An
inconsequent
Consciousness
The EU’s strife for
defending its values in
foreign policy: The case
of Palestine
A Master’s thesis for
International Relations in
Historical Perspective
At Utrecht University
Submission date
2 August 2015
Mw. Yvonne Kleistra
By Robbin C. Looije
An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
2
An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Acknowledgements
This thesis was written as a final product for my Master’s in International Relations in historical
perspective at the University of Utrecht. Writing it has been an absorbing, but engrossing
experience, in which I have revived all elements of my educational career. Even though I hardly
looked forward to this process of researching and writing, I feel satisfied to have finished it, as this
assignment again reminded me of how to most efficiently extract my personal talents, while
combining these with the important competences taught attaining Utrecht University for the
previous 5 years.
Therefore, I would like to thank all the teachers who have taught me well, and all the
teachers who did not, as these let me question for alternative methods to learn. Fair to say that at
Utrecht University, the teachers were remarkable in both their teaching skills as in their personal
observation and attendance to me as a student. I am very content to have studied at this
institution.
Special thanks go to my mentor for this thesis, Yvonne Kleistra, who has hardly interfered
my research and writing process, as I had requested. Yet she did have the patience in letting me
go on my own and was very accommodating with my final deadline. Also I would like to thank
Peter Malcontent for that very same reason.
Of course special thanks go to my parents, who have never stopped motivating me, and
who provided me with the occasional necessary boost. Same goes for my brothers, as well as for
my friends, who kept telling me never to quit, but to be sure of myself. Special word for my
brother Mark, who has given me insight in how to keep the process going, and always being very
interested in my line of procedure. Also lots of thanks for Andrew, Chris, Filipa, Koen, Mark,
Maarten, Remko, Jeroen, Teun, Pieter, and Ciler, all being very important people for me, who have
either contributed in keeping my hopes up for finishing this thesis timely, or given me enormous
self-assurance, or both.
I hope this thesis will be received positively, and may give those interested in EU Foreign
Policy an interesting insight, or at least will be amused while reading. For giving it a try, you will
have my gratitude.
Sincerely,
Robbin C. Looije
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
3
An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Contents
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 1
Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 6
Research introduction .......................................................................................................... 8
Methodology........................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Chatper 1
The Academic Background ............................................................................. 12
Chapter 2:
The EU and composition of a foreign policy ..................................................... 18
2.1
The European political cooperation ........................................................................ 18
2.2
Lisbon Treaty Reforms ......................................................................................... 22
Chapter 4
The EU and the conflicting parties ...................................................................... 27
4.1
The EU and the PA ............................................................................................... 27
4.2
The EU and Israel ................................................................................................ 29
Chapter 5
The EU in the IPC and the MEPP ..................................................................... 32
5.1
Pre-Lisbon accomplishments ................................................................................. 32
5.2
The Post-Lisbon Years .......................................................................................... 35
Chapter 6
EU initiatives ................................................................................................... 39
6.1 The European Neighborhood Policy ............................................................................ 39
6.1. 1
6.2
7
The PA and the ENP.......................................................................................... 41
EU missions in Palestine ....................................................................................... 42
6.2.1
EUPOL COPPS/Palestine ................................................................................. 43
6.2.2
EU BAM Rafah .............................................................................................. 46
The EU and its effects on the IPC................................................................................... 48
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 53
Notes .............................................................................................................................. 55
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
“EU foreign policy is a work in progress, and over time the EU will take on
new missions. But the EU ‘s main geographic focus is likely to be on the
so-called ‘near abroad’: the former Soviet-Union, the Balkans, the Greater
Middle East and North Africa. That is where the EU’s collective interests are
mostly directly at stake.”1
Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy:
Learning from Failure, Survival [By the International Institute for strategic Studies], vol.
45, No. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 167-186
1
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Introduction
Since the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force in January 2009, the European Union (EU)
has aimed for the enforcement of a more coherent and effectual European Union Foreign
Policy (EUFP). The new instruments and institutions the Lisbon Treaty amended for,
should have provided the EU with a broader range of tools, alternatives and structures in
order to accomplish more of its goals in global politics, external regional development
and -state-building, conflict prevention and the promotion of human rights, statebuilding and transparent democracy. The EU desired to get more engaged in global
affairs outside of the economic agenda, and despite the financial and monetary
conundrums taking over EU priorities for some years, EUFP has not remained at a lower
ebb. In fact, in recent years, the EU has been promoting itself as a new global power, as
it has attempted to gain involvement in several important areas, especially in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, and most notoriously the Israel-Palestine Conflict
(IPC). Remarkably, the new EU High Representative for Foreign Relations Fredica
Mogherini has stated that the solution of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in the
IPC will be one of her top priorities, and that the EU has to play a more assertive role in
this particular conflict.2
According to Nathalie Tocci, “[t]he Middle east has always been a principal area of
European foreign policy concern”3. Noteworthy, with the foundation of the European
Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, Middle East security was designated as one of the
very few external topics to be dealt with by European states’ cooperation institutions.
And motivations for EU intermingling in the IPC have hardly changed since, as the IPC
has been the most obtrusive, although not the exclusive, cause of Middle East instability.
With the European states’ attempt to keep their borders and immediate region stable,
Europe has always acknowledges the necessity to solve this conflict between the Israelis
and Palestinians, but besides the matter of safety on its borders, the EU also has other
incentives to a stabilize the Middle East. Because of its energy supply, migration issues,
and the corollary matters of political violence and terrorism, the entire MENA region
remains a highly hazardous neighborhood.4 On the other hand, Tocci argues, European
states act out of cultural and historical ties with the Jewish people, and guilt over the
holocaust and the British mandate which has contributed to the eventual conflict.
Moreover, the IPC has been the focus of many presidents in Washington, who have tried
Author unknown, New EU Foreign Policy Chief calls for creation of Palestinian state in 5
years, Published on November 4, 2014, available at RT News, at
http://on.rt.com/o72qwt
3
Nathalie Tocci, The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard,
Routledge, (New York, 2007), p. 100-102
4
Ibid, introduction
2
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
to resolve the conflict. The American focus on the IPC has provided the Europeans with
an opportunity to parallel Washington and remind the Americans of Europe’s political
importance.5
Certainly, the EU has since long been involved in the IPC as a mediator, but It
has however, not always been very successful in this mediating role. It has failed to
reconcile the conflicting parties, amongst other because it did not use its third party
leverage well during the negotiations. For example, EU policy in trying to bypass Hamas
in negotiations may have been counterproductive, as the 2006 elections have pointed
out Hamas’ enormous popularity amongst Palestinians. The EU may have had righteous
intentions, but the execution of its policy was thought somewhat controversial as well as
hypocritical, mainly due to the self-image it had helped to create and the role it had
adopted in the conflict.6
With the abysmal failure of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
during the 1990s, all Europeans dedicated to a common European foreign policy realized
an enormous transition was needed. As Stevens and Keohane have described, the EU
has showed its ability to adapt, overcome crises and learn from its mistakes, and to
evolve and improve step by step.7 After the dramatic 1990s, the Lisbon Treaty was to
save the European desire to become a serious actor in global politics. This thesis hopes
to show that deepening and further integrating EUFP institutions, getting ever more
incorporated into the Brussels EU structures, have barely contributed to the significant
influence the EU has hoped to gain in the IPC/MEPP processes, until now. Even though
the features of the Lisbon Treaty have been noticeable in the characteristics of how the
EU has presented itself in this specific theatre, the hard features of a strong global power
have not yet been recognized, since the EU has maneuvered itself in a difficult position.
On the one hand, the growing EU rhetoric about defending democratic promotion and
human rights have become paradoxically problematic in execution. Because, on the
other hand, the EU cannot afford to lose its imagine as a trustworthy and liable economic
trading partner. Democracy promotion, stimulation of good governance, state-building
and defending human rights are interesting and honorable values. It is very contestable
however, that a multi-lateral actor like the EU, could claim to defend these values in a
just and fair degree towards all of its trading partners in the region, and even beyond.
Since the Israeli state and the Palestinian Authority are both part of the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and even though the EU has the abilities to act as a powerful
Ibid, p. 100-102
Ibid, p. 120-125
7
Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy:
Learning from Failure, Survival [By the International Institute for strategic Studies], vol.
45, No. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 167-186
5
6
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
regional player, the conflict dynamics do not allow the EU to act as such, despite the
Lisbon Treaty reforms.
Research introduction
EUFP is an interesting object of research. According to many, the multi-lateral
effectuation of the EU, and especially its foreign policy is a unique case, and therefore
not one without dispute. There has been much debate and criticism on the EU and why it
choose to adopt a common foreign policy, and also how this has been implemented.
More precisely, there has been lots of criticism on how it has performed in the case of
the IPC, as incoherency amongst the EUMS has been frequent, dividing the EU from
within.
Starting this research, it was the author’s aim to analyze recent developments in
European Union Member States (EUMS) and explain his perceived increasing support for
Palestinian autonomy. There seemed to be a trend amongst European states in their
support for the Palestinian cause, which was emphasized by the European Parliament’s
support for the Palestinian quest for independence in an official – yet non-binding –
resolution. It seemed very clear that this European support, within EU institutions as well
as within EUMS national congresses, was no offhand expression. With violence rampant
in especially Gaza, during the previous years and growing antipathy caused by the Israeli
separation wall on the Westbank, the European stance towards Israel seems to have
changed dramatically over the previous years. With the ‘conservativation’ of the USIsrael axis, due to Netanyahu’s re-election and the possibility of increased republican
influence in Washington, it was time for the EU to step up. It seemed as if the recent
emergence of pro-Palestine European politicians almost Europe-wide, had culminated in
a final explosion of pro-Palestinian declarations and public criticism to Israel and its
Defense Forces (IDF). These political dynamics within the EUMS and EU institutions,
have ultimately led to enormous and irresistible pressure on Israeli officials and in the
symbolical support for the state of Palestine in several European states. Finally, Europe
was acting coherently and dared not only to speak critically about Israeli policy, but was
willing to act upon it, consciously and consequently. As some European states adopted
resolutions in which Palestinian statehood could be officially politically supported, a very
clear signal message was sent to Jerusalem regarding its own policy towards the
Palestinians. Even political heavyweights France and the United Kingdom participated
and
passed
pro-Palestine
resolutions
in
their
national
congresses,
possibly
acknowledging the Palestine state. The Swedish government even fully recognized the
Palestinian Territories as an official state in October 2014.
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
This perceived ‘trend’ however, seemed not to have been the characteristic of a
recent transition in EU sympathies, nor a reflection of abruptly drastically changing
political alignments. This thesis will try to show that the political actions mentioned
above are merely examples of a new European foreign policy paradigm; Aspects of the
post-Lisbon EUFP, a project which has since long been attempted to create and which is
finally coming alive. And one of its spearheads is to aid the Palestinians in their quest for
independence.
So After brief research it seemed that the perceived sudden uttering of European
pro-Palestine attitudes was not at all surprising, but rather forthcoming. Possibly the
violent uprisings from previous Summer in the Gaza Strip finally allowed a possibility to
publicly side with the Palestinians. But the EU and its institutional predecessors have
since long actually been really supportive on the theme of Palestinian self-determination
and protection of their rights.
8
The ability to initiate, to organize and to practice this
endeavor however, had now changed.
What had changed? The institutional organization of the EUFP. With the Lisbon
Treaty, the EU had reorganized its external political branch, trying to become more
influential and mostly more effective in conflicts like the one in the Middle East. The
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was organizing missions in order to
establish peace and security in conflict areas, both in as outside Europe. Two missions
have been undertaken in the Palestine territories. Also, both Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (PA) have become part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), in which
both parties have signed treaties with the EU, allowing economic benefits for the regional
partners in return for respecting EU values like human rights, etc. It will be interesting to
see how these two initiatives, plus the organizational and structural reforms due to the
Lisbon Treaty, may have had significant weight in the EU’s ever growing pro-Palestinian
stance.
Researching the EU’s involvement in the case of the IPC and as an advocate of
Palestinian self-determination is interesting and important for several reasons. Firstly,
the EU has since long been a promoter of respecting human rights and state-building
activities in the Palestinian Territories, while realizing a relatively stable relationship with
the PA. While being involved in these activities on the one hand, the EU sometimes
remains in a frustrating duality between pursuing these ideological values and
maintaining economic ties with its Israeli partners. The EU has been condemning the
Israeli government for injustices against the Arab minority often, but has hardly taken
any serious action in order to realize change. 9 Secondly, as one of the most politically
sensitive and most versatile violent conflicts around the globe, the IPC is of enormous
Chapter 3 shall give a more extensive overview of the EU-Palestine relations
Benoit Challand, Coming Too Late? The EU’s Mixed Approaches to Transforming the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, MICROCON Policy Working Paper 12, June 2010, 37 p
8
9
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
importance for the EU as a global actor. Not only for the security for its own region, but
also for the EU as a new significant player in global politics, negotiating peace in the
Middle East would be an enormous victory if the EU could achieve, or at least contribute
significantly to this.
Thirdly, it is important to see how the evolvement of EU integration is developing.
EU integration is a highly contestable and heavily criticized notion, as well as a praised
ideology. As the potential of the cumulative resources of 27 developed seem enormous,
results do not yet show that the EU has already developed into the righteous direction.
The Lisbon Treaty has altered the EUFP wing drastically, and even though many snags
and child diseases remain it from running on full capacity, the EU seems desperately
ambitious in using its newly acquired foreign policy assets to show its capacity in conflict
managing-, state-building-, and other development projects.
