Missile Ranges THAAD to be Deployed in South

First Nuclear Age,
1945-90s
1.
Bipolarity
Second Nuclear Age,
1990s to present
1.
– balance
2.
3.
Deterrence
– vulnerability
4.
• asymmetry
2.
Deterrence
• missile
defense
Arms Control
– Managing
rivalry
Multipolarity
3.
Arms Control
• coercion
Rationality
4.
Rationality
Second Nuclear Age, 1990s to
present
1.
Multipolarity
• asymmetry
2.
Deterrence
• missile defense
3.
Arms Control
• coercion
4.
Rationality
1. Multipolarity
More players in the game
Several levels of relationships
Almost all are asymmetric
A. Strategic Level
B. Regional Level
C. Terrorism?
Estimated Nuclear Forces, 2016
(from Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)
A. Strategic level
US and Russia: rough equality
 Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT) 2002
 New START Treaty 2010
China



Chinese nuclear capability
Chinese nuclear doctrine
US Annual Report on Chinese Military
Power
Table 1. Chinese nuclear forces, 2013.
Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 2013;69:79-85
Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Chinese MRBM and ICBM Ranges
from US Report on Chinese Military Power, p. 82
B. Regional Level



South Asia
Middle East
East Asia
South Asia
India Missile Ranges
Pakistani Missile Ranges
East Asia
North Korea: Nuclear tests
• October 9, 2006 (first test)
Missile Ranges
THAAD to be Deployed in South Korea
THAAD
The Middle East
Iran: No tests yet, but



2007 US National Intelligence Estimate
2013 IAEA Report
2015 JCPOA
C. Terrorism?




AQAM
US Invasion of Iraq 2003
Coup in Pakistan
Iranian allies: Hezbollah?
2. Deterrence
Three Modifications to Cold War
Deterrence
Dealing with the regional threat
A. Missile Defense
B. Prompt Global Strike
C. Use of Nuclear Weapons against
Non-Nuclear States
A. Missile Defense
Strategic Defense Initiative:
Reagan’s SDI speech, March 23, 1983
NMD: Deterrence by Denial
National Missile Defense Act of 1999
 US Missile Defense Agency
 The missile defense system
 NMD test videos
 BMD Review 2010
GW Bush and Obama
B. Prompt Global Strike
GW Bush Nuclear Posture Review 2001
 Summary
Obama Nuclear Posture Review 2010

US Strategic Command: JFCC Global Strike
Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and
Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues.”

Congressional Research Service. April 26, 2013
Why Conventional PGS?




Speed
Vulnerability of forward bases
Preemption
Option to stay below nuclear
threshold
C. Use of Nuclear Weapons against
Non-Nuclear States
3. Arms Control
Strategic Arms Control:
 US and Russia
• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT) 2002
• New START Treaty 2010

US and China: nothing
Regional Powers?


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
1968 (1970)
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)
Problems?
Never Signed NPT
 Israel
 India
 Pakistan
Violated Treaty Provisions
 Iraq
 Iran
 North Korea
Coercion, Sanctions, Talks
North Korea
 Six Party Talks
 UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006)
Iran
 P5 + 1 Talks
 UNSC Resolution 1929 (2010)
 2015 JCPOA
Missile Technology Control Regime
4. Rationality

If leaders of these states are
rational…
• Extortion is their policy

If leaders of these states are
irrational…
• How do we deal with them?
Larger Question
Does Deterrence Work?
GW Bush answer
Terrorists Rationality?


Hamas or AQAM?
Rationality of groups that use
suicide bombing?