FREE RIDERS AND TICKET FRAUD IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT: A DELPHI ANALYSIS Elmar Fürst WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business) 1. INTRODUCTION Public transport companies are the backbone of urban transport networks and provide important mobility services for the general public. As these services are of particular importance to a vast majority of people, municipal, provincial and state governments take responsibility for financing infrastructure networks and – at least in part – also the maintenance of the services. However, the use of public transport services is usually not free of charge for passengers. Although tariffs are frequently subsidised, revenues generated by ticket sales are an important source of income for the transport companies in order to keep the system financially balanced. The problem of free riding (= fare evasion, fare dodging or toll fraud; i.e. people using a transport service without paying for it) and ticket fraud (= ticket forgery, ticket falsification; i.e. the production of an illegal ticket facsimile) is, of course, not new to transport industries. Due to technological changes (on the suppliers‟ as well as on the passengers‟ side) the problem seems to change. Different approaches to ticket control, electronic ticketing, a rise in propensity to violence, broadening of poverty or better copying machines are but a few impact factors to take into consideration rendering the problem more and more serious. Thus, transport companies need to react to recent developments if they want to avoid substantial loss of income at present and in the future. This article gives an actual overview on experts‟ perspectives in the Germanspeaking part of Europe (Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland) and discusses different aspects of both free riding and ticket fraud. It is organised as follows: At the beginning free-riding and ticket-fraud are discussed in the actual context. Then the method employed to analyse the phenomena are explained. The subsequent chapter depicts the results in detail before the paper eventually concludes by presenting some implications with practical relevance as well as an outlook on further steps in research. 2. FREE RIDING AND TICKET FRAUD: THREATS TO THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT It seems to be quite clear and comprehensible though, that ticket forgery is generally regarded as a serious crime. However, contrarily to some people‟s opinion, also free riding is no trivial offence as it equally results in serious income losses of local public transport service providers. Nevertheless, one has to take into account the core motive for setting such actions. Disregarding those cases where buying or validating a ticket has been forgotten or where a holder of a ticket mistakes a ticket‟s validity (regarding period or area of validity or other ticket conditions) and uses it falsely and, hence, unintentionally becomes a free rider, a deliberate free rider decides not to pay for a service in order to save the fare – usually calculating the risk of being detected © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 1 and fined – and thus to obtain a personal benefit only. Even “professional” free riders who generally refrain from buying tickets or weighting the sum of ticket prices for a particular period of time against the sum of fees probably payable during that period mostly focus on their personal advantage and do not involve others in their actions. In addition, for some people psychological motives (the thrill of not being caught, to fool staff or to exploit the state) may be a reason for not paying. But still these motives remain individual. Contrarily, ticket fraud principally involves a higher degree of criminal intent and energy. It not only implies the omission of a payment (“non-action”) but the dedicated investment of time and effort. As a matter of fact there is a certain range of severity depending on the actual facts of the case (e.g. a ticket regularly bought is used twice if, for instance, the imprinter‟s stamp for the first ride was too light and thus the second stamp totally covers the first one or if a criminal organisation breaks into ticket machines and steals rolls of original ticket paper in order to commit professional forgery). Technologies employed by specialised criminal groups are sometimes very sophisticated and thus the detection of these crimes is not easy. According to unofficial reports of company representatives some attempts could only be revealed because of a typing error in the advertisement on the reverse side of the ticket or because of unvaried serial numbers. Thus, there is practically no information on ticket forgery – a very sensitive topic for transport companies – and statistical data is not available. Clearly, an aggravation can be noticed as the mere resale of used tickets shifted and more frequently professional persons trade manipulated or forged tickets (Witzel 2010, Ataman 2010). Major crimes are still rare, but do exist. Recently, Italian customs and police detected 2 million forged tickets from Rome-Main Station to the capital‟s airport Fiumiciono representing a value of EUR 28 million in a container arriving from China (Spiegel Online 2012). Regarding the development of the phenomena over time, only a few statistics are publicly available. It also seems that there is not a „general trend‟ but rather a strong association between a city‟s individual parameters and the attempts and