Seminar in Corporate Finance
Fall 2006
Instructor: Prof. Jie-Haun Lee
Class hours: 2:00-5:00 P.M. TH.
Office hours: 9:00-12:00 A.M. TH. or by appointment
I.
Course Objectives
This course is to prepare students for familiarity with the subjects of
corporate finance and for the ability to conduct quality research in the
corporate finance area.
II.
Grading Policy
There are four main components to the grade in this class: a final
examination, literature review reports, a research project, and class participation.
A final examination will be given at the scheduled time during the exam week at
the end of the semester.
The weighting of this exam for the final grade will be 30%.
Two papers will be assigned every week. Students have to well review the
papers and turn in a written report for each paper on the preceding day of the class.
Each report should not be written in more than two pages. The weighting of the
review reports will count for 35%.
Students are also required to discuss (or sometimes present) the papers during the
class. The weighting of class participation will be 15%.
The remaining 20% of the course grade involves a complete research project.
The project should be an academic research related to the topics in this class.
Students have to present their research proposals and complete papers within and at
the end of this semester. The complete paper should be turned in at the last class.
1
III.
Reference Texts:
1. Chew, D.H., The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, 2nd
ed., McGraw-Hill, 1999.
2. Copeland T.E., and J.F. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 3rd
ed., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1988.
3. Smith, C. W., The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance, 2nd ed., McGraw
Hill, 1990.
4. 沈中華, 李建然, 事件研究法: Application in Empirical Research of
Accounting and Finance, 華泰文化事業公司
IV. Reading List:
1. Capital Structure
Required:
1. Campello, Murillo, “Capital structure and product markets interactions: evidence
from business cycles”, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 2003, pp.353-378.
2.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French, “Financial Decisions: Who Issues Stock?” ,
Journal of Financial Economics 76, 2005, pp. 549-582.
3.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, "Theory of Capital Structure", Journal of Finance
46, March 1991 pp.297-355
4.
Haugen, R.A. and L.W. Senbet, "Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their
Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure", Jounral of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 23, 1, March 1988
5.
Korajczyk, Robert A.; Levy, Amnon, “Capital structure choice: macroeconomic
conditions and financial constraints”, Journal of Financial Economics 68,
2003,pp.75-109.
6.
Myers, S.C., "Still Searching for Optimal Capital Structure", Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 1993, P.4-14
7.
Pinegar, J.M. and L. Wilbricht, "What managers Think of Capital Structure
Theory: A Survey", Financial Management 18, 4, Winter 1989, P.82-91
8.
Stewart C. Myers, "The Search For Optimal Capital Structure", The New
Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.205-213
9.
Titman, S. and R. Wessels, "The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice",
Journal of Finance, March 1988, P.1-19
2
Reference:
1. Akerlof, G.A., "The Market for Lemons: Quality and the Market Mechanism",
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 1970, P.488-500
2.
Barnea, A., R.A. Haugen and L.W. Senbet, "Market Imperfections, Agency
Problems, and Capital Structure, A Review", Financial management, Summer
1981, P.7-22
3.
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3, 4, 1976,
P.305-360
4.
Leland H.E. and D.H. Plye, "Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and
Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance 32, 1977, P.371-387
5.
Lewis, T. and D. Sappinton, "Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships",
Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1995, P. 343-361
6.
Merton H. Miller, "The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years", The
New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.192-204
7.
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith, and Ross L. Watts, "The Determinants of
Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policies", The New Corporate Finance: Where
Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.214-229
8.
Miller M.H., "Debt and Taxes", Journal of Finance 32, 2, May 1977, P.261-275
9.
Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller, "Corporate Income tax as the Cost of Capital: A
Correction", American Economic Review, June 1963, P.433-443
10. Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller, "The Cost of capital, Corporation Finance, and
the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review, June 1958, P.261-297
11. Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors do Not Have", Journal of Financial
Economics 13, 2
12. Myers, Stewart C., "The Capital Structure Puzzle", Journal of Finance 39, July
1984, P. 575-592
13. Ross, S.A., "The Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive-signaling
Approach", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, 1977, P.23-40
14. Frank, Murray Z.; Goyal, Vidhan K., “Testing the pecking order theory of capital
structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 67, 2003, pp.217-248.
3
2. Dividend Policy
Required:
1. Ang James, "Do Dividend matter? A Review of Corporate Dividend Theories
and Evidence", 1987, Monograph Series in Financ and Economics, Salomon
Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York University
2.
Black F., "The Dividend Puzzle", Journal of Portfolio management 2, Winter
1976, P.72-77
3.
