.
7 Jonathan Bennett, "Event Causation:The CounterfactualAnalysis", in James E.
Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives,I: Metaphysics,1987 (Atascadero, California:RidgeviewPublishingCompany,1987), pp. 367-386; Bennett'sversion of the
case is on p. 373. [Hereafter,Bennett'spaperwill be referredto as 'Bennett'.]
8 I defend the claim that no event can occur at a time other than the time at whichit in
factoccursin Events:A MetaphysicalStudy,pp. 21 2-216.
9 It appears that Bennett, who accepted that (b) is false (in Bennett, p. 373), is now
preparedto accept (b) as true. After all, in sayingthat the rain caused the fire, we are
merely pointing out a remote and non-salientcause; see his Events and TheirNames
(Indianapolis:Hackett PublishingCompany, 1988), p. 70. I think the rain was not a
cause, remote or non-salient,of the fire, and that Bennett was wrong to change his
mind.
10 David Lewis, "Events",Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1986), p. 250.
II I consider some objections to this essentialist claim about events in Events: A
MetaphysicalStudy,pp. 206-212, and find them wanting.There is also an argument
againstthe claim that an event cannot occur earlierthan it in fact does in Bennett, p.
369; it too is, I think,unsound.
12 Lewis, for example,takes his argumentas a reason to reject this essentialistthesis
aboutevents.
'3 Bennett, however, apparentlybelieves that this conclusion is not unacceptable;for,
to Bennett,all that 'Brown'saction causes Jones's death'means is that that action is in
the causal historyof the death. See Events and TheirNames, pp. 70-71. I too believe
that the passerby'saction was in the causal history of Jones's death;but I think that
events and actions can be in the causal historyof anotherwithoutbeing a cause of the
other.Thisindeedis a principalpointof the presentpaper.
"4 It must be noted that what I mean by 'a delayer of an event' and its companion,'a
hastenerof an event',are not whatBennettmeansby suchphrases.
15 See Bennett, pp. 374-375. Apparently,Bennett has now rejected the asymmetry
fact as a factaboutcauses;see Eventsand TheirNames,p. 71.
16 Again, it is worth pointing out that Bennett and I do not mean the same thingsby
'hastener'and 'delayer'.And because of that, the asymmetrythesis Bennett has now
rejectedis differentfromthe asymmetrythesisthatI thinkis true.
17 One might suggestthat the fact that some event delays the fire does not entail that
that event makes the fire occur, on the grounds that a delayer does not cause the
delayedevent to occur;rather,it causes the delayedevent to have a certainfeature,that
of occurringat a certain (later) time. Thus, delayers are causes, but not causes of the
events therebydelayed.But this suggestionpresupposesthe idea that what are caused
CAUSES AND ENABLERS
211
by causes are (at least sometimes)not events but featuresof events. However, such a
view is at odds with the view that the causes and effects of events are themselvesevents,
and thus cannot happilybe combinedwith CAEC to circumventthe problemthat (b)
raises.
18 I hasten to note that the hastenedeffect is not the same event as that which would
have occurredhad the hasteningcause not occurred.My commitmentto the essentiality
of an event'stime of occurrenceis not the only reasonfor holdingthatviewhere.
'9 Thisis a principalthesisof Events:A MetaphysicalStudy.
20 See Aristotle,DeAnima, Bk. II, ch. 5, and Metaphysics,
Bk. V, ch. 12.
21 If somethingdissolvedjust because it became soluble, it would be because the event
that made the thing soluble was also a cause of its dissolving.The enabler,then, would
not havebeen a pureenabler.
22 I am gratefulto Pat Franckenand RichardBaer for a helpful discussion with me
concerningsome of the issues discussedin this paper,and to LarryPowersfor reading
an earlierdraft.
Departmentof Philosophy,
WayneStateUniversity,
Detroit,MI 48202,
U.S.A.