East China Normal University
Department of Educational Management
Workshop on
Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Educational
Governance
Lecture 3 and 4
Rationality:
The Practical Foundation of Educational Management to Governance (I)
A. Practical Foundations of Educational Management and Educational
Governance:
1. Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Laureate in Economics 1978, in his book
Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) writes
“Administration is ordinarily discussed as the art of ‘getting things done.’
Emphasis is placed upon processes and methods for insuring incisive
action. Principles are set forth for securing concerted action from groups
of men. In all this discussion, however, not very much attention is paid to
the choice which prefaces all action― to the determining of what is to
be done rather than to the actual doing. …Although any practical activity
involves both ‘deciding’ and ‘doing’ it has not commonly been
recognized that a theory of administration should concerned with the
processes of decision as well as with the process of action. …The task
of ‘deciding’ pervades the entire administrative organization quite as
much as does the task of ‘doing’ ― indeed, it is integrally tied up with
the latter. A general theory of administration must include principles of
organization that will insure correct decision-making, just as it must
include principles that will insure effective action.” (Simon, 1945/1997,
p.1)
2. Accordingly, educational administration can be construed as human
capacities and efforts of “getting things done” and the “things” in point
are of course educational activities. Furthermore, in order to get things
done, Simon suggests, two principles must be insured. One is to
“decide” what is to be done and the other is to the actual doing.
3. Conceptions of action, project and agency: The capacities and efforts of
getting things done can further be divided into the following concepts
a. Action: It refers to human efforts deliberately taken by an agent
aiming at fulfilling an anticipated state of affair. It can simply be
defined as a single “in-order-to” intention and effort.
b. Project: It refers to a series of actions, which work in a
sequence of “in-order-to” intentionality. If all go well, they will
probably lead to the fulfillment of the anticipated goal.
c. Agency: It refers to a group of projects methodically organized
and undertaken by an agent or a group of agents. It
presupposes the agents in point to possess and demonstrate
the quality of knowledgeability, rationality, power and
reasonability.
i. Knowledgeability: To be knowledgeable, the agent is
supposed to have sufficient if not full knowledge of the
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action or even project to be undertaken as well the
environment (both physical and social) in which her project
is to be carried out.
ii. Rationality: To be rational, the agent is supposed to have
identified the objective to be attained, to have chosen an
effective (or even the most efficient) action plan to be
undertaken, and finally to have concrete idea and/or belief
of the chance for success.
iii. Power: Power refers to the agent’s’ capacities of controlling
and mastering the environments, in which the agent is
supposed to carry out his project. These capacities include
possibilities in mobilize both physical and social resources
which can contribute to the success of his project. At the
same, they also include ability to avoid and to contain
those factors which may hinder and/or jeopardize the
possibility of success of his project.
iv. Reasonability: To be reasonable, the agent will not only
have to be rational but must justify her actions and/or
project to be socially acceptable. In other worlds, she must
provide a normative justification to the public (both partners
and audiences) within the respective institutional context.
B. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality
1. Weber’s ideas of rationality: The concept of rationality has been
conceived by Weberians as well as sociologists in general as the
mastery concept in Weber’s work. However, “the notion of
rationality is far from unequivocal.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 1) As
Weber underlines in a footnote to The Protestant Ethnic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, “if this essay makes any contribution at all
may it be to bring out the complexity of the only superficially
simple concept of the rational.” (Weber, 1958, P. 194, n. 9; quoted
in Brubaker, 1984, P.1) In fact, it has been well documented by
Weber’s followers that Weber’s specifications of the idea of
rationality vary in his empirical studies in different domains of
modern society, such as capitalist enterprising and calculation,
legal formalism, bureaucratic administration, and asceticism and
the ethic of vocation. (e.g. Brubaker, 1984; Collins, 1981; Kalberg,
1980)
2. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality:
a. In a summary essay of Max Weber’s conception of rationality,
Stephen Kalberg’s writes “however much they may vary in
content, mental processes that consciously strive to master
reality are common to all types of rationality.” (Karlberg, 1980, p.
1159) Taking Kalberg’s conception as a point of departure, we
may conceptualize rationality as a state of mind and a mental
process, in which modern men are consciously and
methodically try to take control different domain of their lives. As
these conscious and methodical efforts of mastery spread
infiltrate into different domains in modern societies, the process
of rationalization began to take shape first in Western Europe in
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the eighteenth century.
b. A number of definitive features have been characterized by
Weber in his empirical studies of the rationalization of the
occidental societies.
i. Capitalism and calculability and controllability: Weber
underlines that the “rational capitalist establishment is one
with capitalist accounting, that is, an establishment which
determines its income yielding power by calculating
according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and the
striking of a balance.” (1961, P.207; quoted in Collins, 1981,
P927.) It implies that calculability is capitalists’ efforts of
monitoring carefully and methodically the processes and
operations of their production (i.e. the means) in attaining
their goal (i.e. profit maximization). Accordingly, capitalists
can then be able to have total control over the productive and
distributive processes. This in turn can minimize their cost
and maximize their profits.
ii. Scientific-technical development and knowledgeability: In
order to act rationally and to have exact calculation and full
control of their actions, modern men are require to possess
certain if not full knowledge of the reality that they are
supposed to master. They include “knowledge of
means-ends relations and the probable reactions of their
physical and social environment to their actions.” (Brubaker,
1984, P. 30) The institutions which provides such a
knowledge base for the growth of rationalism in modern
society are enterprises of scientific and technological
research sponsored by both public and private fund.
iii. Modern legal system and Formalism: Roger Brubaker
underlines that “modern capitalist rationality is rooted in
calculability, modern legal rationality in formalism.” (Brubaker,
1984, P. 16) By formalism, it refers to the legal and social
orders which are “bound to fixed and inviolable ‘rules of the
game’.” (Weber, 1978, P. 811; quoted in Brubaker, P. 17)
These social orders and their ‘rules of the game’ will not only
provide all their participants with formal and standard
guidelines for their calculations and actions but will also
render formal devices for settlements of conflicts.
iv. Predictability: The developments of scientific-technical
knowledge, legal formalism, and calculability and
controllability of capitalism have greatly enhanced the
certainty and predictability of modern men’s capacities of
mastery of reality. As a result, predictability has become the
core of technical efficiency in most of the domains of modern
society.
c. The Weberian concept of rationality: In summary, Weber and
his followers have construed the concept of rationality as a kind
of conscious and methodical human efforts, through which
human agents can master different aspects of reality (i.e.
external world) in knowledgeable, mans-ends calculable,
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controllable, formalized, and predictable manners. Accordingly,
when we say that a man acts rationally, we are in fact
measuring the human action in point with Weber’s conception
of an “ideal type”. That is, we are assessing the extent to which
the action has met with knowledgeability, calculability,
controllability, formality, and predictability.
3. Weber’s typology of rationality: Stephen Kalberg has summarized
Weber’s specifications of rationality into four types (1980). They
are
a. Practical rationality: It refers to the human efforts which strive to
consciously deal with reality in terms of “individual’s purely
pragmatic and egoistic interests”. (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1151) To
be practical and pragmatic, it means that a man “accepts given
realities and calculates the most expedient means of dealing
with difficulties they present.” (P. 1152) “Thus, this type of
rationality exists as a manifestation of man’s capacity for
means-ends rational action.” (P. 1152)
b. Theoretical rationality (Weber also refers it as intellectual
rationality): “This type of rationality involves a conscious
mastery of reality through construction of precise abstract
concepts rather than action.” (Kalberrg, 1980, P. 1152) This
type of rationality can most typically be found in the act of
enquiry among philosophers and scientists.
c. Substantive rationality: “Like practical rationality…, substantive
rationality directly orders action into patterns. It does so,
however, not on the basis of a purely means-end calculation of
solutions to routine problems but in relation to a past, present,
or potential ‘value postulate’.” (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1155) By
‘value postulate’, it refers to “entire clusters of values that vary
in comprehensiveness, internal consistency, and content. Thus,
this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's
inherent capacity for value-rational action.” (P. 1155) In short, it
represents human effort of striving for conscious mastery of
reality through ordering action into pattern of priority in
accordance with a set of “value postulate”, e.g. Calvinism,
Buddhism, Hinduism, communism, or socialism.
d. Formal rationality: Formal rationality can be construed as a
particular type of practical rationality, which specifically
corresponded “with industrialization: most significantly, the
economic, legal, and scientific spheres, and the bureaucratic
form of domination.”(Kalberg, 1980, P. 1158) “Whereas practical
rationality always indicates a diffuse tendency to calculate and
to solve routine problems by means-end rational patterns of
action in reference to pragmatic self- interests, formal rationality
ultimately legitimates a similar means-end rational calculation
by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or
regulations.” (P. 1158)
4. Weber’s typology of social actions:
a. On the beginning pages of Economy and Society (1978) under
the section entitled “Types of Social Action”, Weber writes,
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(Weber, 1978, P. 24-25)
“Social action, like all action, may be oriented in four ways. It
may be:
(1) instrumentally rational (purposive-rational), that is,
determined by expectations as to behavior of objects in the
environment and of other human beings; these expectations
are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the
actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends;
(2) value-rational, that is, determined by a conscious belief in
the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious,
or other form of behavior, independently for its prospects of
success;
(3) affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the
actor’s specific affects and feeling states;
(4) traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation.”
b. This typology has been interpreted by Weberians as
classification of social action by descending order in regards to
the degree of instrumental rationality.
The Typology of Action
Types of action in
descending order of
ratrionality
Subjective meanings covers the following elements:
Means
Ends
Values
Consequence
Purposive-rational
(instrumental-rational)
+
+
+
+
Value-rational
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
-
-
Affectual
Tratitional
Source: Habermas, 1984/81, p. 282
C. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Rationality and Action
1. Habermas’ critique of Weber’s conception of rationality and action:
In his two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action
(1984 & 1987) Habermas underlines that “Through his basic
action-theoretic assumptions Weber prejudice this question in
such a way that processes of social rationalization could come
into view only from the standpoint of purposive (instrumental)
rationality. I would like, therefore, to discuss the conceptual
bottleneck in his theory of action and the use this critique as the
starting point for analyzing further the concept of communicative
action.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 273) The conceptual bottleneck and
prejudice that Habermas has accursed Weber’s theory of action
mainly fall into two aspects:
a. “It conceptualizes action on the presupposition of exactly one
world of existing states of affairs and neglects those actor-world
relations that are essential to social interaction.” (Habermas,
1984, P. 274)
Within Habermas conception of “actor-world relations”, which
he adopts from Piaget’s cognitive development theory, more
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specifically Piaget’s theory of “decentration of an egocentric
understanding of world”, the concept of ‘world’ can in fact be
demarcated into “three worlds”. According to Piaget’s theory, as
a human’s cognition develop, his concept of world will
simultaneously differentiated into (1) the “subjective world” of
the Ego of a human, (2) the “objective world” which consists of
“facts”, i.e. “what he regards as existing states of affairs of the
objective world”, (3) the “social world” which consists of “certain
normative expectations”, i.e. “what he regards as legitimate
elements of the common social world.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 69)
And what has been neglected in Weber’s conception of
actor-world relation is exactly social world or in Habermas
conception the “lifeworld”.
b. “As actions are reduced to purposive interventions in the
objective world, the rationality of means-ends relation stands in
the foreground.”(Habermas, P. 274) As a result, within Weber’s
conception of rationality, there is no place for the
“communicative rationality” and “communicative action”, which
Habermas has delegated a two-volume work of nearly one
thousand pages to signify. (1984 and 1987)
2. Habermas’ conceptions of rationality
a. “When we use the expression ‘ration’, we suppose that there is
a close relation between rationality and knowledge. Rationality
has less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how
speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge. In
linguistic utterances knowledge is expressed explicitly; in
goal-directed actions an ability, an implicit knowledge is
expressed. … The close relation between knowledge and
rationality suggests that the rationality of an expression(or
action) depends on the reliability of the knowledge embodied
in it.”( Habermas, 1984, P.8)
b. “Rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking and
acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior for
which there are good reasons or ground.”(p.22)
3. Habermas’ classification of rationality
a. Cognitive-instrumental rationality
i. “A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actor
satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention
to intervene successfully in the world.”(Habermas, 1984,
p. 11) Accordingly, there are two conditions for the success
of a teleological (goal-directed) action
- Cognitive condition: True propositions of the conditions
necessary for the realization of the intervention.
