INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
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IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 436
How Do Free Trade Agreements Change
Import Prices?: Firm-level Evidence
from China’s Imports from ASEAN
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA*
Chih-Hai YANG
December 2013
Abstract The literature has revealed the positive impacts of free trade agreements
(FTAs) on export prices by employing product-level trade data. This paper
empirically examines the impacts of FTAs on import prices at the firm level. We
focus on firm-level imports in China from ASEAN countries by employing China’s
firm-product-level trade data. As a result, controlling for firm characteristics and
product characteristics, we could not find significantly positive impacts of an FTA’s
entry into force on import prices of FTA eligible products. Instead, we found a
significant increase in import quantities of FTA eligible products. Thus, at the firm
level, the gains from FTAs for exporters may be the increase in export quantities
rather than the rise in export prices.
Keywords: Free trade agreement, prices, FTA utilization
JEL classification: F10; F13; F15
* Researcher, JETRO Bangkok, JETRO ([email protected])
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental,
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).
Publication does
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views
expressed within.
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©2013 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
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IDE-JETRO.
How Do Free Trade Agreements Change Import Prices?:
Firm-level Evidence from China’s Imports from ASEAN
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA #§
Bangkok Research Center, Japan External Trade Organization, Thailand
Chih-Hai YANG
Department of Economics, National Central University, Taiwan
Abstract: The literature has revealed the positive impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) on export
prices by employing product-level trade data. This paper empirically examines the impacts of FTAs
on import prices at the firm level. We focus on firm-level imports in China from ASEAN countries
by employing China’s firm-product-level trade data. As a result, controlling for firm characteristics
and product characteristics, we could not find significantly positive impacts of an FTA’s entry into
force on import prices of FTA eligible products. Instead, we found a significant increase in import
quantities of FTA eligible products. Thus, at the firm level, the gains from FTAs for exporters may
be the increase in export quantities rather than the rise in export prices.
Keywords: Free trade agreement, prices, FTA utilization
JEL Classification: F10; F13; F15
1. Introduction
The effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on prices have received little public
attention. Although such price effects of FTAs are based on “tariff path-through”, which
refers to how much prices change according to tariff changes, it has been little known
compared with “exchange rate path-through”. Due to the saving of tariff payment in
#
Corresponding author: Kazunobu Hayakawa; Address: Bangkok Research Center, Japan External
Trade Organization, 16th Floor, Nantawan Building, 161 Rajadamri Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok
10330,
Thailand;
Tel:
66-2-253-6441;
Fax:
66-2-254-1447;
E-mail:
[email protected].
§
This research was conducted as part of a project of the Japan External Trade Organization
“Comprehensive Analysis on Consequence of Trade and Investment Liberalization in East Asia”. We
would like to thank Takamune Fujii, Toshihiro Ichida, Yasuhiro Takarada, and Taiyo Yoshimi for
their invaluable comments.
1
importing products, FTAs reduce the market prices of those products. Such decrease in
market prices leads to the increase in demand for those products and thus exerts
pressure to push up market prices. As a result, export prices rise but will be less than the
amount of the original tariff rates. This “tariff path-through” is important because it
shows how the tariff rent through FTAs is shared between exporters and importers.
Namely, clarifying the price effects of FTAs contributes to deepening our understanding
on how firms can benefit from FTAs.
The academic study on price effects of FTAs has focused on changes in
product-level trade prices through FTAs. Feenstra (1989) initially examines the effects
of tariffs and exchange rates on US prices of Japanese automobile products and finds
that the tariff pass-through relation varies across products, ranging from about 0.6 for
trucks to unity for motorcycles. The positive impact of FTAs on export prices is also
witnessed in NAFTA where the prices received by Mexican textile and apparel
exporters rise by around 80% of the tariff margin (Cadot et al., 2005). Ozden and
Sharma (2006) examine the US Caribbean Basin Initiative’s impact on the prices
received by eligible apparel exporters and found that export prices rise by around 65%
of tariff margin. However, African apparel exporters capture only 16%-53% of tariff
rent under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Olarreaga and Ozden,
2005). The limited studies suggest the need for more empirical studies. In sum, the
previous studies found positive impacts of FTAs on trade prices. This means that both
exporters and importers benefit from FTAs. Compared with the prices set before the
presence of FTAs, while exporters can sell their products at higher prices, importers can
purchase those products at lower prices.
However, the estimates in these previous papers suffer from biases due to
omitting firm characteristics. Cadot et al. (2005) compare prices under MFN with those
under FTA using the aggregated data. However, as demonstrated in Demidova and
Krishna (2008) 1, exporters under MFN and FTA are systematically different in terms of,
say, productivity. Also, Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) pointed out the role of importers’
market power in determining trade prices. Thus, differences in prices between those two
tariff schemes contain differences in exporter/importer characteristics. The strategy in
Olarreaga and Ozden (2005), which is to compare prices under an FTA scheme with
those under an MFN scheme before the FTA’s entry into force, also does not eliminate
this bias because only some specific exporters/importers turn out to use an FTA scheme
after an FTA’s entry into force. In order to uncover a more precise picture of the tariff
1
Demidova and Krishna (2008) introduces the choice of tariff schemes into the firm-heterogeneity
model of Melitz (2003).
2
rent sharing between importer and exporter, it is important to obtain estimates that do
not suffer from these biases.
In this paper, we examine such price effects of FTAs at the firm level. Specifically,
we explore changes in import prices from ASEAN countries 2 for ASEAN-China FTA
(ACFTA) eligible products before and after ACFTA’s entry into force. The Agreement
on Trade in Goods was signed in 2004 and implemented on 1 July 2005 by the ASEAN
countries and 20 July 2005 by China. 3 China gradually has become the largest trade
country, accounting for 13% of world trade in 2011. To examine firm-level price effects
of FTAs for China, we employ China’s firm-level trade data constructed by merging two
datasets: transaction-level international trade data and firm-level production data. 4
ACFTA is suited to this analysis because “reciprocal tariff rate treatment” in ACFTA, of
which details are explained later, makes our identification of FTA impacts better. Due to
this treatment, FTA eligibility differs by not only products (and year) but also exporting
member countries. Our use of importer-side data enables us to conduct our cross-export
country analysis at a detailed level, i.e., the harmonized system (HS) eight-digit level.
While eligibility for FTAs in general is set at the tariff-line level in each country, the use
of exporter side data forces us to do the analysis at an internationally-comparable level,
i.e., the HS six-digit level.
This paper contributes greatly to the academic literature in at least two ways. First,
in the literature on the price effects of FTAs, our firm-level analysis can avoid the
above-mentioned biases because we can directly control for firm characteristics. Thus,
unlike those in the previous studies, our estimates do not suffer from biases from
omitting firm characteristics and do not contain differences in firm characteristics. 5
2
Those include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Viet Nam.
3
Under this Agreement, the six original ASEAN members and China have to eliminate tariffs on
90% of their products by 2010, while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam have until 2015 to
do so. For more details, see http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_acfta.asp?hl=2. For the development of the
ASEAN-China FTA, see Chirathivat (2002) and Tongzon (2005) for comprehensive discussions.
4
The transaction-level data are the same as those used in Manova and Zhang (2012), which found
that firms set higher export prices in richer, larger, bilaterally more distant, and overall less remote
countries.