approaches of local public transport companies to repel fare evasion. Very few figures can be found on fare controls and the resulting free riding quota. Thus, only some spotlights are presented here. For Vienna, the municipal local public transport company, Wiener Linien, provided figures showing a downward sloping trend of the rate of detected free riders among all controls performed from 4.55% (in 2004) to 3.04% (in the first months of 2010) (Wiener Linien 2010). In the period from January to March 2012 the rate was 2.96%. However, ticket controls almost doubled since 2005 which in a way represents the price for this reduction. Subject May 2012 there was a reform of ticket prices and a rise in the penalty fee for not being able to present a valid ticket from EUR 70,-- to EUR 100,-- (Wiener Zeitung 2012). According to a survey conducted by the journal WirtschaftsWoche the situation in Germany is quite similar (Table 1). The free rider rate ranges from 0.6 to 6.0%. The income loss of the 35 largest cities‟ public transport companies amounts up to EUR 120 million (regardless of the costs for controls). According to estimations of the Association of German Transport Companies (VDV) the income loss in Germany could reach EUR 350 million per year (Schlesinger 2012). Consequently, dedicated action is needed; however, as Welsh/Farrington (1999) state in their review of the costs and benefits of situational crime prevention, only little is known about economic values of related strategies. © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 2 City Chemnitz Köln Berlin Oberhausen Bonn Hamburg Duisburg Kiel München Stuttgart Wiesbaden Wuppertal Bielefeld Dresden Augsburg Mönchengladbach Freiburg Düsseldorf Hannover Karlsruhe Essen Aachen Braunschweig Halle/Saale Leipzig Dortmund Krefeld Nürnberg Bochum Gelsenkirchen free rider Company quota1 in per (acronym) cent (trend2) CVAG 6,0 (up) KVB 4,7 (down) BVG 4,0 (const) Stoag 4,0 (down) SWB 3,9 (const) HVV 3,5 (up) DVG 3,3 (up) KVG 3,0 (const) MVG 3,0 (const) SSB 3,0 (const) ESWE 3,0 (const) WSW mobil 3,0 (const) MoBiel 2,7 (up) DVB 2,7 (up) SWA 2,5 (const) Möbus 2,5 (const) VAG/RVF 2,4 (const) Rheinbahn 2,0 (const) Üstra 1,8 (down) KVV 1,8 (up) EVAG 1,7 (const) Aseag 1,6 (down) BVAG 1,5 (up) Havag 1,5 (const) LVB 1,5 (down) DSW21 1,4 (up) SWK 1,0 (const) VAG 0,9 (down) Bogestra 0,6 (const) Bogestra 0,6 (const) Income loss1 (in mill. Euro) 1,4 9,0 20,0 n.s. n.s. 24,0 3,8 0,8 > 10,0 14,0 1,0 1,2 1,0 2,6 1,4 1,0 1,5 4,0 2,4 7,0 3,7 0,6 n.s. 1,8 2,0 4,5 0,5 1,0 <1,0 <1,0 Controls3 1, 3 1, 3 1, 2, 3, 4 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 2, 3 2, 3 1, 2, 3 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 2, 3 1,2 1, 2, 3 2 1, 2, 4 2 2, 3 1, 2 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 4 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3, 4 1 Specification of local public transport companies (partially estimates, if range highest value); 2 (up) increased,(co) constant, (down) decreased; 3 Tightening of controls planned yes yes no no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no yes no yes no no no no yes no yes no no yes no no no no 1 by uniformed staff, 2 by plain clothed staff, 3 large scale controls (partly supported by police), 4 entrance controls by bus drivers; No participation: Bremen, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Magdeburg, Münster; n.s.: not specified Table 1: WirtschaftsWoche-Survey of local public transport companies of the 35 largest cities in Germany; Source: WirtschaftsWoche Nr. 16/2012 (16.04.2012) Translation by the author From the transport companies‟ point of view, delicts of all kinds and grades of severity have to be equally fought, as minor offences occur much more frequently resulting in a significant cumulate financial damage, whereas, even a single severe crime can entail substantial losses. All forms of free riding or ticket fraud are more or less unacceptable as they attempt to undermine honest passengers‟ integrity and illegitimately take advantage of a service not paid for. Approaches and technologies © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 3 to prevent free riding are very different and depend also on the philosophy whether the local public transport system should be kept open or closed. In an open access system there are no ticket controls when entering a station or boarding a vehicle. Usually, local public transport companies conduct frequent ticket inspections by either uniformed or plain clothed staff. Sometimes large-scale controls with police support are carried out at hubs with significant passenger volumes. In closed systems there can be an access control by staff (mostly bus drivers) selling and inspecting tickets. One year after its introduction in 2004, a significant reduction of free riders on buses from 4.5% to 1.6% could be reached in Berlin by this system. Passengers‟ acceptance was high and there were no operating problems or longer travel times (Müller/Reinhold 2005). However, an increase of critical incidents and violent conflicts has been reported (Van Lessen 2008). An alternative to personal controls are physical or technical barriers like turnstiles, automatic gates or doors etc. Depending on the type of ticket used, a distinction between mechanical and electronic systems can be made. Whereas in mechanical systems the ticket has to be inserted into a card reading device where it is checked, electronic systems use contactless RFID-smartcards which do not need a physical contact to the facility (check-in / check-out). Using RFID technology there is basically no need for physical barriers like turnstiles and the system – still „closed‟ – can be designed like an open one (be in / be out). Even in closed systems a need for personal inspections remains as barriers can be surmounted. Moreover, electronic systems have many advantages in terms of marketing, sales and ticketing, To conclude, it can be stated that – despite some work in criminology (van Andel 1989; Hauber et al. 1996; Smith/Clarke 2000; Killias et al. 2009) – there seems to have been little research so far on fare evasion and ticket fraud, particularly from the economic perspective. 