poster

The University of Science and
Technology of China
22nd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
2016/8/13-8/17, San Francisco
Portfolio selections in P2P lending: A Multi-Objective Perspective
Hongke Zhao1
1School
Qi Liu1โˆ—
Guifeng Wang1
Yong Ge2
Enhong Chen1
of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, {zhhk, wgf1109}@mail.ustc.edu.cn {qiliuql, cheneh}@ustc.edu.cn;
2Eller
1. Abstract
2.2. Multi-objective Assessments for Loans
P2P lending is an emerging wealth-management service for individuals, which allows lenders to directly bid and invest on the loans
created by borrowers. In these platforms, lenders often pursue multiple objectives (e.g., non-default probability, fully-funded
probability and winning-bid probability) when they select loans to invest. How to automatically assess loans from these objectives
and help lenders select loan portfolios is a very important but challenging problem. To that end, in this paper, we present a holistic
study on portfolio selections in P2P lending. Specifically, we first propose to adapt gradient boosting decision tree, which combines
both static features and dynamic features, to assess loans from multiple objectives. Then, we propose two strategies, i.e., weighted
objective optimization strategy and multi-objective optimization strategy, to select portfolios for lenders. For each lender, the first
strategy attempts to provide one optimal portfolio while the second strategy attempts to provide a Pareto-optimal portfolio set.
Further, we design two algorithms, namely DPA and EVA, which can efficiently resolve the optimizations in these two strategies,
respectively. Finally, extensive experiments on a large-scale real-world data set demonstrate the effectiveness of our solutions.
๏ฐ Non-default Probability (๐‘…๐‘— ) is the estimated probability that one loan may repay the principal and interest to lenders in
time.
๏ฐ Fully-funded Probability (๐‘‡๐‘— ) is the estimated probability that one loan may receive enough bids in its auction.
๏ฐ Winning-bid Probability (๐ถ๐‘— ) is the estimated probability that a lenderโ€™s bid on this loan under current loan status will finally
success or participate after the loanโ€™s entire auction.
Problem Statement
Given the lendersโ€™ historical bidding records, and current being-auctioned loans VA={v1, ..., v|V A|}
in market, our goal is to select loan portfolios from VA for each active lender UA={u1, ..., u|UA|}. A
portfolio x=(x1, ..., x|V A|) is an optimal combination of multiple loans, if xj=1, the j-th loan in VA is
selected and put into the portfolio. For each lender ui, the selected portfolios should satisfy her
preference on rate expectation ๐‘…๐‘’ ๐‘ข ๐‘– with minimum risk (maximal non-default probability) and
maximum transaction efficiency (fully-funded probability, winning-bid probability).
Framework Overview
โ€ข
Auction Data
Historical Data
Loan
Historical Loans
All Lenders
Being-auctioned Loans
Recent Bids
Lender
Dynamic Feature Extraction
Model Training
Multi-objective
Assessments
โ€ฆโ€ฆ
โ€ฆโ€ฆ
Assessment Models
Portfolio
Selections
Weighted Objective Strategy
A Portfolio
DPA
โ€ฆ
GBDT
Offline
Flow
Multi-objective Optimization Strategy
A Portfolio Set
EVA
โ€ข
Active Lender Identification
โ€ฆ โ€ฆโ€ฆ
Online
Flow
โ€ข
Identifying active lenders
UA and learning their
preferences
on
rate
expectation,
๐‘…๐‘’ ๐‘ข ๐‘– ,iโˆˆ{1,...,|UA|};
Assessing each beingauctioned loan vj โˆˆ ๐‘‰๐ด on
multiple objectives, (i.e.,
Non-default probability ๐‘…๐‘— ,
Fully-funded probability ๐‘‡๐‘— ,
Winning-bid probability ๐ถ๐‘— );
Selecting portfolios for all
active lenders.
2.1. Active Lenders and Rate Preferences
In summary, for each being-auctioned loan ๐‘ฃ๐‘— , we can adopt a three-element vector ๐‘ท๐’‹ to denote its profile:
๐‘ท๐’‹ = [๐‘…๐‘— , ๐‘‡๐‘— , ๐ถ๐‘— ]
How to estimate these profile
terms for given loans?