5
However, one matter to note is that, since our dataset does not enable us to differentiate directly
trade values under MFN schemes from those under FTA schemes, we are forced to assume that all
firms trading products eligible for FTA schemes use FTA schemes in trading. Under this assumption,
we examine at the firm-product-origin-level how trade prices change in FTA eligible products before
and after an FTA’s entry into force, compared with FTA ineligible products. In order to relax this
assumption, we restrict sample firms to specific firms, such as productive firms, in our empirical
analysis. As for studies using product-level trade data that differentiates tariff schemes, see Bureau et
al. (2007), Cadot et al. (2006), Francois et al. (2006), Manchin (2006), Hakobyan (2010), and Keck
and Lendle (2012).
3
Second, our analysis of trade prices at the firm level is related to the price-quality
literature. For example, Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2012) theoretically
explore the relationship between producer (exporter) productivity and product prices
under the model with product quality differentials. Gorg et al. (2010) empirically
examines this relationship at the firm-product-destination level and finds a positive
relationship. In this literature, our paper is the first one that examines the role of
importer productivity in import prices at the firm-product-origin level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
theoretical framework on the effects of firms’ FTA utilization on their products’ prices.
Section 3 takes a brief look at China’s imports from ASEAN countries before and after
ACFTA’s entry into force. In Section 4, we specify our empirical framework for
examining the impacts of ACFTA’s entry into force on import prices of ACFTA eligible
products at the firm level and describe the data. Empirical estimations and some further
robustness checks are presented in Section 5. The final section concludes this paper.
2. Theoretical Discussion
This section discusses theoretically the effects of FTA on product prices. To do
that, we first list the general determinants of prices and then summarize the effects of
firms’ FTA utilization on their products’ prices.
2.1. General Determinants of Prices
Several factors affect firm-level product prices. Particularly in our context, the
following country characteristics are important determinants of pries. Under perfect
competition, those are set to marginal costs depending on factor prices in exporting
countries such as wages, intermediate goods prices in exporting countries, and so on.
Under imperfect competition, on the other hand, demand size in importing countries and
the degree of competition in importing countries (e.g., the elasticity of substitution or
the number of competitors) play an important role in determining product prices (e.g.,
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Ottaviano,
Tabuchi, and Thisse, 2002). The degree of heterogeneity in preferences in importing
countries also becomes one of the determinants (e.g., Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and
Helpman, 2011). Taking trade costs (e.g., MFN rates or FTA rates) between exporting
and importing countries into account, the model shows the significant effects of trade
costs on prices, of which details are discussed later.
The recent trade theory places much emphasis on firm characteristics, particularly
4
on exporter productivity. Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005) model the firm heterogeneity
in terms of producer productivity. The degree of competition in importing countries is
incorporated in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In these models, as well as the cases of the
above models, the productive producers have lower product prices. On the other hand,
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and Johnson (2012)
introduce a quality dimension into this firm heterogeneity framework. In such models
with product-quality differences, the productive producers have higher product prices
due to producing higher quality products. In either case, exporter productivity plays a
significant role in determining prices.
In addition to these roles of exporter characteristics, importer characteristics may
also play an important role in determining prices. First, as demonstrated in Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012), the more productive firms procure inputs with higher quality. Thus,
the more productive firms may import the more expensive inputs (i.e., the higher import
prices in the more productive firms). Second, if product prices are assumed to be
determined through bargaining between the seller and buyer, the buyer’s (i.e.,
importer’s) market power has significant influence on product prices. Without any
quality differences across inputs, for example, firms with the higher market power or
productivity can import inputs at cheaper prices. In this case, the more productive firms
have the lower import prices. Just as exporter productivity played a significant role in
determining prices, importer productivity is one of the determinants of prices as well.
Empirical studies support the significant roles of the above factors. Manova and
Zhang (2012) find in China’s exports that firm-level export prices are higher in exports
to countries with a larger market size, higher income, and higher trade costs (longer
geographic distance). Bastos and Silva (2010) found similar results for Portuguese
exports. In short, these country-level factors are empirically found to be the significant
determinants of prices. In addition to the relationship with these country-level factors,
the findings in Gorg et al. (2010) for Belgium exports are the higher export prices in the
more productive or the smaller-sized firms. Thus, the evidence concerning the
relationship with firm-level productivity in Belgium exports is favorable to prediction of
the models involving product quality differences.
2.2. Price Effects of FTA
In this subsection, we discuss in detail the effects of firms’ FTA utilization on
their products’ prices. In particular, we focus on firm-product-destination changes in
prices. To make the discussion more precise, we define three kinds of prices: export
prices, import prices, and market prices. The import prices include transport costs in
5
addition to export prices. Then, the market prices include tariffs in addition to import
prices. However, in our discussion, by assuming for simplicity no transport costs for
trading, we make import prices equal to export prices. Thus, we call export prices and
import prices “trade prices”. Under this setting, there are two kinds of effects:
market-driven effects and bargaining-driven effects. We consider first the market-driven
effects and then the bargaining-driven effects.
The market-driven effects of FTA use on trade prices are as follow. 6 Let P i , p i ,
and t i denote market prices in importing under tariff scheme i (FTA or most-favoured
nation (MFN)), trade prices under tariff scheme i, and (ad-valorem) tariff rates under
scheme i, respectively. Namely, it holds that P i = p i (1 + t i ). We assume that FTA
preferential tariff rates are zero while MFN rates are positive. For simplicity, the
downward-sloping (import) demand curve and the upward-sloping (export) supply
curve are also assumed. Under these settings, the market price P i will be lowered before
and after the FTA utilization because FTA rates t FTA (= 0) are lower than MFN rates
t MFN ; P FTA < P MFN . However, P FTA will not be simply equal to p MFN (1 + t FTA ), i.e.,
p MFN . In other words, p FTA and p MFN will not be the same because the reduction of
market prices P increases the demand on the products. As a result, it will hold that p FTA
> p MFN . Nevertheless, it will hold that P MFN = p MFN (1 + t MFN ) > p FTA = P FTA, otherwise
market prices in the case of the FTA scheme become higher than those in the case of the
MFN scheme. Namely,
0 < (p FTA − p MFN ) / p MFN < t MFN .
(1)
This inequality is called “incomplete path-through” in tariff changes.
The bargaining-driven effects are a little complicated. 7 Exporters must bear some
costs for FTA utilization and do much documentation work despite the fact that
importers enjoy the direct benefits from it (i.e., duty-free imports). As is well known, in
using an FTA scheme, exporters need to comply with rules of origin (RoOs). To do that,
they may need to change their procurement sources from the optimal pattern of
procurement. Such a change of procurement sources will raise total procurement costs.
Furthermore, to certify the “originality” of their products, exporters must collect several
kinds of documents, including a list of inputs, production flow chart, production
instructions, invoices for each input, contract documents, and so on. With these
documents, exporters submit certificates of origin (CoOs) to the authority in exporting
countries. In order to encourage exporters to bear such costs for FTA utilization and to
6
For more detailed and theoretically rigorous discussion on “market-driven effects”, see Feenstra
(1989), Feenstra (2004, Ch. 7), and Winters and Chang (2000).
7
See, for example, Olarreaga and Ozden (2005).
6
do such documentation work to apply for CoOs, importers need to give some benefits to
exporters. As one such benefit, importers may allow exporters to raise export prices.
In sum, while in the market-driven perspective, the reduction of market prices
through duty-free imports increases the demand for imported products and thus raises
those trade prices, the bargaining-driven perspective shows the rise of trade prices based
on the bargaining process to encourage exporters to obtain CoOs. The bargaining-driven
effects are more important in the context of FTA schemes because the reduction of MFN
rates yields the market-driven effects but not the bargaining-driven effects since firms
do not need to comply with RoOs when exporting under MFN rates. In this sense, the
price effects of FTAs are qualitatively different from those of the reduction of MFN
rates. The consequent empirical studies at the product level on price effects of FTAs,
e.g., Cadot et al. (2005), Olarreaga and Ozden (2005), and Ozden and Sharma (2006),
overall support the positive effects of FTAs on trade prices. However, as mentioned in
the introductory section, the estimates in these product-level studies suffer from various
kinds of biases. In order to tackle such biases, this paper empirically examines the price
effects of FTAs at the firm level.
3. China’s Imports from ASEAN under ACFTA
In this section, we take a brief look at China’s imports from ASEAN countries. To
do that, we use the firm-product-country-year import data merged from two Chinese
databases. One is the transaction-level import data provided by the Department of
Customs Trade Statistics, the General Administration of Customs of China. Those data
provide detailed information on the company name, eight-digit HS product code,
product unit, quantity, total values, type of ownership, origin, destination, and type of
trade. The other is the Large- and Medium-sized Enterprise Survey conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) covering all state-owned manufacturing enterprises
and the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises with sales of over five million
Chinese yuan (RMB). This dataset includes firms’ information on sales, employment,
capital, and so on. The rule of matching between these two datasets is to identify the
same company in the two databases by exactly the same company name (in Chinese).
For firms having similar names in the two databases, we use the zip code as the criterion
for implementing further compilation.
With those data, we compare firm-product-origin-level imports between 2003 and
2006. In particular, we shed light on the product eligibility for ACFTA schemes, for
which the Agreement on Trade in Goods was implemented in 2005. Namely, firms in
7
China imported any products under the MFN scheme in 2003 but could import products
eligible for ACFTA under the FTA scheme in 2006. In this section, we examine how the
changes in imports from 2003 to 2006 are different for ineligible and eligible products.
The period of 2003-2006 is selected not only because the year ACFTAs entered into
force (i.e., 2005) falls in the middle but also because we can keep the same HS version,
HS2002. Thus, we do not need to be concerned about the consistency of HS codes
across the years and can easily examine time-series changes in trade at a very detailed
level. Below, we focus on trade in manufacturing products (i.e., excluding trade in
products listed in HS01-HS24). 8 As a result, our merged dataset identifies imports by
manufacturing firms, products (HS eight-digit in HS25-97), exporting countries
(ASEAN countries), and years (2003 and 2006). Our observations by exporting
countries are presented in the Appendix. 9
One unique point in ACFTA is the existence of “reciprocal tariff rate treatment”.
Roughly speaking, this treatment allows each member not to give preferential access to
a product to members who do not sufficiently open that product on an ACFTA or MFN
basis. For example, even if China liberalizes a product in ACFTA, China can impose
MFN rates (i.e., non-preferential rates) on imports of that product from an ASEAN
country if that ASEAN country does not liberalize that product in ACFTA or does not
have sufficiently low MFN rates for that product. 10 This treatment means that products
eligible for the ACFTA scheme as exports to China differ by ASEAN country.
The number of ACFTA eligible products in China in 2006 is reported in Table 1.
The information on ACFTA eligibility and tariff rates in China was obtained from the
WITS-TRAINS database. 11 While only around 10% of all products (tariff-line level) are
eligible in the case of exports from Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam, around 40% are
8
In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and China. Based on this agreement, some agricultural products were
liberalized in 2004 as an early harvest program. In order to avoid including the effects from this
program, we focus on manufacturing imports.
9
In our sample, no firms import from Brunei. Also, it does not include imports by trading
companies because of our merging with the Large and Medium-sized Enterprise Survey, which
focuses on manufacturing firms.
10
More specifically, Annex 2 in the Agreement on Trade in Goods says: The reciprocal tariff rate
treatment of tariff lines placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall be governed by the following
conditions: (i) the tariff rate for a tariff line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track must be at 10%
or below in order for that Party to enjoy reciprocity; (ii) the reciprocal tariff rate to be applied to a
tariff line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall be either the tariff rate of that Party’s tariff
line, or the Normal Track tariff rate of the same tariff line of the other Party or Parties from whom
reciprocity is sought, whichever is higher; and (iii) the reciprocal tariff rate to be applied to a tariff
line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall in no case exceed the applied MFN rate of the
same tariff line of the Party or Parties from whom reciprocity is sought.
11
https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx
8
eligible in the case of exports from the other ASEAN countries. Also, we can see that
the means of the tariff margin (difference between MFN rates and ACFTA rates) are
much higher in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam. In short, we may say that these three
countries have preferential access to China in a small number of products with a large
tariff margin.
===
Table 1
===
Table 2 reports firm-product-origin-level “extensive margin” in ineligible and
eligible products separately. “Entry” indicates the number of firm-product-origin
observations which do not exist in 2003 but do exist in 2006. “Exit” indicates that of
firm-product-origin observations which exist in 2003 but do not exist in 2006. “Stay”
indicates that of firm-product-origin observations which exist in both 2003 and 2006.
Taking a look at shares, we can see that there are no remarkable differences between the
ineligible and eligible products. The highest share can be found in “Entry” (around
55%), followed by “Exit” (34%-40%). “Stay” shows around a 10% share, which is the
lowest. Thus, firms in China started actively importing from ASEAN countries after
ACFTA’s entry into force.
===
Table 2
===
The changes in imports are reported in Table 3 according to the above-mentioned
status (i.e., Entry, Exit, and Stay). There are three noteworthy points. First, imports of
eligible products in 2006 occupied 15% (= 240 / (1,397 + 240)). Second, as is not
consistent with our expectations, imports with a status of “Stay” grew more rapidly in
ineligible products (21%) than in eligible products (10%). Third, total imports of
eligible products (107%) experienced a rapider increase than those of ineligible
products (72%). This finding is consistent with the regular expectation that, thanks to
preferential tariff rates, imports of eligible products grow more rapidly. Combining
these findings, we may say that the more remarkable increase of imports in eligible
products is sourced from the increase of imports in extensive margin (i.e., Entry) rather
than that in intensive margin (i.e., Stay).
===
Table 3
===
Table 4 reports the average changes in import prices and quantities from 2003 to
9
2006. In this table, we restrict sample observations only to those with a status of “Stay”
in Tables 2 and 3. The prices are computed by dividing import values by import
quantities. In our dataset, the quantity unit is either kilogram or piece. The unit differs
by HS eight-digit products, not by years or firms. As is consistent with our expectation
formalized in the previous section, import prices in eligible products rise by 28% before
and after ACFTA’s entry into force. However, this rise is not more significant than that
in ineligible products (82%). Namely, the import prices rise more greatly in ineligible
products than in eligible products. The import quantities decrease in both ineligible
(−34%) and eligible products (−14%). Nevertheless, the decreasing rates are smaller in
eligible products. However, it might be problematic to compare prices and quantities not
only across products with different units but also across products with the quantity unit
of kilogram. The regression analysis, which is conducted in the next section, will enable
us to compare those undertaking such a unit issue into account.