Methodology
So this thesis has come to exist after some brief analyses about: (1) The history of EU’s
support for Palestinian self-determination and the reasons thereof; (2) The necessity for
a European foreign policy and the successfulness of its implementation, while; (3)
Recognizing the importance that the values of democracy and human rights has played
in this process. Of course these are a lot of aspects to handle in one singly thesis, but
the author has attempted to at least give it a try, since he thought it would be an
interesting mix of analyzing both history and IR.
Combining all three elements mentioned above, requires a well balanced synopsis
of all three items. Therefore this thesis may diverge somewhat from others, but this was
thus mainly done in order to keep the whole more understandable and readable. Chapter
one shall deal with a brief overview of some important works on EU foreign policy
descriptions. This is important because it deals with how analysts have judged the EU’s
abilities on foreign policy; Its strengths and weaknesses; Its hard versus soft
competences; Its (in)ability to adapt and develop. These are all aspects that may return
when analyzing the EU in its role in the IPC. Subsequently, chapter 2 attempts to
describe how the EU has evolved from an economic institution to a political actor with
strong foreign policy ambitions. During the EU’s history of economic integration, it has
seemed that common economic trade partners and mutual benefits, create mutual
threats, a process encouraged by the joint values all Member States (MS) adopted.
Chapter 3 shall deal with the relationship between the EU and both actors in the IPC, the
Israeli government and the PA, and how the EU’s ‘actorness’ in the IPC has often been
viewed and analyzed. Chapter 4 consists of an overview of the EU’s achievements in
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
both the pre-Lisbon and the post-Lisbon years. Chapter 5 deals with some of the EU’s
initiatives; The ENP and the
two missions the EU has undertaken in the Palestinian
Territories. Finally, I hope to concur, by answering the question of how the EU’s Lisbon
Treaty Reforms have contributed to its foreign policy in the case of Palestine.
Lastly, there is the question of defining EU foreign policy. EUFP in this thesis
refers to as “the foreign policy developed across the CFSP/CSDP, the various dimensions
of the EU’s external action and external policies of international dimensions, as well as
through interaction with the foreign policies of member states.” 10
It is the aim of this thesis to analyze EUFP through the lens of two recently
developed theories in analyzing EU foreign policy. Two chapters of the in 2014 published
New Approaches for EU Foreign Policy seemed incredibly usable for this thesis, as they
both shed an entirely new light on the analysis of EUFP and they combined the two
factors that have been of interest in the case study: rhetoric 11 and democracy
promotion12. These theories are not inconsistent with one another, for two reasons.
Firstly, these were both presented by a group of scholars who have argued to develop
and define new theoretical approaches for EUFP analysis. These were not only all
theories presented by a generation of scholars with new insights and fresh ideas on how
to view EUFP, but these theories also had the feature of being viable for a synergetic
approach.
13
For example, all these ‘new’ approaches of which the two briefly discussed
are part, are not taking into consideration all the evident factors. Thus, combining
several of these is not merely more profound to have result, it is also complementing.
Secondly, the two proposed theories to be used are highly interesting when we
look at the case study. The theories both show the EU as a civilian power. In the case of
IPC, the EU’s main interests are democracy promotion, state-building and sponsorship to
Palestine, and trade partnership with the Israeli government. Despite the conflict in the
Middle East, the EU has not been retained in its soft power, despite incidental increase of
violence in the conflict, plus a dilating gap between the Israeli and European politics.
Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union,
Palgrave MacMillan, (New York, 2014), p. 13
11
Thomas Mehlhausen, Solving the Puzzle of EU Eastern Enlargement: Rhetorical Action
in Diffuse Decision, in: New Approaches For EU Foreign Policy, ed. By M. Wilga, and I.P.
Karolewski, Routledge, (New York, 2014), Chapter 10
12
Irene Hahn-Fuh, External Democracy Promotion as a Means of EU Foreign Policy, in:
Ibid, Chapter 11
13
I. P. Karolewski and M. Wilga, EUFP empirical complexity, theoretical plurality, and
new approaches to EU foreign policy, in: Ibid, p. 248
10
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Chapter 1
The Academic Background
Fundamental in the question what the EU can and will achieve, is in understanding its
potential as a political entity in international relations. It would be interesting to know if
the EU is capable of using its acquired political, or perhaps military, leverage; If it in fact
has evolved from an economic cooperation between states into a confederation with
political influence. Especially in a case such as the IPC, which is so determinative in the
entire MENA region, the EUMS should perish the necessity of political unity in a case
ascertaining direct EU associates and the entire Mediterranean region.
Describing or analyzing EUFP is no sinecure. Many scholars have attempted to
reproduce strategies, have outlined new models of analysis and characterization, and
over and over again academics have reconsidered existing academic cadres and replaced
these. New theoretic frameworks appear frequently and especially in the highly
controversial field of foreign policy, the variations of opinions has been abundant.
One of the most interesting aspects of the discussion around EUFP are the matters of
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power. The quest for the correct qualification of European policy started
in 1971, with François Duchêne’s A New European Defense Community, in which he
denominated Europe as a ‘civilian power’. The Cold War threat of military catastrophe of
before the 1970s was replaced by a mentality of economic interdependence. Politics
needed focus less on military investment, but in civilian services and welfare. 14
Forty
years later, the idea of the EU as a civilian power still exists. According to some
however, this historical qualification has been caught up by the processes of the previous
four decades, making ‘Civilian Power Europe’ an incorrect label.15
According to some,
the EU nowadays displays the attributes of a soft power, in which military and
governmental
organizations,
assets
are
economic
becoming
growth
less
(due
important
to
than
the
interdependency),
power
and
of
private
technological
advancements.16 Few consider the EU to have extinguished themselves as a hard power,
since it yet has to show coercive diplomacy, but has not yet utilized the enormous
military potential if it would bundle all its deployable resources. The possibilities to do so
seem present, and according to some, this need is imminent.17 Of course others define
François Duchêne, A New European Defense Community, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50,
No.1, October 1971, p. 69-82
15
Jan Orbie, Civilian Power Europe, Review of the Original and Current Debates,
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 2006,
Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 123-128
16
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, Foreign Policy, No. 80 Twentieth Anniversary, (Autumn
1990), p. 153-171
17
For example, see Janne Haaland Matlari, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU
Strategic Culture Possible?, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2006, p. 105-121
14
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
EUFP as neither merely soft nor hard, as these are two complementary sides of the same
coin.18 Others have introduced the EU as a ‘normative power’, in which ideas and
concepts of progressive change as a legitimation for its very existence are the founding
blocks of a political entity. Instead of leaning on military or economic power, a normative
power sets moral and ethical standards in order to outline (foreign) policy. 19 The EU has
also been qualified as an ‘enlightened superpower’,20, and a ‘soft imperial power’,21 while
Adrian Hyde-Price considered multi-polar Europe to have used features of both sides,
while creating its external environment.22
Besides the matter of labelling EUFP, scholars have also debated the effectiveness
and consistency (often linked with the aspect of political willingness) of EUFP. It seems
that the productivity of EUFP varies between several external policy areas. Mario Teló for
example, states that the EU has been most effective and coherent in the soft power
areas in which it has engaged. He believes that the EU is the very institutionalization of
twenty-first century multi-polarity in global politics. Maybe not necessarily the created
outcomes, but the coherence between all EUMS and the political willingness in areas
such as “climate change, poverty [impugnation] and sustainable development”23 have
shown the most potential in achieving results.24 The development field in particular has
allowed the EU to become a full-fledged participant in global politics. Not only as one of
the most important donors worldwide, but mostly because of its specific competences,
namely the abilities to coordinate and to regulate, as Jan Orbie has outlined.25
One might think the usefulness of the EU development field is also due to the EU’s
commitment to its ideology. Plainly, ideals and norms may play an important part in the
development discipline, but in other fields in which the EU’s shared ideology should come
Robert Cooper, Hard Power Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy, in: American
Power in the 21st Century, ed. By David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Polity Press,
(Cambridge, 2004), p. 167-180
19
Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, Reflecting on normative power Europe, p. 173-188, in:
Power in World Politics, ed. By Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, Routlege, (London,
2007),
20
Sven Grimm et al., The European Union and Global Development: An ‘Englightened
Superpower’ in the Making? (Introduction), in: The European Union and Global
Development: An ‘Enlightened Superpower’ in the Making?, ed. By Sven grimm et al.,
Palgrave MacMillan, (New York, 2012), p. 1-16 (307)
21
Björn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum, Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism,? EU As a
Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism, European Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4,
(Winter 2005), p. 535-552
22
Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique, Journal of European
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, 217-234
23
Mario Teló, Introduction, in: The European Union and Global Governance, ed. By M.
Teló, Routledge, (London, 2009), p. 1-39
24
Ibid, introduction
25
Jan Orbie, The EU’s Role in Development: A Full-Fledged Development Actor Or
Eclipsed Superpower Temptations? In: The European Union and Global Development: An
‘Enlightened Superpower’ in the Making?, ed. By Sven grimm et al., Palgrave MacMillan,
(New York, 2012), p. 18-37 (307)
18
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
to play, the EU mismanages structurally, rather than acts productively. One of the more
altruistic EUFP goals –the protection of human rights –is one in which the EU hardly
succeeds. Firstly, human rights issues often split the EU in two parties; those who call
for hard measures, and those who endeavor softer means in order to fight human rights
violations. Secondly, inconsistency (selective accusations) have caused the EU to
derogate its credibility at non-EU states. The human rights topic is undoubtedly one in
which the EU has to close a significant rhetoric-efficacy gap.26
EUFP results in effectiveness and productivity vary enormously, as said between
the many policy areas, but also from case to case. Therefore, It is difficult to either
qualify the EU as an effective or ineffective multi-lateral power. Certainly, the EU has set
the bar high for itself, but it has been known to act irrefutably, at least in some areas in
the foreign policy discipline. Its ENP initiative and its continuous dialogue and
cooperation with other regional organizations are merely examples of this feature. Still,
the EU’s multi-laterality remains a strong asset, but it is also a problematic flaw.
Contradictory strategies and inconsistency will remain, unfortunately, but inevitably for
the next few years, part of its external policy.27
One of the main reasons for the structural ineffectiveness and inconsistency is the
important place the ‘big three’ powers engulf. Germany, France and the UK have major
influence on EUFP, and the relationship between these three states and their attitude
towards EUFP are of enormous concern for the development of EUFP. 28 For example
Germany, which is normally highly committed to the EU integration projects, does not
always comply very strategically with other EUMS, often frustrating France and the UK in
the field of foreign policy. For example, It embarrassed their EU partners and the United
States when it did not vote in favor of the suggested no-fly zone in Libya in 2011, again
disqualifying the EU as a cohesive entity, in global display.29
The current framework with which most critics evaluate EUFP effectiveness
however, might not be the just one. The EU’s actorness/effectiveness ratio, according to
Niemann and Bretherton, has too often been compared with other regular actors in
International Relations. They believe that in the case of the EU, evaluation requires a
different model, since the EU as an independent rational actor cannot be compared with
Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Polity Press,
(Cambridge, 2014), P.118-121
27
Caroline Bouchard, et al., Introduction Multilateralism in the twenty-first century, in:
Multilateralism in the twenty-first century, ed. By Caroline Bouchard, et al., p. 1-10
28
Stefan Lehne, The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy, The Carnegie Papers, (Washington,
July 2012), 29 p.
29
Alister Miskimmon, German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis, German Politics, Vol.
21, No. 4, 2012, p.3921-410
26
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other sovereign political entities.30 Coherence as a stipulation for effective foreign policy
might be a correct assumption, but cohesion between EUMS does not automatically
create effectiveness, as according to Daniel C. Thomas. 31
In general, the EU is depicted as an ineffective power in its foreign policy fields.
The political willingness to cooperate coherently and structurally in the long term have
often been thwarted by domestic economic or political agendas in one of the EUMS. This
of course has awakened much criticism on the EUFP, in which many have been accused
of being the responsible of failure. sometimes blaming national politicians in the EUMS’
capitals. As East-European MS for example have other defense priorities than the Balkan
states – the former perceive a threat vis-à-vis Russia, while the latter perceive territorial
and historical conflicting issues with Turkey – it seems as if all EUMS have, or perceive,
different threats and needs, thus creating a very wide set of ‘priorities’. Above all, the
idea of defense security as an intrinsically pan-European system has not been dominant,
as some states cling on to the NATO forum.
32
However, being confronted by a wide set of threats and individual weaknesses,
one of the most striking impressions one gets by analyzing the EU, is its commitment to
its common values. Also in the framework of its EUFP, the EU aims to be:
“guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”33
If the EU wishes to address its accountability in its commitment to these
principles, change seems crucial. Democracy promotion in the Mediterranean for
example, elapses with turtle speed. With the attitude of a risk wary, inflexible and
excessively cautious old man, the EU is not willing to reach those who hope and will
stride for political change in the MENA region, according to Michelle Pace. 34 It seems that
Arne Niemann, Charlotte Bretherton, EU external policy at the crossroads: The
challenge of actorness and effectiveness, International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 261275
31
Daniel C. Thomas, Still Punching Below its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in
European Union Foreign Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, p.
