2011 OECD REPORT ON DIVISION OF LABOUR:
ADDRESSING CROSS-COUNTRY FRAGMENTATION OF AID
November 2011
2011 OECD REPORT ON DIVISION OF LABOUR:
ADDRESSING CROSS-COUNTRY FRAGMENTATION OF AID
NOVEMBER 2011
This report examines cross-country fragmentation and proposes targets for reducing aid
fragmentation based on the most recent verified ODA data of the year 2009. The preliminary key
findings of this analysis were discussed in a DAC technical workshop of aid allocation specialists in
October 2010. Based on these key findings and discussions, this report has been finalised and is
submitted as background material for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness with a
view to inform the HLF4 debate on aid allocations and fragmentation.
Contact:
Fredrik Ericsson, tel +33 (0) 1 45 24 19 65 [email protected]
Hanna-Mari Kilpeläinen, tel +33 (0) 1 45 24 76 23, [email protected]
Suzanne Steensen, tel +33 (0) 1 45 24 76 23 [email protected]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................................3
How is aid fragmentation measured? ...........................................................................................................4
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT TRENDS IN AID FRAGMENTATION? .....................................................7
Where does fragmentation occur?................................................................................................................7
Who are the “fragmenters”?.........................................................................................................................9
What is the estimated impact of donors‟ concentration decisions? ...........................................................10
How fragmented are multilateral agencies? ...............................................................................................12
WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO REDUCE FRAGMENTATION? – A POSSIBLE TARGET ...................15
What is the potential for rationalisation? ...................................................................................................15
What could be done?..................................................................................................................................15
CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................................................19
ANNEX A: COUNTRY PROGRAMMABLE AID .....................................................................................21
ANNEX B: MATRIX OF INDIVIDUAL DONOR-PARTNER COUNTRY AID RELATIONS ...............23
Tables
Table 1.
Table 2.
Table 3.
Table 4.
Table 5.
Table 6.
Table 7.
Table 8.
Fragmentation ratio by region .................................................................................................8
Fragmentation by income group ..............................................................................................8
Fragmentation ratio in fragile and conflict affected states ......................................................9
DAC countries' concentration ratio .......................................................................................10
Impact of number of donors by announced aid exits .............................................................11
Impact of planned aid exits on number of DAC donors and CPA ........................................12
Multilaterals' concentration ratio ...........................................................................................13
Scenario for reaching DAC average concentration ratio .......................................................16
Figures
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009) ..................................................5
Opportunities for concentration (2009) ...................................................................................7
Distribution of aid relations ...................................................................................................15
Boxes
Box 1. Scoring significance of aid relations and concentration and fragmentation ratio ............................5
BACKGROUND
1.
Developing countries1 differ greatly in their paths to development and in the challenges they
face, but at least in one respect, many share a common problem: too little aid from too many donors.
This paper addresses this challenge, which is often referred to as fragmentation of aid across countries.2
2.
The fragmentation of aid poses critical challenges to the effectiveness and impact of development
co-operation. This fact was acknowledged in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which
called for a pragmatic approach to division of labour to increase complementarity and decrease transaction
costs. The Accra Agenda for Action (2008) broadened the scope to international division of labour across
countries and committed donors to using existing channels for aid delivery before creating separate new
channels.
3.
Aid fragmentation is partly due to the current lack of concerted and co-ordinated aid allocation
practices. Each donor, bilateral and multilateral, has its own priorities and incentives framework. Donors
also decide unilaterally which countries and which multilateral organisations and global programmes to
fund. In general, they do not take into consideration the allocation decisions of other donors when making
their own. In addition, different aid extending agencies within donor countries may have different project
or programme practices and procedures that could be perceived as separate “donors” at country level. The
complex and un-co-ordinated nature of aid allocation patterns not only creates gaps in terms of the varying
supply of aid between developing countries (which inevitably results in some countries receiving
significantly less aid than others), but also overlaps in terms of the number of donors present at country
level, some of which contribute relatively small amounts.
4.
Fragmentation of aid entails transactions costs both for donors and partner countries. For donors,
aid relations incur some fixed transaction costs, irrespective of programme or project size. These include
costs associated with maintaining a minimum in-country professional presence and with different phases of
the project or programme cycle, including identification and planning, negotiations and consultations with
relevant stakeholders as well as monitoring, reporting and evaluation of interventions. At the country level,
a large number of donors with different and often uncoordinated management practices3 (i.e. in the absence
of lead donor arrangements) places a heavy burden on the administrative capacity of partner governments.
The assumption is that this administrative burden can be reduced and donors can achieve efficiency gains
when rationalising their overall donor-partner country aid relations.
5.
In recent years, several donors have also taken decisions to concentrate their aid on fewer partner
countries. One reason behind these decisions is to rationalise aid to achieve better results. However, some
of these decisions may also have been brought forward by increased fiscal austerity as a result of the
economic and financial crisis.
1.
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any
territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city
or area.
2.
It is different from fragmentation of aid within countries, usually measured by donor spread across many
sectors at country level and small project size.
3.
Knack, S. and Rhaman, A. (2007), „Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients‟.
3
6.
This work provides the evidence base to reduce fragmentation of aid by updating the landscape
of donor-partner country aid relations4. It analyses the financial dispersion of donor allocations and does
not take into account the non-financial value of donor-partner country relations, for example knowledge
transfer and diplomatic relations. This 2011 edition of the report on fragmentation is the third report in the
series.5 The first, published in 2008, informed the decisions taken in Accra on cross-country fragmentation
and under-aided countries, where the signatories of the AAA committed to “… reduce the fragmentation of
aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among countries and
the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources […] across
countries.”
7.
The 2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour provided insights as to where it might be possible
to further rationalise the number of donors in each partner country. To this end, it proposed a methodology
to score the significance of donor-partner country aid relations in financial terms and presented indicators
for monitoring fragmentation and concentration (see Box 1). The proposed methodology has been widely
discussed since the report was published, and there is growing consensus in the international community
on using these measures.
8.
This report provides an update on cross-country fragmentation based on the methodology
presented in the 2009 report. The updated analysis is based on 2009 data of Country Programmable Aid
(CPA)6 and examines the most recent trends in aid fragmentation. The report also includes information on
potential impact of donors‟ recent actions to concentrate their aid on fewer partnerships. The last section
examines the potential options for rationalisation and proposes possible targets for reducing fragmentation.
How is aid fragmentation measured?
9.
The global matrix of aid relations – defined as the sum of all aid activities by a donor country or a
multilateral agency in one country – shows an increasingly complex picture (see Annex B). Today, there
are globally slightly fewer than 4 000 pairs of donor/country aid relations in the landscape including all
DAC members and major multilateral agencies. This is just the tip of the iceberg, and excludes the aid
relations of the remaining 200-plus multilateral organisations, emerging donors and other non-DAC
donors. Furthermore, many donors have more than one agency providing aid, which is not taken into
consideration in this overall analysis, and which adds to the complexity of the aid architecture.
10.
For this analysis, the same country-level threshold introduced in the 2009 OECD Report on
Division of Labour is applied for bilateral donors. Only donor/country aid relations above USD 250 000
are included in the analysis, in order to remove the “noise” generated by very small aid relations, further
referred to as “micro-aid relations”7. These micro-aid relations often take the form of non-project technical
co-operation, which includes activities such as scholarships, volunteers and trainees and minor grants
channelled through NGOs or multilateral organisations, and usually does not bring about any significant
4.
An aid relation is defined as the sum of all aid activities by a donor or a multilateral agency in a country.
Aid relations are measure by country programmable aid (CPA), i.e. aid that is attributed to a specific
country and programmed in advance. For more information on CPA, see Annex A.
5.
The previous reports are available on www.oecd.org/dac/scalingup.
6.
The 2009 data are the most recent figures available ahead of HLF4. In this report, unless otherwise stated,
the figures are in 2009 US dollars. The data cover 46 donors: 23 DAC countries and 23 major multilateral
agencies, covering development banks, global funds and major agencies of the United Nations (UN). Note
that the European Commission (referred to as EU Institutions) is considered in this report as a multilateral
donor.
7.
Without applying a threshold, there were 3860 aid relations between 46 donors and 152 partner countries in
2009. Of this total, 603 were micro-aid relations, resulting in 3257 aid relations being examined in this
analysis applying the threshold.
4
transaction costs.8 Nevertheless, micro-aid relations represent 16% of all aid relations (per partner country
on average 4 aid relations), but correspond to only USD 50 million or 0.1% of all global CPA.
11.
In 2009, the average donor was present in 71 out of 152 ODA-eligible countries (73 for DAC
countries and 69 for multilateral agencies). From the partner country perspective, the average number of
donors present in each country was 21 (11 DAC countries and 10 multilateral agencies). However, it is
important to note that there are large variations across regions. Countries in Asia and Africa have the
highest number of donors present (on average 26 and 24 donors per country respectively), while the small
island states in the Americas and Oceania lower the averages of these regions (17 for Americas and 8 for
Oceania). The map in Figure 1 provides the foundation for analysing fragmentation by illustrating the
number of donors present across countries.
Figure 1. Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009)
9
12.
The methodology used to measure fragmentation of aid assesses the financial significance of
each aid relation in the context of the growing concern of having too many donors contributing too little in
too many countries. This methodology was developed in 2009 and is summarised in box 1 below. A more
comprehensive background on the methodology can be found in the 2009 OECD Report on Division of
Labour.
Box 1. Defining significance of aid relations and concentration and fragmentation ratios
The rationale: When considering the significance of an aid relation, it is important to examine both the donor and
partner country perspectives. The policy inference is that where aid relations are neither significant from the donor’s
point of view, nor from the recipient’s point of view, there is a rationale to revisit these aid allocations.
Definitions
“Significance” of an aid relation: An aid relation is considered significant in financial terms if we can answer
“yes” to at least one of the following questions:

Q1: Does the donor provide a higher share of aid to the partner country than the donor’s overall share of
global aid?
8.
The threshold of excluding aid relations below the level USD 250 000 is only applied to bilateral donors, as
these types of activities are not applicable to most multilateral donors.
9.
These maps are for illustrative purposes and are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any
territory covered by these maps.
5

Q2: Is the donor among the largest donors that cumulatively account for at least 90% of the partner
country’s aid?
In Question 1, there is a bias towards smaller donors based on the fact that they are usually involved in fewer
partner countries, which makes it less difficult for them at country level to exceed their global share of aid. In contrast,
Question 2 includes a bias towards larger donors, for which it is less difficult to be among the top donors that
cumulatively provide 90% of aid volume at the partner country level. By combining these two criteria both the small and
large donor biases are taken into consideration.
Concentration ratio: Defined from a donor’s point of view, the overall aim is a concentrated portfolio with
significant partner country aid relations. On this basis, the concentration ratio measures the number of donors’
significant aid relations compared to all of its aid relations. The higher the concentration ratio, the less a donor’s
portfolio is fragmented.
Fragmentation ratio: Defined from a partner country point of view, the aim is to maximise the number of
significant donor relations and minimise the number of non-significant relations. On this basis, the fragmentation ratio
measures the number of non-significant donors compared to the overall number of donors. The lower the
fragmentation ratio, the less fragmented are the donors’ aid programmes in that country.
These two indicators are complementary at the global level, since the sum of the global concentration and
fragmentation ratios are one.
Source: OECD (2009).
13.
It is important to acknowledge that aid relations that score as non-significant in financial terms
can be well-targeted and have significant impact at the country level. Nevertheless, these aid relations
necessarily come with important transaction costs, and therefore some rationalisation may be worthwhile
to reduce transaction costs on both ends of the delivery chain.
6
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT TRENDS IN AID FRAGMENTATION?
Where does fragmentation occur?
14.
The global fragmentation ratio is 40%, meaning that two out of every five donor-partner country
relations are non-significant. The fragmentation at the global level stems mostly from bilateral sources,
since nearly half (45%) of bilateral aid relations are non-significant compared to one-third (34%) of
multilateral aid relations respectively. Figure 2 illustrates the proliferation of non-significant aid relations
across countries.
10
Figure 2. Opportunities for concentration (2009)
15.
Countries shaded dark blue present the greatest opportunities for rationalisation and efficiency
gains, and therefore merit particular attention. These countries are mostly located in Africa and Asia with
12 or more non-significant aid relations and an average fragmentation ratio of 55%, meaning over half of
all donor relationships in that country are non-significant.
16.
From 2004 to 2009, the average donor reporting in both years expanded its aid portfolio by three
aid relations, of which nearly all additional relations were considered non-significant. Since commitments
made in the Paris Declaration, fragmentation has increased in all regions except the Americas.
17.
Most recent data show that from 2008 to 2009, the number of partner countries with 12 or more
non-significant aid relations has increased from 40 in 2008 to 44 in 2009. This can be read as a slight
increase in the overall fragmentation ratio. Aid recipients in Europe, Asia and the Americas experienced
further increases in fragmentation, while fragmentation in Africa and Oceania stagnated or decreased
slightly, as shown in Table 1.
10 .
These maps are for illustrative purposes and are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any
territory covered by these maps.
7
Table 1. Fragmentation ratio by region
Significant Non-significant
Total
Fragmentation
For Reference
relations
relations
relations
ratio
A
B
(A+B)
2008 2004
B/(A+B)
Europe
11
145
116
261

