What is good for us,
and how can we know?
Dan Weijers
Victoria University of Wellington
24 February 2014
The Plan
 Wellbeing methodology – the current state of play
 The problems with current objections to accounts
 Reliance on biased judgments
 Assumptions of full belief in accounts
 Ignoring important differences between objective and
subjective vantage points
 Solutions provided
Wellbeing methodology –
the current state of play 1
 In theory, an account of wellbeing should:
 Agree with pervasive (usually reflected upon) intuitions
 Have a compelling rationale




Does not make inconsistent verdicts
Makes verdicts for the right reasons
Is meta-ethically consistent
Is consistent with existing knowledge
 Be functional
 Provide (actual/theoretical) verdicts in all/most cases
Wellbeing methodology –
the current state of play 2
 But, in practice…
 Agree with pervasive (usually reflected upon) intuitions
 Accounts vs. thought experiments
 Widespread judgment about thought experiment that is
contrary to the verdict of the account of wellbeing
 + plausible normative justification for judgment
 = account of wellbeing is wrong
Wellbeing methodology –
the current state of play 3
 As a result of this way of doing things… all of the
main accounts are considered wrong!
Reliance on biased judgments 1


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
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Judgments about thought experiments can be biased
Intuitive vs. deliberative cognition
Intuitions and biases/heuristics
Intuitive cognition and “stipulations”
Introspection and reconstruction
Reliance on biased judgments 2
 Biases in judgments about unrealistic scenarios
 E.g. the experience machine
60.0
Connect %
50.0
40.0
30.0
54.5
52.4
20.0
34.2
10.0
16.5
0.0
Stranger
NSQ
Stranger
Self
Nozick's
Reliance on biased judgments 3
 Problem: Some thought experiments elicit biased
judgments
 Potential solution?: Avoid intuitive judgments
 Bad idea
 Solution:
 Avoid unrealistic thought experiments
 Use intuitive judgements about rationales more and
intuitive judgements specific cases less
 I.e. balance these uses
Assumptions of full belief in accounts
1
 Some objections rely on full belief in the account
being assessed
 The deceived businessman
 Why do some hedonists prefer the non-deceived life?
 The lack of deception is a “freebie”
Assumptions of full belief in accounts
2
 Problem: some objections uncharitably demand 100%
belief in an account of wellbeing
 Solution:
 Make differences reasonably sizable
 E.g. the experience machine
 So, we should look for clear counterexamples
Objective vs. subjective 1
 What is the correct vantage point from which to
evaluate a life?
 Should we evaluate lives from the inside (as they are
lived) or from the outside?
 The choice is often obscured
 E.g. experience machine & deceived businessman
 Rules we cannot follow
 As a result, the objective view is the default
 But would you listen to others’ opinions?
Objective vs. subjective 2
 Problem: the subjective vantage point is devalued
 Solution: Don’t encourage subjective/objective blurring
 E.g. don’t ask ‘which would you choose?’, ask ‘which life
would be best for a stranger?’
 E.g. avoid examples in which the subjective view is required
and subjectively unavailable information is provided
 Solution: Use intuitive judgements about principles more
and intuitive judgements specific cases less
 E.g. Ask how deception that we never experience can harm us
A new methodology for theorising
about wellbeing
 Agree with pervasive (usually reflected upon) intuitions
about realistic, generous, and fair thought experiments
 No sci-fi, no marginal differences, no blurring subj./obj.
distinction
 Have a compelling rationale




Does not make inconsistent verdicts
Makes verdicts for the right reasons (focus on this)
Is meta-ethically consistent
Is consistent with existing knowledge
 Be functional
 Provide (actual/theoretical) verdicts in all/most cases
Take home message
 When theorizing about wellbeing…
 Use real life examples
 Balance assessments of cases with assessments of
rationales and principles