457-474
32
Geoffrey Edwards, The New Member States and the Making of EU Foreign Policy,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2006, P.143-162
33
Treaty of the European Union, Article 21.1
34
Michelle Pace, Paradoxes and Contradiction in EU democracy promotion in
Mediterranean: The limits of EU normative power, Democratization, special issue: The
European Union’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical Inside-Out
Approach, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 39-58
30
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the EU has been able to learn from and exploit these “value transfers”, in order to
promote a EUMS-model society outside of its borders. Based on a one-size fits all pattern
however, EU promotion of its own values outside of the European realm are likely to
conflict with existing social, economical or political cultures in the object states. 35 Even
though not much is yet certain about the influence of conflicting issues during the
process of democracy, human rights, or rule of law promotion, it seems that the EU
should at least acknowledge the conflicting issues that do exist in this field.36
Still, there seems to be a very strong link between the EU’s foreign policy and
promoting the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc. In her book European
Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Karen E. Smith deposes the EU and its foreign
policy ambitions against the light of the internal problems of financial crisis and
accumulated reputation damage. She has named the EUFP objectives the following:
-
The encouragement of regional cooperation and integration;
-
The promotion of human rights;
-
The promotion of democracy and good governance;
-
The prevention of violent conflict; and
-
The fight against international crime.37
Despite the sincerity of these ideological values the EU endeavors to stimulate and
defend, it time and again gets confronted with the inconsistency of defending these
values as these conflict with economic or political certainty. Furthermore, the position of
the EUFP as an internally dividing and ill-defined concept, leaves two paradoxes in mind.
Firstly, the EU itself experiences a ‘democracy gap’. The internal Brussels systems are
very complex and bureaucratic. It is an elitist circle of events, which can count on little
feedback from the populace. Therefore, it is hardly considered democratic. Secondly,
despite all EUMS commitment to the importance of democracy and transparent
governance, EU’s implementation in this field is inconsistent and inconsequent, due to
selective accusations.38
As the research by Nicola Chellotti has pointed out, the influence capitals have on
the decision making process, is limited, since their delegates in Brussels do not
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, September 2004, Prepared for the
Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Oct. 4-5, 2004, Center for Development Democracy
and the Rule of Law, Stanford University
36
Sonja Grimm & Julia Leininger, Not all good things go together: conflicting objectives
in democracy promotion, Democratization, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 391-414
37
Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Polity Press,
(Cambridge, 2013), p.2
38
Ibid, p. 122-124
35
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experience significant pressure from their homeland capitals.39 As the provided examples
above show, there seems a continuous trend amongst scholars that the EUFP
(in)effectiveness is very dependent on the degree of (in)consistency amongst the
individual EUMS on how to visualize EUFP and the political willingness to create
consensus between the 27 EUMS. The greater the inconsistency amongst EUMS and the
political inability to create unanimity, then the eventual policy will be criticized as
inherently ineffective. It is an obvious analogy, and been discussed by a many. Still,
despite these this link in perceptions of failure, the EU seems to remain determined to
enhance and pinpoint to the asset of foreign policy, or - even more specified -
the
creation of a security and defense policy, including military missions. Geoffrey Edwards
has described it as followed:
“And yet there remains an expectation – from others even if not member states
preoccupied with the Euro crisis and its consequences – of something more than
simply consultation. Thus, on the one hand, even against the practicalities of
tightened belts on the part of most EU Members – and what Sharp neatly
summed up as the consequent ‘disjuncture between champagne tastes and beer
budgets’ – there remains a political determination to retain a prerogative of
autonomous action in the field of foreign and security policy.”40
Of course there is a paradoxical downside according to Edwards. The appearance of
collective action, due to pressure – in the form of domestic-, or external political
pressure; and crises – have created a system in which politicians have agreed to ever
further going circumstances of cooperation in the foreign policy arena. Hereby,
politicians have reiterated the circle of perceived need for action, whether this is in the
form of actual policy execution, or institutional reform. 41
Nicola Chelotti, Analysing the Links Between National Capitals and Brussels in EU
Foreign Policy, West European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 1052-1072
40
Geoffrey Edwards, The EU’s foreign policy and the search for effect, International
Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 276-291
41
Geoffrey Edwards, ibid.
39
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Chapter 2:
The EU and the composition of a foreign policy
Intensified European cooperation is a post World War II phenomenon. With the
foundation of the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951, six
European states bound their mutual economic ties to a supranational institution,
officiously expectorating a certain degree of sovereignty. With this forum of economic
dependency and political adherence, political quarrels or shortage of resources did no
longer dissolve into large-scale industrial warfare. However, the degree of economic
cooperation and the decision to develop a common strategy in foreign policy, have been
two significantly different matters. This chapter will provide an overview of the events
that have triggered the European states to commit to the very controversial discipline of
foreign policy.
2.1
The European Political Cooperation
After WWII, European states thus secured their economies from the necessary resources
very quickly, thereby dismantling any incentive for war. Also, the Western European
Union (WEU) and NATO prevised in securing peace, allowing for an enormous economic
comeback of Western Europe during the post-war decades. Under the ECSC, later
transformed into the European Economic Community (EEC), European states focused on
economic cooperation and -integration, while global security threats were being
neutralized by the US. European states did have their own security threats, especially in
their overseas territories, sometimes leading to war. These conflicts however, could
sometimes be positioned in the paradigm of the Cold War, thereby assuring US
assistance.42 In other cases, colonial warfare may have affected European states’
economic and political abilities in their overseas possessions, but hardly ever posed a
serious threat to the European motherland’s existence. The only serious military threat
to Western Europe was the military buildup in the Warsaw Pact states. The WEU and
especially NATO, both founded on military solidarity, were the mechanisms to counter
this threat. The WEU was established on a set of common norms and values, which the
organization desired to secure. In the preamble, the charter states that the parties:
“reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person [and] fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal
Geir Lundesttad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, Oxford University
Press, (New York, 2003), p. 15
42
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freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law,
which are their common heritage.”43
These principles were set in a framework which also encompassed the values of the UNand NATO fora. Still, the WEU seems not to be the result of European motivation to
materialize European common defense policies. Its main aim was the deterrence of
conflict, in order to let economic prosperity and European integration prevail.44 The WEU
seems to have been merely an arrester, and not the potential pro-active defense
mechanism that could save Western Europe.
One should not forget the important symbolic role that NATO has played in the
first post-war decades. Even though the organization was mainly militaristic in nature, it
assured the western European peace and stability, while creating a North-Atlantic
alliance, in which some members saw the enormous potential in a more political
approximation of collaboration, thus disallowing political integration in Europe yet.45
As the WEU was not the predecessor of effective and accurate political foreign
cooperation in the field of European defense, maybe the European Political Conference
(EPC) was. As a result of the Davignon report, the EPC became a non-binding conference
of intergovernmental cooperation, in which hardly any significant permanent organs
existed or offices were filled. Still, the EEC members commonly faced external issues and
started acting as a unity in those matters which affected all. The EPC was a platform in
which sovereignty was fully respected and thus it was entirely intergovernmental. It did
however, set the important first step for the creation of the official implementation of a
common foreign policy in ‘Brusselian’ institutions.46 The EPC was not designed out of lack
of coherent foreign strategy, but rather created since the EEC members recognized they
lacked political aspects which needed to complement the economic integration. With the
project of the common market almost completed, European states needed to integrate in
the political areas, since political union had been the primary goal of European
cooperation in the first place. The desire to speak with common voice, and facing mutual
threats, were the most important incentives for the creation of the EPC. 47
The EPC was regarded as a mixed success, but it exerted the idea of a common
external policy, as the EEC – renamed EC – grew concerned with political events in the
Preamble Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948, Brussels
Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948, Brussels, Articles I and II
45
See the example for the Netherlands: Mathieu Segers, Reis naar het continent, Bert
Bakker uitgeverij, (Amsterdam, 2013), p. 82-84
46
Wolfgang Wessels, European Cooperation: a new approach to European foreign policy,
in European Political Cooperation, ed. By David Allen et al., Butterworths European
Studies, (Bonn, 1982), 1-16 (179p.)
47
Davignon Report, Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the
Problems of political unification, Luxembourg, 27 October, 1970, Part one, points 7, 8, 9.
43
44
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post-Cold War world, which required for a more intensified form of foreign- and defense
policy amongst the now twelve member states.48
These first signs of change regarding significant legally binding European political
instruments concerning common external action were apparent with the signing of the
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA finally brought about this change in the
sphere of foreign policy. As Article 30 of the Act reads:
“1.
The
High
Contracting
Parties,
being
members
of
the
European
Communities, shall endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a
European foreign policy [cursives added].
2.
(a) The High Contracting Parties undertake to, inform and consult each
other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to insure that
their
combined
influence
is
exercised
as
effectively
as
through
coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of
joint action [cursives added].”49
Serious in word and in purport, the SEA may be regarded as the start of the composition
of a common European foreign policy. As the SEA did not only strive for a common
foreign policy, but also for a tighter European political unity within the EC, a single
foreign policy was to become a necessary facet thereof. The SEA lay bare the wish of
some Europhiles in creating the foundations of a Federation of European states. One in
which the Maastricht Treaty had become the next necessary stepping stone.
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was drafted and signed in the Dutch city
of Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991, and 7 February 1992, respectively. It
transformed the construction of European cooperation and integration entirely, as the
European Communities as separate institutions were dissolved, while its notions and
executive structures were bundled into a single institutional structure, known as the
pillar structure of the European Union. The treaty-based organization consisted of three
distended pillars. The first one (the joint pre-existing European Communities), was the
most supranational. Inside this pillar, most of the policy areas were dealt with on which
the European states had been cooperating in already; the common market; the customs
union; agricultural policy; etc.. The third pillar, called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),
dealt with judicial cooperation against organized crime and terrorism and succeeded the
provisional TREVA cooperation. Finally, the second pillar was responsible for the
European
Security
and
Defense
Policy
(ESDP).
It
was
the
iteration
and
Trevor C. Salmon, Testing Times for European Political Cooperation, International
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944 -), Vol. 68, No. 2 (April 1992), p.
233-253
49
Single European Act, Official Journal of the European Communities, Article 30.1, and
30.2(a), June 29, 1987
48
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institutionalization of the preceding EPC, providing for a binding legal instrument in
which EUMS could confer and initialize matters of foreign affairs. According to Smith, the
TEU/ESDP establishment, provided for several important new elements in European
common foreign policy:
1. Assuring that foreign policy became more coherent, while rationalizing the policy
process;
2. Binding EUMS legally by contract to the CFSP;
3. Binding EUMS to the possibility of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
4. Dividing EUFP/CSFP policy makers from domestic policy makers. 50
Despite its heavy intergovernmental features in the CFSP decision-making process,
Maastricht’s second pillar had officially institutionalized European common foreign policy.
since a common foreign policy would lack the common political willingness amongst the
denominated states’ external issues, while a too wide degree of national interests abroad
would surmount the ideal of a common sphere of influence.
The CSFP has since its launch been exposed to lots of criticism. Powered up
almost directly with the beginning with the start of the civil war in the Former
Yugoslavia, the CSFP directly entered a crucial theatre of action, in which it could not
show its usefulness. The disputes on the Balkans ended in open war and massive
bloodshed, while the EUMS of the newly formed CSFP could not make a fist. 51
In the sphere of the realistic theory, critics often state a common foreign policy
amongst several individual states would lack the common political willingness amongst
the denominated states’ external issues, as a too wide degree of national interests would
conflict with the concept of a common agenda. This view has often been countered by
the idea what a foreign policy would have on its agents. A EUFP would create some
sense of Europeanization, and in the end always benefits all actors involved in the
cooperation, despite some smaller disadvantages to its national interests. The largest
proof however, that CFSP was not lingering, but was and remained quite alive, was proof
right under their noses. The project of EUFP had not only been breathed into life shortly
before, it was gaining strength. The fact that the institutionalization was a never-ending
process showed this.52 And with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, amending the TEU, it
became obvious that the brainchild of a large-scale and ambitious notion of a EUFP in
Michael E. Smith, Toward a theory of EU foreign policy making: multi-level
governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe’s common foreign and
security policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 740-758
51
Of course criticism has been expressed in many forms. For a straightforward overview
of EUMS shortcomings during the Balkan wars, see Nicole Gnesotto, Lessons of
Yugoslavia, Chaillot Papers, No. 14, March 1994, 38 p.
52
Ben Tonra, Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a
Cognitive Approach, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 41, No. 4, p. 731-756
50
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effect became more than just a paper notion. The TEU’s recital “to implement a common
foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy,
which might in time lead to a common defense…”, the words “eventual” was replaced by
“progressive”, while “in time” was erased.53
The creation of a EUFP was not one out of security or defense issues, as Western
Europe’s geopolitical interests were secured by the USA and its NATO and WEU
conjunctions. Thus, there was hardly need for pan-European militarism, not on the
European continent, nor in their overseas colonies. Eventually, the Maastricht Treaty
created an official structure of EUFP. To some, this must have meant the end of their
national sovereignty and the conveyance of a highly susceptible domestic policy area to
the unreliable supranational institution. To others, it was the beginning of a larger and
more promising Europe, a necessity for the future. The creation of a foreign policy inside
the concept of the European integration was simple a result of the political need, an
institutional complementation and diplomatic correspondence to the fabulous results in
the economic areas of cooperation. The effectuation of this EFP however, had not been
very successful, yet. And of course the Brussels machine would anticipate to this feature
by signing the Treaty of Lisbon.
2.2
Lisbon Treaty Reforms
The Lisbon Treaty, signed on December 13, 2007, by all EUMS, inured on December 1,
2009. The EU foresaw existing flaws in the decision making process that had been
established by the Maastricht Treaty and its amendments of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice
(2001). After the ratification process took place, the 27 EUMS had officially engaged in
reiterating and intensifying their integration process, also in the area of foreign policy. In
the Lisbon Treaty, noticeable mutations were applied to the external elements of the EU.
Despite these radical changes to the CFSP branch in EU institutions, one might now
wonder how these changes have affected on the EUFP’s execution.
