DARPA BAA0015 Intrusion Tolerance Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware (July , 2001) F. Anjum A. Ghosh G. DiCrescenzo M. Rathi A. Umar R. Zbib Goal: Make COTS Middleware Intrusion Tolerant a) Make the middleware code, data, and messages intrusion tolerant b)Plug-in generic IT functionality (FRS) into COTS middleware (interceptors) c) Provide intrusion tolerance as a service to apps (API) Middleware Basic Distributed Applications Advanced Applications and Services Specialized Applications (e.g.. Extended enterprises) “Higher Level” Middleware (e.g., B2B workflow and supply chains) Special Purpose Middleware (e.g., wireless/VOIP/EC middleware) Basic Middleware (e.g., Web servers, CORBA, MOM) Middleware Platforms (e.g., J2EE,.Net, EAIs) also known as “app servers” Network Services (e.g., TCP/IP) Doc Name – 2 Technical Approach: Four Tasks Impact analysis Software FRS Algorithms Assumptions ICM architecture •Enterprise applications increasingly dependent on middleware stack •Middleware is target for attacks (code red) •Users can tolerate degraded performance in certain conditions •A small subset of systems in the Doc Name – 3 network are trustworthy Task 2: FRS Algorithms Assume we can estimate characteristics of computer systems – Probability of Unavailability of a data fragment on a computer (u) – Probability of Compromise of a data fragment on a computer (c) Given this, algorithms should calculate How many fragments of a data item to make How many copies (replicas) of each fragment How should these fragment copies be distributed (scatterd) amongst the computer systems given their characteristics Doc Name – 4 FRS metrics Developed a metric to compare the different algorithms – Intrusion Tolerance Metric – IMFRS = f(u, c, F, R, S) IMFRS shows probability of Unavailability of a data item plus probability of Compromise of a data item Example: – Machine outside firewall (c is high) – Reduce c of a data item by usimg different FRS Use proposed metric to design efficient FRS algorithms Used simulations to study IMFRS Details in past and upcoming reports Doc Name – 5 Dynamic Intrusion Tolerance Schemes Only static schemes considered so far in the literature – FRS techniques developed in this and other projects – Shamir’s secret sharing, Rabin’s information dispersal (Cryptographic) Fragments or shadows do not change servers – even when server characteristics (u, c) change Can we improve the system strength by dynamic schemes? – Where fragments or shadows migrate over their lifetime – Mobile software code then used to carry the fragments Started Investigations in – Novel dynamic notions of Secret sharing Information dispersal – Construction of protocols for these two notions – Construction of non-cryptographic FRS protocols – Comparison of these two in a dynamic setting Doc Name – 6 Task 3-4: ICM Architecture Make middleware intrusion tolerant: Lower level services to – Adapt & plug-in new/alternate middleware dynamically (interceptors) – Protect middleware by FRSing middleware data, code, messages Make apps intrusion tolerant: High level services (API) – Protect apps by FRSing app data, code, messages Intrusion manager to invoke FRS services at Startup, Normal Run Time, Under attack Apply to diverse middleware: CORBA, MOM, WAP, VOIP, EAI, COM+, SOAP, etc Developed a prototype to demonstrate proof of concept (CORBA, MOM) for asynch/synch communications Gained many insights about middleware services and what is missing (e.g., better interception) Doc Name – 7 Intelligent Compensating Middleware for Intrusion/Assault Tolerance (High Level View) Applications Intrusion Triggers ICM (API) •FRS Routines •Persistent Normal •Non-persistent COTS Middleware •Adapters App IT Middleware IT Network Services “ICM External Architecture”, Data Item: A002, Work Completed under the Project "A Comprehensive Approach for Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware", BAA00-15, March 2001. Doc Name – 8 Prototype Developed a proof of concept prototype Generic approach for CORBA and MOM Developed generic FRS proxies that work both for CORBA and MOM – code FRS (persistent) – data FRS (persistent) – message FRS (non-persistent) Developed FRS Java API – Simple API for fragmenting data – Currently using to fragment the code – Can be used for plugging in different FRS algorithms Current demo is ICM agnostic (I.e., apps do not issue ICM calls) We can use ICM aware later (I.e. apps issue calls to do FRS) Doc Name – 9 PROTOTYPE: ICM: Synchronous Middlewares (CORBA) Persistent FRS Proxy Client Server CORBA Environment ORB Core Intrusion triggers CORBA Proxy CORBA Proxy Transport Proxy Transport Proxy Non-persistent FRS Non-persistent FRS Proxy Proxy Doc Name – 10 ICM: Asynchronous Middlewares (MQ Series) Persistent Client FRS Proxy MQ Environment Server Server Queue Client Queue Intrusion Message Channel triggers MQ Proxy Transport Proxy MQ Proxy Transport Proxy Non-persistent FRS Non-persistent FRS Proxy Proxy Doc Name – 11 FRS JAVA API Objective: Make FRS commonly available Open Java API: – Persistent FRS. e.g. – frsProxy.store(byte[] data) – frsProxy.retreive(dataID) – Non-persistent FRS (messages). e.g. – frsProxy.receiveMessages( ), – frsProxy.sendMessage(messageID, message) Uses the Java Factory design paradigm to create and run