===
Table 4
===
4. Empirical Framework
This section specifies our empirical framework for examining the impacts of
ACFTA’s entry into force on import prices of ACFTA eligible products in
manufacturing firms in China. Then, our dataset is introduced.
4.1. Empirical Specification
As mentioned in the introductory section, due to the possibility of analysis at a
very detailed HS level, we focus on import prices rather than export prices. The same
dataset as in the previous section is used in our empirical analysis. Our basic equation to
be estimated is the following.
ln Prices fipt = α ACFTA ipt + X ft β + u it + ε fipt
(2)
The dependent variable is a log of prices in firm f’s imports of product p from country i
in year t. ACFTA ipt takes the value one if product p from country i in year t is eligible
for ACFTA in China. If FTA utilization raises trade prices as discussed in Section 2.2,
we will obtain significantly positive α. X ft is a vector of variables capturing importing
firm f’s characteristics in year t. In order to completely control for export country-year
characteristics such as factor prices and intermediate goods prices, we introduce export
10
country-year fixed effects, u it . Since we focus on a single country’s imports, the export
country-year fixed effects also control for importer-year characteristics such as demand
sizes and extent of competition. ε fipt is an error term.
In the above specification, our introduction of explanatory variables on firm
characteristics controls for the qualitative differences in prices sourced from the
differences in firm characteristics. This control in the analysis of price effects of FTAs is
our major contribution to the literature. In order to control more for those differences,
we also introduce firm dummy variables later. However, one item to note is that we do
so only for importer characteristics, not for exporter characteristics. In addition, the
above specification does not take into account the effect of MFN rates on prices. As
mentioned in Section 2, the reduction of MFN rates also has a market-driven effect on
trade prices. This effect will be controlled later by introducing tariff-line level dummy
variables. Such tariff-line level dummy variables also control for the effects of
differences in quantity units across products.
Our firm-level explanatory variables, i.e., X, include some importer
characteristics. 12 As discussed in Section 2.1, importer productivity plays a significant
role in determining trade prices. Thus, as a variable for productivity, we introduce the
firm’s total factor productivity (TFP). In order to tackle unobserved productivity shocks
in the estimation of production function for obtaining TFP, we use the TFP measure
developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This method uses intermediate inputs as a
proxy for unobservable productivity shocks and obtains a consistent estimator of TFP.
Also, we introduce a capital-labor ratio (KL ratio) for a proxy for technology though it
shows the actual use of production factors rather than fundamental capital intensity for
producing products. As a variable for factor prices, wage rates are included (Wages). We
also include importer’s age (Age), i.e., years from the firm establishment. All variables
are taken logs.
4.2. Data Source
As mentioned previously, the dataset used is within-firm-origin-product import
data merged from two Chinese databases: Customs data and the Large- and
Medium-sized Enterprise Survey by NBS. More specifically, our dependent variable is
constructed by employing the customs data, while firm-level variables are done by
12
Thus, among the elements specified in Section 2.1, only exporter characteristics are not controlled
in our analysis. We expect that significant exporter characteristics are correlated with importer
characteristics through the matching process between exporter and importer (see, for example, Blum
et al., 2010), so that our inclusion of importer characteristics variables also control for significant
exporter characteristics to some extent.
11
using the survey data from NBS. Also, the information on ACFTA eligibility and tariff
rates in China is again obtained from the WITS-TRAINS database. To compare price
changes before and after the ACFTA that went into effect in 2005, we use data of the
years 2003 and 2006 to represent the before-and-after ACFTA periods, respectively. As
mentioned in the previous section, our datasets include data on imports of
manufacturing products from ASEAN countries by manufacturing firms.
Our use of importer-side data has both advantages and disadvantages. First,
import prices (cif prices) include not only export prices (fob prices) but also freight and
insurance costs. However, such costs will not change much, depending on FTA
utilization. Namely, at least in the case of our analysis, there are no qualitative
differences between the use of import prices and that of exporter prices. Thus, our
estimates will be comparable with those in the previous studies on the effects of FTAs
on export prices. Second, as mentioned in the introductory section, the use of
importer-side data enables us to conduct our cross-export country analysis at HS
eight-digit level. Moreover, since the quantity unit (e.g., kilogram) in our dataset is
different across HS eight-digit codes (i.e., tariff-line codes), the use of importer-side
data enables us to avoid the mix of different quantity units in our analysis.
There are two more noteworthy points. First, since our data restrict sample firms
only to manufacturing importers, observations consist basically of international trade
flow in intermediate goods rather than that in finished goods. Thus, compared with the
case of international trade in finished goods, the bargaining-driven effect may play a
more significant role in the case of that in intermediate goods than the market-driven
effect. Second, our data include only firms with sales of over RMB5 million, i.e., large
firms. This restriction may lower our estimates in the ACFTA dummy because large
importers have large bargaining power in price negotiation. The basic statistics for our
empirical analysis are provided in Table 5.
===
Table 5
===
5. Empirical Results
In this section, we report our estimation results for equation (2). After presenting
our baseline results, we conduct some robustness checks on our results and then some
more kinds of analysis on the firm-level impacts of FTAs.
5.1. Baseline Results
12
The baseline results are reported in Table 6. Column (I) shows the results for
equation (2). As is consistent with our expectation, the estimated coefficient for ACFTA
is significantly positive. However, its magnitude looks quantitatively too large; import
prices of ACFTA eligible products rise by 193% (=exp(1.074)−1) after ACFTA’s entry
into force. As shown in Table 1, the tariff margin is at most 65%. Thus, our estimate
does not meet condition (1). The results in firm-level variables are as follow. The more
productive or capital intensive importers have the higher import prices. As mentioned in
Section 2.1, this result of higher import prices among the more productive importers is
favorable to prediction from the models with product-quality differences. In addition,
we can see that the importers with the higher wages or the younger importers have
significantly higher import prices.
===
Table 6
===
We add some kinds of dummy variables to equation (2) in order to control more
fixed effects. Column (II) includes HS eight-digit dummy variables to control for
product-specific effects, such as the differences in quantity units or the market-driven
effects through the reduction of MFN rates between 2003 and 2006. As a result, column
(II) shows qualitatively-unchanged results for firm-level variables but an insignificant
coefficient for the ACFTA dummy. On the contrary, in column (III), which controls
time-invariant firm characteristics, the coefficients for only ACFTA and TFP are
estimated to be significant. Specifically, the result in ACFTA implies that when products
turn out to be eligible for ACFTA, the import prices rise by 87%, which still does not
fall into the range specified in condition (1). Column (IV) controls for both product and
firm characteristics and shows that only TFP has a significant coefficient.
Furthermore, we also estimate the first-differenced version of equation (2), which
is given by:
ln (Prices fip2006 / Prices fip2003 ) = α ACFTA ip2006 + (X f2006 − X f2003 )β + u i + ε fip .
(3)
For variable Age, we introduce Age f2003 , not (Age f2006 − Age f2003 ). This specification
completely eliminates time-invariant, firm-export and country-product characteristics.
The estimation results are reported in columns (V)-(VII), in which the specification
includes no fixed effects, export country fixed effects only, and both export country
fixed effects and product fixed effects, respectively. All coefficients are estimated to be
13
insignificant, maybe due to the drastic decrease in the number of observations. In sum,
we could not find robust and reasonable impacts of ACFTA’s entry into force on import
prices of ACFTA eligible products.