After the 2009 take-off of the Treaty, the EU structure no longer consisted of the
three separate pillars, in which the supranational and the two other intergovernmental
pillars had been separated. Instead, external relations policy areas all had become part
of the larger EUFP ‘ministry’, which conceptualized under the flag of CFSP. The European
Council has become responsible for setting a framework in which EU external action was
to act upon, and it would adopt joint actions and joint objectives, providing a set of
Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Amsterdam, 2 October,
1997, p.4
53
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thematic or geographical issues in which the CFSP department should work with and in
which the EUMS may act within. The High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs
and Security (HR) has become the head and coordinator of the EU’s external policy
actions, aided by its own diplomacy service, the European External Action Service
(EEAS). The HR also became the face of the EU in external relations, together with the
other new office, the President of the EU Council; A double-headed office which came the
subject of much criticism.54
In general, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty could have been viewed as an
important step in the right direction towards a coherent and effective EUFP. The Treaty,
as Gaspers analyzes, could show the “persistence of diverging national attitudes towards
the role the Union should play in the field of security and defense.” 55 The most important
institutional changes and the declaration to the establishment of a European defense
system has also proved to finally give some important aspects from EUMS capitals to
Brussels. With this, Antonio Missiroli agrees, as well that the creation of the EEAS will
have to take the necessary leading role in the nature of the CFSP. Apart from the child
diseases the institutional reforms may lay bare, both analysts worry that the multi-office
of HR and EU Council President, has become a large obstacle for resilience and adequacy
in the higher CFSP echelon. The performance of the HR, and its relationship with the EU
President will be vital in CFSP execution.56
As EUFP was subject to one of the most significant mutations under the Lisbon
Treaty, it is important to realize that the EEAS remains the impressive result of a very
ambiguous process of bargaining and decision-making. From the start of the negation
processes that preceded the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, ten years have passed. In this
decade, M.E. smith argues, the developments within the field of EUFP have far outpaced
any other field of EU politics. Therefore, the erection of an institution like the EEAS,
which finally ‘institutionalizes’ EUFP, may seem orotund. In practice however, the EEAS
has not yet proven to be of added value for the EUFP. Short term strategies in case of
crises have not yet seemed sufficient, and the deployment of EU civilian - , or military
missions has ceased.57
For example in Kataryna Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening
the EU as an International Actor, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No.1,
2010, p. 57-72, and in Pol Morillas, Institutionalization of intergovernmental DecisionTaking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, EU External
Relations, Law and Policy in the post-Lisbon era, ed. By P.J. Cardwell, Asser Press, (The
Hague, 2012), p. 119-134
55
Jan Gaspers, The quest for European foreign policy consistency and the Treaty of
Lisbon, University of Cambridge, p. 20-53
56
Antonio Missiroli, The New EU ‘Foreign Policy’ System after Lisbon: A Work in
Progress, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 427-452, 2010
57
M.E. smith, The EEAS and the security- development nexus: Organizing for
effectiveness or incoherence?, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 12991315
54
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Whitman and Juncos have been disappointed about the supposed revolutionizing
new approaches the Lisbon Treaty has provided for. They regard them as merely
institutional renovations. The Treaty itself has hardly altered CFSP itself, but only the
office from where ideas were founded. Above all, most areas in which CFSP wants to
become active, the EU already is present in other forms. Countless examples show that
the Lisbon Treaty could hardly change the nature of CFSP; not in how it was processed
or guided, but in the way it was operationalized it would change little. 58 The Treaty again
is a result not of a geopolitical necessity, but a perceived latent demand in the Brussels
elite. Creating large-scale institutions for external action, epochal military - and defense
expedients, the EU has taken a further step on its indefinite path to a federalism. Adding
European Security and Defense Policy into the EUFP framework, comprising elements
such as the European Rapid Reaction forces (RRF), and the later EU Battle Groups, the
EU made a clear statement about where it was going towards. 59
So with the Lisbon Treaty reforms, the EU is one step closer in becoming a
continent-wide federalist superpower. in the eyes of some. And admittedly, despite the
absence of a European army, parallels with defense ministries are hardly inescapable.
Even though checks and balances have been integrated in the process, the EU’s CFSP
under the Treaty of Lisbon has become a new important step in the creation of a
powerful global actor. And this has been exactly its purpose. The Lisbon Treaty’s
preamble states very explicitly, that the European Union has:
“[r]esolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the
progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common
defense […], thereby reinforcing the European identity and the independence in
order to promote peace, security and progress in the world.”
60
Notwithstanding the inherent feature of intergovernmentalism in EUFP, the
strategic power has been supplanted from the capitals towards Brussels. “The European
Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and
define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for
matters with defense implications. It shall adopt the necessary decisions.” 61 A devilish
statement for nationalist Euro-skeptics. Even though the Council is the still relatively
intergovernmental, it is no longer the capitals, but the “the Council [which] shall frame
the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining
Richard Whitman and Anna juncos, The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and
Defense Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (non-)Ratification,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, p. 25-46, 2009
59
ibid
60
Treaty of Lisbon, section II, p.19
61
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 26.1, p. 42
58
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and implementing it [EU foreign policy strategies] on the basis of the general guidelines
and strategic lines [..]”.62
With the partial transfer to Brussels of one of the most incremental policy areas in
government, EUFP hereby created its own institutional pitfall, according to Vanhoonacker
et al. The institutional change as we saw provided in the Lisbon Treaty, also agitated a
modification in how foreign policy is organized. The foreign policy processes, as a result
of this gradual evolvement, have developed more into a system in which bureaucracy,
and not diplomacy, is the key to productivity. This system over time has become heavily
dependent on procedures, rules, dossiers, etc. as a result of the gradual creation of a
multi-level government in which more and more actors have gotten involved in. 63
Missiroli worries that the institutional changes provided by the Treaty of Lisbon could
have made progressive changes to European foreign policy consistency. There have been
however, some barriers in which the Treaty did not foresee. Especially when it comes to
the consistency in common foreign policy on the one hand and those of the individual MS
on the other, a problem which might have been reinforced by the EU’s changing
presidency-role.64 Laursen believes the Union’s CFSP competences based on the Lisbon
Treaty features ‘remain limited in various ways’, as unanimity remains the normal
decision rule. But mostly she fears the uncertainty of what defines CFSP. Specific policy
areas as ‘development cooperation’ and ‘humanitarian aid’ are mentioned as shared
competences with ‘external action’, but nowhere the specific CFSP competences have
been defined.65
It seems that the Lisbon Treaty’s weight on the CFSP has had enormous
turbulence in both the political as well as in the academic arena. To fully understand its
implications and analyze its results however, maybe it is too early. Though, in order to
analyze current EUFP, it was indispensible to understand the consequences of the Lisbon
Treaty and the major difficulties facing the EU in trying to become a just and respected
global actor. What has become clear, is that the advocates of stronger EU influence have
expanded the EU policy areas much wider and more permanently. They have developed
and complicated the EU’s institutions; They has conceptualized and realized an existing
foreign policy subdivision; And They have widened and intensified the gap between those
who wanted all these facets of EU administration, and those who did not.
With the Treaty of Lisbon closely reinforcing the need for political consensus in
the necessity for common foreign policy priorities, the EUMS have created a new
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 26.2, p. 42
Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra and Heide Maurer, Understanding the Role of
Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defense Policy: The State of the Art,
European Integration online Papers, Vol. 14, special Issue 1, (2010), 33 p.
64
Misseroli, 2010
65
Finn Laursen, Introduction, in : Designing the European Union, ed. By Finn Laursen,
Palgrave MacMillan, (London, 2012), p. 22 (336)
62
63
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
expectation of how the EU is to react in not only regional, but global crises situations. Of
course there is still an enormous gap between EU possibilities and its expectations, since
it has not yet proven itself. The gap however, is present.66 These expectations are
difficult to fill in, yet even live up to. The modifiers of the Lisbon Treaty and its CFSP
agenda have been very ambitious. And although it has only been in action for some
years, in terms of crisis management, some conclusions can be made. The European
Council for example, has proven to be an important and clear institution with the political
ability to set longer-term vision, etc. Its number in elements however, and its too
infrequent numbers of meeting don’t allow it to be a well advisor in serious crisis
management, and it should for these dimensions leave more to the Foreign Affairs
Council.67
The Lisbon Treaty has thus been a very ambiguous project and definitely not one
without controversy. As the implementation can hardly be expected fully operational only
several years after its official start, some results may be expected already. As the first
HR has focused mainly on administering the new facets of the EUFP and its institutional
framework, With the new HR in power, the EU should finally start acting like a global
power, at least in the wake of regional crises. And in particular in the case of the IPC,
the EU can no long afford to stand idly by.
Barbara Delcourt and Eric Remacle, A challenge for common foreign and security
policy, in: The European Union and global governance, ed. By Mario Teló, p. 233-257
67
Youri Devuyst, The European Council and the CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty, European
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 327-349
66
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Chapter 4
The EU and the conflicting parties
As mentioned, it was the authors initial aim to research the EU’s involvement in the
Palestinian quest for self-determination. As this chapter shall show, the relationship
between the EU and the Palestinians has however, not been a rather solidified one.
Even though Europeans have since long been supportive towards improving the
Palestinian humanitarian situation, and more recently, their political ambitions, the
Europeans have also been divided. Even, their enormous adherence to a courteously
negotiated two-state solution proves the disparity between the EU’s
and the PA’s
stances. Firstly, this chapter shall give an overview of the EU-Palestine relations and how
these have been effectuated and affected. Secondly, it shall try how the relationship
between the EU and Israel has reversed over the decades, but still maintains of
considerable importance to the EU.
4.1
First Relations
The EEC and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established official connections
in 1975, when the PLO was still the official executive branch of the Palestinian Authority .
In 1976, the EEC formed an official information and liaison representative office in the
Palestinian Territories, in the city of Ramallah. In 1980, the EEC issued the Venice
Declaration, in which it called for the “justice for all the peoples, which implies the
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”. 68 With this declaration, the
EEC as a political entity declared their solidarity with the Palestinians, as well as
reemphasizing the right to existence and security of the state of Israel. Regarding the
Palestinians however, the declaration did not mention a Palestinian state, but instead
focused on the “Palestinian people, which [the EEC] is conscious of existing as such,
must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of
the comprehensive peace settlement to exercise fully its right to self-determination.”69
To solidify their solidarity with the Palestinians, the EU and the PLO again reached
agreements in trade and cooperation, when in 1997 the Interim Association Agreement
was signed. Again, the PLO represented the PA, which was hereby added to the list of
EU’s official political partners as a part of the Barcelona Process, the predecessor of the
Southern compartment of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.
68
69
Venice Declaration, art. 4, June 13, 1980
Ibid, art. 6, June 13, 1980
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As the EU became not only diplomatically, but also contractually assigned to the
Palestinians, it started pro-actively acting towards one of its most enterprising and
financially engulfing projects: the building of a Palestinian state. While doing so,
rhetorically the EU became ever more critical on Israeli settlement policy in the
Westbank and condemning the perpetual Israeli de facto occupation of Gaza. Also, it
starting to financially aid the Palestinians in their humanitarian situation through direct
EU funding, instead of through indirect aid via European NGO’s, as it mainly did before
1997.70 Besides this, the EU kept stressing the need for continuation of peace talks in
the paradigm of the Roadmap with the ultimate goal of a two-state solution, while
accrediting an ever growing role for itself in the peace talks.71
Since the early 1990s, little has seemed to change when looking at public EU’s
releases about the IPC and the MEPP, or the action it has undertaken. As the failure of
Oslo and other peace talks have emerged over the years, the EU has rhetorically and
financially settled itself in the enormous Palestinian state-building commitment more and
more. But in spite of their commitment of a Palestinian state, the EU remains dedicated
to the achieving the two-state solution. In their 2013 EU-Palestine Action Plan, the EU:
“reaffirms its commitment to a two-state solution through the creation of an
independent, democratic, contiguous and Viable State of Palestine, living side by
side with Israel. EU support to the prospect of a Palestinian state and to the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a concrete translation [thereof].” 72
It may seem as if European support for the Palestinians was mainly motivated by
ideological-moral and -ethical motivations, but European states also became utterly
frustrated by the growing American influence in the Arab speaking region. After several
decades of (semi-)colonial influence and a long history of cultural and economic trade
and ties in the MENA region, the USA had replaced most European stakes in the Arab
world after WWII. This obstructed Europeans not only because they believed to have a
larger interest in this region, but also since they believed to have more understanding of
local cultures and histories than the Americans ever could. This competitive view, in
combination with the oil-crisis and the European understanding that the Arab states
were not a significant unity, led to the institution of the Euro-Arab dialogue. The growing
Patrick Müller, EU Foreign Policy Making and the Middle East, Routledge, (New York,
2012), chapter 1, e-book, pages unrecognizable
71
For example, Berlin European Council Declaration, 24-25 March 1999 and Declaration
of the EU on the Middle East (Seville European Council, 21-22 June, 2002)
72
2013 EU-PA Action Plan, Political Chapeau p.3
70
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understanding and respect for Arab states amongst European politicians, and –
populaces, ultimately contributed to a growing favor of Palestinian sympathy.73
4.2
The EU and Israel
As growing European sympathy towards the Palestinians was facilitated by increasing
Euro-Arab cohesion, it was also alleviated by the growing disparity between Europe and
Israel, after the June 1967 war. Even though European relations vis-à-vis Israel had
been founded on West-European states’ traditional support for the Jewish homeland, this
changed after roughly two decades. During the startup years of the ECSC, all six
member states had voted in favor of the 1947 UN Partition Plan74, and Belgium, France,
Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands de jure recognized Israeli within two years. The
GFR followed two years later. The EEC states became close allies of Israel during the
1950s and 1960s. France, for a brief period, became Israel’s primary supplier of military
equipment, intelligence and even knowledge in nuclear weapons development. The fate
of the Palestinian refugees was of humanitarian importance in the West, but the Israelis
successfully marginalized the situation of the Palestinians and the political issue of a
Palestinian homeland was ignored. The EEC was involved in economic and energy
coordination and cooperation, but it hardly concerned itself with common political issues
yet. The 1967 war, in which all EEC states still followed a separate policy vis-à-vis Israel,
changed this situation, as it was one of the incentives towards political cohesiveness.75
As initial European sympathy towards the Jewish state was broad, so was the
Israeli desire to strengthen ties with Europe. Many Israeli’s had European roots, and
politically and culturally the European states were still much more alike than their
neighboring Arab states, which were hostile to the young nation. Politically, militarily and
economically, Israel was being isolated, and increasing trade and diplomatic relations
with the friendly Europeans was not only necessary, it also meant gaining a foothold in
regional politics. The EEC also presented a realistic image of Israel as a welcome
partner, but full EEC membership however, soon seemed contingent at the very most,
and precarious at the least.76
During the 1967 Six Day War, France renounced its affiliation with Israel and the
EEC got divided over whom it supported. Even though a majority of the EEC states still
Francois d’Alancon, The EC looks to a new Middle East, Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol. 23, No. 2, 1994, p. 41-51
74
(West)Germany and Italy were not UN members then.
