“OOO의 정치학”: 발표 일자 조구성 주제
funny yet provocative!!!
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기타 사회과학 및 인문학과의 관계
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
역사학 History

경제학 Economics

사회학 Sociology

언론정보학 Communication Studies

심리학 Psychology
Any others?
What about Political Science vs. History?
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
Focus and Approach: intellectual differences?
(Robert Jervis, 2001)
1. Parsimony (논리적 축약) (political science)
Theoretical robustness is highly prized in political science
Ex) “collective action theory”  alliance politics, interest
group behavior, the internal organizations of legislatures,
political leadership, etc
Historians are less troubled than political scientists by
multiple sufficient causation
For political scientist, this is a (serious) problem.
History vs. Political Science
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
Intellectual differences over focus and approach?
2. Theory-building (이론 정립) (political science)
Political scientists place a high priority on theory-building.
Political scientists lay out a theory first, and then argue that
if this theory is correct, the historical record should reveal a
consistent pattern.
하지만, 실제로는 political scientists often find a historical
pattern or repetition and then try to build a theory to
explain it.
“theory of critical election”: 1800, 1826, 1860, 1896, 1932
History vs. Political Science
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3. Moral concerns (도덕적 판단) (history)
Historians are more influenced by moral concerns and
quicker to make moral judgments.
Many political scientists believe that evaluations of the
actors, especially on moral dimensions, are not scientific.
정치학의 “정책적 함의“???
Political scientists often decline to discuss whether the
actors behaved wisely, let alone morally.
Many historians, but fewer political scientists, feel a
responsibility to educate the public.
History vs. Political Science
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
Intellectual differences over focus and approach?
4. Time (시간성) (history)
Most historians do build their stories by tracing beliefs,
national behavior, and international interactions through
time.
Historians believe that what comes after is in part because
of what went before.
정치학자들도 “path dependence” 재발견
Time and change are a variable for political scientists, but
they are not central.
정치학과 경제학 (예) “Prisoners’ Dilemma”
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“Public goods” (공공재) and “Collective action”
problem (집단행동 문제)
= Public goods, like clean air or national security
 Non-contribution would neither exclude nor
exhaust consumption of the public goods.
 “non-excludability” and “non-exhaustibility ”
= Accordingly, from individual point of view, it is
rational NOT to make any contributions to supplying
public goods. (“시장 실패”  정부 개입  ?)
= 정치와 정치학의 핵심적 이슈 중 하나
“집단행동문제” (collective action problem) &
무임승차자 문제 (free-rider problem)
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“Public goods” and
“Collective Action” Problem
“Individually rational behavior does not
necessarily produce collectively
desirable/optimal outcome.”
개인적 최선  합리적 선택 (not paying for public goods)
공공의 이익  실현 불가능 (no supply of public goods)

양자간의 불일치를 어떻게 해소할 것인가?
Collective Action Problem 예시 “Prisoners’ Dilemma”
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“Prisoners’ Dilemma Game”
to formally (수학적으로) illustrate collective action problem

Let’s assume that ...
Two suspects (A and B) in a major crime
Enough evidence to convict each of them of a minor
offense
Not enough evidence to convict either of them of
the major crime
Investigated separately and no communication
allowed (key premise)
“DEAL OR NO DEAL?”
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Deals (prison years) following two suspects’
strategies (confess vs. quiet)




If suspect A and suspect B both stay quiet about the crime,
each will spend 1 year in prison
If A quiet and B confess, A will spend 4 years in prison, but
B will be freed as a witness
If A confess and B quiet, A will be freed as a witness, but B
will spend 4 years in prison
If both confess, each will spend 3 years
Actions = each player’s actions is {Quiet or Confess}
Rule of writing: A first, B second (action 과 payoff)
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Preference order for the “suspect A”
(Confess, Quiet)
> (Quiet, Quiet) >
 freed (0 yr in prison) > 1 yr in prison >
(C, C)
3 yrs
>
(Q, C)
>
4 yrs
Now, let’s convert the number of prison years into some
arbitrary “pay-off numbers”
 for the sake of clarity (such as the greater, the better)
+3 (C, Q)
>
+2 (Q, Q)
>
+1 (C, C)
>
0 (Q, C)
What about the preference order for suspect A
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Actions
(Confess, Quiet)
(Quiet, Quiet)
(Confess, Confess)
(Quiet, Confess)
A’s years
in prison
A’s
Utility
0
3
1
2
3
1
4
0
What about the preference order for suspect B?
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Actions
(Quiet, Confess)
(Quiet, Quiet)
(Confess, Confess)
(Confess, Quiet)
B’s years
in prison
B’s
utility
0
3
1
2
3
1
4
0
The number in parenthesis is payoff,
not years in prison! (the bigger, the better)
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Suspect B
Quiet
Confess
Quiet
(2, 2)
(0, 3)
Confess
(3, 0)
(1, 1)
Suspect A
Best Response and Nash Equilibrium:
“Individually best response has not come up with the optimal
outcome (2,2), but ended up with a sub-optimal choice (1,1)
Suspect B
Quiet
Confess
(2, 2)
(0, 3)
Suspect A
Quiet
Confess
(3, 0)
(1, 1)
(Nash EQ)
from
Best Response
Then, how can they move from (1,1) to (2.2)???
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Suspect B
Quiet
Confess
Quiet
(2, 2)
(More Desirable)
(0, 3)
Confess
(3, 0)
(1, 1)
(Nash EQ)
Suspect A
Application of Prisoner’s Dilemma:
arms race vs. arms control in international relations
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미국과 러시아의 군비경쟁 (arms race)
Don’t build bombs (= equivalent to “quiet” strategy in PD game)
Build bombs (= “confess” strategy in PD game)
국제정치에 대한 자유주의적 시각 (liberalism)


Institution-building for transparency and communication
Tit-for-tat and repeated game is required for cooperation, i.e.
moving from (1,1) to (2,2)
Collective Action Problems and Arms Race:
Road to Peace? Institution, Information, and Cooperation
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US
Don’t Build
Bombs
Build Bombs
Don’t
Build Bombs
( 2, 2)
(0, 3)
Build Bombs
(3, 0)
(1, 1)
RUSSIA