5.2. Sample Restriction
In Table 7, we restrict the sample only to some specific firms and estimate the
model controlling for both product and firm fixed effects. First, in column (I), we
restrict only to firms with an average TFP (between 2003 and 2006) above its sample
mean. So far, we assume that all firms trading FTA eligible products use FTA schemes.
As mentioned in the introductory section, however, the international transactions by
productive exporters and/or importers are likely to be under FTA schemes. Thus, we
estimate our model only for productive importers. The results show no significant
coefficients for all variables. The insignificant result in TFP will be due to our
restriction of the sample to productive firms, i.e., small variation in the TFP variable.
===
Table 7
===
Second, column (II) in Table 7 restricts only to foreign-owned importers. This
restriction is also for relaxing our assumption that all firms trading FTA eligible
products use FTA schemes. One of the major reasons for not using FTA schemes is
simply because firms do not know about FTA schemes at all (Hayakawa et al., 2013).
Namely, they do not know what FTA is and how beneficial it is for their activities. On
the other hand, foreign-owned firms will have relatively much knowledge on
international activities including FTA schemes and may be more likely to use FTA
schemes if their products are eligible for FTA schemes. Another reason for this
restriction is that international trade by foreign-owned firms may follow a different
mechanism on the price effects of FTAs because they seem to be more likely to trade
with affiliates within the same firm group, i.e., intra-firm trade. In the case of intra-firm
trade, the way of tariff-rent sharing might be different, for example, due to transfer
pricing. However, the estimation results do not change qualitatively. Except for TFP, all
variables including the ACFTA dummy are insignificantly estimated.
Last, in column (III), we simply drop outliers in our sample. Specifically, we
exclude observations with import prices below the 1st percentile or above the 99th
percentile. However, we again found that, except for TFP, coefficients for all variables
including the ACFTA dummy are insignificantly estimated. In sum, we conclude that, at
least on average, the ACFTA eligible products do not experience a more significant rise
14
in import prices than the ACFTA ineligible products.
5.3. Further Analyses
We further conduct some estimation. First, in order to again take into account the
differences in FTA utilization according to firm productivity, as in column (I) in Table 7,
we now introduce the interaction term of the ACFTA dummy with TFP. The results are
reported in Table 8. The coefficients for the ACFTA dummy are still insignificant in
columns (I)-(III). In column (III), its interaction with TFP has a significantly positive
coefficient, but then the coefficient for TFP is also insignificant. In column (IV),
however, the ACFTA dummy, TFP, and their interaction have significant coefficients.
The latter two variables have significantly positive coefficients, while the coefficient for
the ACFTA dummy is negatively estimated. Table 5 reports that the highest productivity
among our sample firms is around 14. Thus, firms with such productivity gain the
benefits of the positive impacts of ACFTA’s entry into force on import prices (0.208 =
−0.478 + 14*0.049). More specifically, “0.208” indicates that the import prices of
ACFTA eligible products rise by 23%, which is a reasonable magnitude, after ACFTA’s
entry into force. As a result, we may say that only importers with very high productivity
use FTA schemes and raise import prices by around 20%.
===
Table 8
===
Second, we introduce the continuous variable on ACFTA eligibility rather than its
binary variable. So far, we have just examined the average difference in import prices
between ACFTA eligible and ineligible products. As formalized in condition (1),
however, there is more room to raise import prices in the case of eligible products with
the larger tariff margin. As a result, we may expect that the rise in import prices is larger
among importing products with a larger tariff margin. To examine this, we introduce a
tariff margin in ACFTA, which is named “Margin”, instead of an ACFTA dummy. By
definition, the tariff margin variable takes zero for all observations in 2003. Also, it does
so for observations of ACFTA ineligible products in 2006. Only observations of ACFTA
eligible products in 2006 take non-zero values in the tariff margin variable. The results
are provided in Table 9. From the qualitative point of view, the results are unchanged
compared with those in Table 6. The coefficients for Margin are significantly estimated
only in columns (I) and (III). Also, while the variable of TFP has significantly positive
coefficients in all specifications, the coefficients for the other firm-level variables are
insignificant if controlling for firm fixed effects.
15
===
Table 9
===
Last, we also examine the impacts of ACFTA’s entry into force on import
quantities of ACFTA eligible products. Specifically, we estimate equation (2) for import
quantities, controlling for both firm and product fixed effects. The results are reported in
columns (I)-(IV) in Table 10. As in Table 7, we also estimate our model for some kinds
of restricted samples. Three points are noteworthy. First, the coefficients for the ACFTA
dummy are estimated to be significantly positive in all kinds of samples except for the
“High TFP” sample. Specifically, import quantities of ACFTA eligible products increase
by around 16% after ACFTA’s entry into force. Thus, taking a closer look at the impacts
at the firm level, we may say that those are increases in trade volume rather than a rise
in trade prices. Second, the coefficients for TFP are significantly and positively
estimated in all kinds of samples, indicating that the productive firms import more.
Third, the other firm-level variables do not have any significant effects on import
quantities. The results in the first differenced version, i.e., equation (3), for import
quantities, are also reported in columns (V)-(VII). Although the coefficients for TFP
remain significantly positive, those for ACFTA turn out to be insignificant. The drastic
decrease in the number of observations may be the main reason for the difference in the
results in the ACFTA dummy between level and first-differenced equations.
===
Table 10
===
6. Concluding Remarks
While the recent studies on price effects of FTAs employ product-level trade data,
this paper empirically examines at the firm level the impacts of an FTA’s entry into
force on import prices of FTA eligible products, compared with those on import prices
of FTA ineligible products. We focus on firm-level imports in China from ASEAN
countries by employing China’s firm-product-level trade data. With our dataset, we can
control for firm characteristics and product characteristics and can avoid suffering from
some of the biases in previous studies. As a result, we could not find significantly
positive impacts of ACFTA’s entry into force on import prices of ACFTA eligible
products. Instead, we found a significant increase in import quantities of ACFTA
eligible products by around 16%. These results are robust because our several kinds of
specification show qualitatively similar results.
16
Our estimates indicate how exporters obtain gains from FTAs. It is obvious that
importers can save tariff payments by importing under FTA schemes. This saving is a
typical and direct gain from FTA utilization. However, exporters need to do more
administrative work for trading under FTA schemes than importers despite the fact that
the direct gainers are importers. Thus, without any gains, exporters will not export under
FTA schemes. Our estimation results suggest that the gain from FTAs for exporters is
the increase in export quantities rather than the rise in export prices. Before starting
administrative work, an increase in export quantities might be accepted by importers
during the negotiation of trade.
Last, we point out one limitation of our estimates. Unlike the estimates in Cadot
et al. (2005) and Olarreaga and Ozden (2005), our estimates do not contain the
qualitative differences in prices (through the choice of tariff schemes) across firms.
However, our estimates suffer from biases from the changes in non-members’ behavior,
while those in Cadot et al. (2005) and Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) do not contain such
biases because they employ product-level trade data that can differentiate tariff schemes
(e.g., MFN scheme or FTA scheme). For example, Ozden and Sharma (2006) compare
prices from FTA partners with those from the rest of the world using aggregated data.