3. METHOD The name of the Delphi method refers to the ancient oracle of Delphi. As in former times the name is associated with predictions and forecasts. First modern applications of the Delphi technique date back to the 1940s where it was employed to predict the results of dog or horse races. Later the method was developed further and used by the US based RAND corporation for military purposes (Häder 2009; Dalkey 1969; Brown et al. 1969). During the next decades the broad acceptance of the method also leads to further developments, different forms and areas of application and methodological discussions. There is no clear definition of the method, however, based on an extensive literature review, Häder (2009) lists several characteristics and requirements which appear to de crucial for the definition of the classical method and are fulfilled in most applications: (1) use of a formalised questionnaire; (2) survey of experts, (3) anonymity of individual responses, (4) determination of a statistical group response, (5) Feed-back to the participants about this group response, (6) (Multiple) repetition of the survey according to this scheme. However, there have been huge debates about variants and applications (Linstone/Turoff 1975; Seeger 1979; Häder/Häder 1994, 1998, 2000). Maybe this topic should be treated in a Delphi study in order to get consensus. One of the attempts to develop a typology was made by Strauss / Zeigler (1975) who stated there were three types of Delphis, numeric © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 4 (aiming to specify single or minimum range of numeric estimates or forecasts), policy (to define answers to current or anticipated policy problems) and historic (determining the issues which were causal for a certain decision in the past or alternatives to that decision, respectively). There is, hence, no doubt that the method can be employed in order to determine the opinion of a group of experts on a certain problem or phenomenon. Representing a quite common research application also in the field of transport research, (Faller/Bacher 1990; English/Kernan 1976; Höjer 1998; Shiftan et al. 2003; von der Masona/Alamdarib 2007; Gracht/Darkow, 2010) we conducted a Delphi analysis on the subject of free riding and ticket fraud in public transport by sending out two rounds of surveys to a representative number of public transport companies and transport associations in Austria, Germany and the German-speaking part of Switzerland asking experts to participate in the study. At the beginning of our project several general research questions (RQ) were developed which have then been operationalised for the actual questionnaire. RQ1: What are the reasons and drivers of free riding and ticket fraud? What are the motives of people committing these offenses and what is the perspective of the general public? RQ2: How serious are the phenomena of free riding and ticket fraud and how will they develop in the future? RQ3: What are the most effective measures against free riding and ticket fraud? What can electronic ticketing contribute to the fight against these phenomena? On the basis of these research questions a questionnaire was developed which should not merely serve as an instrument to gather the experts‟ view but also allow them to put themselves in the position of free riders and ticket forgers. With this „change of perspectives‟ we intended to get a broader view and to encourage experts to consider as much information as possible. In addition to the multi-round-approach of the Delphi method this should even more induce cognitive processes and help respondents to give accurate answers. The questionnaire consisted of 17 partly open, partly closed questions, some with sub-questions. 12 questions were related to free riding, 4 to ticket fraud and 1 question was rather general. We addressed the experts‟ overall perception of the phenomena, its development over time, passengers‟ motives, measures and technologies to prevent and curtail free riding and ticket fraud, penalties, estimated revenue losses, related legal regulations, social aspects of ticket checking procedures, the acceptance of paying passengers and whether using a transport service without paying is seen as trivial offence only or rather as a serious delict, respectively. Before the questionnaires were sent out the wording was shaped in cooperation with a designated expert in qualitative research and a pretest was performed. The research design stipulated two waves of surveys by email followed by a third round in form of a non-public internet forum officially declared as „transmission of results‟ to the experts, however, giving them once more the opportunity to comment on the results. As another incentive to review them, the results were firstly provided exclusively to the panel only. The questionnaire was sent © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 