44%
39% 43%
Africa
55
850
484
1334

36%
36% 33%
America
34
394
200
594

34%
32% 35%
Asia
36
491
446
937

48%
46% 46%
Oceania
16
85
46
131

35%
38% 24%
Global
152
1965
1292
3257

40%
38% 38%
Note: Green upward arrow illustrates a change toward less fragmentation, red downward arrow a change
towards more fragmentation and yellow horizontal arrow no change in fragmentation between 2008 and
2009.
Number of
countries
18.
The most extreme case of fragmentation in terms of a large number of donors providing –
relatively speaking – little aid remains Iraq (92%) as identified in last year‟s report. One donor (United
States) provided nearly 90% of all CPA, while 25 other donors altogether provided 10% of the total CPA
to Iraq in 2009.11 In India and Pakistan, three donors provided 75% of all CPA, while nearly thirty
provided cumulatively less than 10% of total CPA in 2009. In India, this pattern has been steady since
2000 with the three largest donors (IDA, Japan and UK) regularly providing more than 70% of total CPA,
while the overall number of donors providing the remaining 30% continues to increase. From a country
perspective, this introduces two sets of challenges. Firstly, managing the “long tail” of relatively small
donors imposes additional costs. Secondly, there are risks associated with relying on only a few donors for
the bulk of aid.
19.
When examining fragmentation across country income groups (Table 2), lower-middle income
countries (LMICs) continue to face the highest fragmentation ratio, which has remained roughly at the
same level since 2004.12 While upper-middle income countries (UMICs) have relatively fewer donors
operating in their countries (on average 14 in 2009), LMICs traditionally have a few large donors that
provide the majority of aid, but they also have a “long tail” of several donors providing the relatively small
remainder of aid. Since several bilateral donors have started to phase out aid relations in countries that are
moving into a higher income group, the fragmentation ratio in middle-income countries as a whole may
decrease over the next few years.
Table 2. Fragmentation by income group
Fragmentation
Significant Non-significant
Total
For Reference
ratio
relations
relations
relations
A
B
(A+B)
B/(A+B)
2008 2004
LICs
61
985
557
1542

36%
34% 33%
LMICs
48
590
531
1121

47%
46% 46%
UMICs
43
390
204
594

34%
35% 33%
Global
152
1965
1292
3257

40%
38% 38%
Note: Green upward arrow illustrates a change toward less fragmentation, red downward arrow a change
towards more fragmentation and yellow horizontal arrow no change in fragmentation between 08 and 09.
Number of
countries
20.
The most worrying trend is seen in low-income countries (LICs) with the least institutional
capacity to manage an increasing number of financially less-significant actors. More than 80% of all LICs
have experienced an increase in the number of donors since 2004, and in some countries the number of
11 .
Iraq received USD 2.2 billion in CPA in 2009. Excluding CPA from the United States, Iraq received USD
232 million from the remaining 25 donors, roughly the same level of aggregate CPA that was extended to
Moldova (USD 233 million) or Ecuador (USD 236 million) in the same year.
12 .
See Annex B for a complete list of fragmentation ratio by partner country.
8
donors has increased by more than 50%.13 This has resulted in an increase in the fragmentation ratio in
LICs from 33% in 2004 to 36% in 2009, representing an increase in the number of non-significant aid
relations per country from 7.2 to 9.1. Even more severe is the rapid increase in the fragmentation ratios of
fragile and conflict-affected states14. Between 2004 and 2009, the increase in the number of non-significant
donors in fragile and conflict-affected states was three times higher than the increase in non-fragile states.
The average number of non-significant donors in fragile states increased from 8.0 in 2004 to 10.6 in 2009,
while the average number of non-significant donors in non-fragile states “only” increased from 7.1 to 7.7.
Table 3. Fragmentation in fragile and conflict affected states
Number of
countries
Significant Non-significant
relations
relations
A
B
Total
Fragmentation
For Reference
relations
ratio
(A+B)
B/(A+B)
2008 2004
Fragile and/or conflict
41
622
436
1058

