Regulation of Financial Institutions Eric S. Rosengren President & CEO Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Open Classroom Northeastern University Boston, MA November 30, 2011 www.bostonfed.org Why Do We Regulate Financial Institutions? If everyone wants funds at the same time cannot liquidate loans Depositors want immediate access to funds Borrowers want longer-term financing Financial intermediaries borrow short and lend long – assume diversification reduces risk from maturity mismatch Depression – bank runs – widespread bank closures 2 Depression Era Solution Deposit Insurance – FDIC Banks have special role – depositors get limited government guarantee Taxpayers at risk during failure Banks limited in what risk they take Banks have capital requirements – CAMELS Regular bank exams 3 Problems Emerge Interest on deposits does not rise at weaker banks Weak banks have incentive to take more risk Gains go to shareholders, losses go to taxpayers Use financial institutions for other goals Savings and Loans GSEs Banks become larger and more complicated 4 Too Big to Fail International loans – assumption that governments would not default Real estate loans – assumption real estate values would not fall Real estate securities – assumption securities with national pools of mortgages would be protected since national housing prices had not fallen 5 2007-2008 Runs are not unique to banks Investment banks – Bear Stearns, Lehman Insurance – AIG Money market funds – Reserve Primary Fund Exotic structures – SIV International transmission of shocks – global banks are global problems 6 Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) Regulated by the SEC Must maintain significant liquidity ratios Limited in the duration and credit ratings of instruments they can hold Not required to alter net value (NAV) to reflect small movements in underlying asset values Like other mutual funds, not required to hold any capital as protection This structure can generate shareholder “runs” during times of financial stress 7 Importance of Money Market Mutual Funds Critical players in short-term credit markets Significant buyers of CP, ABCP and CDs Important source of financing for organizations dependent on wholesale financing Largest investor focused on high-quality, very short-term paper 8 Figure 1 Total Money Market Mutual Fund Assets Under Management September 12, 2006 - September 6, 2011 Trillions of Dollars 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 12-Sep-06 11-Sep-07 Source: iMoneyNet 9-Sep-08 8-Sep-09 7-Sep-10 6-Sep-11 9 Figure 2 Total Money Market Mutual Fund Assets Under Management by Type of Fund September 12, 2006 - September 6, 2011 Trillions of Dollars 2.5 Prime 2.0 1.5 Lehman Fails (Sep 15) Government 1.0 Tax-Free 0.5 0.0 12-Sep-06 11-Sep-07 Source: iMoneyNet 9-Sep-08 8-Sep-09 7-Sep-10 6-Sep-11 10 Figure 3 Daily Changes in Assets Under Management in Prime Money Market Mutual Funds August 1, 2008 - October 7, 2008 Billions of Dollars 30 AMLF program commences (Sep 22). 0 Lehman fails (Sep 15). -30 Treasury announces insurance for MMMFs (Sep 19). -60 The Reserve Primary Fund breaks the buck (Sep 16). -90 Fed announces AMLF program (Sep 19). -120 -150 1-Aug-08 12-Aug-08 21-Aug-08 2-Sep-08 11-Sep-08 22-Sep-08 1-Oct-08 Note: Prime funds include both retail and institutional funds. Outflows at prime institutional funds account for 90% of prime outflows since September 17. Source: iMoneyNet 11 Response to the Rapid Withdrawals Treasury temporary insurance program Federal Reserve Bank of Boston administered Fed lending facility Addressed short-term liquidity needs of MMMFs Helped stabilize short-term credit markets disrupted by rapid liquidations Efforts proved successful at restoring stability, avoiding further harm Balances have gradually declined (low rate environment and corresponding returns) 12 Figure 4 Highest-Yielding Prime Funds Average Gross and Net Yields August 30, 2011 Funds Average 7-Day Yield Gross (Basis Points) Average 7-Day Yield Net (Basis Points) Five Highest-Yielding Money Market Mutual Funds 38.4 5.0 Next Five Highest-Yielding Money Market Mutual Funds 33.8 2.6 Source: iMoneyNet 13 Figure 5 Foreign Exposure of Five Largest Prime Money Market Mutual Funds As of February 28, 2011 and August 31, 2011 Percent 80 as of February 28, 2011 as of August 31, 2011 60 Change (Percentage Point Difference) 40 20 0 -20 Total Foreign Europe France Source: Crane Data, Mutual Fund Company Websites UK Germany Italy 14 Financial Stability and MMMFs Actions have been taken recently – improved liquidity and monthly reporting of holdings Credit risk and MMMFs holdings Is the current structure appropriate given the critical role of MMMFs to short-term credit markets? 15 No One Proposal has been Settled on – My Preferred Approach A meaningful capital-like buffer – perhaps 3% If violated, automatically leads to conversion to a floating NAV If plan for a buffer isn’t produced and accepted, require MMMFs to float NAV 16 Additional Actions A more proactive regulatory approach Reporting should be more frequent Reducing a fund’s maximum permissible exposure to any one firm Many (but not all) MMMFs have been significantly reducing exposure to troubled institutions – but are assets of riskier firms appropriate investments for MMMFs? 17 MMMFs are Intertwined with Another Systemic Risk Issue Dependence of foreign branches and agencies in the U.S. on short-term wholesale funding Not able to get deposit insurance or FHLB membership Issuing jumbo CDs, CP, and repurchase agreements During times of stress, less stable than retail deposits 18 Challenges from Europe Banks are large relative to their economies Global banks have significant operations in the United States Many global banks have large exposures to European sovereign debt Wholesale credit markets showing significant stress 19 Figure 6 Bank Size Relative to Country Size: Assets of Largest Bank as a Share of GDP as of Year End 2010 Percent 300 Switzerland 250 Netherlands 200 Denmark Sweden Belgium 150 Spain France 100 United Kingdom Germany Italy 50 United States 0 Note: Includes the U.S. and all European countries with a bank ranked in the top 50 worldwide as of year end 2010. Source: Global Finance, IMF 20 Figure 7 Stock Prices of Largest Banks in Europe and the United States Largest Banks in Groups of Five Average Stock Prices: Average Index Level Dec 29, 2006 = 100 Bank Assets Billion Dollars Peak sssssssssss Dec 31, 2010 Dec 30, 2008 Nov 28, 2011 (Post 2006) Average Percent Change Year End Peak to 2010 to Nov 28, 2011 Nov 28, 2011 Five Largest Banks 2,456 33 30 110 -72 -37 Next Five Largest Banks 2,019 30 22 104 -79 -44 Next Five Largest Banks 1,470 41 30 111 -73 -41 Next Five Largest Banks 1,028 34 22 118 -81 -50 Source: Global Finance, Bloomberg 21 Final Thoughts Financial markets remain stressed Many global banks are experiencing wholesale funding issues We are not insulated from European stress Political will in many countries is lagging for directly addressing problems 22
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