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“Is there an Austrian Intelligence Model?”
By Ingo Mayr-Knoch
Written for the course:
“Renseigner les démocraties, renseigner en démocratie”
Taught by Philippe Hayez and Jean-Claude Cousseran
Fall 2014
This paper has received the 2014 IRSEM-PSIA Prize
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published, distributed, copied or stored for public or private use without written permission of the author. All
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Is there an Austrian Intelligence Model?
Recommendations for the Austrian Intelligence Community
Ingo Mayr-Knoch, 17.11.2014
Sciences Po, Paris
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Outline:
1. Research Question
2 Austrian Security Strategy 2013
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2.1 General critique of the Austrian Security Strategy 2013
2.2 Assessment of the Austrian Security Strategy in respect to the intelligence
community
3. Reform proposal for the Austrian intelligence community
3.1 Current organization of the intelligence community
3.2 Problem 1: No overarching tasking and coordination institution
3.3 Problem 2: Military culture in the foreign intelligence service
3.4 Reform after the British model
4. Austria and the common EU intelligence system
4.1 The current EU intelligence system
4.2 An Austrian initiative for an EU federal community model
5. The role of the small states in the EU defense system
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1. Research Question
After the end of the Second World War the presence of many international institutions and
companies and the very lax Austrian antiespionage laws and maybe also the Austrian mentality
has created a real heaven for spies. (Proske 2014)
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The Austrian Intelligence Services in 2014 remain shrouded in mystery. The Austrian foreign
intelligence service the Heeresnachrichtenamt (HNaA) is in 2014 more secretive than the
Israeli Mossad. In contrast to the Mossad the HNaA does not disclose its own logo, does not
have a homepage and does not talk to the press or disclose information about strategy
organization and operations (Mossad 2014). Budget and number of employees are hidden in
the budget of the defense ministry (Wetz 2013).
In the following we will assess the state of the Austrian intelligence community and derive
recommendations for reforms. In order to accomplish this we will:
1. Analyze the Austrian Security Strategy 2013 which was adopted by the Austrian National
Council Resolution of 3 July 2013 in respect to the intelligence system and recommend several
improvements.
2. Analyze if the organization of the Austria intelligence community is able to achieve the goals
of the Security Strategy 2013 and recommend several reforms.
2 Austrian Security Strategy 2013
2.1 General Critique of the Austrian Security Strategy 2013
The Security Strategy 2013 states that Austria today is enclosed by friendly and stable
democracies. Due to the close proximity to the EU periphery in southeast and east Europe
stability of the peripheral states are of special importance for Austrian security interests. A
conventional threat is highly improbable. In today’s security environment threats have become
more complex, interconnected and harder to foresee. In the globalized world regional events
can have a global impact. Possible threats are defined for example as terrorism, cyber-attacks,
proliferations of WMD, organized crime, illegal immigration and failed states. (Federal
Chancellery of the Republic of Austria 2013)
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The Security Strategy 2013 accepts the notion that security has to be provided through an
integrated interdisciplinary approach by stating that civilian and military security aspects are
integrated and contain elements of social, integration, communication, agriculture, finance,
infrastructure, education, information, and health politics. (Federal Chancellery of the Republic
of Austria 2013) But it fails to provide a clear picture of what possible threats will look like
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against which Austria should prepare to defend itself.
The Security Strategy 2013 states that the security interests of Austria are more and more
connected to the European Union. The European Union is also more and more active in foreign
and domestic affairs and security policy fields and almost acting like a state. Austria supports
development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) and the eventual common defense of the EU. Austria wants to actively
help shape the European security landscape and has created the middle European security
partnership which seeks to intensify the police cooperation of the eight member states Bulgaria,
Croatia, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary. (Federal
Chancellery of the Republic of Austria 2013)
Recommendations
The Security Strategy remains too vague in its definition of threats. Every good strategy has to
start with a thorough analysis of the adversary. If the definition of the adversary remains vague
the strategic goals and the strategy will remain vague and it will be almost impossible to derive
clear actions from it. It should be analyzed which states or non state actors are a possible threat
and of what kind this threat is.
Today’s security environment is marked by rapidly appearing threats that are complex and
fundamentally different from each other. See for example the difference in tactics of IS in Iraq
and Syria, Russia in Ukraine and islamists in the Sahel zone. Non state actors are getting more
powerful and the military loses its dominance in warfare. Other pressure instruments of the
grand strategy toolbox to influence the will of the adversary like financial, economic, social,
cultural, propaganda and cyber warfare instruments are being integrated in a common strategic
framework and used in coordination as is demonstrated masterfully by Russia in the conflict in
Eastern Ukraine (Checketts 2009).
