MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Determinants of cost-effective management agreements • Marianne Penker • • Institute of Agricultural Economics University of Natural Resources and Appplied Life Sciences, Vienna • An Austrian implementation analysis • Hans Karl Wytrzens, Birgit Kornfeld, Wolfgang Ressi • Austrian Academy of Science Oesterreichische Nationalbank MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Outline Introduction Material and methods Results • Demand for landscape goods and eco-services • Supply of landscape goods and eco-services Conclusions MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Introduction Management agreements for creating and enhancing landscape goods ‘Bio-economic transformation’ of human-controlled inputs into biological output (Nuppenau, 2001) The ‘production of nature’ entails payments to landholders and expenses for administrative services Success of management agreements has been assessed on the basis of financial input or uptake Peculiarities of the implementation process are scarcely regarded as determinants of their cost-effectiveness MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Material and methods Theories of implementation research and new institutional economics Results of two empirical analyses exploratory surveys 07-11 1999, follow-up interviews 06-08 2001 Policy documents, guidelines, homepages Mail questionnaires, semi-structured oral in-depth interviews government experts in the nine Federal Provinces, national agencies, project officers and conservation experts Qualitative comparative content analysis information was transcribed, summarised, annotated, structured and comparatively analysed MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS EU agri-environmental schemes EU agri-environmental schemes Area (in ha) Small Structures 4,729 0.4 38,347 15.2 New Landscape Features 5,693 3.2 Conservation Plan 1,897 0.2 Ecologically Valuable Areas Payments (in mill. Euro) Total of schemes co-administered by conservation 19.0 All 32 EU agri-environmental schemes 588.5 • (BMLF, 2002) MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Provincial stewardship schemes Stewardship schemes of the Federal Provinces Burgenland Carinthia Lower Austria Upper Austria Salzburg Styria Tyrol Vorarlberg Vienna Total Area (ha) 2.960 150 200 910 n/a 1.778 903 200 4 Payments (mill. Euro) 0.80 0.04 0,06 0.28 1.40 0.50 0.66 0.07 < 0,01 4.81 MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Challenges • Maximum achievement of ecological and recreational objectives with limited public resources • Direct bargaining with landholders • Divergent interests of landholders, residents, city dwellers, conservationists and tourists • Co-ordination of numerous organisations and individuals • Targeted PR to win partners in agriculture, forestry tourism, NGOs and communes MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Demand No direct ‘Coasian’ bargain, intermediary broker Demand defined in political-administrative debate Manifested implicitly in the level of financial incentives offered for certain eco-services Whether it meets the societal preferences is not systematically verified by economic or social assessments Payments depend solely on the foregone profit and the extra expenses Varying societal preferences for different landscape goods are not reflected Centrally governed landscape enhancement is supply driven rather than demand oriented MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Successful implementation Stages of implementation Success Stewardship scheme Failure Take-up Participation in scheme Agreement No participation Compliance Compliance with contract Behaviour in accordance with contract Breach of contract Effectiveness Intended effects on the landscape Achievement of scheme objectives No or unintended landscape effects Output Results Administrative services by government agency Outsourced admin. services Eco-services provided by the landholders Outcome MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Output and outcome Habitat-related ecological results Examples Site inspection, conclusion of contracts, compliance check, evaluation, PR, consulting, data management Site inspection, compliance check, evaluation carried out by NGOs or private business Interventions for the enhancement of landscapes, habitats and species protection m, m², number of newly established, cultivated or developed habitats, wildlife corridors, buffer zones Non habitat-related Changes in microclimate, changes in ecological results population size of endangered species, effects on biodiversity MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Efficiency and effectiveness Effectiveness (demand-outcome relation) Objectives Resources Services/ Behaviour Landscape Effects Demand Input Output Outcome Efficiency (input-output relation) MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Causes for deviation of the actual outcome from the intended one Planning failure Implementation failure Uncontrollable causes Alleged deviations Deficient assessment of demand Selection of inadequate sites Negative externalities of other land uses Faulty deduction of target values from objectives Unrealistic formulation of objectives Faulty / insufficient eco-services (deliberate / negligent breach of contract Degradation of supplying habitats Unsuitable indicators Deficient knowledge of causalities Unfavourable timing Weather Faulty determination of actual outcome Deficient estimation of incentive effects Deficient equipment and operating resources Nature catastrophes Faulty determination of deviation MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Determinants of success Input Description Management implications Natural resources Adequate sites (ecological value, endangerment, potential, corridors) Habitat maps, conservation plans, site inspections, comparative ecological assessments, market place Labour & hum. cap. Skilled and committed contractors Training and extension services, definition of target groups, long term co-operation Physical capital Adequate equipment and Investments not subsidised (collective material (machinery, conownership, NGOs lending equipment and text-specific seeds & plants) providing site-specific seeds and plants) Knowledge Knowledge of contextsensitive management techniques Trial and error, integrating knowledge of NGOs (hot spots, explore new techniques), endogenous knowledge Social capital Trust, networks and cooperation Events and institutions (Conservation Plan) providing face-to face contact between land holders, project officers and beneficiaries Institutions Procedures for negotiations, Transparency and accountability of state incentives for innovation behaviour, balanced multi-level governance, and competition competitive outcome-oriented strategies MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Tradeoffs between different inputs More flexible provincial funds are used to tap the full potential of EU and national funds (fixed payments to landholders) Tradeoffs between different inputs human capacity building, testing of new management techniques, trust- and network-building measures, payments for land and labour Increasing uptake – – reducing farmers’ transaction costs of participation (trust and motivation) reveal additional gains of participation (e.g., the eco-image of farms) Redirection of efforts towards increasing costeffectiveness by picking out those applications – offering crucial sites – promising skilled and committed land holders on-farm conservation plans, extension and training, participation and strategic landscape planning, new & more context-sensitive management techniques MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Conclusions I The implementation analysis 1) Systemises the causes of deviations in the actual outcome from the intended landscape impact 2) Identifies determinants for cost-effective management agreement • How valuable and promising the sites are • The efforts of committed and skilled contractors • Trust and networks • Suitable equipment and material • Context-sensitive management techniques • The degree to which institutions encourage efficiency and equity MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS Conclusions II 3) Indicates that payments to landholders alone are unlikely to provide the intended landscape impacts 4) Points out institutional shortfalls • Mechanisms of value articulation and aggregation • Mechanisms for selecting valuable sites and promising contractors • Systematic determination of property rights for newly developed landscape assets • Clear differentiation between assets to be protected by mandatory regulations and those by voluntary agreements • Institutions to encourage diverse, de-central management strategies, competition and innovation in order to reduce the risk of policy failure
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