The Role of Individual Bargaining Behavior in the Pay Setting Process: A Pilot Study
Author(s): Marian M. Extejt and Craig J. Russell
Source: Journal of Business and Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall, 1990), pp. 113-126
Published by: Springer
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JOURNAL OF BUSINESS
Volume
1, Fall
5, No.
AND PSYCHOLOGY
1990
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL BARGAINING
BEHAVIOR IN THE PAY SETTING
PROCESS: A PILOT STUDY
Marian
M. Extejt
of Management
Department
John Carroll University
Craig
Department
J. Russell
Resources
and Human
Relations
New
State University
Jersey
of
of Industrial
Rutgers?The
for professional
and man
A model of initial salary detemination
on
is developed. That part of the model which concentrates
agerial employees
the role of employee salary negotiation behaviors and attitudes was investigated
in salary bargaining
variance
using a sample of 117 individuals. Significant
and demographic differences be
attitudes and behaviors was found; attitudinal
ABSTRACT:
tween
negotiators
and
were
non-negotiators
ing behavior was found to be positively
lated to salary growth.
determined.
related
Additionally,
negotiat
to salary, but only slightly
re
has long been a topic of intense
The issue of salary determination
Not
and managers.
among
study and debate
economists,
sociologists,
of equity, motivation
and
only has it been studied from the perspectives
market
have also investigated
but researchers
the pay levels
efficiency,
of groups
of workers
and job
based on their occupation,
demographics
One area of compensation
that has received
less
performance.
practice
an individual's
attention
than others
is the process
by which
starting
is determined.
This issue is particularly
relevant
for managerial
salary
and professional
these
For
the hiring manager
employees.
employees,
often has a certain amount
in judging what
of discretion
the appropriate
an
for
be.
should
starting
salary
applicant
particular
It is the purpose
a model
to develop
of the current research
of initial
to
and
that
determination
test
of
the
model
which
deals
salary
portion
with employee
and behaviors.
attitudes
Address
Relations,
all
Box
correspondence
5062, Rutgers
to Craig
University,
J. Russell,
Institute
New
NJ
Brunswick,
113
of Management
08903-5062.
and
Labor
? 1990 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
114
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
A MODEL OF STARTING SALARY DETERMINATION
the starting
is fixed by
salary for a given position
or
contract.
union
This is especially
true for clerical,
management
policy
or blue collar workers.
a model
technical
For these positions,
of individ
ual behavior
are de
to understand
is not needed
how starting
salaries
or strict policy,
not covered by a contract
termined.
But for employees
the manager
who has the responsibility
for hiring
these individuals
pos
sesses a certain amount
in determining
the starting
of discretion
salary
awarded.
is influenced
This decision
of factors,
represented
by a numer
In many
in Figure
firms,
1.
Figure
A Model
of Starting
1
Determination
Salary
Employer's
Bargaining
Pouier
a.
Labor
Market
Conditions
i
Bargaining
Behauior
Pay Grades
E & Ranges
Management
Starting
?j Salary
SL
Policy
Individual's
Human
Capital
X
el
Individual's
Prior
Salary
SL
Indiuidual's
Bargaining
Potuer
and their associated
grades and rate ranges, are de
Pay structures,
These practices
termined
practices.
compensation
accepted
by generally
a
to establish
use job evaluation
and labor market
surveys
techniques
can
be
a
of
These
rates
for
ranges
group
range of wage
jobs.
particular
to reflect
the firm's
modified
goals.
strategic
policy
by management
exercise
the hiring manager
Within
each range,
may
regard
judgment
The floor of this start
salary for each new entrant.
ing the appropriate
in
to
total
is
floor
the
of
the
range for the pay grade;
equal
ing salary
most
cases
the ceiling
will
be less than
the pay grade's
highest
wage
(in
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
115
order to allow for future pay raises) but could include the entire range
in order to attract unusually
candidates.
qualified
a new hire's final starting
Where
that pay range
salary falls within
is determined
of both the candidate
and the hiring
by characteristics
The starting
each party faces are described
manager.
salary parameters
in Figure
(1982).
