Table 1: Equilibrium Wholesale Prices and Final Market Quantities W T B aE (16 8J 8J 2J J ) 2 W wiWW 2( 2 E ) c aE ( 2 J ) 4 EJ qiWW 2v ( 2 E ) ( 2 J )(4 EJ ) w1WT w2WT q1WT WT 2 2v(4 J 2 2J )(2 E ) 32 16J 2 EJ 4 2v( 2 J )(4 EJ ) 32 16J 2 EJ 4 See [W, T] qiTT See [W, B] a (J 2)J 2 ( 4 EJ ) 2c 16 4J 2 (2 E )J 3 32 16J 2 EJ 4 wiTT B 4 2c 8( 2 J 2 ) E (8 4J 4J 2 J 3 ) 32 16J 2 EJ 4 q T 3 w1WB aE (4 2J J 2 ) 2c( 4 2J 2 E (2 J J 2 )) 8 (4 E )J 2 (2 E )v(4 2J J 2 ) 2(8 (4 E )J 2 ) q1WB v(4 ( 2 E )J ) 8 (4 E )J 2 q WB 2 w1TB 2c(2 J ) aJ 2 4 2J J 2 q1TB 2v 4 2J J 2 q 2TB See [T, B] c v(4 2J J 2 ) 4(2 J 2 ) v(2 J ) 2(2 J 2 ) qiBB v 2J Table 2: Second Stage Equilibrium Profits W S DWW i T S WT D 1 4v 2 (2 E ) 2 (2 J ) 2 (4 EJ ) 2 S WW Ui 2v 2 E ( 2 E )( 2 J ) ( 2 J )( 4 EJ ) 2 2 S UWT 1 2 2 2 1 v 2 (1 E )4 ( 2 E )J ( 2 J 2 ) 2 S DWB 2 8 ( 4 E )J 2 2Ev (2 E )(4 2J J )(16 8J 8J 2J J ) (32 16J 2 EJ 4 ) 2 S UWB 2 Ev 2 ( 2 J ) 2 ( 4 EJ ) 2 ( 2 J 2 ) (32 16J 2 EJ 4 ) 2 S UWB 2 2 S UWT 2 (2 E ) v 2 (4 2J J 2 ) 2 4(8 (4 E )J 2 ) 2 2 S DWB 2v 2 (1 E )(2 J ) 2 (4 EJ ) 2 (2 J 2 ) (32 16J 2 EJ 4 ) 2 S DWT W B 4v (2 E ) (4 2J J ) (32 16J 2 EJ 4 ) 2 2 2 3 4 Ev (2 E )(4 2J J 2 ) 2 2 i T See [W, T] S TT Ui 2 Ev 2 (2 J 2 ) (4 2J J 2 ) 2 2 2 (1 E )v 2 (4 2J J 2 ) 2 16(2 J 2 ) 2 S DTB (1 E )v 2 (2 J ) 2 8(2 J 2 ) S UTB Ev 2 (4 2J J 2 )2 16(2 J 2 ) 2 2 1 Ev 2 (2 J ) 2 8(2 J 2 ) 2 S DBB (1 E )v 2 (2 J ) 2 S UBB Ev 2 (2 J ) 2 i See [W, B] 2 8 (4 E )J 2 S UTB B Ev 2 4 (2 E )J 2 (2 J 2 ) 2 1 2v 2 (1 E )(2 J 2 ) (4 2J J 2 ) 2 2 8 (4 E )J 2 1 S DTB S DTT 2 2 See [T, B] i Table 3: Welfare Levels W W WWW 4v 2 (2 E ) 6 EJ 2J EJ 2 E (2 J ) 2 (4 EJ ) 2 T See [W, T] B See [W, B] T WWT ª º 192 128J 96J 2 56J 3 6J 4 « » 2 2 2 3 4 4v « E (8(1 J J J ) 3J (1 J )) » « E (32 48J 8J 2 12J 3 14J 4 6J 5 J 6 )» ¬ ¼ W WB (32 16J 2 EJ 4 ) 2 WTT 4v 2 3J J 2 (4 2J J 2 ) 2 See [T, B] B ª 4 ( 96 64 J 48 J 2 28 J 3 3 J 4 ) º « » v2« E 2 (16 16 J 4 J 3 J 4 ) » « 4 E (16 24 J 16 J 2 16 J 3 J 4 ) » ¬ ¼ 8 ( 8 ( 4 E )J 2 ) 2 WTB v2 96 48J 2 3J 4 64J 28J 3 32( 2 J 2 ) 2 WBB v2 3J (2 J )2 1 3 2 x Bargaining over contract type Downstream competition in quantities Bargaining over contract terms Figure 1: Timing in the basic model 1 Ȗ [(B, B), (B, B)] 0.8 ȕǺ(Ȗ) ȕW(Ȗ) 0.6 [(B,W), (B,W)] 0.4 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 ȕ 1 Figure 2: Equilibrium Contractual Configurations 1 0.8 1 B B 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 W 0.2 W 0.4 0.6 (a) For Ȗ = 0.8 0.8 B W 0.2 ȕW 0.2 B 1 ȕ ȕW W 0.2 0.4 0.6 (b) For Ȗ = 0.4 Figure 3: Likelihood of W and B contracts 0.8 1 ȕ 0.12 ES Di 0.175 ES U i ES Di ES U i 0.15 0.1 0.125 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.075 ES U i ES Di 0.02 0.2 0.4 0.6 (a) For Ȗ = 0.8 ES U i ES Di 0.025 ȕB ȕW 0.05 0.8 1 ȕ 0.2 ȕW 0.4 0.6 ȕB (b) For Ȗ = 0.4 Figure 4: Expected Equilibrium Profits 0.8 1 ȕ ǼWe 0.45 ǼWe ǼWe 0.4 0.35 ǼWe 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.25 ǼCS 0.2 ǼCS 0.4 0.6 ȕ ȕBW (a) For Ȗ = 0.8 0.8 0.3 ǼCS ǼCS 1 ȕ 0.2 ȕW 0.4 0.6 ȕB (b) For Ȗ = 0.4 Figure 5: Expected Equilibrium Consumers’ Surplus (ECS) and Welfare (EWe) 0.8 1 ȕ
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz