The relationship between the errortheory of the self and the theory of
consciousness in Yogācāra School
NCCU, graduate student
Lin Fang-Min
Introduction
• Jonardon Ganeri (2012) ,The self : naturalism,
consciousness, and the first-person stance, argues a
possible solution to the tension between the self
viewed from first personal experiences and the self
viewed from third personal observations. In doing so,
he borrows the Buddhist theories of consciousness and
mind to establish a certain type of self.
• For those who were familiar with Buddhism in general,
this does seem to be a strange move to take. Buddhists
state that the idea of the self is like an illusion, which
should not appear in the mind of the wise. Thus by
analyzing the mental activities, the Buddhist theories
of consciousness are trying to explain the self away.
Introduction
• In order to borrow the Buddhist theory without
fall into the unwanted consequence of explaining
the self away, Ganeri claims that the error-theory
of the self is independent of the theory of the
consciousness in Buddhism.
• That is to say, for Ganeri, the Buddhist analysis of
consciousness does not necessary lead to the
conclusion that the idea of self is erroneous. Thus
he claims that he can use the former freely
without accepting the latter.
• Ganeri even considers this claim as one of his
contributions.
Ganeri’s project
Ganeri proposed that the self has three dimensions:
1) The underself is “the subpersonal monitoring of
the mental states. To own the underself is to
gain the “relation of unconscious access to the
content” of one’s mind;
2) The immersed self is the “first-person
presentation in the content of consciousness”.
To own the immersed self is “referring to a
phenomenologically present tense of mineness”;
3) The participant self is “habitation of a firstperson stance”. To own the participant self is to
be able to engage the world with the pulls and
demands of emotion and intention.
The immersed self
• Ganeri’s idea of the immersed self is borrowed
from the famous eight consciousness theory of
the Yogācāra School:
• The first five consciousness are from five sense
organs (eyes, nose, etc.);
• The sixth is the consciousness of self-awareness
(in the sense that it takes self as its object);
• The seventh is the afflicted-consciousness ;
• The eighth is the repository‐consciousness, which
is the storage room for one’s metal files.
Afflicted-consciousness
• The seventh consciousness, afflictedconsciousness (kliṣṭa-manas), according to Ganeri,
is the key feature of the immersed self. Without it,
the first six consciousness will not be able to
recognize its content as mine.
• The items of the seventh consciousness, or the
“mineness‐markers” as Ganeri puts it, are “what
makes it possible for me to have a first‐person,
rather than merely a third‐person, view on my
mental life.”
Afflicted-consciousness
• Since the afflicted-consciousness is the base of the first
six consciousness, which we are more aware of than
the other two consciousness, Ganeri called it primitive
and pre‐attentive mode of self‐awareness, which is
different from explicit self‐ascription.
• The explicit self‐ascription is the product of the sixth
consciousness, mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna),
which is thought and expressed through our ordinary
language.
• In Ganeri’s understanding, Vasubandhu claims that
there is an error involved in the “transformation of
basic self‐awareness into explicit self‐ascription”
The error-theory
• For Ganeri, this error-theory can be established
only when it “rests on a prior commitment to the
non‐existence of a subject of experience.”
• That is, Vasubandhu assumes that the word “I” is
a referential use of an expression, and since it
doesn’t refer to an actual experiencing subject,
the transformation is erroneous.
The error-theory
• Therefore, Ganeri claims that Yogācāra’s theory of
consciousness and the error-theory are two separate
theories which need different argument to support,
and thus one need not to accept both at the same
time:
• “in every case, Buddhist thinkers do two things at
once: they provide a constructive analysis of the
immersed self, and they associate with it an
error‐theory.
• It is important to retain a clear grasp of the
distinction between these two dimensions in the
Buddhist project.” (Ganeri 2012:147)
The truth of the self?
• However, what Buddhist thinkers do at once
are not just two things, but three; the
description of Buddha’s mental activities is
neglected by Ganeri.
• That is to say, Buddhists did not tell people
that they are wrong without indicating the
truth of the self.
For example…
• It would sound really strange when one says
that Hume’s analysis of self is independent of
the error-theory of self.
• Thus, we cannot accept that the self is nothing
but a bundle of perception without also admit
that the idea of self in ordinary usage is wrong.
The theory and the truth
• In other words, the truth of the self is justified
by the analysis/theory of self .
• Thus, if Ganeri and Vasubandhu both claimed
the same theory of consciousness, then their
conclusion about the truth of the self should
be the same. If the latter is not the case, then
the former is also not.
First twist
• The first twist Ganeri made can be found in his
difficulty to comprehend the error-theory.
• For Ganeri, the afflicted-consciousness is itself
correct. Thus his question is that how then, can a
correct primitive self-awareness become false
after transformation?
• For Vasubandhu, however, the idea of the self
caused by the afflicted-consciousness is itself
already not telling the truth. Thus the
transformation of a false self-awareness is also
false.
What is the self?
• Nevertheless, one can still ask: why the
afflicted-consciousness is false?
• The answer has to do with the following
question: what does the self in the primitive
“self”-awareness refer to?
Ganeri’s explanation
• In Ganeri’s explanation, the self refers to the
phenomenologically mineness.
• However, he didn’t explain that who is “mine” in
the phenomenologically mineness.
• Actually, it is unfair to ask Ganeri what the self
refers to, since his position is that the self is not
referential.
• Ganeri took the mineness, and thus the self, for
granted, and claimed that it needs no further
explanation.
• On the other hand, this is exactly what
Vasubandhu trying to show in his error-theory.
Vasubandhu’s analysis of the
self
• Unlike Ganeri, Vasubandhu’s analysis of the self did
not stop here. He continues to claim that the true
reference of the self/mineness is the
repository‐consciousness.
• However, Vasubandhu further explains that one
should not consider the repository-consciousness is
the self in the ordinary sense.
The target of the error-theory
• The repository‐consciousness is a stream of
consciousness. Thus, even though the mineness
feeling appears both in the first and second moment
all belongs to the same stream, they are two
different consciousness, i.e., they are not numerical
identical.
• Nevertheless, people somehow always thought that
these two mineness always refer to the same thing,
the self.
• The true target of Vasubandhu’s error-theory is this
kind of self, rather than the “transformation”.
The self identity
• Thus, the notion of phenomenologically mineness is
actually acceptable for Vasubandhu, as long as
Ganeri didn’t claim that the two mineness refer to
the same thing.
• However, since for Ganeri the mineness is so
fundamental and cannot be further explained, he did
not even mention a word on self identity.
• This is the key difference between Ganeri and
Vasubandhu. Ganeri abandons Vasubandhu’s errortheory by rejecting any detailed explanation of the
self.
Second twist
• Ganeri claims that without the afflicted-consciousness,
the subject of the experiences will only has a thirdperson view on its own mental states.
• However, for Vasubandhu, the afflicted-consciousness
is never intended to explain the first-person stance.
• The primitive self-awareness is not about the first or
the third-person viewpoint, but about the subject of
the experience.
• Therefore, in the experiences of the awakened, who
don’t have any kind of self-awareness, there is no such
thing as subject (and thus its duality with object), not
to mention the third-person view on its experiences.
Without the afflicted-consciousness
• What this explanation tells about the truth of the
self is that,
• People always thought that there is a subject who
own the experiences, and this subject is the socalled self.
• However, there are only experiences in the end.
Both the subject (whether it possesses a firstperson stance or a third-person stance) and the
object aspect of experience is an imagination
caused by the afflicted-consciousness.
Conclusion
• My purpose is to argue against Ganeri on the subject
of whether the error-theory of the self and the
theory of consciousness in Yogācāra School are two
separate theories.
• A theory of consciousness must tell us the truth
about consciousness through its analysis.
• Ganeri’s theory of self, however, did not try to find
out the truth through the analysis. Instead, he claims
that the self is so fundamental that it cannot be
explained.
• He thus claims that Vasubandhu’s further analysis is
“another” theory which has nothing to do with the
theory of consciousness.