2, adapted from Raiffa
Figure
The Wage
2
Parameters
Negotiation
Range
of
Rgreernent
LIT
LU
W2
Employee's
1
Reservation
Wage
(employee
will
or more)
Reservation
Employer's
Wage
accept
W,
(employer will
or
pay W
less)
the employer's
reservation
Wx represents
is the
price
(wage). Wi
the
is
to pay an individual
wage
highest
for a partic
employer
prepared
ular position. W2 represents
the applicant's
reservation
the very
wage,
minimum
that will be accepted.
The applicant
has determined
that set
less than W2 is worse
than no settlement
tling for a wage
at all. W*
the final wage
settlement
to
represents
both
the star
agreed
by
parties,
individual
in this position.
ting salary for this particular
IfW2 is greater
than Wx, there will be no possible
ifW2 if
range of agreement.
However,
less than or equal to W1} a range of agreement
for the final
"contract"
of W* exists.
wage
Exact determination
of W* is a function
of several
factors. First, the
candidate
to the job a given amount
of human
brings
capital. This capi
tal may
be in the form of the amount
and type of education,
of
years
116
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
or job related
that an
skills. Human
experience,
capital theory assumes
of each individual's
the worth
will recognize
efficient
labor market
capi
rate of return
with a suitable
will be compensated
tal and the individual
1964).
(Becker,
an entrant's
is the indi
A second factor influencing
salary
starting
new
or
firm.
The
in
another
vidual's
employer may
position
prior salary
true worth
of
assume
the
reflected
that a candidate's
salary
previous
to
his/her
worth
reflects
hence
and
that person to the previous
employer
sal
the starting
the prospective
Or, the employer may want
employer.
to
the
or
than
to
to
be
salary
ary
previous
applicant's
greater
equal
avoid morale
problems.
in negotia
and the job candidate may engage
the employer
Finally,
influenced
is
final
The
tions of the starting
upon
salary
agreed
salary.
each
amount
the
of
possesses.
Bargaining
party
power
by
bargaining
outcomes
as the ability
to bring about desired
can be defined
power
sources
of power exist including
& Pfeffer,
1977). Numerous
(Salancik
can be
itself (Lewicki & Litterer,
the power of information
1985). Power
or an interac
the environment,
of the individual,
from qualities
derived
as
and strategies,
to use certain
tion of the two. The ability
techniques
the level of power
will moderate
of the negotiator
well as the personality
& Brown,
1975).
each
(Rubin
party
by
possessed
is recog
in the salary determination
The role of bargaining
process
studied
but has not been systematically
(Heneman,
nized as important
1985). Only Freed
& Dyer,
1989; Kolb & Sheppard,
Fossum,
Schwab,
in negotiation?the
man
the role of one factor
studied
(1978) has
an
de
decisions.
raise
of demand?on
experimental
Using
pay
strength
sub
were
subordinates
found that when
paid,
equitably
sign, Freedman
a strong demand
for a
who made
jects gave larger raises to subordinates
were
subordinates
the
no
When
demand.
made
raise than to those who
on the level of raise
had no effect
of demand
strength
underpaid,
the level of an
if
be
to
is
determined
It
awarded.
beyond
negotiation
yet
sal
of
determination
in
the
a
role
similar
has
initial demand
starting
ary.
the
of the current
The purpose
study is to examine
of
to the determination
behavior
of bargaining
bution
the bargaining
on examining
This study concentrates
are
the following
In particular
questions
job candidate.
1. Do differences
in salary
negotiating
behavior
relative
starting
activities
contri
salary.
of the
investigated:
exist
between
indi
viduals?
etc.) dis
work outcome
factors
2. What
preferences,
(demographic,
who
those
from
for salary
those who actively
negotiate
tinguish
do not?
final
to the
related
behavior
salary
starting
3. Is negotiating
agreed upon by the parties?
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
117
METHOD
Subjects
were
from 117 respondents
collected
(40 female and 77 male)
at
two
in evening MBA
universities.
programs
Comparative
no dif
of the responses
affiliation
revealed
based on university
analysis
are reported
for the entire sample. At the time of
all analyses
ferences;
in a man
the study, all respondents
held a full-time
typically
position,
or professional
characteristics
of the
agerial
capacity.
Demographic
are
in
1.
listed
Table
sample
Data
enrolled
Table
1
Characteristics
Sample
Variable
Mean
(in years)
Age
Current
Salary
in Current
Years
Years
Work
Standard
Deviation
30.10
7.20
$32,960.00
3.60
2.90
6.64
5.4
Job
Experience
$12,402.00
Instruments
a five-section
The first segment
questionnaire.
and work history
information.
the re
Second,
to react to a list of bargaining
that a
behaviors
in during
of
This
list
person might
behav
engage
salary negotiations.
iors was compiled
based on a content analysis
of the
by the researchers
were classified
as either:
literature.
Behaviors
bargaining
Subjects
completed
for demographic
were asked
spondents
asked
1) information
2) negotiating
gathering
behaviors
behaviors
(6 items).
(6 items);
or
An
of the first type of behavior
is "asking peers and colleagues
example
about the 'going rate' for the position".
An example
of a negotiating
behavior
is "asking
for a higher
was
than
offered". For
salary
initially
each of these twelve behaviors
the respondents
were asked
to indicate
on a 5-point
scale
were
how
(1)
[their propensity]
Likert-type
likely they
=
to engage
in each
of these
behaviors
5 = very
(1
very unlikely,
likely) and (2) how likely they believe it is that each behavior would
in a higher
result
5 = very likely).
salary
[their
instrumentality]
(1
=
very
unlikely,
118
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
were asked whether
in any of
Third, participants
they had engaged
current
for
their
twelve behaviors
while
these
searching
job. This job
or external
If
search could have been in either an internal
labor market.
the
times
indicated
how
many
negotiation
they
appropriate,
during
they
For example,
rounds of
how many
exhibited
the behavior.
they indicated
to a final salary.
took place before agreeing
bargaining
of the
In part four, each person was asked to rate their perceptions
at the time of their job search.
for their skills and position
labor market
of
for a number
Finally,
they were asked to rank order their preferences
benefits.
and
selected
rewards,
fringe
salary
job
including
Analyses
in
were used to examine
and cross tabulations
variability
and t-test an
behavior
1]. Correlation
[Research
question
in beliefs,
to examine
the differences
attitudes,
performed
and
for salary
who
between
those persons
and behaviors
bargained
of
variables
those who did not
2]. The dependent
[Research
question
mar
on
labor
were
human
capital,
regressed
salary and salary growth
of
the relative
contributions
to assess
variables
ket, and bargaining
Simple
bargaining
alyses were
three
these
potential
salary
determinants
[Research
question
3].
RESULTS
is pre
activities
of negotiating
of a variety
analysis
frequency
current
in
the
and
2.
in
Table
sented
sample
professionals
Managers
from
the firm. They
in relatively
little information
gathering
engaged
to state a salary offer; few asked about
for their new employer
waited
about sal
asked job incumbents
the salary range, and they infrequently
a
with
contact
of
lack
to
be
due
last
behavior
This
information.
may
ary
or the lack of them in these cases,
the job holder. All three behaviors,
norms
the
that dictate
rules of business
etiquette;
may reflect unwritten
a job interview.
interest
is
It
about
of
during
salary
asking
impropriety
in
the initial
did make
of the respondents
ing to note that a majority
benefits.
about
fringe
quiry
and
from peers
information
did gather
of the respondents
Many
association
sources
reports,
surveys,
professional
(government
published
future employment
do not threaten
sources
of information
etc.). These
as providing
unbiased
and are likely perceived
reports of
relationships,
market.
labor
in the current
the wage parameters
than
for a higher
asked
of the respondents
salary
Thirty
percent
65%
a
for
ask
did
was
offered. Of those who
salary,
higher
originally
2
went
25%
one
rounds,
round of negotiations,
went
through
through
in from 3 to 9 rounds of negotiation.
and the rest engaged
A
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
119
Table 2
Self-Report
of Information-Gathering
Behavior
Most
During
Behavior
Recent
Job
and
Search
Behavior
Negotiating
Percent
Engaging
in Behavior
Information
Gathering
Made
initial salary
19.0
inquiry
about salary range
27.6
Inquired
Asked
50.0
peers about "going" rate
sources
46.1
Investigated
published
Asked
about salary
15.4
job incumbent
Asked
about fringe benefits
75.0
Negotiating
Asked
for higher
salary than initial offer
Asked
for better fringe benefits
13.9
Asked
for different work schedule
10.4
30.2
Asked for job duties 7.8
Stated
Stated
"reservation
wage" 20.0
"had another
job with $X salary"
7.8
The second research
asks what
those who
question
distinguished
for a higher
from
those
who
the
ini
negotiate
salary
accept
employer's
tial offer. Tables
3 and 4 present
the results
of a series of t-tests
that
were performed
to identify
in responses
differences
and char
significant
of the two groups. Bargainers
acteristics
tended to be male,
have their
in business
and report that they were raised
in a
undergraduate
degree
socioeconomic
higher
group. For all variables
investigated,
negotiators
rated
themselves
than non-negotiators,
consistently
higher
although
were
only a few of these differences
There were
significant.
statistically
few differences
in information
behavior
and beliefs.
gathering
Signifi
cant differences
in information
on instrumentality
centered
gathering
beliefs.
Further
of the sex differences
in information
and negotia
analysis
tion behavior
search
is
warranted
in light of "earnings
during job
gap"
research
& Hartman,
(cf. Treiman
1981; Ferber & Spaeth,
1984; Day
mont & Andrisani,
in Table 5, a higher percentage
1984). As presented
of males
that they asked
the prospective
reported
about the
employer
that
used
salary range, while women
and
reported
peer
they
published
more often. Women
information
were more
likely to state that they had
disclosed
the existence
of an alternative
tech
job offer as a negotiating
120
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Table 3
T-test
(n = 47)
of Mean
by Bargainers
Ratings
Reported
and Non-Bargainers
(n = 70)
Comparison
T-values1
Probability
Engaging
Behavior
Information
Gathering
initial salary
Made
inquiry
Inquired about salary range
Asked peers about "going" rate
sources
Investigated
published
Asked
about
fringe
of
in
Will Lead to
Higher
Negotiating
for higher
Asked
salary than initial
offer
benefits
for better fringe
Asked
"reservation
Stated
wage"
Salary
0.40
2.41**
0.41
1.14
2.14*
2.52**
0.77
1.80
0.55
0.28
benefits
Behavior
Belief
3.17**
1.37
2.36*
2.37**
0.86
1.83
0.40
2.56**
2.08*
3.77**
Stated "had another job with $X
salary"
Bargained
salary
than
back
and
forth
for higher
that bargainers
indicates
t-value
1A positive
non-bargainers.
at .05 level
test)
(two-tailed
*Significant
at .01 level
test).
(two tailed
**Significant
rated
themselves
higher
on the
variable
sex
used by either
sex, neither
this tactic was infrequently
nique. While
sexes
in nego
the
between
used it as a bluff. There were no differences
in
to
the
issues
In
addition
for
non-cash
reported
compensation.
tiating
"other"
for
asked whether
Table
they had negotiated
5, subjects were
of
None
or
rewards
[an
characteristics
of
question].
open-ended
job
types
the
of
Twelve
in this category.
filled
percent
the male
respondents
to career paths,
in answers
training
women
filled
e.g. special
relating
etc.
job rotation,
programs,
and dem
between
behaviors,
attitudes,
The relationships
bargaining
order to
In
correlation
were analyzed
variables
analysis.
using
ographic
the 10
more
attitudes
the respondents'
efficiently,
bargaining
analyze
were
col
items
and 10 instrumentality
analyzed
previously
propensity
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
121
Table 4
T-test
Between
Comparisons
Non-Bargainers
Bargainers
(n = 70)
(n = 47) and
Demographics
Salary
0.79
Age
Gender
0.20
2.38**
Degree
Undergraduate
Business
2.24*
Technical
Labor Market
Socio-Economic
0.60
1.26
Experience
Status
2.06*
Table 5
Male-Female
Differences
in Information-Gathering
Behavior
Job Search
Negotiation
During
Male
(n=77)
Information Gathering
Made
initial salary inquiry
16.8%
21.0%
about salary range
30.0
23.7**
mquired
Asked peers about "going" rate
46.8
55.3
sources
42.1
Investigated
52.6
published
Asked job incumbent about salary
15.0
15.8
Asked about fringe benefits
74.0
76.3
Negotiating
Asked for higher salary than initial offer
31.2%
28.9
Asked for better fringe benefits
13.0
16.2
Asked for different work schedule
9.1
13.5
Stated "reservation wage"
18.4
21.1
Stated "had another job with $X salary"
3.9
13.2**
'Significant
at
.05 level
(two tailed
test).
and
Female
(n=40)
122
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
lapsed into 4 separate
scales are labeled:
1) Information
2) Information
3) Bargaining
4) Bargaining
scales,
Gathering
Gathering
Behavior
Behavior
all
items
Behavior
Behavior
Propensity;
receiving
unit weight.