41%
39% 36%
affected states
Non fragile states
111
1343
856
2199

39%
38% 38%
Global
152
1965
1292
3257

40%
38% 38%
Note: Green upward arrow illustrates a change toward less fragmentation, red downward arrow a change
towards more fragmentation and yellow horizontal arrow no change in fragmentation between 08 and 09.
21.
In the case of fragile states, it may be useful to also consider humanitarian aid. Adding
humanitarian aid into the equation, one could expect a change in the fragmentation ratios, but these do not
change significantly and similar trends are observed since 2004. The 2009 fragmentation ratios for both
fragile and non-fragile states are one percentage point lower (40% for fragile states and 38% for nonfragile states) when including humanitarian aid than when only considering CPA. While the fragmentation
ratio that includes humanitarian aid has been stable for non-fragile states since 2004, it has increased by
four percentage points in fragile states during the same time period.
Who are the “fragmenters”?
22.
To engage in a process of improved cross-country division of labour, it is important to examine
how donors allocate their aid. As mentioned earlier, the fragmentation problem originates to a large extent
from bilateral sources of aid. The average concentration ratio of DAC countries has slightly decreased to
55% in 2009 from 56% in 2008. However, there are still wide variations between donors around this
average. Germany, Japan and the United States are significant in more than 80% of their aid relations,
while Canada and several Nordic Plus donors are significant in less than 40% of their relations. Table 4
presents the 2009 concentration ratio for DAC countries.
It could be expected that bilateral donors would be more significant in their so-called “priority
23.
partner countries”, as defined by the donors themselves and where donors have declared a special focus
and a long-term engagement. Yet, 2009 CPA figures show that in cases where priority countries are
designated, close to one-fifth (19%) of DAC donors‟ relations with these priority partner countries were
non-significant. While eight donors were significant in all their priority countries (concentration ratio
13 .
Between 2004 and 2009, the number of donors has decreased in 11 LICs: Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Lesotho, Korea, Dem. Rep., Malawi, Mauritania, Sao Tome & Principe, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and
Uzbekistan. During the same period, the number of donors has increased by more than 50% in Central
African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti and Liberia.
14 .
These are countries classified as fragile and/or conflict-affected states according to the working definition
of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and this is not an official DAC list or
definition. This list compiles various measures for fragility, such as the World Bank CPIA bottom two
quintiles and Fund for Peace Failed States Index. See OECD (2011b), “Ensuring Fragile States are not left
Behind” (forthcoming).
9
100%) six donors – namely Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Korea, Spain and Switzerland – were nonsignificant in 25% or more of their priority partner countries (concentration ratio 75% or less).
24.
While DAC donors‟ concentration ratio deteriorated between 2008 and 2009, it is nevertheless
important to note that many donors have taken measures to reduce their overall number of partner
countries. Because phasing out from a partner country is a long process, the impact of planned aid exits on
overall fragmentation is difficult to estimate. Despite limitations to producing validated figures, the next
section presents the geographic distribution and provides initial estimates of the financial impact of donors‟
decisions to rationalise aid on fewer partnerships, based on CPA figures for 2009.
Table 4. DAC countries' concentration ratio
(Countries sorted by 2009 concentration ratio)
DAC countries
Ja pa n
Uni ted States
Germa ny
Aus tri a
Greece
Portuga l
New Zea l a nd
Aus tra l i a
Fra nce
Netherl a nds
Swi tzerl a nd
Korea
Bel gi um
Spa i n
Uni ted Ki ngdom
Sweden
Ital y
Luxembourg
Norwa y
Denma rk
Fi nl a nd
Irel a nd
Ca na da
Total bilateral
Significant
relations
Non-significant
relations
(2009)
Concentration
ratio
A
B
A / (A+B)
112
106
91
24
21
12
19
28
62
37
33
33
21
52
43
38
38
19
36
29
27
17
18
916
19
23
21
6
9
6
14
24
56
36
33
36
23
60
51
46
53
29
58
48
45
29
37
762
85%
82%
81%
80%
70%
67%
58%
54%
53%
51%
50%
48%
48%
46%
46%
45%
42%
40%
38%
38%
38%
37%
33%
55%
(2009)
Concentration ratio
in priority partner
countries
For reference
(2008)
Concentration
ratio
A / (A+B)
n.a.
n.a.
96%
100%
78%
100%
88%
75%
65%
82%
73%
54%
89%
72%
100%
86%
62%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
68%
81%
77%
82%
78%
86%
67%
63%
77%
41%
56%
58%
46%
50%
48%
59%
44%
54%
46%
50%
37%
36%
40%
56%
30%
56%
1
0
1
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
0
-1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
Note: Japan and the United States do not use the concept of priority partner countries.
The countries highlighted above are the countries above the DAC countries’ average.
The coloured arrows on the right hand side of the table illustrate whether the concentration ratio has
increased between 2008 and 2009 (Green upward arrow illustrates a change toward more concentration,
red downward arrow a change towards less concentration and yellow horizontal arrow no change in
concentration between 2008 and 2009.).
What is the estimated impact of donors’ concentration decisions?
25.
In the past four years, many donors have taken decisions to rationalise aid portfolios by
concentrating their aid on fewer partner countries. By now, nearly all DAC EU donors have decided to
reduce the number of partner countries in which they operate. At the same time, high growth rates in
10
developing countries have resulted in reduced global poverty and graduation from low- to middle-income
status for many countries, especially in South and Far East Asia. Together, these forces are contributing to
a continuously evolving aid allocation landscape and to a re-distribution of aid that reflects rapid changes
in the global economy. This evolving situation underlines the importance of producing comprehensive
analysis on aid allocations in order to support better informed decision making on future aid allocation
decisions by all development actors.
26.
The 2011 OECD Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans collected information on planned
donor exits in future years.15 Information was received from 12 DAC EU countries with a total expected
number of 162 exits, or an average of 13.5 exits per donor. Acknowledging that phasing out of a partner
country is a long process with a gradual decline in aid volume, the potential impact of these decisions was
simulated using 2009 CPA levels. From a partner country perspective, it is generally not the largest donors
in terms of aid volume that are planning to phase out. However, it is worth noting that while a given donor
may not provide large aid volumes in terms of aggregate aid to a country, it may nevertheless represent a
significant proportion of aid directed to a certain sector or area with only a few donors present. Therefore,
also phase outs of such aid programmes can have a significant impact at country level.
27.
There seem to be positive signs that planned exits are focusing on non-significant aid relations.
More than half of all donors‟ planned aid exits are taking place in countries where the aid relation was
considered to be non-significant in 2009, but again with large variations across the regions. In Africa and
Asia, two-thirds of all aid relations to be phased out were non-significant, whereas in Europe and in the
Americas, two-thirds of all planned aid exits concern significant aid relations. No DAC EU donor has
announced that it will phase out aid operations from Oceania, a region with a traditionally limited presence
of European donors.
Table 5.
Europe
Africa
America
Asia
Oceania
Global
Impact of planned aid exits on significant relations
Total number of
planned exits
Total number of
planned exits for
significant relations
26
67
23
46
19
22
14
17
162
-
Total number of
planned exits for
non-significant
relations
7
45
9
29
-
72
90
Significant relations
as share of all
planned exits
73%
33%
61%
37%
0%
44%
28.
In total, these 162 aid relations, which are planned to be phased out, represented 8% of DAC EU
global CPA in 2009. Europe is the region most affected by these rationalisation decisions, with 25% of all
DAC EU aid relations to be phased out in the next few years. This is not surprising given that many of
these are upper-middle income countries, of which some are also already negotiating future membership in
the European Union. In terms of volume, CPA from DAC EU countries to Europe and the Americas is
expected to decrease by 16% (measured at 2009 CPA levels) as a result of donors‟ phase out decisions.
The survey also shows that nearly 17% of all DAC EU aid relations in Africa are expected to be phased out
in the next few years, corresponding to 6% of all CPA from DAC EU countries going to Africa in 2009.16
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis.
15 .
Planned exits covered all years from 2011 to 2015.
16.
These basic estimations do not take into account possible scenarios whereby other donors increase aid to
these countries and/or donors phasing out increase their aid to other countries in the region.
11
Table 6.
Impact of planned aid exits on number of DAC donors and CPA
Average number of
DAC countries per
partner country
Europe
Africa
America
Asia
Oceania
Global
14.7
12.0
8.3
14.4
3.5
11.0
Average number of Average number of
DAC EU countries
DAC EU exits per
per partner country partner country
9.4
7.3
4.8
8.6
1.4
6.6
2.4
1.2
0.7
1.3
1.1
Total CPA
Total CPA
provided by
provided by DAC
DAC countries
EU countries
2,586
17,673
5,012
24,670
1,156
51,097
1,332
10,068
2,209
6,928
128
20,665
Total CPA of
DAC EU exits
208
581
358
605
1,752
How fragmented are multilateral agencies?
29.
On average, multilateral agencies have a higher concentration ratio than DAC countries. Many
agencies have a regional mandate, which limits their aid allocations to a specific region, and results in
relatively high concentration of funds in a limited set of partner countries. Regional development banks fall
into this category, and often are among the largest donors in a country. Multilateral agencies with global
mandates or specific thematic mandates, including many UN agencies and global partnerships and
programmes have the lowest concentration ratios among the multilaterals.
30.
Despite the relatively good performance of multilateral donors compared to bilateral donors, the
concentration ratios of multilateral donors decreased between 2008 and 2009. In 2009 some agencies
widened the scope of their operations. This can be attributed to the multilateral crisis response initiative,
and their expansion to address global public goods.
12
Table 7. Multilaterals' concentration ratio
(Donors sorted by 2009 concentration ratio)
Multilateral donors
IADB
UNRWA
Ca rDB
IDA
EU i ns titutions
AfDF
IMF
Nordi c Dev.Fund
UNTA
IAEA
UNFPA
Gl oba l Fund
UNAIDS
IFAD
GEF
Montrea l Protocol
GAVI
Ara b Agenci es
UNDP
As DF
UNICEF
Total Multilaterals
Significant
relations
Non-significant
relations
(2009)
Concentration ratio
For reference
(2008)
Concentration
ratio
A
B
A / (A+B)
A / (A+B)
25
4
13
69
124
32
30
16
107
68
75
59
66
44
68
7
38
51
75
21
57
1049
0
0
1
11
25
7
7
4
37
28
43
35
41
30
48
5
29
40
59
17
63
530
100%
100%
93%
86%
83%
82%
81%
80%
74%
71%
64%
63%
62%
59%
59%
58%
57%
56%
56%
55%
48%
66%
96%
100%
100%
90%
88%
87%
84%
73%
69%
69%
62%
64%
70%
69%
63%
61%
60%
62%
58%
49%
45%
68%
1
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
Note: The coloured arrows on the right hand side of the table illustrate if concentration ratios
increased between 2008 and 2009 (Green upward arrow illustrates a change toward more
concentration, red downward arrow a change towards less concentration and yellow horizontal arrow
no change in concentration between 08 and 09). The donors highlighted are the donors above the
multilateral average.
The Arab agencies include: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Islamic Development Bank
and OPEC Fund.
The Global Fund provides financing to the health sector only. Therefore, Global Fund disbursements
may still represent a significant contribution to the health sector even if the overall country relation is
classified as non-significant.
31.
Within the limit of multilateral agencies‟ mandates, governing board decisions on aid allocation
to different clients should seek to ensure that these agencies are significant in the partner countries where
they are present. Where this is not possible, it is important to ensure that the funding
channels/arrangements are such that the administrative burden is kept to a minimum for all parties
involved. Recent efforts by multilateral development banks and UN agencies to consolidate activities are a
positive step in this direction.
32.
The way in which multilateral agencies are funded also has implications on overall aid
fragmentation.17 Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members channel most (81%) of their multilateral aid
17.
For
further
information
see
the
2011
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/61/49014277.pdf
13
DAC
Report
on
Multilateral
Aid.
into five main clusters of multilaterals. They are the EDF-plus-EU budget (37%), IDA (21%), UN Funds
and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund
(6%). Only 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining multilateral organisations which number over
200 and often provide technical assistance or serve norm- or standard-setting purposes. In addition, many
bilateral flows earmarked for specific countries, regions, sectors and themes transit through multilateral
agencies, are increasing and can contribute to the increasing fragmentation of aid at the country level.
14
WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO REDUCE FRAGMENTATION? – A POSSIBLE TARGET
What is the potential for rationalisation?
33.
Multilateral agencies have global or regional mandates and rely on their governing bodies for
allocation decisions, so they can less easily withdraw their aid to partner countries to further concentrate
their aid. For this reason, the focus of this section is limited to non-significant bilateral relations. However,
it is important to mention that all actors have the opportunity to rationalise aid within their own aid
portfolio and make greater use of joint financing arrangements.
34.
The global fragmentation ratio was 40% in 2009, including both bilateral and multilateral
agencies. Bilateral donors‟ non-significant aid relations alone represent 23% of all aid relations. These 762
bilateral donor-partner country relations amount to USD 2.9 billion or about 3% of global CPA. The
average non-significant bilateral aid relation represents only USD 3.8 million per year, compared to an
average of USD 52.6 million for a significant bilateral aid relation.
Figure 3. Distribution of aid relations
Total number of aid relations (2009)
916
(28%)
1,579
(49%)
Total CPA of aid relations (2009)
Significant DAC country aid
relations USD 34.2 bn
Non-significant
DAC country aid
(40%)
USD 48.2 bn
relations
(57%)
Multilateral aid relations
Significant DAC country aid
relations
Non-significant DAC country aid
relations
Multilateral aid relations
762
(23%)
USD 2.9 bn
(3%)
What could be done?
35.
There is no single ideal concentration or fragmentation level per donor or partner country. It is
important to emphasise that the degree by which an aid relation is non-significant varies.18 Therefore, there
is no “one” solution and all non-significant aid relations merit close attention. The objective of this analysis
is to provide the necessary evidence to spark discussions on fragmentation and to incite donors to review
their aid portfolios with a view to increasing the number of significant aid relationships and decreasing the
number of non-significant ones. This should ideally lead to reduced transaction and administrative costs
both for donors and partner countries and, ultimately, contribute towards increased effectiveness of aid
delivery and strengthened development results at the country level.
18 .
Some non-significant aid relations fall far from being significant from both donor and partner country
perspectives, whereas other relations are closer to being significant according to at least one of the
perspectives.
15
36.
One possible way to pursue this objective within the DAC would be to increase the
concentration ratio of the 16 DAC countries that presently score below the DAC average. To guide
changes in this direction, relative targets could be introduced so that donors could for example strive to
reach the current DAC average concentration ratio. Donors above this current average could aim to
improve their concentration ratio without a fixed target. Theoretically, there are two basic approaches to
achieve this: either phase out or scale up existing non-significant aid relations.
37.
It takes time to phase out aid programmes and projects, and to ensure predictability and
sustainability it needs to be done in close consultation with the partner country and other donors. At the
same time, it is important to appreciate that in many cases existing Memorandum of Understandings
(MoUs) and contracting arrangements may already be determined. Assuming that the average donor‟s
project and/or programme cycle is 4-5 years, the DAC could set a realistic target date of 2015 to achieve
progress on cross country allocations.
38.
Following the phasing out approach to pursue these relative targets, and based on 2009 data, 16
donor countries would need to reduce their number of non-significant aid relations in order to reach the
DAC average concentration ratio. This is illustrated in Table 8, assuming that the number of significant aid
relations is fixed.
Table 8.
Bilateral donors
Ja pa n
Uni ted States
Germa ny
Aus tri a
Greece
Portuga l
New Zea l a nd
Aus tra l i a
Fra nce
Netherl a nds
Swi tzerl a nd
Korea
Bel gi um
Spa i n
Uni ted Ki ngdom
Sweden
Ital y
Luxembourg
Norwa y
Denma rk
Fi nl a nd
Irel a nd
Ca na da
Total/average for all DAC
countries
Total/average for countries
below DAC average
Number of
partner
countries
(2009)
Scenario for reaching DAC average concentration ratio
New concentration
Reduction in number of nonratio
significant aid relations to reach
Current
(if all donors are above
DAC
average
concentration
ratio
concentration
or at the DAC average
(assuming the number of
ratio
Financial impact of reallocation
significant relations is fixed)
concentration ratio of
55%)
Amounts
reallocated
(in USD
million)
As percentage
of donor
portfolio
131
129
112
30
30
18
33
52
118
73
66
69
44
112
94
84
91
48
94
77
72
46
55
85%
82%
81%
80%
70%
67%
58%
54%
53%
51%
50%
48%
48%
46%
46%
45%
42%
40%
38%
38%
38%
37%
33%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-4
-5
-6
-9
-6
-17
-15
-14
-21
-13
-28
-24
-23
-15
-22
85%
82%
81%
80%
70%
67%
58%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
24
20
19
23
12
109
46
69
50
11
146
76
29
12
168
0.4%
0.6%
1.2%
4.0%
4.7%
2.6%
4.5%
1.2%
6.2%
8.9%
6.2%
11.5%
6.1%
8.7%
3.4%
16.3%
1678/73
55%
(-222/-10)
63%
(-819/-36)
1.6%
1195/75
44%
-222/-14
55%
-819/-51
3.9%
39.
Table 8 shows that the theoretically necessary reduction in the number of non-significant aid
relations varies significantly across donors. For Canada, this refers to 22 aid relations to reach the DAC
average, whereas for Australia this is limited to just one aid relation. Altogether, these 222 non-significant
aid relations under scrutiny for the purposes of this analysis represent USD 819 million or 3.9% of the
16
respective donors‟ aggregated CPA in 2009.19 The effect of having all bilateral donors achieve at least the
current DAC average concentration ratio would be a rise in the overall concentration ratio from 55% to
63%.
40.
However, the other option to increase donors‟ concentration ratio would be to scale up aid to
non-significant aid relations. Theoretically, assuming that the total number of aid relations (i.e. partner
countries) is fixed, close to USD 500 million in additional resources would be required for the 16 donors
currently below the DAC average to raise their concentration ratios up to this level. This would represent
an average increase in aid budgets of 2% per donor.
41.
In addition to phasing out and scaling up non-significant aid relations, other forms of joint donor
arrangements could reduce transaction costs for partner countries, including joint programming, delegated
cooperation, and joint financing arrangements. There could also be other targets than the DAC average,
such as absolute or relative targets, to be adopted to incite change and to indicate milestones over the next
years. In addition to raising donor countries up to the DAC average, all donors could aim to increase the
significance of their aid relations in priority partner countries – where these are defined – so as not to have
any non-significant aid relations with countries selected as focus countries by the donors themselves.
19.