As found in Chang and Winters (2002) and Winters and Chang (2000), non-FTA
partners lower their prices because the duty-free supplies provided by partners yield
fiercer competition. Thus, differences between these prices found in Ozden and Sharma
(2006) overestimate the impacts of FTA on members’ export prices. Our estimates in
this paper also suffer from these kinds of biases though our estimates already show an
insignificant rise in export prices. In short, there are two kinds of sources for biases, i.e.,
differences across firms and those between FTA member and non-member countries. In
order to eliminate both kinds of biases, it is necessary to employ firm-level trade data
that can differentiate tariff schemes.
17
Appendix. Our Observations by Exporting Country
Indonesia
Cambodia
Myanmar
Malaysia
Phillipines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
2003
937
3
13
2,623
908
3,191
2,222
161
18
2006
1,576
6
25
4,045
1,729
3,625
3,688
352
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21
Table 1. Products Eligible for ACFTA and Tariff Margin in 2006
Brunei
Indonesia
Cambodia
Laos
Myanmar
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
Eligible Products
Number
Share
3,243
0.43
3,121
0.41
730
0.10
651
0.09
3,322
0.44
3,144
0.41
3,021
0.40
3,313
0.44
3,334
0.44
491
0.06
Source: WITS-TRAINS Database
22
Tariff Margin (%)
Mean
Max
4.4
45
4.4
45
13.4
30
13.2
30
4.6
45
4.5
45
3.5
45
4.4
45
5.9
65
14.3
30
Table 2. ACFTA and the Extensive Margin in China’s Imports from ASEAN Countries
from 2003 to 2006
Entry
Exit
Stay
Total
Ineligible
Number Share (%)
56
10,332
6,232
34
1,792
10
18,356
Eligible
Number Share (%)
52
2,561
1,976
40
8
401
4,938
Source: Authors’ calculation using customs data.
Notes: “Ineligible” and “Eligible” refer to products ineligible and eligible for ACFTA in 2006,
respectively. “Entry” indicates the number of firm-product-origin observations which did not exist in
2003 but did exist in 2006. “Exit” indicates that of firm-product-origin observations which did exist
in 2003 but did not exist in 2006. “Stay” indicates that of firm-product-origin observations which did
exist in both 2003 and 2006.
23
Table 3. Changes in Imports according to ACFTA Eligibility from 2003 to 2006 (million
RMB)
2003
Entry
Exit
Stay
Total
542
271
813
Ineligible
2006 Growth (%)
1,070
327
1,397
2003
80
36
116
21
72
Eligible
2006 Growth (%)
201
40
240
10
107
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Customs data
Notes: “Ineligible” and “Eligible” are products ineligible and eligible to ACFTA in 2006,
respectively. “Entry” indicates the number of firm-product-origin observations which do not exist in
2003 but do exist in 2006. “Exit” indicates that of firm-product-origin observations which exist in
2003 but do not exist in 2006. “Stay” indicates that of firm-product-origin observations which exist
in both 2003 and 2006.
24
Table 4. Changes in Import Prices and Quantities from 2003 to 2006 according to
ACFTA Eligibility (%)
Ineligible
Eligible
Total
Prices
82
28
55
Quantities
-34
-14
-24
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Customs data
Note: These figures are the average growth of import prices and quantities among observations with
a status of “Stay” (i.e., firm-product-origin observations which existed in both 2003 and 2006).
“Ineligible” and “Eligible” refer to products ineligible and eligible for ACFTA in 2006, respectively.
25
Table 5. Basic Statistics
Prices
Quantities
Imports
ACFTA
TFP
Wages
KL ratio
Age
Obs
25,104
25,104
25,104
25,104
25,104
25,104
25,104
25,104
Mean
1.294
7.463
8.757
0.118
8.876
2.964
4.180
2.078
Std. Dev.
3.136
3.881
2.549
0.322
1.702
0.705
1.316
0.625
Note: All variables except for ACFTA are taken logs.
26
Min
-9.210
0
0
0
-0.861
-2.882
-3.539
0
Max
14.155
18.964
17.324
1
13.818
7.226
14.387
7.602
Table 6. Baseline Results
Level
ACFTA
TFP
Wages
KL ratio
Age
Country * Year
Country
HS
Firm
Number of Obs.
R-squared
(I)
1.074***
[0.357]
0.165***
[0.048]
0.318***
[0.051]
0.262***
[0.038]
-0.210***
[0.056]
YES
NO
NO
NO
25,104
0.1044
(II)
-0.007
[0.062]
0.107***
[0.010]
0.190***
[0.026]
0.139***
[0.014]
-0.121***
[0.025]
YES
NO
YES
NO
24,322
0.8061
(III)
0.626**
[0.254]
0.077*
[0.040]
-0.09
[0.082]
-0.003
[0.057]
(IV)
-0.030
[0.067]
0.060**
[0.025]
-0.013
[0.047]
0.011
[0.033]
YES
NO
NO
YES
22,668
0.379
YES
NO
YES
YES
22,051
0.8615
First-differenced
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
0.040
0.006
0.483
[0.053]
[0.056]
[0.321]
0.027
0.023
0.026
[0.021]
[0.021]
[0.024]
-0.042
-0.028
-0.052
[0.038]
[0.038]
[0.049]
0.005
-0.001
-0.012
[0.029]
[0.029]
[0.037]
-0.003
0.002
-0.019
[0.046]
[0.046]
[0.053]
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
2,167
2,167
1,917
0.0017
0.0094
0.1458
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of import prices in column “Level” and the log difference of
import prices in column “First-differenced”. All variables except for ACFTA are taken logs. The
parentheses are cluster errors by HS eight-digit code. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance, respectively. ACFTA takes the value one if a firm’s imported products from an ASEAN
country in 2006 are eligible for the ACFTA scheme.
27
Table 7. Robustness Checks: Sample Restriction
ACFTA
TFP
Wages
KL ratio
Country * Year
HS
Firm
Sample
Number of Obs.
R-squared
(I)
0.024
[0.094]
0.020
[0.040]
0.006
[0.060]
-0.052
[0.053]
YES
YES
YES
High TFP
11,907
0.8527
(II)
-0.030
[0.071]
0.053**
[0.025]
-0.021
[0.051]
0.034
[0.035]
YES
YES
YES
FOCs
19,555
0.8616
(III)
-0.039
[0.067]
0.049*
[0.026]
0.023
[0.047]
0.005
[0.030]
YES
YES
YES
Outliers
21,632
0.8555
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of import prices. All variables except for ACFTA are taken
logs. The parentheses are cluster errors by HS eight-digit code. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and
10% significance, respectively. ACFTA takes the value one if a firm’s imported products from an
ASEAN country in 2006 are eligible for the ACFTA scheme. In the sample of “High TFP”, we
restrict sample firms only to firms with TFP above the median among all sample firms. “FOCs”
includes only foreign-owned firms as sample firms. In the sample “Outliers”, we drop observations
with import prices below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile.
28
Table 8. Interaction with TFP
ACFTA
TFP
ACFTA * TFP
Wages
KL ratio
Age
Country * Year
HS
Firm
Number of Obs.
