Chapter 7 Answers to Additional Exercises Question 1 0.1 Net savings ($m) 11 11 0.8 Success 0.5 4 3.5 4 0.4 KVG 1 1.2 1 0.2 Fail -8 -8 0.65 Meets standards 2 6 3.9 6 0.5 Success 4 Modify 4 0 TCX dipping 0.5 Fail -4 3.9 -4 0.1 9 9 0.8 Success 0.35 0.5 Fails 2 1 1.5 2 0 0.4 Switch to KVG 1 -0.8 -1 0.2 Fail -10 -10 Abandon -2 -2 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 1 The decision tree indicates that Casti should choose the TCX dipping procedure and, if it fails, they should modify it. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 2 Question 2 a) 0.3 Market share % 5 Change ingredients 22.5 5 0.7 0.4 Tepsi include it 30 30 1 22.5 0.8 10 Do not change 10 Do not include device 12 0.2 24 20 20 0.6 Tespi don’t include it 25 25 0.7 15 2 Change ingredients 15 31.9 24 0.7 Tepsi include it 0.3 45 45 2 25 Do not change 25 Include device 25 31.9 0.2 0.3 Tespi don’t include it 48 40 40 0.8 50 50 Roka Rola should include the device in their cans, but not change the ingredients if Tepsi include the device in their cans. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 3 b) Ex pe cte d m a rke t sha re % 35 30 D o n o t in c lu d e d e vic e 25 20 In c lu d e d e vic e 15 10 5 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 p (T e sp i i n c l u d e d e v i c e w h e n R o k a R o l a r e j e c t o ffe r ) The graph shows that the decision is totally insensitive to the doubtful probability. This is because the maximum expected market share that can be achieved if Roka Rola do not incorporate the device is 25%, while the expected market share of the device is included is 31.9%. c) i) The utility function is shown below. The utilities that were omitted are shown in red. Market share % Utility 5 0 10 0.25 15 0.45 20 0.6 25 0.72 30 0.8 40 0.95 45 0.98 50 1 The graph of the utility function is shown on the next page. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 4 1 Utility 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 Market share (%) This indicates that, in relation to market share, the marketing manager is risk averse. To see this recall that the decision maker was offered a choice between the following two lotteries. Market share Market share 50% p 1.0 30% 1-p 5% If he had been risk neutral the manager would have been indifferent between the lotteries, and hence would consider entering the gamble, when their expected values were the same. This occurs where p = 0.56 (subject to rounding). However, to tempt him into the gamble the marketing manager required that p was at least 0.8. Because he required a much higher probability of ‘winning’ the gamble than a risk neutral person the manager is risk averse. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 5 ii) 0.3 Utility 0 Change ingredients 0 0.56 0.7 0.4 Tepsi include it 0.8 0.8 1 0.56 0.8 0.25 Do not change 0.25 Do not include device 0.32 0.2 0.656 0.6 0.6 0.6 Tespi don’t include it 0.72 0.72 0.7 0.45 2 Change ingredients 0.45 0.801 0.609 0.7 Tepsi include it 0.3 0.98 0.98 2 0.72 Do not change 0.72 Include device 0.72 0.801 0.2 0.3 Tespi don’t include it 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.8 1 1 Expected utilities are shown in the above tree in red boxes. It can be seen that the policy identified in part (a) should still be pursued. iii) The risk and potential outcomes of not including the device are, to the decision maker, equally preferable to a lottery offering only a 0.656 probability of a market share of 50% and a 1 – 0.656 probability of a market share of 5%. Since the risks and potential outcomes of including the device are, in the decision maker’s eyes, equally preferable to a lottery offering a 0.801 probability of a 50% © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 6 market share and a 1 – 0.801 probability of a 5% market share, the decision maker would be rational to include the device. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 7 Question 3 a) b) Key points: The EMV criterion does not take the decision makers’ attitude to risk into account – and this is a one-off decision. Non-monetary objectives are not considered. The assumption of only two possible levels of sales is a simplification of reality. The probabilities and payoffs are subjective estimates c) p(New government) Slohemia payoff Tundrastan payoff 0 71 59.6 1 -10 59.6 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 8 Tundrastan Slohemia The graph shows the probability of a new government coming to power would have to fall below about 0.14 before Slohemia is worth considering. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 9 Question 4 a) 0.86 High numbers Launch course Net returns ($000) 32 32 20.8 0.56 Indicates high numbers 0.14 Low numbers -48 1 -48 20.8 Do not launch course -28 -28 Conduct further research 0.14 High numbers -0.672 32 Launch course 32 -36.8 0.44 Indicates low numbers 0.86 Low numbers -48 2 -48 -28 2 Do not launch course 28 -28 -28 0.6 High numbers 60 Launch course 60 28 0.4 Low numbers No more research -20 1 -20 28 Do not launch course 0 0 The college should not conduct further market research and it should go ahead and launch the course. b) Typical strengths of the analysis are: It allows the decision problem to be decomposed into smaller tasks so that the college’s managers can concentrate on each part of the problem separately, without having to address the entire problem as a whole. The tree should assist communication within the decision making team. The tree should help the managers to gain a clearer view of their problem. The analysis will provide a documented and defensible rationale for the decision. Typical limitations are: The probability estimates on the tree are subjective and may be subject to biases. Assuming that student numbers will simply be either high or low is a simplification of reality. The tree may be incomplete, e.g. perhaps other options are available. The use of the EMV criterion assumes that the college’s managers are neutral to risk and that they have only one objective, namely maximizing monetary returns. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 10 Question 5 a) 0.848 Net benefits $ OK 6000 6000 Extinguish -5000 -5000 0.15 Problems 0.8 2 Conventional burn 4000 2300 4000 5345 0.1 Add resource -3000 2300 -3000 0.1 -6000 -6000 0.002 Escape -44000 -44000 1 5345 0.899 OK 3200 3200 Extinguish -7800 -7800 0.1 Problems 0.8 2 Yarding 1200 -500 1200 2780 0.1 Add resource -5800 -500 -5800 0.1 -8800 -8800 0.001 Escape -46800 -46800 The managers should carry out a conventional burn and , if there are problems, they should apply additional resources. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 11 Question 6 a) Mean no. of Utility passengers 15000 0.00 20000 0.80 22000 0.95 25000 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 15000 17000 19000 21000 23000 25000 Utility Utility Profit ($m) Utility 1.0 0.00 1.1 0.20 1.4 0.60 1.7 0.75 2.0 0.90 3.0 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 Profit ($m) Mean no. of passengers The utility functions generally suggest risk aversion for both attributes. To see this consider the profit utility function. The utility for $2 million is 0.9. This implies that the chief executive was indifferent between the following two lotteries. 1.0 0.9 Profit ($m) 3.0 0.1 1.0 Profit ($m) 2.0 A risk neutral decision maker would have been indifferent between these options when the probability of the profit of $3 million in the gamble was only 0.5 because, at this probability, the expected value of the two options would have been the same. Thus the executive required a higher probability of ‘winning’ the gamble than a risk neutral decision maker before he would consider the gamble. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 12 b) i) The value of k1 means that the chief executive would have been indifferent between the following two lotteries. 0.9 1.0 Profit Mean no, ($m) passengers 3.0 15000 Best Profit Mean no, ($m) passengers 3.0 25000 Best Best Worst 0.1 1.0 Worst 15000 Worst The value of k2 indicates he would have been indifferent between the same two lotteries, except that in the first lottery profit would have been at its worst value of $1.0m and mean passenger numbers would have been at its best value of 25000. ii) The attribute, mean number of passengers, has a higher weight in the decision than profit. c) The decision tree is shown below: 0.8 MAU 0.960 Advertise 0.96 0.944 0.2 0.880 Lower prices 0.88 2 0.9736 0.6 0.990 Do not advertise 0.99 0.9736 0.4 1 0.9736 0.949 0.949 . 0.7 0.920 Retain existing prices 0.644 0.92 0.3 0.000 0 The multiattribute utilities (MAU) at the end of the branches on the decision tree have been obtained using the formula: u(x1,x2) = k1u(x1) + k2u(x2) + k3u(x1)u(x2) where: x1 = mean passenger numbers © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 13 x2 = profit ($m) and: k3 = 1- k1- k2 Their derivation is shown below: Scenario No. of Profit Utility of no. Utility of MAU passengers $m passengers profit 25000 1.4 1.00 0.60 0.960 22000 1.1 0.95 0.20 0.880 25000 2.0 1.00 0.90 0.990 22000 1.7 0.95 0.75 0.949 20000 3.0 0.80 1.00 0.920 1500 1.0 0.00 0.00 0.000 Thus the railway should lower prices, but not use advertising. d) The application of multiattribute utility will allow the attitude to risk of the chief executive to be taken into account and it also allows a range of objectives to be considered in a theoretically correct way. Furthermore, the demands of the elicitation process may lead to the generation of deeper insights into the problem However, this process is time consuming and requires a great deal of commitment so it is really only likely to be useful for major decisions. Also the utilities obtained are influenced by the way the elicitation questions are framed (so multiple assessment methods are desirable) and it is difficult to establish a utility function for a group of decision makers. Moreover, the elicitation process takes the executive from the real decision to a world of hypothetical lotteries so the responses elicited may not truly reflect his preferences. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. www.wiley.com/college/goodwin 14
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