- Instrumental condition: The effectiveness of carrying out
the interventions, i.e. teleological actions.
ii. Definition of cognitive-instrumental rationality: “The
concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality that has,
through empiricism, deeply marked the self-understanding
of the modern era. It carries with it connotations of
successful self-maintenance made possible by informed
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disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to, conditions of
a contingent environment.” (p.10)
b. Communicative rationality
i. “An assertion can be called rational if the speaker satisfies
the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal
of reaching an understanding about something in the world
with at least one other participant in communication.”
(Habermas, 1984, p. 11)
ii. Definition of communicative rationality: “Concept of
communicative rationality carries with it connotation based
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained,
unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative
speech, in which different participants overcome their
merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of
rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both
the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of
their lifeworld.”(p. 10)
4. Rationality and the world
a. Realist's objective world: The realist worldview “starts from the
ontological presupposition of the world as the sum total of
what is the case and clarifies the conditions of the rational
behavior on this basis. ...On this model rational actions
basically have the character of goal-directed,
feedback-controlled interventions in world of existing states of
affairs.” (1984, p. 11-12)
b. Phenomenologist's lifeworld: “The phenomenologist does
not ...simply begin with the ontological presupposition of an
objective world; he makes this a problem by inquiring into the
conditions under which the unity of an objective world is
constituted for the members of a community. The world gains
objectivity only through counting as one and the same world
for a community of speaking and acting subjects. ...Through
communicative practice they assure themselves at the same
time of their common life-relations, of a subjectively shared
lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of
interpretations presupposed by the members as knowledge.”
(Habermas, 1984, p. 12-13)
5. Communicative rationality and theory of argumentation:
a. “I believe that the concept of communicative rationality ...can
be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of
argumentation.” (1984, p. 18)
b. “We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in
which participants thematize contested validity claims and
attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An
argument contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a
systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic
expression.” (1984, p. 18)
6. Constituents of communicative rationality:
a. By bringing in the theory of argument, Habermas expands his
conceptualization of communicative rationality by asserting
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that
“Well-grounded assertions and efficient actions are certainly a
sign of rationality; we do characterize as rational speaking and
acting subjects who, as far as it lies within their power, avoid
errors in regard to facts and means-ends relations. But there
are obviously other types of expressions for which we can
have good reasons, even though they are not tied to truth or
success claims. In the context of communicative action, we
can call someone rational…
i. if he is able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized,
to provide grounds for it by pointing to appropriate
evidence,…
ii. if he is following an established norm and is able, when
criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given
situation in the light of legitimate expectation…
iii. if he makes known a desire or an intention, expresses a
feeling or a mood, shares a secret, confesses a deed, etc.,
and is then be able to reassure critics in regard to revealed
experience by drawing practical consequences form it and
behaving consistently thereafter.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 15)
b. Accordingly, Habermas has differentiated forms of
argumentation and the validity claims of the argument i.e.
constituents of communicative rationality as followings
i. Theoretical discourse: It refers to the form of
argumentations in which controversies over validity claims
of “truth of propositions and/or efficacy of teleological
actions” are thematized and if positive settled.
ii. Practical discourse: It refers to form of argumentations
undertaken in existing normative contexts or
moral-practical spheres. Accordingly, controversies over
validity claims are appealed to the “rightness” of
expressions within particular normative contexts and
moral-practical rules.
iii. Evaluative criticism: There are situations in which the
validity of an expressions is neither appealed to the truth or
efficacy in objective world nor to the rightness in normative
contexts but to specific set of value standards shared
among members of particular culture and language
communities. Habermas has specified aesthetic criticism
as the prototypical case of this form of argumentation. In
this form of argumentation the adequacy of the set
standard of values to be used will be asserted, criticized,
debated and if possible accepted.
iv. Therapeutic critique: In the case of private and/or
self-presenting expressions, their validity claims will be
based on the truthfulness and sincerity of the speakers.