75
Moshe Shemesh, The Founding of the PLO 1964, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20,
No.4, (October 1984), p.105-141, 81
76
Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Israel and the European Union, Lexington Books,
(Plymouth, 2012), p. 1-5
73
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An inconsequent consciousness:
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supported Israel over the Arabs, relations had become disputable, especially with the
1973 energy crisis. As energy supply to the EEC states had been impaired, the EEC
needed restore Euro-Arab relations. In order to spawn the Arabic oil states, the EEC
declared a pro-Palestinian statement, in which it regarded the legitimate rights of the
Palestinians to be taken into account while working towards “just and lasting peace”. 77
Of course this outraged the Israeli politicians, who had felt betrayed. 78 Slowly but
deliberately, the Europeans began alienating Israel from the political European concert. 79
If the 1973 statement had felt like a stab in the back, then the aforementioned
Venice Declaration must have felt like a declaration of war. Israeli politicians were
furious and feared the European stance in the conflict would endanger their security.
Although this has been extremely exaggerated, Israel-European relations by then had
become austerely politicized. Furthermore, a united European voice, led by France,
initiated a principal role in the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Although the EEC could hardly fulfill these ideals, it did engage in a structural policy of
publicly criticizing Israeli settlement policy and the treatment of the Palestinian
refugees.80
Despite heated discussions about the fate of the Palestinians, the EU and Israel
have engaged in wide cooperation in economically related projects, but also in a political,
socio-cultural, and educational and scientific frameworks they have closely cooperated.
Especially the construction of the ENP and Israel’s admittance to this partnership has
benefitted the bilateral relationship, as it provided Israel with new sets of possibilities in
economic ties. But most importantly, the ENP provided Israel with new security
assurances in the wider geographical region. And although Israel was very hopeful in
terms of the creation of new action plans towards further integration with the EU, the EU
has not quite redeemed this promise yet.81
Where the EU-Israel Association Agreement is as nearly an economic engagement
as the one with the PA, the commitment between the EU and Israel, according to
Paasivirta, again “reflect [s] that value and importance [of] the EU [as] the principal
export market for Israeli agricultural products.”82 Although negotiations between Israel
and the EU about several Association Issues have been hindered because of discord
concerning the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, the collaboration between the
EU and Israel based on the Association Agreement remains a purely economic matter in
EPC, Middle East Declaration, 6 November 1973
Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Israel and the European Union, p. 73-77
79
Rory Miller, The PLO Factor in Euro-Israel Relations, 1964-1992, Israel Affairs, Vol. 10,
No. 1-2, p. 123-155
80
Ibid, p. 151-154
81
Ibid, 319-326
82
Esa Paasivirta, EU Trading with Israel and Palestine: Paralel Legal Frameworks and
Triangular Issues, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 305-326
77
78
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
which both parties find trade relations to be beneficial. Also, and despite the non-equal
status concerning the EU-PA contract, the EU-PA free trade agreement is not a political
statement; the EU’s economic commitment towards the PA is totally unrelated towards
the EU’s stance on Palestinian statehood.83
So even though the EU has been economically dedicated to both parties in the
conflict, it does seem that the Israelis benefit much more of the trade agreements with
the EU than the Palestinians do. Instead, the EU may have trade agreements with the
PA, but the PA is also one of the largest receivers of EU funding. This asymmetric
attitude from the EU vis-à-vis both parties remains important to understand when we
analyze further events of how the EU has behaved within the framework of the IPC.
83
Ibid
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Chapter 5
The EU in the IPC/MEPP
The problems facing the EU concerning its foreign policy show parallels in how it has
been struggling in how to become an influential actor within the IPC. The internal
division amongst EUMS, and the fact that there has not yet emerged a possibility of a
European military apparatus that can be used as leverage over either conflicting party
still does not allow the EU to match the USA in their prominent role as conflict mediator.
What the Europeans have done though, is not simply rhetorical, but they shown a
significant political, economic and financial symbolism in their ideological quest: the
defense of values and rights. For both parties in the conflict the EU has and will remain
actively engaged in respecting their sovereignty (towards the Israelis), and the respect
and fight for the right to self-determination and the quest for independent statehood
(towards the Palestinians). Furthermore, the EU has been concerned about the
humanitarian situation and has actively been involved in aid donations and structural
investments to solve the Palestinians socio-economic situation in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank.84 This chapter will focus on how the EU has been involved in the IPC/MEPP
and what have been the basic obstacles therein.
5.1
Pre-Lisbon accomplishments
There has been little dispute amongst analysts about the fact that Europe has not been a
major actor during the MEPP, at least until the Lisbon Treaty emerged. Even though EU
declarations since the Venice Declaration have become increasingly insisting in
respecting Palestinians’ rights and have called for the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state, the EU lacked institutional tools and political cohesiveness for actual
action in the diplomatic arena.
In the context of the wider MENA region, the needs for Europe to keep up at least
the appearance of a foreign policy framework, was righteous already in the early 1990s.
As Europe was not only an important trading partner with the regions south of the
Mediterranean, Europe would also avail with stability in these regions because of its
dependency of energy from the Arab region, and the potential problems of mass
migration, and terrorism in case of social and political collapse. The end of the Cold War
marked a new era in which Europe stood afoot of new challenges and threats in its close
regional environment. As we have seen before, the challenges gave demand to the
Author Unknown, Europe’s Role In the Palestinian-Israel Conflict, European Union
Centre of North Carolina Policy Area: Middle East Peace Process, EU Briefings, March
2008, 9 p.
84
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
creation of a common foreign policy, in which the agenda of the IPC, was one of the
most prominent topics.85 During the 1990’s, Europe had hardly challenged the US as the
main influential actor in the peace process. Nor had it become a strong military power in
the area either. The 1990’s have showed the EU that in order to ruffle the American
military and economic dominance in the MENA region, and Washington’s influence in the
MEPP, it needed to base its approach on economic leverage. As the EU could not match
American ‘hard power’ superiority, it developed a broad economic framework in the
region,86 which would ultimately result in the ENP: The Barcelona Process.
But outside of the regional network of the Barcelona Process, which was
principally an economic meeting in order to gain some influence over non-economic
matters, there was little consensus on how the EU could initiate serious political leverage
over the Israeli government concerning the Palestinians. EUMS stayed hopelessly divided
in their peace ideals. 87 And although during the 1990s, the EU increased its financial aid
for the Palestinians, and in 1996 even appointed a special representative for the
Palestinian issue, initiatives like these were hardly welcomed by their Quarter peace
partners, and even rejected by the Israelis. More importantly, it hardly presented the EU
a more weighty character during the negotiations.
Despite their diligent and earnest ideas and aspirations to stride for their
admirable ideals in the IPC, the EU has hardly been able to defend any of them.
According to Alastair Livingston this failure is even more drastic since it features a failure
in those areas the EU finds very important or is very good at, which is levering the
economic assets it possesses. The reluctance to employ their economic tools in the
context of the IPC on the case of Israel, is expressive. The EU must have felt it cannot
arouse too much irritation on the Israeli side.88 And while not willing to use its economic
power over the Israeli governments, it will definitely not render to militaristic rhetoric.
Since it has observed increasing numbers of violent incidents between the conflicting
parties, the EU does not want to pick up the stick, while keeping the carrot in the other
hand. Their unwillingness to at least threaten with military consequences however, has
made them incapable of ceasing violence, according to Pijpers. He believes EU preLisbon policy in the case of the IPC included two defects. Firstly, the EU did not focus on
the correct root causes of the conflict. He believes the EU analyzed the conflict to be the
result of Israeli occupation over the Palestinian Territories, and not as the result of a
François d’Alançon, The EC looks to a new Middle East, Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol. 23, No. 2, (1994), p. 41-51
86
Rosemary Hollis, Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?, International Affairs
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. 1997), p. 15-29
87
M.B. Altunişik, EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How much of an
actor? European Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 105-121
88
Alastair Livingston, EU Failure in Economic Relations: The Case of Israel and Palestine,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, p.503-518
85
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Palestinian security threat, perceived by the Israelis. The EU may not have had much
political or military leverage during the pre-Lisbon negotiation years. But what it has
done, and should continue doing, is being involved in both Palestine’s and Israel’s civil
societies, and play an important role in eliminating the grass root causes of conflict. By
being involved in civil societies, Europe can make a contribution to lasting peace and
thereby evolve and exploit and expand its own soft-power skills.89 This is a logical result,
also considering the increasing support for the Palestinian cause, by both politicians as
well as European populations, who became severely more pro-Palestinian, or possibly
anti-Israel. The view on the root causes of conflict have been clogged by a biased view.
Secondly, Pijpers insists that the European ‘civil’ culture, in which the EU and its
populations do not wish to engage in violent measures, needs a drastic mentality
change. Though pacifism may seem admirable, it will not lead to tangible solutions in the
IPC. As both adversaries had become used to the increasing amounts of violence, the EU
could only have been able to cease the violence unless it was willing to at least threaten
with its hard power tools, which it was not. The EU has proven to be capable of sending
armed forces in external areas, and these have partially been successful missions. In this
conflict however, the willingness to structurally deploy hard power material, has been
lacking for too long.90
This reluctance towards hard power tools vis-à-vis Israel, may have been out of
pacifistic ideology, or dispossession of courage, or even out of fear of conflict with
Washington. For any reason, where the EU was frustrated by being incapable of
hindering Israeli continuation of violent actions, it has dumped its frustration by
financially providing for the Palestinians. Where the EU cannot contain Israelis, it feels
like it needs to pour more money into the state-building projects in the Palestine. This
inability by the EU in particular, but also by the international community in general, has
resulted into the current paradoxical stalemate. While many speak about creating a
two-state solution, the reality is still from far that, as the existing situation is merely
reconfirming the situation of an Occupied Palestinian Territories status.91
But
besides
reluctance
towards
violence
and
financial/political
ineptitude,
Soetendorp believes the EU simply did not have the institutional tools to act properly as
a well structured organization. He presents an interesting overview of how the main
actors in Brussels structure were sometimes confused about their roles and authority.
The High Representative for the Middle East, the EU Presidency and the External
Michael Schulz, The EU’s Intervention in the Israeli-Palestine Conflict, in: War and
Peace in Transition: Changing Roles of External Actors, ed. By Karin Aggestam & Annika
Björkdaal, Nordic Academic Press, (Lund, 2009), p. 72-89
90
Alfred Pijpers, The EU and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,: The limits of the CFSP,
Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, September 11, 2007, 6 p.
91
Dimitris Bouris, The European Union and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Statebuilding without a state, Routledge, (New York, 2014), p. 3-4
89
Robbin Looije
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Relations Commissioner seemed to be confused about their possibilities and their
legitimacy towards their positions and one another. Soetendorp calls this example the
most important impetus for change in the form of the Lisbon Treaty, but also an
important lesson that the architects of the Lisbon Treaty have learned from. As the High
Representative could face the diplomatic contact in light of the negotiations, Soetendorp
believes the economic power of the EU has ultimately led to the growing European
footprint on regional affairs.92
So, despite its struggles in gaining global status by become an important MEPP actor,
the EU were incompetent in regional politics, due to in incoherency; militarily inadequate
of matching the US Army; And institutionally immature during the 1990s. It almost got
itself excluded from the Oslo Accords, the most important notion in the MEPP. Also, it
was not able to use its economic leverage since it was afraid of hurting existing
economic ties with Israel. As a result, it compensated by financially supporting the PA,
creating an impervious standoff. To become a serious actor in the IPC/MEPP, the EU
needed to develop. It started to (a) focus more and more on the usage of a civilian
power modus in the conflict, and (b) modify its institutions and resource mobilization.