Following this theoretical approach, by phasing out these aid relations these resources would be freed and
could be reallocated to other aid relations. This approach does not require increases in overall aid
envelopes.
17
CONCLUSIONS
42.
To stimulate the international dialogue on cross-country division of labour, it is important to
examine where donors allocate their aid, assess progress in reducing fragmentation, and propose solutions.
This paper takes stock of changes in the financial significance of aid relations between 2004, 2008 and
2009 and presents possible targets to reduce fragmentation of aid provided by DAC donors.
43.
Aid fragmentation is still increasing, especially in low-income countries and fragile states. This is
disturbing since these countries have the least administrative capacity to manage a large number of nonsignificant donors. For middle-income countries, aid fragmentation remains high, but has not worsened
since 2004, and may even decrease as donors rationalise their aid portfolios, specifically in countries that
are achieving higher income levels.
44.
Fragmentation stems to a large extent from bilateral sources. DAC countries‟ average
concentration ratio is still decreasing, but with wide variation across donors. Many DAC countries are
significantly reducing their number of partner countries, including non-significant aid relations; however,
the result of these rationalisation decisions will only be visible in aid statistics reported in the next few
years. For some donors, increased efforts are needed in order to ensure that their cooperation with priority
partner countries constitute significant aid relations. Multilateral agencies can also support efforts to ensure
financially significant aid relations and to minimise transaction costs for all development partners.
45.
In the current context of fiscal austerity, it is important to maximise efficient aid provision and
minimise the burden imposed on recipient countries. Two out of five DAC countries‟ aid relations are nonsignificant. These aid relations represent in total USD 2.9 billion or only about 3% of global CPA. Phasing
out these aid relations could theoretically enable reallocating this CPA to significant interventions to
enhance scale and impact. Such reallocation would assumedly also bring about savings in transaction costs
for both donor and partner country administrations. As an alternative approach to phasing out nonsignificant aid relations, DAC donors could seek to scale up these relations over time.
46.
There are no “ideal” concentration or fragmentation levels per donor or partner country. From a
partner country perspective, improved choice and risk diversification resulting from multiple partnerships
should be balanced against extra transaction costs, specifically those stemming from the “long tail” of
small additional donors. The most important objective is to bring about steady change in some of the least
efficient aid allocations practices. This can be done by setting relative targets, where for example donors
below DAC average could commit to reach the current DAC average concentration ratio, and those already
above the average could commit to improving their existing levels without a fixed target. Such a
commitment could have the target date of 2015, by which at least some significant progress should be
demonstrated. As a minimum, the donor community should stop further aid fragmentation and
progressively strive to reduce fragmentation in line with mutually agreed targets.
47.
Bilateral donors are concentrating aid on fewer partnerships, and many partner countries are now
faced with donor exits. Concentration strategies are typically inward-looking processes, involving very
little co-ordination with other donors or with the partner country governments. Globally these unilateral
decisions do not necessarily lead to improved cross-country allocations if they are un-co-ordinated. To
improve cross-country aid allocations, the international development community should draw on
systematic and regular analysis of fragmentation with the aim to support cooperation and dialogue among
development actors and, ultimately, to inform aid allocation decisions by all donors.
19
ANNEX A: COUNTRY PROGRAMMABLE AID
The methodology of country programmable aid (CPA) was first discussed at the DAC Workshop
on Scaling up for Results and Aid Allocations in February 2007. It was developed in collaboration with
members when defining the coverage of the DAC 2007 Survey on donors‟ aid allocation policies and
indicative forward spending plans. This recent statistical concept is the basis of the DAC work on past and
future aid allocations.
In brief, CPA identifies the subset of total ODA susceptible to programming at country level and
for which donors generally prepare multi-year forward expenditure plans. CPA is defined through
exclusion, by subtracting from total gross ODA aid activities that:
(i) are unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief);
(ii) entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of
development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries);
(iii) do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid from
local governments); or
(iv) are not country programmable by the donor (core funding of NGOs).
CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these are not usually factored into aid allocation
decisions. CPA is also a good proxy for what is recorded at the country level, and thus can be useful for
partner country use. Total DAC CPA is estimated at USD 55 billion in 2009 and represents 58% of DAC
countries‟ gross bilateral ODA.
Historical data series are derived from the standard DAC and CRS statistics. CPA data by donor
and recipient was derived retroactively from 2000 onwards, and is available online on www.stats.oecd.org
and for full download in excel or text format on our webpage at www.oecd.org/dac/cpa.
CPA data is more robust starting in 2007 compared to earlier years due to improved quality in
donors' reporting to the CRS activity database. In addition, since then the DAC Secretariat has worked
closely with some members to refine the derivation of CPA to better reflect each donor‟s specificities and
practices. Box A2.1 shows the technical description of the derivation of CPA.
For a more comprehensive description of the CPA concept, please refer to the development brief
on CPA, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/51/45564447.pdf
21
Table A1.1: CPA of DAC members in 2009
Bilateral
ODA
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total bilateral
Debt relief
of which share of:
Humanitarian aid
Other non-CPA
and refugees in
items and
donor country
unallocated
CPA
%
CPA
USD million
2 312
517
1 664
3 182
1 941
791
8 588
8 360
297
693
1 053
13 150
616
266
4 957
226
3 168
312
4 873
3 013
1 761
7 599
25 992
0%
11%
7%
2%
0%
0%
20%
2%
0%
0%
17%
1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
1%
1%
3%
1%
9%
1%
1%
14%
16%
13%
18%
12%
18%
5%
6%
14%
15%
15%
5%
3%
16%
13%
4%
21%
0%
15%
22%
28%
10%
22%
16%
52%
50%
43%
19%
30%
26%
36%
35%
31%
13%
12%
12%
16%
48%
24%
32%
22%
25%
31%
30%
36%
16%
70%
21%
31%
38%
69%
52%
49%
56%
52%
55%
55%
82%
86%
68%
37%
72%
46%
77%
57%
46%
33%
54%
61%
USD million
1 623
107
515
1 204
1 342
412
4 171
4 675
153
382
581
10 737
527
181
1 850
163
1 461
240
2 797
1 378
574
4 102
15 732
95 332
3%
14%
15%
58%
54 905
22
ANNEX B: MATRIX OF INDIVIDUAL DONOR-PARTNER COUNTRY AID RELATIONS
23
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Least developed countries
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo. Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Kiribati
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Number of partner countries
Number of significant relations
Number of non-significant relations
Concentration ratio (in %)
CPA (USD million)
Average CPA (USD million)
Donors’ share of global CPA (in %)
1 Column 1
Row
Partner countries
Number of significant relations
13
22
21
22
14
23
23
24
14
20
8
16
14
9
16
20
16
14
14
13
5
21
17
19
20
19
3
Number of non-significant relations
24
5
8
8
6
8
7
9
8
5
5
18
7
1
8
16
6
6
6
14
3
11
4
5
7
8
4
Fragmentation ratio (in %)
65
19
28
27
30
26
23
27
36
20
38
53
33
10
33
44
27
30
30
52
38
34
19
21
26
30
5
CPA (USD million)
5263
264
1639
639
126
985
413
692
179
259
44
1668
123
30
93
2886
126
171
131
867
27
420
129
324
378
672
6
Grand total
United States
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
0.6
1.8
2.3
6.4
0.0
37.2
6.8
0.5
0.6
0.0
3.1
0.6
0.1
0.3
-
0.1
3.0
0.5
7.7
0.8
0.1
6.5
0.0
0.1
-
3.0
2.8
0.3
1.0
1.0
0.7
1.2
0.9
9.7
1.5
1.4
1.4
2.8
8.0
9.6
3.7
0.2
2.4
0.1
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
2.7
1.1
0.3
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.1
0.8
0.0
0.3
0.7
0.6
0.1
1.6
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.8
2.2
0.0
5.9
7.3
1.9
3.7
10.0
12.6
33.1
1.1
28.8
6.2
0.6
1.2
0.4
9.9
4.6
3.4
4.3
0.1
20.2
-
4.7 0.3 0.0 1.0 4.9 0.5
1.8 - 2.2 1.9 10.7
3.5 - 0.4 6.0 0.9
6.2 - 0.2 2.7
- 18.9 0.2
4.2 - 0.4 4.2
3.8 - 0.7 3.6
4.2 - 0.1 0.1 17.9 2.4
1.3 - 0.2 0.3 0.9
6.5 0.6 - 0.4
2.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.1
- 3.0 14.6 - 0.5 9.3
1.9 0.0 1.2 1.8 2.0 0.1
5.0
9.4 - 10.6 - 0.6 4.6
0.5 - 0.1 1.8 0.0
- 25.2 5.8 - 0.2 0.2 21.9 5.9
3.5 - 12.5 2.8 - 2.7 0.8 3.5
3.5 - 0.5 5.0 0.1
4.0 - 2.4 0.2 4.3
-
0.0
0.2
1.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
1.7
0.2
-
1.9 0.1 1.9 0.2 1.3 1.2 0.3 6.0
0.2 - 6.4 5.5 9.4 0.6 - 1.7
4.3 - 1.1 - 0.3 2.4 1.2 15.1
6.6 - 0.2 0.1 1.6 - 0.3 3.1 3.0 - 1.4 6.3 - 0.1 - 0.3 2.4 2.1 4.0 - 5.6 - 0.7 0.6 1.2 3.1
- 0.4 0.7 - 4.0 3.4 0.4 4.7
- 0.4 - 1.0 1.1 - 0.4 0.4 0.3 - 3.6 0.8 - 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.5 0.2 7.0
- 0.7 - 0.4 - 0.4 - 63.2 0.9 - 7.0 - 1.5 1.5 1.7 - 1.2 - 1.6 1.1 - 9.5
0.6 - 1.6 0.6 - 3.0
- 0.5 - 0.3
- 8.4 6.5 - 0.5 - 15.0 - 0.2 - 18.8 - 0.2 0.7 - 0.3 4.3 2.3 0.1
- 0.8 - 7.5 0.3 - 3.7
- 4.7 - 0.7 5.9 0.4 8.4
0.1 - 1.8 - 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.1 - 9.4 - 1.3 0.7 - 15.4
53.1
16.2
3.6
9.2
3.5
3.8
10.1
9.3
1.0
0.8
4.6
4.7
0.5
9.0
1.5
16.3
0.9
24.3
1.2
18.9
30.9
15.7
11.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- % --------------------------------------------------------------------------------100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
83.5
61.1
46.5
44.3
41.9
37.7
37.1
63.7
23.4
27.8
33.8
29.0
52.6
69.3
22.8
35.0
12.9
47.9
26.4
55.7
81.2
58.1
47.8
63.9
48.8
52.7
%
52 30 44 55 77 72 118 112 30 46 91 131 69 48 73 33 94 18 112 84 66 94 129 3257 1678
28 24 21 18 29 27 62 91 21 17 38 112 33 19 37 19 36 12 52 38 33 43 106 1965 916
24
6 23 37 48 45 56 21
9 29 53
19 36 29 36 14 58
6 60 46 33 51
23 1292 762
