Public Goods and Collective Action - Micah Gell

Public Goods and
Collective Action
UGA, INTL 4610
August 23-25, 2016
IPCC document portions to summarize
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Climate change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability (everyone read Context
for the AR5)
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Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of
climate change
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Natural and Managed Resources and
Systems, and Their Uses (3)
International Cooperation:Agreements and
Instruments (1)
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Human Settlements, Industry, and
Infrastructure (5)
Regional Development and Cooperation
(7)
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National and Subnational Policies and
Institutions(8)
Human Health, Well-Being, and Security
(2)
Adaptation (4)
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Multi-Sector Impacts, Risks,
Vulnerabilities, and Opportunities (6)
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Climate-resilient pathways: adaptation,
mitigation, and sustainable (9)
Purpose
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Continue defining environmental problems like a social scientist
Concept review
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Association - correlation between two variables
Causal effect - random variation in one variable produces a change in another
Variability - differences observed when a variable is measured at multiple
times/locations
Uncertainty - reflects the fact that scientific measurement and inference are
based on variable data
Confidence intervals - quantitative measurement of uncertainty
Doubt - consequence of uncertainty that can impact politics
Concepts cont’d
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Public good - good that is non-rival and non-excludable
Collective action problems - problems that arise in the provision and
maintenance of public goods; typically involve a mismatch between public and
private incentives
Tragedy of the commons - a collective action problem involving a public good
that, through overuse, becomes depleted or destroyed
Free riding - a collective action problem in which individuals choose to shirk in
providing a public good
Concepts cont’d
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Prisoner’s dilemma - a collective action problems in which actors may choose
not to cooperate, even though cooperation might yield a preferable social
outcome
Externality - a transaction in which individuals who were not party to the
transaction are affected by it
Outline
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Define public goods
Give an example of a collective action problem
Apply these two concepts to the environment
Additional collective action problems
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Free riding
Prisoner’s dilemma
Externalities
Rationale of course
Public good example: Open pasture land
Public goods defined
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Nonrival in consumption - one person’s use does not impede another’s
Nonexclusive - no one can be barred from using
Public good example - pasture land
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Nonrival in consumption - if one farmer places his animals on the land, this
does not prevent another farmer from doing so
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Note - this is true until too many animals are placed on the land
It will often be the case that the definitions apply only partially
Nonexclusive - the land is open, so no one can be barred from using the
pasture
○ Of course, one can imagine limiting access, through the use of fences, permits, etc.
What might happen to pasture land when treated as a pure public good?
Tragedy of the commons
Tragedy of the commons
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Each actor has an incentive to use the resource, because it is abundant and
access is not restricted
Resource is destroyed as a result
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Not inevitable, but likely under certain conditions
For mathematical exposition, see Hardin 1968
Examples: overfishing, the market for taxis, healthy water…
This is a type of collective action problem
Collective action problem - difficulty that arises in providing or maintaining
public goods
Review
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We know what a public good is (?)
We know what a collective action problem is (?)
We are ready to apply these concepts to the environment
Exercise
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In pairs, list four examples of public goods. At least two should be linked to
the environment.
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State precisely why the public good satisfies both definitions. Is it possible that, in some cases,
one or the other definition might not hold?
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What would it take for this public good to be provided and maintained? Can you envision any
collective action problems?
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Present to group for discussion
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Nonrival in consumption - one person’s use does not impede another’s
Nonexclusive - no one can be barred from using
Public goods examples
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Environmental quality (in general)
Air free of pollution (always non-excludable?)
The climate
Water free of pollution
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Common watershed (always non-rival? non-excludable?)
Sanitation infrastructure (non-excludable?)
Water delivery infrastructure (non-excludable?)
Protection from disease
A public park
Collective action problems defined
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Problems that arise in the provision or maintenance of public goods
Typically involve a mismatch between personal and social incentives
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When individuals pursue self-interest, the result is bad for society
Key examples for us: Tragedy of the commons, Free riding, Prisoner’s
dilemma
Free riding
Free riding
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There is a proposal to pave the roads in Athens. How much would you be
willing to contribute?
There is going to be a potluck at your work (house, club, etc.), how much
effort will you spend to make something?
Everyone who lives in your house is supposed to do some cleaning. How
much will you contribute?
Each of these refers to what will ultimately be a public good, or something
similar. Your contribution to the good is minimal, relative to the total. If you are
self-interested, you have an incentive to shirk.
The logic of collective action
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Shirking = not fulfilling one’s obligations in the provision or maintenance of a
pg
For an abstract individual, how does the incentive to shirk relate to the
number of people who benefit from the good
Free riding examples
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Example: Not vaccinating kids
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By vaccinating kids, contribute to public good of herd immunity
Any individual’s contribution is minimal
May not want to pay costs (real or perceived)
…???
Prisoner’s dilemma
Prisoner’s dilemma
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Abstraction of the incentives that shape cooperative behavior
Two actors, each with the option to cooperate or defect
If both actors cooperate they both receive a moderate benefit
If one actor defects while the other cooperates, the one who defects benefits
greatly, while the one who cooperates is punished severely
If both actors defect, both are punished
May lead to non-cooperative behavior, where cooperation could be “better”
Prisoner’s dilemma, examples
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An oil (or coffee) cartel
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If actors coordinate, they can all benefit from a higher price
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But each individual actor can gain more by defecting, and selling a higher quantity at a lower
price
Eradicating an infectious disease
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By exerting high effort, all actors can benefit from environment free of disease
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Some individual actors may prefer to forgo freedom from disease if, risk is perceived as very
low
…???
Externality
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Occur when a transaction between parties impacts individuals not involved in
the transaction
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Transaction is used here figuratively, and refers to any sort of agreement, contract or
exchange
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So the two conditions are (i) there is some transaction between parties, (ii) a person not
involved in that transaction is impacted by it
When externalities threaten public goods, they pose collective action
problems
Externality examples
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Classic example - noise
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Two people decide to get together to practice their music. What happens to the neighbors?
Does this meet the two conditions?
Solutions?
Institutions as solutions to CA problems
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Delegation (e.g. to government and its agents)
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Government provides solutions that individuals cannot
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Vaccination (prevention)
Malaria control (environmental disease reduction)
HIV treatment (therapy)
Fence around the commons
Price mechanism
Exercise: Describe a solution to each of the core collective action problems
with environmental application (in working groups)
Chain of reasoning
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Environmental quality is a public good
Public goods lead to collective action problems
The solutions to collective action problems are institutional
To study Environmental Politics is to seek understanding of the particular
collective action problems that environmental public goods give rise to, and
the particular institutional solutions that might allow society to overcome these
problems