Even though threats against Austria are not very concrete today the rapidly changing security
environment makes it necessary to undertake fundamental research to understand new strategy
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and tactics used by actors in conflicts around the world to have a clearer understanding what
strategy and tactics might be used against Austria and the EU in a future conflict. This
fundamental research on threat tactics and strategy can serve the double function of being able
to develop countermeasures even though a threat is not active today and also being able to copy
and use certain tactics for Austria in a future conflict situation.
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The discovery of threats and their analysis is the fundamental job of intelligence services. The
praxis shows that intelligence agencies are often completely occupied by the need to come up
with current intelligence for current policy challenges. There are often simply not sufficient
resources left over for long term strategic threat analysis. (Lowenthal 2012) Therefore it is
advisable to build an independent institution focused on long term strategic intelligence. In
addition to this the field of security studies should be intensified at Austrian universities as an
interdisciplinary field of studies in order to educate the decision makers of tomorrow and foster
a culture to think interdisciplinary about security problems.
The importance of the security of the EU and its member states for the security of Austria is
clearly recognized in the Security Strategy. The EU is more and more appearing as an actor in
foreign and security policy on the international stage. Therefore it will be seen by adversaries
as a target in its own right. The financial sanctions against Russia were implemented by the EU
and the counter economic sanctions by Russia where introduced against all EU states. Because
of the high economic cultural and social interconnectedness of EU member states an attack
against one state will adversely affect the security situation in every other European member
state. Austria, because if its small size, is traditionally even more dependent on economic and
cultural relations with its neighbors.
The Security Strategy 2013 shy’s away from an important conclusion. The EU needs a
collective defense and security system. This should be a primary goal for Austria. The step by
step integration of the defense and security system will also allow for economies of scale and
synergy effects by eliminating duplications.
This second last Austrian Security and Defense Strategy was formulated in 2001. Because of
the rapidly changing security environment it is necessary that Austria adapts its Security
Strategy on a yearly basis. This will help to be more specific on what threats should be focused
on.
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Summary
1. Provide detailed threat analysis using a holistic interdisciplinary security view
2. Introduce an institution to provide fundamental research on strategy and tactics used by
actors around the world, apart from short term oriented intelligence agencies.
3. Establish security studies as subject at universities as an interdisciplinary field of
research.
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4. Primary goal of Austria is the development of a common EU defense and security
system.
5. Revise the Security Strategy on a yearly basis.
2.2 Assessment of the Austrian Security Strategy in respect to the intelligence community
The Security Strategy 2013 is too unspecific in setting goals for the intelligence services. It is
stated that the Austrian Army should reinforce its capabilities of political and military advance
warning. All security related actors should take part in the production of a common situation
picture on threats. The inner European intelligence exchange should be improved. (Federal
Chancellery of the Republic of Austria 2013) This is certainly a step in the right direction. But
because measures and goals are not clearly defined it is not clear what reforms are needed.
Because of the vagueness there will be probably not much concrete action spurred. A detailed
plan for the intelligence community has to be derived from the overall security goals and
concrete measures have to be outlined after a thorough strength and weakness analysis of the
intelligence community. In the following we will give some basic recommendation for reforms
of
the
Austrian
intelligence
community.
3. Reform proposal for the Austrian intelligence community
3.1 Current organization of the intelligence community
The Austrian intelligence community is made up of three services:
The foreign intelligence agency the Heeresnachrichtenamt (HNaA) is subordinated to the
defense minister. Its personnel, except for specialists like translators, are hired exclusively from
the ranks of the officer corps of the Austrian army. It is not allowed to operate on Austrian soil.
It combines Signal (SIGINT) and Human intelligence (HUMINT) activities and operates
several SIGINT surveillance stations throughout Austria. (Bundesministerium Für
Landesverteidigung Und Sport, no date A)
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The counterespionage service of the army the Heeresabwehramt (AbwA) is tasked with
countering espionage activities directed against the army. (Bundesministerium Für
Landesverteidigung Und Sport, no date B)
The domestic intelligence agency the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
und
Terrorismusbekämpfung (BVT) which is controlled by the ministry of interior. It is tasked
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with counterespionage, surveillance of extremists and counterterrorism on Austrian soil. The
police organizations of the federal states have their own Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
(Bundesministerium Für Inneres, no date)
3.2 Problem 1: No overarching tasking and coordination institution
In Austria similar to Great Britain the intelligence services are subordinated to different
ministries. For example foreign intelligence (MI6) in Britain is under control of the foreign
ministry, domestic intelligence (MI5) is under the control of the ministry of interior. The
cooperation of the different intelligence agencies is managed by a common coordination and
tasking institution the Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) at the level of cabinet of the prime
minister. (Lowenthal 2012) In Austria there is no overarching tasking and coordination body
for the different intelligence services.