5 out as an MS word document which was tested for various versions of the programme. To send out a file was preferred to an online questionnaire as it was assumed that a file can be „taken along‟ on a laptop or in printed form and the respondent does not necessarily need to be online when giving his answers. For the final round an online internet-connection was needed. To cover the German speaking part of Europe in the best possible way, the panel was composed as follows: In principle all persons being involved or having expertise in the field of research would fit into the panel. In order to stick to some principle how to choose the experts, it was decided to contact all major public transport companies and public transport associations (Verkehrsverbünde) in all cities of Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland with 100.000 inhabitants and above as well in all federal state capitals. The contacts were taken from a database compiled at the Institute for Transport and Logistics Management for the purpose of the study comprising all relevant public transport companies and transport associations in the respective region. In order to identify the expert in charge of the research topic the companies were contacted by mail and/or telephone. The first round started in April 2011. In total, a wave of 327 questionnaires was sent out by email accompanied by a cover letter signed by the head of the institute and the project manager asking for co-operation. The initial response in the ten day period foreseen was rather low. After a reminder by mail, 23 questionnaires were returned. Another round of reminders where randomly chosen experts were approached by telephone and asked to participate in the study a total of 31 responses were available at the beginning of June 2011 (3 from Switzerland, 10 from Austria and 18 from Germany) representing an overall response rate of about 10% which has been considered acceptable. The returned answers were analysed and the „average answer‟ was compiled in order to be sent out in round two. Answers to open questions deviating extremely from the group answer were listed separately. Finally, the questionnaire for the second wave was prepared. The group response was inserted below the questions where the respondents could state whether they agree completely, partly or not at all with the statement. If they did not agree completely, they were asked to explain why. In the second round all 31 experts who answered to the questionnaire of round one were contacted by mail in February 2012 and invited to participate also in round two. As contact details were available from the first wave, direct mails and telephone calls could be used to remind the respondents. Eventually, 24 of the initially 31 experts actually completed and returned their questionnaires. Moreover, the monitoring group also tried to involve new participants in the survey. Thus, 286 additional companies from the database were contacted at the end of February and the beginning of March 2012. By either sending mails or calling the experts directly, additional 24 experts could be found. In total 55 (31+24) experts participated in at least one of the rounds, of which 14 were from Austrian, 32 from German and 9 from Swiss companies, respectively (Table 2). Participants round 1 AT Participants round 2 7 Participants round 1 only Participants round 1 and 2 Participants total (round 1 and/or round 2) 12 2 5 14 © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 6 DE 21 27 5 CH 3 9 0 total 31 48 7 Table 2: Participants of the respective rounds of the Delphi survey 16 3 24 32 9 55 This approach might be criticised as it does not perfectly fit into the classical programme of a Delphi study to extend the panel after round one. In principle, one core advantage of a Delphi study lies in the fact that by reconsidering the group answer in the following round the experts will take into consideration a broader basis of information. After some methodological discussions in the monitoring team and having discussed with experts in qualitative research, we decided, however, to stick with the planned expansion of the group of experts, as we believed that (1) the prepared group answers induce a sincerer consideration equally on the new experts‟ side as this advance information will be scrutinised implying a similar cognitive process to that of those experts who already participated in round one (2) a broader review could open ways to new information which can then be reconsidered in round three and strengthens the results (3) from a pragmatic and practical perspective, the disposition to take part in the survey is greater for experts if the efforts associated are reduced and (4) the information gain outweighs the limits of having some new experts in the panel of the second round, particularly as the new group opinion can still be discussed – and if necessary revised – in round three. At average 62.7% of the experts participating in round two could completely agree to the group answer, 21.5% agreed partly and only 4.3% not at all. The average nonresponse rate per question was 4.9%, only. For the third round, an internet forum was prepared and for each question a dedicated thread (= discussion) was opened including the „average answer‟ of round two. The forum was open to the participants of the first two rounds, only as it was password-protected where each expert was assigned a unique user-id and password. Thus, it was ensured that only persons who already participated in the previous phases could post comments to the group answer of round two. Actually round three is somehow „adaptive‟, as new postings can react to previous statements of round three, still in an anonymous environment and on this basis discussion could emerge. 