Born, J. and J. Rimbey, "A Test of Easterbrook Hypothesis Regarding Dividend
payments and Agency Costs", Journal of Financial Research, 1993, P.251-260
4.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, "Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Signaling
and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth", Journal of Financial
Economics 40, 1996, P.341-371
5.
Dennis, D.J., D.K. Dennis, and A. Sarin, "The Information Content of Dividend
Changes: Cash Flow Signaling, overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles",
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 1994, P.567-588
6.
Fama, Eugene F.; French, Kenneth R., “Disappearing dividends: changing
firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?”, Journal of Financial
Economics 60,2001, pp.3-43.
7.
Lee, B., "The Response of Stock prices to Permanent and Temporary Shock to
Dividends", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, march 1995, P.1-22
8.
Jinho Byun, Michael S. Rozeff, “Long-run performance after Stock Splits:1927 to
1996”, Journal of Finance 58, NO.3,2003, pp.1063-1086.
Reference:
1. Bhattacharya, S., "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "the
Bird-in-the-Hand" Fallacy", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, P.259-270
2.
Dennis Soter, Eugene Brigham, and Paul Evanson, "The Dividend Cut "Heard
'round the world": The Case of FPL", The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory
Meets Practice, 1999, P.250-261
3.
Easterbrook, Frank H., "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends", American
Economic Review, Vol. 74(4), 1984, P.650-659
4.
Michaely, R., R. Thaler, and K. Womack, "Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations
and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?", Journal of Finance, June 1995, P.573-608
5.
Miller, M. and F. Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares", Journal of Business 34, 1961, P.411-433
4
6.
Miller, M.H. and K. Rock, "Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information",
Journal of Finance, September 1985, P.1031-1038
7.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens, "Stock Splits: Signaling or Liquidity? The Case of
ADR 'solo-split'", Journal of Financial Economics 42, 1996, P.3-26
8.
Rozeff, M.S., "Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend
Payout Ratios", Journal of Financial Research 5, 3, Fall 1982, P.249-259
5
3.
IPOs
Required:
1.
Aggarwal, Reena, “Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity”, Journal of
Financial Economics 68, 2003, pp.111-135.
2.
Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Krigman, Laurie; Womack, Kent L., “Strategic IPO underpricing,
information momentum, and lockup expiration selling”, Journal of Financial Economics
66,2002, pp.105-137.
3.
Alexander Ljungqvist, William J. Wilhelm “IPO pricing in the Dot-com Bubble”, Journal of
Finance 58, NO.2, 2003, pp.723-752.
4.
Amihud, Yakov; Hauser, Shmuel; Kirsh, Amir, “Allocations, adverse selection, and cascades
in IPOs: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange”, Journal of Financial Economics
68,2003,pp.137-158.
5.
Ang, James S.;Brau, James C. “Concealing and confounding adverse signals: insider
wealth-maximizing behavior in the IPO process”, Journal of Financial Economics
67,2003,pp.149-172.
6.
Beatty, R. and E. Zajac, "Managerial Incentives, Monitoring and Risk Bearing in IPOs", Journal of
Corporate Finance, Summer 1995, P.87-96
7.
Carter, R. and S. Manster, "Initial Public Offering and Underwriter Reputation", Journal of
Finance 45, 1990, P. 1045-1068
8.
Demers, Elizabeth; Lewellen, Katharina, “The marketing role of IPOs: evidence from internet
stocks”, Journal of financial economics 68,2003, pp.413-437.
9.
Hansen, Robert S., “Do investment banks compete in IPOs?: the advent of the “7%plus contract”,
Journal of Financial Economics 59,2001, pp.313-346.
10.
Loughran, T. and J. Ritter, "The New issue Puzzle", Journal of Finance, March 1995, P.23-52
11.
Lowry, Michelle; Shu, Susan, “Litigation risk and IPO underpricing”, Journal of Financial
Economics 65, 2002, pp.309-335.
12.
Lowry, Michelle, “Why does IPO volume fluctuate so much?”, Journal of Financial Economics
67,2003,pp.3-40.
Michaley, R. and W.H. Shaw, "The Pricing of IPOs: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling
Theory", Review of Financial Studies, Summer 1994, P.279-320
13.
14.
Paul A. Gompers, Josh Lerner, “The really long-run performance of initial public offerings: The
pre-Nasdaq evidence”, Journal of Finance 58, NO.4, 2003, pp.1355-1392.
15.
Ritter, Jay R., "The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of Finance
46, 1991, P.3-27
16.
Rock, K., "Why New Issues are Underpriced", Journal of Financial Economics 15, 1986,
P.187-212
17.
Smart, Scott B.; Zutter, Chad J., “Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of
dual and single-class IPOs”, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 2003, pp.85-110.
18.
Zingales, L., "Insider Ownership and the Decision to go Public", Review of Economic Studies, July
1995, P.425-448
19.
Jay R. Ritter and IVO Welch “A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations”, The
6
Journal of Finance, Vol LvII, NO.4, 2002, p.1795-1828
Reference:
1. Aggarwal, R. and P. Rivoli, "Fads in the Initial Public Offering Market?",
Financial Management 19, 4, 1990, P.45-57
2.
Allen, F. and G.R. Faulhaber, "Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market",
Journal of Financial Economics 23, 1989, P.303-323
3.
Beatty, R.P. and J.R. Ritter, "Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of Financial Economics 15,
1986, P.213-232
4.
Booth J.R., and L. Chua, "Ownership Dispersion, Costly Information, and IPO
Underpricing", Journal of Financial Economics 41, 1996, P.291-310
5.
Hanley, K.W., "The Underpricing of IPOs and the Partial Adjustment
Phenomenon", Journal of Financial Economics 34, 2, 1993, P.231-250
6.
Ibboston, R.G., J.L.Sindelar, and J.R. Ritter, "The Market’s Problems with the
pricing of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 7,
Spring 1994, P.66-74
7.
Koh, F. and T. Walter, "A Direct Test of Rock's Model of the Pricing of
Unseasoned Issues", Journal of Financial Economics 23, 1989, P.251-272
8.
Loughran, T., J.R. Ritter and Rydqvist, "Initial Public Offerings: International
Insights", Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2, 1994, P.165-199
7
4. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructuring
Required:
1. Agrawal and Walking, "Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding
Takeover Bids", Journal of Finance 49, 1994, P.985-1014
2.
Brous and Kini, "A Reexamination of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Takeover
Targets", Journal of Financial Economics 33, P.201-225
3.
Dahiya, Sandeep; John, Kose; Puri, Manju; Ramirez, Gabriel,
“Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence”,
Journal of Financial Economics 69,2003, pp.259-280.
4.
Dewenter, "Does the market React Differently to Domestic and Foreign Takeover
Announcements? Evidence From the U.S. Chemical and Retail Industries",
Journal of Financial Economics 37, 1995, P.421-441
5.
Harford, Jarrad, “Takeover bids and target directors’ incentives: the impact
of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats”, Journal of Financial
Economics 69, 2003, pp.51-83.
6.
Harris and Ravenscraft, "The Role of Acquisition in Foreign Direct Investment:
Evidence From the U.S. Stock market", Journal of Finance 46, 1991, P.825-844
7.
Houston, J.S., C.M. James, and N.D. Ryngaert, "Where do Merger Gains
Come From? Bank mergers From the Perspective of Insiders and Outsiders",
Journal of Financial Economics 60, 2001, P.285-331
8.
Jensen, M.C. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 76, 1986,
P.323-329
9.
Kaplan, "The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and
Value", Journal of Financial Economics 24, 1989, P.217-254
10. Loughran, T., and A.M. Vijh, "Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from
Corporate Acquisitions?", Journal of Finance 52, 1997, P.1765-1790
11. Opler and Titman, "The Determinants of leveraged Buyout Activity: Free
Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs", Journal of Finance 48, 1993,
P.1985-1999
12. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro, "A comparison of the Information Conveyed by
Equity Carve-outs, Spin-offs, and Asset Sell-offs", Journal of Financial
Economics 37, 1995, P.89-104
8
Reference:
1. Denis, "Organizational Form and the Consequences of Highly Leveraged
Transactions: Kroger's Recapitalization and Safeway's LBO", Journal of
Financial Economics 36, 1994, P.193-224
2.
Kang, "The International Market for Corporate Control: Mergers and Acquisitions
of U.S. Firms by Japanese Firms", Journal of Financial Economics 34, 1993,
P.345-371
3.
Kaplan and Weisbach, "The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures",
Journal of Finance 47, 1992, P.107-138
4.
Kaplan, "Campeau's Acquisition of Federated: Post-Bankruptcy Results", Journal
of Financial Economics 35, 1994, P.123-136
5.
Kaplan, "Campeau's Acquisition of Federated: Value Destroyed or Value Added",
Journal of Financial Economics 25, 1989, P.191-212
6.