In addition in Britain a Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) was establish where
representatives of all intelligence services work together on a permanent basis to enable
information sharing on a specific problem. (Lowenthal 2012)
The Austrian intelligence community needs an institution that fulfills a central coordination
and tasking role and construct a common intelligence picture. Also permanent forums should
be created that allow the services to work together permanently to establish a picture on
concrete threats like terrorism for example.
3.3 Problem 2: Military culture in foreign intelligence service
The foreign intelligence service HNaA is subordinated to the ministry of defense and recruits
only members of the army. This alone hints at strong military culture and perspective on
security threats and the existence of severe blind spots. The mission of the HNaA is described
in the § 20. (1) Militaerbefugnisgesetz. The HNnA is tasked with collecting information
concerning the military and any related other facts from states and international organizations.
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This mission statement does not reflect the complexity of todays security environment and the
need for an interdisciplinary security approach. The mission of the HNA has to be restated.
It is highly improbable that an intelligence agency that has always lived in the conventional
military world and only recruited military personnel will have sufficient interdisciplinary
breadth and open-mindedness to understand unconventional adversaries using the whole
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bandwidth of pressure instruments. Furthermore military officers tend to get a very detailed
technical and tactical education in military schools which leads to a technical and tactical
approach to problems. But a strategist in contrast has to neglect the details and get a broad
overview over the situation to combine different tactical instruments of power from different
policy field to find a solution to a problem. It also takes a strategic point of view to see strategic
threats and prevent strategic surprise. Therefore soldiers do not make the best intelligence
officers.
The role of foreign intelligence agencies is to provide intelligence analysis to the political
leadership of a country for informed policy decisions. Therefore it has to be intimated with the
intelligence needs of the political leadership and maintain close working relations with it.
(Lowenthal 2012) In Austria the foreign intelligence service is a subdivision of the defense
ministry and tasked by the defense minister. This is a very long and complicated chain of
reporting and tasking to the chancellor (Bundeskanzler) and his cabinet which should be the
main customers of the intelligence agency.
3.4 Reform after the British model
Because of the existing similarities it would take the least organizational changes to reform the
Austrian intelligence community following the British model. Of high necessity is the
formation of an institution (in the following Intelligence Coordination Center ICC) at the level
of the cabinet of the chancellor in order to coordinate the activities of the three intelligence
services and allow for direct tasking and direct feedback between the intelligence services and
their main customers. This institution should have the capability to aggregate the intelligence
reports of the different intelligence services and also use intelligence reports of other ministries
to create a holistic intelligence picture. Since threats are interdisciplinary a culture has to be
developed that every ministry should act as an intelligence collector and add to the common
situational awareness. Especially important is the foreign ministry which naturally collects a
lot of information during its work. For this culture to develop a formal process has to be
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established that tasks every ministry to internally collect intelligence and send reports to the
Intelligence Coordination Center. Similar to the Spanish model the ministers of all the
ministries should meet once a year and develop the intelligence priorities and task list for
intelligence collection together. This will facilitate the access of all ministries to the
intelligence analysis they need and also raise the awareness of all ministries of the importance
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of a common intelligence picture.
The recruitment process of the foreign intelligence service has to be reformed. In order to
reduce group thinking and cultural blind spots personnel from other disciplines have to be
recruited. The service has to become multidisciplinary. A first easy step would be to attach
personnel from other ministries to the service and use them on the management level and in
the intelligence analysis function in order to broaden the focus of analysis. The intelligence
collection is of secondary importance since it should be driven by the needs of the analysts. In
the long run the recruitment and education process has to be reformed to spark a culture change
in the agency. The first step is to start an open recruiting process at Austrian universities and
allow for active applications. A prerequisite for this would be obviously an own homepage and
a public information policy. The education process of new employees has to be reformed
primarily since it is crucial for establishing interdisciplinary values in the new service. Probably
it would be a better solution to subject the foreign intelligence service to the foreign ministry
(like in the UK) rather than the defense ministry since the ministry of foreign affairs is used to
deal with a variety of instruments of foreign relations (economic, cultural and political) and
therefore has a more interdisciplinary approach than the military. But bureaucratic
organizations tend to have a strong inertia and such drastic reformation will strongly be
opposed by the military community. Furthermore this change of ownership could lead to
resignation of many military officers because of the subsequent culture shock which in turn
would mean a loss of knowledge.
Intelligence services are usually busy with meeting the demands of their clients for current
intelligence and do not have the luxury of providing long term strategic analysis. (Lowenthal
2012) Therefore a center for strategic intelligence should be established under the ICC that
analyses future strategic threats using intelligence collected by the intelligence services and the
different ministries. If a clear threat cannot be identified it should concentrate on analyzing
new strategies and tactics currently in use by actors worldwide like IS and Russia. Because it
is highly probable that these strategies and tactics will be copied by future adversaries of the
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EU and Austria. This strategic intelligence center should have close ties to the universities that
are active in the field of securities to foster a scientific discourse about security.