54 80 48 33 38 38 53 81 70 37 42 85 48 40 51 58 38 67 46 45 50 46
82
60
55
1465 85 469 1031 1237 337 3944 4087 117 354 55610569 495 172 1711 132 1269 230 2406 1110 481 3851 14989 85299 51097
28
3 11 19 16
5 33 36
4
8
6
81
7
4 23
4 14 13 21 13
7 41
116
561
30
1.7 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.4 0.4 4.6 4.8 0.1 0.4 0.7 12.4 0.6 0.2 2.0 0.2 1.5 0.3 2.8 1.3 0.6 4.5 17.6 100.0 59.9
23
14
16
14
9
15
16
19
9
11
2
20
7
2
10
20
8
7
8
12
3
18
8
13
13
14
No.
No. of DAC countries
Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the
CPA to that partner country)
DAC countries
Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.
37
27
29
30
20
31
30
33
22
25
13
34
21
10
24
36
22
20
20
27
8
32
21
24
27
27
2
Number of donors
Table B.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
– coverage: DAC countries
Multilateral agencies
16.5
38.9
53.5
55.7
58.1
62.3
62.9
36.3
76.6
72.2
66.2
71.0
47.4
30.7
77.2
65.0
87.1
52.1
73.6
44.3
18.8
41.9
52.2
36.1
51.2
47.3
%
1579
1049
530
66
34203
22
40.1
14
13
13
16
11
16
14
14
13
14
11
14
14
8
14
16
14
13
12
15
5
14
13
11
14
13
No.
No. of multilateral agencies
15
30
22
36
22
34
28
35
12
15
33
30
10
22
33
37
21
21
7
32
9
24
32
29
32
37
13
26
29
33
19
27
22
37
28
29
19
28
21
33
30
29
21
34
28
21
19
28
30
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Yemen
Zambia
Other low-income countries
Cote d’Ivoire
Ghana
Kenya
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Kyrgyz Republic
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
Zimbabwe
Lower-middle-income countries
Albania
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Cameroon
Cape Verde
China
Colombia
Congo, Rep.
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
15
10
10
17
18
20
19
13
12
9
16
13
19
12
12
17
22
11
16
12
9
11
17
17
13
23
12
19
17
24
17
19
22
20
10
13
23
17
2
17
18
18
16
15
6
22
7
16
18
14
9
18
4
15
10
10
8
22
19
5
6
9
18
17
15
15
2
10
17
24
8
10
5
24
5
3
11
5
12
5
15
6
15
2
2
10
13
8
5
15
19
5
6
1
10
2
8
14
791
1527
1506
25
278
1650
2701
436
381
188
4039
326
33
913
221
1863
172
863
368
868
79
24
903
388
206
165
872
2813
195
215
17
1535
103
379
1198
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.7
-
1.7
0.3
0.6
0.1
5.0
8.3
1.3
0.2
0.1
0.5
1.2
0.0
7.4
3.0
0.2
0.8
0.7
4.3
5.1
2.8
0.7
- 0.0 0.1
0.0 - 5.7
0.2 0.1 1.0 0.6
0.0 - 0.8
0.8 - 0.6
68.7 0.2 - 0.5
1.5 - 0.4 0.7
5.4 0.2 - 1.4
5.4
0.2
3.8
0.9
0.0
20.7
81.0
0.4
0.1
30.5
26.2
0.1
38.7
0.1
0.5
5.8
3.6
0.3
1.9
0.1
1.7
5.0
22.4
2.0
5.6
4.2
5.0
3.2
0.3
0.8
5.2
2.0
3.8
0.6
6.0
0.9
3.9
0.1
0.8
1.9
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.2
2.2
2.1
0.1
0.1
0.4
2.3
0.2
1.9
0.2
0.2
1.9
2.0
4.0
3.4
0.4
0.1
1.2
0.6
3.9
0.7
6.8
12.0
1.3
0.4
0.0
12.8
0.1
5.4
10.3
0.1
0.6
0.3
13.8
1.0
5.9
1.2
0.2
1.6 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
3.5 - 0.1 0.1 3.5 0.2 4.5 - 0.1 0.3 4.9 0.3 0.0
2.1 - 3.7
6.4 5.6 0.3 1.1 - 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.1 1.7 0.0 - 0.1 5.2 0.0 0.0
0.3 2.6
5.0 - 0.1 4.3
16.1 - 22.0 4.4 2.2 0.0 0.5 0.2 34.9 1.5 0.3
4.9 - 1.2 0.2 1.8 0.4 0.6
0.0
0.0
2.9
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.8
9.0
1.2
0.6
1.3
0.4
0.8
0.2
0.4
7.5
-
3.4
0.1
42.4
16.3
0.3
1.4
1.1
0.5
0.4
0.0
0.2
1.6
0.4
0.8
0.5
1.7
17.1
2.8
5.7
4.0
2.5
4.5
4.3
0.3
2.7
1.3
0.6
3.8
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.8
0.1
3.6
3.6
2.7
0.1
2.1
0.5
3.8
3.2
0.4
5.2
5.4
0.1
1.4
0.1
0.3
6.4
2.8
3.3
2.3
0.2
2.7
0.1
1.6
0.1
0.7
0.0
10.1
5.6
0.4
2.7
1.0
0.4
-
1.0
1.0
2.6
2.0
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.3
0.8
-
10.7
1.8
11.2
4.5
6.0
2.6
14.8
1.2
1.7
6.6
2.0
15.4
27.3
9.6
12.6
1.7
19.9
22.2
5.8
18.4
10.1
0.5
13.8
19.7
15.2
9.1
1.7
21.0
1.9
68.6
1.8
22.8
23.9
34.4
8.3
9.7 9.5
6.1 28.2
14.8
2.9 16.7
11.3 21.5
6.3 16.0
0.1 0.6
1.0
7.1
1.0 6.3
2.2 2.0
26.1 16.6
1.2
2.9
14.2
9.5
0.8
10.3
0.1
20.7
13.3
19.0
7.4
5.6
8.1
5.7
2.5 - 0.3 - 4.3 3.2 3.4 0.7
- 26.6 - 0.6
0.5 - 0.5 - 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2
- 1.9 - 0.3 - 2.6 0.7
6.1 - 1.0 - 9.4 4.5 2.4 0.1
5.5 - 4.6 1.7 10.5 9.1 5.2 2.8
- 0.1 - 1.7 0.1 0.2 0.3
3.6 - 19.9 11.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 3.8 0.3 0.1 3.1
2.8 - 1.2 - 12.6 2.1 0.4 0.2
- 1.5 1.0 - 0.2 - 9.6 0.7 - 0.7 - 12.4 0.2 1.5 1.6 - 0.1 - 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.3
6.4
1.2
1.9
0.3
1.4
0.1
1.1
2.7
- 13.8 - 1.5 4.8 - 0.4 2.8 0.0 2.3 8.4 - 1.4
4.3 - 1.2 3.5
- 0.3
5.8 - 3.2 1.2 2.1 0.0 - 5.3 - 4.1
2.0 - 0.4 22.2 2.3 - 0.2 0.2 6.4
5.1 - 0.1 0.0 5.3 2.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.3
5.3 - 0.4 6.5
- 2.1 - 0.4
4.4 - 0.2 1.4 0.3 0.6 6.2 - 0.4
- 19.7 - 12.3 2.1 - 2.0 4.1 0.6 2.4 5.0 - 0.1
3.0 - 2.4 0.4 9.1
- 0.4 - 0.8
2.5
- 12.6 3.0 - 1.1 1.8 5.0
- 0.2 - 8.5
1.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 7.6 0.2 - 8.2 0.0 7.0
2.7 - 1.8 0.2 4.1 0.3 0.0 2.2 0.0 4.2
2.5 - 3.5 5.6 0.8 - 2.4 4.4
1.4 5.4
- 0.3 - 50.4 - 7.9 3.1 - 3.5 0.5 2.7 0.1 - 2.5 - 3.2
- 12.2 - 14.0 14.9 - 2.4 8.4 0.1 - 7.9 - 0.1
4.2 - 3.0 0.2 2.7 0.1 - 5.3 0.1 5.2
48 326 - 0.7 - 0.1
- 0.2 0.1 0.3 16.5 4.3 0.2 13.4 0.5
47 221 - 2.4 0.4 - 20.8 6.1 - 1.1 0.8 1.2 64 552 - 0.5 0.0 0.6 5.2 0.3 - 0.1 18.2 19 205 - 12.7 11.0 3.2 0.8 45 624 - 1.6 2.0 5.4 0.1 1.5 5.8 - 0.1 0.8 4.3 0.3 0.2
33 342 - 1.2 - 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.1 3.7 0.8 0.1 1.9 1.5 4.1 34 627 - 3.3 0.4 - 0.0 27.9 4.5 - 0.3 1.2
- 0.0
38 173 - 1.3 - 1.9 0.6 - 0.3 8.0
- 5.8
65 2386 1.2 - 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.2 11.2 12.5 0.0 - 0.7 49.9 0.2 0.0
68 918 - 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.1 1.1 3.1 - 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.1
24
78 - 16.8 1.5 - 0.4 0.5
32 175 - 4.0 2.4 - 1.0 6.1 3.9 32 236 - 2.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 2.5 9.5 - 1.0 5.3 1.4 1.4
60 1188 - 0.8 1.1 0.1 7.8 12.3 1.0 0.0 0.9 12.9 0.5 -
59
47
41
15
38
59
73
42
37
23
65
18
20
37
23
33
23
44
21
43
17
13
30
43
80
23
45
51
24
29
14
31
22
33
44
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
60.8
60.6
40.8
52.9
60.6
66.0
41.9
73.5
88.0
94.7
23.4
50.1
63.6
76.0
13.6
50.8
60.9
47.1
42.5
40.3
34.1
76.1
26.8
51.9
55.8
79.4
44.4
54.6
40.8
61.6
66.2
50.5
45.9
52.5
53.8
53.9
43.9
40.8
96.1
65.6
85.3
46.5
84.9
23.9
84.5
53.2
92.9
50.2
54.1
17
10
14
9
18
19
14
11
21
18
7
8
16
17
14
16
21
8
11
15
19
9
13
9
21
19
5
15
9
20
13
21
13
20
4
4
17
15
3
13
21
21
12
8
3
17
5
12
18
39.2
39.4
59.2
47.1
39.4
34.0
58.1
26.5
12.0
5.3
76.6
49.9
36.4
24.0
86.4
49.2
39.1
52.9
57.5
59.7
65.9
23.9
73.2
48.1
44.2
20.6
55.6
45.4
59.2
38.4
33.8
49.5
54.1
47.5
46.2
46.1
56.1
59.2
3.9
34.4
14.7
53.5
15.1
76.1
15.5
46.8
7.1
49.8
45.9
12
9
14
12
15
11
15
10
13
10
14
11
12
13
15
16
16
5
15
14
14
10
14
13
16
9
10
15
13
16
9
13
15
15
8
11
16
15
7
9
12
16
9
13
4
15
4
12
14
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
El Salvador
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Georgia
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kosovo
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Namibia
Nicaragua
Niue
Palestinian Adm. Areas
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Number of partner countries
Number of significant relations
Number of non-significant relations
Concentration ratio (in %)
CPA (USD million)
Average CPA (USD million)
Donors’ share of global CPA (in %)
1 Column 1
Row
Partner countries
Number of significant relations
Number of non-significant relations
Spain
Portugal
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
CPA (USD million)
Fragmentation ratio (in %)
8
18
7
19
9
10
19
2
8
11
4
2
15
16
9
13
20
5
15
12
19
12
15
14
21
12
10
11
25
23
1
24
18
13
3
5
12
12
18
8
14
1
16
7
9
19
17
4
72
40
59
37
74
70
5
92
69
54
43
71
44
43
67
38
41
17
52
37
32
61
53
22
0.2
9.9
1.3
2.7
1.7
2.1
14.2
1.0
8.3
1.5
0.7
0.0
0.5
0.4
0.8
1.0
0.2
-
1.6
0.1
1.1
1.6
0.1
0.6
1.8
-
0.9
0.9
4.2
0.7
0.2
0.8
0.5
1.2
0.2
1.3
0.9
1.4
-
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.9
0.1
0.2
0.1
3.9
0.5
0.1
0.1
3.2
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
1.7
0.3
0.2
0.0
1.3
1.9
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.5
1.5
0.8
0.3
0.4
9.0
8.2
0.3
7.8
0.0
0.4
0.4
23.5
15.5
0.1
3.4
0.5
2.2
0.4
2.1
-
0.9
7.1
4.4
0.6
3.4
7.9
3.0
21.2
0.6
7.2
4.0
2.4
5.3
8.5
11.7
3.7
4.2
3.8
16.1
4.0
1.9
0.9
7.8
0.2
0.9
0.1
0.3
4.3
0.4
0.4
-
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.0
-
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.0
0.9
0.1
1.4
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.3
1.5
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.2
-
1.9
10.6
2.6
9.8
30.4
42.4
19.4
1.1
5.3
12.3
7.2
1.2
24.3
12.4
12.1
1.6
2.7
41.3
21.5
61.9
34.6
1.6
0.8 13.2
1.2
1.1
0.0
0.9
0.3
0.5
8.8
0.2
2.1
0.2
2.5
1.3
2.1
1.9
-
0.1
0.1
1.0
0.1
0.4
0.1
2.7
1.5
0.2
0.3
0.0
-
0.7
9.0
0.2
0.2
3.9
13.7
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.9
2.7
0.2
0.6
4.4
2.2
0.4
0.2
0.3
-
9.9
0.0
0.1
62.2
0.0
0.4
0.1
-
-
-
0.9 5.2 5.6
1.1
1.1 - 0.1 1.8 0.3 0.9
2.4 - 22.7 8.1 0.2 0.2
- 0.4 - 1.2
0.3 - 8.4 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 14.1
0.4 - 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.1
2.4 - 2.8 - 2.2
0.2 - 0.1 0.3 - 1.6
0.1 - 1.1 - 0.1 0.2
2.9 1.5 0.1 1.7 6.0 1.6
1.6 - 0.1 8.8 2.5 1.2
0.4 - 0.1 0.4 2.5 0.1
- 1.8 17.1 - 0.0 0.3
0.6 - 3.3 0.7 - 0.2
2.5 - 16.0 4.0 1.1 0.9
4.1 0.1 1.8 2.0 0.5 3.1
0.5 - 15.3 0.8 0.7 - 7.6 0.5 2.4 0.1
0.2 - 2.7 0.5 - 0.1
2.2 - 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.4
0.5 - 1.7 -
3.8
30.1
19.7
15.1
29.7
2.2
5.6
2.0
89.6
47.3
28.7
83.3
89.5
14.9
6.4
5.1
27.4
12.7
27.5
13.3
21.7
9.6
1.7
24.8
16.5
68.2
46.8
82.3
20.9
61.9
57.5
78.5
74.9
96.2
72.2
55.5
98.3
98.4
35.9
54.2
71.9
76.3
58.9
76.5
57.1
78.4
79.0
91.8
54.5
31.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
747
311
173
412
4016
3313
33
2237
836
717
59
120
233
363
1119
328
699
9
1963
197
530
1070
982
62
Sweden
183
6
Switzerland
21 13 8 38
5
United Kingdom
29
30
17
30
34
33
20
26
26
24
7
7
27
28
27
21
34
6
31
19
28
31
32
18
4
United States
25 16 9 36
3
Grand total
Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.
16
18
6
15
20
18
11
17
14
17
3
3
16
15
16
12
19
2
23
9
18
18
17
8
13
No.
14
No. of DAC countries
Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the
CPA to that partner country)
DAC countries
52 30 44 55 77 72 118 112 30 46 91 131 69 48 73 33 94 18 112 84 66 94 129 3257 1678
28 24 21 18 29 27 62 91 21 17 38 112 33 19 37 19 36 12 52 38 33 43 106 1965 916
24
6 23 37 48 45 56 21
9 29 53
19 36 29 36 14 58
6 60 46 33 51
23 1292 762
54 80 48 33 38 38 53 81 70 37 42 85 48 40 51 58 38 67 46 45 50 46
82
60
55
1465 85 469 1031 1237 337 3944 4087 117 354 55610569 495 172 1711 132 1269 230 2406 1110 481 3851 14989 85299 51097
28
3 11 19 16
5 33 36
4
8
6
81
7
4 23
4 14 13 21 13
7 41
116
561
30