The prototypical case of therapeutic critique, which
Habermas specifies, is critique employed by
psychotherapists in to distinguish their clients’
self-deceptive and/or illusive utterances from truthful
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and/or sincere expressions.
v. Explicative discourse: It refers to “a form of argumentation
in which the comprehensibility, well-formedness or
rule-correctness of symbolic expressions is no longer
naively supposed or contested but is thematized as a
controversial claim.” (1984, p.22)
Types of Argumentation (Constituents of Communicative Rationality)
Reference
Dimensions
Problematic
Controversial
Forms of
Expression
Validity Claims
Argumentation
Theoretical Discourse
Cognitive
Truth of propositions;
Instrumental
efficacy of teleological
action
Practical Discourse
MoralRightness of norms of
Practical
action
Aesthetic Criticism
Evaluative
Adequacy of standards
of value
Therapeutic critique
Expressive
Truthfulness or sincerity
of expressions
Explicative Discourse
--------Comprehensibility or
well-formedness of
symbolic constructs
Source: Habermas, 1984, p. 23
7. Habermas’ typology of action: Based on his theory of
communicative rationality and action, Habermas asserts that
“The theory of communicative action can make good the
weakness we found in Weber’s action theory, inasmuch as it
does not remain fixated on purposive rationality as the only
aspect under which action can be criticized and improved.”
(Habermas, 1984, P. 332) Accordingly, he reformulates the
typology of action into
a. Teleological action:
i. By teleological action, it refers to that “the actor attains an
end or brings about the occurrence of desired state by
choosing means that have promise of beings successful in
a given situation and applying them in a suitable manner.”
(Habermas, 1984, P. 85)
ii. Moreover, “the teleological model of action is expanded to
a strategic model when there can enter into the agent’s
calculation of success the anticipation of decisions on the
part of at least one addition goal-directed actor.” (P. 85)
iii. Accordingly, The rationality, upon which the critiques and
defenses of teleological and strategic actions are based, is
their truth and effectiveness claims. In Habermas’ own
words, “teleological action can be judged under the aspect
of effectiveness. The rules of action embody technically
and strategically useful knowledge, which can be criticized
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in reference to truth claims and can be improved through a
feedback relation with growth of empirical-theoretical
knowledge.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 333)
b. Communicative action:
i. It “refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable
of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations
(whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors
seek to reach an understanding about the action situation
and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions
by way of agreement.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 86)
ii. Accordingly, the rationality of communicative action is
made up of not only the truth claim of the content of the
referents involved in the exchanges between participants,
but also the comprehensibility of the utterances made, the
mutual understanding thereby reached, and the
coordination subsequently sustained.
c. Normatively regulated action:
i. It refers “to members of a social group who orient their
action to common values. The individual actor complies
with (or violate) a norm when in a given situation the
conditions are present to which the norm has application.
All members of a group for whom a given norm has validity
may expect of one another that in certain situations they
will carry out (or abstain from) the action commanded (or
proscribed).”(Habermas, 1984, P. 85)
ii. Accordingly, the rationality working behind normatively
regulated action and supporting its validity claims is “the
moral-practical rightness” of the norms which are applied to
the situation at point.
d. Dramaturgical actions:
i. It refers to “participants in interaction constituting a public
for one another before who they present themselves. The
actor evokes in his public a certain image, an impression of
himself, by more or less purposefully disclosing his
subjectivity. …Thus the central concept of presentation of
self does not signify spontaneous expressive behavior but
stylizing the expression of one’s own experience wit a view
of the audience.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 86)
ii. “Dramaturgical actions embody a knowledge of the agent’s
own subjectivity. These expressions can be criticized as
untruthful, that is reject as deceptions or self-deceptions.”
(Habermas, 1984, P. 334) Hence, the rationality behind this
type of action is the claim of truthfulness.