5.2
The Post-Lisbon Years
The Lisbon Treaty imposed enormous institutional changes on the external branch of the
EU structures and institutions. It is important to understand how these institutional
changes have been used, and if these have been used in order to give EU officials a
larger weight on the conflicting parties in the IPC. Rachel Frid de Vries believes that the
‘new’ EU has in fact initiated evocatively a number of new processes, in both support for
the Palestinians as well as political pressure on the Israelis. These processes however,
were mostly part of a larger framework of promises and threats if the parties would not
participate pro-actively in the peace process.93 And in some perspective, one could say
that the post-Lisbon EU initiatives in the long term show the features of a more proPalestinian attitude, since it has focused even more on state-building projects, aid funds,
and Security Sector Reform (SSR). On the other hand, the EU initiatives towards the
Israelis have had a strong anti-settlement character. In July 2013 for example, the
European Council pushed a set of “Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their
Ben Soetendorp, The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The
Building of a Visible International Identity, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7,
2002, p. 283-295
93
Rachel Frid de Vries, Normative Power Europe and the Israeli Palestinian Conflict –
Balancing Power and Weakness, Carmel Academic Centre, (Joint Paper with Wybe
Douma)
92
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
activities in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 for grants, prizes and financial
instruments funded by the EU”94
Still, despite these features, the actions that have been undertaken do not show
the characteristics of a wider EU strategy towards the IPC. As noted, the Treaty of Lisbon
allows and calls for the European Council to develop a long term strategy in how the EU
should act in the IPC. On the November 17 2014 EU Council Meeting on the MEPP for
example, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council confined its statements. Besides the Council’s
concern for and condemnation of violence, it has merely called for change, emphasizing
the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and the concern to resume peace talks. This is
sympathetic rhetoric, but hardly includes contributive actions to resume the peace
process or to ‘punish’ the actors involved. It seems that no plan or strategy has been
developed in which direction the EU will and should act towards. Also, the European
Council did not even mention the situation in the Middle East during its first five
scheduled meetings95, while in the sixth only re-insisting the necessity to resume peace
talks, briefly.96 Same goes for many of the other statements by the European Council of
Foreign Affairs. Statements have generally been void and nugatory. It seems that the
IPC/MEPP is a continuous concern for the EU, but as soon as other crises emerge, the
fate of the Middle East is being pressed down on the agenda.
In 2014, the European Council made 7 statements regarding the IPC. One dealt
with the extension of the mandate for the EU police mission in the Palestine.97 Three
other statements regarded conclusions about the MEPP 98, while of the remaining two,
one condemned the abduction of the three Israeli students99. The last two were the
Council’s conclusions on the Middle East situation (Gaza)100. In general, these
Official Journal of the European Union, Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities
and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes
and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards, (2013/C 205/05),
Brussels, 19 July, 2013, 3p.
95
European Council Meeting Conclusions, 10/11 December 2009, Brussels; European
Council Meeting Conclusions, 25/26 March, 2010, Brussels; European Council Meeting
Conclusions, 17 June, 2010; European Council Meeting Conclusions, 28/29 October,
2010, Brussels, European Council Meeting Conclusions, 16/17 December, 2010,
Brussels.
96
European Council Meeting Conclusions, 4 February, 2011, Brussels
97
European Union Council, Press Release: EU police mission in the Palestinian Territories
Extended, 9 July, 2014, Brussels
98
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process,
12 May, 2014, Brussels; Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on the
Middle East Peace Process, 22 July, 2014, Brussels; Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,
Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 17 November, 2014, Brussels.
99
Council of the European Union, Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the
latest developments following the abduction of three Israeli students, 28 June, 2014,
Brussels.
100
Council of the European Union , Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the
escalation in the Gaza Strip, 18 July, 2014, Brussels; Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,
Council Conclusions on the Middle East (Gaza), 15 August, 2014, Brussels.
94
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The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
statements tell us lots about the EU’s fanatic call for ending the violence in the conflict,
and its concern for the humanitarian situation and the political stability within this area,
as well as the illegitimacy of the territorial expansion by settlers, allowed by the Israeli
government. But these statements however, hardly give insight in the long-term vision
of the EU’s concerns for the IPC. Unfortunately, the same could be said about the
European Council’s meetings. While this institution has been mandated by the Lisbon
Treaty to set a larger strategy in its foreign policy, this is hardly noticeable, as its
declarations concerning Israel and Palestine show their rejection of violence (from all
conflicting actors) and concern for the humanitarian situation, little shows the EU’s
positioning in where and how the EU should actively get involved in the conflict
dynamics.
The HR, one of the most prominent Lisbon Treaty mutations in the EUFP branch,
has made many statements about the IPC/MEPP situation. Firstly, lady Catherine Ashton,
and in 2014 appointed Frederica Mogherini have often issed statements in which they
have denounced both Israeli and Palestinian violence, and emphasized the need to
improve the conditions in the OPT, especially in Gaza. 101 These statements however, are
often brief and have little legal basis. They have however, especially with the arrival of
Frederica Mogherini, been very critical and unambiguous.
But the main strength the EU has in gaining leverage over the conflicting parties,
are the cooperation initiatives it has with both Israel and the PA. It has been the EU
initiative
from
the
modifying
the
Barcelona
process
into
a
larger
European
Neighbourhood policy that has allowed for the most control and can in the future create
most change. According to Philip Robin, Mediterranean cooperation and economic
institutionalization will ultimately have the highest chance of succeeding. Although these
hardly deliver any significant results in the short term, they might contribute in the
whole process of trust-building. Another important note is that these are exclusively EU
led, so influence from Washington is non-existent.102
It remains very striking that when the EU reports about the matter of the
IPC/MEPP, it does so within the paradigm of the two-state solution, and in cooperation of
the Quartet. Instead of embracing a new option for resolution, the EU stays committed
to these notions, while not questioning their usefulness. 103
It is very contentious to say that the Lisbon Treaty has not created change in the
dynamics of the EU’s policy in the case of Palestine. It may be daring to say that small
For example, interview with Frederiga Mogherini, I24news, EU’s Mogherini: ‘Would be
glad if Palestinian state is founded on my watch’, available at:
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/49743-141104-eu-smogherini-common-threat-creates-common-interest-in-the-mideast
102
Philip Robin, Always the Bridesmaid, Europe and the Middle East Peace Process,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No.2, p. 69- 84
103
For example, European Council Meeting Conclusions, 4 February, 2011, Brussels
101
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local results have been achieved, but the question remains if even these fit very well in
the larger image the EU idealizes as a conflict mediator in the IPC. Some of these
initiatives will be discussed in the next chapter. What is obvious though, is the increasing
number in which the European Council discusses the Middle Eastern situation, and as the
MEPP should have been one of its spearheads of EUFP, it seems that there is focus on
the conflict. At least more than during the pre-Lisbon era.
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Chapter 6
EU initiatives
The Lisbon Treaty has given the EU many legal grasps in order to attempt serious
initiatives in its foreign policy. In this chapter, two of the most revealing projects in
external relations will be discussed. Firstly the European Neighborhood Policy, and
secondly the two EU missions in Palestine. The former is a strong tool which allows the
EU to keep strong and promising bilateral connections with their neighboring states. 104
But since it is based on economic cooperation and does not fall under the restriction of
the EEAS, it should not be seen as a hard power EUFP tool. It is however, an important
consequence of Lisbon Treaty reforms. The latter, the EU police missions, are results of
the CFSP, as these are pre-Lisbon products, but now fall under the EEAS.
6.1 The European Neighborhood Policy
The ENP consists of a bilateral agreements between the EU and each adjoined individual
neighboring state. These states become part of a multi-lateral regional cooperation
institute: The Eastern neighboring states assembled in the Eastern Partnership; The
Southern and Southeastern states in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the later
formerly known as the Barcelona Process and the former as the Black Sea Synergy. Via
the ENP, the EU has been trying to implement their commitment to certain norms and
values in their direct region. By addressing human rights violations, non-transparent
political processes, social inequality, environment pollution, etc., the EU has attempted
to increase awareness for these values amongst their ENP partners. The Interim
Agreements signed between the EU and all ENP participants demand a positive change of
conduct regarding all these values the EU so heavily claims to pursue. In return, these
partner states are being allowed economic benefits in the form of access conditions to
the EU market with their domestic products. These partnerships provide enormous
economic boosts for both the EU and their partnership states. In 2011 for example, total
trade between the EU and its ENP partners was worth €230 billion.105
The ENP initiative has showed the EU that it is a great way to exercise economic
trade relations with all neighboring states, but also allows them to agree over certain
non-economic values in order to stay participative in the project. Problems may rise of
course, if the EU does not sanction those states who neglect the agreements, in which
104
105
EU on the ENP, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm
EU on the ENP, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm
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not only a precedent can be created in when the EU is allowed to act upon a partner
state, but it can also lose its legitimacy as a consistent normative power.
Through the European Neighborhood Instruments (The funding institution of the
ENP), the EU also provides certain funds for its ENP partners. In 2014, total ENI funds
disposable for the PA amounted to € 309.5 million. The majority of these funds (€ 170.5
million) were meant for basic PA state-administrative costs like civil servant salaries,
social security payments, etc. Another large amount (€ 87 million has been assigned for
the UNRWA in support of the Palestinian refugees. The additional € 52 million was used
for purposes as government support (€ 13 million), support for investment in trade and
vocational training (€ 10.5 million), financial assistance to the Hebron Wastewater Plant
(€ 15 million), assistance to Area C (€ 3.5 million), and assistance for projects in East
Jerusalem (€ 10 million).106
Academic evaluations for the proposal of the ENP were in general modestly
positive107 to surprisingly enthusiastic108 several years ago. More recent events however,
have exposed that the EU’s goals of regional stability on the one hand, while
encouraging states to democratize and promote human rights interest on the other, have
often been conflicting.109 The ENP has shown its usefulness to be utilized as a
promotional tool for the goals the EU emulates. The EU however, had not considered
that these goals and the end goal of the ENP itself – a stable neighboring region – are
often contradicting. In order to get more fruitful result, the EU needs to politicize and
differentiate their relations more.110 The EU has not shown that the ENP has been utilized
in creating a tool to use for building bridges on the long term. Instead, it has created
inconsistent policy and not the unanimity it so often needs. In the MENA theatre, the EU
and its push for democracy promotion has hardly created a prolific foundation for the
future relationships in terms of political advancement theories. 111 These double
standards are noticeable in many cases in the Eastern- as well as in the Southern
neighborhood area, and also definitely in the case of Palestine.
EU Neighborhood Policy Overview – Palestine, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/palestine/index_en.htm
107
See for example Esther Barbé and Elisabeth-Johansson-Nogues, The EU as a modest
‘force of good: The European Neighbourhood Policy, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1,
January 2008, p.81-96
108
See for example Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The European Neighbourhood Policy: The
EU’s Newest Foreing Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11,(2006) p. 139-142
109
Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen, One voice, one message, but conflicting goals;
cohesiveness and consistentcy in the European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 1033-1049,
110
Charles Grant, A new neighbourhood policy for the EU, Centre for European Reform,
2011, 13 p.
111
Michelle Pace, Paradoxes and Contradiction in EU democracy promotion in
Mediterrean: The limits of EU normative power, Democratization, special issue: The
European Union’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical Inside-Out
Approach, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 39-58
106
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6.1. 1
The PA and the ENP
As said, the EU provides the PA with enormous financial support. With such assistance
comes the PA’s responsibility to abide the EU to its wishes. This is where the discrepancy
in interests kicks in. With the notion of my ally’s ally may evolve into my future
nightmare terrorist organization, the EU has frozen financial aid to the PA after the
Hamas democratic victory in Palestine. Lazarou et al. disagree with this decision.
“Consequently, it can be argued that the EU has at its disposal the legal
instruments to ensure Israel’s abidance by the norms and rules that guide
bilateral relations between the two but perhaps lacks the – unanimous - political
will.”112
EU democracy promotion has not been a real success when observers regard the
whole Mediterranean region in general. And the EU’s attempts in the Palestine can be
seen as symbolic for this structural failure. Stephan Stetter believes that the EU’s
behavior towards the PA has not been very different than how it has acted towards other
MPCs. However, since the enormous financial and political support from the EU, the PA
could be much more coerced than other Arab partner states. The EU did have
opportunity to make a statement regarding its ideals. However, it did not. 113 The EU had
an opportunity to put the PA under pressure and coerce them to pay more attention to
transparent governing for example, but it failed to do so. It seems as if democratization
appears not important enough to create diplomatic discontent. The EU had the evidence
and the authority to force the PA to its regulations. The EU had the legal opportunity to
remind the PA to the Interim Agreement, which reads:
“relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the
Agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles
and fundamental human rights as set out in the universal declaration
on human rights, which guides their internal and international policy
Elena Lazarou, Maria Gianniou, and Gerasimos Tsourapa, The Limits of Norm
Promotion: The EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No.2, 2013, p.
171-193
113
Stephan Stetter, Democratization without Democracy? The Assistance of the
European Union for Democratization Processes in Palestine, Mediterranean Politics
Special Issue: Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional
and Domestic Dynamics, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, 2003,
112
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and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement”.114
Although the EU has never seemed to take coercive matters, they have referred
to the promotion of human rights and democracy from the Barcelona Process on.
According to Stetter, who wrote his analysis in 2003, (so before the creation of the EMP)
the attempt to save the ideals may have been noble, but it seemed like it never could
have worked. Maybe EU officials were naïve in believing PLO would transit in their
behavior, but Stetter does name the PA officials (not Hamas) as politically unwilling to
cooperate in the pace the EU strove for.115
EU external actions have always been trying to focus on consolidation of its core
values; Respect for human rights, the Western liberal democratic values, political
transparency and the discouragement of corruption, the rule of law, etc. These values
and the development of sustainable peace on the European continent have created a
common European belief in these ideals and principles. Even though many still do not
believe in a common political entity Europe, many Europeans will embrace the notions on
which the EU fundaments rest. Preaching peace and respect for political and social rights
however, is different than acting towards them. EU statements and resolutions
concerning the Middle East conflict have hardly changed since the beginning of the
1990’s. The EU has started encouraging a Palestinian state around twenty-five years ago
already. It has however, not seriously and pro-actively been engaged in the quest for a
Palestinian state since around ten years. The question of course derives, what has the
EU motivated to assertively get engaged in the Palestinian state for Palestine.