1.7 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.4 0.4 4.6 4.8 0.1 0.4 0.7 12.4 0.6 0.2 2.0 0.2 1.5 0.3 2.8 1.3 0.6 4.5 17.6 100.0 59.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- % --------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
83.5
261 - 0.2 - 0.2 - 0.9 6.0 - 0.2 0.9 6.2 1.5 4.6 0.2 - 0.2 - 25.8 1.3 35.3 100.0
2
Number of donors
Table B.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
– coverage: DAC countries (continued)
Multilateral agencies
53.2
17.7
79.1
38.1
42.5
21.5
25.1
3.8
27.8
44.5
1.7
1.6
64.1
45.8
28.1
23.7
41.1
23.5
42.9
21.6
21.0
8.2
45.5
68.7
31.8
1579
1049
530
66
34203
22
40.1
%
16.5
13
12
11
15
14
15
9
9
12
7
4
4
11
13
11
9
15
4
8
10
10
13
15
10
8
No.
11
No. of multilateral agencies
21
24
3
9
22
14
25
2
1
5
19
9
18
14
18
29
15
7
17
17
21
8
12
15
9
18
21
30
12
19
13
2
19
20
4
7
10
6
16
30
8
31
2
4
9
8
10
9
20
15
17
Syria
Thailand
Tokelau
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Wallis and Futuna
Upper-middle-income countries
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Botswana
Brazil
Chile
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Dominica
Fiji
Gabon
Grenada
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Montenegro
Montserrat
Nauru
Oman
Palau
Panama
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
St. Helena
St. Kitts-Nevis
St. Lucia
St.Vincent and Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
1
5
14
8
15
12
7
17
14
5
13
7
18
5
9
12
7
13
10
14
10
7
6
1
10
16
2
5
10
3
13
12
7
15
1
4
6
6
3
9
7
14
17
14
16
3
7
10
11
14
1
0
0
5
1
3
2
11
12
1
2
4
10
3
3
3
3
2
5
11
16
2
12
7
1
9
4
2
2
0
3
3
18
1
16
1
0
3
2
7
0
13
1
0
7
8
0
2
12
3
11
1
0.1
35.8
25.1
0.5
79.1
2.9
0.3
-
197 226 1.8
10 8.4
39 34.5
612 28 567 118 -
0
0
0
5
26 137
11
12
17
61
14
27
61 287
41 484
7
68
29
8
24 127
59 171
14
75
38
39
25
68
20
57
22
43
28 200
52 226
53 489
17
31
63 279
54 143
50 549
47 239
20
71
50
43
29
23
0
10
50
35
19
80
60 566
13
26
52 1002
50
31
0
7
33
45
25
33
70 155
0
5
65 1634
7
59
0
45
33
33
0
22
55
21
44
50
0.2
3.6
0.7
0.1
-
1.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.8
-
1.1
6.8
1.3
0.9
0.5
0.9
-
2.6
0.7
0.1
0.2
1.8
0.4
0.5
0.1
2.0
0.1
-
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.1
1.1
-
4.5
0.9
0.2
5.5
10.9
3.0
1.6
2.3
2.2
0.8
45.8
0.3
16.5
56.6
0.5
29.2
99.8
6.7
1.2
4.8
0.4
2.1
8.8
1.2
1.2
2.9
20.7
10.3
3.8
6.0
0.1 - 0.6 - 4.8
- 1.3 - 5.6
0.2 - 31.3
0.2 2.8 0.5 0.1 1.6
- 99.8
11.7
17.2
0.5
32.6
31.7
12.8
13.2
1.6
0.5
5.9
3.4
0.9
1.0
0.6
9.5
25.5
5.0
1.1
21.0
6.2
6.1
5.4
9.0
0.4
0.1
0.4
1.3
0.8
0.3
0.1
0.3
-
9.2 1.3
5.5 6.8 4.4 13.8 0.3
0.9
1.0
0.1
0.2
0.1
1.3
-
7.5
2.7
0.2
1.4
4.2
3.0
0.2
6.0
0.3
0.2
26.1
0.8
6.5
0.4
3.8
21.0
8.3
5.8
0.7
19.1
13.5
53.5
0.2
3.7
11.2
34.6
8.4
1.3
6.9
27.8
2.1
86.2
0.7
9.1
3.4
10.7
7.3
17.4
50.6
0.5
35.1
0.5
14.1
11.2
23.3
6.2
3.9
0.1
1.8
0.6
2.7
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.1
1.6
-
9.2
49.3 0.9
29.5 13.5 0.6
4.1
10.7 0.6
0.4
0.1
5.7
0.2
0.0
-
0.1
0.1
3.0
0.3
0.1
3.4
0.4
4.5
74.3
0.0
-
34.7
4.2
0.1
4.8
-
-
1.8 - 0.2 0.5
2.0 0.5 - 0.6
21.2 - 0.2 0.1
- 1.2
0.6 6.3 1.3 0.5
-
- 24.3 0.5 - 1.1
- 3.8
4.2 - 1.0 19.5 - 1.0
- 1.1 0.6 - 1.0 - 0.3
6.1 0.3 12.1 0.3 0.3 1.7
- 10.8 - 0.9
- 7.0 0.8 2.1 - 0.4 0.4 - 1.1
1.1 - 27.8 - 3.6 0.8
- 0.7 - 0.5 - 3.9
1.4 - 0.7 - 1.5
1.6 1.9 4.5 0.1 0.3 1.1
- 6.1
0.2 - 0.1 - 0.4
0.3 - 6.3 - 1.8
5.5 - 2.5 3.8 - 0.6
- 86.9
- 6.6
- 8.3 3.3 - 0.7 3.9 1.6 1.0
1.7 - 0.5 0.9 0.4 4.5
- 95.5
- 8.1
- 8.3 0.4 - 0.2
- 22.9 - 11.7 - 4.8
1.6 - 0.4
- 89.9 - 18.0 - 2.2
- 0.5
1.9
2.5
25.7
12.5
74.6
4.0
3.5
4.9
3.0
25.3
2.8
2.0
10.3
43.0
25.5
18.5
5.7
53.9
10.4
54.5
76.8
23.7
8.1
52.1
1.1
10.2
0.3
1.5
25.9
0.3
10.1
3.1
0.3
38.5
19.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
21.0
60.1
6.3
73.5
20.4
78.3
87.0
71.2
70.5
85.6
23.0
75.6
13.5
69.3
57.3
1.3
23.7
83.7
63.7
86.3
96.8
30.9
99.8
88.0
69.6
86.9
94.6
81.6
97.0
85.4
45.0
43.9
79.3
95.5
0.0
15.3
11.2
78.3
39.0
50.9
65.8
62.1
34.5
79.9
98.4
85.1
78.0
50.4
59.4
99.8
0
1
9
2
10
4
9
19
6
2
8
11
11
2
6
5
1
7
10
20
6
10
4
1
10
13
1
3
6
3
7
20
2
21
1
0
2
1
3
3
11
6
7
11
13
2
4
11
5
15
1
100.0
79.0
39.9
93.7
26.5
79.6
21.7
13.0
28.8
29.5
14.4
77.0
24.4
86.5
30.7
42.7
98.7
76.3
16.3
36.3
13.7
3.2
69.1
0.2
12.0
30.4
13.1
5.4
18.4
3.0
14.6
55.0
56.1
20.7
4.5
100.0
84.7
88.8
21.7
61.0
49.1
34.2
37.9
65.5
20.1
1.6
14.9
22.0
49.6
40.6
0.2
1
4
10
7
8
10
9
10
9
5
9
6
10
6
6
10
8
11
11
10
6
9
9
1
9
7
3
4
4
3
9
10
6
10
1
4
7
7
7
6
9
9
10
10
11
1
5
11
9
10
1
Row
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Least developed countries
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo. Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Kiribati
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Number of partner countries
Number of significant relations
Number of non-significant relations
Concentration ratio (in %)
CPA (USD million)
Average CPA (USD million)
Donors’ share of global CPA (in %)
1 Column 1
Partner countries
Number of significant relations
13
22
21
22
14
23
23
24
14
20
8
16
14
9
16
20
16
14
14
13
5
21
17
19
20
19
3
Number of non-significant relations
24
5
8
8
6
8
7
9
8
5
5
18
7
1
8
16
6
6
6
14
3
11
4
5
7
8
4
Fragmentation ratio (in %)
65
19
28
27
30
26
23
27
36
20
38
53
33
10
33
44
27
30
30
52
38
34
19
21
26
30
5
CPA (USD million)
5263
264
1639
639
126
985
413
692
179
259
44
1668
123
30
93
2886
126
171
131
867
27
420
129
324
378
672
6
UNICEF
UNFPA
UNDP
UNAIDS
Nordic Dev. Fund
Montreal Protocol
IMF
IFAD
IDA
IAEA
IADB
Global Fund
GEF
GAVI
EU institutions
CarDB
AsDF
Arab Agencies
AfDF
2.0
7.4
8.5
3.1
0.6
11.1
0.8
9.5
18.5
5.8
10.7
11.9
7.7
5.9
4.4
1.5
9.0
7.2
0.1
1.3
1.8
3.0
2.4
2.7
0.3
10.1
0.7
5.1
3.4
0.3
0.5
16.4
6.7
0.5
0.7
1.5
3.1
3.1
1.1
2.3
6.0 0.3
- 13.9 2.1
21.6 3.6 1.6
- 22.5 0.7
23.4 2.2 0.2
- 14.6 0.8
- 26.8 1.3
12.6 5.1 0.7
- 26.2 1.0
- 27.7 1.7
- 34.9 9.6 1.5
8.4 0.2
7.3
- 30.7 0.7
3.9 1.3
- 12.1 0.7
- 20.5 1.7
- 43.3 0.3
1.6 7.6
1.9
7.2 0.2
17.3 3.4 0.1
- 11.7 0.2
8.5 0.7
- 11.9 1.4
- 11.6 1.0
0.0
0.8
0.8
0.1
0.3
0.3
1.4
1.4
0.2
1.7
0.4
2.6
0.0
2.9
0.6
0.0
9.4
0.8
0.8
0.8
3.3
-
0.5
0.0 5.7
3.6
0.1 9.9
1.5
0.0 20.0
1.7
0.0 14.1
1.1
- 25.6
3.1
0.1 22.8
6.7
- 11.0
6.7
6.7
1.5
0.2 15.9
1.6
0.1 8.2
0.6
5.4
4.0
0.0 24.1
0.6
7.0
11.6 13.8 0.4 8.7
4.5
0.0 36.1
10.2 - 13.2
1.1
1.1
5.2
- 11.2
3.3 15.7 0.0 5.4
3.2
- 10.6
12.0 - 14.0
- 14.1
4.6
0.1 9.6
9.9
0.0 12.2
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.5
1.6
0.5
1.2
0.4
1.3
0.3
0.2
0.7
3.3
0.1
2.7
2.3
0.2
1.3
1.0
1.3
2.1
0.5
0.3
2.5
5.5
4.9
22.1
14.9
16.9
1.9
5.7
12.5
7.1
5.4
-
-
0.2
1.0
0.3
0.1
1.3
-
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.4
1.5
0.6
0.9
1.3
0.9
1.6
1.4
3.3
2.3
4.1
1.3
1.0
1.4
5.4
0.6
2.3
3.6
2.9
0.8
1.4
1.3
2.2
1.7
1.7
0.1
0.8
0.4
0.3
0.8
0.3
0.6
0.6
1.3
1.4
2.0
0.5
0.8
3.9
2.0
0.2
0.8
1.9
1.8
0.3
0.4
1.1
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.7
3.2
1.3
0.8
1.1
1.8
2.3
1.0
2.4
5.1
1.9
3.2
1.5
2.5
2.2
1.2
1.1
4.4
2.0
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
3.2
1.4
39 91 38 14 149 67 116 94 25 96 80 74 37 12 20 107 134 118 120
32 51 21 13 124 38 68 59 25 68 69 44 30
7 16 66 75 75 57
7 40 17
1 25 29 48 35
0 28 11 30
7
5
4 41 59 43 63
82 56 55 93 83 57 59 63 100 71 86 59 81 58 80 62 56 64 48
1800 902 2736 81 8366 338 566 2307 554 39 11176 399 2487 29 70 47 476 267 693
46 10 72
6 56
5
5 25 22
0 140
5 67
2
3
0
4
2
6
2.1 1.1 3.2 0.1 9.8 0.4 0.7 2.7 0.6 0.0 13.1 0.5 2.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8
------------------------------------------------------------ % ------------------------------------------------------------
Grand total
UNTA
UNRWA
-
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
1.2
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.3
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
4 144 3257
4 107 1965
0 37 1292
100 74
60
772 98 85299
193
1
561
0.9 0.1 100.0
No.
23
14
16
14
9
15
16
19
9
11
2
20
7
2
10
20
8
7
8
12
3
18
8
13
13
14
83.5
61.1
46.5
44.3
41.9
37.7
37.1
63.7
23.4
27.8
33.8
29.0
52.6
69.3
22.8
35.0
12.9
47.9
26.4
55.7
81.2
58.1
47.8
63.9
48.8
52.7
No. of DAC countries
1678
916
762
55
51097
30
59.9
%
16.5
38.9
53.5
55.7
58.1
62.3
62.9
36.3
76.6
72.2
66.2
71.0
47.4
30.7
77.2
65.0
87.1
52.1
73.6
44.3
18.8
41.9
52.2
36.1
51.2
47.3
1579
1049
530
66
34203
22
40.1
%
Multilateral agencies
Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that
partner country)
DAC countries
Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.
37
27
29
30
20
31
30
33
22
25
13
34
21
10
24
36
22
20
20
27
8
32
21
24
27
27
2
Number of donors
Table B.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
– coverage: multilateral agencies
14
13
13
16
11
16
14
14
13
14
11
14
14
8
14
16
14
13
12
15
5
14
13
11
14
13
No.
No. of multilateral agencies
15
30
22
36
22
34
28
35
12
15
33
30
10
22
33
37
21
21
7
32
9
24
32
29
32
37
13
26
29
33
19
27
22
37
28
29
19
28
21
33
30
29
21
34
28
21
19
28
30
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Yemen
Zambia
Other low-income countries
Cote d’Ivoire
Ghana
Kenya
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Kyrgyz Republic
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
Zimbabwe
Lower-middle-income countries
Albania
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Cameroon
Cape Verde
China
Colombia
Congo, Rep.
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
15
10
10
17
18
20
19
13
12
9
16
13
19
12
12
17
22
11
16
12
9
11
17
17
13
23
12
19
17
24
17
19
22
20
10
13
23
17
2
17
18
18
16
15
6
22
7
16
18
14
9
18
4
15
10
10
8
22
19
5
6
9
18
17
15
15
2
10
17
24
8
10
5
24
5
3
11
5
12
5
15
6
15
2
2
10
13
8
5
15
19
5
6
1
10
2
8
14
791
1527
1506
25
278
1650
2701
436
381
188
4039
326
33
913
221
1863
172
863
368
868
79
24
903
388
206
165
872
2813
195
215
17
1535
103
379
1198
8.1
6.7
4.1
1.1
-
6.7
11.4
4.1
7.3
7.7
3.5
4.6
5.3
0.2
8.6
1.1
7.2
2.9
48 326 47 221 64 552 19 205 45 624 33 342 34 627 4.7
38 173 5.5
65 2386 68 918 24
78 2.1
32 175 32 236 60 1188 0.0
59
47
41
15
38
59
73
42
37
23
65
18
20
37
23
33
23
44
21
43
17
13
30
43
80
23
45
51
24
29
14
31
22
33
44
16.5
16.9
2.2
29.4
10.7
11.4
-
17.8
23.6
13.8
1.0
2.2
12.2
0.6
-
4.3
0.0
1.8 21.7
5.0 7.7
0.2
0.8
1.8
2.9
0.5
0.1
1.4
2.7
-
2.3
0.6
1.5
3.3
0.0
0.2
6.1
3.0
0.2
-
6.0
4.2
12.1
0.9
2.6
0.0
6.0
0.4
0.5
5.5
4.8
4.3
0.6
2.2
0.4
7.6
0.1
5.9
0.2
-
-
-
21.2
30.8
7.0
5.8
11.8
21.1
9.0
12.8
1.8
2.2
32.8
35.6
24.8
17.2
8.2
10.7
2.1
7.1
10.3
4.7
1.1
6.8
9.0
2.9
1.2
11.8
2.3
9.9
12.1
10.4
11.6
3.1
12.8
12.0
11.4
12.5
14.6
26.2
1.6
20.4
5.2
4.2
3.6
18.7
0.2
5.9
2.7
3.3
12.1
0.1
0.6
0.0
1.6
3.2
-
0.7
0.8
0.8
13.2
0.4
0.3
1.2
0.5
3.0
0.1
1.1
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.1
1.6
0.2
1.5
0.5
1.1
0.3
1.7
0.2
0.5
0.7
6.3
9.3
2.6
2.9
2.6
0.7
3.8
3.9
6.8
3.1
1.0
4.6
-
-
0.5 0.5
6.9
0.4 1.1
2.9
2.2 0.8 16.8
1.3 5.3
0.2
1.7 5.1
1.4
1.0
2.0 4.7