4. RESULTS Currently round three is still ongoing; hence, results of this round cannot be included in this paper. Findings of round one and two are presented in this chapter according to the topics addressed in the questionnaire: Characteristics and (past and future) development of free riding The experts emphasise that a clear distinction has to be made between people choosing deliberately to evade the fare and those who do not hold a valid ticket by mistake. The latter occurs, for instance, if somebody misunderstands the tariff and buys a wrong ticket for the ride. Free riding is more common in agglomerations than in peripheral areas. However, dense city regions cannot be comprehensively covered and thus the frequency of controls is lower and the free rider quota larger. Many © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 7 people still regard fare dodging as a minor offence or lack the understanding that it is unlawful and disadvantageous for the general public. Many free riders disregard the fact that more free riding results in higher ticket prices and hence the other passengers have to pay for the services they consume. Some passengers even like the challenge of not being trapped and simply search for the thrill. There is consensus in the panel that more intensive controls help to reduce free riding; the simple presence of ticket inspectors leads to a higher rate of compliance. In bus services the obligation to board the vehicle at the front door where the driver inspects the ticket is seen as a very effective measure as there is some reasonable experience about it. However, in peak times this could lead to delays in operations. A second problem is the rising propensity to violence and resulting verbal or even physical attacks against staff. Another means to reduce fare evasion and ticket forgery would be the broad introduction of electronic ticketing and a significant increase of its share. Forgery happens both in the small sense (e.g. the manipulation of a tickets validity date) and even large scale attempts have been traced. In total, forgery is by far not as common as free riding. As reasons for free riding the general economical situation is blamed but on the contrary – as tariffs are usually socially balanced at least to a certain extent – if this was true, consequently a higher rate of free riding should be noticed in socioeconomically rather weak areas, which is not the case. Thus, individual motives count stronger obviously at which the personal economic basis and sparing the fare is of course one important reason for not paying. Regarding the development, about one half of the panel expects the rate to rise in future, most representatives of the second half believe in a constant rate and only very few experts foresee a fall. Reasons for and against free riding from the passengers‘ perspective On the basis of the general statements above, the main reasons from the passengers‟ perspective to commit fare evasion lies in too lax controls and too low penalties (particularly in Germany, where the amount is determined by law on a rather low level of EUR 40; compare Vienna: EUR 100). People want to save costs which – due to the density of controls – can be economically rational. Occasionally, people rate the fare as too high and regard the service not as an equivalent counter value to the fare to pay, especially on short rides or when they perceive a poor service quality. Passing on tickets (transmittable, poorly identified or personal) and small manipulations also save money. Again, as a result of complicated tariffs people may buy a wrong ticket by mistake or simply forget buying or validating their ticket. All in all, there is no clear distinctive group of free riders according to their income, social status, gender etc. Reasons why people decide against free riding comprise the embarrassment of being fined, the damage to their image, a bad conscience, and the amount of the fines. Measures against free riding © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 8 Much can be done to prevent fare evasion: The most effective measure is to intensify controls, to perform mass controls at large transfer stations or covering a certain area where it is hard to bypass the inspections. More presence of staff alone would already reduce fare evaders. Penalties should be significantly raised, particularly in cases of deliberate manipulations, forgery and for free riders in case of recurrence. However, if they were too high some would be incoverable and many people would count on the inspectors‟ kindness. In most cases the receipts will (or even must) not cover the costs, so, despite from a few urban areas, ticket inspection is not a source of profit. Therefore, some companies have outsourced this task to external contractors causing administrative burden as in this case there has to be a public EUwide tender. A positive effect of ticket inspectors is the presence of staff which gives passengers an impression of service and security. Announcements of controls could help, but there is no unanimity in that point. On the technical side there are several measures. For paper tickets the used paper should have different security features like holograms, special imprints, barcodes, serial numbers, etc. From