4. Austria and the common EU intelligence system
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4.1 The current EU intelligence system
We have seen that a common defense and security system is of growing importance for the EU,
since it is seen more and more as an actor on the international level. The establishment of a
common EU intelligence community is even more important than that of a common defense
since the detection of threats precedes every defensive action. A common intelligence system
is necessary for the recognition of threats to prevent strategic surprise. This should allow for a
significant warning time so that a common defense response to it can still be orchestrated in
time even without a fully integrated defense system. An integrated intelligence approach is
therefore more important than a common defense system and could be the first step that leads
to a common EU defense system.
Currently the EU with the Joint Situation Center SITCEN has an intelligence service which has
the goal to support the EU External Action Service which manages foreign relations, security
and defense policy of the EU. SITCEN which draws its staff from the national intelligence
services pools information provided by the national services and provides its own analysis. It
does not collect its own information. (Le Monde 2010)
4.2 An Austrian initiative for an EU federal community model
The SITCEN could become the first seed of an integrated EU intelligence community. A role
model can be the US intelligence community which integrates the work of 17 different
agencies. The US Directorate of National Intelligence DNI serves as a direct link to the
President, integrates the analysis of the agencies, sets intelligence priorities and tasks and
coordinates the intelligence agencies. (Lowenthal 2012) This federal approach can be used for
the stronger integration of the national intelligence agencies in the EU. There is no need to
build a central intelligence agency with its own collection capabilities. The current national
agencies all have their competitive advantages in certain fields and regions. For example the
Spanish CNI is credited with having thorough local knowledge in the Sahel and in South
America. The Austrian service has an excellent overview over the situation in south east
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Europe. The different cultural perspective each national service can bring in will provide for a
stimulating intelligence picture. The national intelligence agencies would therefore further
exist and undertake their own collection and analysis. But like the DNI in the US the SITCEN
should not only aggregate the analysis of the different national services to provide a common
EU intelligence picture but also serve as a place where intelligence requirements for the whole
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EU are formulated by the political leadership of the EU. SITCEN would then task and
coordinate the services of the different nations. The heads of state and government of the EU
should participate in the formulation of EU wide intelligence goals so they can serve as a link
and implement these collection goals to their own service via their national chain of command.
The national intelligence services would serve the double function of informing the political
decision makers at home and providing analysis for a common EU situation picture. The
different agencies should work competitively (see competitive intelligence in the US) in order
to spur the development of different interpretations of analytical problems (Lowenthal 2012).
An excessive centralization of the EU intelligence system would meet too much beaurocratic
resistance. States with strong intelligence agencies like France, Spain and Germany would
probably fear losing their sovereignty. A federal model like in the US is the way to go. In order
to realize economies of scale costly collection methods like satellites and SIGINT can be
centralized in an EU wider service to focus the efforts. This is already done with the European
Union Satellite Center (European Union Satellite Center 2014).
Austria should not wait until this integration of the European intelligence community is decided
on by all member states. Since such an expansion of the duties of the SITCEN would influence
the work of the national intelligence agencies such a process on the EU level will take a long
time and be met with resistance. Furthermore such a close cooperation needs a high trust level
which takes time to build. Austria should seek to build such a federal model of national
intelligence agencies on a regional level. Austria has led a successful cooperation effort of the
national police agencies of Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech
Republic and Hungary. It should seek to build an alliance of smaller EU states with small
intelligence budget to start a federal intelligence community based on the US community model
with a central controlling and tasking institution. This will have the benefit that the member
countries will have a higher combined budget to acquire technology needed for SIGINT and
cyberespionage activities. Trust can be build. The participating nations will acquire a
significant information advantage on how an integration process can be managed and therefore
play a significant role when the integration of all EU national agencies will take place. This
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would allow Austria and the other states participating in the regional model to gain a much
stronger influence on the final EU intelligence system, on the strategic intelligence picture and
therefore also on the security policy of the EU. The Austrian initiative should make clear that
it is happy to welcome new member states. This will create a direct friendly competition to the
EU SITCEN and speed up plans of the EU to integrate the national intelligence services.
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5. The role of the small states in the EU defense system
The new generation of warfare looming on the horizon gives great opportunities for small and
middle powers to offset the dominance of bigger powers. Small powers with severe budget
constraints have traditionally been able to find more creative solutions to new problems as was
demonstrate for example by the North Vietnamese Army and its fight against the US in South
Vietnam. Therefore Austria should see its small size not as a limitation when it comes to
building up a common security and intelligence approach for the EU but as a chance to find
creative solutions and use these to actively pursue a common EU defense and security
approach.
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