These
four
Propensity;
Instrumentality;
and
Instrumentality.
for all scales exceeded
an incidence
.80. In addition
of
alphas
behavior
and an information
behavior
variable
bargaining
gathering
were constructed
the actual number
of these types of behav
by counting
iors the respondents
in during
the most
recent
reported
engaging
job
Coefficient
search.
the correlations
Not surprisingly,
between
that
these scales suggest
a high instrumentality
for a behavior
is associated
with a high propen
=
in turn is related
to a
(r
sity for that behavior
.42, p < .01) which
=
of actual behavior
correla
(r
.43, p < .01). Additional
high incidence
tions revealed
that the propensity
to bargain
and bargaining
behavior
were
related
to the relative
im
perceptions
instrumentality
positively
= .27 and .20
<
of
(r
.01). However,
portance
p
salary
respectively,
when
it came time to actually
it was those persons who ranked
bargain,
= to engage
in bargaining
low who
tended
behavior
(r
.17,
salary
the more valuable
the less
p < .05). Apparently,
salary is to an individual,
one.
for a higher
likely s/he is to risk that salary by trying to bargain
and those with more
labor market
tended
Older persons
experience
but engaged
in less information-gathering
to do more bargaining
than
in
their
the
labor
these
years
market,
persons
younger
persons. During
this knowledge
and did not need to
may have been able to accumulate
it specifically
at the time of the job search. A tight labor market
gather
to bargain
(few jobs, many
persons
may have
encouraged
applicants)
market
diffi
correlations
between
labor
less as indicated
by negative
of
of
and
the
rounds
number
culty, bargaining
bargain
instrumentality
as a risky one in which
may be perceived
ing. This type of environment
If one asks for too high a salary,
instead of a coun
to negotiate
salary.
the prospective
applicant.
employer will simply contact another
to
actual
is
related
current
salary
bargaining
significantly
Finally,
=
were performed
to
behavior
(r
.22, p < .05). Two regression
analyses
influences
how bargaining
examine
further
salary. The first uses cur
the second, salary change. Salary
rent salary as the dependent
variable;
as the subject's
current
salary and the starting
change was measured
teroffer,
These
full-time
of their first
analyses
position.
post-college
salary
as preliminary.
in both regres
The dependent
variable
should be viewed
sions is based on current
salary as our model would
salary, not starting
in
in
current
the
the average
Since
person
sample had been
suggest.
and
the
correlation
between
31h
their job only
years,
salary
starting
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
123
Table 6
Stepwise
Regression
Analysis
Results
for Salary
Beta
Coefficients
Independent
Information
Gathering
t-value
0.30
2.18*
0.12
Age
Behavior
3.58**
Sex
-1.14
Work experience
Labor Market Difficulty
0.09
-
2.60*
Constant
*Significant
**Significant
-3.17**
0.14
3.76**
2.89 2.37*
at .05 level (two tailed test)
at .01 level (two tailed test).
current
to be high. Therefore,
salary could be expected
can be considered
a proxy variable
for starting
salary
current
salary
for the current
sample.
was
onto information-gathering
regressed
behavior,
age, sex,
and
labor
market
in order to examine
the
experience,
difficulty
of the model
in Figure
1. Table 6 presents
the
appropriateness
present
coefficients
and goodness
of fit tests associated
with
these
regression
Salary
work
regressions.
is positively
behavior
associated
with
Information-gathering
salary.
For each additional
behavior
the indi
information-gathering
reported,
viduals
salary increased
by approximately
$1500l. Age and work experi
ence are positively
related
sex and labor market
to salary, while
condi
tions were negatively
related.
The
of sex and labor market
influence
on salary has
experience
been previously
and Duncan
investigated
(1979) and Lloyd
by Corcoran
and Niemi
indicate
(1979). Their
that when
number
of years
findings
in
the work
force is controlled
for in an analysis
experience
relating
of sex on salary is reduced.
In the current
salary and sex, the influence
both variables
a significant
amount
of variance.
analysis,
One
explain
for
this
is that the current sample con
possible
explanation
phenomena
sists of persons
of both genders
in labor market
having
high variance
whereas
often
experience,
previous
the
samples
analyzed
samples where
women
had relatively
low amounts
of work experience.