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D The Instrumental-rational Perspective in Administration and Policy
Studies:
1. The concept of instrumental and technical rationality
a. The concept of rationality: Rationality can be defined as conscious
and knowledgeable ways human beings approaches and even
masters the world around them. Rationality therefore is a state of
mind and a way of life, in which human beings strive to master their
physical and even their social environments.
b. The concepts of instrumental and substantive rationality
i. Instrumental rationality refers to conscious and knowledgeable
process through which human beings calculate and choose the
most expedient means to achieve preconceived and/or
predetermined end.
ii. Substantive rationality refers to conscious and knowledgeable
process through which human beings decide the ends most
worthy of achieving.
c. The instrumental-technical turns in policy studies
i. Policy scientists who adhere to value-neutral or even value-free
method of inquiry advocate that substantive choice of policy
end are political decisions and should be left to politicians.
ii. Accordingly, they contend that policy scientists should confine
themselves to the technical issues of choosing the best, or
more specifically the most cost-effective policy instruments or
means to attain the “politically” pre-determined ends.
2. Instrumental-rational perspective in policy studies
a. Following the conclusions drawn from analytic-positivist policy
studies, the next task to be performed by policy analysts is to work
out, if possible to the last technical details, the action plan to carry
out the policy measures. Hence, it is a task guarded by instrument
and technical rationality.
b. Assumptions of comprehensive (technical) rational model in policy
studies: (Forester, 1989, Pp. 49-54)
i. The agent/actor: A single decision-maker (or a group of fully
consenting decision makers) who is a utility-maximizing,
instrumentally rational actor
ii. The setting: Analogous to the decision-maker’s office, “by
assumption a closed system”
iii. The problem: Well defined problem, “its scope, time horizon,
value dimensions, and chains of consequences are clearly
given” and close at hand.
iv. Information: Assumed to be “perfect, complete, accessible, and
comprehensible.”
v. Outcome: A single best solution or the most optimum resolution
E. Criticism and Revisions on Instrumental-rational Perspective in
Administration and Policy
1. Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality
a. Simon’s defines that “rationality denotes a style of behavior (A) that
is appropriate to the achievement of a given goals, (B) within the
limits imposed by given conditions and constraints.” Simon, 1982,
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p.405)
b. The concept of satisfice: Simon differentiates two stances in regard
to (A), i.e. the degree of “appropriateness to goal achievement.
i. Maximizing or optimizing stance of the “economic man”: “While
economic man maximizes - selects the best alternative from
among all those available to him”
ii. Satisificing stance of the “administrative man”: “Administrative
man satifices - look for a course of action that is satisfactory or
‘good enough’. (Simon, 1957, p. xxv)
c. The concept of bounded rationality: In regard to (B), Simon
indicates that “It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated
individual to rearch any high degree of rationality. The number of
alternatives he must explore is so great, the information he would
need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to
objective rationality is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes
place in an environment of ‘givens’ – premises that are accepted
by the subject as base for his choice; and behaviour is adaptive
only within the limits set by these ‘givens’.” (Simon, 1957, p. 79; my
emphasis)
Simon specifies limitations imposed by the environment of givens
are
i. Limitation of the knowledge
- Incomplete and fragmented nature of knowledge,
- Limits of knowledge about the consequences, i.e.
predictability of knowledge
ii. Limitations of the cognitive ability of the decider makers
- Limits of attention
- Limits on the storage capacity of human mind
- Limits of the learning ability of human beings, i.e. observation,
communication, comprehension, ….
- Limits on changes of status quo, i.e. human habits, routine,
mind set, …
- limits on organizational environments.