time to time the kind/type of paper should be changed as should the other security features. Once more it was pointed out that electronic ticketing – not yet common in the surveyed area – would be effective but at the same time very costly due to large investments and the associated administration. Barriers and particularly the front access to busses have positive effects though but can also cause problems. Rather simple measures with a high expected effect would be a more transparent and easily comprehensible tariff scheme, image campaigns, a raise of awareness and people‟s values and of course better service qualities. All in all a mixture of measures seems the best way to prevent free riding, intensified controls, transparent and simple tariffs as well as adequate penalties. Strengths and weaknesses of different control systems Mechanical checkpoints with turnstiles Mechanical barriers almost yield a coverage and check rate of 100%. Human errors are completely impossible. On the downside, they require a completely closed system and huge investments, are space consuming, slow down passenger flows, could be a barrier for persons with reduced mobility and can even be dangerous and fatal in case of emergencies when a station needs to be evacuated quickly. Still, staff needs to be present at the stations to handle breakdowns and malfunctions and to survey the proper use of the devices. Hence, the systems can only be used efficiently in urban areas for rail or underground services and not on buses or most trams. Electronic systems Electronic systems – while costly as well – would be a good alternative in many respects. The systems work faster and can be used contactless. Tickets are almost forgery-proof and the data collected electronically can be used for market research purposes. There is still a lack of experience, particularly regarding free riders. Barriers, devices and chipcards require substantial investments which are still not fully accepted due to the fact that systems are not seen as mature. There © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 9 is less fear of ticket fraud but of system breakdowns and resulting revenue losses. It is also doubted if the systems are sufficiently transparent for passengers who want to ensure to have the correct ticket with them. An advantage in this context is of course the electronic processing enabling the implementation of best price schemes. Controls by staff At present, this is by far the most common option in the region covered by our research. Controls can be arranged and managed flexibly; staff represents service, security and is the best way of deterrence. Personnel costs are significant; hence, comprehensive controls are mostly not possible. Verbal insults or attacks by passengers have to be considered. Because of technical progress and a lack of time, inspectors may not detect all forged tickets. Of course human control staff is subject to inconsistent practices. Financial damage (in terms of revenue loss) In the first round there were estimates between 1.5 and 15% of revenues with a mean value of 4.1% and a median and modal value of 3%. In the second round the results were closer together. In Austria the estimates lie between 1 and 10% (mean: 4.5); in Germany between 1 and 6% (mean: 3%); in Switzerland between 1 and 15% (mean: 5%). If the rate of pupils‟ transports is higher this results in a lower free rider quota. Unfortunately, many companies did not respond despite of anonymity Effects of electronic ticketing Although in some places such systems are already operational experts lack profound experience with electronic ticketing systems. Undeliberated free riding could be reduced as the validity of the ticket could be tested beforehand electronically and the amount can be deducted after the ride according to the distance travelled. An effect on deliberate free riders is doubted widely. If such a system is cracked by hackers the damage per case is expected to be rather high. As the introduction is costly the benefits have to be calculated thoroughly. For passengers an electronic system offers various advantages. There can be preand post-price procedures together with best price schemes; stolen cards can be immediately blocked and identified. Electronic tickets can be easily combined with front door access in busses where the driver can survey the proper use. Nevertheless, staff is needed requiring special trainings and devices for ticket inspection purposes. Penalties and processes of control In Germany the amount is determined by law at EUR 40 which is mostly regarded as too low by German experts. Still, no raise is foreseen and industry attempts in this respect failed; in Austria EUR 55 to EUR 138.20 have been reported; in Switzerland penalties reported range between CHF 55 (EUR 45.63) and CHF 150 (EUR 124.45). Experts request graduate increases in case of recurrence. In cases of ticket forgery, © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 10 which is considered a crime, to file a charge is obligatory. Sometimes this could also be helpful for repeat offenders. For the process of controlling and penalising the behaviour and conduct of the passengers is essential. Verbal insults and even attacks against staff by not paying as well as paying passengers – many of them juvenile – seem to increase in urban regions. Controls accompanied by police are performed sometimes but are not frequnt as there is a lack of resources on the police‟s side. Staff is frequently trained in de-escalation