Ofek, "Efficiency Gains in Unsuccessful management Buyouts", Journal of
Finance 49, 1994, P.637-654
7.
Palepu, K., "Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical
Analysis", Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 1985, P.3-35
8.
Roll, R., "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers", Journal of Business
59, 1986, P.197-216
9.
Schwer, G.W., "Make-up Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions", Journal of
Financial Economics 41, 1996, P.153-192
10. Walking, R. and Edmister, R., "Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums",
Financial Analysts Journal 41, 1985, P.30-37
11. Walking, R., "Predicting Tendor Offer Success: A Logistic Analysis", Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 1985, P.461-478
9
5. Corporate Governance
Required:
1. Chidambaran, N.K.; Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., “Executive stock option
repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover”, Journal
of Financial Economics 69,2003, pp.153-189.
2.
Del Guercio, Diane; Dann, Larry Y.;Partch, M. Megan, “Governance and boards
of directors in closed-end investment companies”, Journal of Financial
Economics 69,2003, pp.111-152.
3.
Garvey, C.T. and P.T. Swan, "The Economics of Corporate Governance", Journal
of Corporate Finance, August 1994, P.139-174
4.
Ikehberry and Lakonishok, "Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contests:
Evidence and Implications", Journal of Business 66, 1993, P.405-435
5.
Joh, Sung wook, “Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from
Korea before the economic crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 2003,
pp.287-322.
6.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, "Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial Economics 58,
1999
7.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of
Finance 52, 1997, P.737-783
8.
Volpin, Paolo F., “Erratum to “Governance with poor investor protection:
evidence from top executive turnover in Italy:[ Journal of Financial Economics
64 (2002) 61-90]”, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 2002,pp.159-160.
9.
Williamson, O.E., "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance", Journal of
Finance 43(3) July 1998
10. Boubakri, N., J. C. Cosset and O. Guedhami, “Postprivatization Corporate
Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection”,
Journal of Financial Economics 76, 2005, pp. 368-339.
11. Heron, R. A., E. Lie,”Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern
around Executive Stock Option Grants?”, Journal of Financial Economics,
Forthcoming, 2006.
Reference:
1. Holmes, T.J. and J.A. Schmitz, Jr., "On the Turnover of Business Firms and
Business Managers", Journal of Political Economy, October 1995, P.1005-1038
2.
Jensen, M.C., "The Modern Industrial revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 6, 4, 1993, P.4-24
3.
Karen Van Nuys, "Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Process: Evidence
from the 1989 Honeywell Proxy Solicitation", Journal of Financial Economics
10
4.
33, 1993, P.57-71
Volpin, Paolo F., “Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top
executive turnover in Italy”, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 2002, pp.61-90.
6. Ownership and Corporate Control
Required:
1. Classens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L., "The Separation of Ownership and
Control in East Asian Corporations", Journal of Financial Economics 58, 1999
2.
Espen Eckbo, B.; Thorburn, Karin S., “Control benefits and CEO discipline in
automatic bankruptcy auctions”, Journal of Financial Economics 69,2003,
pp.227-258.
3.
Jensen, M.C. and R.S. Ruback, "The market for Corporate Control", Journal of
Financial Economics 11, 1, 1983, P.5-50
4.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., "Corporate Ownership
around the World", Journal of Finance 54, 1999, P.471-517
5.
McConnell J.J. and Servaes H., "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and
Corporate Value", Journal of Financial Economics 27, 1990, P.595-612
6.
Michael L. Lemmon, Karl V. Lins, “Ownership structure, corporate
governance, and firm value: evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis”,
Journal of Finance 58, NO.4, 2003, pp.1445-1468.
7.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, "Management Ownership and market
valuation: An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Financial Economics 20, 1988,
P.267-292
8.
Nenova, Tatiana, “The value of corporate voting rights and control: A
cross-country analysis” Journal of Financial Economics 68, 2003, pp.325-351.
9.
Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb, “Founding-Family ownership and firm
performance: evidence from the S&P 500”, Journal of Finance 58, NO.3,
2003,pp.1301-1327.
10. Slovin and Sushka, "Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and
Firm Value: Evidence From the Death of Inside Blockholders", Journal of
Finance 48, 1993, P.1293-1321
11. Gaspar, J. M., M. Massa and P. Matos, “Shareholder Investment Horizon and
the Market for Corporate Control”, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 2005,
pp. 135-165.
Reference:
1. Zhou, Xianming, “Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and
the link between ownership and performance: comment”, Journal of Financial
11
Economics 62, 2001, pp.559-571.