2. Dahl and Lindblom’s conception of rational calculation
a. Limitations and difficulties in means-end rational calculation
i. Information deficiency: Relevant or even essential information
to the means-end rational calculation may be incomplete,
unavailable, difficult to obtain, …
ii. Communication problem: Available information may not be able
to be dissimulated to all decision-making parties or the
information may appear to be difficult to comprehend.
iii. The number of variables involved is too many to be exhausted.
vi. The complexity of the relations among variables is too
complicated to be comprehended not to mention exhausted.
b. Scientists’ solutions to cognitive deficiency in means-end rational
calculation
“Scientists deal with the problem of information by systematic
observation, with the problem of communication by developing a
precise and logical language usually including the language of
mathematics; with the problems of an excessive number of and
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complex relations among variables by specialization, controlled by
experiment, quantification, rigorous and system analysis, and
exclusion of phenomena not amenable to these methods.” (Dahl &
Lindblom, 1992, p. 78) In summary, these methods include
i. Codification: Method of reducing and unifying numerous,
complicated and disorderly information into comprehensible
units
ii. Quantification: Method of quantifying information and units into
comparable values.
iii. Sampling: Selectively analyzing a fragment, a specimen of the
phenomenon under observation.
vi. Observations in control situations or by randomization.
v. Modeling: Model “is a purposeful reduction of a mass of
information to a manageable size and shape, and hence is a
principal tool in the analyst’s work-tool. Indeed, we will be
employing models throughout this book.” (Stokey & Zeckhauser,
1978, p.9)
3. Choices under calculated risk
a. Risk can be construed as “the residual variance in a theory of
rational choice” (March, 1994, p. 35) or more specifically, the
unexplained variance in a causal modeling equation. It is basically
grown out of the epistemological constraints of the scientific
means-end rational model.
b. Therefore, “calculated risks are often necessary because scientific
methods have not yet produced tested knowledge about the
probable consequences of large incremental changes…and
existing reality is highly undesirable.” (Dahl & Lindblom, 1992, p.
85)
c. Growing industry for risk estimation and risk management in public
policy
4. Charles Lindblom’s science of muddling through
Charles Lindblom agrees with Simon on the limitations of human
rationality, yet Lindblom diagnoses that the sources of these limitations
are more than the cognitive capacity of human mind. He suggests that
limitations are integral parts of the very process of policy making.
Lindblom characterizes this process as “successive limited
comparison” and “muddling through”.
a. “Incrementalism is a method of social action that takes existing
reality as one alternative and compares the probable gains and
loses of closely related alternatives by making relatively small
adjustments in existing reality, or making larger adjustments about
whose consequences approximately as much is known as about
the consequences of existing reality, or both.” (Dahl & Lindblom, p.
82)
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b. Lindblom’s two models of decision-making
1a
2a
3a
4a
5a
Rational comprehensive
Successive limited comparison
Clarification of values or
1b Selection of values, goals and
objectives distinct from and
empirical analysis of the needed
usually prerequisite to empirical
action are not distinct from one
analysis of alternative policies
another but are closely intertwined
Policy formulation is therefore
2b Since means and ends are not
approached through means-ends
distinct, means-ends analysis is
analysis: first the ends are
often inappropriate or limited
isolated; then the means to
achieve them are sought
The test of a ‘good’ policy is nthat 3c The test of a ‘good’ policy is typically
it can be shown to be the most
that various analysts find themselves
appropriate means to desired
directly agreeing on a policy (without
ends
their agreeing that it is the most
appropriate means to an agreed
objective)
Analysis is comprehensive; every 4b Analysis is drastically limited:
important relevant factors is
a. important possible outcome are
taken into account
neglected;
b. important alternative potential
policy are neglected;
c. important affected values are
neglected
Theory is often heavily relied
5b A succession of comparisons greatly
upon
reduces or eliminates reliance on
theory
5. John Forester’s typology of bounded rationality (see Table 4)
a. Bounded rationality I: Cognitive limits
b. Bounded rationality II: Social differentiation
c. Bounded rationality III: Pluralist conflict
d. Bounded rationality IV: Structural distortions
Additional References
Collins, Randall. (1981) "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism:
Systematization." American Sociological Review 45(6): 925-942.
Kalberg, Stephen (1980) “Max Weber’s types of Rationality: Cornerstones for
the Analysis of Rationalization Process in History.” American
Journal of Sociology, 85 (5): 1145-79.
Brubaker, Roger (1984). The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social
and Moral Thought of Max Weber. London: George Allen & Unwin.
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