R-squared
(I)
(II)
0.369
-0.202
[0.441]
[0.244]
0.156*** 0.104***
[0.052]
[0.011]
0.080
0.022
[0.066]
[0.028]
0.318*** 0.190***
[0.051]
[0.026]
0.262*** 0.139***
[0.038]
[0.014]
-0.211*** -0.121***
[0.056]
[0.025]
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
25,104
24,322
0.1046
0.8061
(III)
-0.873
[0.560]
0.059
[0.041]
0.163**
[0.077]
-0.096
[0.082]
-0.004
[0.057]
(IV)
-0.478*
[0.249]
0.055**
[0.025]
0.049*
[0.029]
-0.015
[0.047]
0.01
[0.033]
YES
NO
YES
22,668
0.3794
YES
YES
YES
22,051
0.8616
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of import prices. All variables except for ACFTA and Margin
are taken logs. The parentheses are cluster errors by HS eight-digit code. ***, **, and * show 1%,
5%, and 10% significance, respectively. ACFTA takes the value one if a firm’s imported products
from an ASEAN country in 2006 are eligible for the ACFTA scheme.
29
Table 9. Impacts of Tariff Margin
Margin
TFP
Wages
KL ratio
Age
Country * Year
HS
Firm
Number of Obs.
R-squared
(I)
(II)
0.141**
-0.005
[0.067]
[0.012]
0.158*** 0.107***
[0.049]
[0.010]
0.318*** 0.190***
[0.051]
[0.026]
0.271*** 0.139***
[0.040]
[0.014]
-0.204*** -0.121***
[0.057]
[0.025]
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
25,104
24,322
0.0974
0.8061
(III)
0.089*
[0.050]
0.078*
[0.040]
-0.089
[0.082]
-0.008
[0.057]
(IV)
-0.003
[0.014]
0.060**
[0.025]
-0.013
[0.047]
0.011
[0.033]
YES
NO
YES
22,668
0.3774
YES
YES
YES
22,051
0.8615
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of import prices. All variables except for Margin are taken
logs. The parentheses are cluster errors by HS eight-digit code. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and
10% significance, respectively. Margin is the tariff margin in a firm’s imported products.
30
Table 10. Results for Import Quantities
ACFTA
TFP
Wages
KL ratio
(I)
0.168**
[0.079]
0.102***
[0.038]
-0.042
[0.066]
0.084
[0.060]
Level
(II)
(III)
0.127
0.155*
[0.117]
[0.086]
0.213*** 0.091**
[0.060]
[0.040]
-0.029
-0.044
[0.091]
[0.069]
0.089
0.072
[0.078]
[0.057]
(IV)
0.183**
[0.081]
0.093**
[0.039]
-0.063
[0.065]
0.096
[0.060]
YES
NO
YES
YES
High TFP
11,907
0.7665
YES
NO
YES
YES
Outliers
21,621
0.7695
Age
Country * Year
Country
HS
Firm
Sample
Number of Obs.
R-squared
YES
NO
YES
YES
All
22,051
0.7728
YES
NO
YES
YES
FOCs
19,555
0.7709
First-differenced
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
-0.093
0.023
0.74
[0.107]
[0.111]
[0.815]
0.119*** 0.130*** 0.146***
[0.044]
[0.044]
[0.052]
0.075
0.034
0.087
[0.072]
[0.072]
[0.091]
0.073
0.084
0.1
[0.057]
[0.057]
[0.068]
0.083
0.074
0.06
[0.086]
[0.086]
[0.099]
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
All
All
All
2,167
2,167
1,917
0.0053
0.0194
0.1425
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of import prices in column “Level” and the log difference of
import prices in column “First-differenced”. All variables except for ACFTA are taken logs. The
parentheses are cluster errors by HS eight-digit code. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance, respectively. ACFTA takes the value one if a firm’s imported products from an ASEAN
country in 2006 are eligible for the ACFTA scheme. In the sample of “High TFP”, we restrict sample
firms only to firms with TFP above the median among all sample firms. “FOCs” includes only
foreign-owned firms as sample firms. In the sample “Outliers”, we drop observations with import
prices below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile.
31
～Previous IDE Discussion Papers ～
No.
Author(s)
Title
435
Akiko YANAI
Rethinking Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO
2013
434
Tadashi ITO
Did the least developed countries benefit from duty-free quota-free
access to the Japanese market?
2013
433
Sato Kan Hiroshi
Toward an Inclusive and a Little Bit Ethical World Trading System:
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2013
432
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Platforms and Firm Capabilities: A Study of Emerging Global Value
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2013
431
Shawn ARITA and Kiyoyasu
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2013
430
Toshihiro KUDO
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2013
429
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2013
428
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA,
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2013
427
Toshihiro KUDO, Satoru
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2013
426
Koji KUBO
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2013
425
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Reform of Philippine Basic Education
2013
424
Bo MENG, Zhi WANG and Robert
KOOPMAN
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Domestic Production Networks?
2013
423
Shinichi SHIGETOMI
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Thailand
2013
422
Takahiro FUKUNISHI
Political Crisis and Suspension of Duty-free Access in Madagascar:
Assessment of Impacts on the Garment Industry
2013
421
Toshihiro KUDO, Satoru
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2013
420
Mai FUJITA
The Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation: Fighting
2013
for Supremacy in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry
419
Mai FUJITA
Exploring the Sources of China’s Challenge to Japan: Models of
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418
Romio MORI, Kaoru NABESHIMA Food Safety Control System of Chinese Eel Exports and its
and Nanae YAMADA
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2013
417
Takashi NOMURA, Saori OKADA,
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Takeshi YOSHIZAKI
2013
416
Yasushi UEKI
Supply Chain Collaboration and Responsiveness: A Comparison
between Thai Automotive and Electronics Industries
2013
415
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Formation of Supply Chain Collaboration and Firm Performance in
the Thai Automotive and Electronics Industries
2013
414
Futaba ISHIZUKA
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2013
Countries' Policies
2013
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413
Chie KASHIWABARA
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Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and Its Measures
2013
412
Takahiro FUKUNISHI and
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2013
411
Tsuruyo FUNATSU
Changing Local Elite Selection in Thailand: Emergence of New Local
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2013
410
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Harmonization of Trade in Services by APEC members
2013
409
Koichi KAWAMURA
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2013
408
Emi KOJIN
The Development of Private Farms in Vietnam
2013
407
Tadayoshi TERAO
Political Economy of Low Sulfurization and Air Pollution Control
Policy in Japan: SOx Emission Reduction by Fuel Conversion
2013
406
Miki HAMADA
Impact of Foreign Capital Entry in the Indonesian Banking Sector
2013
405
Maki AOKI-OKABE
Research Review: Searching for a New Framework for Thailand’s
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2013
404
Yuka KODAMA
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2013
403
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402
Hitoshi OTA
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2013
401
Mila KASHCHEEVA
Political limits on the World Oil Trade: Firm-level Evidence from US
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2013
400
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2013
399
Ikuo KUROIWA, Kenmei
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398
Toshitaka GOKAN
The Location of Manufacturing Firms and Imperfect Information in
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2013
397
Junko MIZUNO
An Export Strategy and Technology Networks in the Republic of
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2013
396
Ke Ding, Toshitaka Gokan, Xiwei
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2013
395
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2013
394
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393
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392
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2013
391
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2013
390
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Response of Local Producers to Agro-food Port Rejection: The Case
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2013
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389
Housam DARWISHEH
From Authoritarianism to Upheaval: the Political Economy of the
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388
Koji KUBO
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2013
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387
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386
Yutaka ARIMOTO, Seiro ITO, Yuya Stigma, Social Relationship and HIV Testing in the Workplace:
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385
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2013
384
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2013
383
Nudjarin RAMUNGUL, Etsuyo
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2013
382
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2013
381
Miwa TSUDA
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2013
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380
Kazuhiko OYAMADA
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2013
379
Yoshihiro NAKANISHI
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2013
378
Tadashi ITO
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2012
377
Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, Ahmad The Misconception of Political Lessons: How UMNO Perceives the
Fauzi Abdul Hamid
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376
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375
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373
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372
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA
371
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370
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368
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366
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2013
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363
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YAMANO
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355
354
353
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352
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351
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350
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349
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348
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342
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341
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340
338
Yasushi HAZAMA
Yoshihiro HASHIGUCHI and
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337
Mami YAMAGUCHI
336
Junko MIZUNO
Fernando GONZALEZ-VIGIL and
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347
346
345
344
343
339
335
334
Yuko TSUJITA and Hisaya ODA
333
Hisaya ODA
332
Koichi FUJITA
331
330
Chirashree Das GUPTA
Zhe Ren
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Measuring Global Value Chains and Regional Economic Integration:
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Comparative Analysis of Bilateral Memoranda on Anti-human
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Can FDI Promote Export Diversification and Sophistication of Host
Countries? Dynamic Panel System GMM Analysis
Multiplant Strategy under core-periphery structure
Consciousness, Value and Consumer Choice of Energy Efficient
Appliance: Case of Thailand, China and India
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Roles of Supply Chains in Adopting Product Related Environmental
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Trade, Economic Growth and Environment
The Effect of EU Environmental Regulation on International Trade:
Restriction of Hazardous Substances as a Trade Barrier
Non-Economic Voting and Incumbent Strength in Turkey
Assessing Agglomeration Economies in the Yangzi River Delta,
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Diversified Boundaries of the Firm
Migration as a Rural Development Strategy and the Migrants
Involved: An Account of a Migrants' Hometown in Sichuan, China
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Caste, Land, and Migration: A Preliminary Analysis of a Village
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The Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power
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2012
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2012
2012
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2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
No.
329
328
327
326
325
324
323
322
321
320
319
318
317
316
315
314
313
312
311
310
309
308
307
306
305
304
303
302
301
300
299
298
Author(s)
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Coping and Adaptation againsｔ Decreasing Fish Resources:Case
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Overview of Results from a Questionnaire Survey and Interviews
Yoko IWASAKI
2009-2011
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Innovating Global Value Chains: Creation of the Netbook Market by
Momoko KAWAKAMI
Taiwanese Firms
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Development of Land Rental Market and its Effect on Household
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Farming in Rural China: An Empirical Study in Zhejiang Province
Returns to Migration: The Role of Educational Attainment in Rural
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Tanzania
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Claim against Britain for Compensation by Kenya’s Former Mau Mau
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Effects of Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition on Human
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TANAKA, and Yasushi UEKI
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Factors that Prevent Children from Gaining Access to Schooling: A
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Hiroko UCHIMURA
Health System Reforms in China: Progress and Further Challenges
Production Networks in the Asia-Pacific Region: Facts and Policy
Daisuke HIRATSUKA
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Revisited
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Kumudinei DISSANAYAKE
Work Organizations in Post-war Sri Lanka
Agricultural Efficiency of Rice Farmers in Myanmar: A Case Study in
Nay Myo Aung
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Takeshi KAWANAKA and Yuki
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ASABA
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Kazunobu HAYAKAWA
Intermediate Goods
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Shuji UCHIKAWA
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Platforms, Network Effects and Small Business Dynamics in China:
Ke DING and Jiutang PAN
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Kazunobu HAYAKAWA and
Location Choice in Low-income Countries: Evidence from Japanese
Kenmei TSUBOTA
Investments in East Asia
The Rise and Fall in the Price of Food, Fuel and Manufactured
Tatsufumi YAMAGATA and Yoko
Goods: Interdependency between Prices and Technology Determining
ASUYAMA
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Takeshi INOUE and Shigeyuki
Financial Permeation As a Role of Microfinance: Has Microfinance
HAMORI
Actually been Helpful to the Poor?
Tatsuya SHIMIZU
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Ikuko OKAMOTO
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
No.
298
296
Author(s)
Kaoru NABESHIMA and Kiyoyasu
TANAKA
Shawn ARITA and Kiyoyasu
TANAKA
Title
Innovation Networks among China, Japan, and Korea: Further
Evidence from U.S. Patent Data
2011
Simulating Heterogeneous Multinational Firms
2011
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Seasonality on School Dropout in Bangladesh
Seasonal Migration and Micro-credit in the Lean Period: Evidence
from Northwest Bangladesh
Economic Restructuring and Regional Distribution of Enterprises in
Vietnam
Market Discipline by Depositors: Impact of Deposit Insurance on the
Indonesian Banking Sector
Market Discipline by Depositors:
Impact of Deposit Insurance on the Indonesian Banking Sector
295
Abu S. SHONCHOY and Seiro ITO
294
Abu S. SHONCHOY
293
Futaba ISHIZUKA
292
Miki HAMADA
291
MURAKAMI Kaoru
Negotiating Social Assistance: The Case of the Urban Poor in Turkey
289
288
Kazuhiko OYAMADA and Yoko
UCHIDA
Miwa YAMADA
Yasushi HAZAMA
287
Hisao YOSHINO
286
Natsuko OKA
Domestic, Vertical, and Horizontal Multinationals: A General
Equilibrium Approach using the “Knowledge Capital Model”
Is the Anti-Trafficking Framework Really for the 'Victims'?
Determinants of Political Tolerance: A Literature Review
Strategic Trade Policy and Non-Linear Subsidy -In The Case of Price
CompetitionNeither Exit nor Voice: Loyalty as a Survival Strategy for the Uzbeks
in Kazakhstan
285
Ikuo KUROWA, Kaoru
NABESHIMA, and Kiyoyasu
TANAKA
284
Hitoshi SUZUKI
283
Kozo KUNIMUNE
Etsuyo MICHIDA, Cemal Atici, and
Michikazu KOJIMA
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, Fukunari
KIMURA, and Hyun-Hoon LEE
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA and
Nobuaki YAMASHITA
Noriyuki YANAGAWA and Mariko
WATANABE
290
282
281
280
279
278
277
276
275
274
Innovation Networks among China, Japan, and Korea: Evidence from
Japanese Patent Data
Preliminary Discussions on the Urbanization of Rural Areas in
Modern Iran
A Model of Economic Growth with Saturating Demand
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
Does Quality Matter in the Iron and Scrap Trade?
2011
How Does Country Risk Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?
2011
The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Facilitating
Global Production Networks
Ex ante barganing and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply:
Theory and Evidence from China
Skill Sorting, Inter-Industry Skill Wage Premium, and Production
Yoko ASUYAMA
Chains: Evidence from India 1999-2000
Skill Distribution and Comparative Advantage: A Comparison of
Yoko ASUYAMA
China and India
Bo MENG, Norihiko YAMANO and Application of Factor Decomposition Techniques to Vertical
Colin WEBB
Specialisation Measurement
Measuring Fixed Costs for Firms’ Use of a Free Trade Agreement:
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA
Threshold Regression Approach
Myopic or farsighted:
Kenmei TSUBOTA,
Bilateral Trade Agreements among three
Yujiro KAWASAKI
symmetric countries
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011