7. Corporate Risk Management
Required:
1. Dolde, W., "Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk", The Journal of Financial
Engineering 4(2), 1995, P.187-216
2.
Henk Berkman and Michael E. Bradbury, "Empirical Evidence on the Corporate
Use of Derivatives", Financial Management, Summer 1996, P.5-13
3.
Mian, S.L., "Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy", Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 1996, P.419-439
4.
Nance, D.R., Smith, C.W., and Smithson, C.W., "On the Determinants of
Corporate Hedging", Journal of Finance 48(1), 1993, P.267-284
5.
Smith C.W. and Stulz, R.M., "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies",
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20(4), 1985, P.391-405
6.
Smith C.W. Jr., "Corporate Risk management: Theory and Practice", The Journal
of Derivatives, Summer 1995, P.21-30
Reference:
1. Charles Smithson, Chase Manhattan Bank, and Clifford W.Smith Jr., "Strategic
Risk management", The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice,
1999, P.460-477
2.
Donald J. Smith, "The Arithmetic of Financial Engineering", The New Corporate
Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.534-543
3.
Neil A. Doherty and Clifford W. Smith Jr., "Corporate Insurance Strategy: The
Case of British Petroleum", The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets
Practice, 1999, P.522-533
4.
Rene M. Stulz, "Rethinking Risk Management", The New Corporate Finance:
Where Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.488-504
5.
Samant, Ajay, "Empirical Study of Interest Rate Swap Usage by Nonfinancial
Corporate Business", Journal of Financial Services Research, 1996, P.43-57
6.
Thomas Jones, Lynn Lane, Jonelle St. John, and John van Roden, "Bank of
America Roundtable on Derivatives and Corporate Risk Management", The New
12
Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, 1999, P.551-567
8. Compensation
Required:
1. Antle, R. and Smith, A., "Measuring Executive Compensation: Methods and
Application", Journal of Accounting Research 23, Spring 1985, P.296-325
2.
Bliss, Richard T.;Rosen, Richard J., “CEO compensation and bank mergers”,
Journal of Financial Economics 61, 2001, pp.107-138.
3.
Bosehem, J. and K.J. Smith, "You Can Pay Me now and You Can Pay Me
Later: Dynamic Response of Executive Compensation to Firm Performance",
Journal of Business, October 1995, P.577-608
4.
Goldberg, L. and T. Idson, "Executive Compensation and Agency Effects",
Financial Review, May 1995, P.313-335
5.
Jensen, M.C., and Murphy, K.J., "Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives", Journal of Political Economy, April 1990, P.225-264
6.
Jin, Li, “CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives”, Journal of
Financial Economics 66, 2002, pp.29-63.
7.
Mehran, H., "Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm
Performance", Journal of Financial Economics 38, 2, 1995, P.163-184
8.
Milbourn, Todd T., “CEO reputation and stock-based compensation”, Journal of
Financial Economics 68,2003,pp.233-262.
Bettis, J. C., J. M. Bizjak, and M. L. Lemmon, “Exercise Behavior, Valuation,
and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock Options”, Journal of Financial
Economics 76, 2005, pp. 445-470.
9.
Reference:
1. Murphy, Kevin J., "Corporate Performance and managerial Remuneration: An
Empirical Analysis", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, P.11-42
2.
Yermack, D., "Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?",
Journal of Financial Economics 39, 1995, P.237-270
3.
Young, L. and S.M. Quintero, "The Design of Executive Stock Options",
Managerial and Decision Economics 3-4, 1995, P.129-135
13
9. New Business Finance
Required:
1. Berger, A.N. and G.F. Udell, "The Economics of Small Business Finance: The
Roles of Private Equity and Edbt markets in the Financial Growth Cycle", Journal
of banking and Finance 22, 1998
2.
Gompers, Paul, "Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry", Journal of
Financial Economics 42, 1996, P. 133-156
3.
Gompers, Paul, "Venture Capital Growing Pains: Should the Market Diet?", Journal of
Banking and Finance, 1997
4.
Grenadier, S.R. and A.M.Weiss, "Investment in Technological Innovations: An
Option Pricing Approach", Journal of Financial Economics 44, 1997, P.397-416
5.
Klaus M. Schmidt, “Convertible securities and venture capital finance”, Journal
of Finance 58 NO.3, pp.1139-1166.
6.
Peterson, Mitchell, and Raghu Rajan, "The Benefits of Lending Relationship:
Evidence From Small Business Data", Journal of Finance 99, 1994, P.3-37
14