For borrowing money, a borrower will
๏ฌrst create a listing to solicit bids from 2.2.1. Features for Assessments
lenders by describing herself, the reason ๏ฐ Static features are given explicitly before auction, which are
of lending, the required amount and the extracted from the loanโ€™s properties and the associated borrowerโ€™s
maximal interest rate. Then, if a lender properties. These static features directly reflect the basic properties
wants to lend to this loan within its of loans and borrowers.
soliciting duration, a bid is created by ๏ฐ Dynamic features are extracted from the temporal auction and
describing both how much money she incremental bidding lenders of a loan, which are changing from time
wants to lend and the minimum interest to time during an auction. Dynamic features can reflect the
rate. If this listing receives more than its popularity of a loan.
required amount in its soliciting
duration, those bids with lower rates 2.2.2. Loan Assessments
will succeed/win, and other bids with
Gradient boosting decision tree (GBDT )
higher rates will be outbid/fail. In Training process for a specific objective:
Assessment:
contrast, if this listing canโ€™t receive
After we get the models ๐บ๐ต๐ท๐‘‡ ๐‘– , i โˆˆ {1,2,3}, on three objectives.
enough bids in time, it would be expired
For each being-auctioned loan ๐‘ฃ๐‘— , we can get its estimations on
and all the previous bids would also failใ€‚
three objectives, i.e., the terms in profile ๐‘ท๐’‹ by the model output
probabilities on positive classes of these objectives
How to identify active
lenders in current market?
Active lenders are those who are most likely to
lend in the following period.
College of Management, University of Arizona, [email protected]
Computational complexity:
๐Ÿ
O(max{๐Ÿ ๐‘ฝ๐‘จ ๐‘ฒ๐Ÿ ๐‘น๐’Ž๐’‚๐’™, |๐‘ผ๐‘จ|๐‘ฒ๐Ÿ ๐‘น๐’Ž๐’‚๐’™});
First loop: considers the second constraint and gets all the
1
optimal selections under any p, q; O( 2 ๐‘‰๐ด ๐พ 2 ๐‘…๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘ฅ);
Second loop: gets the final optimal solution; ๐‘‚(๐พ 2 ๐‘…๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘ฅ) for
each lender.
4. Experiments
4.1.Data analysis
4.2.Evaluations of loan assessments
4.3.Evaluations of portfolio selections
4.1.analyze lendersโ€™ lending behaviors from multi-objective, portfolio perspective and identification of active lender
3. Portfolio Selections
How to select loan portfolios
for each active lender?
Selection strategies๏ผšweighted objective strategy v.s. multi-objective optimization strategy
Selection algorithms๏ผšDynamic programming v.s. Evolutionary algorithm
Selections for each lender๏ผšone optimal portfolio v.s. Pareto-optimal portfolio set
Identifying active lenders in advance can achieve
accurate service of portfolio selection, also
improve the service efficiency and user
experience.
4.2. Methods: GBDT, GBDT_S; LR, LR_S; DT, DT_S
Results: (1)dynamic features can improve the
performances of all models significantly, especially on
the fully-funded objective prediction, i.e., about 10%
improvements on AUC; (2) GBDT and GBDT_S
outperform other models on three assessment tasks,
especially on the non-default objective with more than
10% improvements.
Indeed, most lenders often bid periodically, and
invest Lenders who bid in recent days (a time
range, TR, before current time CT) have higher
probabilities to invest in the following period.
Lender ui โ€™s preference on rate expectation ๐‘…๐‘’ ๐‘ข ๐‘– can be calculated as:
4.3. Methods: DPA series, EVA series, EVAR series, SELF
where ๐‘‰๐‘ˆ๐‘– is the loan set that lender ui invested in the past, ๐‘…๐‘’ ๐‘ข ๐‘— is the declared interest rate of loan vj.
Complexity: ๐‘ถ(|๐‘ผ๐‘จ|๐‘ฎ๐‘ต๐Ÿ ), ๐‘ฎ :iteration generations.
Initialization: If ๐ดโˆ— ๐‘– is the Pareto-optimal solution set for
lender ๐‘ข๐‘– , each solution ๐‘ฅ โˆˆ ๐ดโˆ— ๐‘– must be a feasible solution
for lender uiโ€ฒ , iโ€ฒ โˆˆ {i + 1,...,|UA|}, and ๐ดโˆ— ๐‘– is a good
approximation of the Pareto-optimal solution set of ui โ€™s next
neighbor lender, i.e., ui+1 .
Repair: random greedy strategy
A weight vector ๐‘Ž๐‘– = (๐‘Ž๐‘–1 , ๐‘Ž๐‘–2 , ๐‘Ž๐‘–3 ) from
lender ๐‘ข๐‘– to balance the importance of
three objectives
Results: EVA series perform best on Non-default, Fully-funded, Winningbid metrics respectively; EVA could provide lenders with more economic
profits (11.5%, 10.3% returns on Return-0.3 and Return-0.6 metrics).