0.3 10.2 1.5
3.7 2.6 3.2
2.2 0.3
-
0.1 2.2
0.2 4.8
0.2 2.9
0.4 0.5
1.3 17.5
0.3 0.6
2.3 7.7
1.5 0.1
0.9 6.5
0.1 0.3
2.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.2
4.2
0.4
0.7
0.4
0.4
1.9
3.0
0.1
3.6
-
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
10.6
25.7
21.9
5.4
9.8
7.8
2.2
0.0
13.8
0.2
24.0
16.3
10.9
13.9
30.1
43.6
3.3
13.1
14.8
30.1
-
17.5
18.4
17.4
11.5
18.2
10.6
13.1
4.2
4.6
15.1
9.3
0.4
22.3
2.0
13.1
25.8
31.1
3.6
4.8
0.3
8.2
1.4
0.4
11.4
2.4
11.1
4.8
10.9
19.2
20.3
-
0.6 0.6
0.4
1.9
0.5
1.4
0.5 23.5 1.1
1.1
0.8
3.1 4.8
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.4
-
0.5 38.0 0.5 6.8
0.6 13.9 0.2 9.2
0.4
0.7
- 10.6 0.4
0.0
-
0.2
0.4
2.3
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.9
5.9
0.5
0.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
3.0
0.3
0.1
-
0.2
0.3
0.1
-
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.1
3.1
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.5
1.5
0.9
0.3
0.8
1.5
3.5
0.2
2.1
2.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
4.9
1.6
2.3
0.9
0.7
4.7
0.5
1.5
0.2
3.6
0.7
0.4
1.2
3.2
0.6
1.1
-
3.0
1.5
0.9
0.8
9.8
0.8
4.6
1.1
2.9
0.7
2.2
5.5
1.5
0.7
0.6
2.1
1.4
2.2
0.7
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.7
0.8
0.1
0.2
2.9
0.7
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.5
0.2
0.2
1.0
0.4
0.4
0.1
1.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.6 1.0
0.2 0.5
0.3 0.7
4.7 22.2
0.2 0.5
0.3 2.9
0.3 0.7
0.4 0.3
0.2 0.9
0.5 1.8
0.1 0.1
1.3 1.4
1.3
0.3
1.1
0.2
3.3
0.5
0.7
0.3
2.3
0.2
0.7
1.3
1.0
0.2
1.4
0.7
0.5
0.7
0.3
-
-
-
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
5.8
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.0
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.8
0.1
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
60.8
60.6
40.8
52.9
60.6
66.0
41.9
73.5
88.0
94.7
23.4
50.1
63.6
76.0
13.6
50.8
60.9
47.1
42.5
40.3
34.1
76.1
26.8
51.9
55.8
79.4
44.4
54.6
40.8
61.6
66.2
50.5
45.9
52.5
53.8
53.9
43.9
40.8
96.1
65.6
85.3
46.5
84.9
23.9
84.5
53.2
92.9
50.2
54.1
17
10
14
9
18
19
14
11
21
18
7
8
16
17
14
16
21
8
11
15
19
9
13
9
21
19
5
15
9
20
13
21
13
20
4
4
17
15
3
13
21
21
12
8
3
17
5
12
18
39.2
39.4
59.2
47.1
39.4
34.0
58.1
26.5
12.0
5.3
76.6
49.9
36.4
24.0
86.4
49.2
39.1
52.9
57.5
59.7
65.9
23.9
73.2
48.1
44.2
20.6
55.6
45.4
59.2
38.4
33.8
49.5
54.1
47.5
46.2
46.1
56.1
59.2
3.9
34.4
14.7
53.5
15.1
76.1
15.5
46.8
7.1
49.8
45.9
12
9
14
12
15
11
15
10
13
10
14
11
12
13
15
16
16
5
15
14
14
10
14
13
16
9
10
15
13
16
9
13
15
15
8
11
16
15
7
9
12
16
9
13
4
15
4
12
14
Row
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
El Salvador
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Georgia
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kosovo
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Namibia
Nicaragua
Niue
Palestinian Adm. Areas
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Number of partner countries
Number of significant relations
Number of non-significant relations
Concentration ratio (in %)
CPA (USD million)
Average CPA (USD million)
Donors’ share of global CPA (in %)
1 Column 1
Partner countries
16
13
8
18
7
19
9
10
19
2
8
11
4
2
15
16
9
13
20
5
15
12
19
12
15
14
21
29
30
17
30
34
33
20
26
26
24
7
7
27
28
27
21
34
6
31
19
28
31
32
18
3
21
12
10
11
25
23
1
24
18
13
3
5
12
12
18
8
14
1
16
7
9
19
17
4
8
9
Number of non-significant relations
4
Fragmentation ratio (in %)
72
40
59
37
74
70
5
92
69
54
43
71
44
43
67
38
41
17
52
37
32
61
53
22
38
36
5
CPA (USD million)
UNICEF
UNFPA
UNDP
UNAIDS
Nordic Dev. Fund
Montreal Protocol
IMF
IFAD
IDA
IAEA
IADB
Global Fund
GEF
GAVI
EU institutions
CarDB
AsDF
Arab Agencies
AfDF
747
311
173
412
4016
3313
33
2237
836
717
59
120
233
363
1119
328
699
9
1963
197
530
1070
982
62
183
-
-
-
-
29.1
-
-
0.8
- 15.0 - 12.6 0.1 0.3 1.5
0.8
7.4
0.1 1.5
0.9 30.3 0.2
4.3
0.3
9.5 0.2 1.1 2.3
0.1 0.6
2.1 0.0 1.4 4.6
3.9 5.4
1.2 0.1 0.3 2.7
1.9
1.3
5.6
0.4
1.6
0.9
9.4
0.7 0.3
- 43.0 0.2
0.1
1.3
0.1
0.7
0.7
0.1
- 45.4 0.0 3.3
- 21.6 1.5 0.2 0.8 1.7
1.1
- 25.2 0.4 0.5
9.8
0.4 11.7
0.3
4.0 0.2 0.1 2.0
3.8
- 18.6 0.3
- 18.8 0.0
- 15.2 2.7
- 13.0 1.7 4.2
0.7
2.4
1.4 2.2
0.0 18.5 3.6 0.3 0.1 0.9
2.0
- 24.2 1.4 30.4
5.2
36.9
9.0
16.5
1.6
0.9
-
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
-
0.3
22.5
4.8
12.0
31.5
7.4
1.4
0.9
10.9
17.8
10.0
19.9
-
0.5
1.3
0.2
0.9
0.3
0.1
0.3
2.2
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.4
1.4
2.9
5.3
-
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
-
1.5
0.1
1.3
0.0
0.0
-
-
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.1
2.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.2
1.8
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.2
4.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
2.0
0.1
Grand total
UNRWA
-
-
0.5
0.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
4 144 3257
4 107 1965
0 37 1292
100 74
60
772 98 85299
193
1
561
0.9 0.1 100.0
UNTA
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.8
0.1
0.2
0.3
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
5.2
1.7
0.1
0.0
0.1 16.0 0.1
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.2 23.2 0.0
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.5
0.9
0.5
39 91 38 14 149 67 116 94 25 96 80 74 37 12 20 107 134 118 120
32 51 21 13 124 38 68 59 25 68 69 44 30
7 16 66 75 75 57
7 40 17
1 25 29 48 35
0 28 11 30
7
5
4 41 59 43 63
82 56 55 93 83 57 59 63 100 71 86 59 81 58 80 62 56 64 48
1800 902 2736 81 8366 338 566 2307 554 39 11176 399 2487 29 70 47 476 267 693
46 10 72
6 56
5
5 25 22
0 140
5 67
2
3
0
4
2
6
2.1 1.1 3.2 0.1 9.8 0.4 0.7 2.7 0.6 0.0 13.1 0.5 2.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8
------------------------------------------------------------ % -----------------------------------------------------------261 9.0
1.5 0.8 1.9 0.1
1.7
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4
6
13
16
18
6
15
20
18
11
17
14
17
3
3
16
15
16
12
19
2
23
9
18
18
17
8
46.8
82.3
20.9
61.9
57.5
78.5
74.9
96.2
72.2
55.5
98.3
98.4
35.9
54.2
71.9
76.3
58.9
76.5
57.1
78.4
79.0
91.8
54.5
31.3
No.
14
No. of DAC countries
68.2
1678
916
762
55
51097
30
59.9
%
83.5
53.2
17.7
79.1
38.1
42.5
21.5
25.1
3.8
27.8
44.5
1.7
1.6
64.1
45.8
28.1
23.7
41.1
23.5
42.9
21.6
21.0
8.2
45.5
68.7
31.8
1579
1049
530
66
34203
22
40.1
%
16.5
Multilateral agencies
Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that
partner country)
DAC countries
Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.
Number of significant relations
25
2
Number of donors
Table B.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
– coverage: multilateral agencies (continued)
13
12
11
15
14
15
9
9
12
7
4
4
11
13
11
9
15
4
8
10
10
13
15
10
8
No.
11
No. of multilateral agencies
21
24
3
9
22
14
25
2
1
5
19
9
18
14
18
29
15
7
17
17
21
8
12
15
9
18
21
30
12
19
13
2
19
20
4
7
10
6
16
30
8
31
2
4
9
8
10
9
20
15
17
Syria
Thailand
Tokelau
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Wallis and Futuna
Upper-middle-income countries
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Botswana
Brazil
Chile
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Dominica
Fiji
Gabon
Grenada
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Montenegro
Montserrat
Nauru
Oman
Palau
Panama
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
St. Helena
St. Kitts-Nevis
St. Lucia
St.Vincent and Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
1
5
14
8
15
12
7
17
14
5
13
7
18
5
9
12
7
13
10
14
10
7
6
1
10
16
2
5
10
3
13
12
7
15
1
4
6
6
3
9
7
14
17
14
16
3
7
10
11
14
1
0
0
5
1
3
2
11
12
1
2
4
10
3
3
3
3
2
5
11
16
2
12
7
1
9
4
2
2
0
3
3
18
1
16
1
0
3
2
7
0
13
1
0
7
8
0
2
12
3
11
1
197
226
10
39
612
28
567
118
0
0
0
5
26 137
11
12
17
61
14
27
61 287
41 484
7
68
29
8
24 127
59 171
14
75
38
39
25
68
20
57
22
43
28 200
52 226
53 489
17
31
63 279
54 143
50 549
47 239
20
71
50
43
29
23
0
10
50
35
19
80
60 566
13
26
52 1002
50
31
0
7
33
45
25
33
70 155
0
5
65 1634
7
59
0
45
33
33
0
22
55
21
44
50
-
5.4
8.5
1.8
5.6
3.0
0.4
1.1
0.1
0.0
0.2
13.2
4.2
0.0
0.1
0.3
-
0.7
0.4
0.3
0.3
2.0
-
2.8
0.6
4.3
1.0
26.7 0.1
100.0
18.4
5.1
27.4
10.8
20.4
13.3
0.1
26.1
17.7
19.8
0.9
-
-
2.4
0.3 13.4
4.9
2.2 0.5
0.3
2.5 5.7
-
-
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
-
11.1 - 43.0 15.0 - 15.3 5.3 0.6
67.5 9.6
3.4
18.0 3.1
0.7
34.5 4.0 1.5 1.9 0.3
11.2 0.0
0.1
3.9
2.2 2.3 3.2 0.2
15.9 3.0
4.4 0.9
2.4
- 22.8 5.3
4.4
1.9 0.1
75.6 0.2
8.2 0.3 8.4
1.3
58.1 18.2 6.3
16.1 2.8 12.0 0.3
34.5 4.6
52.7 0.1 4.7 1.2 0.1
5.9
2.7 5.6
0.2
9.1
0.2
0.1
7.1
3.3
1.2
0.0
1.9
0.1
65.3 0.3 0.6
0.3
0.2
2.5
5.0
2.8 0.1
19.7 0.2
13.0 2.7
2.2
0.3
0.7
0.2
2.6
6.3
1.9 0.2
50.1 0.4 1.0
0.1
46.0 3.5
0.5
15.3 0.9 3.6
0.1
4.5
38.1 - 30.1 36.3 4.4
40.0 6.1
17.2 0.3 2.4 1.4
30.7 - 12.8 48.1 0.5
0.0
19.0 1.8
7.9 0.5
5.1
- 21.9 0.8 0.7
23.1 2.2
0.4
17.7 13.9 31.2 0.0
0.2
3.6
6.8
7.1
2.9
2.0
3.9
-
4.6
3.5
1.0
-
3.5
-
0.6
0.0
-
1.3
13.0 27.9 0.3
23.8 17.6 0.2
-
0.2
4.1
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.8
1.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.0
0.1
8.3
0.0
0.1
0.9
0.4
0.0
0.4
0.1
0.5
1.8
1.4
0.9
0.4
0.2
1.3
0.8
1.0
0.6
0.7
0.2
4.8
1.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.9
0.1
1.7
0.0
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
7.0
0.1
1.4
1.4
0.8
0.6
1.6
0.1
2.8
0.4
0.5
0.9
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.9
1.7
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5
4.2
0.8
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.3
2.8
0.9
0.8
0.1
2.1
0.1
6.5
0.5
0.7
2.2
1.2
0.8
2.6
1.1
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.3
1.2
1.4
2.8
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.3
1.0
1.8
0.7
0.2
1.3
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.2 25.2 0.2
1.3
0.3
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.1
0.5
0.2
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.1
0.2
1.7
0.4
0.0
5.6
0.2
1.2
0.0
1.3
0.1
0.0
1.3
1.0
3.1
1.0
0.4 30.5 0.7
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.1
0.1
3.0
0.1
0.1
0.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
21.0
60.1
6.3
73.5
20.4
78.3
87.0
71.2
70.5
85.6
23.0
75.6
13.5
69.3
57.3
1.3
23.7
83.7
63.7
86.3
96.8
30.9
99.8
88.0
69.6
86.9
94.6
81.6
97.0
85.4
45.0
43.9
79.3
95.5
0.0
15.3
11.2
78.3
39.0
50.9
65.8
62.1
34.5
79.9
98.4
85.1
78.0
50.4
59.4
99.8
0
1
9
2
10
4
9
19
6
2
8
11
11
2
6
5
1
7
10
20
6
10
4
1
10
13
1
3
6
3
7
20
2
21
1
0
2
1
3
3
11
6
7
11
13
2
4
11
5
15
1
100.0
79.0
39.9
93.7
26.5
79.6
21.7
13.0
28.8
29.5
14.4
77.0
24.4
86.5
30.7
42.7
98.7
76.3
16.3
36.3
13.7
3.2
69.1
0.2
12.0
30.4
13.1
5.4
18.4
3.0
14.6
55.0
56.1
20.7
4.5
100.0
84.7
88.8
21.7
61.0
49.1
34.2
37.9
65.5
20.1
1.6
14.9
22.0
49.6
40.6
0.2
1
4
10
7
8
10
9
10
9
5
9
6
10
6
6
10
8
11
11
10
6
9
9
1
9
7
3
4
4
3
9
10
6
10
1
4
7
7
7
6
9
9
10
10
11
1
5
11
9
10
1