Over the last ten years, indeed the EU has improved its structures considering its
CFSP. Its current structures and organization capabilities have allowed the EU to
intervene not only in Palestine in a judicial and monitoring fashion, but it has engaged
severe military actions in close (Macedonia,
Kosovo), as well as faraway destinations
(Somalia, DRC, Mali). But has the EU rhetoric also become much more pro-Palestinian,
or idealistic?
6.2
EU missions in Palestine
The EU has been involved in the Palestine Territories not only through its ENP/ENI
structures, but also by autonomous ‘EU missions’ on Palestinian soil. These two missions,
EUPOL COPPS/Palestine and EU BAM Rafah, both active since 2005, are funded by EUMS
Human Rights Clause in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement Between the
EU and the Arab States, signed between the EU and Palestine Authority on February 24,
1997
115
Stephen Stetter, 2003.
114
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and partner states. They have been mandated by the EU Commission and approved by
the European Parliament. Mandates have been extended several times, making both
missions still active. In this chapter, both missions shall be introduced briefly and some
evaluations of the missions shall be discussed. This paragraph shall end by concluding
the political implications of the existence of these missions and the shortcomings of the
EU in being involved in the Palestine Territories as such shall be summed up.
6.2.1
EUPOL COPPS/Palestine
The first of the two EU missions in the Palestinian Territories was the EU Police Mission in
the Palestine Territories (EUPOL COPPS/Palestine – EU Coordinating Office for Palestine
Police Support) and was established on November 14, 2005. The establishment of the
mission by the EU was not surprising. In fact, the EU COPPS office was established
already in 2004 in order for the EU’s Representative to the Middle East to analyze the
possibility of a civilian police mission in the Palestine Territories. Under the CSDP, the
European Council adopted a joint action, deciding to contribute and support the PA “in
establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.” 116 The mission started on
January 1, 2006, initially led by Jonathan McIvor, who was guided by the EU’s Special
Representative to the Middle East and later the HR for the CFSP.117 During the mission’s
operation, staff numbers normally 71 EU officials, and 41 Palestinians. Total budget for
would amount to € 8.97 million per year. In this mission the EU has been supported by
Canada, Norway and Turkey as non-EU partner states.
The mission commenced in January 2006, and was expanded after the first three
year period for several times, making it still operational at least until June 30, 2016.118
The aim of the mission is mainly focused on assisting, training and monitoring the PA’s
ability in policing capabilities. The mission has been divided into three different strategic
objectives:
“1. Support the Palestinian Civil Police Reform and Development.”
2. Strengthen and Support the Criminal Justice System.
3. Improve Prosecution-Police interaction.”119
EU Council Secretariat, European Union Police Mission fort he Palestinian Territories,
January 2008, 3 p.
117
Council of the European Union, Council establishes EU police Mission in the Palestine
Territories, document 14402/5, 14 November 2005, available at
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/737EFD4E6329CA73852570B900580301
118
Council of the European Union, Press Release 533/15, EU Police Mission for the
Palestine Territories Extended, 2 July 2015, Brussels
119
EUPOL COPPS Mission’s Strategic Objectives, available at
http://eupolcopps.eu/en/content/what-eupol-copps
116
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In its brochure for introducing the EU mission, the EU presents short-term and
long-term obstacles by enumerating the PA’s Police force (PCP}’s lack of equipment (for
example 31 police stations did not possess a police car; their computers had gotten out
of date; they had no equipment for Public Order; No tear gas grenades, no bullet proof
jackets or ballistic helmets, etc.), the enormous cultural gap (for example the difference
in attitude towards gender equality), the difference in human rights (for example in the
behavior of prison staff), and organizational dilemma’s (for example transferring certain
offices from one ministry to the other).120 But the EUPOL COPPS/Palestine mission
features not merely regular police training and assistance. It focuses on much more
facets of policing. The PCP is trained to setup Program Steering Committees, in which
the cooperation with the Ministry of Interior is enabled and project-based execution is
canalized. Also, the cooperation between the police and prosecutor is being improved, in
order to realize efficient prosecution. Besides this, the mission focuses on the
implementation of anti-corruption regulations, increasing the police’s consciousness of
responsibility and accountability, while trying to increase connectivity with civil society
towards the police. Also, the mission focuses especially on domestic violence, and the
implementation of gender equality in both the police force as well as in society.121
Despite the several expansions of the mission the European Council granted, the
mission has had its setbacks. Deployment of the mission on the Gaza Strip for example,
has been made impossible by the political take-over of Hamas in 2007. Since, the
mission thus has been limited to the West-Bank/Eastern Jerusalem, re-creating the
political tightrope for the EU. Another critical note aims at how the mission’s mandate
has extended too far. Initially, the mandate reserved the mission to alter and effectively
apply for police-related aspects on criminal justice. However, in 2008 the mission’s
mandate to get involved in merely police-related Criminal Justice elements was
expanded into the culpability to get involved in the entire Criminal Justice System. It
even allowed for EUPOL COPPS agents to draft a new Code of Conduct for the Use of
Force and Firearms by Member of the Palestinian Security Forces. Also, they have
reviewed the entire Palestinian Penal Code. These are commendable efforts, but should
EUPOL COPPS information leaflet, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUPOL%20COPPS%20booklet.pdf,
20 p.
121
European Union External Action Service, EUPOL COPPS – Police and Rule of Law
Mission for the Palestinian Territories, February 2015, available at
http://eupolcopps.eu/sites/default/files/newsletters/EUPOL%20COPPS%20Factsheet%20
-%20February%202015.pdf
120
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not directly be the responsibility of the EUPOL COPPS mission, according to ISIS
Europe.122
It is difficult how to evaluate and judge the impact of EUPOL COPPS’ efforts.
Firstly, because most results have to be seen as long-term assets in the creation of a
state. This state however, is far from existing yet. Also, most of the assets the EU has
provided are intangible and are resources that need to be used by the trained PCP-, and
PA officials. In order to extract their gained knowledge, they also need to be able to
work in a free environment. Of course the EU tries to make results more appealing by
presenting tangible numbers: The amount of educated officials and trained policemen;
The numbers of police cars provided; The decreasing stats of crime indicators. These
numbers are being used in order to present the mission’s successfulness. Admittedly, the
EU’s police mission is rather successful in Palestine, trying to re-educate the local
policemen and -women. On the tactical level, many observers believe the trainings pay
off, society’s trust in local police forces increases and crime rates do drop.
When analyzing the execution by EU secondees, responsible for the SSR process
in Palestine, Bouris often uses the terms ‘inefficient’, ‘inconsistent’, and ‘pitfalls’. In
general. Doubis describes a SSR process which is intrinsically rather successful.
Technically speaking at least, the SSR has lived up to its expectations since cooperation
goes smoothly and trainings are effective. The result however, is a SSR in which the
political objectives have not been reached. The lower echelons of the PA may have
learned from the modes of work by EU officials, but the political readiness of the PA’s
elite to omit or even reject, violence, has not been achieved. 123 One important reason for
this could be the dominance of the most important external actors. Possibly, the USA
and Israel still undermine the SSR process, and despite the best EU intentions, SSR is
used for their own best interests. The Palestinian threat of armed violence versus the
Israeli state has to be undermined, regardless if this also subverts any possibility of the
sustainable setup of a political entity in Palestine.124
However, the question is if the mission sufficiently considers the local context of a
proto-state in a protracted conflict. The mission for examples trains PCP forces in
reacting to civil unrest and discouraging misbehavior; An ultimate feature of a
functioning state. The use of such a police force in a politically split environment
however, is no longer an asset. If the political situation in Palestine deteriorates, and
different political actors split up the security forces, a trained and even light-armed
professional force might become a threat to social cohesion, instead of a sizing agent. It
Myrto Hartzigeorgopoulos, EUPOL COPPS: What contribution to the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict?, European Security Review, Vol. 69, No. 2013, 10 p.
123
Hartzigeorgopoulos, 2013
124
Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold, And They Came In and Took Possession of
Reforms: Ownership and Palestinian SSR, in: Local Ownership and Security Sector
Reform, ed. By Timothy Donais, DCAF Yearly Books, (Geneva, 2008), p. 191-213
122
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is an example of how Western politics have taken the initiative to ignore the facts that
Palestine is a non-state in conflict and does not benefit from these short-term and
middle-long term results.125
Analysts sketch these worst case scenarios for no reason. It may seem that the
mission is successful, and the tangible results are there. The PCP hopefully will become
able to create a secure and civil environment in the Palestinian Territories. But can a
policeman in war remain a policeman, or will he become a soldier?
6.2.2
EU BAM Rafah
Parallel to the EUPOL COPPS mission, the EU has deployed another civilian mission in the
Palestinian Territories under the aegis of its CSDP. Following a decision taken on
November 1, 2005, the European Council mandated the EU BAM Rafah (European Union
Border Assistance Mission in Rafah) to engage as a third party in the Gaza crossing
point. The Gaza-Egypt crossing point was decided to be under joint control by Israel, the
PA, and a third party. The EU hereby stepped in to be that third party and has since
been concerned at this logistically and politically highly important and sensitive venue.
The EU BAM Rafah’s operations at location began on November 30, 2005; Only a week
after the operation was officially launched and merely two weeks after the signing of the
Agreement of Movement and Access, between the Israeli government and the PA.
The Rafah border crossing is of imminent importance for the Palestinian economy,
since it is the only official crossing with a neighboring country besides Israel. IDF’s
withdrawal from the Gaza strip in 2005 created a security concern for the Israeli
government and wished to prohibit Egypt-Palestinian trade. The PA of course could not
allow for the closure of the crossing. This disagreement ended with solution of a third
party observant in the Agreement, a place the EU applied to fill in. The EU agents
involved in the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) had the objectives to assist and monitor the
PA custom agents on location, execute customs proceedings and increase the PA’s ability
to increase its border management potential. The final task the third party was admitted
to, is the confidence-building between the two conflicting parties.126
Over the 19 months from November 2005, the RCP was used as a conventional
border crossing point. Assisted by the EU officials, the PA customs allowed for the
movement of 443,975 individuals. Due to some political developments, the RCP
Madeline Kristoff, Policing n Palestine: Analyzing the EU police Reform Mission in the
Westbank, SSR Issue Papers, February 2012, , 18 p
126
EU Council, EU BAM Rafah Mandate, available at http://www.eubamrafah.eu/node/2300
125
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remained closed between June 2006 and June 2007, opening only in very special
circumstances. The RCP has been the item of a lot of political debate, as Egypt refused
to keep the border crossing open, due to Hamas’ gain to power in the Gaza Strip. Only in
a few occasions did the Egyptian government allow for the gates to be opened, only for
former Gaza refugees to return back to Palestine. Since 2011, accessibility to the RCP
varies enormously, as Egypt prefers to close the crossing point if it feels its security is
under threat. When opened, heavy quantitative and qualitative restrictions are imposed
on travelers. The EU RCP mission suspended its main operations from June 2007. Only 4
EU officials and 5 local staff are still present, as its mandate was extended until June 30th
2016.127
According to Esra Bulut, the EU BAM Rafah mission has had some serious
impediments, most of which were outside of the EU’s influence. These impediments have
not allowed for the mission to be successful in trust-building and structurally developing
a stable RCP. These politically very sensitive hindrances however, have disabled a
mission that Bulut believes “exemplifies the difficulty of effectively linking the EU’s
political and economic power, interests and objectives and its ESDP missions on the
ground”.128
Council of the European Union, Press Release 553/15, EU Police Mission for the
Palestinian Territories Extended, 2 July, 2015, Brussels; In this press release, the EU
extends both missions in the Palestine Territories.
128
Esra Bulut, The EU Border Assisting Mission at the Rafah Border Crossing Point
(EUBAM Rafah), in: European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 years 19992009, ed. By Giovanni Grevi et al., The European Union Institute For Security Studies,
Paris, 2009, p , 299-309
127
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Chapter 7
The EU and its effects on the IPC
So EU influence in the Middle East has become increasingly more important for the EU as
a political entity, and because of its regional and ideological affiliation with the conflict.
Although it could not match the USA in its dominance, since the 1990s the EU was able
to thwart Washington in its Middle East policy. It is not evident to state that the US lost
some of its influence due to the slowly apparent failure of the US led peace initiatives,
but it could have given the EU some incentive, together with the slowly developing
political unification.129 Despite all its good intentions however, the EU has not yet created
a common strategy concerning the MEPP or the IPC processes. Different interests by the
EUMS, varying norms and values as to what EU CFSP should stand for, and possibly
diversified degrees of sympathy by EUMS to the conflicting parties still disable the EU to
speak with one voice when concerning highly important decision-making.130
Despite the EU’s reproached lack of a long-term vision in its foreign policy, it will
not render and continue its quest for a successful formula in becoming a serious actor on
the world stage. One of its best hopes for this, is to reach results in MEPP. Under
guidance of the Quartet, the Roadmap to Peace was a widely supported notion in order
to establish peace in the Middle East. Starting early in the 1990s, the Roadmap did not
allow for significant EU influence on the peace process, as the EU had not yet developed
its CFSP structures, or its foreign politics experience. It is the hope of EUFP advocates
that the reforms provided by the Lisbon Treaty will create the institutional incentive and
political ability to transform the EU in the leading entity in the MEPP. If the EU should
succeed in creating peace, it would be an enormous diplomatic victory for EUFP. But in
order to do so, some things need to change.
