Digital Archive
International History Declassified
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org
May 31, 1957
Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR
Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons
Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and
Consequences'
Citation:
“Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear
Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences',” May 31, 1957, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Record Group 59. Department of State Records, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Records Relating to Disarmament, 1948-1962,
box 57, 2 15d: Armaments Nuclear Fourth Countries, 1956-57.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134043
Summary:
This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the
first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states,
the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether
France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957,
Secret
Credits:
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation.
Original Language:
English
Contents:
Scan of Original Document
DECLASSIFIED
Authority ~..l.-
rI -----'----.---_
.
..
,I
~ET
-- ----- ..
-23-
I
II.
A.
PROBABLE CHINESE
CQ£IINUNIST POLICIES
r
•
'.......
1
..... ~
_-
Nuclear
'Vieapons
=
.m......
. . . . . Production
........
The above factors indicate that Peiping 11.1.11 almost certainly attempt
to initiate a weapons phase in the development of its nuclear program
during the period of this estimate.
The degree of publicity accorded this
decision will depend upon the state of international tension in the Far East
and upon relative emphasis accorded the "peace" theme in Chinese Oommurd.st,
propaganda at the tirl1e the program achieves some results.
Although Peiping
will be heavily dependent upon Soviet technical assistance, it 1'11.11 attempt
to portray the nuclear pr-ogr-am, whether described as a weapons or a power
program, as an "indj_genoustl achievement of the Chinese Conununist regime,
possibly giving on1;y- perfunctory acknowledgment to Soviet aid..
The USSR almost certainly wishes to retain its monopoly on nuclear
weapons within the bloc..
How much assistance it will give Peiping in the
actual production of weapons w-ri11 depend in large part upon progress in
achieving international control of nuclear weapons production in fourth
countries and particularly upon the prospects that Japan may produce nuclear
weapons of its om.
The Sino-Soviet agreement under
which Peiping was
supplied 'tdth a research reactor appears to indicate that Communist China,
in common with other countries supplying nuclear ores and materials to the
USSR, has some bargaining power with Hoscow on nuclear matters.
In any
event, the USSR will,Jprobably grant Peiping the necessary technical
assistance for a nuclear power program, from which Peiping may well attempt
to take off into a weapons program"
DECLASSIFIED
Authority~
r--~--- :lJ
nuclear weapons.
Present defense expenditures are resented as an
infringement on finances needed for development plans warranted only
by the need to retain a lead over Paldstan, and the diversion of resources into a nuclear weapons program would necessitate further
curtailment of economic development, and a diversion of nuclear materials
from energy to weapons production would be rej ecbed ,
Most importantly,
the possession or production of nuclear weapons would be incompatible
with many basic aspects of India IS foreign policy.
Despite the depth of Indian feeling against nuclear weapons, there
is one circumstance which might bring about a change in India's attitude
toward the possession of such weapons, i.e., their possession
neighboring states.
qy
The possession of nuclear wear::ons by Pakistan,
or India's belief that Pakistan had received or was going to receive
nuclear weapons, would very probably cause India to try to secure similar
weapons for itself.
The possession of nuclear weapons by Communist
China would be a cause of uneasiness to India, and might make India
desirous of having nuclear weapons, especially if there were increased
Chinese activity on India's borders.
A Congress Party government, although possibly vdthout Nehru during
the latter part of the period, seel,1S the most likely eventuality for
the next ten years.
As long as Nehru remains the domi.nan t figure in
India, present policies and attitudes are likely to
continue~
Should
he die or beomce ancepacatated, he would in all probability be
succeeded by either a Co,lgress government or by a Congress-Socialist
coalition.
A Congress-Socialist coaJ.ition would probably pursue policies
DEC.LASSlFlED •. 7';:'\
.
Authorjty~
r•-----.- .
l.- I
r
--------..··-.-__ ...1
~T
10
be required to hold together such a bitterly-divided nation.
The
regime might well turn to sabre-rattling and foreign adventurism,
which -ltJOuld obviously be more impresei ve if backed up by nuclear
capabilities.
ISRAEL
There is some evidence to suggest that Israel and France have an
agreement to collaborate on nuclear
:i....e search
and have for some years
actually carried on joLlt research in non-military phases.
The scope
of this agreement is not known, nor are there sufficient grounds for
making any refined estimates on the cfrcumstancee, if any" under which
France would supply Israel with the equipment, capital, and raw materials
required for nuclear i'reapons production.
It is not impossible that
France might give such assistance to Israel.
The chances are somewhat
greater that France, once in possession of nuclear weapons, might turn
over a small number of these to Israel, but permit their use on'ly with
French approval.
If the present French hostili t;)r to the Arab bloc and
close relationship with Israel continues" the most likely possibility
is that France would, with considerable and deliberate ambiguity,
threaten to collaborate militarily with Isra.el by retaliating with
nuclear weapons against any Arab capital that ordered an attack on
Israeli soil.
If Israel had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons, it
would do so.
Israel came into existence by fighting, and has perpetu-
ated itself' by fighting.
If it could come into possession of an
~T