strategies and patrols in teams. Goodwill in cases of “undeliberated” free riding is at the inspector‟s discretion. Although legislation and judicature is clear for some experts others would like to see legal clarifications on the right of ticket inspectors to detain someone who fails to present a valid ticket in order to verify the person‟s identity and address. Announcement of controls Announcing controls via media (mostly radio and web) is rare and there is a very heterogeneous opinion on that point. They should neither suggest that all people are free riders nor abet to evade the fare. If controls are announced they also need to be conducted in order to stay credible. A raise of morale could be one effect. However, people will buy tickets for lines where inspections are foreseen but the contrary may happen elsewhere. Not all inspections should be revealed; instead, it could be an option to publish controls and results afterwards. Announcements are not seen as advertisements for public transport or the service providers as the latter should focus on the timetables, services and the positive environmental effects rather than on ticket inspections. Many experts consider announcements as absurd and nonsense. The use of social networks where groups exist informing people about places, lines and vehicles where controls are ongoing should be prohibited by law. Illegal controls by unauthorised persons The rather new phenomenon that people pretend to be authorised ticket inspectors is known to the experts but is very rare. As inspecting staff is usually known to the vehicle drivers such attempts only occur in longer trains and on lines with a high proportion of tourists as well as in urban areas. The paying passengers‘ view Experts could rate on an 11 point Likert scale (ranging from 0 to 10) whether they think that paying passengers feel disturbed by controls (where 0 meant „heavily disturbed‟ and 10 „not at all disturbed‟). Both rounds had quite similar results with an average of 7.7 for the first round (n = 29) and 7.5 for the second round (n = 44), respectively. This means that companies assume that passengers with valid tickets have quite a bit of understanding for controls but also feel disturbed to a small extent. An identical scale was used in order to rate whether paying passengers regard inspections as legitimate (with 0 representing „completely legitimate‟ and 10 „not at all © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 11 legitimate‟). Again, the results were converging from round one to two. In round one the mean value was 2.0 (n = 29), in round two it was 0.9 (n = 44). This is a clear statement that experts think passengers who pay properly for their rides regard ticket controls as legitimate measures by transport service providers. A third question on the passengers‟ view addressed the reception by experts whether passengers regard fare evasion as a minor offence (value 0 on the scale) or as a serious crime (value 10). Here, the experts‟ assumptions on passengers‟ perceptions yield a mean value of 3.8 for round one (n = 29) and 3.7 for round 2 (n = 44). Thus, experts think that passengers do not consider fare dodging as negligible but even less as a major crime. Characteristics and (past and future) development of ticket fraud and forgery The problem of ticket fraud (manipulations or forged tickets) – still small – is rather restricted to agglomeration areas. Some experts see a rising trend; this view, however, is not shared by others. Manipulation of school and student and other regular season tickets is frequent in some part of the region of research. Much effort is put in forgery-proof technologies but over the years security features can be faked also. The only way to prevent this is a regular change of features‟ characteristics which is easier for e-tickets of course. For paper tickets there an increasing number of forgeries on original paper have been reported by the experts which has been questioned in the second round as experts stated the effort which has to be invested does not pay off. Again, frequent changes of ticket layouts, imprints etc could help but this is in many cases not practicable. A complete backtracking of paper rolls is essential and inevitable. Falsifications and forgeries become more and more professional; ticket inspectors are thus often unable to detect them in the short time having a look at the ticket if they do not use electronic checking devices. Furthermore, the photos on personalized tickets are often too small to immediately recognize if the person presenting the ticket is the same as the one on the photo. Another problem are online print-at-home-tickets as their validity can only be checked using a barcode scanner. Damage caused by ticket forgery is marginal and negligible at present. Effects of electronic ticketing In addition to what has already been said about e-ticketing particularly coding and security features are of particular importance. So far there has been little experience and hence low expertise on the subject. Most experts are sure that ticket forgery can be repelled significantly by electronic tickets. For inspection an electronic check is inevitable, a mere visual inspection is insufficient in this respect. Also the passengers need to have the opportunity to check the ticket themselves in order to ensure transparency of credits, transfers, validity etc. At the same time there is the fear that also electronic systems are not immune to criminal acts in the long run. Local public transport for free © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 12 One strategy could – in principle – immediately resolve the problem of free riding and ticket fraud, namely if local public transport was offered free of charge to everyone. In this context the survey also raised that point, eventually. There is a general refusal of this concept. Where such approaches had been tested they failed to increase passenger volumes and the modal shift towards public transport to the desired extent. The experts deem it best if the user of a service also has to pay for it as there is a general belief that things offered free of charge have no value. Another problem could result in a higher rate of vandalism and soiling. In any case, such a system could work only if it was financed by the state, which would then automatically result in higher taxes. A general tax for public transport used for financing the system could be an idea, which had the advantage of a certain passenger rise, lower burden for the environment and a complete elimination of ticketing and sales and all administrative processes associated with it. A problem could evolve in defining the border between local regional and intercity services. From the companies‟ standpoint, service quality would suffer as there would be no incentive to maintain or improve it, to succeed on a market and to attract passengers. Hence, the approach is practically unrealistic. The matter remains a political question but some experts propose alternatives which they consider more effective: Lowering ticket prices to equal fuel prices or to significantly raise the service quality. Another approach could be to introduce a simple and clearly understandable fare concept applied equally in many regions and transport associations which reduces barriers often deterring persons not frequently using local public transport. 5. CONCLUSION The Delphi analysis provided a very detailed and differentiated view on two problems of local public transport companies – free riding and ticket fraud – both threatening the revenue basis of these companies. Free riding, of course, is by far the larger and more frequent problem but manipulation, falsification and forgery of tickets also occur, though, even if they turned out to be of minor importance. The best strategy to fight these offences is to intensify controls, idealy performed by ticket inspectors. As a side effect staff present at stations and in vehicles gives passengers a feeling of service and security. Controls of tickets are regarded as legitimate by paying passengers and the disturbance is limited. Raising service quality in general could also have positive effects on free riding as sometimes people do not perceive the value for money. Other motives for fare evasion are protest, the thrill, of not being caught and – most importantly – the attempt to save the fare. Electronic ticketing, quite costly though, probably would have good effects and would be also attractive to regular customers. In these cases an international standard should be used like the „core application‟ the standard of the Association of German Transport Companies (VDV) or the „ITSO Specification‟, the UK technical standard for interoperable smart ticketing. © Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012 13 Passengers would prefer simple, understandable and transparent systems enabling integrated seamless travel. If – in the e-ticketing world – one needs a separate ticket for every city or region, a large proportion of a possible progress is missed out. Instead of the well-known discussion and conflicts between individual (motorised) and public transport attempts to create gateways between the systems and modes would be much wiser. A smartcard could thus be an effective tool as it could open doors towards park and ride systems, car sharing, taxi services to name but some quite obvious functions. There is also the important insight that not only the price counts but also the quality offered by the transport company. People are willing to pay a higher price if they receive adequate counter value. To conclude, there should be a clear focus on an attractive overall system offering mobility service of high quality and in the way the customer needs them. This would also be the best way to establish a sustainable transport system serving simultaneously the economic needs of the transport companies, the social aspect and the protection of the environment as well. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This paper is part of the project “free riders and ticket fraud” conducted at the Institute for Transport and Logistics Management at WU Vienna. The author – who was head of this project – would like to thank all people engaged in the project‟s development, particularly all respondents for the valuable information as well as Ms. Julia Harant, Ms. Marita Bittner, Ms. Kerstin Stolz and Mr. Alexander Hodics who acted as project assistants during the several stages of the project for their efforts and support. Special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Renate Buber who has cross-checked the questionnaire for her valuable advice in designing the survey. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ataman, F. (2010) Gefälschte Fahrscheine: Billige Tagestickets schon am frühen Morgen, Der Tagesspiegel, 01.03.2010. Brown, B., Cochran, S., Dalkey, N.C. (1969) The Delphi Method, II: Structure of Experiments, RAND RM 5957-PR, Santa Monica, CA. Dalkey, N.C. 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