new FRS algorithm implementations Independent of FRS algorithm implementations – New implementations can be added and easily plugged into the architecture. – Implementations are instantated by sending them arguments through a hashtable Architecture becomes a framework for experimenting with new FRS algorithms Implemented several FRS algorithms, implementing more. Doc Name – 12 TASK1: Summary of Impact Analysis XML CORBA MOM Telecom Middleware WAP Platform EAI Platform ASP Platforms Emarket Platforms Supply chain Platform Components with Possible Impact High Vulnerability DTDs/Schemas, Invalid XML transactions -Trading XML documents on networks can stop or can be diverted Orb core, Servants CORBA-based apps unreliable MOM Queue MOM-based applications unreliable manager Softswitch, VOIP Serious impact on telecom facilities Gateways and services WAP Gateway WAP-based services destroyed EAI Broker Mission critical enterprise applications cannot operate ASP Host Can impact multiple enetrprises. Emarket Catalogs Emarket trading comes to halt and transactions Supply Chain Supply chains stop controller, SCM servers “Intrusion Threats In Emerging Middleware Platforms: Impact Analysis”, Data Item: A002, Work Completed under the Project "A Comprehensive Approach for Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware", BAA00-15. Doc Name – 13 Prototype II: Pattern-based Intrusion Analysis Industry (business) Patterns • Two, three, n tiered • Interaction with existing systems • Loose versus tight coupling Application patterns Infrastructure needed • networks, middleware Solution Patterns Other Analyzers (Integration, COTS middleware selection, outsourcing, etc) • Internal Services • External (with consumers) • External (with partners/suppliers)) Intrusion/Security Analyzer • • • • • Transaction volume Transaction value no of partners Level of trust between partners Others •Possible impact of intrusion •Suggested approaches IBM's business patterns: http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/patterns/ Doc Name – 14 Summary: Potentially High Payoff in developing a generic approach to make COTS Middleware IT Impact analysis Report Completed, Discex paper Prototype: pattern-based FRS algorithms Reports and papers (Dec 2001) ReportMarch 2001 Two papers Published Generic architecture (CORBA, MOM,VOIP) developed, preparing papers Software Prototype1 (July 2001) Prototype 2 (July 2002) Report - March 2001(paper) Report - Dec 2001(paper) ICM architecture Doc Name – 15 Task Schedule GFY 2000 TASKS 3Q 4Q GFY 2001 1Q 2Q 3Q GFY2002 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q GFY 2003 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q Task 1 Impact Analysis Task 2 Architecture Task 3 Software Task 3-Opt Task 4 Evaluation Of FRSA Task 5 (opt.) Managemen t Doc Name – 16 Lessons Learned/Path Forward Key Point: Applications as well as middleware can be made IT through FRS (application aware and unaware) FRS has several interesting areas of investigations: – Persistent versus non-persistent FRS, – Dynamic FRS can benefit intrusion tolerance plus cryptography – Metrics can be developed/used to determine best schemes Middleware architectures and prototyping – Interceptors/exits are of key importance for adaption/plug-in CORBA provides best interceptors, but not enough (cannot intercept ORB) Some middleware (e.g., MS) do not provide any interceptors/exits – Middleware semantic model can be used to reason about security (e.g. role of directory for binding and message transfer) – CORBA versus DCOM similarities/dissimilarities – MQ client interception: MQ does not give us any information about which receiving application is going to pick up the message Impact analysis - Pattern-based approach may be useful Next Step: Refine/apply to a wide range of COTS middleware Doc Name – 17 Publications/Reports “ICM External Architecture”, Data Item: A002, Work Completed under the Project "A Comprehensive Approach for Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware", BAA00-15, March 2001. “Intrusion Tolerance through FRS”, Data Item: A003, Work Completed under the Project "A Comprehensive Approach for Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware", BAA00-15, March 2001 “Intrusion Threats In Emerging Middleware Platforms: Impact Analysis”, Data Item: A001, Work Completed under the Project "A Comprehensive Approach for Intrusion Tolerance Based on Intelligent Compensating Middleware", BAA00-15, Dec. 2000 Ghosh, Anjum, Umar, Zbib, Rathi, “On efficient schemes for Intrusion Tolerance”, Infocom 2001 submitted Anjum, Ghosh, Umar, Zbib, “On Metrics for Intrusion Tolerance and Efficient Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering schemes”, IEEE ICON 2001, accepted. Umar A, Anjum F, Ghosh A, Zbib R, “Intrusion Tolerant Middleware” Discex (Defense Information Security Exchange), June 2001. Umar A, Anjum F, Ghosh A, Zbib R , “Intrusion Tolerant Information Distribution in the Battlefield” 4th ATIRP Conference, March 2001 Anjum, A., “Intrusion Tolerance Schemes to Facilitate Mobile e-commerce”, (IEEE ICPWC Dec 2000) Anjum, A. and Umar, A., “Agent-based Intrusion Tolerance Using Fragmentation Redundancy”, (IEEE WCNC Sept 2000) Doc Name – 18 Questions? Doc Name – 19
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz