Airborne and Ground Based Safety Nets make a positive

Airborne and Ground Based Safety Nets make a positive
difference in ATM Safety - Application in Real Time Operations
& Operational Monitoring
Ground Based SAFNET for Operational Monitoring
Identifying positive deviance - Safety performance monitoring
Safety Forum 2016
Brussels, 07 - 08 June 2016
Tony Licu
Head of Safety Unit
EURCONTROL
Marco Ducci
Carlo Valbonesi
ASMT ECTL Ext. Operations Support
ENAV Safety Team
ASMT User
ENAV Spa
Dr. Frederic Lieutaud
ASMT Project Manager
EUROCONTROL
Airborne
Safety Nets make
positive difference in
ATM safety
Real-time Operations
Ground Based
Operational
Expertise
• Interpret the results
• Implement actions
Operational Monitoring
•
•
Best practices (Safety II)
Systemic issues (Safety I)
ASMT
Automatic Safety
Monitoring Tool
• Drawn attention
• Drive analysis/questions
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The Positive Deviance Approach
Identify
meaningful
Network
Metrics and
Indicators
Correlate
metrics with
ASMT to
capture
safety nets
events
Identify
Outliers
Identify
Hotspots
“Positive”
and
“Negative”
Baseline performance
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Baseline performance
5
Positive Outliers
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Baseline performance
7
Outliers by Traffic Load
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Baseline performance
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Outliers by Vertical movements
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Baseline performance
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Negative Outliers
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Outliers overview
Intervene on airspace
design: reduce vert
movements?
Worse than expected:
which are the causes?
Better than expected:
which are the drivers?
Intervene on traffic
load: reduce
traffic?
Positive Outliers
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Positive outliers – the Rome FIR case
Analysis of outliers: what can we learn?
Better than expected:
which are the drivers?
Specific procedures used to avoid
conflicts in transition areas
Worse than expected:
which are the causes?
A non-optimal tuning of the STCA?
Non-optimal ATC
procedures?
Conclusion and what’s next?
 The Positive Deviance Approach relies on operational data and use
of ASMT to perform Outliers analysis and make difference in:
• Understanding how operations work as a whole
• Measuring and assessing the presence of safety, performing better or
worse than the average:
• capture best practices to reproduce (Safety II), as opposed to
• identify systemic issues to be mitigated (Safety I)
 Italian airspace STCA analysis is only an example - future studies
in ATM safety using SAFNET data and ASMT in the pipeline:
• Correlation of Safety Events (STCA/SMI/ACAS-RA) & Traffic Metrics
• Analyses of Hotspot of false/nuisance SAFNET events for tuning &
performance monitoring
• Analyses of correlation of RIMCAS alerts and Go-around/Missed
Approach (expanding on aerodrome design and procedures)
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