According to Frederiga Bindi, the European inability to make a significant
contribution to the MEPP so far, is due to three factors. Firstly, the Israelis do not trust
the EU as its political advocate and they prefer the political admiration and financial
support of the US. Secondly, although the EU states in general are more sympathetic to
Palestine, and its quest for independence, the Palestinians do not regard the EU as an
entity capable of achieving significant results. Finally, the EU is internally divided in the
degree of Palestine support. Some states are in fact still more pro-Israel than they
support the Palestinians.131
Rosemary Hollis, Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?, International Affairs
(Royal Institution of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No.1 (Jan. 1997), p. 15-29
130
Muriel Asseburg, The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, p. 174-193
131
Federiga Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, P. 206
129
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The IPC has resurrected since the victory of Hamas in Gaza Strip in 2006 and the
repeated attacks of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on Gaza in recent years. With the
stalemate of the peace process and the US affirming the political gridlock, the EU
seemed the ideal party to seize the initiative. Bruno Oliveira Martins states that since
previous autumn, several factors have contributed to the EU finally making diplomatic
statements in the form of recognizing the Palestinian statehood in principal. Several
large EU states have adopted symbolic resolutions in the process towards full Palestinian
recognition, as well as the European Parliament. These events, and Sweden to be the
first large West-European state to recognize the state of Palestine, can be partially
explained by the unrelenting status quo in the MEPP, where there have been no
significant breakthroughs for a long time. Of course, also the persistent continuation of
constructing settlements by the Israelis and the brutal display of violence during some
intense IDF campaigns in Gaza Strip have contributed to the events previous Autumn.
However, the internal boost given to prioritizing the IPC for EUFP by the HR, and the
Special Representative for the Middle East, the EU has prioritized the complex and
politically sensitive conflict in the Middle East as the spearhead of its EUFP. 132 Joining
these illations, change in European attitude towards the Palestinian cause has been
illustrated by EUMS voting behavior in two UN General Assembly meetings. In the voting
for the PA to become a UN observer member, only one state (Czech Republic) rejected,
while 12 abstained. In the plenary conference about Palestinian UNESCO membership
one year earlier, 4 EU states voted no, while 11 abstained. The latter voting being more
politically relevant, the observation that 9 states changed their voting behavior more
pro-Palestinian only one year later may be used as an important indicator for the
future.133
It is worth noticing however, that this trend in pro-Palestinization was not only a
pan-European direction, but one which was also noticeable inside EUMS domestic
politics. When the newly-elected Swedish government decided to declare the recognition
of Palestine in October 2014, it did not merely redeeming an electoral promise.
According to Hugh Lovatt, the Israel-Palestine commissioner of the European Council on
Foreign Relations, the Swedish decision is even more than a result of domestic politics.
Lovatt emphasizes that the possibility of more EUMS recognizing Palestine as a state is
not very realistic in the short term. However, if the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu
continues being a hindrance for the MEPP in the eyes of EU politicians, European
attitudes may change. Especially if the US will keep backing Israel by vetoing UN
Bruno Oliveira Martins, ‘A Sense of Urgency’: The EU, EU Member States and the
Recognition of the Palestinian State, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 20, 2015, 8 p.
133
The Washington post, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/29/map-how-europevoted-on-palestine-at-the-u-n-in-2011-and-now/
132
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
resolutions that have a high possibility of peace and fairness in the EU’s perception.
Next to the political spectrum, Lovatt has noticed that during recent years, societies in
EU member states have become – in effect – more pro-Palestinian, mainly as a result of
the two recent Gaza-wars. Politicians also seem to be bending to the willingness of their
electorates.134
Analyzing the EU and its large financial stake in the PA, it seems that scholars
often emphasize the quantity of donations to the PA, but these miss the political
orientation. Benoit Challand for example, has studied the EU’s contributions to civil
society projects. He believes that the EU has attempted to stabilize civil society by
reconciling both parties in order to suppress the violent characteristic of both the Israeli
and Palestinian civil societies. These projects often lack a bottom-up character however.
And since the input from smaller, but more grassroots organizations is limited, the EU
effectuates a top-down system, which does not only miss the political aspects of conflict
reconciliation, but according to Challand also have been more beneficial to the long-term
Israeli politics.135
As the two police missions in the OPT might be viewed as a success in terms of
the operational effectiveness and that they might have contributed to the trust-building
between both conflicting parties, an important facet to keep in mind is the degree of
admissibility to the Israelis. As these EU mission take place in Palestine Territories, the
de facto authority is still in the hands of the IDF. Of course, the fact that the EU has
been permitted by the Israeli state is an enormous step forwards. And the fact that the
EU does not impose its missions in these areas, but negotiates with Israeli authorities
about the missions’ ‘rules of engagement’ are indulgent. By this however, the EU has set
a precedent in future possible EU missions, in which the IDF knows they will ultimately
be the higher authority to deal with. The EU thus has reiterated and practically
recognized Israel’s occupation over the Palestinian Territories.136
Despite all well-intentioned rhetoric of the EU about the future of Palestine and
the necessity to provide them with a functioning state and security, some things are
paradoxical. The EU has invested enormously in the Palestine SSR and judiciary sectors,
in order to contribute to the creation of a state of Palestine. And technically, this has line
has been followed. Policemen have been trained and security has improved intrinsically,
and despite the fact the EU has tended to focus much more on the SSR than the
Marlene Halser, ‘We will see more European countries recognize Palestine’, Interview
with Hugh Lovatt, Israel-Palestine coordinator at European Council on Foreign Relations,
ynetnews.com, 14-11-2014
135
Benoit Challand, Coming Too Late? The EU’s Mixed Approaches to Transforming the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, MICROCON Policy Working Paper 12, June 2010, 37 p.
136
Dimitris Bouris, EU-Palestinian Cooperation After Oslo: Enforcing Borders,
Interdependence and Existing Power Imbalance, in: Fragmented Borders
Interdependence and External Relations, The Israel-Palestine-European Union Triangle,
ed. By Rafaella A. Del Sarto, Palgrave MacMillan, (London, 2012), p. 27-47
134
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
judiciary sector, they do realize this is an important combination. The political
implications however, have not been overlooked. As the EU has enfolded the
development of SSR in Palestine, the political reparation required in order to utilize
these, have been overlooked. The EU’s missions might be successful, but in the context
of the protracted conflict, are these the necessary foundations to be created? Boutris and
Reigeluth have articulated these most poignant features of EU involvement in the
Palestine Territories most appealingly. According to them, the “SSR troika of police,
judges, borders is ultimately the goal of the European efforts to promote stability and
peace beyond the perimeter. Paradoxically, Brussels is advancing this avant-garde
agenda in a place that has no official borders, no recognized state and unelected
technocrats in power.”137 It’s a “democratic deficit”, which does not represent the moral
and ethical integrity, crashing into the Arab-Muslim world.138 While pretending to
promote democratic reforms and institutional change in both the SSR and Judiciary
sectors, the EU has not created the democratic fundaments necessary.
But not everyone is that negative. Michelle Pace for example has tried to expound
an entirely different form of ‘actorness’, one that focuses less on actual performance, but
on the communicative intentions. Looking from that perspective, she has come to the
conclusion that the EU’s trajectory of action and involvement in the IPC has not been
that negatively as often described. EU’s intrinsic influence and the amount of hardware
provided may be smaller than that of the USA still, but the EU has definitely attempted
to gain ascendency onto the conflicting parties. 139 It is definitely true that the EU has
spent many resources in various forms (But mostly in the form of funding) to the PA and
its assistance in state-building, defending human rights and democracy promotion. And
the EU might deserve some compliments in at least trying. But as Delcourt and Remacle
have argued, by officially stating the ambition to become an influential global power in
the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU may have created a new capability-expectations gap. In
setting new goals in regional and global governance, as well as crisis management and
conflict prevention, the EU needs to realize that simply trying is not good enough. 140
One of the EU’s main sacred cows is the defense of civil rights. The promotion of
democracy and the need to secure human rights have in European rhetoric always been
very important. Just like other actors in IR however, the EU have been criticized for the
Dimitris Bouris and Stuart Reigeluth, Introducing the Rule of Law in Security Sector
Reform: European Union Policies in the Palestinian Territories, Hague Journal on the Rule
of Law, Vol. 4, Special Issue 1, March 2012, p. 176-193
138
Ibid
139
Michelle Pace, The European Union’s governance practices and the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, 2015
140
Barbara Delcourt and Eric Remacle, Global Governance: a challenge for common
foreign and security policy and European security and defense policy, in: The European
Union and Global Governance, ed. By Mario Telò, Routledge, (London, 2009), p. 233-257
137
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
selective accusation of those states the EU accuses. According to Lazarou et al, in the
case of the IPC he EU have been consistently inconsistent. While multi-lateral Europe
struggles to create coherent political direction in its foreign policy, Lazarou recognizes
the EU can be attributed to following a Realist course. Even though it has not acquired
the desired influence in the MEPP because of its concerns for the promotion of
democracy and human rights, the EU is more concerned for its own security. In
defending its values in external conflicts, the border can be seen as another important
aspect of this. The EU would not impose serious sanctions on even those who mess with
these values, if they can impose economic or security threats on the EU. 141
Elena Lazarou, The Limits of Norm Promotion: The EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine,
Inside Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, p. 171-193
141
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Conclusions
“Democracy: Election came out the wrong way; The US instantly decided, along with Israel,
to
punish the Palestinians for the crime of voting the wrong way; A harsh siege was instituted, other
punishments, violence increased; The United States immediately began to organize a military coup to
overthrow the unacceptable [Hamas] government. That’s quite familiar practice – I won’t go
through the record. The European Union, to its shame and discredit, went along with this.”
Over the years, the European Union has aimed to create a common foreign policy
structure in which it can match itself with other global superpowers in the areas of
conflict management, development aid, state-building activities, etc. And all this under
the aegis of the defense of democracy, transparent governing, respect for the rule of law
and human rights. This has been a long process already, and it is very clear that in order
to achieve the same status of the US, the EU still needs to develop a lot of
characteristics of a hard power actor, especially in the sphere of the political willingness.
Still, one should not forget that the EU has yet undergone a long process of learning and
adjusting, in which self-criticism and the prospect of sometimes taking one step back in
order to gain two, has been an indispensible notions. And it almost indisputable that the
current framework of EUFP as has been laid out by the Lisbon Treaty, has much more
potential and high possibility of making a significant contribution to effective foreign
policy acting than the former frameworks.
As I have tried to show, the Lisbon Treaty has made significant changes in the field of
EUFP within the existing Brussels institutions. It seems that some of these changes were
extremely necessary. For example, the relatively large power in the hands of the rotating
EU presidency was a confusing and discouraging element for the EU’s foreign policy. This
being largely eliminated by the join power by the HR and the EU president, a more
continuous policy can be realized. Also, the Lisbon Treaty has showed that EUFP was a
necessity, and would finally be taken seriously by politicians throughout Europe. It thus
created the contours of a European ministry of foreign affairs.
But we cannot say that the Lisbon Treaty has really changed much. As I have
tried to show in the case of the Palestinian Territories, there is a serious EU engagement
in places like these in which it donates enormous amounts of money in state-building
activities, protection of human rights, and promotion of democracy, rule of law, SSR,
etc. The main initiatives I have highlighted, namely the ENP and the monitoring missions
in the Territories, have been pre-Lisbon initiatives. And although through the years the
numbers of assets deployed to these projects have increased, albeit due to the Lisbon
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
Treaty modifications, the Lisbon Treaty has not provided for a new, more dynamic longterm vision on how the EU perceives the conflict in Israel and Palestine and how it will
react to it accordingly. Ironically, framing a strategy in its foreign policy, and composing
a framework in how the EU will achieve its goals of promoting its values in these
conflictual areas has been one of the main incentives of the Lisbon Treaty mutations.
This research has not been done in order to propose the necessity of a EUFP as such. I
have merely attempted to show how it has come about and why – and following – how it
has evolved from a vital side product of economic cooperation into an earnest feature of
European political integration. Of course also this research has had its flaws however,
and as mutations under the Lisbon Treaty have been drastic and evident, it may have
been a little ambiguous to analyze the entire alteration under the Treaty. In order to see
the real change, it might be interesting to focus for example merely on the Foreign
Affairs Council, or the HR, or the EEAS projects. This is also the author’s advise to
possible other researchers who wish to investigate the EUFP, or the Lisbon Treaty
adjustments.
As the understanding of a European common foreign policy came to exist with the
common desire to criticize Israel and reaching out to the Arab states, – combining
economic motivations with preaching common values – during the 1970s, it would be an
enormous achievement if the EU would one day see the Palestinian Territories become
an independent state. It seems that its desires to contribute to this has been sincere.
But both in this quest for Palestinian self-determination as in their process of becoming a
multilateral global power, the EU needs to remain self-critical and constantly re-examine
what it really wants to achieve. It is pitiful that economic and political motivations
sometimes overrule the social and humanitarian ideals, but this flaw is not singly an EU
feature. What truly is deplorably is that the EU hardly evaluates its actions and
motivations, deploying enormous amounts of financial and material resources in a
bottomless pit like the Palestinian Territories. Local projects in Palestine may be partially
effective in creating social order and forming a stable police department. However, if the
EU continues to implement one-size-fits-all project, supported by peace intentions
entirely based on a two-state solution potential, sustainable peace seems quite
impossible, despite any institutional reforms. Because the EU should not only analyze if
projects invested in develop well, but it should also analyze what it wants to become and
achieve. The question the EU needs ask itself is whether it really wants to become a hard
power actor with heavy tools in order to defend and promote its values and principle, or
if it wants to become a civil regional power, exerting influence through economic stimuli.
Robbin Looije
Master Thesis
August 2015
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An inconsequent consciousness:
The EU’s strife for defending its values in foreign policy: the case of Palestine
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Master Thesis
August 2015
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Master Thesis
August 2015
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