1
$5000
The
variable
increments
was measured
SALARY
as an interval-scaled
in salary. A code of 1 represents
a
in the
salary
$5001 to $10,000, etc.
variable
representing
to $5000
2 =
range,
$0
124
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Table 7
Stepwise
Regression
Analysis
Results
for Salary
Change
Beta
Coefficients
Independent
Sex
-0.81
Work experience 0.16
InformationGathering Propensity 0.03
Constant
1.50
*Significant
**Significant
t-value
-1.79*
4.54*^
0.46
1.10*
at .05 level (two tailed test)
at .01 level (two tailed test)
initial
One
conclusion
is that information
is positively
gathering
related
to salary. Although
the information
did not tend to
gatherers
=
effective
(r
because
.17), their bargaining
may be more
bargain more
of the information
they possess.
Further, when both information-gather
are held
women
and labor market
constant,
ing behavior
experience
still earn approximately
less
than
their
male
Table
$4600
counterparts.
7 presents
the results
of a regression
where
is
analysis
salary
change
the dependent
variable.
in salary change
of
the variance
is explained
Only 28%
by the inde
This low level of explanatory
variables.
be attrib
power might
pendent
an individual
uted to the fact that just because
for his/her
bargained
last salary,
this behavior
in previous
may not have been demonstrated
An alternative
determination
is that
salary
experiences.
explanation
for salary
determination
exists
at the
power
significant
bargaining
an
of
not
into
ten
but
the
organization,
entry
point
during
employee's
ure. As expected, work experience
accounted
for the majority
of the vari
ance explained.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
that individuals
in a variety
do engage
of different
suggest
in
and
hold
levels
of
belief
the
behaviors
usefulness
varying
bargaining
is associated
with
increased
start
of those behaviors.
Salary negotiation
to salary growth. This suggests
but is only weakly
related
ing salaries,
that bargaining
skill and behavior
only play a part in the determination
are likely to be a func
increases
of starting
subsequent
salary
salary;
The
data
MARIAN M. EXTEJT AND CRAIG J. RUSSELL
125
and
attitudes
tion of actual job performance
also. Information-gathering
In
Karrass'
are especially
behaviors
(1968) findings.
relevant,
extending
a survey of experienced
that "preparation
Karrass
reported
negotiators,
trait of an effective
and planning
skill" ranked as the most
important
use
deter
to
in
the
correct
information
bargaining
Having
negotiator.
and tactics.
of other strategies
mines
the efficacy
in
differences
male-female
of this research
The findings
concerning
sex
an
dif
"cause"
behind
to
alternative
rise
behaviors
gives
bargaining
in the United
States. While
in wages
ferentials
pre
typically
reported
on general
and
has demon
vious research
style
aptitude
bargaining
differences
strated gender
(Lewicki & Litterer,
1985; Rubin & Brown,
in salary negotia
clear
differences
current
identifies
the
research
1975),
the pay expectation
in conjunction
with
This difference,
tion behavior.
and McFarlin
examined
differences
(1984), may
by Major, Vanderslice
are lower than their male
some
salaries
women's
starting
explain why
as a per
If one assumes
that most pay raises are awarded
counterparts.
men
of
and
the
dollar
between
of
the
absolute
size
gap
centage
salary,
women would
in
widen
years.
only
subsequent
on the employee
concentrates
side of our pro
The current research
at other parts of the model,
to efforts directed
In addition
posed model.
in which
to identify those situations
work
is also needed
salary negotia
suc
with
associated
tion are most useful,
and the tactics and strategies
cess. While
of bargain
the effectiveness
the current study demonstrates
the processes which may differentially
it does not examine
ing behavior,
are certain
outcomes.
For example,
influence
negotiating
bargaining
more effective
than others; do certain techniques
work better
techniques
or economic
in certain
conditions?
Can these
industries,
occupations,
are
or
in
with per
there strong associations
skills be developed
persons,
variables?
sonality
this model
needs
to be evaluated
of
from the perspective
Finally,
an opening
the hiring manager.
That is, how do managers
establish
of
to a job candidate,
fer to present
how are concessions
and
determined,
are
in
what
the
strategies
employed
process?
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